IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

TIM REEVES, ERIC SAUB, GREG

BURNETT, as the Libertarian Party of
Oregon; DAVID TERRY, M.
CARLING and RICHARD BURKE, as
members of the Libertarian Party of
Oregon; and LIBERTARIAN PARTY
OF OREGON,

Clackamas County Circuit Court

Case No. CV12010345
CA A155618

Plaintiffs-Appellants
Cross-Respondents,
and
CARLA PEALER, as the Libertarian
Party of Oregon,
Plaintiff,
v.
WES WAGNER, HARRY JOE
TABOR, MARK VETANEN, BRUCE
KNIGHT, JIM KARLOCK,
RICHARD SKYBA, and JEFF
WESTON, individuals; and
LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF
OREGON,
Defendants-Respondents
Cross-Appellants,
and
JOSEPH SHELLEY,
Defendant.

Caption continued and counsel listed on next page

May 2015

RESPONDENT / CROSS-APPELLANT
LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF OREGONS
REPLY BRIEF ON CROSS APPEAL
On Appeal from the General Judgment of
Dismissal entered on October 25, 2013, and the
Supplemental Judgment entered on May 30,
2014, in the Clackamas County Circuit Court by
the Honorable Henry C. Breithaupt
C. Robert Steringer, OSB No. 983514
bob.steringer@harrang.com
Brett Applegate, OSB No. 132944
brett.applegate@harrang.com
HARRANG LONG GARY RUDNICK P.C.
1001 SW Fifth Avenue, 16th Floor
Portland, OR 97204
503.242.0000

Tyler Smith, OSB No. 07587

tyler@ruralbusinessattorneys.com
TYLER SMITH & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
181 N Grant St., Suite 212
Canby, OR 97013
503.266.5590
Of Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Cross-Respondents

Of Attorneys for Respondent / CrossAppellant Libertarian Party of Oregon

Colin Andries, OSB No. 051892
colin.andries@andrieslaw.com
ANDRIES LAW OFFICES
1001 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1100
Portland, OR 97204
503.206.6002

James Leuenberger, OSB No. 891542

james_leuenberger@mac.com
JAMES E. LEUENBERGER, P.C.
P.O. Box 1684
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
503.679.8473

Of Attorney for Respondents / CrossAppellants Harry Joe Tabor, Mark

Vetanen, Bruce Knight, Jeff Weston,
Jim Karlock and Richard Skyba

Of Attorney for Respondent / CrossAppellant Wes Wagner

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................1

II.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY ON DEFENDANTS CROSS-APPEAL.........2

A.

B.
III.

Plaintiffs claims lacked an objectively reasonable basis

because well-established First Amendment jurisprudence
bars judicial intervention in intraparty disputes absent a
compelling state interest...................................................................2
1.

The law is clear: a court cannot grant the relief sought

by plaintiffs. ...........................................................................2

2.

Decisions by Judge Redman, Steve Trout and the

Libertarian National Committee do not establish the
objective reasonableness of plaintiffs claims. ......................5
a.

Judge Redmans decisions on ORCP 21

motions do not establish the objective
reasonableness of plaintiffs claims. ...........................6

b.

Steve Trouts communications do not shield

plaintiffs.......................................................................7

c.

Decisions of the Libertarian National

Committee have no bearing on this case.....................8

Plaintiffs claims were barred by issue preclusion. .........................9

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................12

ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page(s)

