May 22, 1985

Facts
x Sometime in May 1972, the United States organized an auction by
invitation for the repair of its equipment and facilities in at the US
Naval Station Subic Bay in Zambales, which was one of those provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
x Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the
United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals
and for the name of its bonding company; the company, thereby,
complied.
x In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by
Wilham I. Collins, Director for Contracts Division of the Navy
Department of US, saying that the company did not qualify to receive
an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance on a repair contract and that the projects had been
awarded to third parties.
x The company sued the US and its officers in the US Navy who were
responsible for rejecting their services to order the defendants in
allowing the company to perform the work for the projects, and in the
event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay the damages. The company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
x The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only
of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the complaint being
acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant
United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted
in the complaint.
x Subsequently a motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by the
defendants, who included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.
x The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ.

Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM

I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First
Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35645

The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the

instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.

Issue
x W/N US is suable? NO.
o The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. It is however contended that when a sovereign state
enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be
sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an
individual from which it can be implied that it has given its
consent to be sued under the contract. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
x W/N the trial court has jurisdiction over the case? NO.
o The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act
is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. In that case the plaintiffs leased
three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the
use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover
possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the
leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until
the apartments shall have been vacated. The Court decided that
the US Government has not, given its consent to the filing of
this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name.
Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against
his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a
citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said
government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
o In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private
individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the US was not
deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the
reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure
gestionis.

Notes
x Makasiar, J., dissenting:
o The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed
to continue therein.
o He cited cases wherein the US Government is held suable for
entering into contracts, which by its very act implies its consent
to be sued.
o He expressed that constant resort by a foreign state or its
agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this jurisdiction
impinges unduly upon the sovereignty and dignity of the nation.
Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic
contractors from transacting business and entering into contracts
with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines
because of the non-enforceability of validly executed contracts
and lack of judicial remedy for breaches of contractual
obligation. It is to be reasonably assumed and expected that the
undertakings in the contract will be complied with in good faith,
whether the parties are nations or private individuals.
o Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States
Government before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III
on respect for Philippine law of the Memorandum of Agreement
signed on January 7, 1979, also amending RP-US Military Bases
Agreement, which stresses that "it is the duty of members of the
United States Forces, the civilian component and their
dependents, to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of
the Military Bases Agreement and, in particular, from any
political activity in the Philippines. The United States shag take
all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to
them.

Held
The petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are
set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed, costs against the private
respondent.

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican
City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal
Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic
corporation engaged in the real estate business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of
6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in
the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots
registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos,
Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale
to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private
respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of
evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the
parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of
land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented
by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint
petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and
Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was
filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to
dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by
entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated
the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign

FACTS:

HOLY SEE VS. ROSARIO

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of
a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal
Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government
since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in
international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held
and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it
is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary
course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but
claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute
said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use
of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or
personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of
its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof
are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell
Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because
the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it
for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and

RULING:

ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business
relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative,
the Papal Nuncio.

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti

Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with
respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The
equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units
and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister
Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March
2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and
not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement.
Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated

FACTS:

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR

SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs.
JAMES VINZON

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in

Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a
person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his
own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign
Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to
persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity
of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of
the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine
government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants
Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private
Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government
decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The
mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot
be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or
jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State
does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and
upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to
maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the
living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner
Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of
the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters,
and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official
residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

The SC GRANTED the petition.

RULING:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts
decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as
its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE:

August 31, 2000. Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid
termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in
the Philippines.

Montoya argued that:

(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside
the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers, had committed an
improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee
and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b) having exceeded her
authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public
petitioner because her liability is personal; (c) Philippine courts are vested
with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who
had committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act
is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; and
(d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to

2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange

Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is immune from suit for act(s) done by her
in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United
States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement
of 1947, as amended.

Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:
1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a
foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of
action pleaded in the complaint; and

Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an

identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint
United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon
City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an activity
manager. There was an incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had
Montoyas person and belongings searched in front of many curious
onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for
damages.

Facts:

USA and Bradford v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes and Montoya

[219 SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]
G.R. No. 79253

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by

this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in
Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be
proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him
cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.

Doctrine of State Immunity:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his

capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of
plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau
of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act or
the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent."

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself
to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation
of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so allencompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed
in Article XVI Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the
law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the
international community.

She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads:

In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond
the scope and beyond her place of official functions. Thus she may not avail
of immunity.

