Department of Political and Economic Studies

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Helsinki

Cold War Perceptions

Romanias policy change towards the Soviet Union, 1960-1964

Elena Dragomir

ACADEMIC DISSERTATION
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the
University of Helsinki, for public examination in the Arppeanum Auditoriun, Helsinki
University Museum, on 25 January 2014, at 10 am.
Helsinki, 2014

ISBN 978-952-10-9682-2 (paperback)

ISBN 978-952-10-9683-9 (PDF)
Helsinki University Printing House
Helsinki 2014

Abstract
This study investigated Romanias early 1960s policy change towards the Soviet Union,
focusing on two questions why the change occurred and what actually changed. Calling
it detachment from Moscow, dissidence, new state security strategy, independent or
autonomous line, historiography focuses from an objectivist perspective on the
external permissive conditions that allowed the change. It works within a paradigm which
maintains that after the war Romania allied (balanced) with the USSR against the Western
threat but contends that Romanias alliance with the USSR and its (post-1960) opposition
to the USSR were mutually exclusive. In tackling this dichotomy, some scholars argue that
the change was simulated or apparent, while others acknowledge a partial, incomplete
detachment but pay little attention to what actually changed.
Drawing from recently declassified archive materials, this study used a perceptual
approach and a paradigm which argues that post-war Romania allied not against the threat
but with the (perceived) threat the USSR. It focused on the proximate causes triggering
the change and explained what changed. It investigated the emergence of Romanias
opposition to the USSR mainly through two case studies (the CMEA reform process and
the Sino-Soviet dispute) and covered the period between 1960 and 1964 between
Romanias first categorical (albeit non-public and indirect) opposition to the USSR and
the issuing of the Declaration marking Romanias first public and official (although
indirect) acknowledgement of the disagreements with the USSR.
This study found that the proximate causes of Romanias policy change towards the
Soviet Union resided in the Romanian leaders perceptions of the threats posed to
Romanias interests by various specific Soviet policies, such as the attempts to impose the
CMEA integration or a strong collective riposte against China. The Romanian leaders
considered that such Soviet policies had to be blocked, but they feared that opposition
risked triggering even bigger threats or even the ultimate (perceived) threat to Romanias
security an open confrontation with the USSR. Thus, they responded to the perceived
threats by conceptualising the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR not in terms
of breaking off the alliance, but in terms of finding practical ways (tactics) to block
specific (perceived) less-than-ultimate Soviet threats, without provoking a confrontation
with the USSR.
Through its findings, this study opens new research perspectives on the RomanianSoviet post-war relations and on the role of the leaders beliefs in Romanias foreign
policy choices. It may also be a starting point to understand the unusual present-day
relations between Romania and the Russian Federation.

Acknowledgements
During the time I spent on this study, I incurred considerable debts to many individuals in
Finland and Romania. Pursuing a doctorate is an experience that truly reveals the
importance of teachers and mentors, of colleagues and friends, and, over the past years, I
have had the privilege to found myself within a supportive set of social and professional
networks. As a researcher and graduate student, I greatly benefited from the academic
environment at several institutions: the Department of Political and Economic Studies (at
the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki), the Graduate School for Russian
and Eastern European Studies (at the Aleksanteri Institute in Helsinki), and the Grigore
Gafencu Research Centre (at the Valahia University of Trgovite, Romania).
I also had the privilege to participate in two significant research projects, Competition
in Socialist Society, run by the University of Helsinki (director of project Dr. Katalin
Miklssy) and Utopia versus realism in Romanias foreign policy, run by the University
Valahia of Trgovite (Director of Project Dr. Silviu Miloiu). The weekly Graduate
Seminar at the Department of Political and Economic Studies, the conferences and
seminars organised at the Aleksanteri Institute, the monthly conferences and workshops
from the Grigore Gafencu Research Centre provided me with settings for presenting work
in progress and sometimes distress and for receiving supervision, guidance, feedback,
comments, suggestions or challenging questions.
Numerous participants joined these academic groups over the years, and many deserve
particular mention for their comments on different working papers which I presented or
for how they supported me in solving different but often crucial administrative and
practical matters. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Seppo Hentil, Pauli
Kettunen, Katalin Miklssy, Suvi Kansikas, Silviu Miloiu, Marjukka Laakso, Marjatta
Rahikainen, Riikka Palonkorpi, Juhana Aunesluoma, Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Ohto Rintala,
Markku Kivinen, Markku Kangaspuro, Ira Jnis-Isokangas, Eeva Korteniemi, Hanna
Ruutu, Anna-Maria Salmi.
Working under the supervision of Professor Seppo Hentil and of Dr. Katalin
Miklssy, I have been taught rigor and reason. Time is a very precious commodity of
academic life and I am very grateful for the time that Professor Seppo Hentil and Katalin
Miklssy took to read and comment my apparently never-ending drafts. The study could
not have reached the current state without their patient reviews and rechecks, and I feel
most deeply indebted for their useful discussions and numerous remarks pinpointed on
each chapter. I would also like to thank to Professor Mihai Retegan, from the University of
Bucharest, who has agreed to act as opponent during the public examination and to
Professors Dennis Deletant and Liviu Tirau, who, acting as pre-examiners of my
dissertation, presented me with challenging and useful suggestions and comments.
I am deeply indebted to my colleague and friend Suvi Kansikas who unselfishly
devoted time and effort to read and comment my work. Moreover, Suvis help and
guidance with regard to the practicalities of the last phases of the doctorate programme
was crucial. I am convinced that without Suvis support with regard to different
practicalities I would have not finished the programme. Thank you, Suvi!

Silviu Miloiu also read and commented my drafts and for that I am very grateful to
him as well. I am also indebted to Dr. Mihai Croitor (from the Department of
Contemporary History and International Studies, Faculty of History and Philosophy,
Babe-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania) for his insightful discussions, especially
during the last phases of the research.
Silviu Miloiu and Katalin Miklssy have been the first two people who have shown
confidence in me and in my academic potential. If my work will ever count for something,
then that is because they encouraged me to do research and because they often guided me
through it. I am also forever grateful to my friends and neighbours, Cati and Florin Savu.
Without their support, I could not have started the programme several years ago. Many
thanks are also due to Dr. Tom Junes for his useful language corrections.
During the time I was in this doctoral programme, several funding bodies financed my
work: The Finnish Centre for International Mobility, the Valahia University of Trgoviste
(through the Utopia versus realism research project), the University of Helsinki (through
the Competition in Socialist Society research project), and the Dinu Patriciu Foundation
(through the Open Horizons scholarship program). I am grateful to them all.

Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 3
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................... 4
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................... 8
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... 8
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 9
1.1 The research problem .............................................................................................. 9
1.2 Theory and method ................................................................................................ 11
1.3 Previous research................................................................................................... 15
1.4 Sources.................................................................................................................. 19
1.5 Structure of the study............................................................................................. 23
2 Romanias post-war grand strategy .............................................................................. 24
2.1 Conceptualising Romanias post-war grand strategy .............................................. 24
2.2 Bargaining for friendship ....................................................................................... 27
2.3. Romania A loyal bandwagoner .......................................................................... 33
3 The reformation of the CMEA, 1960-1962................................................................... 36
3.1 Romanias opposition to specialisation .................................................................. 36
3.1.1 Threat perceptions ........................................................................................... 37
3.1.2. Early opposition tactics .................................................................................. 42
3.2 Attempts at CMEA integration .............................................................................. 49
3.2.1 Manoeuvring against integration ..................................................................... 50
3.2.2. An early compromise ..................................................................................... 56
4 Coping with the perceived integration threat ................................................................ 59
4.1 Re-launching integration ....................................................................................... 59
4.2 Romanias first dissent .......................................................................................... 61
4.3 Developing new tactics to block integration........................................................... 65
4.3.1 Making the divergences public ........................................................................ 67
4.3.2 China-related arguments ................................................................................. 72
4.3.3 The sovereignty argument ............................................................................... 74
4.4 Settling the integration dispute .............................................................................. 78
4.4.1 The Iron Gates Power Plant project ................................................................. 78
4.4.2 Bargaining a compromise ................................................................................ 81
6

4.4.3 Reaching an agreement ................................................................................... 90

5 Looking for a balance with China............................................................................... 100
5.1 Romania and the Sino-Soviet dispute, 1960-1962 ................................................ 100
5.1.1 Supporting the CPSU .................................................................................... 102
5.1.2 Romanias neither-nor-position ..................................................................... 106
5.1.3 Ideological considerations ............................................................................. 109
5.2 In search of an ally .............................................................................................. 111
5.2.1 Initiating rapprochement with China ............................................................. 112
5.2.2 Mutual signs of goodwill ............................................................................... 115
5.2.3 Towards a Romanian public position ............................................................. 124
5.2.4 Mutual promises of support ........................................................................... 131
6 The April 1964 Declaration of Independence ........................................................... 136
6.1 The perceived threats of early 1964 ..................................................................... 136
6.1.1 A Warsaw Pact body of coordination .......................................................... 137
6.1.2 CMEA-related threats ................................................................................... 139
6.1.3 Where two are fighting, the third does not win .............................................. 142
6.2 Attempts at mediation .......................................................................................... 145
6.2.1 The official Romanian objectives .................................................................. 148
6.2.2 The secret Romanian objectives .................................................................... 150
6.2.3 The results of the mediation .......................................................................... 152
6.3 Romanias public dissent ..................................................................................... 156
6.3.1 The April 1964 RWPs Declaration ............................................................... 158
6.3.2 The Declaration and the CMEA .................................................................... 162
6.3.3 The Valev Plan .............................................................................................. 164
6.4 Soviet reactions to the RWPs Declaration ........................................................... 170
6.4.1 Accusations in anti-Sovietism ....................................................................... 171
6.4.2 A new compromise ....................................................................................... 175
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 179
Annex Biographical information ................................................................................ 194
References .................................................................................................................... 197

Abbreviations
AA
AC
AMAE
ANIC
CC
CCP
CAER
CMEA
CPSU
EC-CMEA
GDR
GNA
MIA
NDF
NLP
NPP
OSA
PCAF
PCM
PCC
PHP
PPS
PRC
RCP
RPR
RWP
TFCMA
UNO
US/USA
USSR
WTO

Armistice Agreement
Agricultural Conference
AMAE The Archives of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The National Central Historical Archives
Central Committee
Chinese Communist Party
The Romanian equivalent of the English CMEA/Comecon
Comecon/ Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Executive Committee of the CMEA
The German Democratic Republic
Grand National Assembly
The Marxist Internet Archive
The National Democratic Front
National Liberal Party
The National Peasants Party
Open Society Archives
The Permanent Commission for Agriculture and Forestry
(Archive Fond) Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact
Problems of Peace and Socialism
Peoples Republic of China
The Romanian Communist Party
The Romanian Peoples Republic
The Romanian Workers Party
Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance
United Nations Organization
United States/United States of America
The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Warsaw Treaty Organization

List of Tables
Table 1: The Romanian-Soviet exchange of letters (March-June 1963)........81
Table 2: The dissemination abroad of the RWPs 1964 Declaration ...........162
8

1 Introduction
After the collapse of the socialist system, an improvement in Romanian-Russian relations
was expected, but it turned out that such an expectation was too optimistic. The two
parties negotiated for ten years until they reached an agreement making possible the
signing on 4 July 2003 of a treaty intended to unlock the bilateral economic and political
relations.1 Despite this achievement, relations remained relatively cold until today, with
representatives in Moscow and Bucharest declaring from time to time that they were
looking forward towards an improvement in their relations.
For instance, in February 2011 the Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister, Teodor
Baconschi, declared that he had been given the mandate to improve the Romanian-Russian
relations and to take symbolic measures to increase trust between the two states. Few
days later, the ambassador of the Russian Federation in Romania, Aleksandr Churlin,
characterising the bilateral relations as pretty good and normal, asked Romania to
replace the symbolic gestures with concrete actions and emphasised that he would
wish Romania and the Russian Federation to return, if not to the very close relations
from 130 years ago, then at least to friendly relations.2
This study is an investigation into the origins of the process that brought Romania and
the Russian Federation to the present-day situation, being neither friends nor enemies. For
the last two decades, Romanian-Russian relations experienced an ongoing transition which
did not result though in improved relations. In this situation, a reassessment of bilateral
Romanian-Russian/Soviet relations could be relevant for two reasons. Firstly, todays
bilateral relations cannot be unlocked without the proper understanding of the historical
burdens that they carry, and, secondly, this investigation could serve as a benchmark to
restructure Romanian-Russian relations.

1.1 The research problem

The case of Romanian-Russian relations is very generous with regard to examples of
reversing or restructuring state relations, as through history they oscillated between cordial
ties, close cooperation, friendship, neutrality, pretty good relations, open hatred and even
war. During the First World War, Romania and the Russian Empire were on the same side,
but in the interwar period the two experienced tense relations which culminated during the
Second World War, in which they found themselves on opposite sides. The end of the
conflict brought the former two enemies into a frame of friendship, cooperation and
alliance, and from the late 1940s to the end of the 1950s, Romania acted both domestically
and internationally as the most trusted friend and ally of the USSR, posing no serious
problem to Soviet policy. From the early 1960s onwards Romania became a problem for

1
2

Dinu C. Giurescu (coordinator), Istoria Romniei n date, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2010, 818.
Corneliu Vlad, Faz a semnalelor n relaiile romno-ruse, in Curentul, 20 February 2011.

Moscow, being called the nationalist of the bloc3, and opposing in many instances all the
other bloc members, the USSR included. However, officially, Romania and the USSR
remained friends and members within the same military alliance the Warsaw Pact.
The major reversals of relations from the first half of the 20th century from allies and
friends to enemies and then from enemies to friends and allies again occurred within the
context of major military conflicts, while the change of the early 1960s did not occur in
circumstances of war. In a way, the 1960s change was not a reversal as it did not replace
friendly relations with open hostile relations. The early 1960s Romanian approach to the
USSR was rather unusual neither friends, nor enemies, collaborators with regard to some
aspects, and adversaries (even public adversaries) with regard to others. Still, both
Romania and the USSR continued to declare publically that there were no divergences
between them. Given the absence of any military conflict or of any drastic domestic
change (a regime change, for instance) within Romania or the USSR, and the unusual
Romanian position towards the USSR (neither friends, nor enemies, supporters in some
cases, public contesters in others) the following research questions arise: Why did the
change in Romanias policy towards the USSR occur in the early 1960s and what actually
changed?
This study investigates the emergence of Romanias opposition to the USSR between
1960 and 1964 that is between Romanias first categorical (albeit non-public and
indirect) opposition to the USSR and the issuing of the RWPs Declaration marking the
Romanian leaders first public and official (although indirect) acknowledgement of the
Romanian-Soviet disagreements. It focuses on two case studies: the development of
Romanias opposition to the USSR in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) and its defiance of the USSR with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The former
case was chosen because the CMEA specialisation was perceived by the Romanian leaders
as the first major post-war Soviet threat to Romanias interests hence their opposition to
the USSR in relation to the Councils reformation. The latter case was chosen because, on
the one hand, the Romanian leaders tried to use the Sino-Soviet dispute to pressure the
USSR to accommodate their views with regard to the CMEA reform process and because,
on the other hand, the Sino-Soviet quarrel provided the proximate cause for the issuing of
the April 1964 Declaration.
Focusing on the emergence of a change in the policy of a small state, Romania,
towards a great power, the USSR, this study does not intend, however, to survey the
bilateral Romanian-Soviet relations, nor to analyse the USSRs policies towards Romania,
nor to provide a detailed analysis on Romanias participation in the CMEA in the early
1960s or on Romanias involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nor is it interested in
investigating the international response to the new Romanian approach, its consequences
for Romanias international situation or how the Romanians beliefs, perceptions or ideas
were formed. The purpose of the study is limited to revealing the proximate causes of the
change and the content of the change.

Note concerning the talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, the Chinese ambassador in Romania, 5
June 1964, in Romulus Ioan Budura (coordinator), Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1880-1974, Bucuresti, 2005,
465.

10

1.2 Theory and method

In addressing the causal research question why the change in Romanias policy towards
the USSR occurred this study focuses on the proximate causes of the change. According
to Randall L. Schweller, a cause could refer to both permissive causes (permissive
conditions) and proximate causes. The antecedent conditions allow an event to happen, but
they cannot explain the occurrence of the event if not joined by the proximate ones.
Oxygen and dry fuel, for instance, are permissive conditions for there to be a fire. But
there must also be a spark, the proximate cause, Schweller contends.4 Other researchers
use the distinction between long-term causes or preconditions and short-term causes or
immediate triggers.5 The previous literature on Romanias detachment from Moscow
prevalently concentrated on the permissive, external conditions allowing the change, but
this study focuses on the proximate, immediate causes triggering the change.
The main concepts that the study operates with are perceived threats, state grand
strategy and tactics (ways of acting). The study focuses on the perceived threats posed by
a superpower, the USSR, vis--vis a small state, Romania. According to one
historiographical perspective, a small state is defined in terms of territory, population, and
resources.6 A second perspective underlines the capacity of the state to obtain or preserve
security in other words, its power7, while a third analyses the role of the state in the
system.8 This study, however, considers Romania a small state and the USSR a great
power because this is how the Romanian leaders perceived and defined Romania and the
USSR in the 1960s. Taking into consideration variables such as the states territory,
resources, power or their international influence, the Romanian leaders considered that
Romania was a small state and that the USSR was a world superpower threatening
Romanias interests.9
The Romanian archives provide evidence of the Romanian leaders beliefs,
perceptions, views, conceptions with regard to the Soviet Unions goals and intentions
towards Romania. It is not the focus of the study to establish whether the Romanian
leaders perceptions of the Soviet Unions intentions were accurate, according to reality
as it was, or whether they were misperceptions. In this study the terms perceptions or
views refer to how the world or a certain aspect of it was viewed and interpreted by the
Romanian decision makers.
In the International Relations field, there are two contrasting perspectives on the
linkage between an actors behaviour and external conditions. One is the objectivist
perspective which considers that the researcher can describe the environment in
4

Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of power, Princeton
University Press, 2006, 16-18.
5
Chester S.L. Dunning, Russias first civil war. The time of troubles and the founding of the Romanov
Dynasty, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001, 15.
6
David Vital, The inequality of states: a study of the small power in international relations, republished in
Christine Ingebritsen, Iver B Neumann, Sieglinde Gstohl (eds.), Small states in international relations,
University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2006, 81.
7
Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and small states, New York University Press, 1968, 1-29.
8
Robert O. Keohane, Lilliputians dilemmas. Small states in international politics, in Ingebritsen et al, 5561.
9
For instance, The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 7/1964, 4-32.

11

objectively accurate terms and that the decision makers correctly see objective incentives
in this environment. The main problems with this approach are that decision makers may
perceive the external environment differently than assumed by researchers, that the
perceptions of the external conditions may vary between different decision makers, and
that the role of perceptions in the decision makers policy choices is overlooked.10
On the other hand, a perceptual perspective takes into consideration the role of the
perceptions and views of the actors in explaining the states behaviour. Colin S. Gray,
Robert Bathurst, William Wohlforth and Alexander George, for instance, contend that the
actors act in accordance with their perceptions, views of the world, set of beliefs, values,
ideology. As George phrases it, much of an individuals behaviour is shaped by the
particular ways in which he perceives, evaluates and interprets incoming information
about events in his environment. A perceptual approach accepts that the objective factors
affect the actors views, but argues that scholars should not assume that they could know
what the actors think about those factors.11
While it is a truism that people act on the basis of their perceptions or views of the
world, the previous literature on Romanias early 1960s detachment from Moscow
advances an exclusive objectivist perspective, paying no systematic attention to the
Romanian leaders beliefs, views or perceptions. There seems to be one timid exception,
however, in the form of a 2009 study by Mihai Croitor, who, addressing Romanias
involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, paid constant attention to the views of the
Romanian leaders.12 Occasionally, different authors do write about what the Romanian
leaders believed, feared, hoped or intended13, but there is no work produced so far to
systematically propose a perceptual approach. Thus, this is the first study that,
investigating Romanias policy change towards the USSR in the early 1960s,
systematically takes into consideration the way in which decision makers perceived and
internalised the external environment.
Regarding the questions as to who made the decision to change Romanias policy
towards the USSR, the study selected the key actors in Romanias domestic and foreign
policy in the early 1960s (and many years before and after) Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej,
Alexandru Brldeanu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Nicolae Ceauescu, Emil Bodnra,
Gheorghe Apostol or Corneliu Mnescu. 14 This selection is also supported by the fact that
there is enough data to study these leaders perceptions and views or their role in making
the decision of changing Romanias policy towards the USSR.
10

Frank Ninkovich, The Wilsonian Century. U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900, University of Chicago Press,
2001, 6-10.
11
Colin S. Gray, Recognizing and understanding revolutionary change in warfare. The sovereignty of
context., Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2006, 20-49; Alexander George, Presidential
decision making in foreign policy. The effective use of information and advice, Westview Press, Boulder,
1980, 57; Robert Bathurst, Intelligence and the mirror. On creating an enemy, International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo, 1993, 3-20; William Wohlforth, The elusive balance. Power and Perceptions during the Cold
War, Cornwell University Press, Ithaca, 1993, 6-48.
12
Mihai Croitor, Romnia i conflictul sovieto-chinez, 1956-1971, Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, 240-241.
13
For instance, Dan Ctnu, Tot mai departe de Moscova. Politica extern a Romniei, 1956-1965, INST,
Bucureti, 2011, 388; Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sincer a poporului romn, Univers Enciclopedic,
Bucureti, 2008, 487 ; Cezar Stanciu, Devotai Kremlinului. Alinierea politicii externe romneti la cea
sovietic n anii 50, Cetatea de Scaun, Targovite, 2008, 8-25.
14
See Annex Biographical information.

12

Regarding the other research question what actually changed in Romanias policy
towards the USSR the study operates with the concepts of state (grand) strategy and
tactics. According to Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, in modern terms, grand
strategy came to mean the adaptation of domestic and international resources to achieve
security for a state, but in this study the term grand strategy is understood as a theory
explaining how it [a state] can cause security for itself as Stephen M. Walt phrased it.15
If in this study the term grand strategy refers to the way the Romanian leaders theorised on
how Romania could provide security for itself, the term tactics refers to ways of acting, to
something done.
Laure Paquette observe that a state strategy is an imaginative idea that orchestrates
and/or inspires sets of actions (tactics) in response to a given problem and that it is
composed of a goal (the object to be accomplished by actions), tactics (the actions, the
ways of acting to achieve the goal), a core idea (a metaphor or analogy expressed by a
slogan or image) and style or principles (that is general ideas that guide the selections of
tactics).16 In this study, doing nothing is also regarded as a form of action, as a type of
response to a problem. Thus, here the term includes doing-nothing-tactics, passive tactics,
argumentative tactics and active tactics (avoidance, ignoring, postponement, drawing
analogies, alteration, employing threats or balancing).
To analyse the written material, this study uses discourse analysis, drawing on the
concepts of discourse and foreign policy discourse developed by Ole Waever, Lene
Hansen and Henrik Larsen, who contributed to a theory designed to introduce discourse
analysis as a method of foreign policy analysis. Ole Waever argues that discourse is the
dimension of society where meaning is structured, forming a system which is made up of
a layered constellation of key concepts. Seeing structures in language, Waever contends
that discourse can deliver the coherent, well-structured constraints on foreign policy.17
Henrik Larsen maintains that a general problem in foreign policy analysis is how to deal
theoretically with general beliefs to which actors adhere where beliefs refer not only
to their political ideology, but also to meaning attributed to concepts such as state, security
etc. and argues that a discursive analysis approach can solve this problem.18
Accepting Larsens thesis according to which the meaning attributed by actors to
concepts (that is the political discourse on those concepts) is important in explaining
foreign policy choices, this study focuses on the Romanian leaders discourse about Soviet
(perceived) threats to Romanias interests. Lene Hansen emphasises that foreign policy
discourses are analytical constructions and not empirical objects and that they are
identified through the reading of texts. However, there are not as many discourses as
(spoken or written) texts, the individual texts converging instead around common themes
and sets of policies, Hansen maintains, reasoning that the foreign policy debates are
15

Richard Rosecrance, Arthur A. Stein, Beyond Realism. The study of grand strategy in Richard
Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic bases of grand strategy, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, 1993, 4; Stephen M. Walt, The origins of alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 1987,
2.
16
Laure Paquette, Political Strategy and Tactics: A Practical Guide, Nova Science, New York, 2002, 4-19.
17
Ole Weaver, Identity, communities and foreign policy. Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory, in
Lene Hansen, Ole Weaver (eds.), European integration and national identity. The challenge of the Nordic
states, Routledge, London, New York, 2003, 20-49.
18
Henrik Larsen, Foreign policy and discourse analysis, Routledge, London, 1997, 1-6.

13

bound together around a smaller number of discourses which are built around key
representations which might be geographical identities, historical analogies, striking
metaphors or political concepts.19
Focusing on the Romanian discourse of the perceived Soviet threats to Romanias
interests, this work provides also a detailed study of the articulations of those perceived
threats and of the responses to threats as identified within the texts. Not all texts explicitly
advance the perceived threats and the response policies to the threats. The minutes of
secret Politburo meetings and Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on different reports, for
instance, provide explicit examples of the perceived threats to Romania presented by the
USSR and by the other bloc members, while official communiqus or public declarations,
without explicitly elaborating on the perceived threats, do incorporate the policy response
to these perceived threats and are part of the political discourse.
The Romanian early 1960s (non-public) discourse on the perceived Soviet threats is
built around a set of key representations under the main umbrella of the relationship
between Romania and the (allegedly threatening Soviet) other. There are geographical and
power representations such as the vicinity of the threatening other, the opposition between
the (perceived) small powerless Romania and the (perceived) powerful Soviet Union or its
(perceived) territorial expansionism. The discourse is also built around historical analogies
between the perceived early 1960s Soviet threats to Romanias interests and previous
Soviet behaviour and polices such as the annexation of Bessarabia and Bukovina, the
Soviet (perceived) vengeance upon Romania in the aftermath of the Second World War
(for instance, in the form of organising the SovRoms20 or of maintaining Soviet troops,
counsellors and spies on Romanias territory), the Soviet conduct towards Yugoslavia in
the late 1940s or towards Albania and China in the early 1960s. The public responses to
perceived threats, on the other hand, are structured mostly around key concepts and
representations such as the states sovereignty and independence, mutual advantage,
territorial integrity, unity or friendship.
This study uses new primary evidence to analyse events and historical facts that have
been rarely if ever presented in the previous literature. Thus, besides providing an analysis
of the perceptions behind the decision-making process, this study also presents detailed
accounts on several events that the historiography has failed to consider or even notice,
despite their significance in understanding the Romanian-Soviet relations in the early
1960s. For instance, nobody has noticed until now the relevance of the 1960 Agricultural
Conference in the process of Romanias detachment from Moscow. Nobody has ever
investigated Romanias role in blocking Mongolias accession to the Warsaw Pact in 1963
or Romanias reasons for acting in such a way. Nobody has observed or studied the
March-June 1963 Romanian-Soviet crisis and the scholarship has not raised awareness to
the fact that the 1962, 1963 and 1964 Romanian-Soviet secret negotiations on the CMEA
integration concluded with secret agreements relevant not only for the bilateral relations,
but also for the overall bloc integration. Moreover, nobody observed until now that the
Valev Plan was not known in Romania until early June 1964.

19

Lene Hansen, Security as Practice. Discourse analysis and the Bosnian War, Routledge, London, 2006,
17-54.
20
SovRoms were joint Romanian-Soviet ventures, established in 1945, in place until the mid-1950s.

14

1.3 Previous research

Scholars have paid much attention to what triggered Romanias early 1960s change of
policy towards Moscow, but there has been little if any systematic exploration of what
actually changed. According to the historiography, Romania was the most loyal, the
perfect or one of the most docile satellites of the Soviet Union until the late 1950s and
early 1960s, afterwards detaching herself from Moscow and turning to independence,
autonomy or emancipation. Generally, the leaders desperate need to stay in power is
seen as the reason for which the foreign policy of Romania represented until the late
1950s a loyal emulation of the directives and principles supported by the Soviet Union at
the international level, as Cezar Stanciu phrased it.21
Addressing the reasons and/or causes for Romanias detachment from Moscow,
scholars focus, from an objectivist perspective, on the Romanians leaders material
interests and on the permissive causes/conditions allowing detachment to occur. They
often emphasised that the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR was caused,
triggered, allowed or favoured by the 1958 withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania,
by the victory of the Gheorghiu-Dej group over the Muscovites group, by Stalins
death, by the Soviet attempts to reform the CMEA, by Khrushchevs policies of peaceful
coexistence and de-Stalinisation, by the Cuban Missile Crisis, by the Sino-Soviet dispute
or by the abolition of SovRoms.22 Without contesting the important role of such
permissive conditions a subject often addressed by previous research, this study focuses
instead on identifying the proximate causes of the change.
Regarding the causes of Romanias detachment, historiography advances three main
interpretations. According to the dominant one, the Romanian leaders feared that the
Soviet de-Stalinisation or the CMEA reform process would have resulted in their
replacement with another leading team. Thus, according to this interpretation, they
decided to distance themselves from Moscow as a means of preserving their domestic
political power.23 A second school of thought argues that detachment from Moscow was
21

Stanciu, 2008, 8-25; Vladimir Tismneanu, Stalinism for all seasons. A political history of Romanian
communism, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2003, 167; Mioara Anton, Ieirea din cerc. Politica
extern a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej, INST, Bucureti, 2007, 17-31; Gheorghe Boldur-Lescu, The
communist genocide in Romania, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2005, 36; Gheorghe Ciobanu,
Relaiile internaionale ale Romniei ntre anii 1948-1964, Junimea, Iai, 2006, 38; Dennis Deletant,
Communist terror in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State 1948-1965, Hurst&Co., London, 1999,
147, 244; Maria Murean, Romanias Integration in Comecon. The Analysis of a Failure, in The Romanian
Economic Journal, Year XI, no. 30, (4) 2008, 27-58, 45-48; Raluca Rus, Romnia i conflictul israelianoplestinian, Lumen, Iai, 2008, 24-25.
22
Elis Neagoe-Plea, Rolul lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej n elaborarea politicii externe i n direcionarea
relaiilor romno-sovietice (1960-1965), in Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Historica, 9/I, 2005,
231-240; Mihai Retegan, In the shadow of the Prague spring. Romanian foreign policy and the crisis in
Czechoslovakia, 1968, The Center for the Romanian Studies, Iasi-Oxford-Portland, 2000, 17-18; Florian
Banu, Liviu ranu, Studiu introductiv, in Florian Banu, Liviu ranu, Aprilie 1964. Primvara de la
Bucureti. Cum s-a adoptat Declaraia de independen a Romniei, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2004, VIIC; R.J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the twentieth century and after, Routledge, London, 1997, 311-312;
Raymond L. Garthoff, When and why Romania distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact, in Cold War
International History Project Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995, 111.
23
For instance, Brndua Costache, Activitatea Romniei n Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc, 19491974, INST, Bucureti, 2012, 43; Ctnu, 2011, 388; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Gheorghiu-Dej and the
Romanian Workers Party. From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, CWIHP,

15

Romanias way of defending its economic interests in the context of the CMEA reform
process24, while the third contends that in opposing the CMEA integration the Romanian
leaders were genuinely concerned with the preservation of the states independence,
sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic interests.25 Many scholars however argue
that the Romanian-Soviet divergences were not about Romanias sovereignty,
independence or economic interests and that the Romanian leaders claims in this regard
were just propaganda.26
Regarding the question of what changed in Romanias policy towards the USSR from
the early 1960s onwards, there are also three main historiographical approaches.
According to the first, nothing changed, Romania only simulated her detachment from
Moscow. According to the second, Romania opted for a complete detachment, for
independence or autonomy, for a new foreign policy doctrine or for a new state strategy;
while according to the third, detachment was incomplete, partial, or limited to some
political independence, to independence in a numbers of areas, to economic independence
or to domestic autonomy.
Traian Ungureanu, for instance, contests the existence of a change in Romanias
relations with Moscow and argues that the myth of Romanias independence inside the
pan-Soviet system was only a product of communist propaganda.27 Criticising the myth
of Romanias autonomy or even independence, Andrei Miroiu emphasises that Romania
remained throughout the Cold War a member of the CMEA and of the Warsaw Pact and
implying that Romanias alliance with the USSR and Romanias opposition to the USSR
were mutually exclusive contends that Romanias opposition to the USSR appeared as
such, but was not necessarily so [opoziie aparent, in Romanian]. Miroiu claims that the
real goal of this simulated opposition was to trick the West into developing better
economic relations with Romania.28
Most scholars, however, acknowledge a change in Romanias policy towards the
USSR in the early 1960s, and this change is presented under a large variety of names,
although it is rather poorly conceptualised. It is defined either as a fake autonomy or as a
Working paper no 37, 2002, 31-46; Vladimir Tismaneanu, Reinventing politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin
to Havel, New York Free Press, 1992, 82; Retegan, 2000, 19-22, 35-42; Constantiniu, 485-488; Richard C.
Frucht, Eastern Europe. An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture, ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara,
2005, 760; S.N. Sen, Contemporary world, New Age International Publishers, New Delhi, 2006, 121;
Deletant, 1999, 281; Mircea Munteanu, When the Levee Breaks. The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and
the Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 19671970, in Journal of Cold War Studies,
Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 2010, 4361; Stelian Tnase, Elite i societate. Gurvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, 19481965, Bucureti, Humanitas, 1998, 187-189.
24
Georges Haupt, La genese du conflict sovieto-roumain, in Revue francaise de science politique, vol.
XVIII (1968) no 4, 669-684; Horia Socianu, The foreign policy of Romania in the sixties, in James A.
Kuhlman (ed.), The foreign policies of Eastern Europe. Domestic and international determinants, Sijthoff,
Leyden, 1978, 167-173; Tismneanu, 2003, 179, 182; Stephen Fischer-Galai, Europa de Est i Rzboiul
Rece, Institutul European, Iai, 1996, 52-55.
25
Banu&ranu, VII-L; Brndua Costache, Romania and Comecon. Principles of Cooperation, 19491991, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 1-2/2002, 168; Ana-Maria Ctnu, Tensiuni n relaiile romnosovietice n anul Primverii de la Praga, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 1-2/2006, 227.
26
Tnase, 187-189; Tismneanu, 2003, 179; Cezar Stanciu, Fria socialist. Politica RPR fa de rile
lagrului socialist. 1948-1964, Cetatea de Scaun, Trgovite, 2009, 280-281.
27
Traian Ungureanu, Despre Securitate. Romnia, ara Ca i Cum, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2006, 94.
28
Andrei Miroiu, Balan i hegemonie. Romnia n politica mondial, 1913-1989, Tritonic, Bucureti,
2005, 136-186.

16

Romanian liberal foreign policy; either as a greater independence vis--vis Moscow or

as a genuine independent line from the USSR.29 However, scholars often observe the
next dichotomy on the one hand, Romania opposed the USSR, its leadership and its
policies, but on the other it praised the Soviet Union, the common Romanian-Soviet
interests, collaboration and alliance; on the one hand, Romania criticised the CMEA and
the Warsaw Pact, but on the other it remained a member of both organisations and the
USSRs ally. Seeing these two alternatives as mutually exclusive, some analysts contend
that, as Elis Neagoe-Plea phrased it, a genuine independence was out of the question
since Romania continued to be member of the Warsaw Pact and member of the CMEA
two of Moscows main instruments of control.30
Trying to solve this dichotomy, scholars operate with concepts like comparative
independence, limited independence, economic sovereignty, economic independence,
domestic autonomy, some political independence, substantial independence in a number of
areas, independence of the Romanian communist elites from the Soviet elites, suggesting
that detachment affected only some aspects of the bilateral relations such as the
economic or the party fields. Sometimes, scholars even argue that one could at most
acknowledge Romanias independence from Moscow only by comparison with the
previous period, implying that independence was allowed by the USSR itself and that it
was not complete.
Stelian Tnase and Mircea Chirioiu, for instance, argue that, in the context of deStalinisation, the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR was about the autonomy
of the Romanian political elites from the Soviet elites. In other words it was not about the
autonomy of the state. According to Tnase, between 1962 and 1965, Romania renounced
pro-Sovietism, while the 1964 Declaration was the climax of the conflict between the
local elite and the suzerain [Soviet] elite.31 Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney
maintain that from the late 1950s onwards Romania struggled to obtain its economic
autonomy or its economic independence, while Gheorghe Ciobanu writes about
Romanias new economic doctrine of economic independence 32 which means that only
in the economic field Romania could act independently or autonomously.
Amy Hampartumian and Paul D. Quinlan consider that from the early 1960s onwards
Romania exerted some political independence or a foreign policy substantially
independent from Moscow in a number of areas33, but they do not detail why Romania
chose to be substantially independent only in some areas, what substantially actually
29

Boldur-Lescu, 49; Mihaela Cristina Verzea, Desovietizarea culturii romneti la nceputul deceniului
apte, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 3-4/2003, 127; Johanna Granville, Dej-a-vu. Early roots of
Romanias independence, East European Quarterly, XLII, Vol. 4, January 2009, 366; Donald F. Busky,
Communism in history and theory, the European experience, Praeger, Westport, 2002, 23; John Lampe,
Balkans into Southeastern Europe. A Century of War and Transition, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006,
201.
30
Dennis Deletant, Taunting the Bear. Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 196389, in Cold War History, Vol.
7, No. 4, November 2007, 496; Neagoe-Plea, 231-240.
31
Mircea Chirioiu, ntre David i Goliat. Romnia i Iugoslavia n balana Rzboiului Rece, Demiurg, Iai,
2005, 111; Tnase, 123, 172, 192-199.
32
Joseph F. Harrington, Bruce J. Courtney, Relaii Romno-Americane, 1940-1990, Institutul European, Iai,
2002, 196, 197, 214, 225; Ciobanu, 175.
33
Amy Hampartumian, The relationship between Britain and Romania during the Rule of Nicolae
Ceausescu, 1966-1989, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, No 3-4/2003, 55; Paul D. Quinlan, The United States
and Romania. American-Romanian relations in the twentieth century, Woodland Hills, 1988, 165.

17

meant or how and why some areas were selected and other were not. According to Oca
and Popa, after the issuing of the RWPs 1964 Declaration Romania was able to surpass
to some extent her condition of [being] a satellite state rigorously subordinated to the
uncontested leader of the communist world namely the USSR but what to some
extent meant is a problem that the two authors do not tackle either.34 Vlad Georgescu
similarly argues that in the early 1960s Romania moved from full subordination to
comparative independence. 35 Duu contends that in the early 1960s Romania adopted a
policy of limited emancipation from under the Soviet tutelage.36 According to Stanciu, in
the early 1960s, Gheorghiu-Dej did not pursue a complete detachment from Moscow but
only some space of manoeuvre. These scholars do not explain either what they mean by
incomplete detachment or by comparative independence.37
However, Robert King and Dennis Deletant conceptualise Romanias detachment
more carefully. According to Deletant, autonomy, defined by the right to formulate
indigenous policy rather than independence, characterised Romanian foreign policy in the
early 1960s under Gheorghiu-Dej and under Ceauescu thereafter, for throughout the Cold
War Romania remained a member, despite some misgivings, of both the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon and consistently restated its loyalty to the Socialist camp.38
King reasons that independent is not the accurate term to describe Romanias policy
change towards the USSR as independence means a total liberation from the foreign
control. Autonomy is therefore a better term to describe Romanias right of selfgovernment, of making ones own laws and of administering ones own affairs, King
contends, emphasising also that autonomy was granted or permitted by the Soviet Union. 39
But this approach cannot explain why Romania blocked in July 1963 Mongolias
membership in the Warsaw Pact, why in November 1963 Romania voted at the United
Nation Organisation (UNO) in favour of a resolution to establish a nuclear-free zone in
Latin America when the other socialist bloc countries abstained, or why in 1964 Romania
opposed the Soviet intended strong collective riposte against China to give just few
examples from the early 1960s.
The early 1960s change in Romanias relations with the USSR is differently and rather
vaguely conceptualised by different authors. It is called detachment, dissidence,
distancing, separateness, independence, economic independence, opposition, pretended
opposition, economic sovereignty, comparative independence, turn, shift, rift, new foreign
policy doctrine, re-orientation of the Romanian external politics, autonomy, emancipation,
deviation etc. With very few exceptions, authors do not explain why they choose one
concept over the other, but they all work within a paradigm maintaining that after the war
34

Alexandru Oca, Vasile Popa, O fereastr n cortina de Fier Romania. Declaraia de Independen din
aprilie 1964, Vantrop, Focani, 1997, 209.
35
Vlad Georgescu, Romania 40 years, 1944-1984, Praeger, New York, 1985, 41.
36
Alessandru Duu, Revoluia din 1989. Cronologie, Craiova, Sitech, 2010, 36.
37
Stanciu, 2009, 280-281.
38
Drawing from Deletants definition, in a recent study, Cezar Stanciu made his option for the term
autonomy, which should be limited only to the foreign policy, meaning Romanias self-proclaimed right
to make decisions and pursue interests that were not coordinated with or accepted by Moscow. Cezar
Stanciu, Crisis management in the Communist bloc. Romanias policy towards the USSR in the aftermath
of the Prague Spring, in Cold War History, Volume 13, No 3, August 2013, 356; Deletant, 2007, 496.
39
Robert R. King, History of the Romanian Communist Party, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1980, 135136.

18

Romania allied (balanced) with the USSR against the Western threat and contend (or
imply) that Romanias alliance with the USSR and its (post-1960) opposition to the USSR
were mutually exclusive.
In rather rare cases, historiography defines Romanias change of policy towards the
USSR in terms of state security strategy. Andrei Miroiu, for instance, argues that until
1958 Romania identified the security threat in the West, therefore looking for a strategic
alliance with the USSR and its eastern allies. From 1972 onwards, Miroiu continues,
Romania opted for a new security strategy, identifying threats coming from all
directions, including the USSR. However, Miroiu fails to discuss what happened in terms
of security strategy between 1958 and 1972 or how this change affected Romanian-Soviet
relations.40 Cristian Troncot also suggests that after the war Romania identified threats to
its security in the Imperialist West, but he argues that from the late 1960s onwards, the
USSR became the main threat to Romanias security. 41 Similarly, Cezar Stanciu and Paul
Nistor contend that allying with the USSR in 1948 (through the Treaty of Friendship,
Collaboration and Mutual Assistance) and in 1955 (through the Warsaw Pact Treaty)
Romania aimed to secure her strategic interests against a prospective Western attack.42
This paradigm, which maintains that after the war Romania allied (balanced) with the
USSR against the Western threat, lead scholars to assume that Romanias alliance with the
USSR and its post-1960 opposition to the USSR were mutually exclusive.
Drawing from the balance of threat theory as developed by Stephen M. Walt this
study advances instead a paradigm which argues that in the aftermath of the Second World
War Romania allied not against the threat but with the (perceived) threat which was the
USSR. The balance of threat theory contends that the alliance behaviour of states emerges
depending on the level of threat. According to Walt, when entering an alliance, states may
either balance (ally in opposition to the principle source of danger) or bandwagon (ally
with the state that poses the major threat).43 Or, as Patricia A. Weitsman phrased it, when
the threat becomes so grave that a states very survival is at stake, the threatened state
may opt to ally with its enemy, that is, bandwagon, to save itself.44 In other words,
alignment with the perceived source of danger may be motivated by fear and may be a
form of defensive appeasement.