Cf. Freitag v. Dept of Revenue,

19 OTR 37, 41-45 (2006) ................................................................................6
Chavez v. Boise Cascade Corp.,
307 Or 632, 772 P2d 409 (1989) ...................................................................11
Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 US 477, 95 S Ct 541 (1975) .....................................................................3
Decker v. Berean Baptist Church,
51 Or App 191, 624 P2d 1094 (1981) .............................................................5
Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Comm. v. Holm,
227 Minn 52, 55 NW2d 831 (1948) ................................................................4
Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 US 214, 229, 231-32, 109 S Ct 1013 (1989)................................1, 2, 3, 4
State ex rel Fosser v. Lavik,
9 ND 461, 83 NW 914 (1900) .........................................................................4
Hope Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyterian Church
(USA),
242 Or App 485, 255 P3d 645 (2011), affd 352 Or 668 (2012) ....................5
Jackson v. Riddell,
476 F Supp 849 (ND Miss 1979).................................................................3, 4
OBrien v. Brown,
409 US 1, 92 S Ct 2718 (1972) .......................................................................3
Reform Party of U.S. v. Gargan,
89 F Supp 2d 751 (WD Va 2000)....................................................................3
Shuler v. Distribution Trucking Co.,
164 Or App 615, 994 P2d 167 (1999) rev den, 330 Or 375
(2000).......................................................................................................11, 12
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reuter,
299 Or 155, 700 P2d 236 (1985) ...................................................................10

iii
Williams v. Salem Womens Clinic,
245 Or App 476, 263 P3d 1072 (2011) .........................................................13
Statutes
ORS 20.105.................................................................................................1, 7, 13
Other Authorities
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act............................................................3
Voting Rights Act of 1965....................................................................................3

1
I.

INTRODUCTION
Although the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs claims on the

ground that they were barred by the First Amendment, it erred by denying
defendants request for attorney fees pursuant to ORS 20.105 on the ground that
plaintiffs claims lacked an objectively reasonable basis in fact and in law. It is
well established that courts lack the authority to decide who leads a political
party or to adjudicate the validity of matters of internal party governance.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs persistence in mischaracterizing the holdings of
judicial decisions on this subject, courts for more than a century have
recognized the constitutional prohibition against, and the perils of, wading into
the internal workings of political parties.
In fact, these plaintiffs should know better than to argue otherwise.
When their ringleader, Plaintiff Richard Burke, was executive director of the
Libertarian Party of Oregon (LPO), he successfully directed the partys
defense in a writ of mandamus proceeding brought by Defendant Wes Wagner
in which Mr. Wagner asked the Washington County Circuit Court to require the
LPO to follow its own bylaws. In that proceeding, the LPO under Plaintiff
Burkes direction relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Courts decision in Eu v.
San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee for the proposition that
the state cannot intervene in an intraparty dispute in the absence of a compelling
state interest. Then-Circuit Court Judge Marco Hernandez agreed, and

2
dismissed the writ. Mr. Burke and his fellow plaintiffs in this case, who purport
to assert their claims on behalf of the LPO, are precluded from arguing that a
circuit court has the authority to enforce the LPO Bylaws now that they
disagree with the process followed by the LPO State Committee to implement
the reform plan adopted at the LPOs 2010 annual business convention.
In the remaining pages of this brief, the LPO replies to specific
arguments asserted by plaintiffs in their answer to the LPOs cross-assignment
of error.
II.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY ON DEFENDANTS CROSS-APPEAL

A.

Plaintiffs claims lacked an objectively reasonable basis

because well-established First Amendment jurisprudence bars
judicial intervention in intraparty disputes absent a compelling
state interest.
1.

The law is clear: a court cannot grant the relief sought

by plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs simply misunderstand the U.S. Supreme Courts precedents on

the subject of judicial intervention in intraparty disputes. The rule of law is
straightforward: a state may not interfere with the internal affairs of a political
party in the absence of a compelling state interest, and the state has no interest
in protecting the party from itself. Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 US 214, 229, 231-32, 109 S Ct 1013 (1989). Still, plaintiffs
continue to argue that, because the Eu case involved a statutory impairment of
the internal affairs of political parties, only legislative impairments are limited

3
by the First Amendment. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at 29. That argument
ignores the precedents recognizing that judicial action in this area is no more
appropriate than legislative action. See, e.g., OBrien v. Brown, 409 US 1, 45,
92 S Ct 2718 (1972) (reasoning that the partys convention itself is the proper
forum for determining intra-party disputes, and that the political processes
should function free from judicial supervision); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 US
477, 95 S Ct 541 (1975) (ruling state court injunction unconstitutional because
it abridged the associational rights of delegates and violated partys right to
determine the composition of its national convention in accordance with party
standards).
Plaintiffs also persist in their misunderstanding of decisions by other
courts, contending that those courts have settled intraparty disputes in
circumstances that are almost directly on point. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans.
Br. at 30-32. Plaintiffs start with two Reform Party cases, failing to understand
that the Reform Party had agreed to be bound to certain organizational
requirements in exchange for the receipt of federal money to hold its national
convention, under the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. See Reform
Party of U.S. v. Gargan, 89 F Supp 2d 751, 753-54 (WD Va 2000).
The older, pre-Eu cases cited by plaintiffs are no more helpful to them.
Plaintiffs continue to mischaracterize Jackson v. Riddell, 476 F Supp 849 (ND
Miss 1979), a removal action involving the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

