Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved
to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent guilty of malpractice and recommending that
he be suspended from the practice of law.
I
Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC)
which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as
counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra (RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor
paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129
and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a petition
for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.
On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that
the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to
increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for
review, prayed that he be allowed to file an action for annulment.
On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and Motion and let the records remain with it. However,
on November 10, 1987, the said court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.
On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions
of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and policies.
On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or novation explaining that
. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party
may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present
complaint to the effect that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).
On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral
Arguments of the CA decision. The CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral Arguments
on April 14, 1988.
In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988,
denied the motion for reconsideration of the February 12 Resolution.
Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No. 86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC in favor of petitioner's mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been filed and paid
late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise
denied with finality.

Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.
On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed
an Opposition to the Motion for Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690
and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23, 1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of the writ of
execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.
On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to annul
the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No. 344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the
writ of execution was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the decisions
(CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.
On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the implementation of the writ of execution until the petition
filed in SP CV No. 624 for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent Motion to Set Aside and
Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.
From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus with
Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order, respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review byCertiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-G.R.
SP No. 17040).
II
We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to represent his client "within the bounds of the law."
The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns
him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable construction of the law or rules which is favorable to
his client. But the lawyer is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. He cannot
prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional
Responsibility 310 [1979]). Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).
Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:
Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and
frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory
Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v. Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d
Cir. 1971]).
The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected and her defenses were properly ventilated
when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay the
execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said decision became executory even pending its appeal
with the RTC because of the failure of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due. Furthermore, his
petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and
dilatory. According to the CA, there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was denied due
process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud."
As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of
law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).

Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent knew very well that the decision of the MTC
was already ripe for execution.
This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423 (1993), ruled:
. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial
only; the trial court is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and has no jurisdiction either to modify in any
way or to reverse the same. . . . (at p. 430).
(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).
Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844,
to wit:
(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with
the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Abra;
(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the
Court of Appeals;
(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court;
(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc. filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,
(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment, respondent is also guilty of
forum shopping.
In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in
one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 72
SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and
degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple
or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary
action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to
the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).
By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a favorable judgment, which efforts were all
rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as he
perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 [1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on
Bar Discipline "in filing a number of pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial processes' and
disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was
rendered, thus, 'abused procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation, IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline, p. 2).
WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Jonar Santiago vs. Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004
Facts:

Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, was allegedly notarized several documents on different dates and failed to: a) make the proper
notation regarding the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) of the complainant; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the
notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized.
On the other hand, Atty. Rafanan admitted having administered the oath but believed that non-notation of the Resident
Certificates as well as not entering the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register was allowed. Notation of Resident
Certificates are applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases
pending before courts and other government offices. He further asserted that this was a popular practice among notaries public in
Nueva Ecija, some of whom were older practitioners.
Issues:
What is the rule on registry of notarial documents?
Held:
The court ruled in the negative. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required
to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages
of [their] register, on which the same is recorded. Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as
notaries public.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary
weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.
It is intolerable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed
by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the law.
Disbarment, however, cannot be granted considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of Atty.
Rafanan. A fine of P3, 000 is imposed with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

[G.R. No. 120592. March 14, 1997]

TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and
Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a
monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firms undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract.
[1]
Parenthetically, said retainer agreement was terminated by the union on April 4, 1990.[2]
During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year
and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal Bank (TRB). After the appropriate complaint was filed by private
respondent, the case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on March 24, 1987
and docketed as NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466.[3]
On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay
differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential.[4] The NLRC, acting on a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution filed by private respondent as counsel for petitioner union, raffled the case to Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo. [5]

However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution, TRB challenged the decision of the NLRC before the
Supreme Court. The Court, in its decision promulgated on August 30, 1990,[6] modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the
award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. [7]
The bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount
of P175,794.32. Petitioner never contested the amount thus found by TRB.[8] The latter duly paid its concerned employees their
respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll. [9]
After private respondent received the above decision of the Supreme Court on September 18, 1990,[10] he notified the petitioner union,
the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorneys lien over the award of holiday pay differential
through a letter dated October 8, 1990.[11]
Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorneys
fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at P175,794.32, or the amount
of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorneys fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to pay and remit said amount to him. [12]
The TRB management manifested before the labor arbiter that they did not wish to oppose or comment on private respondents motion
as the claim was directed against the union,[13] while petitioner union filed a comment and opposition to said motion on July 15, 1991.
[14]
After considering the position of the parties, the labor arbiter issued an order[15] on November 26, 1991 granting the motion of
private respondent, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that the TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION with offices at
Kanlaon Towers, Roxas Boulevard is hereby ordered (sic) to pay without delay the attorneys fees due the movant law firm, E.N.A.
CRUZ and ASSOCIATES the amount ofP17,574.43 or ten (10%) per cent of the P175,794.32 awarded by the Supreme Court to the
members of the former.
This constrained petitioner to file an appeal with the NLRC on December 27, 1991, seeking a reversal of that order.[16]
On October 19, 1994, the First Division of the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the order of the labor arbiter.[17] The motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the NLRC in a resolution dated May 23, 1995, [18] hence the petition at bar.
Petitioner maintains that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of
attorneys fees in the amount of P17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of the P175,794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its
members, in violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is null and void, [19] for the reasons
hereunder stated.
Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorneys fees, it contends that the award for
attorneys fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon
the decision of the NLRC. Since the claim for attorneys fees by private respondent was neither taken up nor approved by the
Supreme Court, no attorneys fees should have been allowed by the NLRC.
Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorneys fees, as said act constituted a
modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award attorneys fees. It then cited decisions of
the Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory can no longer be altered or modified even by the court
which rendered the same.
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his motion to determine attorneys fees was just an incident of the main case
where petitioner was awarded its money claims. The grant of attorneys fees was the consequence of his exercise of his attorneys
lien. Such lien resulted from and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the favorable judgment was
obtained. To include the award of the attorneys fees in the main case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the adverse
party. All that the non-inclusion of attorneys fees in the award means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB to pay the
opposing party attorneys fees in the concept of damages. He is not therefore precluded from filing his motion to have his own
professional fees adjudicated.
In view of the substance of the arguments submitted by petitioner and private respondent on this score, it appears necessary to explain
and consequently clarify the nature of the attorneys fees subject of this petition, in order to dissipate the apparent confusion between
and the conflicting views of the parties.
There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary.[20] In its ordinary concept, an
attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The
basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article
2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer
as additional compensation or as part thereof.
It is the first type of attorneys fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. Also, the present controversy stems
from petitioners apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorneys fees only before its judgment is
reviewed and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may no longer entertain claims for attorneys fees.
It will be noted that no claim for attorneys fees was filed by private respondent before the NLRC when it acted on the money claims
of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It was only after the High Tribunal modified
the judgment of the NLRC awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the NLRC for a percentage thereof
as attorneys fees.
It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance and for the Supreme Court thereafter to
make an award for attorneys fees when no claim therefor was pending before them. Courts generally rule only on issues and claims
presented to them for adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter ordered the payment of attorneys fees, he did not in any way
modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private
respondents present claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier
decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very
action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.[21]
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only
when something is due to the client.[22] Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the
subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorneys fees only arises when something has been recovered
from which the fee is to be paid.[23]
While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to
the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys fees may arise
has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature.[24] Of course, a petition for attorneys fees
may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. [25]
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence,
private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay
differential, instead of filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same
action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective
the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.
Assailing the rulings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC, petitioner union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all
attorneys fees due to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000.00 which it has been regularly paying to private
respondent under their retainer agreement. To be entitled to the additional attorneys fees as provided in Part D (Special Billings) of
the agreement, it avers that there must be a separate mutual agreement between the union and the law firm prior to the performance of
the additional services by the latter. Since there was no agreement as to the payment of the additional attorneys fees, then it is
considered waived.
En contra, private respondent contends that a retainer fee is not the attorneys fees contemplated for and commensurate to the services
he rendered to petitioner. He asserts that although there was no express agreement as to the amount of his fees for services rendered in
the case for recovery of differential pay, Article 111 of the Labor Code supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten
percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorneys fees.
It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the
interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. [26] It will thus be appropriate, at this juncture, to
determine if private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration under the retainer agreement [27] entered into by him and
petitioner.
The parties subscribed therein to the following stipulations:
x

The Law Firm shall handle cases and extend legal services under the parameters of the following terms and conditions:

A. GENERAL SERVICES
1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be available on a day-to-day basis depending on the Unions
needs;
2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or anticipatory situation confronting any matter within the clients
normal course of business;
3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day course of business;
4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to which the union is a party signatory thereto but prepared or
caused to be prepared by any other third party;
5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body subject to certain
fees as qualified hereinafter;
6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with any government agency and/or any private institution
which is directly related to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.
B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES
1. Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents arising and/or required by your Union which do not fall
under the category of its ordinary course of business activity but requires a special, exhaustive or detailed study and preparation;
2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the Union;
3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table negotiations with TRB management or any other third
person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except CBA negotiations which shall be
subject to a specific agreement (pursuant to PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 & 227);
4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and in behalf of the Union;
5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,
6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the particular member must give his/her assent and that prior
consent be granted by the principal officers. Further, the member must conform to the rules and policies of the Law Firm.
C. FEE STRUCTURE
In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above when required or necessary, your Union shall pay a
monthly retainer fee of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or before the fifth day of every month.
An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.
Any and all Attorneys Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to the Law
Firm.
It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our claim for reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses
covering filing fees, transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or authentication of documents related to any
matter referred to the Law Firm or that which redound to the benefit of the Union.
D. SPECIAL BILLINGS
In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B, the Union shall pay the Law Firm an amount mutually
agreed upon PRIOR to the performance of such services. The sum agreed upon shall be based on actual time and effort spent by the
counsel in relation to the importance and magnitude of the matter referred to by the Union. However, charges may be WAIVED by
the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly
reserved for the Law Firm.
x

The provisions of the above contract are clear and need no further interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant
controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the
latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the
monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the law firms commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General
Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.

