The Prospects for Social Theory Today

Author(s): Anthony Giddens

Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 23 (1978-1979), pp. 201-223
Published by: Regents of the University of California
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The ProspectsforSocial TheoryToday

byAnthonyGiddens
i.
Itis a matter
ofcommonawarenessto anyoneworking
withinthe
socialsciencesthatsocialtheorytodayis in a stateofapparentdisarray.The past decade or so has seen therevivalof traditionally
formsof theory(suchas hermeneutics),
established
theemergence
ofseemingly
novelperspectives
(including
especiallyethnomethodwithinsocial theoryof
ology),and the attemptedincorporation
variousapproachesclaimedto be drawnfromformerly
separate
endeavours(thephilosophy
ofthelaterWittgenstein,
philosophical
To thesewe
ordinarylanguagephilosophyand phenomenology).
canadd themassiverevivalofMarxisttheory.Thishowevercannot
fromtrendsin non-Marxist
be clearlydistinguised
social science,
sincemostof thedivisionsfoundin thelatterreappear,even ifin
ratherdifferent
form,withinMarxism:thecontrastsbetweenthe
varioussortsof "phenomenological
Marxism","criticaltheory",
"Marxiststructuralism",
etc. are oftenas pronouncedas those
outsideMarxism.
pertaining
It is clearthatthereare stillfairlydistinct"nationalsociologies"
tradition
associatedwith
or, moreaccurately,
typesof intellectual
suchas English,
and German.
French,
majorlanguagecommunities,
The degreeof prominence
of thedifferent
theoretical
parameters
indicatedabove variesbetweenthesecommunities:
myremarksin
therestof thispaper well be primarily
directedto social science
withintheEnglish-speaking
world.
In English-speaking
sociology,theimmediate
originsof thedisarrayof social theorycan be quitereadilydiscerned.Duringthe
post-warperiod,up untilat leastthelate 1960's,therewas a consensusthatheldthe"middleground"ofsociology.Thiswas not,to
be sure,an unchallenged
butitprovideda focusofdebate
consensus;

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202

ANTHONYGIDDENS

bothforthosewho supportedit and thosewho werecriticalof it.

This consensus,or so I would argue, involvedtwo connected
canbe tracedbackwellinto
setsofideaswhoseantecedents
strands:
butwhichbecameelaboratedin novelforms
thenineteenth
century,
in the1950'sand 1960's.The firstof theseconcernsI have referred
"
to genericallythe "theoryof industrialsociety} Those who
to the theoryof industrialsociety authorssuch as
contributed
Lipset,Belland ParsonsintheUnitedStates,and Aronand Dahrenviews.Byoptingfor
dorfinEurope-helda rangeofbroadlysimilar
socibetween"traditional
a bipolarcontrast
society"and "industrial
of
no
form
socialist
to
conclude
that
were
able
society
ety",they
froma capitalisticone; socialism
different
could be distinctively
ofindusaremerelytwopartiallydistinct
and capitalism
sub-types
trialsociety.All theseauthorsheldto theviewthat,withthematuorder,class conflictloses its transformative
rityof theindustrial
are
theyagreedwithDurkheim,2
potential.Acuteclass struggles,
theearlyphaseofdevelopcreatedduring
ofthestrains
characteristic
havebecomenormamentofindustrial
society;onceclassrelations
to theexisting
becomesaccommodated
classconflict
tivelyregulated,
of class conflict",which meant
order.The "institutionalisation
and at thesame
boththenormativeregulationof class struggles,
to theseparatespheresofindustrial
timetheirconfinement
negotiaalso supposedlyentailedan end of
tionand politicalmobilisation,
ideology.Marxism,and otherformsof radicalsocialistthought,
of thesamestrainswhich
wereregardedas ideologicalexpressions
in theinitialstagesoftheformation
producedintenseclassconflicts
ofindustrial
society.
Theseviews,whichweredevelopedin a politicalcontextofprogressiveliberalism,duringa phase of relativelystableeconomic
growthin Westerncapitalism,now appearless thanplausibleat a
ofpoliticaland economic
a resurgence
timewhentherehas occurred
as a cautionarytale
conflict.
Indeed,theymaynow be interpreted
in socialanalysis:a periodofnot
oftheperilsofovergeneralization
muchmorethana decadeor so was takenas evidenceforthemost
rootedtrends
aboutprofoundly
and projections
generalassertions
shouldnot
of
this
lesson
nature
in industrial
(The
salutary
society.
in thesmooth
be ignoredby thosewho areproneto treatfalterings
economicgrowthof theWesterneconomiesin currenttimesas a
to a dogmatictypeoforthodoxMarxism.)The
basisfora reversion
theoryof industrialsocietyhas todayprobablylost mostof the
and politicaltheorists:
supportit onceenjoyedamongsociologists
advocateshave had second
even some of its most enthusiastic
abouttheirearlierviews.
thoughts
Sincethetheoryofindustrial
society,as elaboratedin the1950's
of
and 1960's,was closelybound up withcertaininterpretations
politicaland economicchangesin theearlypost-warperiodin the
in the
can be quiteeasilyidentified
West,someofitsshortcomings
light of subsequentdevelopmentsin the advanced capitalist

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SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

203

societies.(One maytakeas an illustration

thewholesaleexpansion
of highereducation,whichonlya fewyearsago was made intoa
trenddeeplyembeddedwithinindustrial
long-term
society.3)Such
is notthecase withtheotherstrandin theerstwhile
consensusin
and involvedan
sociology,whichwas ofa moreabstractcharacter,
overallappraisalofthelogicalformand likelyachievements
ofthe
inturntwofeatures
ofthissecond
socialsciences.We candistinguish
strandof orthodoxor mainstream
sociology:the prevalenceof
and naturalism.
functionalism
Each of thesefeatureshas had a long-standing
associationwith
thetheoryofindustrial
ofthought
whichrun
society:thetraditions
fromComteand Durkheimthrough
to Parsonsand modernAmerican sociologyhave been of primaryimportance
in sustaining
this
connection.
Functionalist
whichhas alwaysbeenstrongly
thought,
associatedwith unfoldingmodels of changebased eitherupon
metaphorsof biologicalgrowthor evolution,has in generalaccordedwell withthethemeof "progresswithorder",a Comteaii
themethathas beenechoedin someversionor anotherby all proof
ponentsof the theoryof industrialsociety.4"Functionalism",
course,is onlya looselyassociatedbody of doctrines.Severalrelatedversionshave beendevelopedin thiscentury:theanthropoof Radcliffe-Brown
and Malinowski, the
logical functionalism
normative
functionalism
ofParsons,and theconflict
functionalism
of Merton.It is notrelevanthereto attempta directcharacterisationof theprincipaltraitsof functionalist
thought.Butis is worth
thatfunctionalism
has normally
beencloselyassociated
emphasizing
withtheidea thatbiologyprovidestheproximate
modelforsocioitisargued,deal withsystems
ratherthan
logy,sincebothdisciplines,
I havetriedto showelsewhere
thatmodelsofbiological
aggregates.
systems,
especiallythosetiedto a notionof homeostasis,willnot
suffice
to illuminate
someofthekeyissuesposedby theanalysisof
socialsystems.5
Thishas also been,in a certainsense,acknowledged
modelsof information
by Parsons,who has turnedto cybernetic
controlinhismorerecentwritings.
FromComteto Durkheimto modernAmericansociology,functionalism
has beencloselyconnectedwitha naturalistic
standpoint
in social philosophy,if naturalismis understoodto referto the
thesisthatthelogicalframeworks
ofnaturaland socialscienceare
in essentialrespectsthesame. No morecomprehensive
interpretationof thisstandpointhas been offeredthanthatformulated
by
residueofthe
Comte,and I wantto pointto at leastone important
Comteanpositionthatremainedan integral
elementofmainstream
sociologyin thepost Second WorldWar period.Comte's"hierarchyofthesciences",was intendedto be appliedbothanalytically
and historically.
That is to say, it provideda logicalexpositionof
therelationsbetweenthesciences,includingthatbetweenbiology
and sociology:each scienceis bothdependentupon thosebelow it
in thehierarchy
and yethas itsownrigorously
autonomousfactual