4
Plaintiffs argue that the court in Jackson enforced an intra-party rule that
requires intra-party dispute resolution process before a civil complaint may be
filed. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at 30. To the contrary, the court in
Jackson rejected the argument that it should dismiss for failure to exhaust
internal party remedies because the fault for such failure lay with the party
asserting it as grounds for dismissal.
In State ex rel Fosser v. Lavik, 9 ND 461, 462, 83 NW 914 (1900), the
court refused to pass judgment on parliamentary tactics within a convention, but
decided which candidate a county auditor was required to place on a ballot.
And in Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Comm. v. Holm, 227 Minn 52,
55 NW2d 831 (1948), the court stated, contrary to what plaintiff would have
this court hold:
The rule with regard to judicial review of the actions
of political conventions is that in factional
controversies within a political party, where there is
involved no controlling statute or clear right based on
statute law, the courts will not assume jurisdiction, but
will leave the matter for determination within the
party organization.
Not one of the pre-Eu cases held that a court may involve itself in a purely
intraparty dispute such as the one before this court.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that two decisions of the Oregon Court of
Appeals involving churches establish the objective reasonableness of their
claims. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at 33-36. Neither of those decisions

5
would trump the doctrines established by the U.S. Supreme Court prohibiting
judicial intervention of courts in intraparty disputes in the absence of a
compelling state interest. It also bears noting that in neither case did a court
declare how the church was to be governed or who would be its leaders. Hope
Presbyterian Church of Rogue River v. Presbyterian Church (USA), 242 Or
App 485, 255 P3d 645 (2011), affd 352 Or 668 (2012) (deciding what entity
held legal title to church property); Decker v. Berean Baptist Church, 51 Or
App 191, 624 P2d 1094 (1981) (affirming trial courts dismissal of the
plaintiffs claims). That distinction is critical; even if this court could
adjudicate the ownership of property claimed by two different church
organizations, no one could reasonably argue that this court can decide who
runs one of those churches and which set of bylaws would govern it.
2.

Decisions by Judge Redman, Steve Trout and the

Libertarian National Committee do not establish the
objective reasonableness of plaintiffs claims.

Plaintiffs offer three additional defenses of the objective reasonableness

of their belief that the circuit court could decide who leads the LPO and what
bylaws would govern it: (1) early in the litigation, Judge Redman denied
defendants ORCP 21 motion to dismiss the claims; (2) an Elections Division
administrator told them they would need to go to court to get what they wanted;
and (3) the Libertarian National Committee agrees with them. Not one of those
arguments establishes the objective reasonableness of their claims.

6
a.

Judge Redmans decisions on ORCP 21 motions do

not establish the objective reasonableness of
plaintiffs claims.

Plaintiffs argue that their claims must have had an objectively reasonable
basis because Judge Redman denied defendants ORCP 21 motion to dismiss
plaintiffs claims on the ground that the circuit court was constitutionally
prohibited from awarding the requested relief. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br.
at 19-20. Defendants respectfully disagree with Judge Redmans ruling, but it
also is beside the point. Judge Redman did not have the benefit of the factual
record that was presented in conjunction with defendants summary judgment
motions. That factual record fleshed out the history and nature of the dispute,
establishing without a doubt that plaintiffs claims involved an intraparty
political squabble. Plaintiffs were well aware of that history and therefore are
accountable for asserting claims for relief that could not be granted.1 Cf.
Freitag v. Dept of Revenue, 19 OTR 37, 41-45 (2006) (court may find that
plaintiffs claim lacked an objectively reasonable basis even though it
previously survived a motion to dismiss).

