EUROPEAn

OFFSHORE
PETROLEum
conFEREnCE
I EXHIBITion

EUR 230

THE BUCHAN FIELD DEVELOPMENT

by E. Darnborough, BP Petroleum Development Ltd.

Copyright 1980, European Offshore Petroleum Conference and Exhibition

This paper was presented at the European Offshore Petroleum Conference and Exhibition held in London, England, October 21-24, 1980. The material is subject to correction by the author.
Permission to copy is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words.

ABSTRACT
This paper describes the Buchan development
scheme which is based on subsea completions
tied into a subsea manifold, connected in turn
by a flexible riser to a floating production
platform. Oil export is by tanker from a
single point mooring buoy. The system is
similar to, but more complex than that used
in the Argyll field.

development were apart from BP, St. Joe Petroleum, CanDel Petroleum, Natomas International,
Gas & Oil Acreage Limited, Charterhall Oil
Limited, CCP North Sea Associates, Lochiel
Exploration (UK) Limited, City Petroleum Corporation. The consortium has since been joined
by Texaco, licencees for block 20/5, ~der a
Unitization Agreement.

Overall the project has exceeded budget and

programme largely due to delay in completing
the conversion of a semi-submersible drilling
rig to a production platform. Subsea work has
gone remarkably well. The paper comments on
these facts and suggests that improved frontend engineering and greater control of contractors would have improved performance. It
suggests that a purpose-built platform is a
better proposition than a conversion. It
concludes that despite the problems encountered
this type of development is viable.

RESERVOIR CHARACTERISTICS
The majority of the oil in place estimated to
be 390 million barrels lies within a horst
block with small amounts lying in flank areas.
The most probable figure for recoverable reserves
is 50 million barrels equivalent to approximately
1,;6 recovery.
The horst block of Devonian sandstone is overpressured and highly fractured. The top of the
reservoir lies some 2,600 m. below sea bed and
the oil water contact some 3,200 m. below sea
bed.

INTRODUCTION
The Buchan field is located approximately 160. kID
E.N.E. of Aberdeen and approximately 55 km W.N.W.
of the Forties field. The water depth over the
field varies between 112 m. to 118 m.

The pay zone is up to 500 m. thick. Pressure

at the bottom of the reservoir is 7,500 psi and
the maximum well head closed in pressure 4,900
psi. Drilling in this reservoir presented considerable technical problems which have been
discussed in other SPE papers.

The field was discovered in 1974 by the Transworld Group and appraisal wells were drilled
between then and 1976 to delineate the field.
In early 1977 the author's Company, BP Petroleum
Development Limited farmed in to the licence
and took over operatorship of the development.

It is not yet clear what the extent of the recovery will in fact be. It is known that oil
flows freely from the fractures but what has yet
to be established is that oil in the matrix of
the rock will make up the losses from the
fractures. If this does not happen the amount
of oil recovered will be very small and the project will be totally uneconomic.

The majority of the field lies th block 21/1

with a small proportion in block 20/5.
The partners in the consortium involved in the

177

To recapitulate therefore the prime aims were low

cost and swift development to give the
earliest production.

Assumihg that there is makeup from the matrix

the field can be produced at a peak rate of
72,000 barrels a day with an average maximum
daily rate of 48,000 barrels. This rate can
be maintained for approximately I! years after
which production declines with the anticipated
field life being not more than five years.

How well we have met these aims will be described.

In reality there were two basic development
options to be considered -

In order to achieve a reasonable rate of production during the latter half of the life of
the field gas lift is to be introduced. It is
not feasible to introduce pressure maintenance
by either water injection or gas injection.
The fractured nature of the reservoir leads to
water or gas being dissipated through the
fractures without effectively displacing oil.

1)

a fixed platform with the drilling of the

development wells subsequent to installation

2)

a floating production platform with subsea wells, the drilling of which could
be started long before the installation
of the platform.

The crude has a low sulphur content and has the

following average characteristics API gravity
Gas/Oil ratio
WaiX content

Within these options ~ number of other choices

had to be made, in particular that of the
means of exporting the oil from the field.

33.0
310 scf per barrel

5%

Reviewing the two options there was little

difficulty, bearing in mind the objectives,
in selecting option(2). In the location under
consideration the installed cost of a fixed
platform which would need drilling and production facilities was substantially greater
than that of a floating production platform.