The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legal services actually
rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. These are a general
retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer.[28]
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal
problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are
secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or
otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for
the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other
parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several
cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorneys fees, each
fee is considered a special retainer.
As to the first kind of fee, the Court has had the occasion to expound on its concept in Hilado vs. David[29] in this wise:
There is in legal practice what is called a retaining fee, the purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled
from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to
perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid
observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. A retaining fee
is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is
intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other
and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither
made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his
attorney for the services for which he has retained him to perform. (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general
retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firms pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its commitment to
render the legal services enumerated. The fee is not payment for private respondents execution or performance of the services listed
in the contract, subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there.
Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid contract fixing the compensation for the attorney,
such contract is conclusive as to the amount of compensation.[30] We cannot, however, apply the foregoing rule in the instant petition
and treat the fixed fee of P3,000.00 as full and sufficient consideration for private respondents services, as petitioner would have it.
We have already shown that the P3,000.00 is independent and different from the compensation which private respondent should
receive in payment for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latters promise to extend
services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firms actual performance of services in favor of the union. Hence,
the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondents services.
We, therefore, cannot favorably consider the suggestion of petitioner that private respondent had already waived his right to charge
additional fees because of their failure to come to an agreement as to its payment.
Firstly, there is no showing that private respondent unequivocally opted to waive the additional charges in consonance with Part D of
the agreement. Secondly, the prompt actions taken by private respondent, i.e., serving notice of charging lien and filing of motion to
determine attorneys fees, belie any intention on his part to renounce his right to compensation for prosecuting the labor case instituted
by the union. And, lastly, to adopt such theory of petitioner may frustrate private respondents right to attorneys fees, as the former
may simply and unreasonably refuse to enter into any special agreement with the latter and conveniently claim later that the law firm
had relinquished its right because of the absence of the same.
The fact that petitioner and private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees
for special services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.
Obligations do not emanate only from contracts.[31] One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our Civil Code is the
quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari protest. As embodied in our law,
[32]
certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
A quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondents lawful, voluntary and unilateral prosecution of
petitioners cause without awaiting the latters consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private
respondents efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union. It cannot even hide

behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondents
actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor
arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the P3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner. The law firms services are decidedly
worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement. Thus, in Part C thereof on Fee Structure, it is even provided that all
attorneys fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to private respondent, aside
from petitioners liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.
A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute
justice. Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him; (2) Nobody wants to
enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another; and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us under the same
circumstances.[33]
As early as 1903, we allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, notwithstanding the lack of understanding
with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis of quasi-contract. [34] Hence, it is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee
for the special services rendered by private respondent in order that petitioner may be obligated to pay compensation to the
former. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from private
respondents services.
We are not unaware of the old ruling that a person who had no knowledge of, nor consented to, or protested against the lawyers
representation may not be held liable for attorneys fees even though he benefited from the lawyers services. [35] But this doctrine may
not be applied in the present case as petitioner did not object to private respondents appearance before the NLRC in the case for
differentials.
Viewed from another aspect, since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondents legal services and assistance regarding its claims
against the bank, only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor, there is at least the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give).[36] This rule of law, likewise founded on the principle against unjust enrichment,
would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioners members.
In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their
professional services.[37] However, the value of private respondents legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111
of the Labor Code alone. Said article provides:
ART. 111. Attorneys fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees
equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.
x x x
The implementing provision[38] of the foregoing article further states:
Sec. 11. Attorneys fees. - Attorneys fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10%
of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.
In the first place, the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorneys fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and
payable to the prevailing part. In the second place, the ten percent (10%) attorneys fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor
Code and Section 11, Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be granted. [39] Article
111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorneys fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative
proceedings and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the
article when circumstances warrant it.[40]
The measure of compensation for private respondents services as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule
ofquantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction. Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserves, is used as the basis for
determining the lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract, [41] but recoverable by him from his client.
Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum
meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services.[42]
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the
services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid
compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that
it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.[43]

Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyers
services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered
in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (a) the time spent
and the extent of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the
subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorneys fees in favor of private respondent. Instead of adopting the above
guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the amount of attorneys fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor
Code. He completely relied on the operation of Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorneys fees at P17,574.43.[44] Observe the
conclusion stated in his order.[45]
x x x
FIRST. Art. 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly declares movants right to a ten (10%) per cent of the award due its client. In
addition, this right to ten (10%) per cent attorneys fees is supplemented by Sec. 111, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended.
x x x
As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorneys fees in the nature of damages
sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable
to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorneys fees, it
does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorneys fees in such maximum limit.
It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict between
lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum
meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorneys fees. The criteria found in the Code of Professional
Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the
parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter and for the resolution of private respondents fees.
It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorneys fees is a question of fact.[46] Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this
case for further reception of evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by private respondent to petitioner. However,
so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to fix in the present
recourse a reasonable amount of attorneys fees in favor of private respondent. For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the
accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that
regard. On such premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair
compensation for the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the order of the labor arbiter
is MODIFIED, and petitioner is hereby ORDERED to pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees
to private respondent for the latters legal services rendered to the former.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118746 September 7, 1995

ATTY. WILFREDO TAGANAS, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MELCHOR ESCULTURA, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Atty. Wilfredo E. Taganas represented herein private respondents in a labor suit for illegal dismissal, underpayment and nonpayment of wages, thirteenth-month pay, attorney's fees and damages conditioned upon a contingent fee arrangement granting the
equivalent of fifty percent of the judgment award plus three hundred pesos appearance fee per hearing. 1 The Labor Arbiter ruled in
favor of private respondents and ordered Ultra Clean Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., (PTSI)
respondents therein, jointly and severally to reinstate herein private respondents with full backwages, to pay wage differentials,
emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay and attorney's fee, but disallowed the claim for damages for lack of
basis. 2 This decision was appealed by Ultra and PTSI to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and subsequently by
PTSI to the Court but to no avail. During the execution stage of the decision, petitioner moved to enforce his attorney's charging
lien. 3 Private respondents, aggrieved for receiving a reduced award due to the attorney's charging lien, contested the validity of the
contingent fee arrangement they have with petitioner, albeit four of the fourteen private respondents have expressed their conformity
thereto. 4
Finding the arrangement excessive, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee from fifty percent of the
judgment award to ten percent, except for the four private respondents who earlier expressed their conformity. 5 Petitioner appealed to
NLRC which affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's order by ruling that the ten percent contingent fee should apply also to
the four respondents even if they earlier agreed to pay a higher percentage. 6Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence
this petition for certiorari.
The sole issue in this petition is whether or not the reduction of petitioner's contingent fee is warranted. Petitioner argues that
respondent NLRC failed to apply the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the factors to be considered in determining whether or not
the stipulated amount of petitioner's contingent fee is fair and reasonable. Moreover, he contends that the invalidation of the contingent
fee agreement between petitioner and his clients was without any legal justification especially with respect to the four clients who
manifested their conformity thereto. We are not persuaded.
A contingent fee arrangement is an agreement laid down in an express contract between a lawyer and a client in which the lawyer's
professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action is made to depend upon the success of the
litigation. 7 This arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction. 8 It is, however, under the supervision and scrutiny of the court to protect
clients from unjust charges. 9 Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "[a] contract for a contingent fee, where
sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness". Likewise, Rule 138, Section 24 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the controversy, the extent of
the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
When it comes, therefore, to the validity of contingent fees, in large measure it depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees
under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of unreasonable attorney's fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts. 10
We agree with the NLRC's assessment that fifty percent of the judgment award as attorney's fees is excessive and unreasonable. The
financial capacity and economic status of the client have to be taken into account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. 11 Noting that
petitioner's clients were lowly janitors who receive miniscule salaries and that they were precisely represented by petitioner in the
labor dispute for reinstatement and claim for backwages, wage differentials, emergency cost of living allowance, thirteenth-month pay
and attorney's fees to acquire what they have not been receiving under the law and to alleviate their living condition, the reduction of
petitioner's contingent fee is proper. Labor cases, it should be stressed, call for compassionate justice.