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204

ANTHONYGIDDENS

reiterated
(a notionthatwas laterstrongly
sphereof investigation
ratherthanhorizontally,
laterally
byDurkheim).Butifunderstood
of thesciencesprovidedan historical
thehierarchy
understanding
- in combination,of
of scientific
of theprogression
development
course,withthe'law of thethreestages".Sciencedevelopsfirstin
removedfromhuman
relationto thoseobjectsand eventsfurthest
and physicsare hencethe
involvement
and control.Mathematics
firstfieldsto be establishedon a scientific
basis; the subsequent
historyof scienceis that of approachingnearerand nearerto
to the
humansocietyitself.Human conductis most refractory
of all forhuman
sinceit is mostdifficult
scientific
understanding,
light.Sociology
beingsto look at theirown behaviorin a scientific
of
is thusthelastscienceto comeintobeing.Now thesignificance
of
formulation
thisgeneralconceptionis thatit tiesa naturalistic
character
thelogicalformofsociologyto an accountofitsyouthful
as comparedto thenaturalsciences.Sociologyis a 'late arrival",the
ofthepositivespiritto theexplanation
oftheextension
completion
ofhumansocialconduct.
ofsociology,as comparedto bioThe notionoftheyouthfulness
surto
the
fields
of physicsand chemistry,
but
logy
particularly
consensus.Itssigelementofthemainstream
vivedas an important
is preciselythatit connectspresumedlogicalfeaturesof
nificance
of thehistoryof the
social scienceto a specificself-understanding
betweenthe
discipline.If thereappear to be certaindifferences
as theestabnaturaland socialsciences,in respectof suchmatters
formulated
laws ofa universalcharacofa setofprecisely
lishment
can be explainedas resultingfrom the
ter, such differences
limitedamountoftimethatsociologyhas beenestablishrelatively
is sustainedby
ed on a scientific
footing.The thesisof naturalism
the assumptionof a lag betweenthe respectivedevelopmentof
naturalandsocialscience.
The 1950'sand 1960'ssaw a remarkable
reunification,
especially
withpositivin thecontext
ofAmerican
sociology,offunctionalism
ofscience,thelatteras formulated
isticphilosophies
by suchauthors
as Carnap,Hempeland Nagel. This conjunctionformeda major
meanswherebythe naturalistic
standpointof the orthodoxconvistic
suchpositi
embraced
sensuswas formulated.
Manysociologists
formsof
liberalised
whichwerethemselves
essentially
philosophies,
witha fervourthatblindedthemto thefact
logicalempiricism6,
view of sciencerepresents
thatthelogicalempiricist
onlyone possiblephilosophyof scienceamongotherpossiblephilosophies:the
logicalempiricist
philosophyof sciencecame to be seensimplyas
whatnaturalscienceis like,and as showingwhatsociologyshould
fromtheirsidewerelesshasty
become.Iftheempiricist
philosophers
theunion,and wereforthemostpartscepticalof
to consummate
cameto accept
thelogicalstatusoffunctionalism,
theynonetheless
of
as
the
concern
both
thatfunctional
shared
biologyand
analysis,

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205

SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

ofsciento theexigencies
socialscience,couldbe madeto conform
tificmethod.7
2.

oftheorthodoxconsensushasbeensucceededby
The dissolution
clamourforattention.
voiceswhichcurrently
theBabeloftheoretical
threeprevalentreactionsto theseemingly
One mightdistinguish
situationof social theory.The firstis a reactionof
disoriented
Thereare somewho areproneto argue
or
disillusionment.
despair
that,since thoseconcernedwiththe more abstractproblemsof
with
socialtheorycannotagreeevenaboutthebasicpresumptions
whichthestudyof humansocial conductshouldbe approached,
of the
be ignoredin thecontinuance
suchproblemscan effectively
practiceofsocialresearch.Manyof theissuesdealtwithas "social
ratherthansociologiitis claimed,arereallyphilosophical
theory",
can hencebe
cal in character:thesquabblesof "social theorists"
upon the doingof social reignoredin favorof a concentration
closescrutiny.
Quite
search.Butsucha stancedoes notwithstand
conception
apartfromtheuntenablecharacterof thepositivistic
canbe clearlydistinguished
whichholdsthatquestionsofphilosophy
we mustinsistthattheoretical
fromthemainbodyofsocialtheory,
cannotbe withoutpotentialimpacteven upon the
considerations
mostsheerly"empirical"
typesofsocialinvestigation.
at
A secondreactionmightbe describedas a searchforsecurity
any cost- a reversionto dogmatism.This is surelythecase for
some of thosewho have turnedback towardsorthodoxMarxist
positions.There are clear senses in whichsuch positionsshare
similarperspectivesto the erstwhileconsensusin mainstream
with issues
sociology;and are equally barrenwhen confronted
whichtodaypressforresraisedby othertheoretical
standpoints
olution.
The thirdresponseto thetheoretical
disarrayof thesocial sciencestodayis almostexactlytheoppositeofthefirst.Ratherthana
oftheoretical
reactionofdespair,itis one ofrejoicing:thediversity
fruitfulness
to
the
inherent
as
welcomed
is
testimony
perspectives
of social theory.We cannotattemptto achievea closureof this
norshouldwe seekto. Evensomeoftheprincipalfigures
diversity,
once involvedin theorthodoxconsensushave now come to veer
extowardssuch a view;8and it is a view which,appropriately
pressed,has a good deal to commend.For it can plausiblybe
dissensusabouthow the
arguedthatchronicdebatesand persistent
studyof humansocial conductis to be approachedexpresssomeitself;that
thingabout the verynatureof that "subject-matter"
aboutthenatureofhumanconduct
deeplyembeddedcontestations
intrude
are integralto humanconductitself,and thusnecessarily
into theheartof the discourseof philosophyand social theory.
ofthispoint,however,shouldnotentail
thesignificance
Admitting

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ANTHONYGIDDENS

206

of creatingas manydivergent
abstract
advocatingthedesirability
perspectives
upon humansocial behaviouras possible.We may
ofcontinuing
thelikelihood
aboutbasic
acknowledge
disagreements
theimporissuesin thestudyofhumanaction,whilestillstressing
tanceofbothestablishing
connections
betweendivergent
positions
and ofattempting
tobothsynthesize
and transcend
them.
I therefore
wishto rejecteachofthesereactionsto thetheoretical
Babel,and to proposeinsteadthatsocial theorystandsin needof
I makethisclaimnotin theanticipation
reconstruction.
systematic
ofsubstituting
a neworthodoxy
foran old one, butin thehope of
providinga moresatisfactory
groundforthediscussionof central
issuesinsocialtheorythaneithertheerstwhile
consensusprovided,
or is permitted
of
isolationin whichthediversity
by thehermetic
current
tendto exist.I wantto arguethat
theoretical
standpoints
or dismissed
theorthodoxconsensuscannotbe quietlyforgotten,
as merelyan ideologicalreflexofwelfare-state
butthat
capitalism,
itsweaknesses
ifwe areto declareitsabandonhavetobe identified
mentjustified;
and I wantto say thattheseweaknessescan now be
toomuchdifficulty.
I alsowishtomakethefurther
discerned
without
of thepre-existing
thata diagnosisof theshortcomings
argument
- of makinga focus
of theorising
consensusindicatesthenecessity
- issuesthatwereignoredwithinthatconof theoretical
analysis
or setsof shortsensus.I proposeto listfivesuch shortcomings,
theerstwhile
consensus.
comings,thatcharacterised
3.