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark
Air Base are no exception to this rule. [footnotes omitted]

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of
the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse

consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds
or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in
his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately
be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the
duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff
or petitioner. . . . .

Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we held
that:

In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., it was ruled that:

The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.

The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized
in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot
be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of
her authority.

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC

extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by

the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions
(Emphasis supplied).

On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med
Arbiters Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a certification
election.

On Februaury 5, 1987 Med Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and

dismissed the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for
Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by the
ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it enjoys diplomatic
immunity.

ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a nonprofit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is
duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It has the activities parallel to
those of the International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

FACTS:

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner vs.

HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
SERVICES (TUPAS) WFTU respondents.

ISSUE:

xxx xxx xxx

Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine

Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status similar to
that of a specialized agency.
Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets,
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every
form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have
expressly waived their immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver
of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution.

BASIS:

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction.
Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise
their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government
in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the
judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction.

The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for
Certification election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order
earlier issued is made PERMANENT.

HELD:

This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the
BLR Order.

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of

the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private

companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a
commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

Issues:

The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the
DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a
"formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a
favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that
the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered
a decision in favour Magnayi.

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal

case against ADB. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the
ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"). ADB
and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its
President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article
50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the
Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

Facts:

DFA vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a

commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its
immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private
companies. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each
widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in
the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
act or acts jure gestionis.

"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity

from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and
processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The
obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which
the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or
control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such
subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic

status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law.

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys

immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of
borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity
in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and
privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government which must be respected.

Held:

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this

case

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,'
where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American
court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether
it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant
is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the
court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to

plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the
Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said
defendant is entitled to immunity.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the
determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities,
a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the
court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or
advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international
agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise
accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly
regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the
highest executive department with the competence and authority to so act in
this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this
Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been

intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a
waiver of immunity would not attach.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a

private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start
of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged
in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when
it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter,
dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,

the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such
a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or
without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a patent
nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the
present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter
before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to
the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases
where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire
into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts
and transactions involved."

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office
of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side
of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum
in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its
claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International
Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer
could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57
SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the
United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to
respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a
manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

VERSTUYFT,

Branch VIII, Court of

MAJOR ANTONIO G.
Constabulary Offshore

LEONCE

Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for petitioners.

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR.

petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of
First Instance of Rizal, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ,
RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S. NAVARRO of the
Action Center (COSAC), respondents.

G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972

Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no

recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that each specialized
agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to
which the specialized agency is a party. Private respondent is not engaged
in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint
project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island

Held:

Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private

respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the
United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.
Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private
respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Facts:

Lasco vs UNRFNRE
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges
and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties,
exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs
duties.

It is undisputed in the record that petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, who was
assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to
the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services,
is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed
on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health
Organization.

The Court thereafter called for the parties' memoranda in lieu of oral
argument, which were filed on August 3, 1972 by respondents and on
August 21, 1972 by petitioners, and the case was thereafter deemed
submitted for decision.

Respondents COSAC officers filed their answer joining issue against

petitioners and seeking to justify their act of applying for and securing from
respondent judge the warrant for the search and seizure of ten crates
consigned to petitioner Verstuyft and stored at the Eternit Corporation
warehouse on the ground that they "contain large quantities of highly
dutiable goods" beyond the official needs of said petitioner "and the only
lawful way to reach these articles and effects for purposes of taxation is
through a search warrant." 1

Upon filing of the petition, the Court issued on June 6, 1972 a restraining
order enjoining respondents from executing the search warrant in question.

An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent

judge's refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of
respondents COSAC (Constabulary Offshore Action Center) officers for the
search and seizure of the personal effects of petitioner official of the WHO
(World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic
immunity, as duly recognized by the executive branch of the Philippine
Government and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in
the matter.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

Emilio L. Baldia for respondents.

The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the
quashal of the search warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily

At the hearing thereof held on May 8, 1972, the Office of the Solicitor
General appeared and filed an extended comment stating the official position
of the executive branch of the Philippine Government that petitioner
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, he did not abuse his diplomatic
immunity, 5 and that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not
the proper remedy in the case of abuse of diplomatic immunity. 6

Petitioner Verstuyft's special appearance on March 24, 1972 for the limited
purpose of pleading his diplomatic immunity and motion to quash search
warrant of April 12, 1972 failed to move respondent judge.