1.4 Sources
The study is based on Romanian primary sources, especially on unpublished documents
from the Romanian National Historical Central Archive (ANIC) and from the Archive of
the Romanian Foreign Ministry (AMAE). The laws in force regulate the access to the
40

Miroiu, 136-173, 186.

Cristian Troncot, Securitatea i serviciile secrete sovietice (1968-1989), in Constantin Hlihor (coord.),
Structuri politice n secolul XX, Curtea Veche, Bucureti, 2000, 548.
42
Paul Nistor, nfruntnd Vestul. PCR, Romnia lui Dej i politica de ngrdire a comunismului, Vremea,
Bucureti, 2006, 285; Stanciu, 2008, 25-35, 71-74, 116-117.
43
Stephen M. Walt, Alliance formation and the balance of world power in International Security, vol. 9,
No 9, 1985, 4.
44
Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous alliances. Proponents of peace, weapons of war, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 2004, 12.
41

19

Romanian historical archives so that documents concerning foreign policy can be available
for research 50 years after their creation, personal files of different politicians 75 years
after their creation, documents regarding national security and national integrity 100
years after their creation. 45 However, the ANIC allows researchers access to the
documents up to 1989 provided that they have been processed.
From the ANIC, the study uses several main fonds: the Central Committee of the
Romanian Communist Party (with the sections Foreign Relations; Office; Foreign
RelationsAlphabetical; Administrative-Political; Propaganda and Agitation); Presidency
of the Council of Ministers (with the sections Presidency of the Council of Ministers and
Minutes); the CMEA (with the sections The Governmental Commission for Economic and
Technical Collaboration and Cooperation in the CMEA Governmental Commission for
the CMEA problems, and The Protocols of the CMEA sessions); and the Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej Collection (Fond 80). The Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection was taken
over by the National Archives from the Ministry of the National Defence in 1995 and
contains valuable reports and letters (most of them annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej himself)
regarding Romanias relations with the USSR, with China or Romanias activity within
the CMEA, for the period 1960-1964, included.
Many documents from these fonds provide information regarding the decision-making
process concerning the change of Romanias policy towards the USSR: minutes of the
Politburo of the CC of the RWP from the period between 1960 and 1964, minutes of
different bilateral (Romanian-Soviet, Romanian-Chinese, Romanian-Yugoslav,
Romanian-Indian etc.) talks, reports by different ministries and commissions sent to
Gheorghiu-Dej, etc. Usually, these documents carry Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations a very
important source regarding his perceptions and views. Often, Gheorghiu-Dej also wrote on
these documents directives for his party or government colleagues, which provide us with
a source on the Romanians responses to perceived threats.
While the access to the ANIC documents poses no special problem, the access into the
AMAE is restricted to a great extent. This archive functions according to the same laws as
the National Archives, and since foreign policy documents cannot be released for research
prior to 50 years after their creation, the access is in theory allowed only for the period
prior to 1963. However, the access to the AMAE is very difficult even for the period prior
to 1960 and usually researchers do not even have access to the inventory books describing
the archive evidence that should be by law available for study. Fortunately, telegrams,
notes, reports produced within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are present in copies in the
Archive of the CC of the RWP detained by the ANIC and thus available for study.
The research could not benefit from Soviet unpublished documents due to funding
constraints and to well-known access limitations46, but the study used published Soviet
sources47 and available Soviet-produced texts, in copies or in original, in the Romanian
45

Law no 16/ 2 April 1996, modified by the Law no 358/ 6 June 2002 and by the Emergency Ordinances no
39/ 31 May 2006 and no 64 /28 June 2003, Monitorul Oficial, No 71/9 Aprilie 1996; no 476/3 Iunie 2002;
nr. 464/29 Iunie 2003.
46
Suvi Kansikas explained how difficult and arbitrary the access in the former Soviet archives still is. Suvi
Kansikas, Trade blocs and the Cold War. The CMEA and the EC challenge, 1969-1976, University of
Helsinki, Helsinki, 2012, 24.
47
A.A. Fursenko (ed.), Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, Tom 1, Chernovye Protokol'nye Zapisi Zasedanii,
Stenogrammy. Postanovleniia, Rosspen, Moscow, 2003; Radu Ciuceanu (coordinator), Misiunile lui A.I.

20

Archives. Additionally, this study used the online collections provided by the Parallel
History Project on Cooperative Security, by the Open Society Archives and by the
Kremlin Decision Making Project at the Miller Center of the University of Virginia. These
collections include English language versions of documents issued not only by the Soviets,
but also by other bloc members, and they proved very useful for this research.48
On the other hand, this study argues that the Romanian archival evidence is relevant
and sufficient in addressing its two research questions, for the following reasons. Firstly,
the Romanian leaders made the decision regarding the policy change towards the USSR
based on the incoming information from the external environment, and it is the Romanian
archives that can tell us (to some extent 49) what kind of information was available to them
in that respect. Secondly, the Romanian archives hold copies of the Czechoslovak, East
German, Bulgarian, Soviet etc. projects, speeches, declarations, as well as Romanianproduced syntheses with regard to such bloc proposals or positions. Moreover, such bloc
documents are usually annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej and extensively commented in
different Politburo meetings by the Romanian leaders, offering valuable insights into the
perceptions, interpretations, but also responses of the Romanian leaders concerning the
others intentions or plans.
Thirdly, the Romanian archives provides minutes, protocols, resolutions, reports,
communiqus of different CMEA or Warsaw Pact gatherings, as well as the
correspondence exchanged between the CMEA or Warsaw Pact members on different
issues, but also between Romania, the USSR, China, Yugoslavia or other states, which
means that proposals and plans produced in and throughout the bloc are available, to an
important extent, through the Romanian archives. However, it is important to emphasise
that this study does not intend to produce an exhaustive analysis of the intra-bloc or intracamp negotiations on the CMEA integration or on the controversies within the communist
movement, its focus being instead on its two research questions.
The Romanian archives provide also extensive reports, literature reviews, translations
of press and academic texts published in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union,
Poland, East Germany, Hungary, but also Yugoslavia, China or North Korea with regard
to the CMEA integration or to the disputes within the communist movement. Often these
texts are annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej another important source of the Romanian leaders
perceptions and interpretations of the others intentions.
The daily bulletins of the Romanian news agency Agerpres are also used in this study.
Annotated issues of these bulletins are available in the ANIC in the Gheorghe GheorghiuDej Collection. The Romanians perceptions and interpretation on the Sino-Soviet dispute
are available through the minutes of different RWP Politburo meetings, and through
Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on the letters exchanged between the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The Romanian
archives hold Romanian, Russian and Chinese versions of these letters, but for the English
Vinski n Romnia. Din istoria relaiilor romno-sovietice, 1944-1946. Documente secrete, Bucureti,
1997.
48
The Miller Center Collection provides translation into English of the volumes edited by A.A. Fursenko,
Prezidium TsK KPSS, 1954-1964, Rosspen, Moscow, Tom 1 (2003), Tom 2 (2006) and Tom 3 (2008).
49
The archives tell us what was discussed. There might have been additional information available to the
Romanian leaders that was hidden from discussions with others or that, although discussed, was not
recorded.

21

version of the missives the study used the Marxist Internet Archive which provides
excellent translations.50
Many documents relevant for Romanias detachment have been published and such
collections of documents51 provide further valuable information for this study. Apart from
the archival evidence, this study uses published memoirs and interviews of former
communist dignitaries. In the case of socialist Romania, there are no journals known yet
for the period under investigation here. Regarding the interview genre, it should be
mentioned that there are no former top decision makers alive today in order to interview
them. However, three of the people that participated directly in the decision-making
process regarding Romanias policy change towards the USSR were interviewed by
Lavinia Betea in the 1990s Alexandru Brldeanu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu
Mnescu.52
The memoirs genre is also quite rare, but it is represented by politicians or diplomats,
such as Paul Niculescu-Mizil (Chief of the Central Committee Section Propaganda and
Agitation, 1956-1968), Ioan Sfetcu (Gheorghiu-Dejs chief of Cabinet), Mircea Malia
(deputy of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1962-1970) or Ion Porojan (a junior
Romanian diplomat in Moscow in the early 1960s).53 Silviu Brucan (Romanias
ambassador to the UNO, 1955-1962) and Sorin Toma (Chief editor of Scnteia and
Member of the CC of the RWP, 1955-1960) occasionally tackle in their memoirs the
change in Romanias policy towards the USSR. However, these two authors have not been
involved directly in the decision-making process and often they recall events in which
they were not involved, their recollections being in this respect personal opinions and
post-1989 reinterpretations.54
The memoirs and interviews used as historical primary sources raise a number of
problems concerning their credibility and representativeness. Researchers and scientists
have questioned the reliability and accuracy of memoirs in general and of the memoirs and
interviews of the previous communist dignitaries in particular, suspected of having
intrinsic problems such as factual errors, distortions, falsifications and self-censorship.55
These problems apply also in the case of Romania, as the interviews and memoirs were
50

The Western views on the Romanian early 1960s foreign policy changes are also available through a
series of published and online collections of documents such as the CIA FOIA Annual Reports, which this
study occasionally used. However, as interesting as a detailed investigation of the Soviet or Western archival
sources might be in relation to the Romanian policy change, it is beyond the scope of this study.
51
Romulus Ioan Budura, Relatiile Romano-Chineze, 1954-1975, Bucuresti, 2008; Dan Ctnu, ntre Beijing
i Moscova. Romnia i conflictul Sovieto-Chinez, INST, Bucureti, 2004; Mihai Retegan, Rzboiul politic
n blocul comunist. Relaii romno-sovietice n anii aizeci. Documente, Rao, Bucureti, 2002; Vasile Buga,
O var fierbinte n relaiile romno-sovietice. Convorbirile de la Moscova din iulie 1964, INST, Bucureti,
2012; Banu&ranu; Budura, 2005.
52
Lavinia Betea, Partea lor de adevr, Compania, Bucureti, 2008.
53
Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie traita, Memorii, I, Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, 1997; Paul Niculescu-Mizil,
O istorie trait, Memorii, II, Democraia, Bucuresti, 2003; Mioara i Ion Porojan, Obsesie i adevr.
Diplomai romni la Moscova (1962-1975), Semne, Bucuresti, 2006; Gheorghe Apostol, Eu i GheorghiuDej, Paco, Bucureti, 2011; Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani n anticamera lui Dej, Edituda Fundaiei Culturale Romne,
Bucuresti, 2000; Mircea Malia, Tablouri din Rzboiul Rece. Memoriile unui diplomat romn, C.H.Beck,
Bucuresti, 2007.
54
Silviu Brucan, Generaia irosit (Memorii), Teu, Bucuresti, 2007, 77-100; Sorin Toma, Privind napoi.
Amintirile unui fost ziarist communist, Compania, Bucuresti, 2004, 177-189.
55
Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Soviet memoirs as a historical source, in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Researcher's
guide to sources on Soviet history in the 1930s, M.E. Sharpe, 1992, 233-254.

22

produced after the collapse of the socialist system and carry much of the post-1989
discourses, ideas, concepts or views.
Nonetheless, despite some misgivings, the memoirs and interviews genres do offer
details and personal reflections not to be found elsewhere. They provide data on the
authors perceptions and beliefs concerning the others perceptions and beliefs, and
therefore they are important historical sources as long as their mentioned limitations could
be surpassed by cross-checking them against each other or against the archival evidence.
Consequently, this study regarded the data provided by such sources with extreme care,
continuously corroborating and comparing them with data provided by the archival
evidence.

1.5 Structure of the study

The first chapter of the study is its Introduction. Providing the adequate background for
the study, the second chapter briefly reviews the Romanian-Soviet pre-1960 relations and
advances a new way of understanding these relations. It argues that after the war Romania
entered and preserved a bandwagon alliance with the USSR the perceived threat. The
next two chapters investigate the emergence of Romanias opposition to the Soviet Union
within the context of the CMEA reform process. They focus, on the one hand, on the
Romanian leaders perceptions of the threats posed to Romanias interests by the Sovietintended CMEA reforms and, on the other hand, on the responses and tactics that the
Romanian leaders developed to block or deter these perceived Soviet threats.
The fifth chapter investigates, on the one hand, Romanias attempts to obtain Chinas
support against the (perceived) Soviet intentions to reform the CMEA through
specialisation and integration and, on the other hand, the emergence of Romanias separate
position with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The study of the Romanian-Chinese
negotiations concerning the CMEA reform process and the study of Romanias attitude
towards the Sino-Soviet dispute are relevant within the discussion of Romanias policy
change towards the USSR in the early 1960s for several reasons. They shed additional
light on how the Romanian leadership conceptualised and perceived its relations with the
Soviet Union; they provide insights into the tactics that a small state used in order to cope
with a (perceived) threatening, neighbouring and allied superpower; and they shed light on
the self-imposed limits of the Romanian anti-Soviet opposition, a very relevant element
regarding the question of what changed in Romanias relations with the USSR.
Discussing the proximate causes for the issuing of the RWPs April 1964 Declaration
which marked the first public (albeit indirect) acknowledgement by the Romanian leaders
of a position that was different from that of the USSR, the sixth chapter continues to detail
on how the Romanian leaders conceptualised Romanias relations with the neighbouring
superpower in relation to the two approached cases studies the CMEA reforms and the
Sino-Soviet dispute. The concluding chapter highlights the findings and accomplishments
of the study and opens up discussions for further research.

23

2 Romanias post-war grand strategy

Addressing Romanias early 1960s policy change towards the USSR, the existing
scholarship has worked within a paradigm which maintains that after the Second World
War Romania entered (and preserved throughout the Cold War) a balancing alliance with
the USSR in order to counterbalance the Western threat. Contending or implying that
Romanias alliance with the USSR and its opposition to the USSR were mutually
exclusive, the existing scholarship argues that the change was either fake or incomplete.
Influenced by Stephen M. Walts theory of balance of threat according to which states
react to perceived external threats56, this study conceptualises the change in Romanias
relations towards the USSR within a different paradigm which maintains that in the
aftermath of the war Romania allied with the main source of the (perceived) threat that
is, bandwagoned with the USSR. This interpretation, however, is completely new in the
field of Romanias post-war studies and needs therefore to be supported by strong
evidence, and this is what this chapter aims to do by focusing on how the Romanian
leaders conceptualised Romanias post-war grand strategy. 57

2.1 Conceptualising Romanias post-war grand strategy

In late 1944, Romania was a defeated former ally of Germany, under Soviet military
occupation, towards which Great Britain or the USA showed no special interest.58
Romanian society and its political elites thought that the very existence of the state was at
stake, and that in the worse case, Romania would become a Soviet republic and, in the
best case, Moscow would impose a communist regime there, as Time Agency reported on
23 October 1944.59 For instance, Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the National Peasants Party
(NPP) was convinced that the country had been already lost to the Russians and doubted
that Romanias annexation or at least Moldovas annexation to the Soviet Union could be
prevented.60
Expecting severe Soviet repercussions for Romanias role in the anti-Soviet war, many
Romanians argued in late 1944-early 1945 in favour of a policy of friendship,
collaboration and alliance with the source of the danger, the Soviet Union, which was seen
56

Walt, 1987, 1-49.

As already mentioned in Introduction, many scholars have studied Romanias pre-1960 foreign policy. For
example of collections of published documents regarding the pre-1960 Romanian-Soviet relations see
Tatiana Volokitina (ed.), Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rossiiskikh Arkhivov, 1944-1948, Tom I,
Moskva, 1997; Tatiana Volokitina (ed.), Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rossiiskikh Arkhivov, 19441953, Tom II, Moskva, 1998; Tatiana Pohivailova, Transilvanskii Vopros. Vengero-Rumynskii Territorialnyi
Spor I SSSR, 1940-1946, Dokumenty, Rosspen, Moskva, 2000; Ioan Scurtu (coordinator), Stenogramele
edinelor Biroului Politic i ale Secretariatului CC al PMR, 1952, Bucureti, 2007; Dan Ctnu, Vasile
Buga, Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej la Stalin, 1944-1952, INST, Bucureti, 2012.
58
Alessandru Duu, ntre Wehrmacht i Armata Roie, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2000, 231-233.
59
Time Agencys comment concerning the Russian policy in Romania, 23 October 1944, AMAE, Fond
71/1939, E 9, vol. 157, 204-206.
60
Burton Y. Berrys report, 17 March 1945, in Ioan Scurtu (coordinator), Romnia, Viaa politic n
documente, 1945, Bucureti, 1994, 212.
57

24

as the only solution able to appease the Soviets and to secure Romanias future security.
According to Iuliu Maniu, the war and its outcome had proved undoubtedly to the
Romanian people and political elite, that in this part of Europe there is only one big
power with decisive influence the Soviet Union, that friendship with the Soviet Union
constitutes the main condition of the existence of the Romanian state and that any other
foreign policy but that of active collaboration and good neighbourly relations with the
USSR amounts to self-destruction. Thus, the fulfilment of the difficult conditions of the
Armistice Agreement (AA) imposed upon Romania in September 1944 was seen by
Maniu as a sacrifice that Romania needed to make in order to obtain the Soviets trust.61
Dinu Brtianu, the leader of the National Liberal Party (NLP), was to a lesser extent
the supporter of a pro-Soviet policy, but, still, in March 1945 he also argued that the
Romanian elites needed to do everything they can to consolidate the feelings of mutual
trust between our country and our big Eastern neighbour.62 However, the main supporter
of such a policy was the Gheorghe Ttrescu wing of the NLP. In December 1944,
Ttrescu (future Minister of Foreign Affairs, between 6 March 1945 and 5 November
1947), argued in a public speech that in choosing the future state security strategy
Romania had to first take into consideration the reality of the existence of a victorious
and powerful neighbour at its Eastern border. According to Ttrescu, Romanias future
security was conditioned by a future permanent collaboration with the Soviet Union that
could be formally recognised through a bilateral treaty of alliance and mutual assistance.
To reach such a goal, Ttrescu further reasoned, first Romania had to ransom through
many sacrifices the mistakes of having participated in the anti-Soviet war.63
In late 1944-early 1945, the communist leaders argued in similar terms in favour of a
Romanian pro-Soviet foreign policy. On 30 September 1944, Ana Pauker (future Minister
of Foreign Affairs, between 1947 and 1952) reasoned that Romania was to perish for
good64 if friendship with the USSR did not become the basis of the states future grand
strategy. According to Pauker, at that time, the USSR was a vindictive neighbouring
giant, powerful enough to put Romania in its right place with a single move of the
hand, in a context in which neither the USA, nor Great Britain could or wanted to get in
the way of the Soviet Union as far as Romania was concerned. Because Romania had
fought and lost the war against the USSR, now she had to redeem herself and to
accommodate the Soviet Unions demands, otherwise she risked loosing her
independence, Pauker argued in different party meetings.65

61

Iuliu Manius letter to A.Vishinski, 15 November 1944, in Ciuceanu, 93.

Dinu Brtianus Memorandum to Dr. Petru Groza, 22 March 1945, ANIC, Fond Ministry of National
Propaganda, Studies and Documents, File no 2/1944-1945, 2-4.
63
Gheorghe Ttrescus speech from 17 December 1944, in Gheorghe Ttrescu, Mrturii pentru istorie,
Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1996, 282-294.
64
S se prpdeasc complet, in Romanian.
65
The minutes of the talks between the delegations of the Social Democratic Party and of the Communist
Party of Romania, 30 September 1944; The minutes of the meeting of the Council of the National
Democratic Front, 29 October 1944, in Radu Ciuceanu, Corneliu Mihai Lungu (coordinators), Stenogramele
edinelor Conducerii PCR, 23 septembrie 1944-26 martie 1945, INST, Bucureti, 2003, 78-94, 103, 117123.
62

25

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca or Petru Groza advanced identical positions. In

January 1945, during a meeting of the Council of the National Democratic Front66, Dr.
Petru Groza the leader of the Ploughmens Front and Romanias future Prime Minister
(between 6 March 1945 and 2 June 1952) argued that Romanias geopolitical situation,
which he defined in terms of Romanias vicinity to the USSR and the Soviet victory in
war, called for a policy on two levels: firstly, alliance with the Soviet Union up to a pact
of mutual assistance on the economic, political and military levels and, secondly,
friendship with the Western democracies. Vasile Luca, member of the Communist
Party67 and future Minister of Finances (between 6 November 1947 and 9 March 1952),
agreeing, added that, in the given international and military situation, Romania must not
look for the vicinity of England and America, but for friendship and alliance with the
USSR, the only one that he saw as being capable to guarantee the independence and
existence of our country as a national state and to help preserving our national life.
Arguing that the only perspective of existence of our country [Romania] is friendship
with the USSR, in January 1945 Vasile Luca and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej considered
that the threat to Romanias interests was coming not from the West, but from the East,
from the USSR. If the Soviet leaders trust in Romania and in its leaders was not
obtained rapidly, Romania risked to remain an occupied country and to lose
Transylvania, Luca and Gheorghiu-Dej argued. In order to convince the leaders in
Moscow that her friendship was sincere, Romania needed to make many sacrifices such as
complying with the difficult economic, military or administrative stipulations of the AA,
the two communist figures stressed on the same occasion.68
The non-communist government officials conceptualised in a similar way Romanias
future relations with the Soviet Union. On 9 February 1945, for instance, Constantin
Vioianu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared to A.P. Pavlov (political counsellor of
the Allied Control Commission) that Romania was committed to collaboration with the
USSR and that, replacing Paris, Moscow had become the centre towards which Romanias
future foreign policy was oriented. According to Pavlov, however, the USSR was not
convinced yet that it could count on Romanias friendship, and demanded therefore, as
further proof of Romanians loyalty, the improvement of the fulfilment of the AA and the
purging of the so-called collaborators of the previous regime from the historical parties
the NLP and the NPP and from the administrative state body.69
In the Cabinet of Dr. Petru Groza, formed on 6 March 1945 under Soviet pressure, the
communists held five of the 18 ministerial portfolios. On 31 March 1945, Gheorghe
Ttrescu (Vice-president and Minister of Foreign Affairs) announced that the Cabinets
main aim was to secure the states international security by establishing a tight
friendship and a long-lasting alliance with the big neighbour from the East. Two sets of
reasons were considered when making this choice, Romanias recent experiences in terms
66

The National Democratic Front (NDF) included the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the
Ploughmens Front, the Patriotic Union and the Union Federation.
67
The Communist Party had several names in Romania, namely The Socialist-Communist Party (19211922), the Communist Party of Romania (1922-1943), the Romanian Communist Party (1943-1948), the
Romanian Workers Party (1948-1965), and the Romanian Communist Party (1965-1989).
68
The minutes of the 24 January 1945 meeting of the NDF Council in Scurtu, 1994, 80-93.
69
Tele-phonograms sent by A. P. Pavlov to V. M. Molotov from Bucharest, on 9 February 1945 and 2 March
1945, in Ciuceanu, 111-113; 137-139.

26

of alliances and the long-lasting (perceived) Soviet threat. Thus, Ttrescu observed, on
the one hand, that Romanias alliances with Western faraway powers or with Eastern
European small states had proved inefficient in providing security for the state and, on the
other hand, that in the aftermath of the war the USA, Great Britain and France had agreed
to the USSRs prevalent role in Eastern Europe. Ttrescu believed that, as a small and
defeated state, Romania lacked the capabilities to oppose the great neighbouring Soviet
Union, which instead had the motives to penalise Romania for its war alliance and had the
power to crush its western neighbour if it wanted. According to Ttrescu, earning the
Soviets friendship and trust was a mandatory condition for Romanias future existence
and security. Thus, he concluded that Romania needed to carry onwards only a policy
with the face to the East, a policy of friendship, assistance and collaboration in all fields
with the USSR.70
Conceptualising a policy of friendship and collaboration with the USSR, in the second
half of the 1940s, the Romanian political elites also took into consideration Romanias
previous experience in terms of alliances. After the First World War, Romania had sought
its security through defensive alliances with France and Great Britain, in an attempt to
balance against the revisionist states in the region Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet
Union. When the two Western powers showed little interest in concluding military
alliances with Eastern European states, Romania entered the regional security defensive
alliances the Little Entente in 1921 and the Balkan Entente in 1934. In 1926, Romania
had concluded Treaties of Friendship with France and Italy, but these treaties offered no
security guarantees against an attack from a third party. In 1921 and 1926, Romania and
Poland signed alliance treaties offering mutual security guarantees against any type of
aggression, but those agreements proved useless when the Second World War began. In
November 1940, Romania allied (balanced) with Germany in order to counterbalance the
USSR, but this alliance failed to reach its goal too, and in late 1944 Romania was a
defeated state, under Soviet military occupation, completely isolated internationally.
Given these historical experiences and the perceptions of the Soviet threat, in the send part
of the 1940s the Romanian elites conceptualised Romanias future grand strategy in terms
of friendship, collaboration and alliance with the USSR, the perceived source of danger.

2.2 Bargaining for friendship

Immediately after its instalment, the Groza Cabinet began to act to earn the Soviets trust.
On 9 April 1945, Petru Groza was promising Pavlov that the Soviet representatives in
Romania were to be asked for their approval with regard to all the important or less
important matters.71 In return for their trust in Romanias declarations of loyalty and
friendship, the Soviets repeatedly requested the so-called democratisation of the country,
and despite the attempts of King Mihai and of Gheorghe Ttrescu to limit the
70

Articles and speeches by Gheorghe Ttrescu, March-December 1945, in Ttrescu, 311-313, 351-367,
397, 519.
71
Notes regarding the talk between A. P. Pavlov and P. Groza, Bucharest, 9 April 1945, in Ciuceanu, 163165.

27

infringement of human rights the Cabinet began the democratisation process by

shutting down newspapers and periodicals critical to the government or to the Soviet
Union, by dissolving the NPP and the NLP, by annihilating the organisations seen as antiCommunist or anti-Soviet, by purging those considered fascists, war criminals and
enemies of the people from the public life.72 Such proofs of loyalty to the Soviet Union
were accompanied though by attempts to obtain from the USSR alleviations of the
economic and political burdens imposed upon Romania.
On 13 April 1945, Ttrescu assured Pavlov once more that Romania was to put its
foreign policy completely and totally under the control of the Soviet Union and that all
Romanian foreign policy steps were to be put in accord with the Soviet Union. Ttrescu
asked then for the concluding of a bilateral official document confirming Romanias
devotedness towards the cause of her collaboration with the Soviet Union. A Romanian
governmental delegation could travel to Moscow as soon as possible, in order to address
the problems of the bilateral treaty and of Romanias place at the Peace Conference, the
Romanian minister proposed. Responding, Pavlov argued that a Romanian governmental
visit to Moscow was untimely and that the USSR could not conclude a treaty of alliance
and collaboration with Romania because she had fought in the anti-Soviet war.73
Persevering, in July 1945 Gheorghe Ttrescu was publicly declaring that the
strengthening of friendship and the achievement of permanent collaboration with the
USSR in the framework of a pact of mutual assistance, legal in time of peace as well as in
time of war was the main and permanent objective of Romania. Ttrescu often
declared though that Romanias choice for a policy with the face to the East was not
determined by any ideological affinities with the USSR but by the needs of the
Romanian people. Emphasising that Romania wanted also to maintain her relations of old
friendship with the Western democracies and especially with France and the USA,
Ttrescu implied that Romanias pro-Soviet policy was a response to the Soviet threat
and not to a Western menace.74
When the Groza Cabinet came in power in March 1945, there were no diplomatic
relations between Romania and the USSR (or the USA or Great Britain). The RomanianSoviet diplomatic relations were re-established in August 1945, in the context provided by
the Potsdam Conference and by the continuous Romanian proofs of loyalty to the USSR.
The Romanian officials interpreted the re-establishing of the bilateral relations as a sign
that the many economic, military and human sacrifices that Romania had made after 23
August 1944 in order to earn the Soviets trust had finally began to yield results, and as
a proof that Romania needed to continue its pro-Soviet policy. 75 Encouraged by the reestablishing of the bilateral relations, the Romanian government attempted then to obtain
from the USSR the improvement of Romanias political and economic situation.
Economically it aimed at convincing the USSR to alleviate the heavy economic burdens
72

Dorin Dobrincu, Historicizing a disputed theme. Anti-communist armed resistance in Romania, in

Vladimir Tismneanu, Stalinism Revised. The establishment of communist regimes in East-Central Europe,
Central European University Press, Budapest, New York, 2009, 314-317.
73
Notes on the talk between A. P. Pavlov and Gheorghe Ttrescu, 13 April 1945, in Ciuceanu, 167-170.
74
Gheorghe Ttrescus speeches from 3 July 1945 and 16 December 1945, in Ttrescu, 319-341, 379.
75
Communiqu regarding the reestablishment of the Romanian-Soviet diplomatic relations in Scnteia, 8
August 1945; The response of King Michael I of Romania to the speech of the Soviet Ambassador in
Romania, ANIC, fond Royal House, File 43/1945, 4-6.

28

imposed by the AA and to conclude new economic agreements able to help Romanias
post-war reconstruction. Politically, it wanted to obtain the recognition by the USSR that
after 23 August 1944 Romania had participated at the war against Germany and the
acceptance of the principle of friendship as the basis of the future bilateral relations.76
Observing the states 1945 international isolation, the Romanian officials believed that
the Soviet Union was the only country that can give [Romania] an immediate and
consistent aid as Gheorghiu-Dej, the Minister of Communications, put it.77 On 8 May
1945 the two parties signed an agreement of economic collaboration in Moscow, which
provided for the establishment of Soviet-Romanian joint stock companies the so-called
SovRoms. In July-August 1945 four economic conventions were concluded, creating the
first four SovRoms, in the fields of oil production; river and maritime navigation; air
transport and civil aviation; glass, mining and metallurgical industries.78
Historiography generally argues that the conventions on the creation of SovRoms
constitute hard evidence that the Romanian communists, being ideologically devoted to
the Soviet elites, willingly subordinated the interests of the Romanian state to the interests
of the Soviet Union.79 Nonetheless, despite the disadvantages these conventions brought
for Romania, they still had the merit of regulating to an important extent the previously
arbitrary Soviet (economic) conduct in Romania. According to the Romanian government,
economically, these conventions opened important perspectives for the economic
reconstruction and development of our country, while politically they were another step
towards Romanias rapprochement with the USSR, signalling that the friendship and
collaboration with the USSR had been finally initiated.80
On the other hand, the Romanian government concentrated its efforts towards
persuading the USSR to alleviate the economic burdens imposed upon Romania through
the AA. On 27 June 1945, Constantin Vasiliu-Rdceanu, Minister of War, asked
Vishinski if it would be possible for the two parties to analyse the problem of the
reduction of the goods delivered by Romania in accordance with the AA, and proposed
for a Romanian delegation to travel to Moscow. The timid Romanian requests were
rejected.81 The Romanian government continued to act in accordance with the economic
stipulations of the AA, but it repeatedly asked the Soviets to lessen those burdens. In
August 1945, for instance, Romania asked the USSR to accept the delivery of oil products
to substitute the grain that Romania could no longer deliver due to the 1945 drought. The
Soviet authorities refused this proposal too.82 On 31 August 1945, Ttrescu sent a letter
76

The discussion between C. Vasiliu Rdceanu and A. I. Vishinski, 27 June 1945, in Marin Radu Mocanu
(coordinator), Romnia i Armistiiul cu Naiunile Unite, Documente, Bucureti, 1995, 318-320.
77
The minutes of the 7 March 1945 meeting of the leadership of the Communist Party of Romania, in
Ciuceanu & Lungu, 329, 341.
78
Accord of economic collaboration between Romania and the USSR, Moscow, 8 May 1945; The JulyAugust 1945 economic conventions, ANIC, Fond CAER, Governmental Commission for the CMEA
problems, File 1/1945-1952, 123-234.
79
For instance, Constantin Moraru, Politica Extern a Romniei, 1958-1964, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2008,
31.
80
Ttrescus Speech, 24 August 1945, in Ttrescu, 351-361.
81
The discussion between C. Vasiliu Rdceanu and A.I. Vishinski, 27 June 1945, in Mocanu, 1995, 318320.
82
Mihail Gelmegeanus Report to Petru Groza, 1 September 1945, ANIC, Fond Presidency of the Council
of Ministers (PCM), Minutes, File 2466, 362-365.

29

to the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest, communicating again the wish of the Romanian
government to send a delegation to Moscow to address all problems that interest our
countries, including Romanias policy of collaboration with the USSR and Romanias
place at the Peace Conference.83 This time the Soviets agreed and on 4-13 September 1945
a Romanian delegation was in Moscow, finally obtaining a reduction of the quantities of
goods that Romania needed to deliver to the USSR under the Article 11 of the AA.84
The most important problem for the Romanian delegation concerned the need for
Soviet grain, Romania being unable at the time to deliver grain to the USSR in accordance
with the AA or to feed its population. However, the delegates85 were especially concerned
with how to pursue these interests without upsetting the Soviet leaders. Thus, when Stalin
announced on 4 September his decision to help Romania and to give the Romanian
delegates in Moscow unlimited rights to make requests, Ttrescu carefully responded:
If we ask too much, you tell us and we will comply, but if we ask too little, you tell us
also so that we can ask for more.86
On 11-13 September 1945, several Romanian-Soviet agreements were signed in
Moscow. One of them provided that the USSR was to deliver to Romania 300,000 tons
wheat and corn, to be repaid by Romanian deliveries of equal amounts, plus 5% in 19461947. Another one concerned the substitution of other goods for grain in reparation
deliveries, while the third provided for the reduction in deliveries by Romania of food and
fodder for the use of the Red Army on Romanias territory and of material and financial
payments as required by the Allied High Command in Romania. The fourth agreement
concerned Article 12 of the AA and provided a considerable reduction of Romanias
indebtedness. The fifth abolished Soviet military control over Romanian railroads and the
sixth provided the repatriation of the Romanian prisoners of war held by Soviet forces.
Through other agreements, the USSR returned to Romania a portion of her merchant navy
taken as war booty and leased to Romania 2,000 motor trucks.87 These agreements,
however, addressed and solved only a small part of Romanias problems and they were not
immediately and completely enforced. 88 But given the previous chaotic situation within

83

Gheorghe Ttrescus letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest, S. I Kavtaradze, 31 August 1945,
ANIC, Royal House, File 43/1945, 17-18.
84
According to Article 11 of the Armistice Agreement, Romania had to pay to the USSR reparations to the
amount of 300 million US dollars delivered in 6 equal annual instalments. The Reparations Convention from
16 January 1945 stipulated that by September 1946 Romania had to deliver to the USSR and to the Soviet
troops in Romania huge quantities of grain. This Convention was later modified in Romanias advantage by
the Romanian-Soviet agreements from 13 September 1945, 16 April 1946, by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty,
and again in June 1948 through an exchange of notes between the Soviet and Romanian governments. The
Text of the Armistice Agreement, Moscow, 12 September 1944, in Radu Marin Mocanu (coordinator),
Romnia marele sacrificat al Celui de-al Doilea Rzboi Mondial, Bucureti, 1994, 310-314.
85
Groza, Ttrescu, Gheorghiu-Dej, tefan Voitec (Minister of Education), Mihail Ghelmegeanu (President
of the Romanian Commission for the Application of the AA), Mircea Solacolu (Commissary for Foreign
Trade), Bucur chiopu (Commissary for Prices), Emil Bodnra (Secretary General of the Presidency of the
Council of Ministers).
86
Petru Grozas Declaration in the Council of Ministers, September 1945, ANIC, PCM, Minutes, File
9/1945, 4-15.
87
The September 1945 Romanian-Soviet economic conventions, ANIC, PCM, File 2759, 1-13, 17.
88
Correspondence between the Romanian and the Soviet authorities, ANIC, PCM, File no 2776/1945-1947,
23-43; File 2761, 1-48.

30

Romanian-Soviet economic relations89 they did represent an important improvement for

Romania, regulating those relations and reducing considerably her obligations.
The Romanian government considered these agreements important both economically
and politically. According to Groza, this was an economic success which proved that
Romania could obtain and preserve the Soviets trust only through a policy that
completely accommodated the Soviet Unions interests and demands. Adopting any other
policy towards the USSR would have been an irremediable mistake that would have
pushed Romanias to a certain tragedy. Thus, Groza concluded in September 1945 that
from that moment on the destiny of Romania was alongside this gigantic neighbour,
without forgetting, not even for a second, the other great allies.90
According to Ttrescu, the Romanian-Soviet September 1945 agreements
consecrated the trust of the Soviet Union in Romania, anticipated the development of the
conditions that were to allow Romania to resume, after a lost war, the line of her
interrupted independence and marked the beginning of the end of Romanias political
and economic isolation from the rest of the world.91 In September 1945, Romania reestablished diplomatic relations with Poland and in November-December 1945 she
concluded trade accords with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. These accords, however,
proved insignificant and unable to improve Romanias economic situation, but they had a
political significance, breaking Romanias international isolation.92
After considerable international American-British-Soviet negotiations, in February
1946 the USA and Great Britain too re-established diplomatic relations with Romania.
This event fostered the hopes of the Romanian government with regard to the
improvement of Romanias economic relations with the Western states93, but on 22
February 1946, George F. Kennan, the USA deputy chief of mission in the USSR, sent to
89

After 23 August 1944, the Soviets had acted in Romania according to their own will, without taking into
consideration any agreement or law. The Armistice Agreement stipulated that Romania had to return to the
USSR all valuables and materials removed by the Romanian authorities from the Soviet territory during the
war and had to pay as compensations to the USSR 300 million dollars in 6 equal annual instalments in
commodities (oil products, grain, timber products etc.). The AA had placed the Romanian military and civil
authorities under Soviet command, and the entire economic infrastructure was put at the will of the Soviet
authorities. The very harsh military, economic and administrative conditions imposed on Romania by the
AA were greatly surpassed by the Soviet requests. For instance, the occupier imposed Soviet sentinels at
Romanian factories, farms, damps, obstructing the Romanian authorities from inventorying the goods that
had to be delivered to the USSR. It dismembered industrial infrastructure and equipments and sent
everything to the USSR. The Soviet High Command in Romania betook over 40,000 train cars, over 500
locomotives, and about all tank cars, which meant that the remaining cars were insufficient for Romania to
comply with the Soviet delivery demands under the stipulations of the AA. Moreover, important quantities
of goods were taken from Romania without the fulfilment of the custom formalities and without the payment
of the related custom duties, which affected directly Romanias capability to comply with the economic
stipulations of the AA. For instance, Memoir addressed to Vishinski by C.I.C. Brtianu, the president of the
NLP, concerning the application of the Armistice Convention, ANIC, Fond Royal House, File 25/1944, 1-10;
Memoir elaborated by Savel Rdescu, the President of the Romanian Commission for the Application of the
Armistice, ANIC, Fond Pan Halippa, Dosar 79/1945, 1-56.
90
Petru Grozas Declaration in the Council of Ministers, September 1945, ANIC, PCM, Minutes, File
9/1945, 4-15.
91
Gheorghe Ttrescus speech at the NLPs Conference, 16 December 1945, in Ttrescu, 362-391.
92
Stanciu, 2008, 136-172.
93
Ciobanu, 41.

31

Washington his long telegram, drawing out the blueprint of the American containment
doctrine94, and few days latter, on 5 March, Winston Churchill delivered his famous Iron
Curtain speech. In these new international conditions, the Romanians became even more
deeply concerned with what would the Soviets say if Romania looked towards the
Americans for economic help as Ana Pauker put it. Still, in 1945-1946, Gheorghiu-Dej,
Minister of National Economy, tried repeatedly to obtain American loans to buy American
wheat and industrial equipment. The USA, however, rejected these requests95 and thus, the
Soviet Union remained the only supplier of economic aid to Romania which in return
helped to maintain and increase Soviet political leverage over Romania.
The Romanian government tried to obtain from the Americans and British not only
economic, but also political aid. In the summer of 1946, for instance, Ion Gheorghe
Maurer, Alexandru Brldeanu and Belu Zilber, representing Romania at the Peace
negotiations, tried to persuade the American and the British delegates to help Romania
resist the Soviet threat, pleading with them to not leave Romania in the hands of the
Russian. Angry, Molotov summoned Maurer and Brldeanu and asked them to stop
contacting Western representatives, unless Soviet approval had been explicitly given
beforehand. The Romanian delegates complied, because as Maurer privately declared to
Dumitru G. Danielopol, a Romanian economist residing in Great Britain the Russians
were in the country, the Americans were far away and Romania had no other choice but
to live with the Russians.96
Although the first Romanian-Soviet economic agreements were concluded in 1945, the
political ones were delayed for several years. A first political (although partial) Soviet
concession to Romania occurred according to the interpretations of the Romanian
government during the Peace negotiations, the USSR being the only power defending
without any reserves the Transylvanian borders and the rightness of the Romanian cause
with regard to Transylvania, as Ttrescu put it in a public speech97. This formulation
however should not be taken ad litteram. It was just another way of cultivating the
Soviets benevolence. In fact, the Soviet Union used the Transylvanian issue as leverage
against Romania not only during the Peace negotiations98, but throughout the Cold War.99
However, the February 1947 Peace Treaty imposed new economic, political and
military burdens on Romania. Delivering a speech in the Romanian Parliament, Ttrescu
argued in August 1947 that despite its heavy, unjust and burdensome conditions, the
Peace Treaty encompassed also few bright stipulations such as recognising Romanias
independence and sovereignty and acknowledging Transylvania as Romanian territory.100
94

John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment. A critical appraisal of postwar American national security,
Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, 24-52.
95
Robert Levy, Ana Pauker. The rise and fall of a Jewish communist, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 2001, 83-84; Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944-1947, Iai, 2000, 514-515.
96
Constantiniu, 456.
97
Ttrescus speech at the NLPs Conference, 16 December 1945, in Ttrescu, 362-391.
98
The 12 September 1944 Armistice Agreement had declared the Vienna Award null and void, but
acknowledged that Transylvania or the great part there of was to be returned to Romania subject to
confirmation of the peace settlement. Dan Vtman, Politica extern a Romniei de la Armistiiu i pn la
semnarea Tratatului de Pace, 1944-1947, Pro Universitaria, Bucureti, 2009, 100-118, 136.
99
Larry L. Watts, Ferete-m, Doamne, de prieteni. Rzboiul clandestin al blocului sovietic cu Romnia,
Rao, Bucureti, 2011, 144-169, 179-187, 241-245.
100
Ttrescus speech in the Assembly of Deputies, 26 August 1947, in Ttrescu, 507-522.