The firstI have brieflyalludedto above: it is thatmainstream

a mistaken
of itsorigins
self-interpretation
sociologyincorporated
vis-a-visthenaturalsciences.As I havealso mentioned
above, this
thepast
two-fold
it
involves
assertions
about
has
a
aspect:
point
ofsocialscience,butalso concerns
logicalimplications
development
which are drawn fromthat developmentconcerningcontrasts
betweenthesocialandnaturalsciences.
of
Thereis no roomhereto undertakea properdocumentation
thethesisthatsocial scienceis a relativenewcomeras compared
eitherto biologyor to theothernaturalsciences:that"sociology"
has beenthelastdisciplineto be puton a scientific
footing,breakand thephilosophyofhistory.But
ingwithspeculative
philosophy
we have good reasonto be scepticalof theseclaimsifwe consider
of
how oftentheyhave beenlodged.Membersof each generation
sinceat leasttheearlypartoftheeighteenth
socialthinkers
century
a newlyscienhavebeeninclinedto assertthattheywereinitiating
tificstudyofmaninsociety,incontrast
to whatwentbefore.9
Vico
tobe founding
conceivedhimself
a "newscience"ofsociety.Montesquieu and Condorcetmade similarclaims,and held theywere
breakingwithwhatwentbefore.Comtesaid muchthesamething
in his time,acknowledging
the contributions
of his forerunners,

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SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

207

of sociology,which
themto theprehistory
but largelyrelegating
hisown
basis through
was onlycomingto be placedon a scientific
efforts.
Andso itcontinues:Marxarguedmuchthesamein respect
of Comte;Durkheimin respectof Marx; and, yetanothergenerationlater,Parsonsof Durkheim.The factthatclaimshave been
of social thinkers
in successivegenerations
lodgedso persistently
of
thata "greatdivide"has beencreatedbetweentheestablishment
on
a scientific
approachto humansocial conductand institutions
thatremainedembroiledin
theonehand,andpreceding
standpoints
philosophyon theother,does notin and of itselfshow
speculative
thatno suchclaimscan be sustained;but it does justifyregarding
themin a scepticallight.At anyrate,I shallassertat thispointthat
as comparedto thenatural
thenotionthatsociologyis a newcomer,
sciences,is an errorwhosesourceis to be foundin theacceptingof
of authors
thedeclarationsof one or otherof thesegenerations
towhichDurkheim
Marxor the1890-1920
generation
(usuallyeither
belonged)at theirfacevalue. Social scienceis as old as naturalscienceis; bothcan be datedback to thepost-Renaissance
periodin
moderninform.
Europe,as recognisably
sectorswithinboth the naturaland social
Of coursedifferent
in
scienceshave developedunevenly.It is also perhapsimportant,
to emphasisethat
orderto forestallpossiblemisunderstandings,
ofthesocialsciences
ofthethesisoftheyouthful
character
rejection
does not involveeitherdenyingthatprogresshas been achieved
withinthem,nor thattherehave not been important
rupturesor
as well
betweendifferent
dislocations
phasesoftheirdevelopment,
traditions.Moreoverwe have to be
as betweenrivalintellectual
of theterm"sociology"by
theinvention
carefulwithterminology:
Comte,and its subsequentsuccessfulpropogationby Durkheim
(who howeverregardedit as a somewhatbarbaricterm)has had
morethana certainamountto do withtheview thatthe "great
fromthemiddle
divide"insocialthought
can be locatedsomewhere
to thelatenineteenth
close
century."Sociology"meantsomething
- progresswithorderin
to whatbecametheorthodoxconsensus
respectof the maturationof industrialcapitalism,naturalismin
respect
ofthelogicalframework
ofsocialscience,andfunctionalism.
The term"sociology"is thusa heavilycompromisedone, and I
thatit is todayin
continueto use it onlyin theacknowledgement
a more
suchwide currencythatthereis no hope of substituting
term.
appropriate
Iftheideaoftheyouthful
natureofsociologycannotbe sustained,
thataredrawnfromitin explainneither
cananyoftheimplications
level of developmentof social
ing the apparentlyrudimentary
scienceas comparedwiththenaturalsciences.Sociologyis not in
theprocessoftakingthefirststepsalongpathsalreadysuccessfully
emtroddenby thenaturalsciences(to say this,as I shallstrongly
of the natural
phasizelater,is not to say thatthe achievements
to thesocialsciences).The mostcharacteristic
sciencesareirrelevant

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208

ANTHONY GIDDENS

differencebetween social and naturalscience, which has inevitably

preoccupied the advocates of naturalism,is the apparent lack, in
the former,of sets of preciselyformulatedlaws that are generally
agreed upon by themembersof a professionalcommunity.
Various qualificationsobviously have to be made in approaching
such matters.The naturalsciencesare not a unity;some disciplines,
and sectors of disciplines,are more nomologically advanced than
others. Nor are the social sciences, if that termbe interpretedto
includeeconomics,all of a piece either.Those who work in the social
sciences are probably prone to underestimatethe prevalence of
profounddisagreementsamong physicalscientistsover quite fundamentalproblemswithintheirareas of endeavour. Nonetheless, the
contrastsbetweeneven theless advanced fieldsof naturalscienceand
the most advanced fields within the social sciences, in respect of
nomology,are clear and demonstrable.
Rejectingthe thesisthat social science is a latecomermeans also
rejectinga lag interpretationof thisdifference.What, then,are we
to make of the issues of theexistenceand logical formof laws in the
social sciences?
I want to propose thatlaws certainlydo existin thesocial sciences,
if'laws" be understoodin a comprehensivesense to referto generalisations of a causal character; thereonly appears to be a dearth of
laws in social science if such generalisationsare dismissedas unimportantor wantingby comparisonwiththose to be found in certain
areas of naturalscience. (This should not be taken to implythatthe
establishingof laws is necessarilythe sole concern of eithernatural
or social science.) But thereare two principal reasons to suppose
thatsocial scientificlaws, even in those areas where quantification
fromthose characteristicof
is most feasible, will be differentiated
the various fields of the physical sciences. One does not referto
and, althoughnot trivial,I shall treatit as essenlogical differences,
The othertypeof differenceis logical in charactiallyuninteresting.
forpurposesof my presentdiscussion.
ter,and muchmoresignificant
The firstconcernstheundeterminationof theoriesby facts.It has
become a well-establishedprinciple of the philosophy of science
that theories are undeterminedby facts, and that no amount of
accumulated factwill in and of itselfdeterminethat one particular
theorybe accepted and another rejected,since theoreticalmodifications can, in turn,influenceobservationsto accommodate them.
There is good cause to suppose that the level of undetermination
of theoriesby facts is likely to be greaterin most areas of social
science than in most areas of natural science. The factorsinvolved
are well-enoughknown, and thereis no need to elaborateupon them
at any length:theyinclude difficulties
of the replicationof observathepaucity
tions,therelativelack of possibilitiesof experimentation,
of "cases" forcomparativeanalysiswithregardto theoriesconcerned
withtotalsocieties,etc..
The second is more important,at least to the presentdiscussion,

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SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