It will be seen that this reservoir combining

difficult drilling conditions with an uncertain
recovery needing the complication of gas lift
to produce only 50 million barrels and all in
relatively deep water is a truly marginal field.
The commercial risks associated with its
development are considerable.
DEVELOPMENT

Unusually significant in the considerations

was the question of abandonment costs. Again
due to the short life of the field these costs
have a greater impact than normal. The use of
a floating platform simplifies the abandonment
considerably.

SC~

The development scheme adopted is in principle

the one selected by the original operator.
Eefore accepting it however alternatives ~ere
considered. Keeping in mind the high commercial
risk presented by the development of the Buchan
reservoir the major objectives were very clear.

Of perhaps greater significance was the question

of timing. By following the option (2) route
drilling and completion of the developme~wells
proceed in parallel with the construction of
the production platform and, if one's planning
is right, as the drilling rig leaves the field
the production platform comes over the horizon.
All that is then necessary is to anchor the
rig, connect up the riser and start the oil
flowing.

They 'were 1)

Capital investment had to be kept to a

minimum

2)

The time for the development had to be

as short as feasible.

The other major choice which had to be made was

the methoa of export. In the case of Buchan
there were two realistic options -

The first point. is something of a truism and

clearly is an objective with any project; in
the case of a field as marginal as Buchan with
a real risk of commercial failure it is particularly important.
The second point is perhaps not quite so obvious.
Those familiar with DCF (discounted cash flow)
methods of economic evaluation will be aware
that the sooner positive cash flow is achieved
the better the rate of return on the investment.
There is to say the sooner oil flows after commitment is first made the better the economic
return. In a field such as Buchan, with a very
short life and consequently a short period of
positive cash flow, delays in start-up could
in the extreme lead to a position where financing
costs swamp income.

I)

Pipeline to Forties and thence to shore

2)

By tank.ers

In this case cost was the dominating factor,

the overall cost of installing, connecting,
operating ~nd eventual abandonment of the pipeline to Forties was far in excess of the comparable costs of installing a single point
mooring system and using tankers.

178

PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT

Sea trials have demonstrated the satisfactory

performance of both tanker and loading buoy.

The development scheme called for the draining

of the reservoir by 8 wells. Six of these were
to be in the horst and the other 1wo to be
drilled in the flanks as semi appraisal wells
which hopefully would provide'additional production. The intention was to have the six
horst wells i.e. the main producers, drilled
through a template immediately over which would
be installed the production platform. This
would ensure that these wells were accessible
by divers from the platform and also that wire
line interventions could be made from the platform.

In the case of the subsea equipment the major

philosophical design point was simplicity.
The Xmas trees are very straight-forward,
the only sophistication being that of split
construction. The lower portion includes a
manually operated master valve in the flowport and in the annulus access port. By
closing these valves together with the down
hole safety valvesit would be possible to retrieve the upper part of the tree for replacement or maintenance without the need to kill
the well.

In practice we chose to convert one of the

existing exploration wells to production and
installed the template alongside it. Only
four wells instead of five were eventually
drilled through the template for programming
reasons which are described in more detail
later.

The upper part of the tree has hydraulically

operated master wing and swab valves,the
hydraulics being simple, direct actuation.
There are no electrics, no 'pilot valves, simply
a line from the surface to an operating cylinder.
Flows from all trees are brought to a gathering
point described, (a little. inaccurately) , as
the subsea manifold. The manifold forms the
interface between the trees and the production
riser. Each tree is associated with a single
production riser and a single gas lift line.
These lines are disposed around a 12" central
riser which provides the export line for discharging dead crude to the tankers. The manifold and riser are described in detail by a
paper being presented at this conference by a
colleague.

For a number of reasons the drilling of the

eighth well was delayed and is scheduled to
be spudded in October 1980.
The production platform was to be a conversion
of a semi-submersible drilling rig and of those
available at the time the Pentagone rig Drill
Master was :::;elected. Its basic advantages
were
Great stability
Good load'carrying capacity
Spaciousness
Experience has borne out our thinking on the
first two items but the apparent spaciousness
was deceptive.

WELL COMPLErIONS
Again the objective within the constraints applicable was to keep the well completions as
simple as possible. The elements of the completion,with one exception, are standardised
throughout the field and comprise 5!" tubing,
hydraulically set packer, sliding sleeve, side
pocket mandrels for gas injection valves, tubing
retrieval downhole safety valve, mechanically
run and set tubing hanger, single joint 2i" OD
for annulus access, facilities for wire line
retrievable downhole safety valve in the annulus
access. The tubing retrievable valve design
incorporated facilities enabling a wire line
retrievable valve to be installed inside the
tubing retrievable valve in the event that the
latter malfunctioned. Additional facilities
are provided for plugs in the upper joint of
the tubing and in the annulus access joint also
in the tubing hanger supports themselves.