Furthermore, petitioner's contingent fee falls within the purview of Article 111 of the Labor Code. This article fixes the limit on the
amount of attorney's fees which a lawyer, like petitioner, may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings since the labor suit
where he represented private respondents asked for the claim and recovery of wages. In fact, We are not even precluded from fixing a
lower amount than the ten percent ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it. 12 Nonetheless, considering the
circumstances and the able handling of the case, petitioner's fee need not be further reduced.
The manifestation of petitioner's four clients indicating their conformity with the contingent fee contract did not make the agreement
valid. The contingent fee contract being unreasonable and unconscionable the same was correctly disallowed by public respondent
NLRC even with respect to the four private respondents who agreed to pay higher percentage. Petitioner is reminded that as a lawyer
he is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties.
When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control. 13
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion the assailed NLRC decision is hereby affirmed in toto.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

NAKPIL v VALDES
Facts: Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated inMoran, Baguio. He went into an agreement with Atty. Carlos
Valdes for thelatter to buy the property in trust for Nakpil. Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The landstitles were
transferred to his name. When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired theservices of Valdes and his accounting and law
firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil. What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from thelist of assets of
Jose Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to hiscompany, the Caval Realty Corporation) while including the loans
hecontracted.What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI.While the case was pending, Imelda also filed an
administrative complaintfor disbarment against Valdes.The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CAreversed the CFI.The
complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and wasdecided in favor of Nakpil. The SC held that Valdes only held the lots intrust for
Nakpil.
Issue: W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for hisacts,
namely:o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;o Including his loans as claims on the estate; ando Apparen
tly, representing conflicting interests when his accountingfirm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and
ENORNagainst the estate of Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Held:The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that
Valdesbroke the trust reposed on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed touse his professional services as a lawyer and an
accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an agreement that the latter would bebuying the property in trust for
Jose. By his act of excluding the propertyfrom the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used for his ownbenefit) as
claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose
and him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basisfor Imeldas decision to use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representingconflicting interests which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In
thecase at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's
accounting firmprepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,computed the claims of two creditors of the
estate. There is clearly a conflictbetween the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are
creditors of the estate.

[A.C. No. 4539. May 14, 1997]

ROMANA R. MALIGSA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING is charged by Romana R. Maligsa in a verified affidavit-complaint for disbarment with conduct
unbecoming a lawyer for certifying under oath a Deed of Quitclaim dated 5 May 1992[1] over a piece of property subject of a pending
civil case before the Regional Trial Court Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-5434.[2]
On 11 March 1996 we required respondent to comment on the complaint. He failed to comply despite service upon him of our
Resolution together with copy of the complaint.
On 22 October 1996 we considered the failure of respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting to file his comment as waiver of his right to
do so and directed the case submitted for decision.
On the basis of the complaint and the supporting documents, this Court finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against
respondent for making it appear in the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Quitclaim in question that the affiant therein signed the
document and acknowledged the contents thereof before him as Notary Public on 5 May 1992 when in truth and in fact the affiant did
not and could not have done so.
The evidence clearly discloses that on 5 May 1992 a Deed of Quitclaim was purportedly executed by one Irene Maligsa in favor of
Juanito V. Abaoag over a parcel of land located in Cablong, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.[3] The subject document was notarized by
respondent on the same date. The document was apparently used as evidence against complainant in a pending civil case for
annulment of OCT No. P-31297, quieting of title with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order plus damages.
The complainant alleges that the Deed of Quitclaim could not have been executed and notarized on 5 May 1992 because the affiant
Irene Maligsa died on 21 April 1992 or sixteen (16) days earlier.[4] Moreover, Irene Maligsa could not have signed the document
because she "never knew how to write as she uses the thumb mark in every transaction she entered." [5]
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 [6] provides
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal,
if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
Furthermore, the Acknowledgment contained in the questioned document specifically provides "BEFORE ME personally appeared
IRENE MALIGSA x x x x" [7] Clearly, the party acknowledging must personally appear before the Notary Public or any other
person authorized to take such acknowledgment of instruments or documents.
In the case before us, it would have been physically and legally impossible for the affiant Irene Maligsa to have executed the alleged
Deed of Quitclaim on 5 May 1992 and to have personally subscribed to its authenticity and validity before respondent notary public
on the same date, affiant having died on 21 April 1992. Also, it behooves respondent as a notary public to require the personal
appearance of the person executing a document to enable the former to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
Quite importantly, this is not the first time that respondent has been involved in an act of malpractice in violation of his oath as a
lawyer and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v. Cabanting,[8] the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for
six (6) months from the practice of law. In those cases respondent purchased his client's property which was still the subject of a
pendingcertiorari proceeding contrary to the prohibition stated in Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code and Art. II of the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Under the circumstances, a recollection of the basic principles of professional ethics in the practice of law
is apropos.
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession. [9]
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and protection of the interest
requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts
and the administrative offices generally.[10] Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one making it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and
failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a
fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [11] Considering
the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his prior misconduct hereinbefore mentioned for which he was penalized with a
six (6) month suspension from the practice of law, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely, the contumacious behavior of respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the
imposition of a much graver penalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy
of his continued membership in the legal profession; consequently, he is ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all the courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 1474

January 28, 2000

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral conduct for having raped his
neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's
abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began touching
her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.
At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house, he saw his wife and
respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.1 She was kicking respondent with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and
other leg, preventing her from defending herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint 2 for rape against
respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Abraham A. Suller.3
On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice. 4
On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.5
On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. 6

From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties appeared with their respective
counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of
Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.7
On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been referred to him previously.8
In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On
August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties.9
On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the case submitted for resolution
as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite due notice.10
On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution recommending that the disciplinary
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent.11
The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that respondent acted in a
grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12
In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient punishment
for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to
practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.13 "Good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in
order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."14
WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, GonzagaReyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur

Arrieta vs Llosa
FACTS: A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Llosa by Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly notarizing a Deed of Absolute sale, wherein,
vendors noted were already dead prior to its execution. In answer, respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale.
But before affixing his notarial seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the signatures, verified the identities of the signatories, and
determined the voluntariness of its execution.

However, in a later date, the respondent sought to dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact the instant case is only a product of
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some facts and is now convinced that everything is in order. The designated Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP recommended the dismissal of the instant case. The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the above
recommendation and resolved to dismiss the instant case after finding no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or suspended from practice of law.
HELD: YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six months from practice of law with a warning that another infraction will be
dealt with more severely. Citing Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 also known as the Notarial law, the Supreme Court explained
the importance of adherence to said law as part of the responsibility of a duly deputized authority to conduct such notarial process.
Due diligence is to be observed, this being part of a lawyers professional responsibility and procedural lapse is not an excuse to cater

to the convenience of clients. Any violation is tantamount to misconduct. Such misconduct is a ground for disbarment as stated by the
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stressed the primary responsibility of lawyers as stated
in Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. A lawyer must also refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity may be disbarred or suspended.

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3248. September 18, 1992.]
DOMINGO R. MARCELO, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ADRIANO S. JAVIER, SR., Respondent.
Vicente Peala for Petitioner.

In a verified letter-complaint 1 dated May 19, 1988, complainant Domingo R. Marcelo charges respondent Atty. Adriano S. Javier, Sr.
with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a transaction over complainants residential lot as security for a loan.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court en banc of April 12, 1988, the present administrative case
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The said letter-complaint, along with complainants affidavit 2 required in the order dated April 5, 1989 of the said IBP commission,
set forth complainants material allegations on his plaint. It appears that on November 13, 1984 complainant mortgaged his
unregistered land consisting of 1,045 square meters located at Cambaog, Bustos, Bulacan to mortgagee Sy Hun Tek as security for a
loan in the alleged amount of P80,000.00 payable on November 15, 1985 with legal interest, with the deed of mortgage having been
prepared and notarized by respondent as the family lawyer of the mortgagee.
Of the alleged amount of the loan, complainant only received P50,000.00 from which was deducted P2,500.00 as first installment or
the loan for the month of December, 1984, and a further amount of P5,000.00 was taken by respondent for the titling of said property
under Act. No. 496. In effect, complainant only received the actual amount of P42,500.00.
As of the filing of the instant administrative case, respondent had not yet caused the mortgaged property to be duly titled. Complainant
was not given a copy of the mortgage deed, much less the chance to read the same, and he learned of the contents of said deed only
when he secured a certified true xerox copy thereof from the Records Management and Archives Office in Manila.
Upon complainants default on two months installments on the loan, respondent went to the house of complainant at a time when the
latter was sick and asked him to sign some papers which respondent told complainant were merely to confirm the latters obligation to
Sy Hun Tek. Relying thereon and because of his confidence in respondent, complainant signed the papers without being given copies
thereof.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A few weeks thereafter, complainant learned that the mortgaged property had been foreclosed and sold to one Enrico Perez, a resident
of the place where the land is situated. There was no public auction nor the posting of appropriate notices thereof as prescribed by law.
Moreover, the sale of the mortgaged property by Sy Hun Tek to Perez was within the redemption period.
Complainant, with the assistance of his present counsel, wrote to Enrico Perez indicating his desire to redeem the property but the
letter was never answered. He likewise approached respondent to solicit the latters help to redeem said property but respondent
refused to extend any help and told complainant not to worry because his obligation to Sy Hun Tek had already been settled thereby.
The pertinent portions of the mortgage contract 3 adverted to above further provide as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . ., the MORTGAGOR hereby by these presents, cede(s), assign(s) and transfer(s) all his rights, interests, and participation, by way
of FIRST MORTGAGE, unto herein MORTGAGEE, his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interests (sic), the above-described parcel
of land subject to the following terms and conditions, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the MORTGAGOR shall pay in full the loan obligation on or before November 15, 1985, with the legal rate of interest;
2. That MORTGAGOR shall caused (sic) to be paid the loan of P80,000.00 by way of installments in accordance with the following
schedule, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1st December 15, 1984 P 2,500.00
2nd January 15, 1985 2,500.00
3rd February 15, 1985 2,500.00
12,500.00
4th March 15, 1985 2,500.00
5th April 15, 1985 2,500.00
6th May 15, 1985 2,500.00
12,500.00
7th June 15, 1985 2,500.00
8th July 15, 1985 2,500.00
9th August 15, 1985 2,500.00
12,500.00
10th September 15, 1985 2,500.00
11th October 15, 1985 2,500.00
12th November 15, 1985 2,500.00
12,500.00
_________
P80,000.00.
Plus the expenses for the
issuance of title 5,000.00
___________
TOTAL P85,000.00
x