As they did in the circuit court, plaintiffs apparently try to create the
impression that this Court rejected defendants constitutional argument twice
before, arguing that Defendants twice briefed and argued their argument about
jurisdiction under the First Amendment. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at 20.
As plaintiffs counsel was forced to admit under questioning by the court in the
summary judgment hearing, Judge Redman ruled only once on defendants
motion. Trans (5/16/2013) 141:23-142:10. The circuit court deferred ruling on
defendants first motion raising the constitutional issue until plaintiffs joined
necessary parties. See Order on Rule 21 Motions signed April 27, 2012.

7
Judge Redman also was not presented with defendants argument on the
preclusive effect of the Washington County Circuit Courts decision in 2006,
discussed below, and made no rulings on that matter. Plaintiffs cannot rely on a
prior decision by Judge Redman to avoid accountability for filing a claim
seeking relief that was precluded by a prior judgment.
b.

Steve Trouts communications do not shield

plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs argue that their claims were objectively reasonable because

Steve Trout, an official with the Oregon Secretary of States office, told the
parties that they have to go to court to adjudicate this matter if there is to be any
change because they do not adjudicate this type of dispute. Pls Comb. Reply
and Ans. Br. at 20-22. That argument fails for at least two reasons. First, Mr.
Trout expressed no opinion on whether a court constitutionally could award the
relief sought by plaintiffs or whether issue preclusion would prevent a second
adjudication of that issue. Mr. Trout only stated that if there is to be any
change, it would need to come from a court because the Secretary of State was
not going to grant the relief requested by plaintiffs. ER-23 (Trout Declaration
at page 2). Second, even if Mr. Trout had opined on the First Amendment and
preclusion issues, his opinion is irrelevant to the question of whether there was
an objectively reasonable basis for plaintiffs claims. The subjective views of
Mr. Trout or anyone else have no bearing on objective reasonableness. See
ORS 20.105(1) (directing the court to award attorney fees upon a finding that

8
there was no objectively reasonable basis for asserting the claim) (emphasis
added).
c.

Decisions of the Libertarian National Committee

have no bearing on this case.

Plaintiffs argue that their position is supported by various decisions of the

Libertarian National Committee. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at 22-23.
Again, plaintiffs argument is not responsive to the question of whether they
had an objectively reasonable basis for their claims. There indeed were
conflicting rulings on the parties dispute by various organs of the national
party. The national partys Judicial Committee ruled that the LNC was required
to recognize the leadership of the defendants, while political organs of the party
have supported plaintiffs. But the fact that plaintiffs have been able to convince
some people within an organization to support their cause has no bearing on
whether the First Amendment barred the circuit court from wading into the
dispute or whether the answer to that question was established through the
doctrine of issue preclusion. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the
LNCs view of this dispute is irrelevant. The highest body of the LPO is its
State Committee, not the Libertarian National Committee (LNC). The LPO
is affiliated with the LNC, but the LPO and the LNC are independent
organizations. See Dkt 99, Ex 26 at 1 (Wagner Decl). The LNC has no power
to decide who leads the LPO or what bylaws of the LPO are effective. Id.

9
Accordingly, if any governing body were to receive deference in resolving this
matter, it would be the LPO State Committee that adopted the 2011 Bylaws.
B.

Plaintiffs claims were barred by issue preclusion.

Perhaps the most frustrating part of this litigation for defendants is that
when the tables were turned in 2006, the LPO under Plaintiff Burkes
management obtained the dismissal of a writ of mandamus proceeding on the
ground that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Eu, barred courts from enforcing the bylaws of a political party. Setting aside
frustration with such tactics, the point is that the final judgment in the 2006
Washington County case established issue preclusion on the subject of judicial
enforcement of political party bylaws, such that plaintiffs could not have an
objectively reasonable basis for asserting a claim seeking to enforce the LPOs
bylaws.
Plaintiffs have two primary arguments on issue preclusion: (1) plaintiffs
were not a party or in privity with a party to the 2006 Washington County case;
and (2) the issues in this case and the 2006 Washington County case are not
identical. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at 24-28. Plaintiffs are incorrect on
both counts.
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the effects of issue preclusion by claiming that
they were not parties to the 2006 Washington County case and therefore did not
have a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at