For the single point mooring system a Catenary

Anchor Leg Mooring (CALM) buoy was ultimately
chosen on the basis of lowest installed cost.
Engineering studies indicated that an articulated tower despite its greater cost might
have better operating characteristics allowing
loading to continue to more severe weather
than the CALM buoy. These benefits were marginal and at the time existin,articulated
towers were experiencing problems. The buoy,
of Imodco design, is the largest of' its type
in the world and is to operate in deeper water
than ever before.
Two tankers have been chartered and modified
for dedicated use on the field. The tankers
of 100,000 DWT have been modified to have
bow mooring and loading, segregated ballast,
inert gas, crude oil washing and to have provision for slow astern steaming. The latter
is to ensure control of tension on the mooring
hawser when operating in calm conditions. In
their modified form these tankers can ~ach
accommodate a load of some 75,000 tonne.

The exception is tha satellite well drilled into

the flank which has #" tubing but is otherwise
completed exactly as the others.
A potential problem with the completion adopted,
except of course in the flank well,is the fact
that at those points where wire lines tools may

179

be used the tubing string is reduced to 4~"OD.

There is therefore an inherent risk that in
the event of a wireline breakage a "birds
nest" could be formed below one of the 4i"OD
restrictions making fishing very difficult.

At this date work, (with the exception of the

drilling programme) was proceeding on target
and unfortunately,as will be recalled, drilling
and completion lay on the critical path. A
decision was therefore taken to reduce the
number of wells drilled through the template
from five to four and to drill a well deviated
into the horst block from the satellite location. In this way it would be possible to
clear the template site in time for the
scheduled arrival of Drill Master in the third
quarter of 1979 and still have the desired
total number of wells. This decision incurred
disadvantages namely,

Tubing retrievable downhole safety valves

were selected for a number of reasons but the
two most significant were
a)

our experience to date has indicated

that this type is the most reliable.

b)

they permitted the running of perforation tools. This meant that the overall
safety of the perforation operation was
increased as, in addition to tree valves
and the wire line BOP, we had the safeguard of a downhole safety valve.

a)

the need to lay additional flowlines

and hydraulic control lines.

b)

removing the well from the operating

area of Drill Master, which means that
any wireline interventions reqUired
in the future will necessitate the
hire of a special semi-submersible.

It is of course too early to make any comment

on the performance of the completion during
production. Problems were experienced during
installation and these are described later.

Point (a) represented a substantial increase

in capital cost whilst point (b) will lead to
increases in operating costs. The decision
to modify the drilling programme was taken
in the full light of this knowledge and reflects
the fact that starting production on time was
the most significant factor in the profitability
of the development.

PROGRAJ.VlME
Work on the development started in March 1977
and called for the field to be on-stream by
the end of September 1979, i.e. a 30 month
programme. At the time this was recognised
to be ambitious and with hindsight we realise
that some key elements were misjudged and that
the proposed timing was barely, if at all,
possible.

The budgeted cost for the development at this

time (eariy 1978) was 135 million. Of this
some 40 million was for drilling, testing
and completing the production wells.

The initial critical path lay through drilling

and completion. With this in mind efforts
were concentrated on design manufacture and
installation of the drilling template in
order to be able to start drilling as soon as
possible. Once again simplicity;was the key
note to success which in this instance was
certainly achieved. The template was installed
on the seabed in August 1977 and drilling
commenced in early September 1977, i.e. within
six months of starting the project.

The actual cost soared as a consequence of the

planned programme not being met.
The three most significant problems in this
respect started to emerge in early 1979 and
were

Concurrently with the design and manufacture

of the template specifications for the subsea equipment, the production equipment and
of the export system were being drafted and
tenders being invited. Enquiries were also
initiated for semi-submersible drilling rigs
available for charter and conver~ion. By
November 1977 contracts had been let for design and procurement of the subsea equipment
and for the management of all work concerned
with the production platform, including its
installation.
By the beginning of February
of 1978 agreement had been reached to bareboat charter the rig, Drill Master. Just
prior to this the order for the single point
mooring system had been placed. Also in March
1978 enquiries for suitable tankers to be
dedicated to the export of oil from Buchan
were issued.

a)

drilling and completion

b)

design and fabrication of subsea

equipment

c)

conversion of Drill Master.