"3. That provided, however, that if I, DOMINGO R. MARCELO, MORTGAGOR, shall pay or cause to be paid to the said SY HUN

TEK, MORTGAGEE, his heirs or assigns, the said sum of EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00), within the period of ONE (1)
year from and after the execution of this mortgage, together with the legal rate of interest, then this MORTGAGE shall be discharged
and of no effect; otherwise, I hereby agree that the said MORTGAGEE, may enforce his rights herein without judicial proceedings by
causing the above-described property to be sold at Provincial Capitol after giving notice of sale for 20 days posted in at least three
public places of the Municipality of Bustos, Bulacan, said sale to take place on a business day between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. at the
municipal building at said municipality, under the direction of a notary public of said municipality, the justice or auxiliary justice of
the peace of the municipality, or the provincial sheriff, in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118;"
x

For his part and in compliance with the order dated August 15, 1988 4 of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, respondent filed his
verified answer 5 specifically denying that he was the one who prepared the deed of real estate mortgage, contending that the same
was merely acknowledged before him by the parties thereto. He alleged that under the mortgage deed. complainant was under
obligation to pay P80,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for titling of the subject property upon maturity, but despite receipt of said amount in
cash from the mortgagee through the latters brother, Sy Hun Kiong, as evidenced by cash vouchers dated November 12, 1984, 6
complainant did not pay the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of documentation and notarization of the mortgage deed. Respondent took
two (2) copies thereof, one for himself and another for the Clerk of Court, while the rest of the copies were given to complainant and
Sy Hun Tek.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Complainant having thereafter defaulted in his installment payments. he approached Sy Hun Kiong, brother of the mortgagee, offering
to sell his mortgaged property in payment of the loan obligation and, together, they sought respondents legal advice on the effects of a
dation in payment. After a week, or on August 26, 1985, Sy Hun Kiong. Sy Hun Tek and complainant returned to respondents law
office and requested respondent to prepare the dation in payment which, inter alia, provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the VENDOR MORTGAGOR hereby by these presents, waives, cedes, and assigns, all his rights, interest and participation (i)n
the above-described property by way of DACION EN PACO (DATION IN PAYMENT), unto herein VENDEE-MORTGAGEE, his
heirs, assigns and successors-in-interests (sic) subject to the following terms and conditions to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That upon the signing of this agreement the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall be free and release(d) of all his existing obligation to
the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE in the amount of P80,000.00 including interest and other such charges;
2. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall pay and shoulder the corresponding documentation and notarization expenses;
3. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR likewise waive(s) and transfer(s) all his rights, interests and participations over the subject
property to the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE, including the right to take physical possession of the same;chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
4. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall guarantee the peaceful possession and enjoyment of right of the VENDEEMORTGAGEE from any cause of action adversely (a)ffecting the mortgage rights and interests of the VENDEE-MORTGAGEE and
assume to pay all expenses that may be incurred in connection with the said documents;
5. That the VENDOR-MORTGAGOR shall upon the signing of the AGREEMENT pay all the necessary taxes and assessment
covering said property;
6. The parties bound themselves that the deed of Real Estate Mortgage shall be considered without force and effect by virtue of this
AGREEMENT;
7. It is understood that this AGREEMENT was executed for the purpose of liquidating the obligation of the VENDEE-MORTGAGOR
(sic) TO THE VENDEE-MORTGAGEE in the amount of P80,000.00 by way of selling the property described above to the latter so as
to relinquish or as (sic) extinguish said obligation of VENDOR-MORTGAGOR." 7
Respondent similarly took two (2) copies of said document and gave the rest of the copies to complainant and Sy Hun Tek.
Further, respondent avers that there were no foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, either judicially or extrajudicially,
precisely because of the previous settlement of the account as a consequence of the dation in payment at the instance of complainant.
Additionally, respondent argues that there is no occasion to speak of a redemption period as there was no foreclosure to begin with.

The sale of the property to Enrico Perez was valid since Sy Hun Tek had become the owner thereof as a result of the dation in payment
and Perez cannot be compelled to have the property redeemed by complainant because the former acquired it through a legitimate and
voluntary transaction. Respondent denies that he was ever approached by complainant for the supposed redemption and contrarily
charges complainant with false and fraudulent misrepresentations because, although he was fully aware of the acquisition of said
property by Perez, complainant continued to receive rental payments thereon from one Johnny Loo.
In a subsequent affidavit, 8 respondent stressed his earlier averments and insisted that all of complainants allegations were
"fabricated, well-orchestrated, bereft of legal and factual basis, biased and unreasonable." Moreover, according to him, it was the
mortgagee who insisted on having the property titled to secure his mortgage lien thereover, at the expense of the mortgagor; that the
present complaint was filed as a leverage against the dismissal of complainants petition for mandamus to compel redemption of the
subject property; and that all of complainants allegations in his affidavit could only have been possible through the inducement of
some other persons and were founded only upon hearsay evidence and self-serving statements.
Annexed to respondents answer was an affidavit executed by Sy Hun Kiong 9 substantially to the effect that he was personally
approached by complainant to seek his assistance in obtaining a loan of P80,000.00 from Sy Hun Tek, offering as security therefor the
aforestated unregistered parcel of land. On November 10, 1984, complainant and said affiant requested Atty. Javier to prepare the deed
of real estate mortgage. Upon approval of the terms of the deed by Sy Hun Tek, Atty. Javier notarized the same on November 10,
1984, the original and two (2) copies thereof being retained by Sy Hun Tek with another copy given to complainant.
Said affiant further avers that it was complainant who offered the mortgaged property in settlement of his indebtedness, which the
mortgagee accepted due to the formers insistence. Atty. Javier was requested to prepare the document embodying the dation in
payment, but for which legal services complainant likewise failed to pay the stipulated amount of P5,000.00, as well as the costs of
documentation and registration of the document, realty taxes and other assessments.chanrobles law library
Complainant, in his reply, 10 challenged the veracity of respondents statements in his answer and branded the letters allegation that
he merely acknowledged the mortgage deed as a brazen lie. He reiterated his previous allegations in his complaint and assailed the
authenticity of the cash vouchers presented in evidence as proof of his supposed receipt of the proceeds of the loan by disclaiming
having signed the same. While admitting that he filed the earlier petition for mandamus in an attempt to effect redemption, he denied
having proposed, much less insisted on, the dation in payment as a means to settle his indebtedness.
In addition to his testimony, complainant presented Arthur Liqueron, an employee of Security Bank and Trust Company, to testify on
the withdrawal made by Sy Hur Kiong from his current account deposit with said bank relative to the loan agreement, and Sy Hun
Kiong who testified on the incidents surrounding the loan and mortgage contracts.
Following the submission of the parties respective affidavits and memoranda and upon admission of all exhibits and testimonies of
the witnesses, the case was submitted for resolution on the following issues: (1) whether the amount of the loan was P50,000.00 or
P80,000.00, with complainant receiving either the net amount of P42,000.00 or P77,500.00: (2) whether or not complainant was
informed of the contents of the mortgage contract and furnished a copy thereof; and (3) whether or not complainant was fully apprised
that what respondent made him sign was a dacion en pago and given a copy thereof after its notarization by Respondent.
On the first issue, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found sufficient evidence to sustain complainants claim that with regard to
the obtention of the loan and the preparation, execution and notarization of the deed of real estate mortgage, he only dealt with the
mortgagees brother, Sy Hun Kiong, also known as Achiong, and that respondent, as family lawyer of the mortgagee, actually
prepared and notarized the deeds of real estate mortgage and dacion en pago. Thereafter, Sy Hun Kiong accompanied complainant to
the Security Bank and Trust Company where a withdrawal from the current account of New Manila Panasahan Marketing owned by
Sy Hun Kiong was made by a check in the amount of P50,000.00 from which P2,500 plus P5,000.00 were deducted as advance
payment of the first installment on the loan and expenses for the titling of the mortgaged property, respectively, leaving a net sum of
P42,500.00 for complainant.
The IBP commission extensively and correctly observed that
"From the context and on the face of the deed of real estate mortgage, it can also be gleaned that the actual loan obtained by the
complainant from Achiong or Sy Hun Kiong but placed in the mortgage in the name of the latters brother Sy Hun Tek, is only
P50,000.00 and the sum of P30,000.00, which is the total amount of the consideration of the mortgage is obviously for interest for one
year on the loan of P50,000.00. This is quite evident from the schedule and the amount of installment payable by the complainant as
stipulated in the mortgage, which schedule of installments is already hereinabove reproduced on page 3 hereof. Why is the sum of
P30,000.00 as stipulated in the mortgage made payable in 12 equal monthly installments at the rate of P2,500.00 beginning December
15, 1984 up to November 15, 1985? And why is the sum of P50,000.00 made payable in four quarterly equal installments at the rate of