209

inlogicalformbetween
difference
a fundamental
becauseitconcerns
laws in thesocial sciencesas comparedto thosefoundin natural
laws is still
science.Althoughthe characterof naturalscientific
and muchdebated,thereis littlereasonto doubtthat
controversial
informwithinthedomains
universal
mostsuchlawsarepuntatively
all laws operatewithincertainboundary
of theirapplication10;
butthecausalrelationsthattheyspecifyareimmutable
conditions,
ofthoseconditions.Thisis, however,notthe
giventheoccurrence
case withlaws in thesocial sciencesin which,as I have triedto
the causal relationsinvolvedalways referto
show elsewhere11,
"mixes"of intendedand unintended
consequencesof reproduced
acts. Laws in thesocial sciencesare historicalin characterand in
socialconduct,
mutablein form.All formsofregularised
principle
can be analysedas involvingtypical
as I have arguedelsewhere12,
conditionsof
sets of connectionsbetweenthe unacknowledged
of actionin thecontextof itspurposive
acton,therationalisation
and theunintended
reflexive
consequencesof action.
monitoring,
involvedwithlaws in thesocialsciences
The boundaryconditions
includeas a basicelementknowledgethatactors,in a giveninstituoftheiraction.Change
haveaboutthecircumstances
tionalcontext,
condiestablishedconnectionstyingunacknowledged
in typically
of action,and unintended
tions,therationalisation
consequences,
resultsin potentialalterationof
intomodesof socialreproduction
thecausalrelationsspecified
by a law or laws: and suchalteration
can stemfromcomingto know about such a law or laws. Once
known- bythoseto whoseconducttheyrelate- lawsmaybecome
thevery
appliedas rulesand resourcesin thedualityof structure:
doublemeaning(and origin)of"law"as bothpreceptofactionand
to this.To say that
aboutactiondrawsourattention
generalisation
mutable
and in principle
all lawsin thesocialsciencesare historical
is not,ofcourse,to denythattheremaybe laws ofuniversalform
whichmightby
concerning
physicalaspectsofthehumanorganism
relevantto thestudyofsocialconduct.
oflaws
withthemutability
The orthodoxconsensuswas familiar
and "selfin the social sciencesin the formof "self-fulfilling"
Butheretherelationbetweenthereflexive
negating
prophecies".13
of knowledgeand theconditionsof actionis appreappropriation
thesocialinvestigahended,first,
onlyas a "problem"confronting
of evidencefor
themobilisation
torand, second,onlyas affecting
issues
as
than
rather
broaching
epistemological
generalisations,
themselves.
relevantto theverycharacterof thosegeneralisations
or self-negating
prophecies,in otherwords,are seen
Self-fulfilling
or propaas predictions
which,by thefactof theirannouncement
gation,serveto createtheconditionswhichrenderthemvalid, or
The "problem"theypose
effect.
alternatively
producethecontrary
the noxiouseffectwhichsuch nuisances
is thatof marginalising
of
Butifthemutablecharacter
ofhypotheses.
haveuponthetesting

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210

ANTHONYGIDDENS

all social scientific

is acknowledged,
we mustcongeneralisations
clude thatsuch a standpointis quiteinadequate.Ratherthanatto marginalise,
and treatpurelyas a "problem",the
tempting
ofsocialscientific
theories
and observations
potential
incorporation
withinthereflexive
of thosewho are their"object"
rationalisation
- humanagents
- we haveto treatthephenomenon
as oneofcentral
interestand concernto the social sciences.For it becomesclear
orformofstudythatis concerned
thateverygeneralisation
withan
withinthat
existingsocietyconstitutesa potentialintervention
society:and thisleads throughto thetasksand aimsof sociology
as criticaltheory.
4.

thatcharacterised
the erstwhile
The second set of shortcomings
consensusconcernitsrelianceupona now outmodedand defective
theimplicaphilosophy
of language.As I shalltryto demonstrate,
I have justdiswithconsiderations
tionsof thispointlinkdirectly
cussed. Orthodoxsociologytook forgrantedan old-established
viewoflanguage:an old-established
view,however,thatreceived
a new impetusfromtheworkof Russell,theearlyWittgenstein,
fromlogicalempiricism.
and subsequently
Language,accordingto
thisolderview is, above all, a mediumof describingthe world
(physicalor social). Languageshouldbe studiedas a mediumof
and an isomorphycan be discoveredbetweenthe
descriptions,
oflanguage,
formoflanguage,or certaincentralfeatures
structural
to whichlanguagegivesaccess. The most
and the object-worlds
versionof thisstandpointis to be
developedand sophisticated
foundin Wittgensten's
Tractatus,accordingto whichbasic units
oflanguage"picture"
unitsinreality.
corresponding
viewsis onlyone eleown rejectionofhisformer
Wittgenstein's
from
ofphilosophies
otherwise
mentina convergence
quitedistinct
one anotherwhichincludeordinarylanguagephilosophy,Schutzhermeneutics.
All these
ian phenomenology,
and contemporary
havecometo theviewthatitis erroneousto treatlanguageas being
as a mediumof descriptions.
Descripmostlyaptlycharacterised
tionis onlyone amongmanyotherthingsthatare carriedout in
and throughlanguage.Languageis a mediumof social practice,
and as such is implicatedin all thevariegatedactivitiesin which
socialactorsengage.Austin'sfamousexampleis stillas good as any
to illustrate
thepoint.The wordsutteredin a marriageceremonial
do notconstitute
a description
ofthatceremonial:
theyarea partof
thatceremonial.
In anotherequallywell-known
example:language
has as manyuses, and therefore
as manyfacets,as thetoolsin a
tool-box.14

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SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

211

Since theorthodoxconsensusacceptedthe traditionally

establishedviewoflanguage,thoseworkingwithinitdismissedtherelation betweenordinarylanguage- the languageemployedin the
of
courseofday to day conduct-and thetechnicalmetalanguages
or importance.
socialscienceas of no particular
interest
The object
ofconceptsintroduced
or inventedby thesociologistis to improve
where
or
correct,
necessary,the inadequaciesof ordinary
upon
language.Ordinarylanguageis oftenfuzzyand imprecise:these
deficiencies
can readilybe overcomeby movingoverto metalangformulated
But
uageswhichembodyclearand precisely
concepts.15
theassumption
thattherelationbetweenordinary
languageand the
technicallanguagesof social scienceposes no questionsof any
whichcannotbe maintainedifwe
or difficulty
interest
particular
understandsignificance
of the newer philosophicalconceptions
oflanguage.Ordinaryor lay languagecannotbe simplydismissed
in thelightof sociologicalneologisms,
sincelay langas corrigible
of
into
the
constitution
social
itself.
enters
activity
uage
very
those
from
thestandThispointhas beenrecognised
working
by
of
as
well
as
philosophy,
by phenpoint post-Wittgensteinian
of how
authors.At leasttwodistinct
omenological
interpretations
the connectionsbetweenordinarylanguage and the technical
conceptsof thesocialsciencesshouldbe graspedcan be discerned
in theliterature.
One is thatformulated
by Schutzin relationto
what he calls, borrowinga termfromWeber,the "postulateof
adequacy".Schutzholdsthattherelevancespresumedby theconare different
fromthoseof lay actorsin
cernsof thesocialscientist
in
theirday to day behaviour.In social science,we are interested
context-free
the
of
stocks
generalised,
knowledge;
knowledge
employedby social actorsin social life,on the otherhand, are
formsof "cookery-bookknowledge",in which the emphasisis
upon thepracticalmasteryof thedemandsof everydayactivities.
The conceptsinventedby thesocial scientist
from
thusmaydiffer
thoseemployedin ordinary
orders
language,becausetwodifferent
ofrelevancies
areinvolved.Buttheformer
have to meeta criterion
of adequacyin respectof thelatter.Schutz'svariousformulations
of the postulateof adequacy are not whollyunambiguous.He
seems,however,to assertthatconceptsof social sciencecan only
be declaredto be adequate insofaras theycan be translatedin
intotheeverydaylanguageoflay actors.16
Ifthisis in fact
principle
whatSchutzmeans,it is hardlya defensible
viewpoint.To adapt
an exampleused by Winch: in what sense does the notion of
have to be capable of translation
into the
'liquiditypreference"
ordinarylanguageconceptsof actorsengagedin economicactivities?Thereseemsno reasonto supposethatanyevaluationofthe

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212

ANTHONYGIDDENS

adequacyof theconceptto economictheoryhas anythingto do

The inadecan be effected.
withwhetheror notsucha translation
indicated
also
by consideringthe
quacies of Schutz'sview are
to whichwe mightverywellwantto apply
behaviourofchildren,
in questionaretoo
ofaction;ifthechildren
technical
terminologies
than
more
to
have
mastered
skills,
linguistic
rudimentary
young
of testing
theadequacyof
therewouldobviouslybe no possibility
intermsofa translation
suchterminologies
process.
not a satisfactory
Schutz'spostulateof adequacy is therefore
mode of approachingthe connectionsbetweenlay languageand
view is set out by
the conceptsof social science.An alternative
Winch,and I shallsuggestthatthisis morenearlycorrect.Winch
holdsthatthereis a "logicaltie"betweenordinary
languageand the
specialisedlanguagesof thesocial sciences,and indicatesthatthe
natureofthistieis thereverseofthatentailedby Schutz'spostulate
ofadequacy:itexistsnotbecausesociologicalconceptshave to be
because
intolay ones,buton thecontrary
capableoftransposition
the
that
social
scientist
invented
the
beings
presuppose
by
concepts
to whomtheyreferhave masteredan indefinite
rangeof notions
thatareappliedinthecourseoftheirconduct.Winchdoesnotspell
clearthat
and does not makeit sufficiently
thisout satisfactorily,
to
suchnotionsare typicallyonlypartiallyavailablediscursively
social scientific
actors;nor does he reallyexplainwhydistinctive
languagesare neededat all, as Schutztriesto do.17But his main
pointis clearenough,and valid: a termlike liquiditypreference
onlyappliesto thebehaviour,and consequencesof behaviour,of
actorswho have mastered,in thesenseof practicalconsciousness,
etc.- notionsembedded
notionslike"risk","profit",
"investment",
ofuse ofordinary
inthecontexts
language.
at all is a quesarenecessary
metalanguages
Whysocialscientific
tionI willaddressin thenextsection,sinceansweringit involves
lookingat issuesto be discussedthere.We cannot,however,leave
matters
whereWinchleavestheminrespectto therelationbetween
of social science.The "tie"
lay languageand the terminologies
betweenthetwo is not onlylogicalin character;it has practical
of reflexivity,
introwhichrelateto the significance
implications
ducedearlier.It is notjustthatthesocialanalystis dependent
upon
- foundedin ordinarylanguagecategories
"mutualknowledge"
of his fieldof investigation.
in orderto generatecharacterisations
Thereis a two-wayrelationinvolvedbetweenlay languageand the
languageof socialscience,becauseanyof theconceptsintroduced
- and are frequently
in
by sociologicalobserverscan in principle
- appropriated
and applied as
practice
by lay actorsthemselves,
partof "ordinarylanguage"discourse.Thus it may happenthat
terms(a good exampleis the term"economic")appropriatedby

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SOCIAL THEORY TODAY

213

technical specialists from lay discourse are given new meanings,

and thesenew meaningsare later adopted into lay discourse. Such
a phenomenonis not just of interestto the historyof ideas. Again it
introducedissues that cannot effectivelybe marginalisedin social
science, in the manner normally suggested within the orthodox
consensus, which typically assumed that there is simply an
instrumentalconnection between sociological findingsand practical "applications" of them,a connectionpresumedto be logically
thesame as thatpertainingbetweennaturalscienceand technology.
To carrythisdiscussionfurther,however, it is necessaryto identifya furthersource of weakness in the erstwhileconsensus. This I
shall identifyby saying that orthodox sociology relied upon an
erroneous revelatorymode of social science, based upon naturalisticpresumptions.The essentialsof thismodel are as follows. The
findingsof naturalscience, it is assumed, are revelatoryor demystifyingin respectof common-sensebeliefsabout the physical world.
What science does is to "check up" upon common-senseviews of
and attitudestowards the world, showing some of themto be mistaken, and using others as a point of departure from which to
develop more detailed and profound explanations of objects and
events than those embodied in lay knowledge. The progress of
sciencepuncturesthe delusions of customaryhabitual beliefs.Now
under some circumstances,it is pointed out, the findingsclaimed
by scientistsare resistedby those who choose to cling on to their
establishedbeliefsor conceptions. Scientificfindingsare rejectedor
ignoredbecause vested interestsare threatened,or habits and prejudices remainsteadfast.There are those who continueto hold that
the earthis flat,no matterhow conclusivelythe evidence points to
thecontrary.
In the orthodox consensus, this view was transferreden bloc to
sociology. There are strongreasons to suppose- followingparticularlytheargumentsdeveloped by Husserl in The Crisisof European
Sciences- thatthisis an inadequate approach even in respectof the
relation between natural science and "common sense." I shall be
concerned here, however, only with its implicationswhen transposed to thesocial sciences.
According to the revelatorymodel just described, then, "resistance" to the findingsof social investigatorstakes the same formas
that found in respect of some of the claims of natural science- a
"refusal to listen" in favour of an obdurate clinging on to preexistingbeliefsor ideas. But anyone who works within the social
formof resissciences is likelyto be familiarwith a quite different
tance to theclaimed findingsof social science. Far fromresistingthe
findingsof sociological investigationsbecause they convey claims
that people are disinclinedto want to know about, such findings
are resisted on the basis that they are already well-known and
familiar. Sociology, it is often argued, simply tells us what we
already know- albeit oftenwrapped up in an esoteric jargon that

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214

ANTHONYGIDDENS

bestowsnoveltyupon its initialappearance.This could be called

thelaycritiqueofsociology.
Sociologistsarenotproneto takethelay critiqueof theirclaims
itto theinfluence
ofengrained
habits
usuallyassimilating
seriously,
to thefindings
ofsciencehereis
ofthought,
or prejudice;resistance
to theveryidea ofstudying
humansocial
heldto includeresistance
conductin a scientific
manner.Butlay objectionsto socialscience
are so prevalentthat a more plausibledefenceagainstthemis
needed; and this can also be foundby an elaborationof the
model. The object of sociologyis to check up upon
revelatory
common-sense
beliefs.Wheresocial researchrevealsthat what
actorsbelieveabout theconditionsof theirown action,or other
willnecesof theirsociety,is in factthecase, itsfindings
features
It is justsuchinstances,it is
sarilyappearbanal or unilluminating.
uponbythelaycriticsofsociology.But
proposed,thatarefastened
therewillbe otherinstancesin whichsocialanalysiswillshowthat
common-sense
beliefsare in factinvalid;in such circumstances,
socialsciencewillappearrevelatory.
ofsocialsciencehavenotbeeninclinedto give
Ifthepractitioners
to thelaycritiqueofsociology,somephilosophers
seriousattention
havedoneso. Louch,forexample,has arguedthattheconceptsof
To explainhuman
and pretentious".18
sociologyare "unnecessary
we needonlyto enquireintothereasonsactorshave
socialactivity,
whatthosereasons
foractingas theydo. Once we haveascertained
are or were,whichcan be done in ordinarylanguage,thereis
Louchsays,
nothingmorethatcan be asked.Whileanthropology,
can provideforus a collectionof "travellers
tales",sociologyis a
- indeed,worsethanthat,sincethe introducredundantexercise
tionof technicalconceptsin place of ordinarylanguagetermscan
evidentenoughto everybody,
serveto obscurewhatwas formerly
and hencecan be used by thepowerfulas a meansof dominating
withthesameconclusion,although
thelesspowerful.Winchflirts
he evidentlyregardsanthropologyas of more importance:for
given that he does not clearlyexplicatethe role of technical
of
conceptsof social science,and thathe precludesthepossibility
causal laws in respectof socialconduct,it is noteasy
formulating
wouldlooklike.19
toseewhata "Winchean
sociology"
even
I suggestthatwe takethelaycritiqueofsociologyseriously,
ifin theend it cannotbe sustained.Forit is correctto claimthat
everymemberof a societymustknow (in boththepracticaland
discursive
modes)a greatdeal about theworkingsof thatsociety
init;moreaccurately
put,suchknowbyvirtueofhisparticipation
as an elementin theproductionand reproledgeis incorporated
ductionofthatsocietyvia thedualityofstructure.
Contraryto the
of
orthodox
it
is
not
at
all
the
consensus,
easyto ascerassumptions
tainand clarifytheconditionsunderwhichthesocialsciencescan
deliveran enlightenment
acceptableto themembersof a society.

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SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

215

Explanationof humansocial conductin termsof reasonscan cerofactionis

therationalisation
tainlynotbe ignoredbysociologists:
orthodox
socioof
social
that
thefundamental
activity
component
On theotherhand,itshouldbe emphasised
justas
logydiscounted.
of actionis always bounded,in
thatthe rationalisation
strongly
itis inexploring
thenatureand
of
and
sort
historical
context;
every
oftheseboundsthatthetasksofsocialscienceare to be
persistence
found.
One further
aspectof theseissuesmustbe mentioned.It is a
notable featureof the "rediscoveryof ordinarylanguage and
in a sortofparaleventuated
commonsense"thatithas frequently
language
ysisof thecriticalwill.Havingcometo see thatordinary
and theworldof thenaturalattitudecannotmerelybe disregarded
orcorrected
by thesocialanalyst,someauthorshavebeentempted
to concludethatno kindofcriticalevaluationofthebeliefsorpracticesis possiblewheresuch beliefsand practicesformpartof an
Winch'sdiscussion
alienculturalsystem.The debatesurrounding
as is thatstimulated
ofZandesorceryis, ofcourse,well-known,
by
In
indifference".
Garfinkel'sprincipleof "ethnomethodological
have
I wantto argue,bothsetsof proponents
thesecontroversies,
righton theirside:butbothhave failedto makea vitaldistinction.
valid descripIt is rightto claimthattheconditionof generating
in
to participate
tionsofa formoflifeentailsbeingable inprinciple
it(without
havingdoneso inpractice).To know
havingnecessarily
a formoflifeis to knowa language,butin thecontextofthepracticesthatare organisedthroughtheformsof "commonsense"or
tacitpresuppositions
againstthebackgroundof whichdiscourseis
to thesocial
tasksareintegral
carriedon. In thissense,hermeneutic
sciences.But it does not followfromsuch a conclusionthatthe
formsof lifecannotbe
beliefsand practicesinvolvedin divergent
- includingwithinthisthecritique
subjectedto criticalassessment
of ideology.We mustdistinguish
betweenrespectfortheauthenenticityof belief,as a necessaryconditionof any hermeneutic
counterbetweenlanguage-games;
and thecriticalevaluationof the
fashion,we
justification
of belief.Expressedin less cumbersome
mustdifferentiate
what I have called "mutualknowledge"from
whatmightsimplybe called"commonsense".20
Mutualknowledgeis a necessary
mediumofaccessin themediathe factual
tion of framesof meaning,and involvesbracketing
statusof thetacitand discursiveunderstandings
sharedby an observeror interpreter
and thosewhose conducthe or she seeksto
It is largelybecause the bracketing
involvedin the
characterise.
applicationof mutualknowledgeis itselftypicallytacitmutual
knowledge,
employedin a routinefashion,thattheattitudeofresof beliefis not readilyapparentto sociopectfortheauthenticity
Butthedifference
thatsuchan orientation
makes
logicalobservers.
is easilyseenincircumstances
whereitis absent.Thusaccordingto

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216

ANTHONY GIDDENS

"physiological" views of schizophrenia, the utterancesof schizophrenicsare oftento be regardedas merelymeaninglessbabble. If

Laing is right,however, the language of schizophrenicsis meaningful,so long as we see thatsome of the notions taken forgrantedby
the majorityof the population are questioned or expressedin quite
differentformby schizophrenicindividuals. The development of
dialogue with schizophrenicpersons, as a hermeneuticendeavour,
is only possible if we accept that theirutterancesand actions may
be treated "methodologically" as authentic; that is, the possible
validity or otherwise of these uterrancesand actions is held in
abeyance.
What I earliercalled the "rediscoveryof ordinarylanguage and
common sense" is in thesetermsthe discoveryof thesignificanceof
mutualknowledge:mutual knowledgeis not corrigibleto the sociological observer. It is only the methodological bracketing
mentioned above that separates mutual knowledge from what I
want to suggestcan be called "common sense." By common sense I
referto the unbracketingof mutual knowiege: the considerationof
the logical and empirical status of belief-claims involved (tacitly
and discursively)in formsof live. "Common sense" is corrigiblein
the lightof claimed findingsof social and natural science. The distinctionbetween mutual knowledge and common sense can be
illustratedby allusionto theZande witchcraftcontroversy.Winch is
rightto hold thataccurate characterisationsof the beliefsand practices connectedwith Zande sorceryare "rational"- insofaras that
highly contested term means in this context that there exist
internallycoherent meaning frames which both a sociological
observer and the Zande draw upon in generatingdescriptionsof
witchcraft.But he is wrong insofaras he seems to implyfromthis
that acknowledgement of the "rationality" or authenticity of
Zande witchcraftand oracular divination precludes critical evaluation of the beliefsand the activitiesthus characterisedor identified.Mutual knowledge is the necessary medium of identifying
what is going on when a sorcererplaces a malicious spell upon an
individual in order to procure that person's death. But this is no
logical bar at all to critical enquiry into the empirical grounding
that can be marshalled to support the validity of the belief-claims
held in relation to this practice, or into theirpossible ideological
ramifications.It is worthpointingout thatthecriticalassessmentof
common sense beliefsdoes not just presumelogically the drawing
upon of mutual knowledge; the reverseis in fact also the case. For
any characterisationsof practicesmade by a sociological observer
logicallypresuppose the possibilityof theirjustification,offeredin
response to the potential critical evaluation by others of the
accuracy or appropriatenessof those characterisationsthemselves.

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SOCIAL THEORY TODAY

217

5.

of theerstwhile
As a fourthtypeof shortcoming
consensus,we
maysay: orthodoxsociologylackeda theoryof action.ButI also
want to claimthatthiswas directlylinkedto a failureto make
questionsofpowercentralto socialtheory.The lackofa theoryof
action,by whichI mean a conceptionof conductas reflexively
monitored
by social agentswho are aware of conditionsof their
behaviour,is firstof all to be attributedto the dominanceof
naturalism
as a philosophyofsocialscience.In thecruderversions
or applicationsof naturalismin sociology,conductis explained
sheerlyas the outcomeof social causes. As the most thoroughof a theoryof actionwith
goingattemptto producea synthesis
has justlybeen
Parsons's"actionframeofreference"
functionalism,
schemein (English-speaking)
themostinfluential
overalltheoretical
sociology.Criticshaveoftenpointedoutthat,in spiteoftheaction
whichParsonsuses,recognisable
humanagentsseem
terminology
to elude the graspof his scheme- the stage is set, the scriptis
therolesare established,
but theperformers
are curiously
written,
absentfromthescene.21Butthecriticshave notalwaysrecognised
whythisis so. The mainpointis that,in The Structure
of Social
actiontheorywith"voluntarism",
Action,Parsonsidentified
by
to thepurposivecharacterof human
whichhe referred
primarily
conduct,and to thecapabilityofactorsto choosebetweendifferent
goals or projects.22Voluntarismwas interpretedagainst the
backdropof the "Hobbesianproblemof order",as posing the
or a diversity
ofwillsis compatible
questionofhow purposiveness
of the Hobbesianproblemand
with"order".The reconciliation
voluntarism
thusbecamethemainissue thattheactionframeof
reference
was calledintoexistenceto resolve,and thisreconciliationwas achievedthroughregarding
valuessimultaneously
as the
basisofsocialconsensusand ofthemotivational
ofthe
components
of membersof society.Apartfromdifficulties
raised
personalities
ofvalues,and
bythisthesisinrespectofthenatureand significance
of "order"23,
thisapproachdoes notserveto drawattention
to the
importanceof reasons in human conduct: that human beings
monitortheirconductvia theknowledgetheyhave of
reflexively
of theiractivity.AlthoughParsonsseparates
the circumstances
"cognitive"from"cathectic"symbolsin his scheme,his social
actorsarenotcapable,knowledgeable
agents.
Of courseneithernaturalism
nor functionalism
reignedunchalin
the
Within
American
lenged
post-warperiod.
sociology,those
froma perspective
ofsymbolicinteractionism
hav diverged
writing
from the emphases of the orthodox consensus,
significantly
especiallyin theirbeingconcernedwiththetheoryof action,as I
- Blumer
have specifiedit above. But "symbolicinteractionism"
's
term for a diffuseset of influencesemanatingfrom G.H.
Mead- has fromthe beginningbeen hamperedby the lack of a

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218

ANTHONYGIDDENS

theoretical
analysisand
purchaseupon problemsof institutional
The importanceof Mead's conceptionsof the
transformation.
of the gestureand symbol,overdevelopmentof reflexivity,
of society,as represented
shadowedthefactthathis treatment
by
one. Mead's social
the "generalisedother",was a rudimentary
philosophy(like Piaget's developmentalpsychology)lacks an
ofthebroadersocietyas a differentiated
and historunderstanding
icallylocatedformation.Moreover,althoughMead successfully
at thecentreoftheconcernsofsocialphilosophy
placedreflexivity
and socialtheory,theoriginsoftheT in thedialecticof T and 'me'
remainedobscureand unexplained.The majorpartof his concern
of the "me", or social self.Hence it is
was withthe emergence
that,amongstsome of his followers,the
perhapsnot surprising
reflexive
relationof T and 'me' largelydisappearsfromview in
favourofa concentration
uponthesocialself.Once thismovement
has takenplace,and giventhedearthofan adequateconceptualisaand institutional
tionofinstitutions
change,thewayis openforthe
can be helpand functionalism
idea thatsymbolicinteractionism
fullyconjoinedto one-another.The formeris held to deal with
issuesto do withsmall-scalesocial relation"microsociological"
withaspectsofthe
issues,concerned
ships,while"macrostructural"
ofsociety,areleftto functionalism.
structure
institutional
In New Rules of SociologicalMethod I have arguedthatthe
of a theoryof actionintosociologycannot
introduction
successful
of the idea of
be achievedwithouta complementary
re-working
relevantto questions
is immediately
structure.
Such a re-working
of ordinarylanguage and the lay critiqueof sociology. The
whichI accentuated
notionofthedualityofstructure,
fundamental
that the
as a leadingthemeof thatbook, involvesrecognising
of actionbothdrawsupon and reconstitutes
reflexive
monitoring
thatto be
ofsociety.Acknowledging
theinstitutional
organisation
memberof society,everyindividualmustknowa
a ("competent")
greatdeal about theworkingsof thatsocietyis preciselythemain
as appliedto social
basisof theconceptof thedualityof structure
The thesisthatthenotionof humanagencycannotbe
interaction.
and vice versa,
adequatelyexplicatedwithoutthatof structure,
has to be
necessarilyconnectswith the claim that temporality
of
treatedas integralto a conceptualgrasp of the constitution
betweenstructuralist
social life. Whateverthe incompatibilities
of strucand history,one of the specificcontributions
throught
turalismfrom Saussure onwards has been to illuminatethe
temporalorderingof social reproduction.The social totality
as in functionalist
cannotbe best understood,
conceptionsof the
ofpresence
and absence
butas relations
whole,as a given'presence",
of structuralist
authorsagainst
ordered.The strictures
recursively
and formsofsocialtheorythataccordprimacyto the
philosophies
be
againstthebackgroundof
subjectmay readilyunderstandable
Cartesianism;and it is essentialto graspthe importanceof the

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SOCIALTHEORYTODAY

219

thesisthatwe have to rejectany conceptionof a subjectthatis

of
to itself/'
Butherewe also approachthelimitations
"transparent
structuralist
theories,whichare riddledwith dualismsinherited
fromSaussure.One ofthesedualismsis thatbetweenstructure
and
withthatof unconscious/conevent,usuallyoverlapping
directly
of theseoppositionshas effectively
forescious.The prominence
ofgenerating
a satisfactory
amountofhuman
closedthepossibility
of the
thought.The supersession
agencyfromwithinstructuralist
ofstructure
andevent,within
dualism
sociologicaltheoryat anyrate,
- or so I wantto claim- by introducing
is mostreadilyapproached
andstructure,
theformer
a distinction
betweensystem
beingordered
in termsof thereproduction
of spatiallyand temporally
situated
events,thelatterbeingboththemediumand outcomeofsuchreproconnected
to therejection
ofthepolarduction.Thisis immediately
of
since
a
of
unconscious
/conscious
theory agencymustrecogity
of practicalconsciousnessis not "connise thebasic significance
in structuralist
sciousness"as ordinarily
understood
butis
theories,
fromtheunconsciousin any sense of
also easilydistinguishable
thatterm.
and functionalism
Structuralism
betraytheircommonoriginsin
which
with
of
of
theyhavebothcharacterrespect concepts power
isticallybeen associated.Formanyauthorsworkingwithinthose
ifa conceptofpowerhas beendevelopedat all, poweris
traditions,
of a societyor collectivity
confronting
regardedas a phenomenon
theindividual.This was alreadyclearin Durkheim,who in those
placeswherehe addressedproblemsof power,tendedto do so in
termscomparableto thosein whichhe soughtto analysetheconof social facts.24
Those authorswritingwithin
influence
straining
thephilosophyof action,on theotherhand,have eitherregarded
poweras thecapabilityof an individualagentto accomplishhis
influenced
will,or (especiallyin theliterature
by Austinand the
havelargelyignoredissuesofpoweraltogether.
laterWittgenstein)
In thisregard,thereis a pointofdirectcontactbetweenthephiloso- each of which,in
functionalism"
phyof actionand "normative
as
rather
ways,havetendedto treatnormsor conventions
different
"thesocial".
exemplifying
ofpower,as thechanceof an agentto secure
Weber'sdefinition
of others,is probablythemost
hiswillevenagainsttheresistance
I wantto criticisethisin two
utilisedin theliterature.
frequently
Weber'ssubjectivist
methodrespects.On theone hand,it reflects
ologicalposition,and leads to thedualismof actionand structure
thatI have insistedhas to be overcome;on theother,considered
betweenpowerand
solelyfromthepointofviewoftheconnection
agency,it does not bitedeeplyenough.For thenotionof human
actionlogicallyimpliesthatofpower:"action"onlyexistswhenan
or refraining
fromintervenagenthas thecapabilityofintervening,
influence
theircourse.
ing,in a seriesofeventsso as to potentially
of a theoryof actionintosociologythusentails
The introduction

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ANTHONYGIDDENS

220

regardingpower as just as essential and integralto social

as conventions
are. Butthesameconsiderations
which
interaction
applyto thetheoryof agencygenerallyalso applyto power;that
is, we have to relatepoweras a resourcedrawnuponby agentsin
theproductionand reproduction
of interaction
to the structural
characteristics
of society.Neitheraspectof poweris more"basic"
thantheother.
6.

The fifthtypeof shortcoming

of the orthodoxconsensushas
been muchdiscussedin recentyears,but I want to hold thatits
cannotbe adequatelyunderstoodapartfromissuesI
implications
to in theprecedingsections.This fifth
have referred
point,which
at thebeginning
ofthispaper,
connectsbackto themesI introduced
model
is: thatorthodoxsociologywas closelytiedto a positivistic
The
has
become
indiscrimnatural
science.
term
so
of
"positivism"
to pointout that,in the
thatit is important
inatelyemployed25
contextof theideas informing
theerstwhile
consensus,it can be
used in a fairlydefinite
sense:to referto whatsomephilosophers
havelabelledthe"receivedmodel"ofnaturalscience.The received
modelwas strongly
conditioned
by a liberalisedversionof logical
as workedoutby Carnapand others;butitwas further
positivism,
consolidatedand elaboratedby membersof the "Berlingroup"
(especiallyHempel), and by indigenouscurrentsof American
forinstance,
(as represented,
byNagel).
philosophy
I havealreadypointedto theimportant,
ifneverentirely
happy,
thatwas effected
betweenthisapproachto thephiloconjunction
ofnaturalistic
Buttheinfluence
sophyofscienceandfunctionalism.
of course,has stretched
morebroadly
standpoints,
considerably
thanthis.Manyauthorswho have beeneitherscepticalabout,or
have presumedthatthereceived
criticalof,functionalism
directly
model of naturalscienceis appropriatefor sociology. Logical
empiricistconceptions of natural science, particularlythe
methodas originally
advocatedby Hempel
hypothetico-deductive
and Oppenheim,achievedwidespreadacceptance.26
Such conceptionswere employedto suggestthat social scienceshould aim
towardsthe (admittedly
distant)goal of formulating
deductively
relatedhierarchies
of laws; and thatexplanationin both natural
and social scienceconsistsin the deductivesubsumptionof an
cannotbe regarded
oreventundera law.27Butthefirst
observation
ofthenomologicalformof
as an appropriate
generalinterpretation
thenaturalsciences,andhas evenlessrelevanceto sociology,given
thehistorical
characterof laws of humansocialconduct;thelaws
ofthesocialsciencesare in principle
to
open to the"environment"
whichtheyrefer.In thelightof theseconsiderations,
theemphasis
thatexplanationis the deductiverelatingof an eventto a law
- even ifappliedin
appearsas peculiarlydogmaticand restrictive

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SOCIAL THEORY TODAY

221

respectof the naturalsciences,but particularlywithinthe sphereof

thesocial sciences.
Explanation,most broadly conceived, can be more appropriately
treatedas the clearingup of puzzles or queries; seen fromthispoint
of view, explanation is the making intelligibleof observations or
events that cannot be readily interpretedwithin the contextof an
existingtheoryor frameof meaning. The distinctionbetween descriptionand explanation then becomes in some part contextual in
character.The identificationor descriptionof a phenomenon, by
its incorporationwithin a given frameof meaning, is explanatory
where that identificationhelps to resolve a query. Such a broad
notion of explanation relates explanatory queries in science quite
closely to everyday queries. In neither case is there a logically
closed formassumed by explanation; that is to say, all attemptsto
satisfyqueries presuppose a contextual "etceteraclause", whereby
an enquiryis deemed to be concluded "forpresentpurposes/'
It is importantto be clear that rejectionof positivisticphilosophies of natural and social science does not imply advocating a
"soft"or humanisticversion of sociology. In particular,therecan
be no reversionto the opposition of verstehenand erklrenwhich,
the tasks of
in thehermeneutictradition,has served to differentiate
the social sciences from those of the natural sciences. For it is a
notable featureof the development of hermeneuticsthat most of
those authorswho have proposed thatthe social or human sciences
are distinctivelyconcernedwith "meanings"or "culturalproducts",
have accepted a positivisticmodel of natural science. Dilthey, as is
well known, was strongly influenced by J.S. Mill's Logic, and
accepted the latter'soverall characterisationof natural science as a
foilforhis conception of the human sciences. In more recenttimes,
Winch's account of the philosophical basis of the social sciences
relied, apparently without question, upon the view of natural
science developed by the logical empiricists;and Habermas's elaboration of his notion of knowledge-constitutiveinterests still
appears to retainelementsof a positivisticmodel of science, thus in
erklarendifferentiation.28
some partrecapitulatingthe verstehen/
The main implicationof the ideas I have set out in this paper is
that,in thecurrentphase of social theory,we are involved in rotating two axes simultaneously: that of our understandingof the
characterof human social activity,and that of the logical formof
natural science. Moreover these are not entirelyseparate endeavours, but feed froma pool of common problems. For just as it has
become apparentthathermeneuticquestions are integralto a philosophical understandingof natural science on the one hand, so on
the other the limitationsof conceptions of the social sciences that
exclude causal analysis have become equally evident. We cannot
treatthe natural and social sciences as two independentlyconstitutedformsof intellectualendeavour, whose characteristicscan be
separately determined, and which then subsequently can be

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222

ANTHONY GIDDENS

broughttogetherand compared. Philosophersand practitionersof

sociology must remain attentive to the progress of the natural
sciences; but any philosophy of naturalscience in turnpresupposes
a definitestance towardsproblemsof social theory.

1. Studiesin Social and PoliticalTheory,op.cit., pp. 14-20; "Classical

Social Theoryand theOriginsof ModernSociology,"AmericanJournal
ofSociology,Vol. 81, 1976.
London:Fontana,1978,pp. 21-23.
2. Cf.myDurkheim.
KarabelandA.H. Halsey: PowerandIdeologyinEducation,
3. Cf.Jerome
NewYork:OxfordUniversity
Press,1977.
to linkfunctionalism
4. It is a mistake,as I have triedto showelsewhere,
inpolitics."FourMythsinThe History
mainlyto conservative
standpoints
of Social Thought,"in Studiesin Social and PoliticalTheory,op. cit.
5. Cf. "Functionalism:
ApresLa Lutte,"in Studiesin Social and Political
Theory,op. cit.
andItsCritics,"Ibid.,pp. 44-57.
6. See "Positivism
7. See in particular
Carl G. Hempel:"The Logicof Functional
Analysis,"
NewYork,1965.
inAspectsofScientific
Explanation,
8. See theinteresting
Analysisin
essayby RobertK. Merton:"Structural
Sociology,"in PeterM. Blau:Approachesto theStudyofSocial Structure.
NewYork:FreePress,1975.
9. Cf. "ClassicalSocial Theoryand The Originsof ModernSociology,"
op. cit.
viewsof scientific
emendationof traditional
10. Foran important
laws,
seehoweverMaryHesse: TheStructure
Berkeley,
ofScientific
Interference,
ofCalifornia
Press,1974.
University
11. NewRulesofSociologicalMethod,op. cit.
12. Ibid.
13. TheseaccountshavingtheirorigininR. K. Merton:"TheSelf-Fulfilling
New York: FreePress,
Prophecy,"in Social Theoryand Social Structure.
1957.
14. Ludwig Wittgenstein:
PhilosophicalInvestigations.Oxford, 1972,
para. 11.
15. See, forinstance,C. W. Lachenmeyer:
The Languageof Sociology.
NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1971.

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SOCIAL THEORY TODAY

223

in sucha way
16. The Conceptsof Social Science:"Mightbe constructed
withinthelife-world
thata humanactperformed
by an individualactorin
forthe
wouldbe understandable
thewayindicated
by thetypicalconstruct
inin termsof common-sense
as well as forhis fellow-men
actorhimself
life."AlfredSchutz:CollectedPapers.The Hague:
ofeveryday
terpretation
Morton,1967,p. 44.
17. PeterWinch:The Idea of a Social Science.London:Rontledge,1963.
18. A. R. Louch:Explanationand HumanAction.Oxford,1966,p. 160.
19. See especially
pp. 83 ff,inWinch,op. cit.
20. NewRulesofSociologicalMethod,op. cit.
to Max Black: The Social Theoriesof
21. See someof thecontributions
- Hall, 1961.
TalcottParsons.EnglewoodCliffs:Prentice
22. TalcottParsons:The Structure
of Social Action.Glencoe:FreePress,
1949,pp. 737ffandpassim.
23. Cf.NewRulesofSociologicalMethod,op. cit.p. 98.
24. See especially"DeuxLoisde L'volutionPenale,"AnneSociologique,
Vol. 4, 1899-1900.
and ItsCritics,"in StudiesinSocial and PoliticalTheory,
25. "Positivism
op. cit.
26. CarlHempeland P. Oppenheim:"StudiesintheLogicofExplanation,"
Philosophy
ofScience,Vol. 15,1948.
27. Cf. GeorgeHomans: The Natureof Social Science.New York: HarcourtBrace,1967.
in Studies in Social and
28. "Habermas'sCritiqueof Hermeneutics,"
PoliticalTheory,op. cit.

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