Of these by far the most significant, without

question, was the conversion of the drilling
rig, item (c).
Some detail of how the programme in fact developed is given in the following sections.

180

The difficulties of drilling in the

Buchan reservoir

DRILLING AND COMPLETION

The drilling programme had originally been
scheduled to finish in August/September
1978. In fact drilling of template wells
finished in early November, some two months
late whilst the satellite wells were finished,
on programme, in September.

It was the first time deviated wells

had been drilled from a floater in
the North Sea. Deviations were up
to 45 and drilled depths as much as
3,500 m. (11,500 ft.)

The rig over the template went immediately

onto completion of the template wells and of
the exploration well 21/1-2ST. It had to
~uspend work at the end of May 1979 to permit
the laying of subsea flowlines and other
subsea construction work.

It was the Operator's first experience

of subsea completions in the North Sea.
It should be noted that the delay can be
ascribed entirely to mechanical problems: despite the difficult conditions the planned
drilling procedures proved totally satisfactory.

Completion work on the template wells was

resumed at the end of the construction work
in October and the wells were left perforated,
cleaned up and ready to flow at the end of
December 1979, i.e. three months after the
originally scheduled start-up of the field.

FLOWLINES
The dynamically positioned reel ship Apache
was used for laying twin 4" flowlines to each
satellite well. It also laid the hydraulic
control umbilicals. Apart from tangling the
ends of the control umbilicals,which fortunately presented no real problem,the flowline
laying programme was extremely successful.

On the satellite location completion work

commenced late March 1979 and finished in
mid July 1979.
Most of the time lost in the overall drilling/
completion programme was during the completion
phase. Delays during drilling were largely
due to mechanical problems with drilling
equipment.

Prior to laying the 4" flowlines, an orthodox

lay barge, Choctaw, had been used to la~ the
12" export line from the template to the buoy.
Apache should have been used but was not
available in time.

The major problem during completion was with

orientation of the tubing hanger. The cause
of the difficulties lay in a faulty design
of tubing hanger running tool which
fortunately was fairly easily rectified once it
had been identified.

Between the completion of the laying of the

12" line and the start of the flowline laying
the CALM buoy was installed, with only minor
problems.
Concurrently with the buoy installation Bredford Dolphin was stationed over the template
carrying out the installation of the manifold
base and of interconnecting pipework between
the Xmas trees and manifold base. The diving
programme was highly successful with divers
averaging over 22 hours on the seabed out of
every 24, over a period of some 45 days. The
originally planned work programme had been
65 days.

In two of the wells problems were experienced

with downhole safety valves when satisfactory
pressure tests could not be achieved. In
both cases this was ascribed to heavy mud,
used during completion, settling out on
working parts and preventing correct operation.
In the case of one well it was eventually
necessary to lock open the tubing retrievable
valve and insert the wireline retrievable
valve. In the other case it was possible
to retrieve the tubing and re-run with a
replacement valve.

The field construction work where we had expected problems and delays went very smoothly
and was highly successful.

Summing ,up,therefore, the wells were ready

to flow at the end of 1979 instead of May
1979 and if Drill Master had been complete,
as scheduled, in September 1979 installation
of the field would have had to have been
delayed to permit completion of the well
programme.

SUBSEA EQUIPMENT
A single management contract was let for the
design,fabrication,installation and commissioning
of subsea equipment which comprised-

Drilling and completion in fact took 2~ months

longer than originally planned representing
an overrun of approximately 15%. Whilst
disappointing at the time the performance,
on reflection, is not wholly unsatisfactory
bearing in mind the following factors:

Tubing hangers
Xmas trees
Manifold
Production riser including tensioning
equipment
Wireline riser and BOP including handli~
and tensioning equipment.

181

Master, namely, stability, load carrying

capacity, spaciousn~ss. We are satisfied with
our ,judgement regarding the first two factors
but the space required for all the facilities
proposed on the platform has proved extremely
tight despite the removal of almost all drilling equipment other than the derrick and
draw works.

The manufacture and supply of hangers and

trees whilst on a very tight schedule kept
pace with the drilling and completion pro~
gramme.
The leSs orthodox items of equipment caused
problems. The subsea manifold despite its design being based on that of the Argyll installation presented design and fabrication
problems: in part.1.cular difficulties were experienced in obtaining a satisfactory pressure
test on the complex pipework. Consequently
this item was not available for installation
during the construction programme. It was in
fact installed by the drilling rig which subsequently continued completion work on the
template wells.

The facilities on the platform include

three stage separation plant
duplicated flare systems for high, medium
and low pressure venting
metering skid for measurement of crude
oil won and saved

The wireline riser and BOP were constructed

and made available in time for the perforation
of the wells. Despite the satisfactory performance of this equipment in these operations
adequate time was not given to the design in
the context of service operations from the
production platform. As currently designed
the BOP in particular, will present operational
problems in terms of its bulk and weight.

oily water treatment plant

full saturation diving facilities
production riser handling and tensioning
system
wireline riser handling and tensioning
system

Design and fabrication of the production riser

ran many' months behind schedule. If the production platform had been installed on time
lack of vital components in the riser would
have inhibited the field start-up. The interfacing of this equipment with the rig presented
problems which were not addressed soon enough.
The tensioning arrangements, the fleXible
connections are all complex,occupying con~
siderable space which will make access to
the moonpool,during operations,difficult.
Given more engineering design time it is
conceivable that a radically different solution to the production riser problem might
have been adopted.

gas lift compressor with treatment plant

and distribution manifold (this equipment
to be installed after two years of production)
Very careful control of weight has been exercised throughout design and construction to
ensure that wei'ght and stability are within
the limits of the rig.
On the question of space the rig is now in all
areas somewhat cramped and particular problems
have been experienced in laying out the moonpool. Space here has been taken up by the
diving equipment which is separated from the
rest of the moonpool by a fire wall. In the
space left we have had to accommodate the
tensioning arrangements for the production
riser, which in its complete form will have
19 separate lines, tensioning equipment for
guidelines, provide facilities for running
and tensioning the wireline riser, for storing
the wirelineBOP and for the flexible connections
between risers and platform.

PRODUCTION PLATFORM
Turning now to Drill Master, the rig entered
the conversion yard in Stornoway on 14th
October 1978 and the original programme
agreed by all parties, i.e. BP, the managing
contractor and the conversion contractor,
was for completion by the end of May 1979.
At that time it was planned that construction
work on the template should be carried from
the rig. It very quickly became apparent
that delays in delivery of materials, not
helped by the transport strike at the beginning of 1979, precluded any possibility of
the rig being available for this work. A
separate construqtionprogramme on the template as referred to above was established
and completion of Drill Master was rescheduled
for September 1979.

At the time of writing the rig is scheduled to

leave this year,in the first week of September
which would lead to oil flow at the beginning of
October 1980.
What then h~ve been the problems which had led
to a conversion programme originally planned
to occupy 8 months taking 22 months? The two
major reasons are -

1)
It is perhaps now worth recalling the technical reasons for the selection, of Drill

182

the fact that the work was of much

greater complexity and extent than envisaged by any of the parties involved,

dation on production platforms extensive

modifications have been necessary including
the installation of several new prefabricated modules. On a production platform
there may be not more than two men per
cabin compared to the four men per cabin
permitted on a drilling rig.

i.e. BP, its managing contractors and

the conversion yard
2)

low productivity in the conversion yard.

Dealing with the latter point first, our experience was that,d~spite the rig being
inshore,overall productivity of the construction was no better than that achieved in offshore construction work. Factors contributing
to this were:

Again this had entailed substantial ancillary work in the way of services such as
heating and v.entilating.

The yard had to be remobilised after

having been mothballed for some time

6)

The complications in themoonpool area,

which have already been touched upon.

The rig had to be anchored in the

harbour with access by ferry,not
directly from the quayside.

7)

A totally unexpected problem was that an

inclination test carried out on acceptance
of the rig indicated the weight of the
structure to be approximately 100 tonne
in excess of the figure provided by the
owners and which had 'been used in the design
of the conversion. To counter this it was
necessary to remove or move some equipment
e.g. the potable water storage tank had to
be moved from the deck to the base of a
leg.

8)

The weight of P1Plng installed is over

100 tonne greater than that originally
estimated.

9)

The flare booms, of which there are two in

order to accommodate all wind directions,
have turned out to be much larger and more
massive than planned in order to keep radiation levels at an acceptable level.

10)

The ballasting system has had to be refurbished, including re-commissioning of the

control system.