P12,500.00? It is therefore quite very obvious that what the complainant received from Achiong or Sy Hun Kiong is a net amount of
P42,500.00, which is the balance of the P50,000.00 after deducting the first installment of P2,500.00 and another sum of P5,000.00
either for the respondent or for expenses for the titling of the mortgaged property. And still on top of the one year interest of
P30,000.00, the complainant, as stipulated in the mortgage, still had to pay interest at the legal rate on the total sum of P80,000.00.
"The conclusion therefore is that, indeed, the complainant actually received as loan under the deed of real estate mortgage only the
sum of P50,000.00." 11
We also find merit in its following findings on the second and third issues, and we accordingly approve and adopt the
same:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"As to the second and third issues, there are tell-tale indications in the record that the complainant, was not apprised in full by the
respondent of the total amount stated in the deed of real estate mortgage as his obligation thereunder, as well as of the terms and
conditions stipulated therein. What respondent merely told him was that he had to pay P2,500.00 per month under the mortgage (TSN,
Testimony of complainant, Hearing on April 12, 1989, pp. 42-43). And neither was the complainant given by the respondent a copy of
the deed of real estate mortgage as well as a copy of the dacion en pago contrary to the claim of both respondent and Achiong (par. 8Affidavit of Complainant, Exhibits D, D-1 to D-4; TSN, testimony of complainant, Hearing of April 12, 1989, p. 18). This finding is
strongly corroborated by the fact that sometime before he filed his petition (captioned For Mandamus already quoted above) with the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan, the complainant had to secure a copy of the mortgage from the Bureau of Records
Management. This certified copy of the mortgage was allegedly attached to the letter-complaint as Annex A thereof but it is nowhere
to be found in the record. A copy of the certified copy of the mortgage was produced by the complainants counsel during the hearing
before Commissioner Pineda, but the same was not submitted nor attached to the record, obviously because a xerox copy the said
mortgage was already marked and offered as evidence as Exhs. 4, 4-A, 4-D of Respondent. Had the complainant been given a copy of
the deed of real estate mortgage as claimed by the respondent and by Achiong, he would not have taken the trouble of securing a
certified copy thereof from the Bureau of Records Management.
"It is also quite relevant to note that said petition For Mandamus was filed with the Regional Trial Court on September 26, 1986,
which is less than one year from November 15, 1985, after which later date the mortgage as stipulated therein, could be extrajudicially foreclosed. So that complainants petition to compel redemption of the mortgaged property was timely instituted because the
mortgage could be foreclosed only after November 15, 1985. However, because of the failure of the complainant and his counsel to
amend the petition as ordered by the RTC, the petition was dismissed by the Court (Annex 2 of respondents Answer, p. 26, Record).
"The complainant was not also informed by the respondent that what he was made by the respondent to sign when he failed to pay
several overdue installments is the dacion en pago, nor was the complainant given by the respondent a copy of the dacion en pago.
This finding could be gleaned from the fact that complainants petition filed with the Regional Trial Court only referred to the deed of
real estate mortgage. It was only sometime in September 1988 that the complainant had knowledge for the first time of the dacion en
pago when he received a copy of the respondents answer to which was attached, among other documents, a copy of the dacion en
pago as Annex 3 thereof. For, if the respondent gave the complainant a copy of the dacion en pago after it was notarized by the
respondent, the complainant and his lawyer, Atty. Vicente Peala, would not have missed to file at the start a complaint for annulment
of the dacion en pago on the ground of fraud, instead of filing the petition for mandamus to compel the mortgagee Sy Hun Tek and
his vendee Enrico Perez to allow the redemption of the mortgaged property.
"For another thing, there are also some indications in the record that the respondent purposely maneuvered, obviously upon the
instigation of his clients Sy Hun Tek and the latters vendee, Enrico Perez, the signing by the complainant of some blank long bond
which turned out to be the dacion en pago. In this connection, it is important to note once again that the mortgage, as stipulated
therein, could only be foreclosed after November 15, 1985. According to the complainant, when he failed to pay several overdue
installments on the mortgage, the respondent made him sign some blank long bond paper while he was sick in his house, without the
respondent telling him the real purpose of his signing. What the respondent told the complainant on that occasion was that it was
merely a document wherein the complainant recognized that he was already in arrears in the payment of the installments on his
mortgage obligation. (TSN, Hearing, June 9, 1989, pp. 23-24; Hearing, April 12, 1989, pp. 28-30). But there is nothing in the
mortgage which stipulates that the mortgage could be foreclosed upon mere failure of the complainant to pay any installments on their
respective due dates. It is hardly credible that the complainant could have agreed to sign the blank bond paper had he been informed
by the respondent that it was to be a dacion en pago. This is because the mortgage could not yet be foreclosed when he was made by
the respondent to sign the blank bond paper on April 26, 1985, for the mortgage, as stipulated therein, could only be foreclosed after
November 15, 1985. It is therefore quite reasonable that had the respondent informed him of the real purpose of his signing the
document, the complainant would naturally NOT agree to sign the document, for not only he still had six (6) months and 18 days
within which to pay in full his mortgage obligation but also he had one year from the foreclosure of the mortgage within which to
redeem the property, which he tried to do but failed, not knowing then that what he was made to sign by the respondent turned out to

be the dacion en pago.

"From all the foregoing, it can be safely concluded that the failure of the complainant to recover his mortgaged property is because of
respondents deliberate failure to furnish timely the complainant copies of the deed of real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago
which he prepared and notarized and in concealing from the complainant the true context and purpose of the said documents. In one
word, the respondent is guilty of deceit." 12
At this juncture, a brief resume of the relevant principia on ethics in the legal profession would be apropos.chanrobles law library : red
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. 13 The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by
clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. 14
The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can
do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. 15 To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in
the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. 16
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. 17 A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice
law during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and it declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. 18 Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice
law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him. based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. 19 It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish the attorney. 20
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counsellor which include
the statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. These statutory grounds are so broad as to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. 21 It is a settled rule that the enumeration of the
statutory grounds for disciplinary action is not exclusive and a lawyer may be disciplined on grounds other than those specifically
provided in the law. 22 Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, 23 in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court, 24 or an unfit or unsafe person to en joy the privileges and to manage the business of others in the capacity of an
attorney, 25 or for conduct which tends to bring, reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.
26 Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt, of the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 27
In all cases, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion, 28 mindful always of the fact that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary action and should be
resorted to only in cases where the lawyer demonstrates an attitude or course of conduct wholly inconsistent with approved
professional standards. In cases of lighter offenses or of first delinquency, an order of suspension, which is correctional in nature,
should be inflicted. 29 In view of the nature and consequences of a disciplinary proceeding, observance of due process, as in other
judicial determinations, is imperative along with a presumption of innocence in favor of the lawyer. 30 Consequently, the burden of
proof is on the complainant to overcome such presumption and establish his charges by clear preponderance of evidence. 31
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondents failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance
with the strictures of the lawyers oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby
occasioning unwarranted inconvenience and hardship on complainant. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of
his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
While complainant should have been more discerning and less gullible in his business dealings, nonetheless respondent lawyer should
likewise have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeates every aspect of a transaction for which his services have been
engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. If respondent was indeed the reasonably prudent and
respectable attorney that he represents himself to be, instead of taking undue advantage of the naivate and lack of education of
complainant, he should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the parties
in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him; failing therein, and with his advanced age duly
considered, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion, albeit apparently his first.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Adriano S. Javier, Sr. from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months from notice, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a
copy of this resolution be spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and duly circularized to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

RURAL BANK OF SILAY, INC.,

complainant, vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO H.PILLA,
respondent.
Respondent executed a REM in favour of the complainant over a parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidental, as an attorney in fact of
the registered owners, Pedro Torres and Oscar Granada together with an SPA which was purportedly authorized by the owners to
mortgagethe land in favour of the complainant.The complainant released a loan in the amount of 91,427 Php in favour of the
respondent.Later, the complainant found out that the respondent was not authorized by Oscar Granada tomortgage the land when he
was joined as defendant for removal of cloud on title with preliminary injunction and damages.Granada specifically denied having
executed an SPA to respondent to support the said loan.The trial court decided against the respondent, and held that the SPA was
forged and falsified because the spouses Granada have not signed the same. The respondent did not appeal from thesaid judgment. The
foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the complainant Bank aforged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of
obtaining a loan is a betrayal of hisoath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct herein has forfeited his right
tocontinue further in the practice of law.Respondent refuted the charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him.Upon the instance
of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceitand gross misconduct against him. Respondent denied
employing any deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural bank. According to respondent,he did not know
that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorneyappointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The
special power of attorney purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros Occidentalin favor of
complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if indeed said document wasforged, he was not a party to the forgery. IBP
recommended he be suspended for 5 yearswhich was later reduced to 3.
Issue:WON the respondent is guilty of deceit and gross misconduct.
Held: SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARSSince respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a handin
the falsification of the same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption with his barefaced denial that he had no
knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give credence to
respondents negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of attorney issuedin his favor was falsified. As a lawyer,
respondent knows or ought to know that parties to a public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest that the
same is their own free act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement, respondent caused the special power of attorney to be
notarized without the parties appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to complainant rural bank
in order to obtaina loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that respondent had a hand in the falsification of thedocument especially
considering that it was he who chiefly benefited from it.
Indeed, the settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document
is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. Further, if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), takingadvantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.

Respondents acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof,
which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The fact that the conduct pertained to respondents private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A lawyer may
besuspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as longas it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the

practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar . Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP
that respondent be suspendedfrom the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.

Sebastian vs. Calis, A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999

Facts:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the respondent who promised to
process all necessary documents required for complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of
her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters Development Bank Check No.
12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of
said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of. 156) and a
list of questions which would be asked during interviews.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer
married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was furnished documents to support
her assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was
assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the
promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by complainant, but the
corresponding receipt was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to her on her departure which
was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P.
Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the
Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone
call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in
Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport and brought
her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainants passport with a promise that he
will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she demanded for the return
of her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of
One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu
attending to business matters.

In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent had transferred to an
unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.

Held:
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character.This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law.We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.We must stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard.
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the
summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in removing
respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward
complainant.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000]
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOTCATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs.LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO
MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete
City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages.
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that there was already
a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D, which originally formed part
of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are coowners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order for partition but there is no showing
that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was
registered in the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Korte
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot
No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the
names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August
1927.[1] On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639.[2] Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an order[3] directing the parties to
subdivide said lot into six portions as follows: Rtcspped
a) Hermogenes Olis - lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis - lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot - lot 1639-C
d) Roberto (Alberto) - lot 1639-D
Maglucot
e) Anselmo Lara - lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot - lot 1639-F.[4]
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both
surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents
built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who
represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped
paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo. Sdaadsc
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax declarations in the names of
Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Olis (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) [5] as indubitable proof that there
was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents predecessor-in-interest, took active part in the
partition as it was he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition.[6] The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which
states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no court order
showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-ininterest, to deny the existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim that there was one. [7] Said court,
likewise, ruled that the tax declarations[8] over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of
Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot by the latter.[9]
The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows: Missdaa
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants
ordering the latter:
1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs; Slxmis
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees;
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to
the time they actually vacate the premises in question; Sclaw
4. To pay the costs.[10]

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by
petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition.[11] The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639. Slxsc
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
I
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL; THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY BY THE
DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D, HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;
III
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND
AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF
THE CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD
ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT
PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENED
DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE;[12]
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of
them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred
by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.[13] Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding
for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not
agreeable to the partition.[14] Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective
houses that they are "constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot."[15] Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are
estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and
respondents acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the
present.[16]
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the
interested parties were apprised or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently
confirmed the same.[17] Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition.[18] Third,
they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing
no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever.[19]
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we find that the petition is meritorious.
As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.Scslx
Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following
instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record."[20] This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC,
are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine whether indeed there
was partition. Slx
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which determines whether a coownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the

parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. [21] The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken
up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with
an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either
case i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by
any party aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. [22]
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable.
[23]
The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the
partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the
case, it has become final and executory and cannot now be disturbed. Mesm
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the
trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is
interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.[24] An order for partition is final and not
interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. [25]
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso,[26] which held that the
order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial
court are not binding.[27] In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless,
where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot
thereafter question the decree,[28] especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the
execution of the commission.[29] Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision
plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco.[30] In that case, the order was clearly
interlocutory since it required the parties " to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order
appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the
parties. Calrky
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties.
[31]
However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision
plan. The purpose of court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court
approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but
only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan. Kycalr
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. [32] By virtue
of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639.[33]It was only in 1952 when the petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have
said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch
plan. Such possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty (40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties
therein. Further, it appears that said court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance with
the sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual backdrop, said court ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to
approve the tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having occupied
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision
plan which would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession of the
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan. Kyle

It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and
conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. [34] It follows that a party to a partition is also
barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where
respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are
estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party.[35] A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument.
[36]
In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it
in part. They must accept all or none.[37]Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently
attacking its validity of any part of it.[38] Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already
occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be
heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in
accordance with the sketch plan. Exsm
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have
placed reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount
to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance of
benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon
knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his own.[39] Ratification means that one under
no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction
would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.[40]
The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they
were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting
an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to
Ruperta Salma were for the payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that the parties would be
unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show
that a tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax declarations for specific portions
of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily
verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D
is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right
which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.[41] Since the possession of respondents were found to be that
of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from
1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. Msesm
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. [42] Thus, after a long possession in
severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed.[43] It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land,
improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an
actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. [44] And where
a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and called by the name of one
of the tenants in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that
there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name it bears.[45]
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT
No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is
shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of
partition. Esmso
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who
may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their
obligations thereunder.[46] As originally conceived, registration is merely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is never
necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the parties.[47] Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to
prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that recorded instruments exist and are genuine. [48]
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent
thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions
of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of
the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any change

in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents
rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in
1952 were the bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952
having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the
actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for
a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already wellsettled. In Espina vs. Abaya,[49] we declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal,[50] reiterated in Tan vs. Lim,[51] this
Court has ruled, thus:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral partition when it has been
completely or partly performed. Esmmis
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where the
parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of
the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has
been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree
title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the
rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of
individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the
purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking
possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to
take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between
tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the
parties. Esmsc
Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio
Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the houses of respondents
were built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot. Esm
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents were informed that petitioners were going
to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house
of said witness and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot.[52] Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because
they also intend to use the lot for a residential purpose.[53] This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and the CA
did not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why
would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the
petitioners and that they are not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D. Chief
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot, [54] Tax
Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot,[55] Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the names of
Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida[56] showing that the houses of the above-mentioned persons are constructed on the land of Roberto
Maglucot[57] constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot.
Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents therein are presumed to be true and
accurate.[58] The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their
respective declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other
evidence. Jksm
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in
their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said
lot showing the partition into six portions.[59]
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review on certiorari. Thrice in
the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records
and lack of study of the law "by the researcher."[60] Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without
reference to the record"[61] that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for
petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher." [62]

Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart from the persons that comprise
it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is
highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be
reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings
and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts.[63]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby REINSTATED. h Y
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santaigo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4807

March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT
JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof,viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should
he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer
most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to
advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely,
Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the
hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of
Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his
knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in
effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all
civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of
any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion,
formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time
with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of
Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine
students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students,
namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven,
Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who
apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary
Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and
unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement of
Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was
still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled
students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement

of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997,
of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology,
dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter
of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997
with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with
the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for
defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado
Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case
against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then
already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although
aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil
Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons
of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a
lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied
by the Manifestation1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a ReAdmission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative
proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them.1wphi1
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings;
nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and
the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3324

February 9, 2000

PASTOR EDWIN VILLARIN, PACIANO DE VEYRA, SR., and BARTOLOME EVAROLO, SR., complainants,
vs.
ATTY. RESTITUTO SABATE, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
BUENA, J.:
Complainants Pastor Edwin Villarin, Paciano de Veyra, Sr. and Bartolome Evarolo, Sr. prays that administrative sanctions be imposed
on respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. for not having observed honesty and utmost care in the performance of his duties as notary
public.
In their Affidavit-Complaint,1 complainants alleged that through their counsel Atty. Eduardo D. Estores, they filed a complaint against
Paterno Diaz, et al. under SEC Case No. DV091, Region XI Davao Extension Office, Davao City.
Respondents in the SEC Case filed their "Motion to Dismiss With Answer To Villarin's Et. Al., Complaint To The Securities and
Exchange Commission"2 prepared and notarized by Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. The verification of the said pleading reads:
V E R I F I C AT I O N
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY) S.S.
WE, REV. PASTORS PATERNO M. DIAZ, MANUEL DONATO, ULYSSES CAMAGAY, LEVI PAGUNSAN, ALEJANDRO
BOFETIADO, All of legal ages after having been sworn in accordance with law depose and say:
1. That we were the one who caused the above writings to be written;
2. That we have read and understood all statements therein and believed that all are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and
belief.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF hereunto affixed our signatures on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines.
By: (Sgd.) Lilian C. Diaz