Respondent judge set the Foreign Secretary's request for hearing and heard
the same on March 16, 1972, but notwithstanding the official plea of
diplomatic immunity interposed by a duly authorized representative of the
Department of Foreign Affairs who furnished the respondent judge with a list
of the articles brought in by petitioner Verstuyft, respondent judge issued his
order of the same date maintaining the effectivity of the search warrant
issued by him, unless restrained by a higher court. 4

Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director
for the Western Pacific with station in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date respondent Judge
advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect of
his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions"
pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search
warrant order "pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC."

Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972

upon application on the same date of respondents COSAC officers search
warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic Act 4712 amending
section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code 3 directing the search and
seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.

When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates

entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972,
they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes. The crates
were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation's warehouse at Mandaluyong,
Rizal, "pending his relocation into permanent quarters upon the offer of Mr.
Berg, Vice President of Eternit who was once a patient of Dr. Verstuyft in the
Congo." 2

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of

separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, 8 and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer
acting under his direction. 9 Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that
courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of
property, as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in
conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that "in such cases the
judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the political
branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction." 10

1.
The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly
recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity,
pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The Department of
Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the
subject of a Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in
international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of
the search warrant, since his personal effects and baggages after having
been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be
baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the
tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents COSAC officers. The
Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the Government, 7 likewise
expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked
for the quashal of the search warrant.

The writs of certiorari and prohibition should issue as prayed for.

Hence, the petition at bar. Petitioner Verstuyft has in this Court been joined
by the World Health Organization (WHO) itself in full assertion of petitioner
Verstuyft's being entitled "to all privileges and immunities, exemptions and
facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law"
under section 24 of the Host Agreement.

denied quashal of the search warrant per his order of May 9, 1972 "for the
same reasons already stated in (his) aforesaid order of March 16, 1972"
disregarding Foreign Secretary Romulo's plea of diplomatic immunity on
behalf of Dr. Verstuyft.

3.
Finally, the Court has noted with concern the apparent lack of
coordination between the various departments involved in the subjectmatter of the case at bar, which made it possible for a small unit, the
COSAC, to which respondents officers belong, seemingly to disregard and go
against the authoritative determination and pronouncements of both the
Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance that petitioner Verstuyft is
entitled to diplomatic immunity, as confirmed by the Solicitor-General as the
principal law officer of the Government. Such executive determination
properly implemented should have normally constrained respondents officers
themselves to obtain the quashal of the search warrant secured by them
rather than oppose such quashal up to this Court, to the embarrassment of

Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the

executive branch of government that respondent judge had some ground to
prefer respondents COSAC officers' suspicion that there had been an abuse
of diplomatic immunity, the continuation of the search warrant proceedings
before him was not the proper remedy. He should, nevertheless, in
deference to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of the executive
branch of government to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of
the search warrant, and forwarded his findings or grounds to believe that
there had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of
Foreign Affairs for it to deal with, in accordance with the aforementioned
Convention, if so warranted.

As already stated above, and brought to respondent court's attention, 13 the

Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
of the United Nations 14 for consultations between the Host State and the
United Nations agency concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact
of occurrence of the abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no repetition
occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment voluntarily
assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect
of law.

2.
The unfortunate fact that respondent judge chose to rely on the
suspicion of respondents COSAC officers "that the other remaining crates
unopened contain contraband items" 11 rather than on the categorical
assurance of the Solicitor-General that petitioner Verstuyft did not abuse his
diplomatic immunity, 12 which was based in turn on the official positions
taken by the highest executive officials with competence and authority to act
on the matter, namely, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance,
could not justify respondent judge's denial of the quashal of the search
warrant.

Castro, J., reserves his vote.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio

and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

The clerk of court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the
Secretary of Justice for such action as he may find appropriate with regard
to the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof. So ordered.

ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are hereby
granted, and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued against
execution or enforcement of the questioned search warrant, which is hereby
declared null and void, is hereby made permanent. The respondent court is
hereby commanded to desist from further proceedings in the matter. No
costs, none having been prayed for.

The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction
and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner
Verstuyft.

The seriousness of the matter is underscored when the provisions of

Republic Act 75 enacted since October 21, 1946 to safeguard the
jurisdictional immunity of diplomatic officials in the Philippines are taken into
account. Said Act declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or
prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public
minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or
attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom the same
is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer
concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process. 16

said department heads, if not of the Philippine Government itself vis a vis
the petitioners. 15

Hence, SC denied the petition.

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow
ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong
City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of
a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the
MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion
was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.

HELD:
(1)
NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts
cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner
is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court
needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of
the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement
is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered
by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from
legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

(2)
NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by
law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation
is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000