11)

Our problems have of course been further

compounded by the disaster to the sister
vessel, Alexander L. Kielland, which capsized with great loss of life on 27th
March 1980. As a result of that incident
very extensive inspection of the rig structure has been carried out, design reviews
have been made to confirm the soundness
of the design, and a large number of modifications, all relatively minor, e.g.
reshaping of stiffeners, removal of redundant penetrations, have been carried
out. It is roughly estimated that this
workload has delayed tow-out by some two
months and increased costs by between
7 - 8 million.

Working space was restricted limiting

the amount of labour which could be
used at any work face.
The design work was inadequate leading
to many clashes of different trades,
e.g. piping with H & V, electrical
cable pulling with pipework.
Turning to point (1) it is worth listing some
of the areas where work scope has been greater
than anticipated.
1)

2)

The condition of ancillary services was

not satisfactory. Considerable unscheduled
work has gone into the restoration to
satisfactory workirtg condition of fire
mains, compressed air systems, cooling
water systems and steam generation systems.
Some basic equipment needed extensive modification to bring it into line with regulations promulgated since the building of
the rig. A prime example is the main
electrical distribution system which whilst
originally acceptable was
considered
unsafe both by the certifying authorities
and by BP.

3)

The extraction of existing equipment and

insertion of new has proved much more difficult and more time consuming than expected. This stems from the integrated
design of the Pentagone; it has been necessary to cut and reweld decks and walls
in many areas in order to remove and
install equipment.

4)

Safety zoning for production differs from

safety zoning for drilling. Many areas
on the rig originally safe are now
hazardous and in order to make use of
existing electrical equipment a complex,
highly instrumented ventilating system
has been necessary.

5)

PRESENT POSITION
At the time of writing the Buchan field is
expected to be on-stream just over twelve
months behind the original schedule, i.e. at
the end of 42 months instead of 30 months.

To meet regulations relating to accommo-

183

A particular aspect of design of critical

importance which would receive much greater
attention in a future project is the coordination of design work on interfaces. E.g.
additional
time spent on the study of the
interface between the subsea equipment and
the rig in the moonpoo1 would have been well
justified. The author would strongly recommend on future projects of this nature the
building of a scale model to assist in the
design. A study of this nature carried out
earlier in the project might well have led
to a radical rethink of the production
riser design.

The total capital cost of the development

has increased by almost 4~ft. Despite this
we are pleased to report that, helped by
increasing oil prices, it is still an economic
development.
The bulk of the delay and of the increased
cost has resulted from the problems experienced in converting a drilling rig to a
production platform.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite our somewhat bitter experience with
Buchan we are firmly of tl;J.e opinion that
the basic approach to the development is
sound and would not hesitate to adopt it
again in developing a marginal field. There
are lessons of c9urse)to be learnt which
we think are as follows:
With increasingly stringent regulations and
realising more fully now the comprehensive
differences between drilling rigs and product ion platforms we would not contemplate
another conversion. Bearing in mind that.
our original programme was extremely optimistic and that it is unlikely that a development of this type can be completed in less
than 36 months it is better in all respects
to build a purpose-designed rig. Based on
Buchan experience a purpose-built rig would
cost substantially less than a conversion
and could have been completed in the time
scale actually attained.

Apart from the specific point raised above

modelling would have been of immense help
in the design of the conversion and of its
planning. Time spent on this in the early
stages would have been most valuable.
To recapitulate as succinctly as possible on
the lessons we believe Buchan to have taught
us
1.

stop and think - before finally committing

to a development programme consider and
evaluate all realistic options.

2.

Pay particular attention to interfaces ensure that as an Operator you have full
control of their design.

3.

In complex design situations make use of

scale models.

4.

Be very wary of major conversion projects

purpose-built equipment is likely to be
much more economic.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes"to acknowledge BP Petroleum
Development Limited and their partners in the
Buchan development, namely, st. Joe Petroleum
Corporation, CanDel Petroleum Limited, Natomas
International, Gas and Oil Acreage Limited,
Charterhall Oil Limited, Lochiel Exploration (UK)
Limited, CCP North Sea Associates and City
Petroleum Corporation for permission to produce
this paper.

It is the author's view that too great an

emphasis was put on the achievement of a
short programme which meant committing to
the manufacture of hardware before the completion of adequate studies. A period of
say six months, at the beginning of the project devotedto a design study of all the problems associated with the floating production
platform, would almost certainly have highlighted some of the problems which we hit
later.

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