10
27. Plaintiffs argument is unavailing. It is undisputed that the LPO was a
party to the 2006 Washington County case. As for the present case, according
to their own caption, Plaintiffs Reeves, Saub, Pealer, and Burnett bring claims
on behalf of the LPO. It is therefore inescapable that those plaintiffs claim to
act on behalf of a party to the 2006 Washington County case. Furthermore,
according to Plaintiffs caption, Plaintiffs Carling and Burke bring claims as
LPO members. Accordingly, their claims derive from the LPO, and as such,
they are in privity with the LPO. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Reuter, 299 Or
155, 160-61, 700 P2d 236 (1985) (A person may be bound by a previous
adjudication either by reason of being a party in the case, or by reason of
participation which is substantially equivalent to having been a party, or from
having a legal relationship that is derived from one who was a party.). Indeed,
Plaintiff Burke controlled the LPOs defense in the Washington County case.
Dkt 99, Ex 35 at 4-6 (Wagner Decl) (billing statements showing LPOs contacts
with its attorney). Given that each of the plaintiffs, by their own caption, are
acting in their purported capacities as either members of the LPO or as officers
bringing claims on behalf of the LPO itself, it is not, as plaintiffs argue,
fundamentally unfair to apply issue preclusion to them. Pls Comb. Reply
and Ans. Br. at 28.
Plaintiffs argue that issue preclusion does not apply because, according to
plaintiffs, the issues in this case and the 2006 Washington County case are not

11
identical. Plaintiffs are incorrect. The court in the 2006 Washington County
case stated the central issue of that case accordingly: I understand [that] what
is being requested is for this court to force the Libertarian Party to comply with
its internal rules. Dkt 99, Ex 33 at 20 (Wagner Decl) (hearing transcript). In
this regard, the LPO, led by Plaintiff Burke, argued that noncompliance with
bylaws is not something that is subject to a legal remedy. It is subject to a
political remedy. Id. at 14. The issue in this case is identical, and the trial
court in this case reached the same conclusion as the court in the 2006
Washington County case: a court lacks the authority to force a political party to
comply with its internal rules.
Plaintiffs also argue that the issues in this case and the 2006 Washington
County case are not identical for the additional reason that the relator in the
2006 Washington County case (Defendant Wagner) sought a writ of mandamus,
while plaintiffs in this case seek a declaratory judgment. Pls Comb. Reply and
Ans. Br. at 25. This argument also is incorrect. In numerous instances, Oregon
courts have concluded that decisions have preclusive effect in different type of
proceedings. See, e.g., Chavez v. Boise Cascade Corp., 307 Or 632, 634, 772
P2d 409 (1989) (administrative determinations may have preclusive effect in
later civil proceeding); Shuler v. Distribution Trucking Co., 164 Or App 615,
627, 994 P2d 167 (1999) rev den, 330 Or 375 (2000) (arbitration decision may
have preclusive effect in later civil proceeding). A judgment in a writ of

12
mandamus proceeding has the preclusive effect of a judgment in any other type
of civil proceeding.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court in the 2006 Washington County
case ruled that claims seeking to force a political party to comply with its
internal rules may be brought in a declaratory judgment action rather than in a
writ of mandamus action. Pls Comb. Reply and Ans. Br. at at 21. The
plaintiffs support this mischaracterization of the 2006 Washington County case
by quoting from a colloquy between the court and counsel for the defendants
regarding the question of whether the relator had an adequate remedy at law
other than a writ of mandamus. Id.; Dkt 99, Ex 33 at 14 (Wagner Decl)
(hearing transcript). A reading of the transcript demonstrates that Judge
Hernandez referred to declaratory actions in his attempt to articulate the
Libertarian Party of Oregons position, but offers no opinion on whether such
an action would be appropriate. Judge Hernandez explained that the court
might have concluded that the plaintiff needed to exhaust other remedies such
as a declaratory judgment action before seeking a writ of mandamus, but the
constitutional prohibition trumped that inquiry. Dkt 99, Ex 33 at 20-21
(Wagner Decl) (hearing transcript).
III.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs asserted three claims against defendants, each founded on the