(Sgd.) Camagay

(Sgd.) M Donato

By: (Sgd.) Atty. Restituto B. Sabate

(Sgd.) Dr. Levi Pagunsan

(Sgd.) Pastor A. Bofetiado

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before the above-named affiants on the 6th day of February, 1989 at the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines.
(Sgd.) RESTITUTO B. SABATE, JR.
Notary Public3
Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but that of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the signatures
of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for them; and that herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it
appear that said persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so. Complainants averred that respondent's act
undermined the public's confidence for which reason administrative sanctions should be imposed against him.
In his Answer,4 respondent alleged that Paterno Diaz, Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado swore to the correctness of the
allegations in the motion to dismiss/pleading for the SEC through their authorized representatives known by their names as Lilian C.
Diaz, wife of Paterno Diaz, and Atty. Restituto B. Sabate, Jr. manifested by the word "By" which preceded every signature of said
representatives. Respondent allegedly signed for and in the interest of his client backed-up by their authorization 5; and Lilian Diaz was
authorized to sign for and in behalf of her husband as evidenced by a written authority.6 Respondent alleged that on the strength of the
said authorizations he notarized the said document.
Respondent also alleged that in signing for and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by the word
"By" which suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact that
his clients authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the respondent
and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with. Respondent further alleged that the complaint is malicious
and anchored only on evil motives and not a sensible way to vindicate complainants' court losses, for respondent is only a lawyer

defending a client and prayed that the case be dismissed with further award for damages to vindicate his honor and mental anguish as
a consequence thereof.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate,
Jr. be suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of six (6) months. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines adopted the said recommendation and resolved to suspend the respondent's Commission for six (6) months for
failure to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. notarized the Motion to Dismiss With Answer
prepared by him which pleading he signed for and in behalf of Levi Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado (while Lilian Diaz signed for
her husband Pastor Diaz), three of the respondents in the SEC case, with the word "By" before their signatures, because he was their
counsel in said case and also because he was an officer of the religious sect and corporation represented by the respondents-Pastors.
But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that the same cannot be condoned. He failed to state
in the preliminary statements of said motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by their designated attorneys-in-fact.
Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he appeared before himself as Notary Public.1wphi1.nt
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. 7 That function would be
defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity
thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position, and the very
purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.8
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal,
if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.9
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same
are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts they have personal
knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through any representative. Otherwise, their representative's names should
appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same and that is only the time they can affix their signatures and personally
appear before the notary public for notarization of said document.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such
duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of
the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must
now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion.10
That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an individual,
and even more so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times. 11 For notarizing the
Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not before him and for notarizing the same
instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED
from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96

F: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal advice were
given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth. Petitioner refuses to provide
information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was sought from them and it may breach
the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.

I: WON fiduciary duty may be asserted by petitioner on refusal to disclose names of their clients (privilege information)
R: SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship
with their client.
As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1.

The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

2.

Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.

3.

Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.

4.

With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.

EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:

1.

Strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought
the lawyers advice.

2.

Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)

3.

Government lawyers have no case against the lawyers client unless by revealing the clients name it would provide them the
only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (present in this case)

4.

Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)

5.

Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential.

Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901:Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the
course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as
currently worded provides:Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment,
can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity. 29Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:Sec. 20. It is the duty of
an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.This duty is explicitly
mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of
his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of
the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great
trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not
that of his client.

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4058. March 12, 1998]
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no violation of its code of conduct. Accordingly, a
lawyer who trifles with judicial processes, engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in his pleadings must be sanctioned.
The Case

This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) before this
Court on July 5, 1993, seeking his removal or suspension from the bar for forum shopping, which amounted to grave misconduct, x x
x unduly delaying the administration of justice, and violating with impunity his oath of office and applicable laws and
jurisprudence.[1]
After the respondent submitted his Comment, dated August 21, 1993, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) on September 27, 1993 for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 15, 1997, we received a resolution from the
IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent guilty of violating Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, viz:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-149
Adm. Case NO. 4058
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
Atty. Ernesto B. Flores
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, hereinmade [sic] part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding
the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty.
Ernesto Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for violating the provision of Canon[s] 10 and 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[2]
The Facts

Because the parties[3] agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence, the case was submitted for resolution on the
basis of their documentary evidence. As found by Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, the facts are as follows:
x x x. On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando of the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration
Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City, issued a Writ of Execution (x x x) in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84 to
enforce the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1992 in G.R. No. 89070 (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 209 SCRA 55). The Writ of Execution was issued on motion of Benguet Electric Cooperative (BENECO for short) to collect
the amount of P344,000.00 which it paid to Peter Cosalan during the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, on the basis of
its decision ordering the respondent board members to reimburse petitioner BENECO any amount that it may be compelled to pay to
respondent Cosalan by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen.
After issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent, as new counsel for the losing litigant-members of the BENECO Board of
Directors, filed a Motion for Clarification with the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070, the minute resolution to
wit: to note without action the aforesaid motion.
Thereafter, the respondent instituted a suit docketed as Civil Case NO. 2738-R (x x x) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio
City, seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the said writ of
execution. That case, however, was dismissed by the Presiding Judge Clarence Villanueva in his Order dated March 18, 1993 (x x x).
Accordingly, the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC, Baguio City, through Sheriff III Wilfredo Mendez, proceeded to levy on the
properties of the losing board members of BENECO. Thus, a sale at public auction was set on June 1, 1993, at 10:00 oclock in the
morning in front of the Baguio City Hall, per Sheriffs Notice of Sale dated May 4, 1993 (x x x), of the properties of Abundio Awal
and Nicasio Aliping[,] two of the losing members of the Board of Directors of BENECO in the aforementioned case.
Respondent claims in his comment (x x x) that Branch 7, motu proprio, dismissed Civil Case No. 2738-R for lack of jurisdiction on
March 18,1993, which dismissal was [sic] became final due to respondents failure to perfect an appeal therefrom which claim
according to the complainant, constitute[s] deliberate misrepresentation, if not falsehood, because the respondent indeed interposed an
appeal such that on May 11, 1993, the RTC 7 of Baguio City transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 2738-R to the Court of
Appeals per certified machine copy of the letter transmittal of same date (x x x).
While respondent never essentially intended to assail the issuance by the NLRC of the Writ of Execution x x x nor sought to undo it
(x x x) the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R which he filed prays for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary writ of injunction for defendants Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio City Sheriff to cease and desist from enforcing the

execution and levy of the writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action in said court (x x x)
which complainant likewise claims as an unprocedural maneuver to frustrate the execution of the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 89070 in complete disregard of settled jurisprudence that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions
which arise and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders and awards rendered in labor cases citing the case of Cangco vs.
CA, 199 SCRA 677, a display of gross ignorance of the law.
On May 26, 1993, respondent again filed for Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad,
Benguet, separate complaints for Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, Ope Lege, and thus Exempt from Levy and
Execution the subject properties with Damages, etc. docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 93-F-0414 (x x x) and 93-F-0415 (x x x), which are
essentially similar actions to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-0313-84. He also filed an
urgent Motion Ex-parte (x x x) praying for temporary restraining order in these two (2) cases.
The complainant further alleges that respondents claim for damages against the defendant Sheriff is another improper and
unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a violation of respondents oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said Sheriff was
merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job.
Recommendation of the IBP

As noted earlier, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended, and the IBP Board of Governors concurred, that
respondent be suspended from the bar for six months for:
1. Falsehood, for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738R was not appealed on time
2. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping
Commissioner Jose ratiocinated:
A cursory glance of (sic) x x x the complaint filed by the respondent in Civil Case No. 2738-R before the RTC of Baguio City, which
complaint was signed and verified under oath by the respondent, reveals that it lacks the certification required by Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91 which took effect on January 1, 1992 to the effect that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding
is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency. If there is any other action
pending, he must state the status of the same. If he should learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or pending before
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency[,] he should notify the court, tribunal or
agency within five (5) days from such notice.
Among the other penalties, the said circular further provides that the lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for
non-compliance thereof.
In sum, it is clear that the respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility under
which the lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court and exert[s] every effort and consider[s] it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.[4]
This Courts Ruling

We adopt and affirm the recommendation of the IBP suspending the respondent from the bar, but we increase the period from six (6)
months to one (1) year and six (6) months.
Forum Shopping

Circular No. 28-91,[5] dated September 4, 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992, requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to
be attached to petitions filed before this Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994. The IBP
found that the respondent had violated it, because the complaint he filed before the RTC of Baguio City lack[ed] the certification
required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.[6]
We distinguish. Respondents failure to attach the said certificate cannot be deemed a violation of the aforementioned circular,
because the said requirement applied only to petitions filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals. [7] Likewise inapplicable is
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994 which extended the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping to
all initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than this Court and the Court of Appeals. Circular No. 0494 became effective only on April 1, 1994, but the assailed complaint for injunction was filed on March 18, 1993, and the petition for
the constitution of a family home was instituted on May 26, 1993.
Be that as it may, respondent is still guilty of forum shopping. In Chemphil Export and Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
[8]
this Court declared that (t)he rule against forum shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars [9] of this Court merely

formalized the prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against transgressors. The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of
Rule 16 and Section 4 of Rule 2 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provide:
SECTION 1. Grounds. -- Within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx
(e)

xxx

That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

xxx xxx

xxx[10]

SEC. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action. -- If two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of
action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1 (e) of Rule 16, and a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others.[11]
The prohibition is also contained in Circular No. 28-91. This circular did not only require that a certification of non-forum shopping
be attached to the petitions filed before this Court or the Court of Appeals; it also decreed that forum shopping constituted direct
contempt of court and could subject the offending lawyer to disciplinary action. The third paragraph thereof reads:
3. Penalties.
(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint.
(b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer wit the filing of multiple petitions and complaints to ensure
favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court.
(c) The submission of false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of Court, without prejudice to
the filing of criminal action against the guilty party. The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The foregoing were substantially reproduced in Revised Circular No. 28-91[12] and Administrative Circular No. 04-94.[13]
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another,[14] or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[15] The most important
factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. [16]
After this Court rendered its Decision[17] in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.[18] and
upon motion of BENECO, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of execution[19] ordering the clerk of court and ex officio
city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction personal and real property of the members
of the Board of Directors of BENECO.
On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board Members Victor Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo
Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
preserve the status quo as now obtaining between the parties, as well as a writ of preliminary preventive injunction ordering the clerk
of court and the ex officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to cease and desist from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of
execution from the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action raised in court. [20]
When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores filed with another branch of the RTC two identical but separate actions
both entitled Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc.,
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415.[21] The said complaints were supplemented by an Urgent Motion Ex
Parte[22] which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of
plaintiffs property to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment of the court later in this [sic] cases, until further
determined by the court.
Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. Modequillo vs. Breva,[23] reiterated in Manacop vs. Court of Appeals,
[24]
shows the frivolity of these proceedings:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually
resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

xxx.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Adhering to the Courts declaration in said cases, the subject properties are deemed constituted as family homes by operation of law
under Article 153 of the Family Code.
The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and unnecessary; they were clearly asking for reliefs identical
to the prayer previously dismissed by another branch of the RTC, i.e., to forestall the execution of a final judgment of the labor
arbiter. That they were filed ostensibly for the judicial declaration of a family home was a mere smoke screen; in essence, their real
objective was to restrain or delay the enforcement of the writ of execution. In his deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief in two
different courts, Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a friendly forum which would capitulate to his improvident plea for
an injunction and was thereby trifling with the judicial process. [25]
We remind the respondent that, under the Code of Professional Responsibility,[26] he had a duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.[27] The Code also enjoins him from unduly delaying a case by impeding the execution of a judgment or by
misusing court processes.[28]
In consonance with Millare vs. Montero[29] and Garcia vs. Francisco,[30] respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for
one year. In Millare, the respondent filed with different courts a total of six appeals, complaints and petitions which frustrated and
delayed the execution of a final judgment. Holding that respondent made a mockery of the judicial processes and disregarded
canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered
[and], thus, abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice, [31] this Court suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for one year.
In Garcia, the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law, for violating the proscription against forum
shopping. This Court held that he deserve[d] to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to
other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.[32]
Falsehood

The investigating commissioner also held respondent liable for committing a falsehood because, in this administrative case, he stated
in his comment that he had not perfected an appeal on the dismissal of his petition for injunction. In his said comment, the
respondent stated:
Branch 7 (of the RTC) motu proprio, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on March 18, 1993. Not having perfected an appeal
on the dismissal, the order of dismissal became final under the Rules 15 days after its receipt by respondent on record, or before April
6, 1993. So that today this case is no longer pending.
xxx.
It should be noted that when Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 for family homes and damages were filed in the court below
on May 26, 1993, Civil Case NO. 2378-R which seems to give basis to the present Complaint was deemed terminated, there being no
appeal formally taken and perfected in accordance with the Rules.
xxx.
And that precisely was the primal reason why respondent decided not to appeal any further anymore [sic] the order of dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction of the court below in Civil Case No. 2738, and let it be deemed final by the Rules and
jurisprudence.[33] (Underscoring supplied.)
The indelible fact, however, is that respondent did file an appeal which was perfected later on. The original records of the injunction
suit had been transmitted to the appellate court.[34] Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dismissing the appeal.[35] Thus,
in denying that he had appealed the decision of the RTC, respondent was making a false statement.
Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his appeal means that no appeal was made under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court. The pertinent provisions of Rule 50[36]read:
SEC. 2. Effect of dismissal.-- Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the clerk shall return to the court below the record on
appeal with a certificate under the seal of the court showing that the appeal has been dismissed. Upon the receipt of such certificate in
the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had ever been taken, and the judgment of the said court may be enforced
with the additional costs allowed by the appellate court upon dismissing the appeal.

xxx xxx

xxx

SEC. 4. Withdrawal of appeal.-- An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of appellees brief. x x x. The
withdrawal of an appeal shall have the same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this rule.
Respondents explanation misses the point. True, he withdrew his appeal. But it is likewise true that he had actually filed an appeal,
and that this was perfected. False then is his statement that no appeal was perfected in the injunction suit. Worse, he made the
statement before this Court in order to exculpate himself, though in vain, from the charge of forum shopping.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
courts.[37] He shall neither do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any. He also has a duty not to mislead or allow the courts to
be misled by any artifice.[38]
For this offense, we suspend the respondent from the practice of law for another year. True, in Ordonio vs. Eduarte,[39] Porac
Trucking, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals[40] and Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC,[41] we imposed a suspension of only six months for a similar
malfeasance. But in Flores case, his falsehood is aggravated by its brazenness, for it was committed in an attempt, vain as it was, to
cover up his forum shopping.
Before we close, we note that this simple case was referred to the IBP on September 27, 1993. It was deemed submitted for resolution
per the investigating commissioners order dated May 10, 1995. However, the investigating commissioner submitted his report only
on May 5, 1997. Moreover, the IBP transmitted its recommendation to the Court only through a letter dated July 31, 1997, which was
received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 15, 1997. Why it took the IBP almost four years to finish its investigation of
the case and over two years from the date the parties filed their last pleadings to resolve it escapes us. After all, the case did not
require any trial-type investigation, and the parties submitted only documentary evidence to prove or rebut their respective
cases. Thus, we find it opportune to urge the IBP to hasten the disposition of administrative cases and to remind it that this Court
gives it only ninety days to finish its investigation, report and recommendation. Should it require more time, it should file with the
Court a request for extension, giving the reason for such request.
WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping, Respondent Ernesto B. Flores is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and, for violating his oath and the Canon of
Professional Responsibility to do no falsehood, he is SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1) YEAR, resulting in a total period of
TWO (2) YEARS, effective upon finality of this Decision. He isWARNED that a repetition of a similar misconduct will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in his files which are with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ. Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO and LORENA
AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, J.:

In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the petitioners, to show cause
why he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility considering:
. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read the petition as borne out by the following statement:
". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same
has "failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned
judgment". . .
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his use of intemperate language in the petition, as
exemplified by his characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party";
as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious
character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom;
and by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused with that confusion which is the natural product of having been
born, nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent Judge,
the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his Honor was already either PublicProsecutor or RTC Judge; in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the Provincial Road, about 6
kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable attire, and dignified
"mien"; and his charge that the respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a scheme to unlawfully deprive
petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30 May 1994, by
describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and
blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber" (Petition, pp.
13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12 bottom, p.
13 top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed particularly
when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and
therefore stands in dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this
Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled
to the honors of being dealt with administratively or otherwise.
and prays:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from
turning the undersigned into a martyr to his principles.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all
read the petition in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief."
perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution.
Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he
volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator,"
"abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the
falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and
"blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September
1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon which his
defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and phrase to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case,
Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of
the First Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn
duty to render justice, thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of "encouraging

discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously
uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision
if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition
for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has
equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and
eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which reads as follows:
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his
duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to conduct
that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs. Albert,
57 Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what
he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 1617 [1970]), stated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex rel.
Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not
to promote distrust in the administration in the administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a lawyer
should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment
of the liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." [People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael C. Climaco,
55 SCRA 107 [1974]).
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a
citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re:Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]),
this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judge, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiency of out
judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, or no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright
bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216).

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a
sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the
assertion of their client's rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe ech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important
public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration justice. There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system
of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted
by the general community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust
in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the
members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and
abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68
SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers
Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation against this Court,
particularly the Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious.
Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who
"seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his
own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238
[1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in
his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays
that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the
"RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can extenuate his
liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier
adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B. Tiongco in this Court.
Padilla, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., took no part.