Bai Sandra Sema vs.

COMELEC and Didagen

Dilangalen, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008.
Facts: The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) was created under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The
Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato
City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in
the ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989.
There are two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district of
Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities. However, for the reason noted above,
Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of Region
XII.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the
ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao. The voters of
Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in
a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
7902, subject of these petitions, renaming the first
legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007
elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion
from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City
for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in
Congress.
Issue: There are a number of issues resolved, but
the main issue is this Whether Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.
Ruling: The power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays was delegated by
Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. However, pursuant
to the Constitution, the power to create a province is
with Congress and may not be validly delegated.
Section 19 is, therefore, unconstitutional. MMA Act
201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
The creation of Shariff Kabunsuan is invalid.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO ET AL VS
GOVERNMENT OF RP (2008)
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of
the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process. While the facts surrounding this controversy
center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between
the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing
on all areas in the country where there has been a
long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is
tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must
uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which
the President may lawfully exercise her discretion,
but it must do so in strict adherence to the
Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the
freedom of action vested by that same Constitution
in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to
pursue the peace process effectively.
Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to
law and the Constitution.
Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The
failure of respondents to consult the local
government
units
or
communities
affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents

exceeded their authority by the mere act of

guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review. As
the petitions involve constitutional issues which are
of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention
and
intervening
respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping
with
the
liberal
stance
adopted
in David
v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensusbuilding. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government
Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations before any project or program critical
to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro
people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut
procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed
consent
of
the
Indigenous
Cultural
Communities/Indigenous
Peoples.
Notably, the
statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere
agreement or compromise. The invocation of the
doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the
general right to information or the specific right to
consultation is untenable. The various explicit
legal respondents effectively waived such defense
after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of
the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance
and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser
on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371.
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess
of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled
with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying
them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional ,
for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence. While there is a clause in the
MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will
not be effective until that framework is amended, the
same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum
of Instructions From The President dated March 1,
2001, addressed to the government peace panel.
Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President
herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the
only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome
of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process. While the

MOA-AD would not amount to an international

agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act
of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD
fatally defective.
BSP v COA
The jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA)
over the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is the
subject matter of this controversy that reached
us via petition for prohibition. filed by the BSP under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In this petition,
the BSP seeks that the COA be prohibited from
implementing its June 18, 2002Decision, its
February 21, 2007 Resolution, as well as all other
issuances arising therefrom, and that all of the
foregoing be rendered null and void.
Issue:
WON BSP and its funds are subject to the COAs
jurisdiction?
Held:
After looking at the legislative history of its amended
charter and carefully studying the applicable laws
and the arguments of both parties, we find that the
BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject
to the COAs audit jurisdiction.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111,
approved on October 31, 1936), entitled An Act to
Create a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers
and Purposes created the BSP as a public
corporation to serve the following public interest or
purpose:
Sec. 3. The purpose of this
corporation shall be to promote
through
organization
and
cooperation with other agencies,
the ability of boys to do useful
things for themselves and others,
to train them in scoutcraft, and to
inculcate in them patriotism, civic
consciousness and responsibility,
courage, self-reliance, discipline
and kindred virtues, and moral
values, using the method which are
in common use by boy scouts.
There are three classes of juridical persons under
Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently
constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls
under the second classification. Article 44
reads:
Art. 44. The following are juridical
persons:
(1) The State and its
political subdivisions;
(2) Other
corporations, institutions
and

entities for public interest or

purpose created by law; their
personality begins as soon as
they have been constituted
according to law;
(3)
Corporations,
partnerships
and
associations
for private
interest
or
purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and
distinct
from
that
of
each
shareholder, partner or member.
(Emphases supplied.)
The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public
interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it
under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art.
45. Juridical
persons mentioned in Nos. 1
and 2 of the preceding article
are governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are
regulated by laws of general
application on the subject.
Partnerships
and
associations for private interest or
purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning
partnerships.
(Emphasis
and
underscoring supplied.)
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its
amended charter shows that it was created
in order to implement a State policy
declared in Article II, Section 13 of the
Constitution, which reads:
ARTICLE II - DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 13. The State
recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being. It shall inculcate
in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic
affairs.
Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special
law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of
public corporations defined by paragraph 2, Article
44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which
creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.