idea that the circuit court would resolve an intraparty dispute over the

13
governing documents and leadership of the LPO. Well-established
constitutional principles prohibit judicial involvement in such a dispute. At
least one plaintiff knew that was the case when plaintiffs commenced this
litigation: Plaintiff Burke controlled the LPOs defense when it obtained a
ruling to that effect in the 2006 Washington County case. That ruling created
issue preclusion that established a second, independently sufficient barrier to
the relief plaintiffs sought. Lacking any legal or factual support, plaintiffs
claims did not have an objectively reasonable basis. See Williams v. Salem
Womens Clinic, 245 Or App 476, 482, 263 P3d 1072 (2011) (A claim lacks an
objectively reasonable basis for purposes of ORS 20.105(1) if it is entirely
devoid of legal or factual support.). Defendants therefore were entitled to
findings pursuant to ORS 20.105(1) establishing their right to recover their
reasonable attorney fees. Defendants respectfully request that this court reverse
the circuit courts ruling on their rights under ORS 20.105(1) and award them
their reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of May, 2015
HARRANG LONG GARY RUDNICK P.C.
By:

s/ C. Robert Steringer
C. Robert Steringer, OSB No. 983514
bob.steringer@harrang.com
Brett Applegate, OSB No. 132944
brett.applegate@harrang.com
Of Attorneys for Respondent / CrossAppellant Libertarian Party of Oregon

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH ORAP 5.05(2)(d)

I certify that (1) this brief complies with te word-count limitation in
ORAP 5.05(2)(b), and (2) the word count of this brief (as described in
ORAP 5.05(2)(a)) is 3,166 words.
I certify that the size of the type in this brief is not smaller than 14 point
for both the text of the brief and footnotes as required by ORAP 5.05(4)(f).
HARRANG LONG GARY RUDNICK P.C.

By:

s/ C. Robert Steringer
C. Robert Steringer, OSB No. 983514
bob.steringer@harrang.com
Brett Applegate, OSB No. 132944
brett.applegate@harrang.com
Of Attorneys for Respondent / CrossAppellant Libertarian Party of Oregon

PAGE 1 - CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH ORAP 5.05(2)(d)

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

I certify that on May 11, 2015, I filed the foregoing RESPONDENT /
CROSS-APPELLANT LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF OREGONS REPLY
BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL with the Appellate Court Administrator by
using the eFiling system.
The following participants in this case are registered eFilers and will be
served via the electronic mail function of the eFiling system.
Tyler Smith, OSB No. 07587
tyler@ruralbusinessattorneys.com
TYLER SMITH & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
181 N Grant St., Suite 212
Canby, OR 97013
503.266.5590

James Leuenberger, OSB No. 891542

james_leuenberger@mac.com
JAMES E. LEUENBERGER, P.C.
P.O. Box 1684
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
503.542.7433

Of Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants, Cross-Respondents

Of Attorney for Respondent / CrossAppellant Wes Wagner

Page 1 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

Colin Andries, OSB No. 051892

colin.andries@andrieslaw.com
ANDRIES LAW OFFICES
1001 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1100
Portland, OR 97204
503.206.6002

James L. Buchal
Murphy & Buchal LLP
3425 SE Yamhill Street, Suite 100
Portland, OR 97214
Of Attorney for Amicus Curiae Oregon
Republican Party

Of Attorney for Respondents /

Cross-Appellants Harry Joe Tabor,
Mark Vetanen, Bruce Knight, Jeff
Weston, Jim Karlock and Richard
Skyba
HARRANG LONG GARY RUDNICK P.C.

By:

s/ C. Robert Steringer
C. Robert Steringer, OSB No. 983514
bob.steringer@harrang.com
Brett Applegate, OSB No. 132944
brett.applegate@harrang.com
Of Attorneys for Respondent / CrossAppellant Libertarian Party of Oregon
P0521280.v2

P0521280.v2

Page 2 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE