Fall

Intelligence Efforts in the American

Revolution:
Patriotism or Pragmatism?
Prospectus, Historiographical Analysis, Annotated
Bibliography

Kyli Stoner
Junior Research Seminar
May 7, 2015

08

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Prospectus:
The years between 1775 and 1783 are arguably the most trying years of our
nations history. This period in time is unique in its own right. The Revolutionary War
created the United States of America as we know it today. The seven years that the
Continental and British armies fought were brutish, trying, and incredibly difficult for the
colonists. The Revolutionary War was a hard-fought and well-deserved victory on all
fronts. Of course, the battles themselves were vital to ensure victory on the patriot side,
but there are other notable factors that won the war for America. The behind the scenes
work is just as, if not more important than the combat the soldiers endured. The
Continental army was not very successful during the entire length of the Revolution.
They were victorious here and there, but small victories at most. Until the Battle of
Torktown, they were outnumvered and had much less discipline and training than the
British. The patriots needed an ulterior motive in order to get and edge up on the enemy,
since their military was so weak. The patriots were going to have to get inside
information in order to try to be on the offensive. The American intelligence system as
we know it today stemmed from an intelligence collection in the American Revolution.
Espionage plays a key role in any countrys affairs, but it was pivitol in the victory and
success of the patriot movement in the Revolutionary War.

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Historiographical Analysis:
The literature on Revolutionary American Intelligence efforts is very scarce.
Studying espionage itself is very new to American History. Another reason why there are
limited sources is because of the lack of primary sources. Up until the early 1900s, the
identities of the spies and intelligence masters were not known. Because of this,
historioans have not had much time to develop intensive research on the subject. Of the
authors who have written on the subject, there is some debate as to the causes, natrye, and
motivations of not only the intelligence movemebt itself, but but of the men that played
key roles in the development of the movement. There are to main schools that the
historians are divided into. The first is that the men who were involved in intelligence
activities of the American Revolution were true patriots, and their contributions as
passionate Americans is what made intelligence successful. The second school is that
intelligence operations succeeded because it was necessary for survival, not because of
the virtue of the men that were in leadership positions. Within the sources being
examined, there is a huge gap in time from the publication dates. This justifies that the
subject of Revolutinoary War Intelligence efforts is a new field and historians are just
starting to scrape the surface of the weath of knowledge available. Because of this, there
is no real progression from one authors ideas to the next. There are also different kinds
of authors within the variety of texts. Historians and military personnel are all included in
the Historiographical analysis. When examining the sources, the question that will
hopefully be answered is whether or not the background of the authors reflects what
school they fall into. Instead of examining the sources in a chronological manner,

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which will not assist the analysis, the sources will be analyzed based on the authors
backgrounds and professions.
Morton Pennypacker wrote the book General Washingtons Spies: On Long
Island and in New York in 1939. He is the first historian to study the subject of
Revolutionary War intelligence efforts because he identified the names of the men who
were involved in the mist successful operation, the Culper Spy Ring. Pennypacker set the
precedent for all future studies of this subject. Pennypacker falls within the first school
mentioned. He values the men in the operation not only as key players in the success of
the Revolution, but describes them as demigods. The men who participated in the
operations possessed strength of characternerve, poisefearlessness.1 The men who
were leaders in the operations were so passionate, patriotic, and fearless that they were
the reason why intelligence was successful in the Revolution.
Jumping to 2008, Alexander Rose is the author of Washingtons Spies: The Story of
Americas First Spy Ring. He defends the patriot spymasters the same way the
Pennypacker does. He does thouroughly expand on Pennypackers ideas, though. Rose is
claiming that the technology is better than it was in Pennypackers day, so more
information is being discovered and released, thus making it easier to justify a historical
argument. Rose acknowledges Nathan Hales attempt at collecting pieces of information
was a miserable failure, but he brings to light Washingtons reevaluation and persistence
with the operation.2 He fixed mistakes to ensure the Culper Spy Rings success, therefore
1

Morton Pennypacker, George Washingtons Spies: On Long

Island and in New York (Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society,
1939), 1.

2 Alexander Rose, Washingtons Spies: The Story of Americas First Spy

Ring (New York: Bantam Books, 2006), 34.

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winning the war for America. Rose is a historian, earning his docorate at Cambridge
University. His educational background allows him to look further into the motives of the
men who were vital aspects of intelligence operations, instead of solely the practical
aspects of creating an intelligence ring. Rose, almost 70 years later, takes Pennypackers
ideas and expands on them with even more research and analysis.
George Washington on Leadership takes a different approach with intelligence research.
Richard Brookhiser argues in his 2008 work that Americas greatest leader was George
Washington because of what he did, who he knew, and what he thought.3 This book is
philosophical in nature. His research on Washington continues the conversation
between the sources being examined. This book is an excellent window into the success
of the intelligence community. This books fits into this school because Brookhiser
argues that successes in the Revolution were due to Washington as a leader and a human
being. There is a chapter in the book that focuses on his involvement with the intelligence
movement, specifically Benedict Arnolds betrayal. He worships Washington for his
patience, demeanor, and skill as a fair, but cunning leader. Within this school especially in
this work, the historians are arguing that a greater good exists and that the men in the
Revolution knew this and would fight for that good no matter what. The men were
virtuous, as leaders, like Washington, or as regular patriots who came straight from the
home front to risk their lives for that greater good.
The last book being examined in the first school is the most passionate of the other
works. George Washingtons Secret Six: The Spy Ring That Saved The American
Revolution was written in 2013. This book is specialized on the Culper Spy Ring and its
3 Richard Brookhiser, George Washington on Leadership (New York:
Basic Books, 2008), 127.

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specific actions. Brian Kilmeade argues that the Culper Spy Ring changed the course of
history and won the American Revolution. All Americans owe tremendous gratitude to
George Washingtons Secret Six. Beyond that claim, the reason why the spies
identities were not revealed until 200 years later is because the men were humble and did
not seek fame from their works. The men had such a love of country that they tried their
hardest to not reveal their identities and were successful.4 Kilmeades work takes the first
school to its limits. Kilmeade portrayed the men as virtuous, selfless individuals who
only had a love of country, and created and participated in the intelligence communities
because of that, not out of necessity for survival or economic gain.
The research of this subkect has a polar opposite within the historical literature. The
school that these works fall into is that the intelligence operations were created and
succeeded because of necessity for survival, not the virtues and the passions of the men
that were involved. A Short History of Espionage, written by Colonel Allison Ind in 1963,
is the earliest of the sources in this school. This work is not specialized. There is only a
short chapter on Revolutionary War intelligence efforts. That small chapter not only firs
in to his thesiss of the book, btu also the school that represents the other side of the
historiographical debate. Colonel Ind argues that espionage is key in protecting any
country. It is a necessary instrument of survival. The United States adoptions of
espionage was an instrument of survival that was natural and necessary in order to
develop into a new nation. The development of intelligence efforts matches the current
economic trends of the United States: mass production. Colonel Ind describes the nature

4 Brian Kilmeade, George Washingtons Secret Six: The Spy Ring That
Saved The American Revolution (New York: Penguin Group, 2013), 215.

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of intelligence and espionage in the United States as a business of intelligence.5 The
amount of money spent is contingent with the results. He argues that Washington knew
the development of an intelligence network would be an economic investment, but saw it
as a necessary benefit. The Culper Spy Ring was run as a business. The men did not do
the work that they did because they were brave patriots, but smart businessmen. They
were not virtuous in that regard, but simply pragmatic. Colonel Ind is not a historian. He
is a colonel in the military. He is knowledgable in his field; not necessarily in the
historical analysis of primary sources. His bias toward pragmatism and prudence explains
his position in writing on this subject, thus creating the school and continuing this
debate.
The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors, and The Real Forces Behind World Events is
another excellent source that supports Colonel Inds arguments. John Hughes-Wilson
argues in his 2004 work that subduing enemies does not require force and that
intelligence collection is enough. Intelligence is a pivitol part of security that matters.
Wilson does praise Washington, but as a pragmatic intelligence master, not a virtuous,
good man. Washington was the vehicle used for success. The actual collection of
intelligence was the key to victory. According to Wilson, Washington was a cunning
intelligence master.6 Wilson was an intelligence officer for the federal government, so he
has a different approach to research. As an intelligence officer, prudence and pragmatism
take prededence over virtues and good. Wilson fits into the historiographical debate
5

Colonel Allison Ind, A Short History of Espionage (New York:

David McKay Company, 1963), 62.

6 John Hughes-Wilson, The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors, and the

Real Forces Behid World Events (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
2004), 138.

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because he argues that Washington was effective. Washington realized another tactic had
to be created in order to defeat the British, so he created an intelligence ring. He may
have loved his country and was a good patriot, but that is not the question that Wilson
seeks to answer in this work. Washington created the intelligence rings out of necessity
alone. This is a more personal analysis compared to Colonel Inds work, because Wilson
focuses and elaborates on Washington as an effective and pragmatic leader, not the
movement as a whole.
John Nagy does not put the men involved in Intelligence efforts on a pedestal like
Pennypacker and Kilmeade. In Invisible Ink: Spycraft of the American Revolution, Nagy
argues that George Washingtons military application of the intelligence information
gathered proved to be key in the eventual American victory.7 Nagy has an M.A. in
management science, so he is not a historian but is not involved directly in the military,
either. His profession does not match the other authors, but his opinion fits into the
second school because he does not treat Washington as a demigod of sorts in order to
glorify the victory of the Americans in the Revolution. He treats him as a skilled,
effective leader that did what he had to do to ensure victory, not because of his virtuous
nature.
The last source being examined is the most recent out of all the works in this
historiographical analysis. This is the most current source available on the specific
subject. Kenneth Daigler, who is a former CIA officer and has an M.A. in History, is the
author of Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War.
He argues that the intelligence networks in the Revolution were created, and were
7 John A. Nagy, Invisible Ink: Spycraft of the American Revolution
(Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing), xvi.

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successful, because of George Washingtons background in elementary intelligence.8 He
does not praise Washington by any means. He fits into this school because he argues
from a practical perspective. George Washington had basic intelligence collection skills,
and knew he had to expand on them in order to be successful in the Revolution.
Washington was an effective and pragmatic leader, but Daigler does not bring into play
the personal and patriotic intentions of Washington. Daigler actually brings in a new
perspective to the historiographical debate. Counterintelligence activities during the
Revolution heavily influenced todays modern system of collecting information. Daigler
explains that the United States is soft when it comes to counterintelligence. He raises
some important questions, such as should we keep the system the way it is? If we expand
our efforts, are the citizens going to have to give up their rights and freedoms?9

Kenneth Daigler, Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American

Intelligence in the Revolutionary War (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2014), 1.

9 Ibid. 247

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Daigler did not answer those questions, but those specific questions are a great avenue for
further research. There is not enough research on American Intelligence activities in order
to delve deeply into the subject, yet. It is worth exploring, though. In future exploration
of this topic, I will consider these important questions that Daigler came across in his
research. It is a great expansion of the current debate. The American Revolution was a
turning point in American history, Victory was vital in order to creat a new, truly
independent country based on the idea of natural right and definite truth. Every source
supported the bigger argument that the American Revolution was won because of
intelligence efforts, but they diagnosed the nature of both men that created the operations
and the operations themselves. The pattern that is prevalent in this historiographical
analysis is that historians evaluate sources tied to theory, while military and security
personnel evaluate information based on pragmatism and prudence. This is an important
question that needs to be asked, but more research needs to be done on the topic in order
to create an educated, definitive answer. Annotated Bibliography:

Brookhiser, Richard. George Washington on Leadership. New York: Basic Books, 2008.
This book is a discourse on leadership examining George Washington. This book
relates around philosophical themes, but provides a window to the successes of
Washington while he was in command. This is used as a window into George
Washingtons leadership when dealing with betrayal, such as Benedict Arnolds plan
to give West Point to the British.
Colonel Ind, Allison. A Short History of Espionage. New York: David McKay Company,
1963.
This book provides insight as to why intelligence networks were created around the
world and relates it to the United States. The author treats intelligence as an economic
concern.

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Daigler, Kenneth. Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the
Revolutionary War. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014.
Kenneth Daigler raises new questions regarding the ethics of creating intelligence
networks and gathering counterintelligence. He never answers these questions, but
provides an avenue for further research.
Hughes-Wilson, John. The Puppet Masters: Spies, Traitors, and the Real Forces Behind
World Events. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2004.
This wide-range history of spies and traitors looks at the reasons for creating the
intelligence networks in the United States. This book helps explain the necessity for
intelligence operations in the government.
Kilmeade, Brian. George Washingtons Secret Six: The Spy Ring That Saved The
American Revolution. New York: Penguin Group, 2013.
This specialized book gives excellent details on the Culper Spy Ring, the central, and
most successful, spy ring in the American Revolution. This is very specific and helps
the reader know more about the creation and people involved in the spy ring.
Nagy, John. Invisible Ink: Spycraft of the American Revolution. Yardley, PA: Westholme
Publishing, 2010.
This book focuses on the actual tactics the spies used. This is important when arguing
that the Americans won the Revolution because they outspied the British. It allows
the reader to compare and evaluate the tactics of the Americans to that of the British.
Pennypacker, Morton. George Washingtons Spies: On Long Island and in New York.
Brooklyn: Long Island Historical Society, 1939.
This book is the first of its kind. Pennypacker discovered and uncovered the secrets of
the Culper Spy Ring and sparked further research and debates. This is the key starting
point in researching this subject.
Rose, Alexander. Washingtons Spies: The Story of Americas First Spy Ring. New York:
Bantam Books, 2006.
This book expands on Pennypackers ideas. The facts presented in Pennypackers
book are explained in further detail and offers more in-depth evaluation. The second
step is to research this subject.