32

Another year passed, however, until, on 4 February 1948, Romania and the Soviet Union
concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA),
which acknowledged friendship and collaboration as the basis for bilateral relations.101
While the USSR was mainly interested in creating a defensive alliance to secure a buffer
zone for its territory in the event of an attack from Germany or its possible allies102, for
Romania this treaty represented the first official recognition by the Soviet Union of the
principle of friendship and cooperation as the core of future bilateral relations.
The Romanian archives provide rather scant information with regard to this treaty, but
the available evidence suggests that the text of the treaty was unilaterally drafted in
Moscow. Analysing its content, Ana Pauker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued on 13
February 1948 that one of the most important aspects of the treaty was that it guaranteed
that the USSR was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Romania, consecrating the
states independence and sovereignty. Another important aspect was that the treaty had a
mutually defensive character and was able to provide Romania with the necessary security
guarantees in case of need a field where the Romanian-French treaty from 1926 had
failed, Pauker argued on the same occasion.103 The expectations of the Romanian cabinet
regarding Soviet non-interference in Romanias affairs proved too optimistic. Still, the
1948 treaty was the first post-war Romanian-Soviet agreement that treated Romania
(albeit formally) as an equal party of the USSR and not as a defeated enemy.
Arguing that in 1944-1948 Romania entered a bandwagon alliance with the USSR (the
perceived threat), this chapter does not intend to address the problem of ideology. The
Romanian post-1989 historiography maintains that Romania entered the orbit of the
Soviet Union in 1948, after and due to the communists coming to power.104 This chapter
maintains instead that the main factor in choosing Romanias policy with the face to the
East was not ideology, but the perception of the Soviet Union as a threat, and that the
communists were not alone in conceptualising Romanias post-war pro-Soviet policy. 105

2.3. Romania A loyal bandwagoner106

Although the 1948 TFCMA placed the principles of friendship, independence,
sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs at the base of the post-war bilateral
relations, the USSR continued to see Romania as a risk for its security and to treat her as
101

Treaty of friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Romania and the USSR, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 34/1948, 1-4.
102
Ralph B. Levering, Debating the origins of the Cold War. American and Russian perspectives, Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2001, 137; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin's cold war. Soviet strategies in
Europe, 1943 to 1956, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995, 121.
103
Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 February 1948, ANIC, PCM, Minutes, File
2/1948, 1-11.
104
For instance, Ciobanu, 24-26; Stanciu, 2008, 74-86.
105
An early version of this chapter was presented at the conference Scrambling for power: war and political
transformation in the Balkans (Thessaloniki, Greece, 31 May-3 June 2012), under the title Constructing
Romanias pro-Soviet state security strategy, 1944-1947.
106
According to Thomas Ambrosio, a bandwagoner is a weaker state which chooses to ally with a more
powerful state (a bandwagon). Thomas Ambrosio, Challenging America's global preeminence. Russia's
quest for multipolarity, Ashgate, Burlington, 2005, 10-20.

33

a hostile territory, as Watts put it. Soviet troops, spies and counsellors were maintained
in the country even after the conclusion of the treaty, while the states resources were
severely exploited. After the withdrawal from Romania of the Soviet troops (in 1958) and
of the Soviet counsellors (in the late 1950s and early 1960s), the USSR activated and
developed an impressive network of secret agents in Romania, providing another proof of
how little trust the Soviet leadership actually had in its Romanian formal ally, even many
years after the end of the war.107
The Romanian leadership, on the other hand, guided its post-1948 policy towards the
USSR by the principles that had been defined between 1944 and 1948 namely,
preserving the Soviet trust and giving the USSR no reason (or pretext) to see Romania as a
threat to the Soviet interests. The Romanian leaders believed that Romania which they
saw as a small country that lacked any other alliance options and was under Soviet control
had no other alternative but to accommodate the Soviet interests. As Maurer later
phrased it, loyalty was the only post-war tactic capable to convince the USSR to accept
alleviating the economic, political or military pressures forced upon Romania after the
war.108 The Romanian leaders feared that any Romanian policy or action displeasing the
Soviets could be regarded in the USSR as a proof of Romanias disloyalty, and risked
triggering additional Soviet anti-Romanian measures. This fear was confirmed to some
extent in July 1953, for instance, when considering that Romania was not following the
model of the Soviet new economic course rapidly and enthusiastically enough
Malenkov, Khrushchev and Mikoyan accused the Romanian leadership of taking an antirevolutionary position and of risking to transform Romania, through their economic
domestic policy, into a weak flank of the Soviet Unions front.109
Romanias policy change towards the USSR is sometimes understood in terms of
domestic struggle for political power between the so-called Muscovite group led by Ana
Pauker110 and the home communists group led by Gheorghiu-Dej. According to this
interpretation, in 1952 the first group was purged and replaced in power by the second,
which instead embraced a more national-oriented policy, less subordinated to the Soviet
interests and demands.111 Ovidiu Bozgan, for instance, claims that during the period when
Ana Pauker was Minister of Foreign Affairs (1947-1952), the foreign policy of the
Romanian state was a pure fiction, Romania having no objectives, aims, tactics, strategies
others than those ordered by the Soviet Union and designed to achieve the Soviet Unions
aims and interests.112

107

Watts, 32-33; Cristian Troncot, Duplicitarii. O istorie a Serviciilor de Informaii i Securitate ale
regimului comunist din Romnia, Elion, Bucureti, 2003, 16.
108
Interviews with Maurer in Betea, 323-326.
109
The Minutes of the 8-13 July 1953 talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations in Kremlin, in
Gh. Buzatu, Romnia i Marile Puteri, Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 2003, 598-601.
110
The Muscovite group generally refers to leaders that had spent part of the interwar period in the USSR. It
include Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu, Petre Boril, Valter Roman, Dumitru Petrescu, Leonte
Rutu or Gheorghe Stoica. It is generally regarded as being completely loyal to the Soviet Union.
111
Victor Frunz, Istoria Stalinismului n Romnia, Humanitas, Bucureti, 1990, 219; Lucian Boia, Romania
Borderland of Europe, Reaktion, London, 2001, 123; Lavinia Stan, Lucian Turcescu, Religion and politics
in post-communist Romania, Oxford University Press, 2007, 46; Duu, 2010, 11, 23, 25, 27.
112
Ovidiu Bozgan, Ana Pauker n documente diplomatice franceze, 1947-1949, in Arhivele
totalitarismului, no 3-4/2000, 63.

34

Deletant and Levy, however, correctly observe that this interpretation is misleading
and incorrect and that the theory of the obedient Muscovites is rather simplistic. For
instance, Levys well documented monograph reveals that, after 1948, Paukers policy
often contradicted the Kremlins line in various matters regarding Romanias domestic or
foreign policy.113 Moreover, despite the 1952 purge of Paukers group and the 1953 Soviet
new course, Romanias domestic and foreign policy line did not suffer a drastic change. In
terms of domestic policy, the Romanian leadership continued to follow the Soviet model
to the letter and pursued the states industrialisation (which had began prior to 1952),
while in terms of foreign policy it continued to emphasise Romanias loyalty to the USSR
(as defined prior to 1948)114 and to ask for Soviet guidance and directives.
As Mircea Malia recalls, in 1962 the Romanian representatives at the UNO were still
committed to this type of policy and were being instructed to advance no position without
asking the Soviet representatives first for their position or without following the Soviet
example. 115 Publicly and officially, until the early 1960s, Romania acted both domestically
and internationally as the most loyal satellite of the USSR. Behind the scenes, though,
Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer or Pauker criticised and tried to block the Soviet exploitation of
Romanias resources, and attempted to limit the interference of the Soviet counsellors in
Romanias domestic affairs, as early as 1947-1955.116
Scholars often argue that the (1958) withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the (19561959) abolishment of the SovRoms were due to a change in Romanias policy towards the
USSR.117 The Romanian leaders, instead, explained such events through a change of the
USSRs policy towards Romania. On the one hand, they observed that Khrushchev was
publicly advocating the principles of complete equality in rights, non-interference in
internal affairs, and respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty as
regulators of the relations between the socialist states. On the other hand, they believed
that Romanias previous loyalty tactic were to a great extent responsible for the fact that
the USSR had finally agreed to the abolishment of the SovRoms or to the withdrawal of
its troops from Romania.
Thus, they concluded in the late 1950s that the line of loyalty towards Moscow had to
be maintained, being the only one capable to improve the countrys situation in relation to
the USSR. 118 However, in the early 1960s, the Romanian leaders began to perceive new
Soviet threats to Romanias interests, and such perceptions caused this study argues
Romanias change of policy towards the USSR.

113

Deletant, 1999, 147; Levy, 221-238.

For instance, Note regarding the talks between the leadership of the CPSU and the members of the
Romanian delegation, 26 January 1954, Kremlin; Recommendations for the government of the Romanian
Peoples Republic regarding the economic problems, February 1954, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
153/1954, 22-35.
115
Malia, 2007, 8.
116
Banu & ranu, xx-xxvi; The Minutes of the 31 May 1952 Politburo Meeting, in Scurtu 2007, 185-191;
The minutes of the meeting of the Agrarian Commission of the CC of the RWP, 19 September 1949,
Bucharest, in Mihnea Berindei, Dorin Dobrincu, Armand Gou (eds.), Istoria comunismului n Romnia,
Documente, 1945-1965, Bucureti, Humanitas, 2009, 212-215.
117
For instance, Moraru, 9, 30.
118
Interview with Maurer in Betea, 323-326.
114

35

3 The reformation of the CMEA, 1960-1962

This chapter investigates the emergence of Romanias opposition to the USSR in the
CMEA framework. On the one hand, it addresses the questions of why Romania opposed
the CMEA reformation and, on the other hand, of where, when, from whom and how this
opposition manifested itself. Answering the questions from the second category, this
chapter opens the discussion of what actually changed in Romanias policy towards the
USSR in the early 1960s. The period under analysis starts in 1960 with Romanias first
categorical opposition to bloc specialisation as Alexandru Brldeanu, vice-president of
the Council of Ministers and member of the CC of the RWP, phrased it119 and ends in
1962 with the first Romanian-Soviet integration compromise.

3.1 Romanias opposition to specialisation

After Stalins death in March 1953, there were various attempts to reorganise the CMEA
as a more equitable and efficient economic institution.120 In 1954, the members addressed
for the first time the topic of specialisation and coordination of investments and national
plans, initiating the specialisation agreements designed to curb costly industrial
duplication and import substitution. In 1954 the Council adopted the procedure of making
specialisation recommendations and in 1956 created twelve permanent commissions to
promote specialisation and cooperation in particular economic sectors. Although in 1955
and 1956 the CMEA discussed the coordination and synchronisation of the national fiveyear plans, most attempts at plan coordination remained sealed up within a bilateral
framework.121
The CMEA recommendations regarding specialisation and coordination of plans were
not mandatory, and the member states rarely and only partially complied. The 1959
CMEA Charter/Statute stipulated that all recommendations and decisions of the Council
can be adopted only with the consent of the interested member countries. It noted that one
of the Councils main objectives was to develop the agriculture and industry of the
member states through the consistent implementation of the international socialist
division of labour. It also consecrated the coordination of the national economic plans
as the main collaboration form within the CMEA.122 It was in this context of CMEA
reforms that Romanias opposition to the economic bloc policies gradually developed.
Between 1954 and 1958, without openly opposing the specialisation recommendations,
the Romanian representatives in the CMEA repeatedly stressed that Romania was
interested in developing its heavy and chemical industries and in specialising herself in
119

Alexandru Brldeanus discourse at the Agricultural Conference (AC), 3 February 1960, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1960, volume III, 186.
120
Much of this subchapter (3.1) was previously published in Elena Dragomir, Romanias participation at
the Agricultural Conference in Moscow, 2-3 February 1960, in Cold War History, Vol. 13, No 13, August
2013, 331-351.
121
Robert Bideleux, Ian Jeffries, A history of Eastern Europe. Crisis and change, Routledge, 1998, 553-554.
122
The Charter of the CMEA, Sofia, 14 December 1959, ANIC, Fond Governmental Commission for the
CMEA problems, The Protocols of the CMEA sessions, File 114/1959, 43-55.

36

producing oil drilling equipment, agricultural machinery, tractors, locomotives or trams.

Gradually, divergences appeared between Czechoslovakia and the GDR, on the one hand,
and Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, on the other hand, as the states from the first group
wanted to determine the others agricultural specialisation, while the others aimed at their
own industrialisation. By 1958 Romanias dissatisfaction regarding bloc specialisation
increased, the Romanian leadership noted that other member states benefited from
derogations from the CMEAs recommendations while Romania was given a predominant
agricultural role.123 However, this Romanian dissatisfaction did not yet target the Soviet
Union. It was in February 1960, during the Agricultural Conference held in Moscow
when, for the first time in Romanias post-war history, Romanian top level officials
opposed (albeit indirectly) the Soviet leaders.

3.1.1 Threat perceptions

Initially, the CMEA took into consideration Romanias although limited specialisation
in different industrial sectors, but from April 1959 onwards, within the CMEA Permanent
Commission for Agriculture and Forestry (PCAF), the Romanian delegations faced
(perceived) increasing attempts to impose Romanias agricultural specialisation. The
Romanian delegation at the April 1959 session of the PCAF did not oppose specialisation
directly, but it did not accept it either. Opting for postponing tactics, it argued that prior to
adopting actual measures of specialisation the CMEA had to conduct detailed studies on
the necessity of reforms. The argumentation of the Romanian delegation was accepted124
and a permanent working group was created in Moscow to elaborate studies in that regard.
Although no such study had been produced, the specialisation idea was again raised in
Sofia during the 12th session of the CMEA (10-14 December 1959) and during the 6 th
Session of the PCAF (17-20 December 1959), when the Czechoslovak and East German
delegations proposed to adopt decisions regarding the actual specialisation of different
agricultural sectors. The Romanian delegation argued again that a detailed analysis on the
possibility regarding the specialisation of different agricultural sectors was needed
before discussing the actual specialisation. Its observations were again accepted, but in
January 1960 the Romanian leadership received from the Secretariat of the PCAF a
Czechoslovak project advocating the CMEA active, planned, rational division of
labour.125
Parallel to these CMEA talks, in November 1959, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev
issued a circular letter proposing the convening of a meeting of the representatives of the
socialist states from Europe in order to exchange opinions and experiences with regard to
the bloc agricultural problems. The meeting, Khrushchev argued in his letter, was to give
the participants the opportunity to recognise how many and what kind of products one
123

Liviu ranu, Romnia n Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc, 1949-1965, Enciclopedic, Bucureti.
2007, 66-137.
124
Brldeanus discourse in the AC, 3 February 1960, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1960,
volume III, 186-187.
125
M. Stancus Report, 28 January 1960; Czechoslovakias Project for the gradual deepening of the
international division of labour between the countries of the socialist camp, January 1960, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 18/1960, Vol. I, 20-40.

37

[state] can produce. Gheorghiu-Dej feared that the other bloc members might try to use
the meeting to advocate Romanias agricultural specialisation.126
Officially entitled the conference of the representatives of the communist and workers
parties from the European socialist countries regarding the exchange of experience for the
development of agriculture, the summit was held in Moscow on 2-3 February 1960. As the
Romanians had anticipated, it also addressed the problem of the CMEA agricultural
specialisation, triggering in Gheorghiu-Dejs words Romanias open riposte.127
Romania was represented at this Agricultural Conference (AC), by Gheorghe GheorghiuDej, Chivu Stoica (president of the Council of Ministers and member of the CC of the
RWP), Alexandru Moghioro and Alexandru Brldeanu (vice-presidents of the Council of
Ministers and members of the CC of the RWP), Ion Cozma (Minister of Agriculture and
member of the CC of the RWP) and a group of experts, including M. Stancu (deputy of the
Minister of Agriculture) and S. Vrejb (member in the Planning State Committee).128
Presenting reports on the situation of agriculture in their respective countries, the
participants (except for Romania) made proposals regarding the bloc agricultural
specialisation. Enver Hoxha, for instance, announced that Albania intended to enlarge its
agricultural surface, to export grain, cotton, sugar beet, tomatoes, citrus, tobacco and to
import chemical fertilisers, tractors and other machines from other bloc countries. Bulgaria
announced its intention to increase the production of grain and corn for domestic use, and
of fruits, grapefruits and vegetables for export, while Czechoslovakia planned to develop
its stock-raising sector, the production of chemical fertilisers and agricultural machines
and to import from other bloc countries fodder, oil plants, vegetables, fruits, cotton and
grain. Walter Ulbricht and Erich Rbensam argued that East Germany had favourable
conditions for producing fruits, sugar beet and pulse and for developing its stock-raising
sector, and that other countries should produce fodder, oil, fibber plants, potatoes, fruits
or vegetables.
The Polish delegation129 prognosticated an increase of meat production and of the
agricultural surface, and reasoned that specialisation needed to be addressed in the CMEA
forum as soon as possible. Hungary was disposed to export within the bloc fruits,
vegetables, grapefruits, corn, various industrial equipment and agricultural machines. The
Soviet delegation130 fostered specialisation and reasoned that all bloc states needed to
increase their grain production. Khrushchev allusively criticised some countries that
prior to the war had been important exporters of grain but were importing grain in 1960.
He openly supported the necessity of specialisation131 in the agriculture of our
126

Khrushchevs 14 November 1959 letter to the CMEA leaders, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1960, volume I, 14-21.
127
The 8 February 1960 minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the CC of RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 9/1960, 17.
128
The list of the participants to the AC, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 7/1960, 2, 11.
129
W. Gomuka (First Secretary of the Party), Jsef Cyrankiewicz (Prim Minister and member in the
Politburo), Edward Ochab (Party Secretary and Politburo member), Edmund Pszczkowski (head of the
Agricultural Section of the CC).
130
Including N.S. Khrushchev (First Secretary of the CC of the CPSU and Prim Minister), A.N. Kosygin
(Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and President of the Planning State Committee), V.V.
Matskevich (Minister of Agriculture).
131
Quotation marks in original. In the Romanian archive documents the term specialisation is usually placed
in quotation marks.

38

countries and the elaboration of concrete measures of specialisation.132 Besides their

speeches in the AC, the Soviet delegates circulated among the participants a series of
documentary reports on the development of the Soviet and bloc agriculture.133 GheorghiuDej paid particular attention to the report of the Soviet Minister of Agriculture, V.V.
Matskevich, which advocated the elaboration of a bloc-wide united coordinated plan.134
The Romanian delegates believed that the Soviet or the German allusions to some
countries or to other countries targeted Romania which was supposed to become the
bloc supplier of agricultural products and an importer of bloc industrial products. Noting
how similar the other participants proposals were, the Romanians worryingly concluded
that the others had agreed prior to the opening of the conference on how to pressure
Romania to accept what they called the principle of specialisation. According to
Gheorghiu-Dej, there were two main forms of specialisation that the CMEA tried to
impose in 1960 one national, referring to the specialisation of specific agricultural
sectors within a country, and one international, referring to specialisation among the
CMEA countries. The Romanian leader often argued in closed party meetings that the first
one was bad enough and unacceptable, the second was even worse, and both
contravened Romanias interests. 135
While the other participants at the AC proposed and supported bloc specialisation, on 2
February, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej read a report (prepared in Bucharest) arguing that
Romanias agriculture had been developed after the war by placing industrialisation and
especially the development of heavy industry at the basis of Romanias economy.
Gheorghiu-Dej declared at the AC that Romania intended to increase the production of
fodder, grain and corn and to continue developing its stock-raising sector, but no intention
of exporting agricultural products or of importing industrial products was stated.136 Later,
the Romanian leader argued in different closed party meetings that the absence from this
speech of any reference to specialisation was intended as a hint for the others regarding
Romanias position towards specialisation.
Because the other participants did not seem to take the hint and continued to insist on
bloc specialisation, on the evening of 2 February, the Romanian delegation in Moscow
decided to drop its ignoring tactics and to react in force against the principle of
specialisation. The next day, during the main session of the conference, Alexandru
Brldeanu delivered a speech prepared on site in Moscow encompassing, as
Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it, Romanias point of view on the problem of specialisation. 137
132

The minutes of the AC, 2-3 February 1960; Khrushchevs speech at the AC, 2 February 1960; Romanianproduced Report regarding the main problems raised at the AC by the other delegations, 14 February1960;
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 7/1960, 1-220; File 6/1960, Volume III, 228-258; File 8/1960, 1171.
133
Khrushchevs 13 January 1960 letter to Gheorghiu-Dej regarding the convening of the AC, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1960, volume I, 24-25.
134
The Soviet reports (partially annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej), ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
6/1960, volume I, 26-280; vol. II, 1-172; vol. III, 1-168.
135
The minutes of the 8 February 1960 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 9/1960, 11-26.
136
Report, January 1960; Gheorghiu-Dejs speech at the AC, 2 February 1960, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 6/1960, Vol. III, 208-225, File 7/1960, 89-105; Protocol no 2 of the 22 January 1960
Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 3/1960, 1-2.
137
The minutes of the 8 February 1960Politburo meeting, ANIC, Fond CC of RCP, Office, File 9/1960, 1117.

39

Brldeanu first used postponing arguments, reasoning that the CMEA had not yet
produced a study on the necessity of specialisation, as previously decided, and that, until
such a study was elaborated, specialisation was another nebulous and ambiguous thing.
Next, simulating an attempt to define the term, Brldeanu openly explained to the other
participants what specialisation could not be from Romanias point of view. If by
specialisation one meant that Romania was to produce fodder for the East German stockraising industry or grain for Bulgaria that intended to produce vegetables instead, then
such a thesis is unacceptable and lacks one essential element our accord, Brldeanu
openly declared in Moscow. He further stressed that Romania could not accept the thesis
of agricultural specialisation because it was not economically profitable for Romania to
export fodder instead of meat, grain instead of agricultural machinery.
The Romanian delegate also inferred that letting the other CMEA states decide in
which sectors Romania had to specialise meant in fact an acceptance of foreign
interference in the states domestic affairs. When deciding the line of Romanias economic
development, the Romanian leadership had to consider only the directives of the RWP and
any other specialisation, but the one decided by the party, is not possible for us,
Brldeanu stressed. Still, the Romanian delegate added, Romania was not against
specialisation; on the contrary, it supported specialisation provided that one defined first
what specialisation meant and that specialisation took into consideration the conditions
within the CMEA countries.138
Although the Romanians were convinced that the bloc specialisation offensive was
directed from Moscow, at the AC Brldeanu said nothing about Soviet support for
specialisation, choosing to deal with and to criticise as Gheorghiu-Dej later put it
only the Bulgarians, East Germans and Czechoslovaks because we did not want to attack
on too broad a front.139 However, contesting specialisation during a top level bloc
gathering in which the Soviet leaders openly supported it was a form of opposing the
USSR, albeit indirectly.
On 3 February 1960, the Secretariat of the AC was convened to elaborate on the
summits Communiqu, which created the context in which the Romanian representatives
openly contradicted the other bloc delegates (including the Soviets). The first draft of the
Communiqu stipulated that the CMEA was to elaborate measures for the continuous
specialisation and division of labour in agriculture, but, when the Romanian
representatives opposed, Andropov (USSR) proposed the CMEA to study the
possibilities regarding the specialisation and division of labour. This proposal was also
rejected, tefan Voicu (Romania) argued that since specialisation was not on the
conferences agenda it should not be discussed at all. However, when this formal argument
failed to prevent the others from debating the subject, Voicu employed a different tactic
namely altering the others initial proposal.
Emphasising the so-called principle of the interested countries recognised also in the
1959 CMEA Statute Voicu argued that Romania was not against reforms, and that, on
the contrary, Romania supported the specialisation of every state in accordance with its
138

Brldeanus discourse in the AC, 3 February 1960, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1960,
volume III, 186-190.
139
The minutes of the 17-18 May 1960 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
28/1960, 5-18.

40

own interests and natural conditions. He advanced, therefore, the wording that the CMEA
was to study the possibilities of all countries to develop in those directions for which they
have conditions for a favourable development and in accordance with the mutually
advantageous interests of the socialist countries. Andropov proposed, in response, the
CMEA to study the possibilities for the continuous specialisation in the field of the
production of agricultural products, chemical fertilisers and agricultural machines in
accordance with the interests and possibilities of each country. After additional informal
Romanian-Soviet talks, Gheorghiu-Dej finally accepted this wording, but the initial
reference to the specialisation of labour was completely removed from the agreed-on text
of the Communiqu.
Thus, the initial proposal referring to the CMEA elaborating measures for the
continuous specialisation and division of labour in agriculture, altered by the Romanian
interventions, became studying the possibilities for the continuous specialisation in
specific fields and in accordance with the interests and possibilities of each country. This
tactic of altering an initial proposal was often used by the Romanians in the early 1960s in
order to resist and block different bloc policies perceived as contravening Romanias
interests. It was meant, firstly, to complicate and thus to prolong as much as possible the
discussions and the adoption of a decision and, secondly, to divert the specialisation
proposals from their initial (perceived) aims.
Despite Voicus success, the Romanian leaders believed that the other CMEA
members and especially the Soviets would continue to exert pressure to impose
specialisation. Because the idea of specialisation could not be completely removed from
the Communiqu, they considered the result a satisfying compromise. Accepting
specialisation according to the interests of each country was, according to GheorghiuDej, even so too large a compromise, but, given the situation, he continued, Romania had
to treat [these] problems with benevolence, to compromise, and to seek to conciliate
with the others. However, during the 8 February 1960 Politburo meeting, Gheorghiu-Dej
stressed that Romania would accept a specialisation compromise only if it would not affect
the development of Romania and its place among the other socialist countries.
The Romanian delegates at the Agricultural Conference paid special attention to the
Soviet reactions when they opposed specialisation and observed that Khrushchev did not
say that he would have any objection. They also noticed that Andropov insisted that a
common point of view had to be formulated, but declared that he understood very well
the Romanian point of view. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, this benevolent attitude was
explained by the Soviet leaders fear of causing a public bloc disagreement with Romania,
which, the Romanian leader believed, would have affected the USSRs prestige.
Gheorghiu-Dej concluded that this Soviet (perceived) weakness had to be explored and
exploited further by Romania in its endeavour of blocking the international division of
labour.140

140

Report regarding the meeting of the ACs Secretariat, 3 February 1960; The ACs Communiqu, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 18/1960, volume I, 57-71; The minutes of the 8 February 1960 Politburo
meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 9/1960, 10-26.

41

3.1.2. Early opposition tactics

On their return from Moscow, the Romanian leaders began preparing Romanias future
opposition to the (expected) bloc specialisation offensive. This preparation was made on
two main levels instructing the Romanian representatives at the CMEA on how to
recognise and oppose specialisation; and obtaining the official approval of the party
members for opposing specialisation. In February-April 1960, meetings with top party
members, diplomats or governmental officials were organised around Romania to address
the CMEA specialisation. During these meetings, the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian
or East German leaders were harshly criticised for their (perceived) intensions to
transform Romania into an exporter of raw materials and fodder, without any
consideration for Romanias economic interests, but the Soviet support for specialisation
was not criticised, nor mentioned. Romanias determination to oppose specialisation was
often stressed, though.141
On 26 April, a Plenum of the CC of the RWP was convened to address the socialist
transformation of agriculture and the preparing of the 3 rd Congress of the RWP
(scheduled for June). Although the subject was not on the plenums official agenda, the
participants were also informed about the specialisation discussions that had taken place
at the AC. The Bulgarian or the East German plans regarding Romanias specialisation
were criticised in very strong terms, but the Soviet Union was not mentioned as a
supporter of specialisation.142 This Romanian approach rapidly changed though and in less
than a month the USSR was openly criticised not only in closed Politburo meetings, but
also at plenums of the CC of the RWP for the (perceived) fault of advocating Romanias
specialisation. This change of position was caused by the Soviets stand at the CMEA
Seventh Session of the Permanent Commission on Scientific-Technical Collaboration in
the Field of Agriculture and Forestry, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 12-14 May.
During this session, the president of the commission (I. Primov, Bulgaria) presented
the participants with a document proposing the agricultural specialisation among
countries and especially the specialisation in the fields of chemical products and
machinery for agriculture. Ion Cozma interpreted this proposal as an attempt to trick the
Romanian delegation to accept a partial specialisation in the field of chemical products
and machinery for agriculture with the hidden aim of creating a precedent and of
consecrating a new CMEA rule, which he called the principle of specialisation.
Gheorghiu-Dej too believed that specialisation in the agricultural field was raised in Sofia
with the aim of creating an instrument to control the industrial production of Romania.
According to the Romanian leaders views, once the agricultural specialisation was
accepted, Romanias industry was to produce [only] what the agriculture asked from it.
That meant that the agricultural specialisation project was in fact a diversionist tactic used
by the Soviet Union and its CMEA supporters to block Romanias industrialisation and to
force its agricultural specialisation. But, the Romanian leader argued further, such an

141

The minutes of the 17 February 1960 meeting of the Bucharest members of the CC of the RWP, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Office, File 11/1960, 1-5; Notes from 4 and 25 March 1960; Report, 23 March 1960; Circular
Letter to regions, 26 March 1960, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 18/1960, Vol. I, 72-125.
142
The minutes of the 26 April 1960 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 24/1960, 5-9; 35-45.

42

economic organisation of the bloc was against Romanias general interests and, thus, it
had to be blocked.
The draft that Primov advanced in Sofia was accepted by the Albanian, Hungarian,
East German and Soviet representatives who generally reiterated the positions that their
respective countries had advanced in February 1960 in Moscow. They even argued that
the AC had already made decisions regarding specialisation. 143 But, the Romanian
delegates rejected the proposal. In secret talks, they subsumed such manoeuvres under a
category of perceived bloc (and especially Soviet) fait accompli tactics. According to the
Romanian leaders perceptions, the other bloc members were attempting to present
specialisation as an accomplished fact, as a done deal, which could therefore only be
accepted by Romania. In response to such proposals, Ion Cozma declared in Sofia in May
1960 that neither the CMEA nor the Agricultural Conference had reached any decision
regarding specialisation.
Cozma resisted the others proposals by resorting to several postponing arguments. He
contended that the discussion on specialisation was untimely because the CMEA had not
yet elaborated studies on the necessity of specialisation (as previously agreed) and because
the subject was not on the meetings agenda. Thus, if in early 1960 during domestic closed
party meetings the Romanians argued that Romania had to oppose specialisation because
it threatened Romanias interests, in the CMEA framework they preferred to argue against
the opportunity of addressing the subject at that moment and not against specialisation
itself. Apart from their postponing arguments, the Romanian delegates in Sofia also
employed tactics of appealing to authority which had also been explored to some extent
by the Romanian delegates during the Agricultural Conference.
Thus, implying that the party was the ultimate decisional authority within a socialist
state, Marin Stancu (Romania) argued in Sofia that Romania could comply only with the
decisions made by the RWP, which did not foster specialisation, but a balanced
development of the agricultural and industrial sectors. Marcu reasoned further that the
parties within the CMEA states had already approved the 1960-1965 production plans, that
the specialisation proposals contravened the stipulations of those plans, and that, in such
circumstances, the CMEA should postpone the international specialisation plan at least
until 1965. Vladimir Matskevich, the head of the Soviet delegation, in a hot dispute with
the Romanian delegates, maintained in return that specialisation should have been
accepted and applied as proposed for the period between 1960 and 1965, and if we do not
specialise [until 1965], then we will discuss, we will study and we will reach the
conclusion that specialisation is not possible.
Despite the Romanians opposition, the first draft of the Protocol of the Sofia session
addressed the problem of specialisation. Informed about the course of the talks, the
Romanian leadership sent additional directives to Sofia, asking its delegates to obtain a
written document encompassing Romanias opposition. After long and contradictory talks,
the Bulgarian, Albanian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Polish and Soviet delegations in Sofia
accepted to take into consideration the Romanian point of view and to insert into the text
of the final Protocol Romanias so-called separate position [poziie diferit, in
143

The minutes of the 17-18 May 1960 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 28/1960, 6-8; Synthesis
regarding the points of view of the participants at the Session of the Permanent Commission on Agriculture,
Sofia; The minutes of the 16 May 1960 Politburo Meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 26/1960, 19-54.

43

Romanian]. In the end, the Protocol of the Sofia session included the two most different
positions advanced by the participants East Germanys position, proposing specialisation
for a long list of agricultural products (including olives, citruses, seeds, cereal, pulse or
sunflower) and Romanias stance, rejecting any kind of specialisation. Gheorghiu-Dej was
convinced that the Soviets had accommodated Romanias position in Sofia only because
they were interested to preserve the image of a united bloc and therefore aimed at avoiding
the emergence of a public bloc divergence with Romania. 144
If during the Agricultural Conference both the Soviets and the Romanians were very
attentive to avoid any open dispute, in Sofia the two delegations confronted each other
directly. There are several explanations for the fact that in February 1960 in Moscow the
Romanian representatives avoided to oppose the Soviets, while in Sofia they openly
countered them. Firstly, in Moscow the Soviets were less direct in supporting
specialisation and argued that the initiative had belonged to other delegations, but in Sofia
they openly prompted specialisation. Secondly, the Moscow meeting discussed general,
theoretical maters regarding specialisation, while the Sofia session aimed at concrete
measures regarding specialisation in specific economic fields. Thirdly, in Moscow
Romania was represented at a very high party and state level, while in Sofia it was
represented by technocrats and experts. For years to come, Romania was to use this tactic
of duplicity. In high level bloc gatherings, the Romanian leadership was to stress that
Romania and the USRR had common positions, views or interests, while in different
bilateral or multilateral experts meetings, Romanian lower-ranked representatives were to
oppose categorically the Soviets when Romanias interests were perceived as being in
danger. Nonetheless, the Sofia session too established a precedent, as its Protocol included
Romanias separate position a practice often employed by Romania in the CMEA
framework and beyond during the following years.
On 16-18 May 1960, the Central Committee and the Politburo of the RWP approved
the position of the Romanian delegation in Sofia and decided on Romanias future
responses to the next (expected) bloc attempts of specialisation. Addressing his fellow
party members, Gheorghiu-Dej pointed out, firstly, that specialisation was against
Romanias economic interests and therefore unacceptable. Secondly, he stressed that
although the Soviet Union was the main supporter of specialisation, Romania should not
antagonise Moscow through its opposition. On the contrary, Romania had to spare the
(perceived) Soviets susceptibility. Thirdly, he believed that the Soviet leaders feared a
public bloc divergence with Romania, reasoning further that due to this (perceived) Soviet
weakness Romanias opposition had considerable chances of success. And, finally, he
indicated the main tactic Romania was to use to resist specialisation namely altering the
others initial proposals. According to Gheorghiu-Dejs directives from May 1960, when
presented with specialisation proposals, the Romanian representatives were to agree with
the bloc specialisation of the interested states and not with bloc specialisation per se.
A first practical step in organising Romanias future opposition was according to
Gheorghiu-Dej to carefully instruct the Romanian representatives in the CMEA on how

144

The minutes of the 16 May 1960 Politburo Meeting; The Protocol of the May 1960 Sofia CMEA session,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 26/1960, 1-46.

44

to recognise and reject any specialisation attempts, without antagonising the Soviets.145
This directive was rapidly put into practice, and diplomats, economic negotiators,
representatives in different CMEA bodies were instructed accordingly. The May 1960
RWPs Plenum approved in unanimity the position of the Romanian delegations at the
Moscow Agricultural Conference and at the Sofia CMEA session. This approval aimed,
on the one hand, at blocking (expected) Soviet attempts to find (within the RWP) defectors
disposed to support Romanias specialisation and, on the other hand, to legitimise the
Romanian leaderships tactic of appealing to authority. This tactic entailed that the
Romanian leaders opposed specialisation on the grounds that it contravened the decisions
of the RWP, the ultimate decisional state authority. This argument from authority and the
argument of the interested states became the main tools the Romanian leaders used in the
second half of the year 1960 (and then many years afterwards) to block or postpone the
CMEA specialisation attempts.
For instance, in the session of the CMEA permanent working group called to study
the possibilities regarding the specialisation in agriculture, held in Moscow in September
1960, the Romanian representatives declared that Romania was not against specialisation,
but stressed that it was not interested in its own agricultural specialisation. Moreover, they
implied that, addressing the future development of the agriculture of the CMEA states, the
working group was on the verge of interfering in the domestic affairs of those states. The
other participants proposed all the CMEA states to present the working group with
documents addressing the situation of their agriculture and with proposals regarding their
future domestic agricultural specialisation. Using the precedent established in Sofia, the
Romanian delegation advanced a separate position which was included in the Protocol
of the session. The separate position specified that only the interested states were to
elaborate such documents. Furthermore, in October, the Romanian government decided to
send to the working group in Moscow no proposals regarding the states agricultural
specialisation, motivating that Romania was not interested to specialise.146
The argument from authority was also developed and perfected. During the Sofia
session, the Romanian delegates had argued that specialisation had to be postponed
because it contravened the objectives established by the RWPs 1960-1965 Five Year
Plan, but at that time the Plan was just a project yet to be approved in the June 1960
Congress of the Party. On 20 June 1960, during the Congress, in the presence of delegates
from 46 states, including Khrushchev, Gheorghiu-Dej announced that the main objective
of Romanias 1960-1965 and 1965-1980 development plans was to secure the
continuation of the industrialisation of the country at a sustained pace, giving priority to
the heavy industry with its main pivot, the machine-building industry and to the wide
increase of the agricultural vegetable and animal production. Although no direct reference
to specialisation or to Romanias opposition to specialisation was made, the Romanian
leaders speech was an implicit opposition to bloc specialisation.
In his 21 June speech delivered at the RWPs Congress, Khrushchev complimented the
Romanian leadership for its previous economic successes, but observing that only one
145

The minutes of the 16 May 1960 Meeting; The minutes of the 17-18 May 1960 Plenum; the Plenums
Communiqu, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 26/1960, 19-46; File 28/1960, 5-18, 60
146
Note and Report regarding Romanias participation in the meeting of the working group, September
1960, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 4/1960, 3-10.

45

and a half decade ago Romania was one of the most backward agrarian states in Europe
which imported about 95% of its industrial machinery the Soviet leader added that the
marvellous decision of the RWPs Congress to increase in five years Romanias
industrial production by 2.1 times and the agricultural production with 70-80% was part of
such a colossal plan. Khrushchev further noted that there were already industrialised
countries within the bloc, and reminded that the leaders of the bloc communist parties had
already met several times to discuss about the problems of the economic development and
collaboration of the socialist countries. He further reasoned that in the future, in each
country must develop those sectors of production that ensures good results, using the
support of the other socialist countries to obtain resources that are insufficient in their
own countries.147 Thus, on the one hand, Khrushchevs speech encompassed a certain
degree of irony towards Romanias economic plans, implying with words such as
dreamlike, marvellous or colossal that its tasks were too optimistic or even
unrealistic, while, on the other hand, it reiterated albeit allusively the Soviet views
regarding the future economic bloc development through specialisation. Publicly,
however, no open disagreement developed at that time.
The Congress approved Romanias Five Year Plan, which fostered industrialisation
and a multilateral development of agriculture. Afterwards, the Romanian leaders often
argued in multilateral or bilateral talks that Romania could not accept the specialisation
proposals because they contravened the decisions of the RWPs Congress. To legitimise
their anti-specialisation position further, the Romanian leaders often emphasised that the
1960-1965 Five Year Plan had been realised with the participation of all the party
members, of thousands of Romanian specialists, during many years of hard work. 148
While the Romanians continued in 1960-1963 to make major investments in
industry149, the Soviets, East Germans or Czechoslovaks continued within the CMEA
and within the bilateral relations frameworks to try to persuade Romania to accept
agricultural specialisation and to abandon her program of industrialisation. 150 The
Romanian leaders were convinced that the Soviet leadership wanted to block its
industrialisation in order to transform Romania into a supplier of agricultural products,
into a market for the industries of other bloc states and avoid Romanias competition in the
industrial field.
The Romanian-Soviet talks held in Moscow between 25 May and 6 June 1961, at the
level of economic experts and lower-ranked state representatives, provide one example
regarding the bilateral controversy about Romanias industrialisation. Tackling the
development of the national economy of Romania and the Romanian-Soviet economic
collaboration until 1980, these talks focused on seven different economic sectors and
were organised in eight different working groups: energy and fuel; steel industry;
147

Gheorghiu-Dejs Report at the 3rd Congress of the RWP, 20 June 1960; Khrushchevs Speech at the same
Congress, 21 June 1960, in Congresul al III-lea al Partidului Muncitorec Romn, 20-25 Iunie 1960,
Bucureti, Politic, 1960,14-94, 193-228.
148
Much of this subchapter (3.1) was previously published in Elena Dragomir, Romanias participation at
the Agricultural Conference in Moscow, 2-3 February 1960, Cold War History, Vol. 13, No 13, August
2013, 331-351.
149
The economic development plans of Romania for the years 1961, 1962 and 1963, ANIC, CC of the RCP,
Office, Files 43/1961, 1-209; 32/1961, 200-251; 29/1962, 14-54.
150
Stanciu, 2009, 240-243.

46

agriculture; foreign trade; machine-building industry; building materials industry;

provision industry; and a synthesis group.
The Romanian delegation was headed by Alexandru Brldeanu and Gheorghe Gaston
Marin, and was especially interested in obtaining Soviet technical support to develop
Romanias industry, in general, and to build an Integrated Steel Plant in Galai, in
particular151, a plant imagined as the centre of the development of our country, as
Gheorghiu-Dej put it.152 The Soviets argued instead that Romania should produce more
fruits, vegetable, corn, oil and gas to be exported to other CMEA states and to import
steel and machinery. Brldeanu rejected these proposals on the grounds that Romania was
not as rich in oil and gas as the Soviets assumed, and stressed that, if Romania accepted to
exploit oil and gas in the annual amounts suggested by the Soviets, Romanias reserves
would be very rapidly exhausted. In response, A. Zasiadko, the head of the Soviet
delegation, accused Romania of concealing its real energetic resources, of building an
autarchic economy and of sitting on her natural resources as a hen on its eggs.
For years to come, the Soviets would counteract Romanias opposition to the proposed
internationalist division of labour within the bloc through direct or inferred accusations of
Romania having an autarchic economy which further implied that the Romanian leaders
were Stalinist and anti-internationalist. Despite these Soviet indirect accusations in MayJune 1961, the Romanian delegation in Moscow did not give in. It explained Romanias
position and then it simply refused to negotiate or compromise. After long and tense talks,
the two delegations agreed to postpone the tackling of the divergent bilateral problems.
The Soviet 1961 totally unacceptable conceptions as Brldeanu phrased it
confirmed once more the Romanian leaders' perceptions of a threat. According to their
views, the USSR wanted to transform Romania into a producer of raw materials and
agricultural products, to avoid Romanias industrial competition and to transform Romania
into a market for the Soviet or Czechoslovak industries.153 However, while in closed
Politburo meetings the USSRs policies were criticised for contravening Romanias
economic interests, publicly the Romanian leaders continued to praise the friendship with
the USSR. On the other hand, the Romanian central and local press published almost daily
articles about Romanias industrialisation. These articles eluded completely the
specialisation theme and the debates on the CMEA reforms, and stressed the industrial
successes of Romania.154 According to Gheorghiu-Dej, this tactic of completely ignoring
the others favourite project in the Romanian media was imagined to help the others
deduce Romanias position on specialisation.155
Between 31 July and 2 August 1961, a Romanian high level party and state delegation
visited the USSR. With that occasion Khrushchev criticised the Romanian leaders for
not using methods that had showed [better] results in the agricultural sector and reasoned
151

Dan Ctnu, Divergenele romno-sovietice din CAER i consecinele lor asupra politicii externe a
Romniei, 1962-1963, I in Arhivele totalitarismului, No 1-2/2005, 79-80.
152
The minutes of the 26 April 1960 RWP Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 24/1960, 5-9, 35-45.
153
The minutes of the 7 June 1961 meeting; Note regarding the results of the Romanian-Soviet preliminary
talks, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 25/1961, 2-19.
154
For instance, Scnteia, January-June 1961.
155
The minutes of the 3 April 1963 Politburo meeting, in Retegan, 2002, 223; Gheorghiu-Dejs annotation on
the Notes of the Romanian Embassy in Moscow, 6 June 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
1/1963, 60-62.

47

that the unjust positions of the Romanian leaders determined the low productions of corn
in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej response was moderate, the Romanian leader noting that we
experimented and [our] calculations showed that the square-cluster method does not
determine a higher production. However, the official Communiqu of the August 1961
talks mentioned no disagreements and noted instead the bilateral total unity of views in
all the discussed problems related to both foreign and domestic matters.156
Despite Romanias inferred opposition, the Soviet leadership continued to foster its
reform plan. During the 22nd Congress of the CPSU (17-31 October 1961) Khrushchev
reasoned that the victory of socialism could be achieved through the socialist states
division of labour and that every country had to specialise in a production field that best
fitted its economic profile and capabilities.157 Few months later, in December 1961, the
CMEA meeting in Warsaw finally approved the Basic Principles of the International
Socialist Division of Labour a project under discussion since 1958. Although its initial
aim had been to find ways to improve bloc specialisation, the final text was as Edward
A. Hewett put it confusing and completely useless as a guide to solving practical
problems concerning specialisation.158 This confusing form, however, pleased the
Romanian leaders very much and was to a great extent the result of the Romanian altering
tactics.
According to the Romanian leaders perceptions, the Basic Principles had been
initiated by the other CMEA members as a means to embed the common right of all
countries to use the natural resources, the raw materials and the energy resources existing
in other countries, that were instead supposed to drop their industrialisation programmes
and to become preponderantly agricultural producers. Considering Romania the main
target of such (perceived) threats, in 1958-1961, during the drafting of the Basic
Principles, the Romanian delegates worked hard as Brldeanu put it to block these
threats. Without saying no, they reasoned that specialisation referred to those production
fields that best fitted the economic profile and capabilities of an interested country and that
coordination of national economic plans was at the basis of the CMEA collaboration
ideas encompassed also in the 1959 CMEA Statute.159
The Basic Principles noted that the international socialist division of labour is being
implemented, consciously and according to plan, in agreement with the vital interests and
tasks relating to the harmonious and comprehensive development of all socialist countries
and that the coordination of national economic plans represented the main means for the
successful development and intensification of the international socialist division of
labour.160 The document was finally adopted during the 6-7 June 1962 Moscow meeting
156

Note from the talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations; The Communiqu, 11 August
1961, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 32/1961, volume III, 239-243, 250-264.
157
Katalin Miklssy, Khrushchevism after Khrushchev. The rise of national interest in the Eastern bloc in
Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (eds.), Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Policy and Government in the Soviet
Union, 1953-1964, Routledge, 2009, 153.
158
Edward A. Hewett, Foreign Trade Prices in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Cambridge
University Press, 1974, 3.
159
The minutes of the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meeting; The minutes of the 21-23 November 1962 Plenum
of the CC of the RWP; Brldeanus Report in this plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 14/1962, 40;
file no 29/1962, 151-197; file no 30/1962, 349-354, 365-368.
160
The Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour, 7 June 1962, in Scnteia, 17 June
1962.

48

of the representatives of the party first secretaries and heads of governments of the CMEA
states and it provided the Romanian leaders with one of the main reasoning arguments
they used to oppose specialisation in the years to come. Once the document was adopted,
the Romanians argumentation often followed the structure: The Basic Principles said X
about bloc specialisation; therefore X is the only manner in which bloc specialisation
could take, where X usually referred to the wording that the coordination of national
economic plans was the main means to be used to achieve the international socialist
division of labour.

3.2 Attempts at CMEA integration

On 10 April 1962, the Romanian leaders received a Polish project (dated March 1962)
proposing integration as a solution to the CMEA economic collaboration problems. On 29
April, Khrushchev issued a circular letter in which he argued that the Polish draft could
serve as a serious basis for an exchange of opinions that was to take place on the occasion
of the June 1962 CMEA Conference in Moscow.161 This new Soviet-Polish bloc move
raised the Romanian leaders perceptions of threats to an unprecedented level.
The Poles proposed a closer integration of the economies of the fraternal countries,
the coordination of the investment plans, the creation of supranational bodies and of an
Economic and Political Council of the CMEA, as well as a revision of the CMEAs
Statute. They also advocated the majority rule and mandatory decisions principle as
replacements for the unanimity rule and for the principle of recommendations. Who did
not comply with the mandatory decisions was to suffer sanctions, according to the Polish
project.162
Gheorghiu-Dej believed that such CMEA integration, if accepted as proposed, negated
Romania's sovereignty and independence. The project was seen as a subterfuge used by
the other CMEA leaders to control and exploit Romanias natural resources and to
transform her into an agricultural producer and into a market for the others industries. If
the Polish project was accepted, the Romania leaders reasoned, the CMEA could impose
upon Romania through mandatory decisions adopted by majority vote any policies,
including those contravening Romanias interests.
According to the Romanian leadership, the CMEA integration (had it been accepted)
was to make Romania even more economically dependent on trade with the CMEA and
with the USSR and, consequently, more vulnerable not only economically but also
politically. The members of the Romanian Politburo even believed that the CMEA
integration project was an economic subterfuge used by the USSR and its supporters to
deepen Romanias political dependency and subordination to the USSR. Thus, their
conclusion was that integration was unacceptable. As Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it,

161

The exchanges of letters between the Romanian, Polish and Soviet leaderships, April-May 1962, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 53/1962-1963, 146; Foreign Relations, Alphabetical, File 14U/1962, 1419.
162
The current problems of the development of the collaboration among the CMEA states, Warsaw, 5 March
1962, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 53/1962-1963, 147-206.

49

I thought about it, I contemplated it and I reached the conclusion that, after all, the CMEA
cannot command in this country [Romania]; here our leadership gives orders. Regardless
of the future [CMEA collaboration] framework, they will not be able to establish the future
principles of [Romanias] development. () The CMEA cannot decide what is to be done
in Romania!163

On 15 May 1962, the Romanians received another document from Warsaw a Project of
Resolution, which no longer made reference to the initial integration proposals. 164 The
Romanian leaders believed that the two Polish projects had been in fact initiated by the
Soviet comrades and probably by comrade Khrushchev himself as Brldeanu phrased
it.165 However, being unable to find an explanation on why the May Project of Resolution
did not repeat the April proposals of integration, the Romanian leaders did not rule out the
possibility of having to face concrete integration proposals at the CMEA 1962 conference.
Therefore, the Romanian delegates at that conference were mandated to use all necessary
means to express our point of view and to block integration if necessary. 166

3.2.1 Manoeuvring against integration

The following is a brief description of the tactics that the Romanian leaders intended to
use at the June 1962 Moscow CMEA conference in order to block integration. Explicitly
formulated during the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meeting, the spectrum of opposition
tactics included the argument from authority, the tactic of drawing analogies, the tactic of
rejecting accusations, the tactic of making accusations, but also the threats of playing the
China card and of making Romanias separate position public.
In late May 1962, the Romanian leaders were convinced that all the other CMEA
members had agreed prior to the opening of the conference on how to act together to
pressure Romania to accept integration. They expected the others accusations that
Romania was autarchic, nationalist, anti-internationalist, anti-Soviet, negligent towards the
interests of the bloc and of the camp. They also expected the others to use the argument
from authority along the following lines: 1) a Soviet or bloc authority said X about
integration, resulting that X was the only correct assertion; 2) Romania opposed
integration and contested X; 3) it resulted that Romania contested in fact the initial Soviet
or bloc authority, which amounted to being anti-Soviet, anti-Leninist, autarchic etc. To
prevent or counteract such (anticipated) accusations and tactics, the Romanian leaders
planned to oppose integration with a combination of tactics and arguments.
First, they intended to emphasise that Romania was not autarchic, anti-Leninist or
nationalist; on the contrary, Romania was committed to her internationalist duties, to the
relations with the socialist bloc, to the friendship with the USSR. They also planned to
point to the (alleged) similarities between the CMEA integration and the Common Market
integration. They intended to quote Khrushchev criticising the Common Market
163

The minutes of the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-64.
Gomukas Letter to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, 15 May 1962; The Polish
project of Resolution, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 130-200.
165
Synthesis regarding the Soviet visit in Romania in June 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
39/1962, volume II, 28.
166
The minutes of the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-64.
164

50

integration (as he often had done) and to infer that the Polish integration proposals were
actually against Khrushchevs anti-integration declarations. They also intended to quote
extensively from Soviet or bloc produced texts (including Khrushchevs declarations and
speeches and the 1960 Moscow Declaration), which advocated the principles of
sovereignty, equality in rights, independence, non-interference in domestic affairs.
Arguing then that the Polish proposed integration contravened these principles, the
Romanian delegates were to infer again that integration contravened in fact Khrushchevs
own views.
Furthermore, the Romanian leaders wanted to quote the Basic Principles which placed
the coordination of the national economic plans and the principle of the interested states at
the basis of the economic collaboration. Finally, they intended to appeal to the authority of
the RWPs forums and to argue that Romanias integration and specialisation contravened
the decisions made by the RWPs Congress and Plenums, which fostered not
specialisation but the states industrialisation. All these arguments converged at the central
level, according to which Romania allegedly agreed with and strongly supported the
international division of labour that as the Romanians were to argue was to secure the
industrial specialisation of all states in accordance with their interests and capabilities,
with the principles of mutual advantage and independence etc. All these anti-integration
arguments were integrated in the draft of the speech from Bucharest for Gheorghiu-Dej to
read at the Moscow June 1962 CMEA conference. 167
Although the Romanian leaders perceived the CMEA integration as a Soviet project,
the Romanian delegates in Moscow were instructed to criticise and oppose explicitly the
Poles and not the Soviets, so that the USSR would not be given the opportunity to wring
[s rstlmceasc, in Romanian] our [Romanias] orientation. However, if the other
bloc members were to insist on integration, then the Romanian delegates were mandated
to respond and to oppose integration openly, despite the risk of creating divergences as
Gheorghiu-Dej pointed out in the 30-31 May Politburo meeting. If the arguments included
in Gheorghiu-Dejs speech would fail to convince the others to drop their integration
proposals, then the Romanian delegation was mandated to begin employing (indirect)
threats against the (perceived) interests of the USSR.
By late May 1962, the Romanian leadership was convinced that the Soviet leaders
were especially interested to preserve the image of a united bloc and that, if Romania
threatened to make the integration disagreement public, Moscow would have most likely
abandoned its integration intentions. On the other hand, the Romanian leaders believed
that, given the Sino-Soviet public dispute, a Romanian threat of involving China in the
CMEA debates could have had the same result. However, Gheorghiu-Dej also considered
that these two tactics (of making Romanias different position public and of playing the
China card) involved some very delicate aspects of the bilateral relations. Therefore, the
Romanian delegates were instructed to employ these two tactics at the June 1962 CMEA
meeting only as a last resort; to use them only as a backup (de rezerv, in Romanian) and
as an emergency tactic to block integration.

167

The minutes of the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meting; The project of the discourse of the Romanian
delegation at the June 1962 CMEA meeting, underlined and annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-64; 112-128.

51

Thus, Gheorghiu-Dej's speech at the plenary session of the CMEA conference, in front
of all the other bloc leaders, which strongly opposed integration was seen by the
Romanian leaders as a significant step towards making the bloc divergences public, but
also as an indirect threat to the Soviet interests. Until then, the Romanian party and state
leaders participating in top-level bloc gatherings had refrained from taking an openly
different position from the rest of the bloc and especially from that of the USSR. For
instance, at the 1960 Agricultural Conference, Romanias strong opposition to
specialisation had been advanced by Brldeanu, Vrejb or Voicu low-ranked
representatives while Gheorghiu-Dej had emphasised the unity of interests and ideas.
The second threatening tactic that the Romanian delegation was mandated to use in
Moscow in June 1962 as a last resort was to involve China in the CMEA integration
debate. Brldeanu, Ceauescu or Gheorghiu-Dej considered that the question was not if
but rather when Romania had to play the China card in order to deter the Soviet
integration attempts. During the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meeting, Gheorghiu-Dej
presented in detail how this tactic had to be used.
Because the other CMEA members often argued that integration was to be beneficial
for the entire world socialist system, the Romanian delegates were instructed to agree
and then to ask the plenum of the CMEA conference if all the socialist states in the world
were to be involved in the integration process. If the CMEA integration was important for
the entire world socialist system, then the Romanians planned to ask why China, North
Korea or North Vietnam were not members of the Council and why they were not
involved in the CMEA reform debates. They intended to argue that China was a great
country with immense natural resources and with an immense market, that the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) was a huge force in the world socialist system, numbering
hundreds of millions of members, and that, therefore, Chinas participation as a full
member in the CMEA would improve the efficiency of the Council as a whole and by
extension of the world socialist system.
The Romanian leadership also contemplated a change in tactics to prolong and
complicate the talks, to move the focus of the CMEA debates from the topic of integration
itself to the topic of involving China in the CMEA integration debate. Taking note of the
emerging Sino-Soviet dispute, the Romanian leaders believed that the Soviet leadership
would renounce the integration project when presented with the prospect of Chinas
involvement in the CMEA reform debates. The Romanian leaders had tested the China
tactic for the first time in April 1962 when Janusz Zambrowicz, the Polish ambassador in
Romania, was insistently asking for Romanias considerations concerning the Polish
integration project. Initially, the Romanian leadership tried to postpone its answer as much
as possible, but Zambrowicz insisted. Gheorghiu-Dej finally agreed to meet him, but
instead of providing a straight answer, he presented the Polish diplomat with a series of
questions. Given that the Polish project argued that the CMEA integration was necessary
to increase the economic efficiency of the entire world communist system, were all the
socialist countries in the world to be involved in the CMEA integration talks? Had the
CMEA observers and Albania also been sent the Polish document? Had Albania been
invited to participate in the June 1962 meeting?

52

Gheorghiu-Dej knew that Albania had not been invited and that China, although
invited, had not been sent the Polish project168, but he played this game as a pretext to
imply that according to Romanias views Albania, China, North Vietnam and North Korea
should be involved in the CMEA reform talks. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, this way of
putting the problem shocked and even scared the Polish ambassador who, instead of
giving a straight answer, immediately changed the subject, apparently no longer interested
in Romanias considerations concerning the Polish April 1962 integration proposals.
Soon afterwards, the Poles withdrew their radical integration proposals and advanced
instead the May 1962 moderate Project of Resolution.
Gheorghiu-Dej concluded that most likely his discussion with the Polish ambassador
had reached Moscow and that the Soviet leaders had reviewed their position towards
integration in order to prevent Romania to attempt to involve China in the CMEA reform
talks.169 It is beyond the focus of this study to establish whether the Romanian leaders
perceptions were accurate or not. What is relevant is that the Romanian leaders chose their
opposition tactics based on their perceptions and interpretations of the external conditions
and of the others intensions or vulnerabilities. They believed that the Soviet leadership
did not want Chinas involvement in the CMEA talks, nor did they want Romania taking
the side of Beijing in its dispute with Moscow, and this is why the Romanians decided to
use the China card as leverage against the (perceived) Soviet integration attempts.
The Romanian delegation at the June 1962 CMEA Conference included Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Brldeanu, Gheorghe Gaston Marin,
and a group of experts.170 It left for Moscow with a speech openly opposing integration (to
be read by Gheorghiu-Dej at the plenary session of the conference); with the mandate to
play (if absolutely necessary) the China card; with its own project for a resolution of the
conference171; with the goal of blocking the others expected attempts to create
supranational bodies or to change the rules by which the CMEA functioned.172 However,
delivering his speech at the CMEA conference, Gomuka explicitly withdrew the April
integration proposals, including the one regarding the creation of a Political Council of
the CMEA. The Polish leader supported instead the creation of a body to assure the
fulfilment of the CMEA's commonly agreed decisions and to impose sanctions against
those who did not comply with those decisions, and argued that the international division
of labour had to be based on the coordination of the national economic plans and on the
states interests which was also Romanias official position.
Representing Bulgaria, T. Zhivkov criticised those national points of view that had
(allegedly) impeded the improvement of the CMEAs activity and, supporting the Polish
April integration proposals, asked for the revision of the CMEAs Statute. Criticising the
168

In May 1962 the Romanian leaders were aware that China had repeatedly declared its lack of interest in
becoming a full member of the CMEA. Note from 23 May 1962 and Report of the Romanian Embassy in
Beijing from 30 May 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 14/1962, 81, File 59/1962, 1-6.
169
The minutes of the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meeting; The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963
Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 14/1962, 16-64; File 4/1963, 94.
170
Protocol no 8 of the 30-31 May 1962 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 1-2.
171
Resolution of the June 1962 CMEA conference (The Romanian project), ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
14/1962, 82-97.
172
The minutes of the 11 June 1962 meeting of the RWP leadership, ANIC, CC al RCP, Office, File 27/1963,
1-3.

53

harmful consequences of autarchy and the futile parallelism, Kdr (Hungary) supported
both the April and May Polish texts, and argued that it was time for the CMEA to take
decisive measures to deepen economic collaboration and to create some forms of
unification in some industrial sectors. Kdr agreed with the strengthening of the role of
the CMEAs Secretariat and with the creation of an Executive Council, but opposed the
creation of a Political Council of the CMEA.
Khrushchev supported all the initial Polish proposals, and advocated the creation of an
integral world socialist system, of a unique economy regulated by a general plan, of an
international, united, harmonious economic complex and of common enterprises. He
criticised some countries for having (allegedly) developed tendencies of autarchy
(allusions targeting, according to the Romanian leaders, Romania), and maintained that the
socialist states must not hesitate in some cases to sacrifice the individual interests to the
general interest and to guide their economic policy starting from the common interests of
our great cause. According to the Romanian leaders, Khrushchevs speech proved that the
CMEA reforms were designed to maximise the economic benefits of the industrialised
CMEA states to the detriment of Romania whose independence, sovereignty and
economic interests were to be infringed on in the process.173
Observing, on the one hand, that the integration proposals had been officially initiated
by Poland and, on the other hand, that Gomuka had explicitly withdrawn them in Moscow
in June 1962, Gheorghiu-Dej decided to consider that the proposals had been withdrawn
de jure and to no longer openly criticise the April Polish initiative in his speech. Hence,
the Romanian leader delivered in Moscow a milder version of the speech that had been
prepared from Bucharest. Praising as legitimate the Polish decision to withdraw the
initial integration proposals, Gheorghiu-Dej opted for a more indirect opposition to
specialisation. He agreed that specialisation was necessary, but what the others called
economic collaboration in his speech became the absolutely necessary bilateral and
multilateral economic collaboration based on the coordination of the national economic
plans as provided by the Basic Principles. If the others supported international
specialisation, the Romanian leader agreeing with them supported the specialisation
of all countries and in particular specialisation in the fields of machine-building and
chemical industry in accordance with the interests of those states.
In his address, Gheorghiu-Dej stressed Romanias commitment to respecting its
internationalist duties, the stipulations in the 1960 Moscow Declaration, the principles of
mutual advantage, equality in rights, sovereignty, non-interference, independence. He also
emphasised that the Romanian leadership was determined to follow the decisions of the
RWPs 1960 Congress with regard to the states industrialisation. Moreover, GheorghiuDej inferred that the proposed CMEA integration resembled too much the Common
Market integration, which he openly criticised.
In response to the pro-integration speech that Khrushchev had just delivered,
Gheorghiu-Dej declared that the Romanian delegation in Moscow could not reply
immediately to the Soviet leaders concrete proposals for several reasons. He reasoned
that, firstly, Khrushchev's important proposals entailed all the countries of the socialist
camp and the CMEA members in particular and that such proposals could not be
173

The speeches of Gomuka, Zhivkov, Kdr and Khrushchev at the June 1962 CMEA meeting, annotated
by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 33/1962, vol. I., 4-148 ; vol. II, 1-142.

54

answered on site, but had to be carefully considered. Secondly, he stressed that the
Romanian delegation had not been mandated to take a position in that respect. But,
Gheorghiu-Dej added, the Romanian government and the Central Committee of the RWP
would analyse Khrushchevs June 1962 proposals and then later formulate an answer. 174
According to Brldeanu, Gheorghiu-Dejs response had been intended as an indirect
objection to Khrushchevs proposals, but also as an indirect threat, implying that if the
integration project continued Romania would formulate and announce her opposition
publicly.175 Although Emil Bodnra later argued that Gheorghiu-Dejs June 1962 allusive
dissent represented Romanias first mutiny against the integration front176, it is worth
noting that, during the plenum of the conference Gheorghiu-Dej preferred to just voice
Romanias opposition, though without openly antagonising the Soviet leaders.
However, during various informal talks with Khrushchev in Moscow in June 1962, the
Romanian leader openly opposed integration177 using the tactics of drawing analogies or
formulating accusations. For instance, Gheorghiu-Dej conveyed to Khrushchev that
Romania opposed the CMEA integration because the proposed common enterprises
resembled too much the SovRoms international enterprises that had hindered
Romanias economic development and interests, he argued. Khrushchev agreed that the
SovRoms had been a very big mistake that had affected Romanian-Soviet relations, but
emphasised that the mistake had been made by Stalin and that the CMEA common
enterprises were something different.178 According to Romanian archival sources, during
several informal talks, all the other delegations at the conference were presented with
Romanias strong position against integration, but officially, during the plenum of the
conference, the Romanian delegates chose to only imply opposition. However, as
Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauescu often argued, only because the integration proposals
(perceived as) detrimental to Romanias interests had been withdrawn did the Romanian
delegates decide to no longer oppose integration openly at the plenum of the
conference. 179
However, during the meeting of the Secretariat of the conference, the Romanian
delegates did openly oppose the proposals regarding the charging of the Executive
Committee of the CMEA with the task of coordinating all the investment plans. The
Romanians successfully advanced instead a proposal according to which the Executive
Committee was to coordinate the main investments and especially those investments that
concerned two or more countries which meant in practice not all countries and not all
investment plans. The Romanian delegates also successfully opposed the proposal

174

Gheorghiu-Dejs speech at the June 1962 CMEA conference, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 29/1962,
254-272.
175
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 26.
176
The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo Meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 250.
177
Randall W. Stone argues that Khrushchevs 1962 CMEA integration plan was never a serious proposal.
Stones main argument is that integration was not on the agenda of the June 1962 CMEA meeting! Randal
W. Stone, Satellites and commissars. Strategies and conflict in the politics of the Soviet bloc trade, Princeton
University Press, 1996, 34.
178
The minutes of the 21-23 November 1962 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, CC of RCP, Office, File
30/1962, 353-355.
179
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 4, 22-23, 25,
28.

55

regarding the establishment of a mechanism designed to sanction the states that would not
comply with the CMEAs recommendations.180
In the end, the Resolution of the June 1962 CMEA Conference and the Basic
Principles consecrated the principle of the interested states and stipulated that the
coordination of the economic national plans would be the main instrument in realising the
international division of labour. Moreover, the Resolution argued that the creation of
common international enterprises was timely for some economic fields (which implied
not for all economic fields), and maintained that such enterprises would be built, organised
and run by two or more interested states (that is not by all the CMEA states).181
The Romanian leaders believed that the Soviets accommodated Romanias view
because they feared that otherwise Romania might make its opposition public. They were
rather pleased with the results of the conference, as none of the initially proposed
integration measures were adopted. Still, they often argued that the 1962 CMEA
Resolution was even so too large a concession. They also believed that the integration
project had not been dropped all together but just once more postponed. Upon return
from Moscow and expecting further attempts towards reform, Gheorghiu-Dej decided that
Romania must make no sacrifice182 and must continue to oppose integration. But, in
doing so, it had to avoid creating divergences with the rest of the bloc and especially with
the Soviets, the Romanian leader pointed out.183

3.2.2. An early compromise

Between 18 and 25 June 1962, Khrushchev visited Romania, occasioning according to
many scholars the first Romanian-Soviet tensions.184 However, as this study has
already revealed, the Romanian-Soviet disagreements had appeared at least several years
earlier, but they had been carefully concealed from public knowledge.
Expecting strong Soviet pressures towards Romanias integration, prior and during
Khrushchevs visit, the Romanian leaders orchestrated an impressive public pro-Soviet
campaign press articles, manifestations, political declarations, TV programs, slogans,
songs emphasising the (allegedly) long-lasting Romanian-Soviet friendship. The
Romanian media was simultaneously stressing the (allegedly) spectacular results that
Romania had obtained in the fields of heavy and chemical industry, and of corn and pork
meat production.185 The Romanians had imagined this dual media campaign tailored for
180

The minutes of the meeting [of the RWP leadership], 11 June 1962, ANIC, CC RCP, Office, File 27/1963,
1-15.
181
The Resolution of the June 1962 CMEA conference, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 33/1962,
vol. II, 164-199.
182
This was an allusion to Khrushchevs June 1962 Moscow speech.
183
The minutes of the meeting [of the RWP leadership] form 11 June 1962; The minutes of the 21 June 1963
Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC RCP , Office, File 33/1963, 34-52; File 27/1963, 1-15.
184
Mihai Croitor, Gheorghiu-Dej i Declaraia de independen din 1964. PMR ntre Moscova i Beijijg,
in tefan Bosomitu, Mihai Burcea (coordinators), Spectrele lui Dej. Incursiuni n biografia i regimul unui
dictator, Polirom, Iai, 2012, 308.
185
Scnteia, 31 May-28 June 1962; Plan of measure regarding Khrushchevs June 1962 visit in Romania;
List of slogans for manifestations, 9 June 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 39/1962, Vol. I,
16-47; Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 166-176; Niculescu-Mizil, 2003, 37-40, 56.

56

the Soviets as an allusion that Romania would not accept her specialisation and integration
and as an indication that Romanias opposition posed no threat to the bilateral friendship.
The Soviet delegation to Romania included N.S. Khrushchev, V.V. Grishin alternate
member of the CC of the CPSU, Y. V. Andropov member of the CC of the CPSU, I.K.
Zhegalin the Soviet ambassador in Romania. The official bilateral talks began with
Gheorghiu-Dejs report on the economic progress that Romania had made after the war, in
particular in the industrial and agricultural fields, and with an invitation for the Soviet
delegates to visit the countrys top heavy industry and chemical factories (Grivia Roie,
Electroputere Craiova, Borzeti Chemical Plant), and her top Agricultural Research
Institute (in Fundulea).
In response, Khrushchev accused the Romanian leadership of reporting false economic
success, and repeatedly criticised Romanias industrial and agricultural policies. He
argued that, in corn production, Romania should adopt the Soviet square-cluster method,
and that it should accept concrete measures of agricultural specialisation. Khrushchev
insisted that it would be more profitable for Romania to produce and deliver corn to the
East German stock-raising sector, than to produce meat and industrial machinery. Arguing
further that specialisation was to the advantage of the small and less industrially
developed countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania, the Soviet leader also
implied that Romania developed tendencies of autarchic economy and that the Romanian
leaders were not true communists.186 According to the Romanians perceptions, during
the entire visit, the Soviet leader showed discontent, anger and discourtesy towards his
hosts. Gheorghiu-Dej believed that this hostile attitude of Khrushchev had been triggered
by the position of the Romanian delegation at the 6-7 June 1962 CMEA meeting and by
Romanias determination to pursue state industrialisation and to reject bloc integration.187
In response to Khrushchevs harsh and open criticism, Gheorghiu-Dej argued that the
Soviet leadership had the wrong statistics and numbers on Romanias economic
development, that the Romanian meat and corn production sectors were profitable, that
using a traditional cultivation method Romania had a bigger corn-cropping power than the
USSR with its square-cluster method.188 While Khrushchev resorted to a large tactical
spectrum stretching from threats to promises, Gheorghiu-Dej generally refused to discuss
the Soviet considerations. He did not openly say no to Khrushchev, but did not accept
his ideas and proposals either, stating instead that the Romanian leadership was to
examine all the problems thoroughly and to formulate at some point in the future
Romanias official position on the matter. Without dropping the integration proposals,
Khrushchev admitted that the decision belonged after all to the Romanian leaders, and
stressed that the supranational CMEA planning body was a long-term project not to be
implemented in practice very soon.
The Soviet leader motivated this conciliatory final position by stating that he did not
want to quarrel [nu vreau s ne certm, in Romanian] and to create divergences with
186

Speeches, minutes, notes of conversations between the two delegations, 18-24 June 1962, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 39/1962, Vol. II, 2-121.
187
Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 173-174; Brucan, 92; The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum of the CC of the
RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 10/1963, 49.
188
In the 1950s, Romania had experimented with the square-cluster method in the field of corn cultivation,
but given the unsatisfactory results rapidly abandoned the experiment. Ctnu, 2011, 283.

57

Romania.189 Nothing from these tensions reached the public sphere though, and both sides
stressed publicly that the Soviet visit to Romania represented a new manifestation of the
long-lasting friendship, of the brotherly collaboration and of the adamantine alliance
between the Romanian and the Soviet peoples.190
Resisting the CMEA specialisation and integration between 1960 and 1962, the
Romanian leaders laid the basis for a pattern of opposition to the USSR that they would
employ for years to come. This pattern included several main elements: opposition was a
response to an imminent perceived threat; its goal was to postpone/eliminate that specific
perceived threat; opposition to a specific perceived threat was built in stages, from indirect
resistance to public and official contestation and counteractions; acting to block a
perceived specific Soviet threat, the Romanian leaders were especially concerned to not
antagonise the USSR; making officially public the Romanian-Soviet disagreements and
using China-related arguments were last resort tactics the Romanian leaders intended to
use to eliminate a perceived Soviet threat the higher the perceived threat, the more likely
for them to use these two tactics; when the perceived imminent specific threat was
postponed or eliminated, the Romanian leaders lessened the oppositions intensity, moving
from strong, public and official to secret, implied contestation.

189

Speeches, minutes, notes of conversations between the Romanian and the Soviet representatives, 18-24
June 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, file no 39/1962, Vol. II, 2-139.
190
Scnteia, 19, 21, 23, 25 June 1962; Gheorghiu-Dejs speech at the Grivia Factories, 19 June 1962,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File no 39/1962, Vol. I, 205-226.

58

4 Coping with the perceived integration threat

Focusing on the period between 1960 and 1962, the previous chapter argued that the
Romanian leaders perceived the CMEA reform process as a direct threat to Romanias
economic and political interests, and that these threat perceptions triggered a gradual
change in Romanias relations with the USSR. Continuing to investigate the emergence of
Romanias opposition to the USSR in the context of the CMEA reforms, this chapter
covers the timeframe from June 1962 to July 1963 which covers the months between two
Romanian-Soviet compromises on bloc integration.

4.1 Re-launching integration

The Romanian leaders had hoped that the integration compromise reached in June 1962,
multilaterally, at the CMEA conference, and bilaterally, during Khrushchevs visit to
Romania, was to postpone the addressing of the matter for some time, but this expectation
rapidly proved to be too optimistic. During his vacation in Crimea in August 1962,
Gheorghiu-Dej was once more prompted by Khrushchev to accept bloc integration and
was informed that the Soviet leadership intended sometime in the future to raise the
problem of the unique planning body again. 191 A month later, in September 1962, the
international magazine Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS) published Khrushchevs
article entitled Present problems of the development of the world socialist system, which
proposed the creation of a unique planning body, and criticised the autarchic orientation
of our countries, though without openly naming those countries. 192
In early November 1962, the Soviet leadership seemed more determined than ever
before to reform the CMEA.193 It is important to know how and why the Soviet leadership
intended to reform the CMEA (and many studies have been produced in this respect194),
but this is beyond the scope of this study, which instead focuses on how the Romanian
leaders perceived the Soviet intensions and how they reacted to such perceptions.
On 13 November 1962, in response to Khrushchevs September article, the RWPs
Politburo decided to convene the Plenum of the CC of the RWP to inform its members
about the integration tendencies manifested within the bloc. The move was designed to
legitimise Romanias opposition to integration and to instruct the Romanian
representatives on how to recognise and oppose integration.195 Although the RWP Plenum
191

The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 29.
N.S. Hruciov, Probleme actuale ale dezvoltrii sistemului mondial socialist in Lupta de clas, Seria V,
Anul XLII, September 1962, 5-21.
193
Miller Center. Minutes 64c of 5 November 1962, regarding the Plan for the development of the national
economy of the USSR for 1963 and the budget for 1963, available at
http://web1.millercenter.org/kremlin/62_11_05.pdf, accessed on 1 October 2013.
194
For instance, Kansikas, 2012; Lee Kendal Metcalf, The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance: the
failure of reform, Boulder, 1997; Robert Bideleux, The Comecon Experiment, in Robert Bideleux and
Richard Taylor (Eds.), European Integration and Disintegration. East and West, Routledge, 1996, 174-204;
Richard B. Day, Cold War Capitalism: the view from Moscow, 1945-1975, M.E. Sharpe, 1995; Michael
Kaser, Comecon: Integration problems of the planned economies, Oxford University Press, 1967.
195
The minutes of the 13 November 1962 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 28/1962, 6-9.
192

59

was officially opened on 21 November, the participants were gathered in Bucharest on 19

November and given two days196 to carefully study the Plenums documents, which were
the March-April 1962 Polish project for integration; the speeches delivered in Moscow in
June 1962 by Gomuka, Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev, and the Resolution of the 1962
CMEA conference.197 Then, during the three days of the Plenum, the party leaders
explained and commented these texts.
Simultaneously, a Plenum of the CC of the CPSU was held (19-23 November 1962).
During this Plenum, Khrushchev contended in his (19 November) speech that the
representatives of the CMEA members should meet in the near future to decide on the
creation of a CMEA common planning body. The next day, Scnteia published excerpts
from Khrushchevs speech, including the part proposing the creation of the common
planning body.198 Some historians argue that the 21-23 November 1962 RWP Plenum was
convened in response to Khrushchevs 19 November 1962 declaration199, but recent
Romanian archival evidence reveals that on 19 November the participants of the RWPs
Plenum were already convening in Bucharest.
Criticising integration during their party Plenum, the Romanian leaders stressed how
the Czechoslovak, Polish or East German intensions to reform the CMEA threatened
Romanias interests, but they once more refrained from openly criticising the Soviet
leadership. Approving in unanimity the activity of the Romanian delegation at the June
1962 CMEA meeting, the Plenum decided that the integration problem had to be debated
with functionaries from the ministries, from other central state institutions, or from
regional party organisations.200 However, it was not about debating. The Romanian
diplomats and representatives had no say in Romanias response to integration. Instead,
they were informed about the others intentions which were considered detrimental to
Romanias interests, and were carefully instructed on how to oppose integration proposals.
While the Romanian representatives were instructed on how to oppose integration, the
other bloc members were saluting it. In December 1962, at the 12th Congress of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party, Novotny supported Khrushchevs proposal regarding the
creation of the CMEA common planning body. A month later, in an article published in
the PPS, Zhivkov contended that the creation of a common planning body was of
revolutionary importance and that the economic autarchy of some countries which
remained unnamed had become unacceptable. During the 6th Congress of the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany (15-21 January 1963), Walter Ulbricht maintained that
Khrushchevs proposal needed to be implemented as soon as possible, and on 10
February 1963 Antal Apr, member of the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers'
Party and vice president of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, in a speech delivered in

196

The minutes of the 21-23 November 1962 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, CC of RCP, Office, File
30/1962, 18-21.
197
List of the documents of the RWPs November 1962 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 29/1962, 1-2.
198
AMAE, Telegrame cifrate intrate, Oficiul Moscova, vol. III, 78; Scnteia, 20 November 1962.
199
For instance, Peter J. Wiles, East Central Europe as an active element in the Soviet empire in Milorad
M. Drachkovitch (ed.) East Central Europe. Yesterday, today, tomorrow, Hoover Press, 1982, 86.
200
The minutes of the 21-23 November 1962 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 30/1962, 349354, 365-368, 375; Brldeanus Report at the November 1962 plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
29/1962, 151-197.

60

Szeged and published in Npszabadsg, announced the accord of the Hungarian leadership
with Khrushchevs proposal.201
These declarations were followed by actions. On 14-21 December 1962, the 17 th
Session of the CMEA (chaired by Alexandru Brldeanu) and the 3 rd Session of the
Councils Executive Committee (chaired by Antal Apr), both held in Bucharest, raised
the problem of the CMEA common planning body. The Romanians objected with the
same old arguments. They stated that Romania agreed with the specialisation of the
interested states, with the coordination of the plans of the national economies of the
CMEA members (as stipulated in the Basic Principles), or that Romania was not yet
interested in her own specialisation.202 When the other participants insisted on the creation
of the common planning body, the Romanian delegates again used the postponing
argument that the RWP had not yet reached a decision on the problem of integration and
that Romania would respond to such proposals when a decision was made. As Brldeanu
later phrased it, this was again a way of rejecting this idea without creating public
divergences.203
The Soviet Union continued to push for integration, and on 16 and 19 February 1963
an article in Pravda and one in Tribuna Ludu quoted Khrushchev urging the creation of a
unified planning body common to all CMEA countries. 204 The publication of these articles
was not accidental, as during those days the 4th Session of the Executive Committee of the
CMEA (16-21 February 1963) was held in Moscow, and was again openly addressing the
problem of the creation of a CMEA unified planning body.

4.2 Romanias first dissent

The February 1963 session of the Executive Committee of the CMEA (EC-CMEA) was
officially called to discuss the improvement of the CMEAs activity. The Romanian
delegation to this session headed by Alexandru Brldeanu was mandated to say
clearly our opinion if, by chance, one was to raise again the problem regarding the creation
of supranational bodies. In other words, in response to perceived imminent threats, the
Romanian delegation was mandated to begin employing the tactics of making public the
bloc divergences on the CMEA integration. Although the Romanian delegation expected
some talks on integration, the concrete proposals advanced in Moscow in February 1963,
by the East Germans or by the Soviets took them completely by surprise as they later
often argued.205
On 16 February, Bruno Leuschner, the head of the East German delegation and the
chair of the session, advanced a Project of Statute of the EC-CMEA, which advanced the
201

The positions of the fraternal parties from the socialist states regarding the CMEA problems, in ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 112/1963, 107-115.
202
Report regarding the 17th Session of the CMEA and the Third Session of the Councils Executive
Committee, ANIC, Office, File 35/1962, 38-75.
203
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 32.
204
Cited in Richard Szawlowski, The system of the international organizations in the communist countries,
Leyden, 1976, 75-76.
205
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 7, 32.

61

gradual creation of a unified planning body, the replacement of the principle of

recommendations and of unanimity rule with the principle of the mandatory decisions and
of majority rule. According to the perceptions of the Romanian leadership, these proposals
had originated in fact in Moscow, the East Germans being seen as intermediaries of the
Soviets. The project presented by Leuschner was accepted by all the other participants.206
In response, Brldeanu complained (in his 17 February speech) that Romania had not
been consulted prior to the advancement of such proposals. He also pointed out (as an
indirect threat) that the Romanian leadership could follow the others example in that
respect, and without consulting them could publicly declare that she did not agree with
the creation of the unique planning body.
Brldeanu counteracted Leuschners proposals with Romanias old postponing tactics.
He argued that Romania did not agree in this phase with the idea of creating such a
body, that prior to making any decision the problem needed to be thoroughly analysed
and studied, that the RWP had not yet formulated its position on the matter. Then, he
elaborated the argument of sovereignty as an anti-integrationist reasoning. If in June 1962
at the CMEA conference, Gheorghiu-Dej merely implied that integration contravened the
principle of national sovereignty, this time Brldeanu openly accused the others
integration proposals of threatening directly the CMEA members sovereignty. He
maintained that the planning of the national economy was an inalienable attribute of the
sovereignty of the socialist state and that accrediting a supra-state body or an extra-state
body to take over the attribute of the sovereignty of a socialist state means in fact an
infringement of sovereignty, and means that sovereignty would remain a simple juridical
notion lacking the main means to accomplish it.
Furthermore, Brldeanu emphasised that no plan established by supra-state bodies
could justly consider the interests of Romania and that, therefore, the RWP will never
agree to cede its attributes to some supranational bodies. Fearing that his affirmations
might be in his own later formulation perverted by the other bloc delegates,
Brldeanu proposed the participants to agree to an exchange of written speeches, but this
proposal was rejected.207 Brldeanus speech reveals once more that the Romanian
leaders feared that the Soviet leadership would pervert Romanias opposition to
integration and would use it as pretext to take some anti-Romanian measures. The
Romanian leaders main concern was to not cause, through their opposition, an open
confrontation with the USSR and therefore they constructed their opposition stratagem
around different Soviet arguments, such as maintaining publicly that integration was
unacceptable because it contravened the principle of sovereignty that had been advanced
by the Soviets themselves.
M.A. Lesechko (USSR) and B. Leuschner (GDR) contested Brldeanus interpretation
according to which integration encroached upon the others sovereigntys rights and
maintained instead that the unique planning body would not give directions to countries.
Moreover, Otokar Simunek (Czechoslovakia) argued that the creation of the unique
planning body was to be made in stages and that until 1970 it was about the stage of the
206

Report, March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1963, Vol. I, 79, 88-90; The minutes of the 5-8
March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 32- 33, 41-42, 73-81.
207
Consequently, the Romanian archives do not provide us with the speeches of the other participants, but
only with Brldeanus notes about those speeches.

62

coordination of the plans. Antal Apr, instead, taking the floor, confirmed the
agreement that the [1963 CMEA] Conference was to discuss the creation of the unique
planning body. Aprs declaration raised the Romanian leaders threat perceptions to
higher levels. They interpreted this declaration in the sense that all the other CMEA states
had secretly decided to address and impose integration during the subsequent 1963 CMEA
gathering. Although Lesechko tried to rectify Antal Aprs stumble, insisting that the
creation of the unique planning body would not be addressed at the 1963 CMEA annual
conference, during the next half of the year the Romanian leaders concentrated their
efforts on preventing the creation of integration bodies with the occasion of the 1963
CMEA conference.
On 18 February 1963, Lesechko proposed the creation of five CMEA inter-state unions
for five economic sectors/industries, including an inter-state direction for the energy
system. The unions were meant to remain in the property of the participating countries
and to establish (with a 2/3 majority vote) the volume and the type of products that each of
the five industries was to produce or in which country of the Council different factories
were to be established. Romania was supposed to become a producer and exporter of oil
and gas and the location of an inter-state enterprise exploiting the energy resources of the
Danube River. As Lesechko put it, Romania had to bring her energy resources to the
common cauldron. The other delegations declared their accord with these proposals, but
Brldeanu, mocking the common cauldron phrase, opposed it, arguing that Romania did
not have enough resources of gas and oil to supply other bloc countries. According to
Brldeanu and Gheorghiu-Dej, if accepted, Lesechkos proposals, would have allowed the
CMEA bodies to decide the main lines of the development of the national economy.
They were also convinced that a supra-state body was unable to take into consideration
Romanias interests and that such a body was to impose policies and measures detrimental
to Romania, but advantageous for the industrialised bloc countries.
On 19 February Khrushchev announced his intention to address the session of the ECCMEA. Brldeanu received this news with great concern. As he later explained during a
Politburo meeting, the most (perceived) difficult part of his mission in Moscow was to
adopt the right tactic of opposition. The decision to reject integration had been long before
taken, but how to implement it into practice, without creating additional problems between
Romania and the USSR, was still considered a difficult and delicate matter in Bucharest.
Thus, the announcement that Khrushchev himself intended to address the Executive
Committee worried Brldeanu who had been given the mandate to oppose the CMEA
integration, but had nonetheless not been given the mandate to oppose Khrushchev
directly. 208
Addressing209 the Executive Committee on 20 February, Khrushchev tackled three
main problems the efficiency of the CMEA, the creation of the unique planning body
and the bloc energy shortage. Criticising the inefficiency of the Councils activity,
208

Brldeanus Notes about the 16-19 February 1963 talks in the CMEA Executive Committee,
incorporated in The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963,
33-46; and in The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
4/1963, 16-17, 23-30, 127-129.
209
Brldeanu asked the Soviet party to be given a copy of the transcript of the 20 February 1963
discussions, but the Soviets denied the request on the grounds that as M.A. Lesechko put it the meeting
had not been arranged and it was not necessary to give a transcript.

63

Khrushchev fostered cooperation on the basis of production and not on the basis of trade.
The Council had produced enough general principles and in this stage the countries
must concretely move to the cooperation of production and to the creation of a
supranational planning body, as Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia had
already agreed, the Soviet leader pointed out. The reorganisation of the CMEAs
cooperation was in the interest of the small countries and not in the interest of the USSR
and one should not treat the cooperation problems from the narrow individual interest of
each country. He further complained that each country solves its energy problems within
its borders without considering the possibilities the bloc could provide. Khrushchev also
claimed that the resources of the Danube River were not properly used and added that the
Soviet leadership intended to discuss with Romania that problem, because no doubt, it
would be good for Bulgaria to participate in the Iron Gates [project].
But, regardless of all these arguments Khrushchev continued there was a Korean
comrade, an illiterate in matters of Marxism-Leninism who used to complain that the
USSR intended, through the creation of a unique planning body, to pursue a policy of
domination and to exploit other countries, under the cover of cooperation. But, because
the Korean example worried me, the Soviet leader concluded his speech, in my opinion,
a special decision of the CMEA regarding the unique planning body is no longer needed.
Analysing Khrushchevs speech, the Romanian leadership considered that all the
allusive accusations of autarchy or illiteracy in matters of Marxism-Leninism (which
equalled with being anti-Leninist and Stalinist) targeted in fact Romania and her
leadership. The Korean comrade and the Korean example were also allusions to them,
the Romanian leaders believed. However, they regarded Khrushchevs speech not only as
a series of threats and accusations, but also as a confirmation of their previous analyses
according to which, in order to avoid Romanias public dissent, the Soviet leadership was
disposed to accommodate her position on integration.
Responding to Khrushchev, Brldeanu did not take the path of denying the
(perceived) accusations against Romanias line. Deliberately ignoring those accusations,
he constructed his speech on the idea of agreeing in his own words with the Soviet
leader. Brldeanu argued that Romania shared Khrushchevs position and did not agree
either with the creation of a unique planning body because Romanias fundamental
position is that of respecting the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of
states. Romania and the USSR do not have antagonistic interests, but, given the different
level of development of the two states our interests are completely different, Brldeanu
stressed. Then, addressing Khrushchev directly, he added:
We [Romania] consider that everything you [Khrushchev] said before and all problems
that appear from the specific necessities of countries could be solved only through
coordination of plans, on a voluntary basis, with complete respect for sovereignty and noninterference in the affairs of each country. You [Khrushchev] said nothing about
sovereignty. Let me ask you: What is your opinion in this matter?

Thus, if at secret Politburo meetings, the Romanian leaders argued that the Soviet Union
and the other bloc countries wanted to create a framework allowing them to control
Romanias resources and economic production, in a bloc gathering and in front of
Khrushchev, they opposed integration on the grounds that it was not respecting the

64

Leninist principles of states sovereignty and non-interference. Although Brldeanu

declared formally that Romania and the USSR did not have antagonist interests in matters
related to bloc economic cooperation a concept that will gradually but formally replace
in bloc debates the concept of economic integration the Romanian and the Soviet
interests were, de facto, in opposition.
To the complete (and later often confessed) surprise of the entire Romanian leadership,
on 20 February 1963, Khrushchev responded that I agree with the way comrade
Brldeanu raised the problem, and stressed that, in the conception of the Soviet
leadership, common planning would not affect national sovereignty, that, on the
contrary, common planning must be pursued on the basis of maintaining this sovereignty
unaltered. Khrushchev continued:
When I speak of this planning, I do not mean merging, because we do not have a unique
state. Each country must pursue its planning and in doing so it must consider the needs and
possibilities that each country has. I do not propose a common cauldron because the time is
not ripe. () I must tell you that without respecting sovereignty completely, the countries
will not be interested to cooperate. () It is clear that the conditions for unification have
not ripened yet. It is a good thing that comrade Brldeanu raised this problem. The
cooperation must be based on sovereignty and on the domestic possibilities of countries.
Otherwise, it is not cooperation but merging, [it is] the borders removal. This problem has
not ripened yet and this is why we do no raise it. Moreover, we [the USSR] stop those that
would like to raise it. As communists, we know that this moment will come, but when it
will come we cannot say yet. Maybe in our mind the problem has ripened; still, the
economic conditions are not ripe yet.

This intervention by Khrushchev provided the Romanian leadership with the sovereignty
argument, its main official anti-integration argument from then on, as this chapter will
further detail.210

4.3 Developing new tactics to block integration

On 26-27 February 1963 the Politburo of the CC of the RWP Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer,
Brldeanu, Ceauescu, Bodnra, Gheorghe Gaston Marin, Leonte Rutu, Gheorghe
Apostol, Chivu Stoica, Alexandru Drghici, etc. analysed the proposals advanced on the
occasion of the EC-CMEA in Moscow in February 1963. The participants concluded that
their previous perceptions of the others threatening intentions had been once again
confirmed and that the situation could not get any better. They believed that the
integration proposals were triggered by the abject interests of the other CMEA members
who aimed for several objectives: to control Romanias natural resources of oil, methane
gas and Romanias energy potential of the Danube River; to import from Romania cheap
agricultural products; to export to Romania expensive industrial machinery; to avoid
210

Brldeanus Notes about the 20 February 1963 talks in the CMEA Executive Committee, incorporated in
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 48-72; and in
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 8-25,
80.

65

Romanias economic competition in the industrial field. Some bloc members probably
even wanted to annex parts of Romania, the Romanian leaders reasoned during the 26-27
February 1963 Politburo meeting.
They argued that accepting Khrushchevs theses would have lead to CMEA control
over the economic resources of Romania, to the control over the Romanian people, to
the elimination of the bilateral relations of Romania, to foreign interference in
Romanias domestic affairs, to total unification, and ultimately to Romanias
annexation. Considering that the USSR was an expansionist great power with hegemonic
economic, territorial and political tendencies, they feared that the Soviet leadership had a
two phases plan to first get control of Romanias economy, production, resources, and
then to annex parts of its territory. As Brldeanu phrased it, the problem in the CMEA
is not economic, but political, is about settling an economic dependence which will
manifest itself at the political level. Brldeanu believed that the other Eastern European
states supported the Soviet-proposed reforms hoping to solve in this way their domestic
economic problems. In the case of the USSR, however, it was about the goal, not about
the causes of integration, the Soviets thereby trying to use the CMEA to create a legal
framework to allow them to ensure absolute control over every socialist country, to
dictate and impose its will onto the others, Brldeanu and his party fellows reasoned.211
While scholars often explain Romanias opposition to the CMEA integration through
the Romanian leaders goal of preserving their domestic power in the context of deStalinisation,212 the archival materials provide us with a different explanation. The
Romanian leaders believed that their power positions would have been in fact secured had
they agreed to the Soviet CMEA projects and that, on the contrary, their opposition would
have jeopardised their domestic power positions, as the Soviet leaders might have decided
to replace the opposing Romanian leadership with an obedient new team. As Bodnra put
it, had Romania accepted integration, the state would have faced the beginning of the
abolishment of its sovereignty, but as much as our leadership is concerned I think that
we will have plenty of time for hunting and other activities; we will become bailiffs.213
Thus, a perceptual approach reveals that the Romanians opposed the USSR not because
they feared that the Soviet leaders might have imposed a new leadership in Romania, but
in spite of that fear.214
Agreeing with such perceptions and beliefs, the Politburo decided that Romania must
make no concession with regard to the integration problem, as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it.
The following is a description of three opposition tactics that the Romanian leadership
elaborated in February 1963 the sovereignty tactic, the China card tactic and the makingthe-divergences-public tactic.

211

The minutes of the 26-27 February, 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 20134.
212
For instance, Stanciu, 2008, 8-25; Deletant, 1999, 281; Sen, 121; Ctnu, 2011, 388; Tismneanu, 2002,
31-46; Tnase, 187-189.
213
Vtaf, in Romanian. The term has different meanings such as head of the servants in a manor, boyar, or
land steward, but all these meanings implies a type of leadership, of being in command, although under a
superior authority.
214
The minutes of the meeting of the CC of the RWP from 26-27 February, 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office,
File no. 4/1963, 14, 24-25, 104.

66

4.3.1 Making the divergences public

The Romanian tactic of making the divergences with the USSR public included two main
levels. On the first level there was the threat to the USSR with making the bloc integration
divergences public, while on the second there was the actual implementation of that threat
into practice. Prior to February 1963, on several occasions, the Romanian leadership had
conveyed to the Soviet leaders that Romania would make her opinion known on the
integration problem at the right time. This had been mainly a postponing tactic, but it was
also meant as an indirect threat, implying that if her integration views were not
accommodated, Romania would make the bloc's secret disagreements public. As already
noted, given the high level of the perceived integration threats, in May 1962, GheorghiuDej took into consideration the possibility of reading at the June 1962 CMEA conference a
speech openly opposing integration, which was Romanias way of making the
divergences public, but when the Poles dropped their integration proposals, the
Romanian leaders decided to no longer make public their opposition.215
In late February 1963, however, perceiving again imminent integration threats to
Romanias interests, the Romanian leaders revived the tactics of making Romanias
separate opinion public in the form of an official document (as they called it) to
encompass, as they put it, our theses as opposed to Khrushchevs theses. Regarding the
form that this document was to take, in February 1963 the Romanian leaders were rather
indecisive, considering several possibilities an article, a declaration/statement, a
published speech, a secret (or open) letter addressed to the socialist and non-socialist
leaders of the world.
However, according to the initial February 1963 decision, the document was to address
in a principled manner three fundamental international problems: the CMEA reform, the
USSR-China dispute and the East-West relations, all placed under the umbrella of the
thesis according to which the leaders of the great powers or parties had no right to decide
the faith of other small states or parties. The proximate cause of the Romanian leaders
decision to issue such a document was their perceptions of the threats posed to Romania
by the integration project. Specifically, they feared that the next CMEA conference
(scheduled in the summer of 1963) was to pressure for the creation of supranational
bodies. Analysing the Soviet intra-bloc, intra-camp or inter-camp behaviour (for instance,
the USSRs 1960-1962 relations with the USA, China, Albania and Romania or its 19481959 relations with Yugoslavia or Romania) Gheorghiu-Dej, Petre Boril, Alexandru
Moghioro, Ceauescu and other members of the RWPs Politburo recognised a distinctive
Soviet threatening behavioural pattern, marked they argued by the USSRs tendencies
of being a great power which used the method of dictating and imposing its will upon
its allies and partners, which was accustomed to agree with other great powers upon the
faith of the small states and parties regardless the latter's interests, which considered itself
entitled to take unnecessary and unacceptable risks on behalf of all its allies, without
consulting or informing them.
The October 1962 Cuban crisis had provided the Romanian leaders with a (perceived)
example of how careless and aggressive the USSR and its leadership could be. Due to
Khrushchevs manner of conducting international politics and due to his tendency of
215

See supra, subchapter 3.2.1.

67

deciding on behalf of his allies, in October 1962 Romania had been on the verge of being
bombed without even knowing why or by whom, Gheorghiu-Dej argued in February 1963
and many times afterwards. Moreover, noting the Soviets post-war behaviour towards
Yugoslavia and Albania, the Romanians asked themselves how far the Soviets were
disposed to go in their dispute with China or in their integration dispute with Romania.
Were the Soviet leaders ready to go as far as to publicly condemn and isolate China and
Romania just as they had done with Yugoslavia in 1948?
The Romanian leaders also identified the Soviet leadership's tendencies and
conceptions to impose its will on the others in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute. It was
irrelevant if the Chinese theses were right or wrong, the Romanian leaders reasoned
among themselves, the only relevant thing was that all parties and states were equal in
rights, being entitled to express their own views with regard to both domestic and foreign
policy, and to act accordingly. Moreover, the Romanian leaders identified in the Soviet
behaviour towards China a precedent that, in their views, could have been dangerous for
Romania. If the Soviet leaders treated Mao Zedong the leader of a great power, of an
immense force, of one of the biggest parties in the world as a broken galosh, how
were they to treat Romania and the RWP which opposed integration so strongly? The
Romanian leaders were also concerned with the (perceived) Soviet tendency to unilaterally
involve other states in the Sino-Soviet confrontation. Hence, they decided that their
document had to address the problem of the responsibility of the leaders of the great
powers in such a way that it would cure Khrushchev of his tendency to decide on
behalf of the USSRs allies.
According to the minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, the Romanian
leaders believed at the time that a Romanian public and official position on the
fundamental international problems could block the Soviets tendency of talking on
behalf of Romania and of the RWP. They also considered that, the other bloc members,
under Soviet guidance, were publicly presenting their reform projects and conceptions as
if integration had already been accepted by all the CMEA members, Romania included. To
this (perceived) bloc fait accompli tactic that promoted integration the Romanian leaders
answered with the tactic of making Romanias position on integration public. 216 In
Gheorghiu-Dejs words:
There are attempts to introduce [in practice] things that have not even been discussed. ()
Nobody has the right, no matter who that would be, to make on our behalf public
declarations. We did not give any mandate to anyone in this regard. () We cannot accept
such a thing, we cannot make declarations on behalf of any country, and absolutely nobody
has the right to make declarations on our behalf. 217

Later in 1963, the Romanian leaders often complained to different Soviet representatives
about this bloc (perceived) fait accompli tactics. In April 1963, for instance, they openly
complained to Andropov (who was visiting Romania) that the other bloc members used to
make declarations regarding the integration of the entire bloc as if all the CMEA states
216

The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 23135.
217
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 5-8.

68

(Romania included) had agreed upon the matter. Then, Andropov admitted that maybe
sometimes the Romanian comrades had not been consulted, but argued instead that
something like that had happened because, given the unity of views that existed until now
between us [Romania and the USSR], one assumed that the Romanians would agree.218
The Romanian leaders did not accept Andropovs explanation as genuine their
opposition had already been communicated numerous times in bloc or bilateral secret talks
and considered that once Romanias position was made public through an official
document, the Soviets could no longer assume such things.
On the other hand, in early 1963, the Romania leaders were convinced that the USSR
wanted to avoid any bloc disagreements reaching the public sphere. Hence, they hoped
that if Romania published a document announcing her position on the fundamental
problems, the Soviet leaders would then refrain from publicly advocating projects and
policies that would have contradicted the content of the Romanian text and would have
implicitly or directly acknowledged the existence of the disagreements. On the other hand,
the document was intended to function as a guide for the Romanian representatives in the
CMEA on how to recognise and oppose the Soviet policies threatening Romanias
interests.219 The Romanian leadership believed that such guiding material was absolutely
necessary, because, as Brldeanu put it, in the last twenty years Romania had raised an
entire generation on the basis of the socialist internationalism and on the basis of love for
the Soviet Union and because in 1963 that generation had difficulties in understanding the
Soviets (allegedly) real intentions towards Romania. Thus, according to the Romanian
leaders, domestically, the document was meant to help the Romanian population,
diplomats, party and state cadres to, on the one hand, decipher the threats posed to
Romania by the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, to block those threats acting in the
right, principled way so that no additional tensions between Romania and the USSR
would be allowed to appear.
The Romanian leaders believed that opposing publicly Khrushchevs theses
encompassed considerable risks, but that taking no action against integration was to lead
to even worse practical consequences. The greater the perceived threats, the greater the
calculated risks the Romanians were willing to take. One (perceived) risk was for the
entire bloc to group around the USSR, to condemn, criticise and isolate (economically and
politically) Romania, just as the USSR had proceeded with Albania, Yugoslavia and, more
recently, attempted to do with China the Romanian leaders reasoned. They expected also
possible Soviet or bloc accusations that Romania and its leadership were anti-Marxist,
anti-Leninist, anti-internationalist, nationalist, autarchic and anti-Soviet. To avoid or limit
as much as possible such anticipated accusations, on 26-27 February 1963, the Romanian
leaders decided to, on the one hand, explicitly and repeatedly confirm Romanias
commitment to the friendship with the USSR and to respect its internationalist duties, and,
218

Talks with Y.V. Andropov over lunch, 2 April 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 13/ 1963,
1-6.
219
Addressing the early 1960s reform of the Romanian diplomatic corps, Stanciu argues that the process was
triggered by the need to provide Romania with competent professionals capable to pursue the recently
adopted policy of autonomy. Cezar Stanciu, A Rebirth of Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of Communist
Romania between Subordination and Autonomy, 19481962, in Diplomacy & Statecraft, 24:2, 253-272,
2013, DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2013.789770 .

69

on the other hand, to present the Romanian theses and policies as deriving directly from
the socialist principles of equality in rights, mutual advantage, non-interference in internal
affairs, independence and sovereignty. If Romanias opposition to the CMEA integration
was to be formulated in such terms, then the Soviets would have no argument to publicly
criticise Romania, to accuse her of anti-Leninism or anti-Sovietism, the Romanian leaders
believed.
Once the decision to elaborate the document was made (in February 1963), the
Romanian leaders acted to put it into practice, according to a plan designed in three stages.
Firstly, the RWPs CC Plenum was to formulate Romanias official position about
integration (this happened in March 1963); secondly, a commission formed by Emil
Bodnra, Nicolae Ceauescu, Alexandru Brldeanu, Leonte Rutu and Gheorghe Gaston
Marin was to draft material or a document in accordance with the adopted position; and
finally, the document was to be sent to the other party and state leaderships, published and
discussed in Romania with the party and state cadres.220 However, the last two stages of
this plan were not implemented for reasons that this chapter will further address.
During the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, Gheorghiu-Dej,
Brldeanu, Ceauescu, Gaston Marin, Gheorghe Apostol and other top dignitaries
presented their conceptions, views, perceptions and fears regarding the proposals and
intentions of the other CMEA countries. The Soviet leadership was harshly criticised for
the first time at a RWPs Plenum for its integration project seen as targeting Romanias
interests. The Politburo members emphasised that the CMEA integration threatened
Romanias national interests, her independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Even
the states national character was in danger, they argued, since the other bloc members
aimed to create an ideological, cultural integration, through the creation of some
extraordinary things such as the integration in the field of the school textbooks.
Stressing that the Romanian diplomats and representatives had to oppose integration in the
future, in March 1963, the Romanian leaders also insisted that this opposition had to be
mastered so that the Soviets and their supporters would be criticised only in an indirect
manner and from a principled position.
The Plenum approved unanimously the interpretations of the Romanian leadership and
authorised the Politburo to elaborate a document addressing not only the CMEA
problems, but the problem of unity of the camp and as well as other problems. It was
decided that the document was to be sent to both socialist and non-socialist leaders.221 The
Plenums Communiqu mentioned nothing about the Romanian anti-Soviet criticism. It
noted instead that the participants had approved in unanimity the activity of the
Romanian delegation at the February 1963 session of the EC-CMEA and had reaffirmed
[the Plenums] complete agreement with the Basic Principles according to which the
coordination of the plans of the national economies in the spirit of the principles
proclaimed by the 1960 Moscow Declaration was the main means for reaching the
economic development of the bloc and for the enforcement of the international division of

220

The protocol no 2 and The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 4/1963, 1-135.
221
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 6-473.

70

labour.222 According to Gheorghiu-Dej, the Communiqu was meant as an additional

indication for the Soviets that Romania:
would not agree with the unique planning body, with the inter-state unions, with the
common enterprises, with the internationalisation of the productions means that is with
everything that could infringe on the national independence.223

The proceedings of the March 1963 Plenum were not published224, but the party and state
local and central cadres were informed about the position adopted on that occasion
concerning the problem of integration. Consequently, in the spring of 1963, the Romanian
anti-Soviet criticism transcended the secret Politburo meetings, appearing first during a
Plenum of the Central Committee and then at regional party meetings. However, this
strong anti-Soviet criticism was not officially assumed by the Romanian leadership, was
not allowed to cross the border and did not appear in any party or state document. It was
only verbally expressed and carefully confined within Romanias borders.225
Through such behaviour, the Romanian leaders were following three aims. Firstly,
they wanted to instruct the Romanian representatives in the CMEA on how to recognise
and oppose the integration attempts of the other CMEA states. Secondly (and expecting
the worst) they wanted to legitimise Romanias future opposition to integration and for
that they acted to make credible the argument that the entire Romanian population had
agreed with the position adopted by the March 1963 Plenum and thus with the opposition
to bloc integration. And thirdly, they wanted to prepare the Romanian population for the
case in which the Romanian-Soviet integration disagreements would have reached a level
of conflict.
A Note issued on 11 March 1963 by the Politburo was instructing the Romanian
representatives abroad to declare but only when and if asked that the Romanian
People's Republic is against the discussed [integration] proposals, that this position was
approved in unanimity by the [March 1963] Plenum and that the Plenum considered that
the creation of supra-state bodies contravened the principles of complete sovereignty of
the CMEA member states. Moreover, they were instructed to argue that the decision to
issue a public declaration or document encompassing Romanias views with regard to the
fundamental international problems was triggered not by Romanias opposition to
integration, but by her internationalist duty to contribute to the unity of the camp and to
the development of the world socialism system, because, they were to reason, the CMEA
integration was to negatively affect that unity.226
On 21 March 1963, the regional party organisations received a document entitled
Regarding the problems of the economic collaboration among the countries of the
socialist camp debated at the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum of the CC of the RWP. The central
authorities gave the express order for this top secret document to not be multiplied and
to be returned in all copies to the Central Committee once the discussions were over.
Such directives could suggest that the document was openly anti-Soviet, but it was not.
222

Communiqu, in Scnteia, 9 March 1963 .

The minutes of the 3 April 1963 Politburo meeting, in Retegan, 2002, 223, 228.
224
Protocol no 1 of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1963, Vol. I, 1-2.
225
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 6, 107, 472-473.
226
Note, 11 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 13/1963, 4-6.
223

71

The document was rather vague and in its pages the criticism against the Soviets or even
against the other bloc members was mainly indirect, pointing at most to some tendencies
showed by some countries. The document criticised openly and strongly the integration
theses and presented in detail Romanias opposition and conception on integration, but it
did not name the Soviet leaders openly as the authors of those theses. For instance, it
argued that given the proposals advanced in Moscow in February 1963,
it is clear that one intends to systematically introduce in practice some organisational forms
and methods designed to lead to the infringement of the national sovereignty and
independence of the respective countries, to the direct interference in their domestic
affairs.227

This material criticised only indirectly the Soviet proposals and Khrushchevs prointegration declarations and articles, but within the meetings organised around the country
in March-April 1963 to discuss this text, the Soviet Union and its leaders were directly and
harshly criticised and accused of tendencies and intentions of subordinating other
countries.228 The transcripts of such meetings were turned over (together with the 21
March 1963 document) to the headquarters of the CC of the RWP, as requested.229 Thus,
as Larry Watts correctly observed, the Romanian anti-Soviet criticism from the early
1960s did not target the outside world, but mainly the Romanian population.230

4.3.2 China-related arguments

Contemplated for the first time in 1962, the China card tactic was revived and developed
in February 1963 along two distinct, although convergent, lines of action. The first (to be
further investigated in this chapter) was imagined as a means to bloc the perceived Soviet
integration attempts and referred to presenting the Soviets with China-related arguments.
The second (to be investigated in detail in the next chapters) referred to the Romanians
attempts to persuade the Chinese to support Romanias cause against the (perceived)
Soviet integration attempts. The following is a description of this tactic as Gheorghiu-Dej
described it in February 1963.
Whenever the Romanian representatives Gheorghiu-Dej instructed were to
encounter proposals regarding the revision towards integration of the CMEA Statute, they
had to declare their accord, but to further insist that such a revision was absolutely
necessary in order to make possible the participation of all socialist states, including
China, in the CMEA. When the members of the CMEA were to argue that integration was
to secure the interests of the entire world socialist system, the Romanian representatives,
agreeing again, were to ask pretending to be confused what kind of world socialist
227

Circular letter to the Regional Party Committees, 21 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File6/1963,
Vol. I, 77-116.
228
For instance, The minutes of the discussions at tefan Gheorghiu Academy, March 1963, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 17/1963, 1-28; or The minutes of the 30 March 2 April 1963
meetings of the party cadres from the central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Office, File 9/1963, 3-235.
229
Note sent by Major Ioan Linu to Ion Pcurar, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no. 9/1963, 2.
230
Watts, 224.

72

system can we be if some [socialist] countries participate in the CMEA [only] as

observers231, why the CMEA members talked on behalf of the entire socialist world
system since not all the socialist states were members of the CMEA or what the Asian
states thought about the CMEA reforms.
When the other CMEA members were to maintain that the reform of the CMEA was to
increase the economic efficiency of the organisation and of each member taken
individually, the Romanian representatives agreeing again had to reason that China was an
immense economic and political force and that its participation as a full member could
only increase the economic efficiency and prestige of the Council. In the written document
that the Romanian leaders intended to issue, all these arguments were to be incorporated,
but without actually naming the Asian states. As Gheorghiu-Dej put it, the document had
to principally say: let us all collaborate and cooperate; let us see what causes deter some
countries from entering the CMEA.
Employing the China-related arguments, the Romanian leader had three main
objectives in mind, all subsumed to the goal of blocking/postponing the Soviet integration
plan. Firstly, he believed that these arguments were to complicate and prolong the
integration talks by moving the stress from the discussions about integration to the idea of
involving the Asian states in the matter. Secondly, such arguments were to alter the initial
integration proposal transforming it into something (presumably) less threatening to
Romanias interests. If China would actually agree to become a full member of the
CMEA, then Romania and China together could have given the reform project a different
direction which was to be in line with Romanias interests the Romanian leader believed.
(The next chapter will investigate in detail this aspect.) And, finally, Gheorghiu-Dej
believed that the China-related arguments were to pose an indirect threat to the Soviet
interests, implying Romanian collaboration with China in the context of the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
The Romanian leaders believed that the Soviet leadership wanted the RWPs
unconditional support in its dispute with Beijing. Thus, they decided to make during
their secret talks with the Soviets allusions to possible Romanian support for some of the
Chinese theses (as they put it), which implied that if the Soviet leadership wanted to
prevent Romania from getting too close to the Chinese positions then it had to
accommodate its views on integration. The Romanian leaders also believed that their
arguments related to Chinas full membership in the CMEA were most likely to convince
the Soviets to drop their integration plans. But, on the other hand, the Romanian leaders
feared that the Soviet leadership could have counteracted such arguments by accusing
Romania and the RWP of becoming pro-Chinese, anti-Soviet and anti-Leninist. Therefore,
231

China had participated in the work of various CMEA bodies as an observer since 1956. By 1958 North
Korea, Mongolia, China and North Vietnam received the status of observers in the Council. In 1958, at the
Moscow conference of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties a closer economic
cooperation between China and the CMEA was discussed. China was offered several times but refused
to assume a more active role in the Council. Until late 1961 the Asian observers participated regularly in the
sessions of the Council, but after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, Albania a full member
ceased to participle in the CMEA meetings, while China, North Vietnam and North Korea ceased to
participate as observers. Cuba became an observer in 1965. Three of the observers became full members:
Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in 1978. M. Lavigne, International political economy and
socialism, Cambridge University Press, 1991, 54-55.

73

Gheorghiu-Dej instructed his colleagues to approach with care (in their integration talks
with the Soviets) the delicate problem of the China-related arguments. According to
these instructions, they had to argue, on the one hand, in favour of Chinas participation in
the CMEA, but to stress, on the other hand, that Romania and the RWP were not taking
the Chinese side, that it was taking no side, but the side of the Marxist-Leninist teachings.
Such an approach was to prevent the Soviets from wrenching the Romanians positions,
the Romanian leadership reasoned in February 1963.232
However, before beginning to employ China-related arguments to counteract the
integration project, the Romanian leadership acted to get the formal approval of the
RWPs ordinary members for employing such tactics.233 This move had two aims. Firstly,
it explained to Romanian officials and representatives how to use this tactic when they
needed to oppose the others integration attempts and, secondly, it legitimised the use of
this tactic, giving the Romanian leaders the pretext to argue and they argued indeed234
that the questions regarding the Asian states participation in the CMEA had not been
raised by the leadership of the RWP, but by ordinary party members.

4.3.3 The sovereignty argument

As this chapter will further detail, from February 1963 onwards, the Romanian-Soviet
dispute on the CMEA integration took the form of an ideological controversy regarding
the principle of sovereignty, with the Romanians reasoning that integration contravened
that principle and the Soviets arguing that integration completely respected sovereignty.
From this perspective, a very important question arises: did the Romanian-Soviet quarrel
on sovereignty grow from a different ideological interpretation of the postulates of
Marxist-Leninist theory or did the Romanians manipulate those postulates to reach their
pragmatic objectives?
Katalin Miklssy argues that ideology was the official system of belief that guided the
entire process of domestic and foreign policy-making in the socialist state, and that it
simultaneously provided the political system with legitimisation. On the other hand,
Miklssy contends, ideology also offered the decision makers a set of officially acceptable
arguments to which they resorted to justify even those decisions that had not been derived
from ideological considerations and beliefs. 235
These propositions are also applicable to Romanias case, particularly to the way the
Romanian decision-makers utilised the sovereignty argument during their integration
dispute with the Soviet leadership. On the one hand, they acted within a system of beliefs,
values, ideas in which they genuinely believed, but, on the other hand, they purposely
232

The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 22,
32-33, 47, 76-77, 107-136.
233
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 60-410; Circular
letter addressed to the Regional Party Committees on 21 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
6/1963, Vol. I, 77-80, 99; The minutes of the 30 March 2 April 1963 meetings of the party cadres from the
central apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 9/1963, 3, 167.
234
Note regarding the 3 April 1963 discussions with Y. V. Andropov, in Retegan, 2002, 192-217.
235
Katalin Miklssy,Manoeuvres of national interest. Internationalism versus nationalism in the emerging
Kadarist criticism of Romania, 1968-1972, Kikimora Publications, Helsinki, 2003, 42-45.

74

manipulated the theoretical ambiguities within the ideological framework in order to

legitimise political decisions driven not from ideological considerations, but from
pragmatic reasons. To limit the (anticipated) Soviet criticism to Romanias opposition, the
Romanian leaders decided to debate with the Soviets over the meaning and weight of the
principle of sovereignty rather than accuse them of intending to control Romanias
territory and resources as they were convinced was the case.
Observing with amazement how easily, in February 1963, comrade Khrushchev had
agreed with comrade Brldeanu that integration should not infringe on the CMEA states
sovereignty, the Romanian leaders decided that from that moment on they would formally
oppose the integration plan of the other CMEA members on the ground that it contravened
the commonly agreed principle of sovereignty.236 According to Gheorghiu-Dej, the
principles of sovereignty, independence, non-interference in internal affairs, equality in
rights, etc. offered the Romanian leadership the moral base for publically stating its
opinion not only in matters related to integration, but in all international matters in which
it had a different position.237
As early as 1960, the Romanian leader had stressed that Romanias different position
had to be principled, which meant that it had to be built on the principles that formally
guided the relations between the socialist states.238 Gheorghiu-Dej believed that since
those principles had not even been elaborated by us [Romania], but by the other party [the
USSR], it was to be very difficult for Khrushchev to openly argue against Romanias
opposition, as any Soviet criticism in that respect would in fact amount with Khrushchev
arguing against a moral basis that he himself had built. Thus, the Romanian leadership,
grabbing those principles and refusing to let go, motivated every different Romanian
position through its commitment to sovereignty, independence or non-interference in
internal affairs as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it.239
As previously mentioned, one of Khrushchevs main arguments in supporting the
CMEA specialisation and integration was ideological. Drawing from Marxist-Leninist
theory, the Soviet leader contended that our countries have now reached the phase when
besides the national economy one must show serious attention to the construction of the
economy of the world socialist system as a whole.240 According to Gheorghiu-Dej and
other Romanian decision makers, this was one of the worst of Khrushchevs theses
because, if accepted, it would lead to the disappearance of national borders.
The Romanian leaders acknowledged that Khrushchevs arguments originated in
Marxist-Leninist theory according to which states emerged under certain historical
conditions and would disappear when a communist society would finally replace the
socialist society. This is why they did not like when bloc members talked about the new
phase of relations that the socialist states had allegedly reached in their development as,
in their interpretation, such a formulation implied that the moment when the national
236

The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 6, 107, 472-473;
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 6-7, 22,
32-33, 39, 47, 70-136; Interviews with Brldeanu in Betea, 129-131.
237
Notes from the 2 April 1964 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 13/1964, 6.
238
The minutes of the 16 May 1960 Politburo Meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 26/1960, 1-46.
239
The minutes of the 19 august 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations, in Budura,
2005, 510; Sfetcu, 300.
240
Khrushchevs speech in Bucharest on 24 June 1962, in Scnteia, 25 June 1962.

75

borders would be dismantled was close. Moreover, according to the Romanians

perceptions, Khrushchevs appeal to Marxist-Leninist theory was just a subterfuge used to
reach the unjust objectives of a hidden agenda which aimed in fact to control Romanias
resources and territory. As Gheorghiu-Dej argued in the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo
meeting, the CMEA members considered that
Romania sits on riches as the hen sits on its clutch241; they want the eggs, they thought how
to proceed [to get them] and came with an avalanche of Marxist formulations; and if we
say something now, we are called anti-Marxists.

The RWP Politburo members considered that the Soviets interpreted and manipulated
the teachings of Marxism-Leninism to fit their unjust objectives and that Khrushchev
had in fact abdicated from Marxism-Leninism, not in all matters, but in the important
problems such as collaboration, construction of socialism, relations with capitalist states.
In their view, according to Khrushchev, socialism from now on must be based on the
renunciation of national sovereignty as Ceauescu phrased it or that was a thesis that
had nothing to do with Marxist-Leninist teachings, just as the Soviet working method of
dictating its will to the other parties or of imposing its plans to the other states had
nothing to do with Leninism either.
In theory, Gheorghiu-Dej accepted the Marxist argument that under certain historical
conditions states were to disappear, but he prompted his colleagues to argue, when
presented with such ideas, that the time for action in such a direction had not ripened yet
and that only when Europe will be a federation of socialist states, the situation will be
different. According to the Romanian leader, the possibility for Europe to become a
federation of socialist states was very unlikely. Thus, his counterargument was not one
derived from ideological convictions. It was merely a way of using an officially acceptable
idea to justify a position that derived from his commitment to secure the states national
interest which he defined in terms of territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty etc.
Several Politburo members (such as Gheorghiu-Dej, Petre Boril or Leonte Rutu) also
observed the theoretical contradictions within the Marxist-Leninist teachings. Noting
that Lenin fought against the theory concerning the creation of the United States of
Europe by appealing to the principle of sovereignty, they decided in February 1963 to
juxtapose to the integration theories the principle of sovereignty exactly as Lenin did
as they phrased it. Observing that Khrushchev justified his pro-integration position with
quotations from Lenin, the Romanian leaders decided to oppose integration with
quotations from the same classics of Marxist-Leninist theory, but also with quotations
from the 1957 and 1960 Declarations or from the Basic Principles which recognised the
principles of sovereignty, independence, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual
advantage principles that were, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, even so too limited. Such
a principled and just Romanian position was to muddle the Soviets plans of accusing
the Romanians of being nationalist, anti-Marxist or 'anti-internationalists' the
Romanian Politburo members argued in February 1963.242
241

He was quoting A. Zasiadkos opinion as expressed during the Romanian-Soviet economic negotiations
from May-June 1961. See supra, Subchapter 3.1.2.
242
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 8,
15-21, 31, 61-69, 78-80, 90, 101-107, 117-118.

76

To gather quotes from the classics of Marxism-Leninism, as the Romanian leaders

put it, the Secretariat of the CC of the RWP was asked to elaborate the so-called
documentary reports formed of those parts from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, but
also from the 1957 or 1960 Declarations or from Khrushchevs works or declarations on
the notions of sovereignty, independence, equality in rights or territorial integrity. The
Romanian leaders decided that such quotes were to represent Romanias principled and
moral basis in rejecting the others interpretations and ideological arguments supporting
bloc integration. The Romanian archives provide numerous documentary reports of this
kind, often annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej.243
According to the Romanian interpretations, not only the USSR, but the entire bloc was
interpreting the Marxist-Leninist teachings on sovereignty, industrialisation or
independence, in order to fit their goals. Monitoring press and academic articles, but also
party and state leaders declarations244 with regard to the CMEA reforms, the Romanian
leaders concluded in early 1963 that all Eastern European states were focusing (under the
guidance of the Soviet leadership) on the re-interpretation of the notion of sovereignty
with the aim to create a theoretical argument able to justify their integration plan which
was in fact motivated by their abject objectives and not by ideological considerations.
Thus, the Soviets derived their arguments from the Leninist teachings and argued that the
world socialist system had reached a phase of development that asked for new practical
forms of organisation, but the Romanians were convinced that the USSR wanted in fact to
control Romanias natural resources and that in order to reach such a goal its leaders
abusively and wrongly reinterpreted the Marxist-Leninist teachings.245
Monitoring the other leaders articles and declarations, Gheorghiu-Dej was especially
worried of the Soviets arguments that sovereignty had become a historical notion and
that the borders between states were no longer political barriers but particularly economic
barriers that needed to be surpassed in the common interest of all bloc members and
especially in the interest of the small bloc countries.246 Other articles also argued that the
economic independence had become an outdated notion or that some countries used
to wrongly promote an autarchic economy.247 Such texts were usually signed by some
obscure names, but the Romanian leaders believed that they represented in fact the official
position of the other bloc leaders, and especially the Soviets, since as Gheorghiu-Dej
put it we know that nothing could be published within the bloc countries without the
243

See for instance Documentary Report with references to sovereignty and national independence, 20 April
1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 29/1963, 1-20.
244
For the period November 1962-April 1963 see, for instance, the articles, synthesis, notes, reports from
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 112/1963, 44-222; File 113/1963, 25-36; File 114/1963, 22-50.
245
See for instance Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on A. Nikitins article Economic problems in the period of
the building of communism, published in Economiceskaia Gazeta, no 18/1963, reproduced in the Agerpres
Bulletin from 7 May 1963, ANIC, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection Fond 80, File 828, Vol. I, 70-81;
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File. 4/1963, 8, 1521, 31, 61-69, 78-80, 90, 101-107, 117-118.
246
See for instance A. Paszynski, Integration means more than we could imagine in the Polish Magazine,
20 April 1963. Translated in Romanian and annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, 9 May 1963, ANIC, Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej Collection Fond 80, File 927, 59-63.
247
See, for instance, Josef Koshnar, Our economic problems and the CMEA in Pravda, the official
newspaper of the CC of the Communist Party of Slovakia, 13 May 1963. Translated in Romanian and
annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, 22 May 1963, ANIC, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection Fond 80, File
927, 71-76.

77

official approval of the leadership of the respective parties.248 Moreover, not only some
insignificant journalists wrote articles contesting the states borders and sovereignty, but
also the leaders of parties and states, as Ghizela Vass complained on 9 April 1963 to I.K.
Zhegalin, the Soviet Ambassador in Romania. 249
Thus, until February 1963, the Romanians opposed the bloc specialisation and
integration indirectly, agreeing in principle with the others proposals, but arguing that it
was not yet the right time for implementing such proposals into practice, that one should
conduct studies on the necessity of integration and specialisation prior to actually taking
measures of integration, that Romania needed more time to formulate an official opinion
on the matter, etc. However, from February 1963 onwards, they openly opposed
integration on the grounds that it contravened the Leninist principle of sovereignty.

4.4 Settling the integration dispute

In late February 1963, the Romanian leaders feared that the Soviet leadership and its bloc
supporters intended to use the following 5th and 6th Sessions of the Executive Committee
of the CMEA (scheduled for April and May 1963) and the following annual CMEA
meeting (scheduled for June 1963 and then postponed to July 1963) to impose upon
Romania, through fait accompli tactics, the creation of CMEA supranational bodies.
Therefore, they decided that a document had to be elaborated and spread fast, as a tool to
block such (perceived) bloc manoeuvres and plans.
If until then the Romanian representatives had often used the postponing argument that
they could not agree or disagree with the concrete proposals of integration because an
official position had not been formulated yet by the RWPs forums, after the issuing of the
document they intended to reason that Romania could not accept integration because the
party had decided otherwise namely to oppose integration because it infringed the
principle of sovereignty which had been commonly accepted by all the socialist states.250
This plan however was gradually abandoned, due to a series of events triggered by another
manoeuvre by Khrushchev in early March 1963 which aimed, according to the
Romanians perceptions, to transform the Romanian-Yugoslav Iron Gates Power Plant
into a bloc common enterprise.251

4.4.1 The Iron Gates Power Plant project

In the 1950s, the CMEA had addressed on several occasions the problem of the
exploitation of the energy potential of the Danube River, selecting Nagymaros as the most
convenient place to build a future power plant. In October 1958, Antal Apr (Hungary)
248

Note regarding the 3 April 1963 discussions with Y. V. Andropov, in Retegan, 2002, 192-217.
Note of the conversation between I. K Zhegalin, G. Vass and C. Lzrescu, 9 April 1963, Bucharest,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File no 6/1963, 9-12.
250
The minutes of the26-27 February 1963Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 135
251
Khrushchevs letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, 9 March 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relation, File 18 U/1963, 45-51.
249

78

and Karel Polacek (Czechoslovakia) signed an accord regarding the construction (in 19611965) of a hydro-electrical power plant at Nagymaros.252
The Yugoslav-Romanian discussions regarding the construction of the Iron Gates
complex on the Danube River began also in the 1950s, and in 1956 a bilateral commission
was established to look into the matter.253 In the late 1950s and early 1960s Bulgaria
became interested in the Romanian-Yugoslav project, considering that it had the potential
to provide cheap electricity for the Bulgarian emerging economy. 254 In October 1961,
Anton Jukov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, wrote to the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion
Gheorghe Maurer, and to the President of Yugoslavia, Josef Broz Tito, stating Bulgarias
interest in participating in the construction of the Iron Gates Power Plant. The Romanians
agreed in principle, but Tito responded (in April 1962) that Bulgarias involvement in
the project was not necessary.255 In late 1962, Khrushchev was considering that the
electric power station near the Iron Gates on the Danube would be profitable for the bloc
if it was to be constructed together by the bloc members.256
Although interesting, studying the Soviet intensions here is beyond the scope of this
research which focuses instead on how the Romanian leaders responded to perceived
Soviet plans. Thus, in 1962-1963, when the other bloc members began to talk about the
bloc common enterprises, the Romanian initial benevolent attitude towards Bulgarias
participation in the Iron Gates project disappeared completely. At the 4th Session of the
EC-CMEA held in February 1963 in Moscow, when Lesechko and Khrushchev (among
others) proposed the participation of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in the construction and
operating of the Iron Gates Plant, Brldeanu opposed arguing that Yugoslavia did not
agree.257 Afterwards, however, the Romanians would oppose such a proposal with the
argument that it contravened the Leninist principle of sovereignty.
Disregarding the Romanian opposition, on 9 March 1963, Khrushchev sent a circular
letter to all the European socialist states and to Yugoslavia, writing that the Soviet Union
together with other countries members in the CMEA agreed to participate in the
construction of the Danube complex. Benefiting from the participation of all the Danube
riverside countries who were members of the CMEA, the complex would solve many of
the energy problems of the Council, the Soviet leader wrote. Although this letter made no
direct reference to the Iron Gates project258, according to the Romanian perceptions, the
252

Open Society Archives (OSA), Radio Free Europe Report Czechoslovak-Hungarian hydroelectric
project in the Danube Valley dropped, 17 January 1969, at
http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/20-1-349.shtml, accessed on 25 October 2012.
253
The Protocol no 7 of the 13 May 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 20/1963, 1-3.
254
Bulgaria had begun a program of rapid industrialisation, her need for electricity was increasing. Unable to
produce the necessary electricity, Bulgaria imported it mainly from Romania and from the Soviet Union,
through Romania.
255
Correspondence between the Romanian, Yugoslav and Bulgarian officials, August 1959-June 1962,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, Alphabetical, File 4 B/1945-1960, 16-58, 87-88, 145-149; File
7I/1944-1965, 123-139.
256
Miller Center. Minutes 75b of 30 December 1962, regarding the Information by Comrade N.S.
Khrushchev on the conversations with Gomuka, available at
http://web1.millercenter.org/kremlin/62_12_30.pdf, accessed on 1 October 2013.
257
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no. 4/1963,
13-19, 30-31, 102-103.
258
The Romanian-Yugoslav seven-year-long negotiations regarding the Iron Gates Complex ended in the
spring of 1963. The accord regulating the common construction and exploitation of the complex was signed

79

Soviet real aim was to secure the involvement of other states in the construction and
operation of the Iron Gates complex.259 Moreover, when I.K. Zhegalin, the Soviet
ambassador in Bucharest, communicated on 11 March 1963 to Gheorghiu-Dej that one
has to discuss the problems raised in this letter at the next [1963] CMEA conference260,
the threat perceptions of the Romanian leaders grew exponentially.
According to the Romanian leadership, the Soviets intended through this letter, firstly,
to instigate the others CMEA states against Romania by providing them with the implicit
argument that Romanias opposition to the creation of a Danube multinational complex
was the main cause of their energy deficit261 and, secondly, to force upon Romania,
through (perceived) fait accompli tactics, a decision made without the participation of the
Romanian leadership. On 15 March 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej responded to Khrushchev that
Romania cannot agree and is categorically against this idea because it represents an
infringement of its sovereignty rights. The Romanian leader further stressed that our
position does not come from national selfishness or from not understanding the needs of
the other friendly countries, but from our duty to defend the principle of sovereignty. 262
All the states that had received Khrushchevs 9 March letter were sent the same
response.263 In mid-April 1963, Tito also responded to Khrushchevs 9 March letter
arguing that the Romanian-Yugoslav negotiations regarding the Iron Gates project were
far too advanced to accommodate the involvement of other states.264
On 29 March 1963, Andropov called Bucharest, stating that the Presidium of the CC of
the CPSU approved in unanimity the position and point of view in the 15 March
Romanian letter. Andropov offered then to travel to Bucharest, if the Romanian leadership
had nothing against it, in order to personally bring a Soviet letter of response.265 In early
April 1963, Andropov brought to Bucharest another letter by Khrushchev (dated 30 March
1963). The Romanians delayed their answer to this missive and another Soviet delegation
(headed by N. V. Podgorny) visited Romania between 24 May and 5 June and brought a
third letter by Khrushchev (dated 23 May 1963). On 8 June 1963, Ceauescu travelled to
Moscow to personally hand Khrushchev a 32-pages-long letter of response, encompassing
Romanias views with regard to the CMEA integration and to the unity of the camp a
euphemism referring to the Sino-Soviet dispute. On 24-25 June 1963 Khrushchev
on 30 November 1963 in Belgrade by Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito. The State Council of Romania ratified the
accord on 24 June 1964, and the construction of the complex began in September 1964. The first hydro
generator of the Iron Gates Complex began to function in August 1970. Giurescu, 572-573, 578, 614;
Scnteia, 1 December 1963.
259
Khrushchevs letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, 9 March 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relation, File 18 U/1963, 45-51.
260
Note regarding the conversation between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and I.K. Zhegalin, 11 March 1963,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File no 5/1963-1964, 30-36.
261
For instance Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on Khrushchevs 23 May 1963 letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 18 U/1963, 169-182.
262
Gheorghiu-Dejs letter to Khrushchev, 15 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 18
U/1963, 28-39.
263
Note, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1963, 3-8; Protocol no 4 of the 14 March 1963
Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1963, 1.
264
Note regarding the talks between Brldeanu and A. Milatovich, Yugoslavias ambassador to Romania;
30 April 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 5/1963-1964, 42-43.
265
Note regarding the telephone conversations between Y.V. Andropov and Ghisela Vass, respectively
Andropov and Gheorghiu-Dej, 29 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 17U/1963, 17-18.

80

travelled to Bucharest and the CMEA integration dispute was finally settled in Romanias
favour, as the next two sections of this chapter will detail. 266

4.4.2 Bargaining a compromise

In early 1963, despite their formal alliance, Romania and the USSR had come to the point
where their CMEA-related goals and interests were divergent. Romania wanted to
maintain the status quo in the CMEA or even to reduce its role and power as the
Romanian leaders put it267, while the USSR wanted to reform the Council towards
specialisation and supranational integration. Khrushchevs letter from 9 March 1963
triggered four months of Romanian-Soviet negotiations on integration.
During this time, the Romanian leaders postponed the issuing of the document about
which they were talking in February 1963. Moreover, they rapidly learned that threatening
the Soviets with making public such a text was their best bargaining asset. These secret
negotiations were carried out on two levels, exchange of letters and bilateral talks (Table
no 1). Within the letters written official documents the Romanians opposed integration
on the grounds that it contravened the Leninist principle of sovereignty, but during the
verbal (formal and informal) negotiations, they often made allusive threats to making
Romanias disagreements with the USSR public and to involving China in the CMEA
reform debates.
Table 1: The Romanian-Soviet exchange of letters (March-June 1963)
9 March
15 March
30 March
23 May
7 June
24-25 June

Soviet letter.
Romanian letter of response.
Soviet letter of response. Brought to Bucharest by Y. V.
Andropov. Bilateral negotiations. No agreement.
Another Soviet letter of response. Brought to Bucharest by
N.V. Podgorny. Bilateral negotiations. No agreement.
Romanian letter of response. Brought to Moscow by N.
Ceauescu. No negotiations.
Khrushchev visited Romania. Bilateral negotiations on the
basis of these letters. A compromise is reached.

Khrushchev responded to the 15 March 1963 Romanian letter through a missive dated
30 March. The Soviet leader wrote that the Romanian leadership had misunderstood his 9
March proposals and intentions, that only the interested countries were to participate in the
construction and valorisation of the multilateral Danube complex, that the USSR did not
intend to infringe the sovereign rights of Romania or of the Danube riverside countries
and did not pursue any selfish goals or interests. Khrushchev confessed then that he was
266

The CIA wrongly reported in late June 1963 that Gheorghiu-Dej flew to Moscow to settle the CMEA
divergences with Khrushchev, but in fact the Soviet leader travelled to Bucharest. The Central Intelligence
Bulletin, 28 June 1963, at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP79T00975A007100130001-8.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2013.
267
The minutes of the meeting [of the RWP leadership], 11 June 1962, ANIC, CC RCP , Office, File
27/1963, 1-15.

81

surprised and pained that such interpretations of the sovereignty principle could appear
in Romania, our closest friend with which there had never been the smallest harshness.
His letter did not intend to begin a dispute with the Romanian party, Khrushchev
continued, on the contrary, I completely agree with you and I hope that, through this [30
March letter], the problem will be exhausted so that the misunderstanding that it [the 9
March letter] caused will not generate prejudices in the fraternal and friendship relations
between our parties, between our countries.268 Such a turn of phrase, however, was
perceived in Romania as a concealed threat and was deciphered in the sense that if the
Romanians continued to misinterpret and misunderstand the Soviet intentions, then the
Soviets would take measures so that the bilateral friendship would suffer.
On 2 April 1963269, bilateral talks were held in Bucharest between Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Nicolae Ceauescu, Alexandru Brldeanu, Emil
Bodnra, Ghisela Vass and Andrei Pcuraru, on the one hand, and Y. V. Andropov, I.K.
Zhegalin, the Soviet Ambassador in Romania, and E.D. Karpischenko, functionary in the
apparatus of the CC of the CPSU, on the other hand. The talks were held based on
Khrushchevs 30 March 1963 letter. Reiterating the arguments from the letter, Andropov
tried to convince the Romanians that there was no bloc conspiracy 270 targetting
Romanias sovereignty.271 The Soviet delegate pleaded with the Romanians to
immediately settle the difference of opinions and to not let them expand any further. He
also stressed that in the problem of collaboration a euphemism to name the integration
dispute there were no differences of opinions between the Romania and the Soviet
leaderships and there were no problems able to divide Romania and the USSR.
According to the Soviet messenger, the USSR wanted the relations with Romania to be
as clear as they have been until now.
From Khrushchevs letter and from Andropovs declarations, the Romanian leaders
concluded that the Soviet leadership had already renounced not only the Danube Complex
idea but also to its integration proposals in general. They decided nonetheless that, being
in the advantage, it was the time to lead the Soviets in a merry dance. Thus, they carried
on the sovereignty debate, providing Andropov with numerous proofs and with
evidence of the bloc sovereignty conspiracy. The Documentary Reports on the many
bloc articles and declarations fostering integration were used on this occasion by
Gheorghiu-Dej, Brldeanu, Ceauescu or Maurer who proved by appealing to them that
there was a big gap between, on the one hand, Khrushchevs declarations that the CMEA
integration was not to infringe on the states sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity, and, on the other hand, the practical CMEA proposals or the practical
268

Khrushchevs letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, 30 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 18
U/1963, 137-157.
269
The Romanian archives provide us with The Note regarding the discussions with Y.V. Andropov from 3
April 1963 (ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 18/1963, 2-25). However, there is an error regarding the date, as
the meeting took place a day earlier, on 2 April 1963, between 11:30 AM and 2:30 PM. According to
another archival document (The minutes of the 3 April 1963Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office,
file 17/1963, 5-24), on 3 April 1963, at 11:00 AM, a meeting of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP was
already taking place, analysing the previous days talks with Andropov. Moreover, according to a Note
regarding the 2 April 1963 talks with Andropov over lunch (ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
13/1963, 1-13), Andropov left Romania in the morning of 3 April, at 8 AM.
270
Complot, in Romanian.
271
Talks with Andropov over lunch, 2 April 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 13/1963, 1-6.

82

implications of the integration theories as they had been advanced in different bloc
articles asking for common enterprises or supranational planning bodies.
Brldeanu exemplified this bloc conspiracy against Romania as follows. Firstly,
Economiceskaia Gazeta, which was not an insignificant magazine, but an official
newspaper of the CC of the CPSU, he stressed, wrote that the state frontiers that had
appeared during history were no longer in accordance with the present economic
necessities and that the notion of the national economy is outdated nowadays. Secondly,
Brldeanu continued, the CMEA leaders proposed the creation of the inter-state economic
unions and of the common planning body. Putting such pieces together, the Romanian
leadership had no other interpretation available but that one wanted to tear pieces from
the countries as in a childrens brick game and recombine them as one likes. This was an
idea with which Romania could never agree because it contravened the principles of
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs,
Brldeanu concluded.
Ceauescu and Gheorghiu-Dej gave another example. They observed that different
bloc economists argued in their articles that the communist world had to be divided into
two regions, one more developed and one less developed, that China was destined to
remain a backward country, and that the CMEA, after its reorganisation, was to also
include socialist advanced and socialist backward regions. First, such theories were
advanced by economists and scholars in academic journals, and then one made proposals
regarding the CMEA specialisation and integration. Putting these two observations
together, Ceauescu argued, the Romanian leadership could reach but one conclusion
through integration and specialisation one intended to transform Romania into a backward
country of the communist world. But, Romanian could never accept such a very
dangerous theory which did not take into consideration the interests of the states or the
principles of sovereignty, equality in rights and independence, because Romania had the
internationalist duty to defend those principles, the two Romanian leaders further
stressed. Moreover, they noted, Romania intended to present its views on these matters
through a public declaration that was (allegedly) under elaboration.
Andropov argued in response that between the two parts there might have been at most
some economic misunderstandings regarding bloc collaboration, but that such problems
could be easily cleared out without letting them alter the framework of the political
bilateral friendship. This turn of phrase was again perceived as a threat in the sense that if
Romania did not accept to clear out the observed problems, then the Romanian-Soviet
political friendship would suffer the consequences. On the other hand, observing
Andropovs plea for settling the dispute immediately, the Romanian leaders concluded
that the Soviets were also interested to preserve unaltered the bilateral friendship relations
with Romania for reasons of prestige and security. Because they were so concerned to
preserve the image of a united bloc, the Soviets were very vulnerable the Romanian
leaders considered to the threat of making public Romanias different opinion.
Therefore, they repeatedly formulated, in their talks with Andropov, the allusive threat that
Romania was to make the Romanian-Soviet disagreements public with regard to both the
CMEA reform and the Sino-Soviet dispute, the latter suggesting possible Romanian
support for the Chinese in their dispute with Moscow. Andropov was informed that
Romania was preoccupied not only with the CMEA collaboration, but with the Chinese

83

problem as well and that the declaration that the RWP intended to issue soon would
tackle also the problem of the unity of the camp.
During their talks with Andropov, the Romanian leaders used the China-related
arguments as a tactic to block the CMEA reform. As it had been decided in the 26-27
February 1963 Politburo meeting, the Romanian leaders agreed with the others proposals
for the Councils reform, but, noting that the reform aimed at increasing the CMEAs
economic efficiency to the benefit of the entire world socialist system, they asked
Andropov if all the world socialist countries would be involved in the process of reform.
Would China, North Korea or North Vietnam be asked what they thought about the
reorganisation of the Council? Why were the Asian states not members of the CMEA,
were they not part of the world socialist system? Was the socialist world system formed by
just few European socialist states? Presented with these questions Andropov was told
though that they had been actually raised by ordinary party members and citizens and that
the Romanian leaders, not knowing how to answer, had decided to pass them on to the
Soviet comrades. In response, Andropov proposed the convening of a meeting between
Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev. The Romanian leadership accepted the proposal in
principle, but argued that the meeting would take place only after the elaboration of the
official document encompassing the views of Romania, so that the two leaders could
discuss on the basis of that document. 272
During the next two months the Romanian leadership left the Soviets guessing what
Romania would do next. They did not hurry to respond to the 30 March 1963 Soviet letter
or to the proposal regarding Khrushchevs visit to Bucharest.273 In the meantime, the 5th
and the 6 th Sessions of the EC-CMEA were held in Moscow (17-25 April) and in Warsaw
(10-13 May). The Romanian leaders used these meetings to test the Soviet positions, to
see if the Soviets or other delegates would re-open the talks on the creation of the
supranational bodies at those sessions. Observing that concrete proposals of integration
were no longer advanced at the EC-CMEA sessions and that the Soviet delegates there
actually supported the positions of Romanian delegates, the Romanian leaders concluded
that their secret tough negotiations with the Soviets had begun to yield results.274
Meanwhile, the Romanian leadership mastered a gradual rapprochement with China
(to be detailed in the next chapter) designed to put additional pressures on the Soviets to
accommodate Romanias views in the integration problem. This manoeuvre rapidly
proved useful and if in late 1962 Romania was rarely mentioned in the Chinese press275,
from April 1963 onwards the Chinese media began to publish laudatory articles about
Romania and her economic achievements. In late April 1963 the Communiqu of the 5-8
March 1963 Plenum of the RWP was published in China, signalling according to
Dumitru Gheorghiu, Romanias ambassador in Beijing the improvement of political
relations between the two states.
272

Note regarding the 2 April 1963discussions with Andropov; The minutes of the 3 April 1963 Politburo
meeting of the CC of the RWP, in Retegan, 2002, 192-240.
273
The Minutes of the 13 May 1963 Politburo meeting, in Retegan, 2002, 241-272 .
274
The documents discussed and approved in the April-May 1963 sessions of the EC-CMEA, Brldeanus
discourse at the May CMEA session; The minutes of the meeting of the 8 May 1963 and 15 May Politburo
meetings, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File no 28/1963, 97-122; File no 53/1962-1963, 1-129;
ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 19/1963, 1-153; File no 21/1963, 25-28, 86-89.
275
Report of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, AMAE, Fond China, Problema 217/1962, 258-259

84

The echoes of the 1963 Romanian-Soviet CMEA disagreements reached most of the
world, including Washington, London, Belgrade, Berlin or Beijing. 276 It would be very
interesting to study at some time in the future in more depth the echoes (in the West, in the
East or in the Far East) of the Romanian-Soviet early 1960s disagreements, but as
interesting as this would be, it is not the purpose of this study, which instead concentrates
on the Romanian views and interpretations of those echoes.
According to Dumitru Gheorghiu and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the echoes in Beijing
of the Romanian-Soviet disagreements contributed to the improvement of the RomanianChinese relations, a result that further increased, they thought, Romanias space of
manoeuvre during the April-June 1963 secret integration negotiations with the Soviets. To
cultivate the (perceived) Soviet fear that Romania might end up in the arms of the
Chinese, Gheorghiu-Dej instructed the Romanian diplomats in Beijing to use every
opportunity they had to link, during their talks with Soviet representatives there, the
CMEA divergences with the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus, every time a Soviet diplomat
would address the problem of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Romanian counterpart had to
respond by bringing up the CMEA integration.
One example of how this directive was implemented is provided by the 18 May 1963
talks between Ilya Sergeevich Shcherbakov, advisor at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, and
Dumitru Gheorghiu. Presenting the Soviet views on the Sino-Soviet dispute, Shcherbakov
asked for Romanias opinion. To this Dumitru Gheorghiu responded by directing the
discussion towards the CMEA disagreements as A. Bezerian, First Secretary at the
Romanian Embassy, later reported to Bucharest. Shcherbakov had to let aside the
discussion on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to respond. Thus, he declared that there are
probably problems in the CMEA, but they, of course, would be solved in a comradely
spirit. He also insisted that the CMEA reform proposals had not originated in Moscow.
Ambassador Gheorghiu and Gheorghiu-Dej were convinced that such a benevolent
Soviet attitude towards Romanias CMEA views was due only to the Soviets fear that
Romania might take the Chinese side and might make her disagreement with Moscow
public. The Romanian leaders decided therefore to continue cultivating this (perceived)
Soviet fear as leverage in the CMEA integration dispute.277

276

For instance, OSA, Radio Free Europe Reports, Background Reports (HU OSA 300-8-3), Soviet
Romanian Relations, 23 March 1963, at http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:5eab7a9ef6ba-4f97-8647-1128237c4134; Soviet-Romanian differences, 6 June 1963,
http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:efbb7851-80f4-47ed-b46e-07fac8ca6246, accessed 9
October 2013; Situation Reports Series (HU OSA 300-8-47), Situation Report Romania, 5 July 1963, at
http://www.osaarchivum.org/greenfield/repository/osa:a0c1c4ee-53f0-4155-a97e-83079bb591f6, accessed
on 9 October, 2013; CIA FOIA Archive, Memorandum of 20 December 1963, at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP80B01676R002900300004-6.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2013; Central Intelligence Bulletin, 28 June
1963, at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP79T00975A007100130001-8.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2013.
277
Note of audience regarding the visit of Ilya Sergeevich Shcherbakov, advisor at the Soviet Embassy in
Beijing, to Dumitru Gheorghiu, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 55/1963, 9-12; Report of the
Romanian Embassy in Beijing, 25 May 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 55/1963, 1-7.

85

According to I.K Zhegalin, the Soviet leaders wanted to settle the integration dispute
with Romania prior to the opening of the 1963 CMEA annual conference.278 Because the
Romanians had not responded yet to the 30 March 1963 letter or to the proposal regarding
a visit of Khrushchev to Bucharest, on 24 May- 5 June 1963, the Soviet leadership under
the pretext of an exchange of experience sent another delegation to Romania, headed
by N.V. Podgorny (member of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU and First Secretary of
the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine). Anticipating that Podgorny was to raise the
same problems and in the same manner as Andropov had done the previous month, in its
13 May meeting the RWPs Politburo decided to respond to Podgorny with the same
arguments that it had used during Andropovs visit. Gheorghiu-Dej prompted his
colleagues to receive the new Soviet messenger with friendship because, although
Romania would make no compromise in the integration problems, the bilateral
divergences must not be allowed to alter the feelings of friendship towards the Soviet
Union, towards the CPSU, towards the Soviet people [as] our interest is to maintain good
relations with our [Soviet] comrades.279
Podgorny brought to Bucharest another letter, dated 23 May 1963, signed by
Khrushchev and addressed to Gheorghiu-Dej. Khrushchev wrote that the Soviet leadership
was worried because it had not received any Romanian response to its previous letters and
that consequently it considered necessary to review its considerations regarding the
problems that had caused Romanias violent reaction as formulated in the 15 March
Romanian letter. Khrushchev argued again that the Romanians had misunderstood the
Soviet proposals with regard to the bloc economic reform, that the integration projects
were not designed to infringe on the sovereignty of the states, that the Soviet Union was
very rich in natural resources and needs nothing from Romania except her friendship and
mutual understanding. The most displeasing in Romanian reaction to the Soviet proposals
was, Khrushchev argued further, that the Romanian leaders made the big secrets public
and that on the occasion of different party meetings organised around the country the
Soviet Union, the CPSU and its leadership were publicly criticised.
Stressing the Soviet Unions commitment to the bilateral friendship framework, the
Soviet leader implied though that Romanias obstinacy to continue opposing would result
in the deterioration of the [bilateral] relations. If such a thing happened, then Romania
was the culpable one and the one that was to suffer the most. The Soviet Union was highly
committed to the bilateral alliance and was expecting proof that Romania was committed
too. The Soviet Union and the CPSU wanted to preserve the relations of friendship with
Romania and with the RWP, because it would be an absurdity, it would be simply and
solely wrong if we [the Romanians and the Soviets] would allow a deterioration of the
relations between the USSR and the RPR, two fraternal socialist countries. Khrushchev
also reminded that Ion Antonescu had brought Romania in a war against the Soviet Union.
He also insinuated that the Romanian Communist Party had supported Antonescus regime
and stressed that the current Romanian party leadership was again casting shadows on
the bilateral friendship. He openly reasoned that Romanias unfriendly and anti-Soviet
actions could lead to the termination of the Romanian-Soviet friendship framework and
278

Note on the conversation between I.K Zhegalin, G. Vass and C. Lzrescu, 9 April 1963, Bucharest,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 6/1963, 9-12.
279
The Minutes of the 13 May 1963 Politburo meeting, in Retegan, 2002, 241-272.

86

could place again the Romanian-Soviet relations in a sphere of enmity. According to

Gheorghiu-Dej, these were direct threats designed to intimidate the Romanian leadership
and to force Romania to exculpate herself from the blame of being a threat (or having
been a threat) to the Soviet Unions interests.280
The Romanian leaders worryingly observed that the subject of Romanias participation
in the anti-Soviet war was also publicly addressed in the USSR or in other bloc countries,
in different books or articles.281 They believed that this bringing into the public debate of
Romanias participation in the war against the USSR was the Soviet leaderships way of
indirectly threatening that if Romania continued with the alleged anti-Soviet attitudes,
then the USSR would terminate the Romanian-Soviet friendship framework. According to
the Romanian leaders, this was the ultimate threat to Romanias interests, not because the
dismantling of the Romanian-Soviet alliance would have bereft Romania of Soviet
military support in the event of a Western attack, but because the Soviets presented
Romania with an either/or alternative either devoted, loyal friends or enemies, either
with us or against us, there was no third alternative available.
The Romanian leaders believed that the Soviet leadership used this false dichotomy
intentionally as a means to force upon them choices that otherwise they would not agree
to. Every time Romania would choose a direction that displeased Moscow no matter
how small and insignificant the problem would have been, such as changing the name of a
street, deciding the citizenship of a child born from a mixed Romanian-Soviet couple or an
economic domestic measure the Soviet leaders reacted by accusing Romania of being
anti-Soviet, anti-Leninist, by threatening with the termination of the friendship
relationship, which amounted to the two sides being open enemies again, the Romanian
leaders observed/perceived in the early 1960s.282
Khrushchevs letter from 23 May 1963 was the basis for the Romanian-Soviet talks
held between the Romanian delegation headed by Gheorghiu-Dej and the Soviet one
headed by Podgorny. Held on 26 May 1963, the talks took again the form of a debate
about the socialist states right to national sovereignty and both parts reiterated their
previous arguments and positions. Podgorny openly argued that Romania had no reason to
fear that the USSR would encroach upon its neighbours' borders and incorporate their
territory as new republics.
On this occasion, both sides tried to use the Chinese problem as a bargaining chip to
maximise their chances of success. The Soviet delegates accused the Romanian leadership
of becoming pro-Chinese and therefore anti-Soviet, but Gheorghiu-Dej refused to take a
defensive position as he later argued and chose instead to be offensive. If Romanias
opposition to the CMEA integration meant that Romania was pro-Chinese then the
Romania leader sarcastically responded comrade Podgorny was kindly asked to please
280

Khrushchevs letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, 23 May 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP,

Foreign Relation, File 18 U/1963, 169-182.
281
See, for instance, Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on the February-March 1963 Reports regarding N.I.
Lebedevs Romania in the Second World War and V.B. Ushakovs Foreign policy of the Hitlerist Germany,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 48/1962, 1-9; ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 37/1963, 3-4.
282
Khrushchevs letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, 23 May 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relation, File 18 U/1963, 169-182; The minutes of the 5 June 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Office, File 25/1963, 4, 13-18; The minutes of the Romanian-Soviet talks in Moscow, 7-14 July 1964,
in Buga, 61, 75-79.

87

return to Moscow and tell N.S. Khrushchev that we became Chinese, that we suffer
from national isolation, from national narrowness, that we are nationalists283.
Because the Romanian leaders insisted that their position was to be soon made public
in an official declaration, Podgorny pleaded with them to not issue such a document
because there is no need for a document, but for an exchange of opinions () there is no
need for a bunch of documents; there is no need; if there are problems, then let us meet;
you do not need documents. He proposed secret and direct negotiations between
Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev. According to Epishev (alternate member in the CC of the
CPSU and member of the Soviet delegation), during such a meeting with Gheorghiu-Dej,
Khrushchev wanted to address to a lesser extent the CMEA technical problems and to a
greater extent the political consequences of those problems, namely the negative
consequences that the CMEA divergences which were in fact divergences between the
USSR and Romania, as the Soviet delegates reasoned had for the Romanian-Soviet
relations of friendship.284
Between 27 May and 3 June, the Soviet delegation headed by Podgorny travelled
around Romania, accompanied by Nicolae Ceauescu. On 3 June, the visitors returned to
Bucharest285 for a last round of discussions during which both delegations maintained their
previous positions. Concluding the talks, Podgorny employed a last (perceived) threat,
stressing the geographic proximity of the USSR to Romania and the Soviet power:
We [the Soviet delegates] thank you very much for having given us this opportunity [of
visiting Romania] all the more so that we are neighbours. Only the Danube River separates
us.286 Your ducks swim to us and our ducks swim to you. We live close [to each other] but
I did not manage to visit Romania until now. Of course, with a boat one could cross over to
your side. The border patrols would have let me pass, but you cannot cross the frontier
without anyone knowing, and even if you do cross someone might say what right do you
have to cross over without stating this to anyone? You cannot cross over without an
agreement. Of course, I joke when I speak of this thing.287

This joke, however, was perceived as a threat in Romania and during the Politburo
meeting from 5 June, the Romanian leaders debated on the best way to respond to such
(perceived) Soviet threats. Brldeanu proposed that the Romanian letter responding to
Khrushchevs May missive would explicitly address the topic of the Romanian-Soviet
war, to emphasise that, as Gheorghiu-Dej put it, Romania had paid and overpaid its debt
of honour for having fought the war against the USSR, that Romania had completely
respected the very difficult stipulations of the 1944 Armistice Agreement and of the 1947
Peace Treaty, and that, from that point of view, the two parties were even with each
283

Quotation marks in original. Terms borrowed by Gheorghiu-Dej from the public debate on the SinoSoviet dispute and on the CMEA integration.
284
The Minutes of the 26 May 1963 meeting between the Soviet and the Romanian delegations, in Retegan,
2002, 273-299.
285
Scnteia, 27 May, 4 June 1963.
286
The USSRs border with Romania followed also the Prut River. However, the Danube River defined the
border between Romania and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Podgorny was First Secretary of
the CC of the Communist Party of Ukraine.
287
The minutes of the 3 June 1963 meeting between the Romania and the Soviet delegations, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Office, file 24/1963, 2-20.

88

other. Gheorghiu-Dej argued instead that the Romanian leaders should not fall into the
(perceived) Soviet trap and that instead of exculpating Romania they should be offensive.
He reasoned that the Romanian letter of response should note that recalling some events
that happened during history was always instructive a phrase intended as an allusion
that Romania could also make public different historical facts that would certainly
displease the Soviets.
After long debates, the Romanian leaders decided that this matter was far too delicate
and that it needed to be approached with extreme care. Thus, although they were very
upset with the Soviet integration policy and with the (perceived) Soviet pressures and
threats, the Romanian leaders decided to raise the problems politely.288 Therefore, in
their 7 June289 letter of response to Khrushchev, the Romanians noted only briefly that it
was not the Romanian people that had fought the war against the USSR, but Antonescus
fascist regime. They repeatedly assured the Soviet leadership of the friendship of the
Romanian people, party and state, and agreed to the convening of a meeting between
Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev at a date to be chosen by the latter.
The more-than-30 pages long Romanian missive to Khrushchev from 7 June 1963 was
structured around three fundamental problems: the CMEA integration, Chinas
participation in the CMEA and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Regarding the first issue, the letter
argued that the RWP and Romania could not accept the unique planning body, the unique
plan, the common enterprises or the inter-state unions because they infringed on the
principles of sovereignty, independence, equality in rights etc. Romania was loyal to those
principles and it was its internationalist duty to prevent the negative economic and
political consequences that integration was to produce for the unity of the camp and for
the interests of the socialist states individually. Moreover, Gheorghiu-Dej emphasised
that in our opinion it is completely unacceptable that the concern of a party to respect
sovereignty as scrupulously as possible to be labelled as insularity, national
narrowness, national selfishness, nationalism or autarchic tendencies290.
For the first time in an official written document, Gheorghiu-Dej also raised the
problem of Chinas participation in the CMEA. He wrote that the Council reflected only
in part the socialist world system since it did not include all the socialist countries.
Although the letter did not explicitly mention China, North Korea or North Vietnam, these
countries had been mentioned on many occasions during different Romanian-Soviet verbal
1963 negotiations. Referring to the unity of the world communist movement problem,
Gheorghiu-Dej noted in his letter that the RWP supported the end of the public dispute.
Of course, differences of opinions can appear and do appear among the socialist
countries, but only comradely talks held on the basis of the principles elaborated in
288

The Protocol no 9 and The minutes of the 5 June 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
25/1963, 1-2, 4-28.
289
Sometimes, Romanian scholars (see, for instance Buga, Studiu introductiv, in Buga, 14) date this letter
to be from 13 June 1963, but the correct date is 7 June. On 8 June, Ceauescu was already handing over this
missive to Khrushchev in Moscow. The error is explained through the existence in the Romanian archives of
some copies of the 7 June letter, copies dated (and most likely produced on) 13 June. Gheorghiu-Dejs letter
to Khrushchev, 7 June 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 16 U/1963, 17-41; ANIC, CC of
RCP, Office, File 23/1963, 29-62.
290
Quotation marks in original. Terms borrowed from the public debate on the Sino-Soviet dispute and on
the CMEA integration.

89

common () represent a secure path to eliminate the divergences that appear and serve as
a guaranty of the unity, the Romanian leader argued.291
Sending Ceauescu to Moscow with this letter, the Romanian leadership did not expect
any spectacular results, as Gheorghiu-Dej later declared. It did not expect the Soviet
leadership to revise its position, to recognise or adopt the Romanian point of view.
The aim of this manoeuvre was instead to make our position known and to transmit once
more to the Soviet leadership that the Romanian leadership was determined to oppose the
CMEA integration publicly if it had to.292 Ceauescu had not been given the mandate to
negotiate, but Khrushchev used his presence in Moscow to try once more to calm the
Romanians down. On 8 June, Khrushchev repeated to Ceauescu that the CMEA
integration could not infringe on the states sovereignty, that the Council had a voluntary
basis, that only the interested states were to participate in the supranational bodies, that
the USSR was a rich country in no need to control the resources of other states and that the
USSR did not intend to incorporate another republic.
Complaining that the Romanian leadership had allowed one to publically criticise the
Soviet Union in meetings all over Romania, Khrushchev also employed threats. Just as the
Romanian leadership did in Romania, the Soviet leadership could also organise meetings
around the USSR to publicly and openly criticise Romania, allowing the Soviet population
to remember the time when Romanian armies reached Odessa, Khrushchev emphasised.
He added that
Antonescus armies occupied Odessa, Crimea; and [they] even reached Stalingrad. Many
of the people who remember this are still alive [in the USSR]. We [the Romanian and
Soviet leaderships] must not allow the return of the [Romanian-Soviet] relations from
Antonescus time. The fact that you [Romania] appealed to the masses could encourage us
[the USSR] to appeal to the masses as well.293

Analysing these (perceived) threats, the Romanian leaders considered that, although
possible, it was rather unlikely for the Soviet leadership to break off the bilateral
friendship relationship. They believed that, for security, economic and prestige reasons,
the Soviet Union was interested to preserve its alliance with Romania.294

4.4.3 Reaching an agreement

On 13 June 1963 the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest announced that Khrushchev would
arrive in Romania on 24 June.295 On 21 and 22 June, the RWPs Politburo debated on how
to receive the Soviet leader. Gheorghiu-Dej instructed his Politburo colleagues to limit the
291

Gheorghiu-Dejs letter to Khrushchev, 7 June 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 16 U/1963,
17-41.
292
The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 261.
293
Note regarding the conversation between N. Ceauescu and N.S. Khrushchev, 8 June 1963, Moscow,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations, 17U/1963, 33-52.
294
For instance, The minutes of the 5 June 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 25/1963,
13-18.
295
Note regarding the conversation between Gheorghiu-Dej and Zhegalin, 13 June 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, file 5/1963-1964, 58.

90

talks with Khrushchev to the three problems that had been raised in the Romanian letter
from 7 June and to avoid addressing any additional subject that the Soviet delegation
might have tried to tackle. It was also decided by the Romanians to use in their talks with
the Soviet leader the same arguments and tactics that had been used in April-June 1963
during the talks with Andropov and Podgorny. In other words, the Romanian leadership
planed to put special emphasis on the China-related arguments, on the intention of making
Romanias disagreement public and, above all, on the sovereignty argument.
Gheorghiu-Dej believed that Khrushchev feared that Romania might publically align
with the Chinese against Moscow. He also believed that this (perceived) Soviet fear was to
Romanias advantage and it had to be further cultivated. Gheorghiu-Dej also anticipated
that Khrushchev would most likely accommodate Romanias views on integration, just to
(hopefully) get Romanias alignment with the position of the CPSU against China in
return. To cultivate the (perceived) Soviet fear of a Romanian-Chinese rapprochement, the
RWPs Politburo members decided to resort to tactics of criticising integration along the
line advanced by the Chinese in their 25 points letter from 14 June 1963. According to the
21st point,
the relations between the socialist countries, whether large or small, and whether more
developed or less developed economically, must be based on the principles of complete
equality, respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, and must also be based on the principles of mutual support and
mutual assistance in accordance with proletarian internationalism. () It would be greatpower chauvinism to deny these basic principles and, in the name of international division
of labour296 or specialisation, to impose ones own will on others, infringe on the
independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries or harm the interests of their people.297

Evidence in the Romanian archives suggests that this 21 st point had been written with the
aim to support Romanias position in the CMEA and had been the result of intense secret
Romanian-Chinese negotiations.298 The next chapter will venture further into this aspect.
The Romanians planned to make no direct reference to China or to the Chinese 14 June
letter, but the Romanian leaders believed that the similarity between their views and the
Chinese views were to trouble the Soviet visitor to the extent of fearing an imminent
Romanian-Chinese collaboration, and that such a fear was to make him accommodate
Romanias views on integration. A last decision taken by the Politburo on 21-22 June
1963 was to appoint a delegation including as many Politburo members299 as possible to

296

Quotation marks in original.

The letter of the CC of the CCP to the CC of the CPSU, 14 June 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dejs
ANIC, Fond 80, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 827/1963, 268-330. I also used the translation
into English of this letter provided by the Marxist Internet Archive (MIA), at
http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm, accessed on 11
February 2011.
298
Emil Sorans Report concerning a discussions with the editors of Renmin Ribao, June 1963, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 1/1963, 70-75.
299
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Emil Bodnra, Petre Bril, Nicolae Ceauescu, Chivu Stoica, Alexandru
Drghici, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Moghioro, Alexandru Brldeanu, Dumitru Coliu, Leonte
Rutu, Leontin Sljan, tefan Voitec and Mihai Dalea.
297

91

meet with Khrushchev. That was a manoeuvre designed to prove to the Soviet leadership
how united the leadership of the RWP was in regard to the integration problem.300
The Romanian-Soviets talks were held on 24-25 June 1963 in Bucharest. The Soviet
delegation came to Bucharest determined to find an acceptable form of collaboration with
regard to the cooperation issue.301 It included N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev, A. N.
Kosygin, N. V. Podgorny, Y. V. Andropov and I. K. Zhegalin. Khrushchev opened the
talks by declaring that the meeting was not intended to confirm the divergences or to
rake up the relations, but to allow for an exchange of opinions regarding those problems
concerning our parties, our countries. As a compromise he proposed the Romanian
leaders to agree to solve the problems that we can solve and to put aside those problems
in which we have different opinions, openly admitting that you [the Romanians] may see
[the problems] differently. You have the right to disagree with us [the Soviets]. We do not
force you. During the talks, both leaderships acted for different reasons though to
limit the extent of the bilateral disagreements in what they called a theoretical ideological
difference of opinions about the principle of sovereignty, and both confirmed their
commitment to the framework of friendship.
During negotiations, the two delegations employed their arguments and tactics as they
had been used since March 1963. The Soviet delegation argued that the Romanians had
misunderstood the Soviet proposals, that the CMEA reform did not intend to infringe on
the states sovereignty or independence, and that specialisation was in fact based on
respecting sovereignty. The USSR did not support either the creation of the unique
planning body and of the inter-state unions and only the interested states were to
participate in such projects that were nonetheless to respect the principle of sovereignty,
the Soviet delegates repeatedly stressed. The Romanians also reiterated their position,
arguing that the bloc integration infringed on the principles that stood at the basis of the
relations between the socialist states and especially the principle of sovereignty and that,
for that reason, it could not be accepted.
Khrushchev also tried to use the argument that the CMEA reform proposals were
mandated by the postulates of Marxist-Leninism and sarcastically asked the Romanian
leadership to quarrel with Marx and Engels. Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauescu argued in
response that the unification of the communist states as anticipated by Lenin was to indeed
occur at some point in the future, but that nobody could know when that would happen.
For that reason, Gheorghiu-Dej ironically added that the Romanian leadership had decided
to not invoke the classics of Marxism-Leninism during the talks, but to refer to the 1960
Moscow Declaration, that is to the principles of sovereignty, independence etc. Moreover,
Ceauescu added that Marx and Engels had written that before addressing the problem of
the internationalisation of the world economy the states needed first to reach equal levels
in their economic development and to develop their industries. But, as that stage of
development had not yet been reached, the discussion on the integration was untimely, the
Romanian delegate concluded. The Soviets argued in return that the Romanians
interpretation of the sovereignty principle was illiterate, but the latter stubbornly

300

The minutes of the 21-22 June 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 33/1963, 13-72.
Miller Center. Minutes 101a of 10 June 1963, available at
http://web1.millercenter.org/kremlin/63_06_10.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2013.
301

92

maintained their position: integration was unacceptable because it infringed on the

principle of sovereignty, contravening the Marxist-Leninist teachings.
To support their interpretation, the Romanian leaders resorted to the argument from
authority. On the one hand, they cited the 1960 Moscow Declaration, different works or
declarations of Marx, Lenin and Khrushchev which formally recognised the sovereignty
principle. On the other hand, they quoted extensively various bloc proposals promoting
integration and argued that such proposals contradicted the ideas of Marx, Lenin and
Khrushchev himself. This Romanian argument from authority exasperated the Soviet
representatives to the point that in June 1963 directly, but informally N.V. Podgorny
asked Gheorghiu-Dej and Leonte Rutu to stop gathering so many quotations.
Although exasperated and irritated as clearly evident from the minutes of the talks
Khrushchev agreed in the end that the CMEA collaboration had to be further addressed
bilaterally and not multilaterally. He also pointed out that with or without Romania
specialisation would be achieved, but only based on sovereignty and that there will be a
planning body that would respect the states sovereignty and the interests of each
republic. However, during the June 1963 Bucharest talks, the Soviet leader also
formulated more or less subtle threats to Romanias interests. Firstly, he made allusions to
economic sanctions against Romania. He stressed that Romania was dependent on the
economic support of the USSR and on the economic collaboration with the CMEA states
and that it was not useful for Romania to break the economic relations with Moscow.
Moreover, the Soviet delegates noted that the USSR might have stopped its import of oil
from Romania302 or its exports of iron ore to Romania. From the USSR, Romania needed
raw materials to develop its iron and steel industry, as well as industrial equipment, and
thus the Soviets allusions were perceived by the Romanian leaders as a threat in the sense
that if they continued to oppose Moscow, the Soviet leaders would consider breaking off
the economic relations with Romania.
On 24-25 June Khrushchev also threatened to terminate the framework of bilateral
friendship. On the one hand, Khrushchev argued that the USSR was committed to its
friendship with Romania, but, on the other hand, he added that since Romanias leadership
showed anti-Soviet attitudes and insincere friendship, the only option for the Soviet
leadership was to reciprocate with similar attitudes and actions. The Romanian leadership
rejected the accusations of being anti-Soviet and declared once more Romanias
commitment to the friendship, collaboration and alliance with the USSR. The bilateral
friendship framework was not a topic of discussion, they repeatedly emphasised in June
1963, but only some concrete problems with regard to the economic collaboration.
However, the Soviets were not the only ones employing more or less allusive threats to
the others interests. The Romanian leaders employed threats as well. They openly argued
that, in the common benefit of the world socialist system, China should participate in the
CMEA as a full member and that all the Asian socialist states should be asked to state their
opinion concerning the Councils reforms. Moreover, they informed Khrushchev that
Romania and the RWP intended to publicly announce their position regarding the problem
of the unity of the camp. Taking the hint, the Soviet leader responded by pleading with
the Romanian leadership to not make a problem out of this and by mildly complaining
302

In 1963 the USSR was importing from Romania 1.9 million tones of oil.

93

that the Romanians should have just said we do not agree with the CMEA integration
without actually raising the problem as to why China, [North] Korea and [North] Vietnam
do not participate in the CMEA.303
If during the formal talks, the Soviet leader showed the Romanians rather a
conciliatory face with regard to the Chinese problem, during some informal talks, he
directly accused them of trying to find allies in China and of being pro-Chinese. To
these open accusations Gheorghiu-Dej responded (also informally) that when one states
that Romania is pro-Chinese one does an injustice to Romania, but added sarcastically
that I cannot say that everything the Chinese say is nonsense. The RWP had its own
views with regard to the Chinese situation and as we stated our opinion concerning
sovereignty, we will state our opinion concerning the participation of the other countries in
the CMEA as well, Gheorghiu-Dej firmly told Khrushchev, aiming to cultivate the
(perceived) Soviet fear of Chinese-Romanian collaboration.304
Because the two delegations maintained their initial positions, scholars generally argue
that the Romanian-Soviet June 1963 talks were sterile and that the reconciliation
attempt () failed.305 For several reasons, however, the Romanian leadership saw the
meeting with Khrushchev as a success. Firstly, they reasoned, the meeting confirmed that
the Soviet leaders feared very much that Romania might support the Chinese and might
make public her disagreements with the USSR about integration and about the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Or, the Romanian leaders argued, these (perceived) Soviet fears should be further
exploited by Romania. Secondly, the Romanian leaders observed that the meeting
provided an illustration of what kind of economic and political measures the Soviets might
take to counteract Romanias disobedience, namely breaking off the bilateral economic
and friendship relations. Once these possible measures were identified, Romania could act
to prevent or counteract their consequences.
Considering the Soviet economic threats credible, during a Politburo meeting from 26
June Gheorghiu-Dej reasoned that Romania had to act immediately to diversify her trade
relations with non-socialist states and especially in those economic fields in which the
Soviets could cause Romania some difficulties, as he put it. He further argued that Brazil
or Algeria could provide the Romanian industry with the iron ore that the capricious
Soviet leader could decide at some point to refuse to give Romania.306 Agreeing,
Brldeanu and Ceauescu further emphasised that Romania also needed to develop her
agriculture and industry to the point of being less and less dependent on the CMEA
members agricultural or industrial commodities.
303

The minutes of the talks held between the Romania and the Soviet delegations, 24-25 June 1963, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign relations, File 16U/1963, 42-116; The Minutes of the 26 June 1963Politburo meeting, in
Ctnu, 2004, 229-264.
304
The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 232, 238-239.
305
ranu, 2007, 174; Anton, 2007, 174.
306
Such measures were indeed taken and Romania gradually diminished her economic dependence on the
USSR and the CMEA, developing trade relations with France, Great Britain, USA, Brazil, Algeria, India,
China or the Arab states. By the end of the 1960s, the CMEA share in Romanias foreign trade dropped from
70% to 45%. Nonetheless, in 1966, the CMEAs share in Romanias foreign trade was 68%, of which 40%
was trade with the USSR. By 1975 (compared with 1960), the CMEAs share in Romanias foreign trade
dropped from two thirds to 37.8%. The minutes of the 12 May 1966 talks between Emil Bodnra and Zhou
Enlai, in Budura, 2008, 283; Richard Felix Staar, Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Stanford
University Press, 1984, 215; Kansikas, 2012, 39.

94

According to the interpretations of the Romanian leaders, struggling, as they put it,
against the USSRs integration attempts did not imply only economic risks for Romania,
but also security risks, and that opposing the Soviet Union was one of the most difficult
battles in Romanias history. Ion Gheorghe Maurer also emphasised that Romania fought
this battle against one of the two biggest powers in the world, against the leaders of a huge
party, of a party with great prestige, and moreover fought this battle alone, because all the
members of the CMEA allied to their [Soviets] point of view. Emil Bodnra went even
further with the analysis and argued that in the history of the Romanian-Soviet relations,
this was the second time when Romania foiled the Soviet plans to settle matters with
Romania. Bodnra reasoned that in 1944 the USSR had tried to settle matters with
Romania in one way, while in 1963 it resorted to a different way. If Romania would
not have opposed the integration front in 1962 and 1963, then what the USSR could not
achieve in 1944 it would finally achieve in 1963, namely the compete control and
probably even the annexation of Romanias territory, Bodnra concluded, without being
in any way contradicted by his party colleagues.
However, observing that, despite all the pressures and threats, Khrushchev had finally
accepted a solution of compromise, the Romanian leaders concluded that the Soviet
menace of breaking off the bilateral friendship with Romania, although possible, was
rather unlikely, and that, for economic, prestige and strategic reasons, the Soviets were
interested to preserve the framework of friendship and alliance with Romania.
According to the Romanian leaders interpretations, the most important result of the
June 1963 talks with Khrushchev was the achievement of an implicit agreement which
(they believed) settled the integration dispute in Romanias favour. According to this
informal arrangement which in 1963-1964 was often acknowledged by both sides, but
which remained unknown to this day in historiography the Soviet leadership agreed to
postpone sine die its CMEA integration proposals, while the Romanian side promised in
return to not make public its different view regarding the sovereignty problem and the
unity of the camp problem.307 As Ion Gheorghe Maurer later put it, in June 1963, the
Romanian-Soviet divergences regarding the CMEA reforms were once again solved
through postponement.308 Gheorghiu-Dej often summarised the June 1963 agreement as
follows:
In June 1963 in Bucharest, they [the Soviets] asked from us [Romanians]: Let us smother,
let us not disclose the divergences that have appeared between us. We [Romania] agreed
and proceeded accordingly and therefore each side remained on its initial position. We
cannot say that we have convinced our [Soviet] comrades that they are not right or that
they are wrong, but they could not convince us either that they are right. We agreed with
each other to [for Romanias part] not disclose, to smother [the divergences] and for their
[Soviet] part to be careful, to pay attention [to our views], to not put any kind of pressure
upon us in order to make us promote the conceptions they intended to reach with those
unique plan, unique planning body and so forth.309

307

The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 229-264.
Rezolvate prin amnare, in Romanian. The Minutes of the 3-10 March 1964 talks between the Romania
and the Chinese delegations, Beijing, in Budura, 2008, 128, 134.
309
The minutes of the 24 June 1964 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, file 28/1964, 4, 65.
308

95

Soviet published sources reveal that the Soviet side too was contented with the
compromise reached in Romania310, but, as interesting as this aspect is, it is not the focus
of this study.
For a while, the Romanian leaders had taken into consideration the idea of making
public Gheorghiu-Dejs letter from 7 June addressed to Khrushchev, to transform this
letter into the official document encompassing Romanias different position, but, because
Khrushchev had agreed to postpone the integration talks, on 26 June they decided to
reciprocate and to postpone the implementation of the tactics of making public Romanias
disagreements, at least until the July 1963 CMEA conference when, as Leonte Rutu
argued, Romania could finally see if Khrushchev was to keep his part of the bargain or
not.311 With this thought in mind, Gheorghiu-Dejs went to the Moscow CMEA
conference from 24-26 July 1963 carrying two variants of the same speech. 312
According to Emil Bodnra and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the first moderate variant
responded to Khrushchevs June 1963 appeal to not disclose the divergences and was 12
pages long. The second one was over 30 pages long, was drafted on the basis of the 7 June
Romanian letter to the Soviets and represented Romanias different position on
integration. During the 18 July 1963 Politburo meeting, the Romanian leaders had decided
that if, at the CMEA conference, Khrushchev was to respect his part of the Bucharest
bargain and was to block, if necessary, the Soviet, Czechoslovak or East German
integration proposals, then Gheorghiu-Dej was to read in the plenum of the conference the
moderate variant of the speech, but if the other CMEA members were to try to provoke
the Romanian delegation again with proposals about integration and specialisation, then,
as Gheorghiu-Dej put it,
let us say to them we see that we are not understood313 and then to take out the second
variant. [Let us tell them:] forgive us, but we have talked enough. We thought that we
have been understood [but we have not], therefore we want to explain to you our position.
And under this pretext that we want to explain [our position] we bring out the second
variant. If they push the things forward, we can publish the text.

The Romanian leader anticipated that Khrushchev would most likely respect the Bucharest
deal, but still he left to Moscow prepared for both cases, considering that the Soviet leader
was a very unpredictable figure.314 However, to the satisfaction of the Romanian
delegates315, at the 1963 CMEA conference nobody advanced concrete projects on the
creation of supranational bodies. Piotr Jarosiewicz (Poland) argued that the CMEAs
members still needed to make considerable efforts to coordinate the economic plans
and to put into practice the Councils recommendations regarding the specialisation of
production. Todor Zhivkov, Walter Ulbricht and Jnos Kdr referred to the creation of
common enterprises and of economic unions, but they advanced no concrete proposals and
310

Fursenko, 2003, 1143.

The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 229-264.
312
The two variants of Gheorghiu-Dejs speech, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations File 24/1963, vol. I,
108-195; Copies of these variants are also available in ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 31/1963, 331-362;
File 39/1963, 9-52.
313
Quotation marks in original.
314
The minutes of the 18 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 39/1963, 116-122.
315
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Emil Bodnra, Alexandru Brldeanu and Leonte
Rutu.
311

96

made no reference to the unique planning body. 316 Gomuka argued that the necessity to
create economic unions and common enterprises was a problem that had generated
objections within the CMEA and that it seems that one still needs to determine what those
mean. Regarding the common enterprises, Gomuka reasoned that the Council had not
accumulated yet enough experience and that consequently he did not think that it
requires further discussion.317
On 24 July 1963, after the above speeches were delivered, Khrushchev approached
Gheorghiu-Dej, asked him to not deliver a speech polemising with the others on the
integration problem, and promised in return that the Romanians would be pleased with his
own address which was scheduled for the next day, after the Romanian leaders speech.
Gheorghiu-Dej accepted Khrushchevs suggestions318 and on 25 July read in the plenary
session of the conference the moderate variant of his speech.319
Taking the floor afterwards, Khrushchev kept his promise. He argued that the socialist
division of labour would not affect the industrialisation of any of the socialist states, but
would contribute to the levelling of the economic development of the socialist countries.
Moreover, he added that the specialisation of production had to be based on the principle
of free consent of the states and on the principles of sovereignty, mutual advantage and
comradely support, without infringing the integrity of the national economy. Although
Khrushchev reasoned that the coordination of the economic plans needed a body of
coordination, he insisted that it was not about a supranational body. Following
Khrushchev, Novotny agreed with the ideas advanced by comrade Khrushchev and
argued in his speech that one needs to do everything for the gradual levelling of the
economic development of different countries.320
During the Politburo meeting from 31 July 1963 Gheorghiu-Dej explained to his
colleagues why he had not read in Moscow the polemic variant of the prepared speech,
despite the Poles or the East Germans mild support for integration. On the one hand, no
concrete projects for integration had been advanced in Moscow, but only some opinions,
and, on the other hand, Ulbricht, Kdr or Gomukas declarations in favour of the
creation of supranational unions or common enterprises were less important in the big
picture, the Romanian leader argued. Only the Soviets position counted, he added, and as
long as Khrushchev had respected the Bucharest agreement, it was not necessary for the
Romanian delegation to read its radical variant of speech or to publish it. The Romanian
leader had returned from Moscow convinced that the Soviets themselves (and especially
Khrushchev) had tempered the other delegations from advancing again concrete
integration proposals and that they acted as such because they feared that the Romanians
might open fire and might make good on their threats.
However, while during the plenary session of the July 1963 CMEA conference
Gheorghiu-Dej refrained from openly opposing and criticising the CMEA integration, the
316

Proces-Verbal of the July 1963 CMEA meeting; J. Jarosewics 24 June 1963 discourse; The minutes of the
July 1963 CMEA meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 25/1963, vol. I, 3-77.
317
Gomukas24 July 1963 speech, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 24/1963, vol. I, 60-63.
318
The minutes of the 31 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 41/1963, 22.
319
Gheorghiu-Dejs 25 July 1963 discourse at the CMEA conference, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations,
File 24/1963, vol. I, 79-97.
320
Khrushchev and Novotnys 25 July 1963 speeches at the CMEA Conference, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 25/1963, vol. I, 126-150, 164-180.

97

sessions of the commission called to elaborate the Resolution of that conference witnessed
intense contradictions. The Romanians were upset that references to the future creation of
economic unions were made in the project of Resolution. Alexandru Brldeanu
(Romanias representative in that Commission) argued that the Resolution should make no
reference to the creation of those economic unions and refused to accept any other solution
of compromise. The Hungarian and Polish representatives advanced as a solution the
provision that only the interested states were to participate in such economic bodies.
Although previously the Romanian representatives in the CMEA had eagerly promoted the
so-called principle of interested states, this time, in accordance with his mandate,
Brldeanu refused to accept it. He argued that if Romania rejected the CMEA integration
that did not mean that Romania was not interested in the problem of integration; on the
contrary, Romania was very interested and had a firm position on the matter, namely that
the Romanians could not agree with integration!
The Soviet representatives did not participate in the talks on the principle of the
interested states, letting the Romanians, on the one hand, and the Hungarians and the
Poles, on the other hand, argue with each other. However, when this approach remained
without results, the Soviet delegates finally interfered, by taking the Romanian side, whose
position was then accepted.321 Thus, the documents of the July 1963 CMEA conference
accommodated to a great extent the Romanian positions on integration. The Resolution of
the conference noted that the countries had to further concentrate their attention on the
coordination of their plans for the period between 1966 and 1970 and on the enlargement
of the specialisation and cooperation in production; it stated that the CMEA countries had
to continue to elaborate and implement measures to increase the production of cereals and
to enlarge and deepen their collaboration in the field of the production of tractors,
agricultural machines or chemical fertilisers; and it made no reference to the supranational
bodies.322
Moreover, the Resolution of the 18th Session of the CMEA (held on the same occasion
in Moscow) acknowledged the principles of national sovereignty, equality in rights and
mutual advantage as the basis of the future CMEA economic collaboration and of the
international division of labour; it referred to the industrialisation of the less developed
states, especially to the development of the heavy industry, and to the levelling of the
development of the member states; it recognised bilateral consultations as the means to
decide on the problem of the coordination of the national plans; and it made no reference
to any supranational bodies.323 The meetings Communiqu used the phrasing
coordination of plans and acknowledged that the economic collaboration among the
socialist countries was based on the principles of equality in rights, rigorous respect for
national sovereignty, [and] mutual advantage.324 The initial project for the Communiqu
(elaborated by the Soviets) made no reference to these principles, and it was again the
Romanians who successfully requested their incorporation in the text.

321

The minutes of the 31 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 41/1963, 14, 20-46.
The Resolution of the July 1963 CMEA conference, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 31/1963, 236-370 .
323
The Resolution of the 18th session of the CMEA meeting held in July 1963 in Moscow, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign relations, File 16U/1963, 157-178.
324
Communiqu, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 24/1964, vol. II, 29-36; Scnteia, 28 July 1963.
322

98

Upon returned to Bucharest, the Romanian leaders observed with satisfaction that the
texts of the conference had taken into consideration all their requests. They reasoned that
these texts represented in fact a written and public acknowledgement of the June 1963
verbal and secret Romanian-Soviet agreement. Gheorghiu-Dej was convinced that
Khrushchev had backed down from his initial pro-integration position because he was
afraid that the Romanian more or less indirect threats of making the divergences with the
USSR public were not a bluff.325 During the next months, the Soviets and their bloc
supporters abstained from addressing openly and publicly the CMEA integration326 and
Horia Socianu correctly contended that in July 1963 the integration dispute between
Bucharest and Moscow was settled in Romanias favour.327 Given this success and
hopeful that Khrushchev would keep his part of the June 1963 Bucharest bargain for a
longer time, after the CMEA conference, the Romanian leadership reiterated its decision
to not make public its disagreement with the USSR.328

325

The minutes of the 31 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 41/1963, 21-43, 47.
Moraru, 2008, 50-51.
327
Socianu, 170.
328
The minutes of the 5 December 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 58/1963, 6- 11.
326

99

5 Looking for a balance with China

Scholars argue that there were two main phases in Romanias stance towards the SinoSoviet dispute, the first which lasted until 1962 and was characterised by complete loyalty
to the Soviet position and the second which started in 1963 and was marked by a
Romanian so-called third way or neutrality. 329 Scholars have also observed that
Romanias early 1960s breaking away from the Soviet line coincided with the
emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and argued therefore that the latter represented
either a beneficent context that allowed Romanias detachment to occur330 or a cause of
(and even model for) detachment.331
The Romanian scientific literature generally maintains that there is a causal relation
between the Romanian-Soviet 1962 CMEA-related disagreements and the 1962 change in
Romanias attitude towards the Sino-Soviet dispute. Mioara Anton and Mihai Croitor, for
instance, explain the 1962 Romanian-Chinese rapprochement through Gheorghiu-Dejs
attempts to find in China an ally with which to balance against the Soviet CMEA
integration.332 However, despite these scholarly assessments, nobody has investigated how
the Romanian leaders conceptualised and played the China card as leverage against the
USSR in the CMEA dispute.
To facilitate the analysis, this study addressed the China card tactic on two distinct
levels the level of Romanian-Soviet relations and the level of Romanian-Chinese
relations. If the previous chapter tackled the problem of how in 1963 the Romanian leaders
used (in their relations with Moscow) the China-related arguments as leverage to block
integration, this chapter focuses on two other (interrelated) aspects the Romanians
attempts to convince the Chinese leaders to allow Romania to balance with China in the
CMEA against the Soviet Union and the emergence of Romanias opposition to the USSR
with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute.333

5.1 Romania and the Sino-Soviet dispute, 1960-1962

In the 1950s, Sino-Soviet relations were, generally, cordial, with China following the
Soviet model of centralised economic development with a special emphasis on heavy
industry. In the 1950s, Romania supported the Soviet Unions positions with regard to
China, formulating identical or similar views concerning problems such as the wars in
Korea or Indochina, the national liberation movements or decolonisation. 334 After
Khrushchevs 1956 secret speech, though, the CPSU and the CCP set out two different

329

Stanciu, 2009, 250, 263; Moraru, 92; Crampton, 312-313; Banu&ranu, LVIII-LXV.
Ctnu, 2011, 31; Neagoe-Plea, 231-240; Tismneanu, 2003, 178-181.
331
Moraru, 9, 77-78, 107.
332
Anton, 2007, 171; Croitor, 2009, 16, 213.
333
Under the title Balancing with China against the USSR. Romanias opposition to CMEA integration,
1962-1963 a very short and incipient version of this chapter was presented at the conference Russian-East
European relations, from Tsarism to Gazprom (University College, Cork, Ireland, 4-5 May 2012).
334
Budura, Studiu introductiv, in Budura, 2005, 16.
330

100

paths of ideological, political and economic development.335 Mao Zedong argued that the
Soviet de-Stalinisation disrupted the communist unity. He strongly criticised the Soviet
thesis of peaceful coexistence with the West and insisted on the inevitability of war within
the struggle against imperialism. In response, the Soviet leadership stopped its support for
the development of the Chinese nuclear program, adopted a neutral position towards the
Chinese-Indian border dispute and strongly criticised the Chinese economic programme
the Great Leap Forward which was intended to transform China into an industrialised
power.336
Very little information about the Moscow-Beijing disagreements was reaching
Romania, though, in the late 1950s, and, puzzled by the evolution of the situation, the
Romanian leaders employed in this matter a wait-and-see attitude.337 This type of stance
was defined along two main lines Romanian attempts to gather more information with
regard to the dispute and Romanias abstention from taking any side. In 1959, for instance,
the Romanian delegation (headed by Emil Bodnra) that participated in the Tenth
Anniversary of the Peoples Republic of China left Bucharest with directives to formulate
during the visit no opinion regarding the Sino-Soviet dispute; to carefully observe the
relations between the Soviets and the Chinese and to bring their observations back home
for discussion and debate. Upon return, the delegation reported considerable tensions
between the Soviets and Chinese, which made Gheorghiu-Dej decide that Romania had to
continue being disciplined and patient.
Thus, in late 1959, the Romanian representatives who used to come in contact with
Chinese and Soviet diplomats were instructed to refrain from formulating any position
with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, but to carefully gather as much information as
possible about the ongoing disagreements.338 The Romanian leaders option to wait and
see how the situation would evolve rather than unconditionally accept the Soviet guidance
questions the historiographical mainstream interpretation regarding Romanias blind
obedience as Ciobanu phrased it339 to the USSR or Romanias inability to make any
type of independent foreign policy decisions.340
The secret Sino-Soviet divergences erupted in public in the early 1960s in the form of
ideological disputes or polemics, each party accusing the other in speeches and in printed
articles of not respecting the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in theory and practice. By
the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, Mao deemed the Soviet leaders as unworthy of
having the leadership of the international communist movement.341 The CCP opened the
public dispute in April 1960 through an article published by the Hongqi (Red Flag), which
335

Lorenz M. Lhti, The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the communist world, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2008, 72-80.
336
Anthony Best, Jussi Hanhimki, Joseph Maiolo, Kirsten E. Shultze, International History of the
Twentieth Century and Beyond, Routledge, 2008, 358-362.
337
Dan Ctnu uses the term passivity. Ctnu, 2011, 230-233.
338
The minutes of the 9 October 1959 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 37/1959, 2-20;
Report of the Romanian party and state delegation to the tenth anniversary of the Peoples Republic of
China, 28 November 1959, AMAE, Fond China, Problem 220/1959, 4; See also Paul Niculescu-Mizil, 1997,
300.
339
Ciobanu, 38.
340
Retegan, 2000, 17-18.
341
Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a monolith. Alliance politics and problems of coercive diplomacy in
Asia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, 146-163.

101

indirectly criticised the CPSU. The Soviets replied by criticising (without naming the
CCP) the leftists, the left-sectarian sentiments and tendencies within the communist
movement and by supporting the theory of peaceful coexistence. In June 1960, however,
Khrushchev decided to use the presence of the communist leaders at the 3rd Congress of
the RWP (Bucharest, 20-25 June 1960) to openly attack the Chinese delegation.342

5.1.1 Supporting the CPSU

On 24-26 June 1960, a meeting of the representatives of the communist and workers
parties was organised in Bucharest. A day prior to the opening of the meeting, the Soviet
delegation gave the other delegations a report vehemently criticising the Chinese for their
position on peaceful coexistence, the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Great Leap
Forward. All participants, with the exception of Albania, aligned with Khrushchev against
the Chinese delegation. Peng Zhen343, the head of the Chinese delegation in Bucharest and
a senior CCP Politburo member, accused Khrushchev of breaking the agreement to
confine the Bucharest meeting to an exchange of views, and of resorting instead to a
surprise attack against the CCP.344 Taking the Soviet side, on 24 June, Gheorghiu-Dej
criticised the profoundly wrong Chinese theses and accused the Chinese Embassy in
Bucharest of interference in Romanias affairs. 345
Scholars generally explain the Romanian leaderships 1960 support for the Soviet side
through its ideological conformism.346 The recently declassified archival evidence
suggests, though, that ideology was not the triggering factor in this matter and that the
decision to take the Soviet side was made hastily, under (perceived) crisis conditions.
According to the Romanian leaders perceptions, the Soviet anti-Chinese manoeuvre in
Bucharest had situated them in a situation of crisis which they defined through five main
elements: the lack of intelligence with regard to what the Soviets and the Chinese actually
argued about; the element of surprise; the very short period of time within which they had
to decide; the (perceived) lack of any other alternative choice; and the existence of a
(perceived) threat from the Soviet side.
The Romanian leaders considered that they did not have access to the relevant
information and could not, therefore, make an informed decision with regard to the SinoSoviet dispute. They were taken by surprise by the amplitude of divergences as they
emerged in Bucharest in June 1960 and as they often recalled they were unable to
apprehend what the actual problem in dispute was. In addition, the Romanian leaders were
not given the time to carefully analyse the situation and to make a decision, receiving from
the Soviet delegation the over-70 pages-long report condemning China on the evening of
23 June 1960 at 11 pm and being requested to present the RWPs position the next day.
342

Dong Wang, The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet
Split, 1959-1962, CWIHP Working Paper Series, No 49, 37-39.
343
The form Peng Zhen corresponds to the Penyin system, but in the Romanian documents and literature
the name is spelled also Peng Chen (the Wade-Giles system) or Pn Ci-jen (the phonetic transcription).
344
Croitor, 2009, 174-187.
345
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dejs speech at the Meeting of the Communist and Workers Parties, 24 June 1960,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations, File 35/1960, Vol. II, 217-219.
346
Croitor, 2009, 183.

102

Later, the Romanian leaders often explained their wrong decision (as they called it) to
support Moscow through the fact that the Soviet manoeuvre had taken them by surprise
and had given them very little time to react.347 On the other hand, in light of the Soviet
manoeuvre, the Romanian leaders considered that they had no other alternative. Ioan
Romulus Budura and Yan Mingfu the Romanian and Chinese interpreters at the
communist meeting recall that Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues were very upset for
being forced to go along with the Soviet leaders attack against the Chinese delegation.
According to Mingfu, during a four hours of secret Romanian-Chinese talks held in the
night of 25/26 June, Gheorghiu-Dej struggled to convince the Chinese delegates that
Romania was under considerable Soviet pressure and had no other choice but to support
the Soviet delegation. 348
Gheorghiu-Dej feared that the 3 rd Congress of the RWP could provoke additional talks
about Romanias agricultural specialisation. As previously mentioned, on 20 June, the
Romanian leader announced at the Congress, in front of the leaders of 46 communist and
workers parties, Romanias commitment to industrialisation an implicit rejection of the
bloc specialisation project. In his 21 June 1960 speech, without openly declaring his
approval or disapproval for Romanias industrialisation programme, Khrushchev
indirectly pleaded for bloc specialisation. Still, the two did not explicitly contradict each
other.349 Thus, the Soviet leader did not criticise or oppose the RWPs next Fife Year Plan
fostering industrialisation, while the Romanian leader supported the Soviet side in its
attack against the Chinese. In other words, the Romanian leader went along with the antiChinese attack in order to appease the (perceived) Soviet dissatisfaction with Romanias
opposition to specialisation.
Despite the tense talks, the communist conference ended with a Communiqu of
compromise which encompassed both Soviet and Chinese positions and reaffirmed the
participants commitment to the stipulations of the 1957 Moscow Declaration.350
Afterwards, the Romanian leadership continued to support openly the Soviet side against
the CCP. The 1 August 1960 Plenum of the CC of the RWP (and party meetings organised
across the country afterwards) condemned the dogmatism of the Chinese, supported the
Soviet views and praised the role of the Soviet Union and of the CPSU within the
communist movement.351 On 2 August 1960, the CC of the RWP sent a letter to the CC of
the CCP criticising the activity of the Chinese delegation at the RWPs Congress, accusing
the CCP of abandoning the theses of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of the 1957
Moscow Declaration and judging with disapproval Chinas policy towards the capitalist
347

The Minutes of the talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Giancarlo Pajetta (member of the CC of the Italian
Communist Party), 19 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 40/1963, 12; Note regarding the Audience
granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to Xu Jianguo, 12 December 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
94/1963, 3-5; The minutes of the 3-10 March 1964 discussions between the Romania and the Chinese
delegations, in Budura 2008, 129, 139; Interviews with Corneliu Mnescu, in Betea, 482- 484.
348
Romulus Ioan Budura, Studiu introductiv, in Budura 2008, 10-11; Yan Mingfu, Peng Zhen at the
Bucharest Conference in Peng Zhen in memoriam, Beijing, 1998, in Budura, 2008, 551; The minutes of
the talks between Nicolae Ceauescu and Peng Zhen, Beijing, 9 March 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, foreign
Relations, File no 29/1964, 239-247.
349
See supra, subchapter 3.1.2.
350
Communiqu, in Scnteia, 28 June 1960.
351
Protocol no 4 and the Minutes of the 1 August 1960 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 36/1960, 14, 18-49.

103

states and especially towards India.352 The Romanians made their position public and sent
this letter to the central committees of the communist parties of the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, North Korea, North Vietnam,
Mongolia, Albania and Bulgaria353 a move that resulted in a rapid deterioration of
bilateral Romanian-Chinese relations.354 Other communist parties took a similar position
and sent to Beijing (and to other capitals) letters condemning the activity of the CCPs
delegation in Bucharest and the Chinese general policy. 355
In October-November 1960, the Moscow Conference of the communist and workers
parties, focusing on the Sino-Soviet dispute elaborated the 1960 Moscow Declaration
which recognised the important historical role of the USSR in the development of world
communism and stressed that all communist parties were equal and independent. The
document also admitted Chinas important role in building communism in Asia and
reasserted the thesis that war was not fatally inevitable. The Declaration also stipulated
that the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and economic competition between the
socialist and the capitalist countries was the foundation of the foreign policy of the
socialist countries.356 During the 1960 Moscow Conference, the Romanian delegation
again supported the Soviet positions, criticising the Chinese for their ideological, political
and economic wrong theses.357
However, by late 1960, the Romanian leaders had the time to carefully analyse the
Sino-Soviet situation and to decide Romanias future position. Barbu Zaharescu
(Romanias Ambassador in China between 1959 and 1961) and Avram Bunaciu
(Romanias Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1958 and 1961) reasoned that Romania
had to be more moderate towards the Sino-Soviet dispute, that what was going on in
China deserved a careful study and was not that bad, and that Romania should not allow
party relations to vitiate the Chinese-Romanian state relations. The December 1960
Plenum of the CC of the RWP, openly criticised Bunaciu and Zaharescu for employing
such moderate attitudes towards the Chinese and decided that Romania was to continue
supporting the Soviet side. Still, on that occasion, Gheorghiu-Dej instructed the Romanian
diplomats to display a polite attitude towards the Chinese diplomats and to avoid as
much as possible the issues in the dispute. Thus, by the end of 1960, the Romanian
leadership had defined for Romania an unusual dual approach regarding the Sino-Soviet
dispute. In its direct relations with the Chinese, the Romanian diplomatic body was
instructed to employ a polite attitude, to refuse to tackle the Sino-Soviet dispute, to take no
side, but in its direct relations with the Soviets (and publicly) the Romanians were taking
352

The letter of the CC of the RWP to the CC of the CCP, 2 August 1960, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
36/1960, 70-90.
353
Notes in ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations-Alphabetical, File 1G/1947-1963, 203-204; File
13C/1950-1965, 57-60; File 7C/1960, 1-2, File 3P/1948-1964, 63-64.
354
The Minutes of the 24 October 1960 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no 43/1960, 640.
355
Such letters in ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations-Alphabetical, File 1G/1947-1963, 218-260; File
4B/1945-1960, 157-174.
356
Alfred D. Low, The Sino-Soviet dispute: an analysis of the polemics, Fairleigh Dickinson, Rutherford,
1976, 80-120.
357
For instance, Petre Borils 7 October 1960 speech in the Commission that drafted the 1960 Moscow
Declaration and Gheorghiu-Dejs two speeches given at the 1960 Moscow Conference, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 60/1960, 1-15; File 73/1960, 173-199, 237-240.

104

the Soviet side. This choice resembles an attempt of running after two hares, but it
suggests that the Romanian leadership would have preferred not to attack the Chinese.
In December 1960 Gheorghiu-Dej explained why Romania needed to continue taking
the Soviet side as follows. Firstly, he saw in Romanias support for the USSR a form of
appeasing the Soviet leadership. In the context of the emerging Romanian-Soviet CMEA
specialisation disagreements, the Romanian leader considered that Romania did not need
another casus belli with Moscow and that upsetting remote China was a small price to pay
to propitiate the neighbouring Soviet superpower. On the other hand, Gheorghiu-Dej
tended to believe that the Chinese would back down rapidly and that the dispute would be
solved to the advantage of the Soviets rather fast. However, while publicly he was arguing
against the wrong Chinese theses, in secret meetings he was reasoning as early as
December 1960 that not all the Chinese theses were wrong and not all the Soviet theses
were correct. One of the Chinese theses that the Romanian leader approved during the
December 1960 Plenum was the one regarding the role of national particularities or
national characteristics in establishing the path of economic development of the socialist
countries. The Romanian leader also doubted that the dispute between Moscow and
Beijing was exclusively ideological.358
After the 1960 Moscow conference, the Sino-Soviet relations went through a less tense
phase, but the dispute reopened in October 1961, during the 22nd Congress of the CPSU
when Khrushchev staged a fierce attack against Albania which (absent from the Congress)
was defended by the Chinese delegation. After the Congress, the Soviets continued to
criticise Albania, while China criticised the Yugoslav leadership, both sides still refraining
from accusing and criticising each other directly. 359 During the 22 nd Congress of the
CPSU, the Romanian leadership again supported the Soviet position, and several weeks
later, another Plenum of the CC of the RWP (30 November-5 December 1961) criticised,
albeit briefly, the CCP for its support for Albania or for letting Maos personality cult
bloom, as Petre Boril put it.360 The 1961 critique of the Chinese position was printed in
Romania in newspapers and brochures.361 Regarding state relations, in late 1961, Romania
recalled its ambassador from Tirana (maintaining there a charg daffaires) and asked the
Albanese government to recall its ambassador from Romania.362 Supporting the Soviet
manoeuvres, Gheorghiu-Dej signed (with Khrushchev, Gomuka, Kdr, Ulbricht,
Novotny and Zhivkov) the 31 October 1961 letter of the CC of the CPSU asking for the
exclusion of Chinese observers from the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Pact.
Croitor correctly observed that the last Romanian official and public support for the
Soviets against the Chinese occurred in the form of a letter from 3 March 1962, drafted
358

The Minutes of the 19-20 December 1960 Plenum; The minutes of the 5 December 1960 Politburo
meeting with Annex, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 52/1960, 34-112; File 47/1960, vol. I, 11-20; vol. II,
380-389.
359
Low, 121-122.
360
The minutes of the meeting of the 30 November-5 December 1961 Plenum of the CC of the RWP; Petre
Borils speech at the Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 53/1961, Vol. I, 134-136; File no 55/1961,
38-40; The speech of Emil Bodnra at the Plenum, in Dan Ctnu, A doua destalinizare. Gh. GheorghiuDej la apogeul puterii, Vremea, Bucureti, 2005, 267-288.
361
Scnteia, 7-9 December 1961.
362
Stanciu, 2009, 236-237.

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and sent to Beijing at the Soviets direct request.363 On 8 January 1962, the Soviet
ambassador in Bucharest, Ivan Kuzmich Zhegalin, had asked the Romanian leadership to
take a public position against the theses presented by the Chinese delegation at the
session of the World Peace Council that had been held in Stockholm in December 1961.
The Romanians complied and on 3 March 1962 they sent a letter to the CC of the CCP
condemning the Chinese position regarding general disarmament, peaceful coexistence or
the CCPs support and approval for Albanias policies. 364 Afterwards, the Romanian
leaders no longer participated in the Soviet anti-Chinese campaign, but they did not begin
to support the Chinese against the Soviets either. What triggered this change is the
question the next section tackles.

5.1.2 Romanias neither-nor-position

If prior to 1962 the Romanian leadership supported the Soviet side in its dispute with
Beijing, after 1962 it adopted a different position, supporting neither the Soviets, nor the
Chinese. Justifiably, historiography often calls this option neutrality.365 However, the
Romanian leaders themselves never identified their stand as being neutral, neutrality or
neutralism. Although they often declared, in Romania or abroad, that in Brldeanus
words the RWP holds neither with the Soviets, nor with the Chinese, they explicitly
and repeatedly emphasised that this position did not mean being neutral.
According to the Romanian leaders view, being neutral would have meant, on the
one hand, being completely indifferent towards the dispute or towards the way the SinoSoviet party and state relations would have evolved and, on the other hand, letting the two
sides settle the matters by themselves regardless (and with Romania being indifferent to)
the outcome. The Romanian leaders often argued that they were very concerned with how
the Sino-Soviet relations developed and were very interested in becoming involved in the
Sino-Soviet dispute in order to facilitate some (anticipated) outcomes and to prevent
others. In this regard, Gheorghiu-Dej or Alexandru Brldeanu often explicitly maintained
that Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute was not one of neutrality but, as
they put it, one of active, principled and objective participation in the Sino-Soviet
dispute, aiming to trigger specific outcomes.366
Given these conceptions of the Romanian leaders, this study avoids considering the
Romanian position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute as neutral and advances instead the
term neither-nor-position. From 1962 onwards, the Romanian leaders often defined their
363

Croitor, 2009, 208-213.

Note regarding the talks with I.K. Zhegalin, 8 January 1962; The letter of the CC of the RWP to the CC of
the CCP, 3 March 1962, published in Mihai Croitor, n umbra Kremlinului. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej i
geneza Declaraiei din Aprilie 1964. Documente, Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, 19-28.
365
See, for instance, Dennis Deletant, Romania under communist rule, Civic Academy Foundation,
Bucharest, 2006, 150; Mark Kramer, The Kremlin, the Prague Spring and the Brezhnev doctrine in
Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.) Promises of 1968: crisis, illusion, and utopia, Central European University
Press, Budapest, New York, 2011, 297.
366
Notes from the 2 April 1964 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 13/1964, 2-10; The
minutes of the19-22 May 1964 meeting with the employees of the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Foreign
Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 24/1964, 189; The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum of the
CC of the RWP, in Banu&ranu, 67-68, 141-142; Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 58-59.
364

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position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute as follows: refusal to take any side; refusal to
discuss the substance of the ideological arguments of the two sides; support for the
stipulations of the 1960 Moscow Declaration; promotion of the idea that any divergences
had to be solved through negotiations. This unique Romanian stand was not published
until mid-1963, but it was explicitly presented as early as 1962 to the Chinese, Soviet,
Indian, Yugoslav, East German, Italian and British party leaderships and diplomats, as
well as to the Romanian party members in closed meetings organised across the country.
In late 1962 and early 1963 the Sino-Soviet dispute aggravated 367, and both the Soviet
and the Chinese leaderships unsuccessfully asked the Romanian leadership to formulate its
position and to pick a side. For instance, a November 1962 report of the Romanian
Embassy in Beijing wrote about the (perceived) Chinese efforts to convince Romania to
support their views. The Romanian representatives in China were instructed by Bucharest
to tactfully resist such attempts and to make no declaration in support of any side.368
According to the Romanian leaders perceptions, the Soviets were trying in late 1962
(directly or through Indian or Yugoslav intermediaries) to bring Romania on the Soviet
side. In October 1962, when Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and
Corneliu Mnescu, visited India, they were insistently asked to express Romanias
position regarding the Chinese-Indian border conflict and the Sino-Soviet dispute.
However, they refused to pick a side or to comment on the substance of the dispute,
emphasising that in the opinion of the RWP the unity of the communist movement had to
be secured and the problems had to be settled through negotiations. Other (perceived)
Soviet intermediaries were provided with a similar response a month later, when in
November 1962 a delegation of the Great National Assembly of Romania, which was
visiting Yugoslavia, was repeatedly requested to present Romanias position towards the
dispute within the communist movement.
A month later, in December 1962, Shripad Amrit Dange, the president of the
Communist Party of India, on a visit to Romania, was insisting to be presented with the
Romanian leaderships position on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Responding, Nicolae
Ceauescu, Leonte Rutu and Chivu Stoica reiterated the previously announced position,
and added that Romania would not publish special articles on the polemic, as we do not
consider necessary to dwell on this subject; we have enough important problems to debate
in our media.369
While the Romanians began implementing their neither-nor-position, the leaderships
from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria or Hungary, at the request of the CPSU,
began condemning at their congresses and plenums the Chinese and Albanian leaderships

367

Sergey Radchenko, Two suns in the same heaven: the Sino-Soviet struggle for supremacy, 1962-1967,
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, 2009, 24-33.
368
The Romanias Embassy in Beijing, Report, 13 November 1962, AMAE, Fond China, Problem 20/1962,
paged without numbers; Report regarding the 12 November 1962 discussion between the Chinese Military
Attach in Bucharest (lieutenant-colonel Sia Fei) and lieutenant-colonel Costache Ranga, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Administrative-Political Section, File 7/1962, 11-14.
369
Report; The minutes of the 25 December 1962 talks between Nicolae Ceauescu, Leonte Rutu, Chivu
Stoica and Ghisela Vass with comrade Dange, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 55/1962, 109-123, File
32/1962, 2-18.

107

for their factionalist positions.370 The Romanian party delegations participating at such
bloc gatherings avoided addressing in their speeches the Sino-Soviet dispute, while
Gheorghiu-Dej himself used various pretexts to not participate at all. In January 1963, for
instance, the Romanian leader did not attend the 6 th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party
of Germany (15-21 January 1963, Berlin), and the fact was correctly interpreted in
Moscow as a Romanian refusal to align against the Chinese. 371
Consequently, on 17 January 1963 (during the East German Congress) the Soviet
Ambassador in China, Stepan Chervonenko, reproached Dumitru Gheorghiu, the
Romanian ambassador in China, that the RWP, in contrast to the other European parties,
had not yet publicly criticised the Chinese. The Soviet diplomat stressed once again the
necessity as he called it for the communist parties to proceed, through their
congresses or through other means, to an open censure of the factionalist, provocative
positions of the Chinese comrades, and implied that the RWP had probably fallen under
the influence of the CCP together with other oscillating parties.372 Despite
Chervonenkos allusions, the Romanian leadership maintained its position, refusing to
condemn the Chinese both internationally and domestically.
Resisting equally the (perceived) Chinese and the Soviet pressure to pick a side, the
Romanian leadership often defined their neither-nor-position towards the Sino-Soviet
dispute through negation it was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-Chinese; neither anti-Soviet
nor anti-Chinese. According to Romanian archival materials recording different bilateral
Romania-Soviet talks, the Soviets did not accept such explanations and often complained
that one could be either pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese or pro-Chinese and therefore antiSoviet. The Romanians, however, rejected this dichotomous approach, and proposed
instead a third alternative, their neither-nor-position373, which, however, by not supporting
the Soviets was another form of opposing them. Thus, if prior to 1962, Romanias
opposition to the USSR was visible in the field of the CMEA reform, from 1962 onwards
this opposition began to manifest itself also in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The main question is, however, why did the Romania leaders make this turn in 1962,
from publicly and officially supporting the Soviets against the Chinese to a neither-norposition? This chapter argues that this change occurred when the Romanian leaders
decided to begin looking for a balance with China against the perceived Soviet threats of
CMEA integration. As the third chapter of this study detailed, in April-May 1962 the
Romanian leaders envisaged the China card tactic as leverage against the (perceived)
Soviet CMEA March-April 1962 integration proposals. Although the implementation of
this tactic was postponed until March-June 1963, after the 2 March 1962 letter of the CC
of the RWP addressed to the CC of the CCP, all Romanian public criticism against the
Chinese ceased.
370

Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,
2000, 123; See also, Walter Ulbrichts 12 February 1963 letter to Mao Zedong, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations-Alphabetical, File 1G/1947-1963, 294-308.
371
Anton, 173.
372
Excerpts documents received from Romanias Embassy in Pekin, 13 April 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 1/1963, 25-30.
373
See, for instance, The Minutes of the 26 May 1963 meeting between the Soviet and the Romanian
delegations, in Retegan, 2002, 273-299; The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu,
2004, 232, 238-239.

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Besides this proximate cause of the change, Gheorghiu-Dej took other factors into
consideration when he decided in 1962 to stop publicly criticising the Chinese. If in 1960
he believed that the Soviets were to put the Chinese in their place rather rapidly374, by
1962 he developed other convictions. Considering that it was difficult to predict the
further evolution or the outcome of the dispute and seeing now China as an emerging great
power soon to have even the nuclear bomb375 the Romanian leader revised his previous
position and concluded that it was not in Romanias interest to get involved in the
(perceived) emerging conflict between Moscow and Beijing. Thus, he decided that the
Romanian leadership should take no side, and should be, in his own words, more careful
and should not pull out the gun and fire each time the Soviet and the Chinese leaderships
fired against each other.376 Ideologically, the Romanian leader considered that neither the
Soviets nor the Chinese were entirely right or entirely wrong, and that both tended to
interpret the Marxist-Leninist teachings to fit their non-ideological interests.377

5.1.3 Ideological considerations

Scholars often explain Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute in terms of
ideology. Anton argues that the RWP and the CCP had the same ideological orientation
and similar economic views, and that this ideological identity triggered Gheorghiu-Dejs
fascination for the Chinese model.378 Croitor maintains that the RWP and the CPSU had
identical positions with regard to the principles at the basis of the world communist
movement, and that Gheorghiu-Dej aligned with the Chinese theses (in which he did not
believe, according to Croitor) only because he was an opportunist trying to obtain Chinese
support against the CMEA integration.379 Retegan contends that Gheorghiu-Dej was
drawn towards China not by ideological, tactical or strategic considerations, but by his
pragmatic determination to preserve his personal domestic political power in the context
of de-Stalinisation.380
However, the Romanian archival evidence suggests, that ideology is not the primary
factor that explains Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute. It also suggests
that the Romanian leadership had its own ideological conception. The minutes of different
secret RWP Politburo meetings, of Romanian-Soviet or Romanian-Chinese talks, as well
as Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations on Romanian produced reports or on the letters that the
Chinese and the Soviets exchanged among themselves in the early 1960s provide reliable

374

The minutes of the 5 December 1960 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 47/1960, vol. I,
11, 19-20.
375
In January 1962, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces, Leontin Sljan, was reporting to the CC
of the RWP that according to the intelligence arriving from the Romanian military attach in Beijing, Nicu
Gheorghe, China was to posses the atomic bomb in a not very distant future. Leontin Sljans Address to
the CC of the RWP, 18 January 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Administrative-Political Section, File 7/1962, 16.
376
The minutes of the 5-8 March 1963 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 68-69, 91.
377
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 23135.
378
Anton, 171.
379
Croitor, 2009, 16, 213, 146.
380
Mihai Retegan, 1968 Din primvar pn n toamn, Rao, Bucureti, 1998, 39-40.

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sources regarding the Romanians considerations of the ideological aspects of the SinoSoviet quarrel.
In the early 1960s, the Moscow-Beijing divergences took the form of ideological
polemics on subjects such as revolution and war, peaceful coexistence, economic
development, methods to build socialism, each side accusing the other of not respecting
the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in theory and practice. Analysing the ideological
argumentation of the two sides, the Romanian leaders argued that both employed correct
and wrong theses. An example in this regard is provided by Gheorghiu-Dejs annotations
on the 30 March 1963 letter of the CC of the CPSU addressed to the CC of the CCP.
According to this source, the Romanian leader considered that the Soviet thesis according
to which Marxist-Leninists needed to do everything in their power to prevent a new world
conflict and the thesis that peaceful coexistence corresponds with the vital interests of all
peoples were very just and important, and had therefore Romanias complete
support. Another Soviet very just thesis, as Gheorghiu-Dej put it, was the one according
to which the violation of Marxist-Leninist principles in the relations between parties can
affect not only party interests but the interests of the wider masses of the people.
The Romanian leader also agreed with Khrushchev that we communists can argue
between ourselves, but he did not agree that there were favourable international and
domestic conditions in the present epoch for more and more countries capitalist and
non-capitalist to go over to socialism. This Soviet interpretation was too optimistic and
even unrealistic according to Gheorghiu-Dej. The Soviet 30 March 1963 letter noted
also that the socialist system is so progressive by nature that it enables the peoples to
swiftly eliminate their backwardness, to catch up with the more highly-developed
countries, and, marching in one rank with them, to fight for the building of communism.
This too was an exaggeration, according to Gheorghiu-Dej. Furthermore, when
Khrushchev argued that the transition from capitalism to socialism could be made
peacefully, the Romanian leader wrote that this thesis was weak, vulnerable and
given the number of the countries that had actually freed themselves peacefully
unlikely to actually occur in reality.
The Soviet leader also wrote that the national interests and the interests of the socialist
system as a whole combine harmoniously and that life has proved convincingly that
every country can best solve its national tasks only through the closest cooperation with
the other socialist countries on the basis of genuine equality and mutual aid. These ideas,
however, reminded the Romanian leader of the CMEA integration debate, triggering his
suspicion and concern. Why did the Soviets consider it necessary to include in their letter
to the Chinese such considerations? Were they trying to obtain Chinese support in the
CMEA integration endeavour, the Romanian leader asked himself.381 On the other hand,
the Romanian leaders agreed with the Soviet-supported principles that regulated, in theory,
the relations between the socialist states (equality in rights, sovereignty, independence,
non-interference in internal affairs, mutual aid), but they believed that, despite its
381

The letter of the CC of the CPSU addressed to the CC of the CCP, 30 March 1963, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Fond 80, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File no 828 vol. I/ 1963,
6-33. I also used the English translation of this letter as provided by the MIA at
http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpsu/30march1963.htm, accessed
on 13 November 2012.

110

declaration, the Soviet leadership and especially Khrushchev, did not respect those
principles in practice.382
The Romanians employed similar positions towards Beijings ideological
considerations, reasoning that some of the Chinese theses were correct, while others were
wrong. As this chapter already noted, as early as December 1960, Gheorghiu-Dej agreed
at a Plenum of the CC of the RWP with the Chinese thesis regarding the role of the
national characteristics and particularities in the economic development of a country. The
Chinese thesis regarding the inevitability of war, however, had been always contested by
Romania.383 The Romanian leaders often argued that it was irrelevant if the Chinese were
right or wrong, what was relevant from their point of view was that a state and a party had
the right to independently draw out their domestic or foreign policies, whether those
decisions would be considered correct or not. Moreover, the Romanian leaders were
deeply concerned with the precedent that the Soviets were about to create (according to
their perceptions and interpretations) with the Chinese case. Noting the post-war Soviet
behaviour towards the Yugoslavs, the Albanese and the Chinese, in early 1963,
Gheorghiu-Dej and his Politburo fellows feared that Romania and the RWP might be next
in line among those publicly condemned and punished in one way or another for having
advanced domestic and foreign policies displeasing Moscow. Thus, refusing to go along
with the Soviet anti-Chinese policies in the early 1960s the Romanian leaders were also
aiming to block the Soviets from establishing a precedent that, at some point, might have
been used against Romania, as they believed.384

5.2 In search of an ally

When in February 1963 the Romanian leaders decided to begin using the China-related
arguments as leverage against the Soviet CMEA integration project, the RomanianChinese party and state relations were rather cold. The Romanians had made no
preliminary investigations with regard to the possible Chinese reactions to their arguments
that the Asian states had to be asked to state their opinion about the CMEA reform or to
become full members in the CMEA. As Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it, we do not know what
position the [North] Korean, the [North] Vietnamese [and] the Chinese would take when
we [the Romanians] would criticise the fact that they are outside the CMEA.
In this respect, in early 1963, the Romanian leaders faced the next (perceived)
dilemma. On the one hand, they believed that the Sino-Soviet dispute created a favourable
context for their China-related arguments to be successful in blocking the Soviets CMEA
integration plans, but on the other hand they feared that the rather cold Romanian-Chinese
382

The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 8118.
383
The minutes of the 1 August 1960 Plenum; Annex to the Minutes of the 5 December 1960 Politburo
meeting; The Minutes of the 19-20 December 1960 Plenum; ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 52/1960, 33112; File 47/1960, vol. II, 380-389; File 36/1960, 4, 18-49; The letter of the CC of the CCP addressed to the
CC of the CPSU, 14 June 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Fond 80, Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 827/1963, 268-330.
384
The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
4/1963, 17-135.

111

relations could undermine the success of their China-related tactic because the Soviets
could consider implausible Romanias threats of balancing with China. Thus, the February
1963 decision to initiate a policy of rapprochement with China was triggered also by the
Romanian leaders conviction that Romania needed to be able to display better relations
with Beijing had it wanted to make credible the threats of balancing with China as they
planned to employ in the integration debate with Moscow.
Moreover, Gheorghiu-Dej feared that the Chinese leadership could have publicly
declared its complete indifference to the CMEA problems, risking to deprive the
Romanian leadership of one of its main bargaining chips in its attempt to block the CMEA
integration. Thus, the reconciliation with China was meant, on the other hand, to prevent
such an outcome. However, the Romanian leaders did not contemplate their China card
tactics only in terms of threatening the Soviets to balance with China, as the previous
chapter detailed. They also tried to actually influence the Chinese leaders to take action to
become a full member of the CMEA, because, they believed that, once China became a
full member of the CMEA, Romania and China could work together to block
Khrushchevs integration attempts.385

5.2.1 Initiating rapprochement with China

Deciding to take the initiative to reconcile with China, the Romanian leaders correctly
anticipated that given Romanias 1960-1962 support for the Soviet side it was to be
very difficult to convince the Chinese to reciprocate. They carefully planned and
employed therefore a step-by-step rapprochement which began with declarations of
friendship and economic accords, evolved to voluntarily blocking various (perceived)
Soviet anti-Chinese manoeuvres, and ended with proposing the Chinese to ask for Chinas
membership in the CMEA.
In March 1963, Romania was already publishing laudatory articles about the economic
development of China. On 8 March, Gheorghe Rdulescu, the Romanian Minister of
Foreign Trade, relayed to Xu Jianguo, the Chinese Ambassador in Bucharest, that
Romania wanted to strengthen its friendship with China on the basis of the 1960 Moscow
Declaration, and proposed an improvement of bilateral trade relations. A month later,
Dumitru Gheorghiu, Romanias Ambassador in Beijing, requested to be received by Peng
Zhen and Chen Yi, Chinas Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the audience he was
granted, Dumitru Gheorghiu declared that the Romanian leadership regretted that the
Soviets had undertaken their June 1960 attack against the Chinese leadership in
Bucharest.386
The Romanian-Chinese trade relations witnessed a significant and rapid improvement
in 1963. In 1961 and 1962 the total value of the Romanian-Chinese trade had decreased to
18 million, respectively 14 million roubles, from 52.3 million, respectively 60.2 million
roubles, in 1960 and 1959.387 But, on 8 April 1963 Romania and China signed a new
385

The Minutes of 3-10 March 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations, in Budura,
2008, 179-185, 210.
386
Liu Yong, Sino-Romanian relations: 1950s-1960s, INST, Bucureti, 2006, 138-139.
387
The Romanian Embassy in China, Report, AMAE, Fond China, Problema 20E/1963, 26.

112

commercial agreement stipulating for that year an increase of the trade volume by 140% in
comparison with the previous year. 388 The improvement of the political relations,
however, was slower and the Chinese leaders repeatedly refused to meet directly with the
Romanian leaders who instead used different diplomatic channels and intermediaries to
send their messages to Beijing. For instance, on 11 April 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej was
informing the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Bucharest about the CMEA
disagreements, presenting Romanias position on the matter. On the same occasion, the
Romanian leaders noted that we [the Romanians] would want all the socialist states to
participate in the CMEA, but no direct proposal regarding the Asian states participation
in the CMEA as full members was made.389
According to a report from Beijing by Dumitru Gheorghiu, from April 1963 onwards,
the Chinese began to display a more benevolent attitude towards Romania. This attitude
was apparent, Gheorghiu reported, from the laudatory articles published in the Chinese
press about Romanias economic achievements390, from Chinese officials (perceived)
willingness to meet and discuss with the Romanian diplomats in Beijing something that
previously did not use to happen and from the Chinese interest and even eagerness, as
Gheorghiu put it, to enlarge the Romanian-Chinese commercial and cultural collaboration.
This perceived Chinese benevolent attitude towards Romania was encouraged not only by
the Romanian-Soviet CMEA disagreements, but also by Romanias new attitude towards
Albania, the Romanians believed.391 On 7 March 1963, Romania and Albania had signed a
bilateral trade and payments protocol and, on 28 March, Radio Tirana announced the
return of the Romanian Ambassador, George Velcescu, to his post in Tirana. Similar to the
Chinese media, in the spring of 1963, the Albanian press too began to publish flattering
articles about Romanias socialist development.392
In May 1963, Cen Jouei Cin one of the chief editors of the newspaper Renmin Ribao
(Jenminjibao/Peoples Daily) approached Emil Soran, Scnteias correspondent in
Beijing, and stressing that he was transmitting the point of view of the CCP praised the
5-8 March 1963 Plenum of the CC of the RWP. According to Cen Jouei Cin, the Chinese
leadership considered that the March Plenum was one of the greatest importance not only
for the RWP, but also internationally, because the principles of sovereignty, equality in
rights, mutual advantage present in the Plenums Communiqu were in complete accord
with the point of view of the CCP [and] with the stipulations of the 1960 Moscow
Declaration. The Chinese leadership, Cen Jouei Cin continued, also asserts the respect
388

Scnteia, 9 April 1963; Liu Yong, 139.

Note regarding the 11 April 1963 talk between Gheorghiu-Dej and Dinh Van Duc, North Vietnams
ambassador in Bucharest, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 5/1963-1964, 38-41.
390
A similar phenomenon took place in North Korea at the same time. Report of the Romanian Embassy in
Pyongyang, 17 May 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 1/1963, 47-49.
391
Report of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, 25 May 1963, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 55/1963, 1-7.
392
In December 1961, when the Soviet-Albanian crisis broke out, Romanias ambassador in Tirana (George
Velcescu) was on vacation in Romania, and the Bucharest leadership used the opportunity to not send
Velcescu back to his post in Tirana. Romania did not make any official announcement though with regard to
the cessation of diplomatic relations with Albania or to reducing the diplomatic status of their diplomatic
relations from ambassadorial to charg daffaires level as East Germany, Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia did. In March 1963, as if nothing had happened, the Romanian leadership just sent Velcescu
back to his post in Tirana. The minutes of the talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Giancarlo Pajetta, 19 July
1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 40/1963, 16-18.
389

113

for national sovereignty, for the complete equality in rights against the great power
chauvinism, against the idea that bigger and more developed states [should] impose their
will upon smaller or less developed states. This is why we [China] published [in late April
1963] the Communiqu of your plenum.393 Encouraged by such a (perceived) benevolent
Chinese attitude, Gheorghiu-Dej asked Corneliu Mnescu, the Romanian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, to further explain to the Chinese Ambassador in Romania our position in
the CMEA, to tell him how we conceive the relations between the communist states, and
that we wish normal relations with China and with the CCP, regardless the position of the
Soviets, Mnescu declared in an interview. 394
On 16 May and on 5 June 1963, Mnescu proposed the Chinese (through their
ambassador in Romania) an alliance of necessity, which was constructed around an enemy
of my enemy approach. Mnescu argued that, in terms of state security and interests,
Romania and China had a common enemy the USSR and, therefore, common
problems, which they should tackle together. The Romanian minister reasoned that
Romania and China had to resist similar Soviet pressure concerning their economic
interests and their sovereignty. He noted that the Soviets interfered in the affairs of the
Romanian and the Chinese states and parties; that, regarding the economic development of
the socialist states, Romania and China had common views, both being committed to the
principle of industrialisation, both developing their economies starting from their
national particularities and both praising the principles of sovereignty, equality in rights,
mutual advantage and independence. The Romanian and the Chinese leaderships had their
differences of opinion in relation to peace and war, peaceful coexistence or disarmament,
but they did not have to agree in all matters in order to work together towards a common
goal namely blocking/counteracting specific Soviet plans and actions threatening their
interests, Mnescu further reasoned. Recalling the Soviet economic manoeuvres against
China, Mnescu also declared on that occasion that
I believe that this is one of the problems that one must settle. Normally we [socialist states]
should help each other, we should collaborate on the basis of the principle of mutual
advantage; this is what unity of our communist community means. A country has bigger
possibilities. Another country has smaller possibilities. A country is more advanced on the
road of building socialism. Another one is less advanced and it is the latter that needs to be
supported more. This support however, must not mean economic and especially political
domination.

Criticising the CMEA attempts at reform through integration, Mnescu stressed that
Romania agreed that the CMEA can and must be improved, but implied that the reforms
had to be made through the accession of the Asian states. It seems to us [Romania] that
the absence from the CMEA of a series of socialist countries weakens the strength of the
CMEA, Mnescu declared on 5 June 1963 to Xu Jianguo, without advancing though any
direct proposals in this respect. Regarding Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet
dispute, Mnescu assured Xu Jianguo that Romania would not take the side of the

393
394

Emil Sorans Report from Pekin, 5 June 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 1/1963, 63-65.
Interview with Mnescu, in Betea, 484.

114

USSR.395 The Chinese did not hurry to respond through diplomatic channels to Romanias
CMEA indirect questions, but, on 17 June 1963, Renmin Ribao published the Chinese 14
June letter, and, as already noted, the 21st point of that letter implicitly supported the
Romanian integration views.

5.2.2 Mutual signs of goodwill

According to his annotations on the 14 June 1963 letter of the CC of the CCP to the CC of
the CPSU, Gheorghiu-Dej found many faults in the Chinese theses, but the 21 st point had
his entire support. The letter implied, for instance, that the Soviet Union and the CPSU
were betraying the interests of the entire international proletariat and argued that certain
persons in the international communist movement are now taking a passive or scornful or
negative attitude towards the struggle for liberation of the oppressed nations. GheorghiuDej believed that with this kind of formulations the Chinese were intentionally and
dangerously sharpening the dispute which was to eventually split the communist
movement for good in two groups of parties and states around Moscow and Beijing.
In general, Gheorghiu-Dej considered that the Chinese ideological argumentations
and accusations against some persons which he correctly identified as the leaders of
the CPSU were chaotic, sinuous, wrong, false, superficial, illogical,
rudimentary and confused. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, the Chinese ideological
arguments were merely some Chinese tricks, tendentious insinuations, mystifications
and amalgam of chaotic notions of which [only] some are just. In his view, the most
incorrect and dangerous Chinese thesis was the one regarding peaceful coexistence and
general disarmament, because, he argued, the Chinese recipes incited violent action at any
cost. According to the Romanian leader there were many other wrong theses in that letter.
It argued, for instance, that the US imperialists stepped into the shoes of the German,
Italian and Japanese fascists, their strategic objectives being to grab and dominate the
intermediate zone lying between the United States and the socialist camp and to secure
the destruction of the socialist countries and the subjugation of all the peoples and
countries of the world. Gheorghiu-Dej wrote on the margins of the letter that such
considerations were exaggerated, nave and bogus. He had the same opinion about
the Chinese thesis of the paper tigers396.
Thus, the historiographical interpretation regarding the alleged ideological identity
shared by the Romanian and the Chinese leaderships397 is invalidated when the new
available archival evidence is addressed from a perceptual perspective. The Romanian
leaders interpreted and perceived the Chinese theses which according to their views
prompted polemics, conflict and war not through the lens of the Marxist-Leninist
395

Notes regarding the 16 May 1963 and the 5 June 1963 discussions between Corneliu Mnescu and Xu
Jianguo, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations, File 53/1963, 2-20; File 58/1963, 1-14.
396
Mao Zedong argued that the United States is nothing but a paper tiger and the US imperialism in
appearance it is very powerful, but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of, it is a paper tiger. Outwardly a tiger,
it is made of paper, unable to withstand the wind and the rain. US Imperialism is a paper tiger, part of a talk
with two Latin-American public figures, 14 July 1956, MIA,
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_52.htm, accessed on 15
January 2013.
397
Anton, 171.

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teachings, but through the lens of the practical consequences that such theses would have
had (in their view) for the international stability and especially for Romanias security.
The Romanian leaders considered that the Chinese ideological arguments were false,
nave, illogical, rudimentary and confused not because they were not in accordance
with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, but because they were (perceived as being)
unwise, imprudent, risked to provoke an international general crisis that would affect in
one way or another Romanias interests as well. According to the Romanians, the Chinese
leaders were either unable to apprehend, or simply indifferent to the devastating
consequences of their pro-war theory. Thus, they determined the justness of the Soviet or
of Chinese theses not through a theoretical Marxist-Leninist analysis, but through a careful
consideration of the (anticipated) practical implications of those theses for Romanias
pragmatic interests.
However, the 21st point from the Chinese 14 June 1963 letter had the support of the
entire Romanian leadership, Gheorghiu-Dej considering it not only very just, but also
important in Romanias (expected) future integration battle with the Soviets. According
to this point, the economic development of every socialist country must start from its
own concrete conditions and must fully utilise all its available resources, in a planned
way. It noted that
the relations between the socialist countries, whether large or small, and whether more
developed or less developed economically, must be based on the principles of complete
equality, respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and must also be based on the principles of
mutual support and mutual assistance in accordance with proletarian internationalism. ()
It would be great-power chauvinism to deny these basic principles and, in the name of
international division of labour or specialisation, to impose ones own will on others,
infringe on the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries or harm the interests of
their people.

After the publication of 14 June 1963 Chinese letter, various Chinese (albeit low-ranked)
officials approached Romanian representatives in Beijing and told them that the 21st point
had been designed to help Romania in its struggle against the Soviet CMEA integration
attempts. They even implied that the Chinese leadership was disposed to go further in
supporting Romania to block the CMEA integration. For instance, on 18 June 1963, the
editors from Renmin Ribao, addressing the content of the 21st point, relayed to Emil Soran
that the Chinese leadership did not want to see repeated in the case of Romania the
situation through which China itself went when the Soviet leadership exercised economic
pressure in order to impose its own objectives to the detriment of the Chinese interests.
Although rather vague, such declarations encouraged the Romanian leaders to hope that
the Chinese were disposed to support in a more concrete manner Romanias cause in the
CMEA.398 In the meantime, the Romanian leaders believed that the 21st point was in itself
helping their cause very much, because, in their views, it cultivated the Soviets
(perceived) fear that Romania was sliding towards China. To prevent such a thing from
398

The letter of the CC of the CCP addressed to the CC of the CPSU, 14 June 1963, annotated by GheorghiuDej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 827/1963, 268-330; See also Emil
Sorans Report concerning the 18 June 1963 discussions with the editors of Renmin Ribao, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 1/1963, 70-75.

116

happening, the Soviets would eventually accommodate Romanias views on the problem
of integration, the Romanian leaders believed in the summer of 1963.399
Although the Romanian leadership considered that much of the content of the 25
points letter was unjust, on 19 June 1963, Leonte Rutu informed the Chinese
ambassador in Bucharest that the RWP had decided to publish excerpts from the letter.
Advocating once more an alliance of necessity between Romania and China, Rutu
suggested that the Romanian leadership was disposed to oppose the Soviets not only on
the CMEA integration problem, but also on the Sino-Soviet dispute problem. In Rutus
words,
every party has the right to express its point of view in any problem. We [the Romanians]
have different opinions and we express them in the place and at the time we consider
necessary, as communists should do. Our [RW] Party has lately expressed sincerely and
principled its point of view with regard to some problems of the economic collaboration
between the socialist countries. Sometimes one talks about the baton. We play under
nobodys baton, we have our own baton. The leadership of our party is a very good
conductor; it can conduct any piece, no matter how hard it is. And this applies to both,
domestic policy and international problems. 400

Rutu concluded that the main thing is to be united, that if we [Romania and China] are
united, we will be strong. Our [Romanian] people have a saying and I believe that the
Chinese people have a similar saying unity is strength.401
The next day, on 20 June 1963, Romania was the only Eastern European state
publishing a summary of the 14 June Chinese letter.402 This decision irritated the Soviets,
but was received with satisfaction in Beijing. 403 Regarding the publication in Romania of
the letters and articles that the Chinese and the Soviets were throwing at each other, in
mid-1963 the Romanian leaders considered three possible options: to publish the Soviet
and Chinese texts integrally, to publish nothing, and to publish excerpts from those texts.
The problem was again analysed not from the point of view of the (Romanian perceived)
ideological correctness of the two sides, but from the perspective of Romanias interests.
According to Maurer, publishing nothing was not a good solution because the
Romanian population would still discover the content of those texts but through different
external sources such as Radio Free Europe, or that would mean, Maurer emphasised, that
the Romanian people would have no access to the correct interpretation of those texts,
399

The minutes of the 21-22 June 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 33/1963, 13-72.
During the 1963-1964 talks with the Chinese, the Romanian representatives often argued that the
Romanian leadership did not follow the Soviet baton a strong metaphor that had originated in Beijing. A
Peoples Dailys editorial from 15 December 1962, for instance, argued that we [the CCP] will never obey
the baton of an anti-Marxist-Leninist. In another editorial from 27 February 1963 it was written that it was
a fact of particular gravity that late in June 1960 someone [the Soviet leader] went so far as to wave his
baton and launch an all-out and converging surprise attack on the Chinese Communist Party at the meeting
of the fraternal Parties in Bucharest. Whence the Differences? - A Reply to Thorez and Other Comrades,
editorial in in Renmin Ribao, 27 February 1963, at MIA,
http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/replytothorez.htm, accessed on
5 May 2012.
401
Note regarding the conversation between Leonte Rutu and Xu Jianguo, 19 June 1963, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign relations, File no 5/1963-1964, 61-64.
402
Scnteia, 20 June 1963.
403
Ctnu, 2011, 309.
400

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which only the Romanian leadership could provide. The solution of publishing the Soviet
and the Chinese texts integrally was also dismissed, for two other reasons. Firstly, it was
unconceivable for the Romanians to publish theses with which they disagreed (and both
the Soviet and the Chinese advanced, in their opinion, wrong theses). Secondly, the
Romanian leaders considered that publishing the Soviet and the Chinese texts integrally
equalled to being neutral, or as Boril put it, neutrality was something that the Romanian
leaders did not want to display, since it was not true, as the Romanian leaders were not
indifferent to the arguments that the Soviets and the Chinese used in their quarrel. On the
contrary, they had their own position with regard to the polemics, a position that one
might deduce, Boril further argued, from the excerpts of the Soviet and Chinese texts that
were actually published in Romania. Thus, on 4 July 1963, the Politburo decided to
publish condensed versions of the Soviet and Chinese texts, eliminating everything that
broke and poisoned the relations between Moscow and Beijing.
As far as Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute was concerned, the
Romanian leaders decided to maintain their previous neither-nor-approach: to take no side,
to strive for unity, to produce no Romanian texts regarding the dispute. During the
Politburo meeting from 4 July 1963, Ion Gheorghe Maurer reasoned at some point that
maybe a moment will come when the Romanian leadership will have to publicly and
openly formulate our position through an article so that everybody would be elucidated
about Romanias stance on the Sino-Soviet dispute, but, he further noted, that was a
decision still waiting to be made.404
Despite its initial decision to publish only condensed forms of the Soviet and Chinese
polemic materials, on 17 and 18 July 1963, Scnteia published the entire Chinese and
Soviet letters from 14 June and 14 July. To respect the self-imposed rule of displaying
impartiality towards the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Romanians published the two letters
opposing each other on the right page, the Soviet letter and, on the left page, the Chinese
letter.405 This mid-July 1963 move was made because the Romanian leadership considered
that displaying a benevolent attitude towards the Chinese (through the publishing of their
14 June letter) might put additional pressure on Moscow and might move the Soviets to
accommodate Romanias anti-integration views at the approaching CMEA conference
(scheduled for 24-26 July 1963).
Another voluntary Romanian sign of goodwill towards China took place at the meeting
of the leaders of the European communist and workers partied held in Berlin on 29 June
1963 on the occasion of Ulbrichts 70th birthday. Convinced that the communist leaders
had been summoned to Berlin in order to condemn China prior to the opening of the
Moscow July 1963 Sino-Soviet negotiations, Gheorghiu-Dej decided as a favour to
China, as he put it to not attend the meeting in Berlin and to send Ulbricht instead a
letter of felicitation.406 The participants at the Berlin meeting did criticise the Chinese
leadership and its policies407, and the Romanians implicit refusal to do the same was

404

The minutes of the Politburo meeting from 4 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 37/ 1963, 2-13.
Scnteia, 17, 18 July 1963.
406
Note regarding the audience granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to Xu Jianguo, 12 December 1963,ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 94/1963, 21-22.
407
Costache, 2012, 63.
405

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especially appreciated in Beijing, where the Chinese leaders began to show some
willingness to return the favour to Romania.
For instance, on 5 July 1963, during a conversation with the Romanian ambassador in
China, Dumitru Gheorghiu, the Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, first applauded
Gheorghiu-Dejs wise decision to not participate in the Berlin meeting and then
emphasised that, regarding its disagreements with the Soviets, Romania had Chinas
sympathy. The CCP did not agree either with Khrushchev imposing his will on the other
fraternal parties, Romanias situation was comprehended in China and the Chinese
leadership hoped that the RWP and the CCP were to increase their mutual
understanding, Zhou Enlai further noted. Shortly after this discussion, China offered to
support Romania in the economic field, so that it could resist further economic Soviet
pressure408 which the Romanian leaders were expecting.409
The July 1963 discussion regarding Mongolias admission to the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation (WTO) according to Radchenko, another anti-Chinese move by
Khrushchev410 provided the Romanian leadership with another occasion to do a favour
to China, as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it. 411 Mongolia requested to be admitted to the WTO
on 15 July 1963.412 Several days earlier, in a letter from 11 July, Khrushchev informed the
Romanian leadership that the CC of the CPSU had a positive attitude towards
Mongolias request which, he argued, deserved to be supported by all the members of
the organisation. Acknowledging the absence of a juridical framework for admitting
Mongolia in the WTO, the Soviet leader wrote on that occasion that Article 4 of the
Warsaw Pact Treaty413 had to probably be supplemented by a special protocol to allow
the admittance of a non-European state. In case of a general agreement, Mongolias
admission could be accomplished on the occasion of the CMEA meeting scheduled for
July 1963, Khrushchev concluded.414
The Romanian leaders read this proposal through the lens of the failure of the SinoSoviet July 1963 Moscow negotiations. They observed the chain of events which, they
408

Liu Yong, 139-140.

The Minutes of the 26 June 1963 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 229-264.
410
Radchenko, 84-85.
411
Note concerning the discussions between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, the Chinese ambassador in
Romania, 5 June 1964, in Budura, 2005, 476.
412
Mongolian Request for Admission to the Warsaw Pact, 15 July 1963, in The Parallel History Projects on
Cooperation Security, Warsaw Pact Record Collection, the Parallel History Project on NATO and the
Warsaw Pact (PHP),
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=20907&navinfo=14465, accessed on 2
February 2012.
413
Article 4 of the Warsaw Pact stipulated that In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several
states that are signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states, each state that is a party to this treaty
shall, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations Organisation, render the state or states so attacked immediate assistance,
individually and in agreement with other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the means it may consider
necessary, including the use of armed force. The states that are parties to this treaty shall immediately take
council among themselves concerning the necessary joint measures to be adopted for the purpose of
restoring and upholding international peace and security. In accordance with the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations Organisation, the Security Council shall be advised of the measures taken on the basis of
the present article. These measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has taken the necessary
measures for restoring and upholding international peace and security. The Warsaw Treaty, at PHP,
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_pcc/wapa_treaty.cfm, accessed on 5 May 2013.
414
Note on Khrushchevs 11 July 1963 letter, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 16U/1963, 179.
409

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argued, could not be a coincidence. Firstly, Khrushchev sent his 11 July letter; then, on 13
July 1963 Andropov was informing the Romanian leadership (over the telephone) about
the deadlock that the Sino-Soviet negotiations had reached and about the Soviet
leaderships intention to publish the next day in Pravda its 14 July letter of response to the
Chinese 14 June missive415; and, finally, on 15 July 1963, the Prime Minister of the
Mongolian People's Republic, Yumjaagin Tsedenbal, addressed the Polish Prime Minister,
Jzef Cyrankiewicz, in a formal letter proposing Mongolias admission to the WTO, on
the formal grounds that Mongolia needed to strengthen its defensive capabilities in the
Far East, especially against Japan. The Romanian leadership was convinced that this
initiative came in fact from Khrushchev and not from Tsedenbal and that it had been
envisaged as an anti-Chinese manoeuvre and provocation.
Rumours that the Chinese might break their relations with the Soviet Union were
reaching the Romanian capital causing great concern. The Romanian leadership perceived
the admission of Mongolia to the Warsaw Pact as a serious and provocative act
towards China, which had the (perceived) potential to cause even open military conflict,
not only between the two parties, but between the states grouped around Moscow and
Beijing. According to Emil Bodnra, if allowed to happen, Mongolias admission to the
Warsaw Pact would constitute the division of the communist movement and camp in two
groups of parties and states and would facilitate the appearance of two opposing military
blocs within the socialist camp. 416 According to the Romanian leaderships interpretation,
such a situation was one of extreme gravity for Romania as well, because it posed direct
threats to her interests and security, risking to draw her into the (anticipated) Sino-Soviet
state confrontation.
Given their perceptions and expectations, the Romanian leaders decided very rapidly
that they had to block Khrushchevs manoeuvre to bring China into the WTO. However,
how to implement this decision was a subject that provoked considerable debate. The main
concerned was how to reach their goal without saying no to Khrushchev, because as
Ion Gheorghe-Maurer phrased it during the 18 July 1963 Politburo meeting tactically it
was not a good thing for Romania to say no to the Soviet leadership. Therefore, instead
of openly opposing Khrushchevs proposals, the Romanian leaders decided to resort to
postponing tactics and to argue that, prior to discussing Mongolias admission in the
Warsaw Pact, one had to thoroughly study the practical implications of such a move.
This is another case that confirms the pattern that this study identified in Romanias
opposition to the USSR, namely Romanias opposition was a response to a perceived
imminent threat; the goal of her opposition was to postpone/eliminate that specific
perceived threat; and acting to block a perceived specific Soviet threat, the Romanian
leaders were especially concerned to not antagonise the USSR. In this particular case, the
415

Note regarding the telephone conversation between Y. Andropov and Ghisela Vass, 13 July 1963, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relations Alphabetical, File 18 U/1963, 226-227.
416
The Polish leadership was also worried with the implications of Mongolias admission in the Warsaw
Pact, Adam Rapacki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, arguing in a Memorandum sent on 20 July 1963 to the
members of the Polish Politburo that the political consequences of such a move were dubious and risky.
The Polish too saw this manoeuvre as being directed against China and risked triggering the appearance of
military blocks within the socialist camp. Adam Rapackis Memorandum from 20 July 1963, PHP,
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=17905&navinfo=14465, accessed on 25
December 2012.

120

Romanian leadership opposed Khrushchevs proposal regarding Mongolias membership

in the WTO because they perceived it as being (potentially) dangerous for Romanias
interests. The opposition was again an indirect and principled one, instead of openly
rejecting the proposal, the Romanians employed postponing and altering tactics, asking for
detailed analyses on the consequences of such a move. To a lesser extent, they also
resorted to altering tactics, indirectly threatening to divert the initial proposal to a direction
(presumably) unwanted by the USSR, as this section will further detail.417
On 16 July 1963 the Romanian leadership responded to Khrushchevs 11 July missive.
The Romanian four-pages-long letter of response was composed mostly of questions and
was signed by the Gheorghiu-Dej, on behalf of the Romanian leadership. Without openly
opposing Mongolias admission to the WTO, Gheorghiu-Dej claimed that it is not clear
which of the stipulations of Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty had to be supplemented by a
special protocol. He argued that in our opinion, prior to addressing the problem of
Mongolias admission, the member states had to examine together a series of questions
such as: How does one see Mongolias admission in the WTO? If Mongolia was
attacked, would the members of the WTO have to intervene in Asia, or did one have in
view Mongolias help for the European states in the case of an attack in Europe? Does
one assume that the WTO members would accept to defend the security of non-European
countries? Would the modification of Article 4 trigger modifications of other stipulations
of the Warsaw Treaty? Given the stipulation of the Article 9 of the treaty418, would not the
refusal of one single state to agree with the modification of Article 4 imply the
nullification of that modification?
Would Mongolias membership be in accordance with the functions of the treaty
which was called to ensure the security of the European states in Europe and to initiate the
creation of a pan-European collective security treaty? Would it determine the revision of
those functions? What consequences would the fact have that through the admission of
Mongolia the WTO would cease to be a regional pact? Would other Asian states be
admitted to the WTO? How could the treaty be modified without the accord of all the
member states? What would other non-Warsaw Pact states say if the pact would be
modified without the accord of all its members? All these questions, together with other
aspects that will probably appear Gheorghiu-Dej wrote in his letter to Khrushchev
had to be elucidated through a thorough analysis prior to discussing the admission of
Mongolia to the WTO.419
Thus, the Romanian leader implied in his letter that Romania would oppose
Mongolias admission to the Warsaw Pact if the subject was to be officially addressed,
that it would oppose the modification of Article 4 of the Treaty, that it was disposed to
417

The minutes of the 18 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 39/1963, 121-139.
Article 9. The present treaty is open to be acceded to by other states, irrespective of their social and state
systems-which may express their readiness to assist, through participation in the present treaty, in combining
the efforts of the peace loving states for the purpose of safeguarding the peace and security, of nations. This
act of acceding to the treaty shall become effective, with the consent of the states that are parties to this
treaty, after the instrument of accession has been deposited with the government of the Polish People's
Republic. The Warsaw Treaty, at PHP, http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_pcc/wapa_treaty.cfm,
accessed on 5 May 2013.
419
Gheorghiu-Dejs letter to Khrushchev, 16 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
17U/1963, 142-145.
418

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make its opposition in this matter public and that, once the precedent of modifying the
treaty was created, Romania might propose other modifications as well and might also
propose the admission of other Asian states in the WTO. Maurer and Gheorghiu-Dej
anticipated that faced with such indirect threats, the Soviet leadership would most likely
renounce to their Mongolia-related proposals.
The Romanian leaders left for Moscow prepared to face and oppose other (expected)
anti-Chinese manoeuvres as well. They feared that Khrushchev could attempt to use the
convening of the July 1963 CMEA and WTO summits to impose upon the USSRs allies a
collective condemnation of the Chinese. Practically, they expected Khrushchev to propose
the adoption of a new common declaration to replace the 1960 Moscow Declaration. The
Romanians feared that such a declaration, if ever elaborated and adopted, could reconsider
or even drop all together the principles that the 1960 Declaration consecrated (sovereignty,
equality in rights etc.), which was to deprive the Romanian leadership from the main
arguments it used to oppose the (perceived) Soviet attempts at bloc integration and
coordination. On the other hand, the Romanian leaders considered that Chinas collective
condemnation would create a dangerous precedent, as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it, and
that, once such a precedent was set, Romania risked being publicly condemned as well,
either for its CMEA integration position or for any other domestic or foreign policy action
that might have displeased the Soviets leaders. In conclusion, the Romanian delegation left
for Moscow in July 1963 with the mandate to insist on postponing the question of
Mongolias admission to the WTO, until all the implications of such a decision will be
thoroughly studied, to take no side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to not participate in a
collective condemnation of China if the Soviets would attempt something like that. 420
In the evening of 23 July 1963, Andrei Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR, and the Romanian delegation in Moscow (Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer, Bodnra,
Rutu and Brldeanu) discussed the questions that had been raised in the Romanian letter
from 16 July. Gromyko tried to dismantle the Romanians arguments, answering their
questions one by one. He argued that technically the WTO was not a regional organisation
because the USSR was not only a European state, but also an Asian state. He reasoned that
Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty would be modified through an additional protocol to be an
integral part of the pact (whatever that meant) and stressed that other Asian states such as
China, North Korea or North Vietnam had formulated no request to adhere. Gromyko
insisted that the Mongolian comrades took the initiative to adhere without being
influenced by anybody, but by their real security needs, because, although Mongolia had
no common border with the capitalist states, those states could conduct airborne operations
on its territory and could transform it into a bridgehead against the socialist states.
Addressing Gheorghiu-Dejs allusion that Romania would not consent to Mongolias
admission, Gromyko stressed that Article 9 of the Warsaw Pact stipulated that the
admittance of other states could be done with the consent of the states that are parties to
this treaty, which did not mean all states, the Soviet representative reasoned. Moreover,
he indirectly threatened that one should also consider that according to the international
law if a party did not comply with its obligations, the other party could forbid the party in
question to make use of its rights as stipulated in the [Warsaw] Treaty. Concluding,
420

The protocol no 19 and The minutes of the 18 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office,
File 39/1963, 1-2, 121-139.

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Gromyko emphasised again that the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU and the
government of the USSR supported Mongolias request to adhere to the WTO.
Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer and Bodnra responded that we [the pact members] must not
precipitate to adopt a decision that could sharpen even more the divergences within the
communist movement and that there was no imminent and direct danger that makes
Mongolias admission in the WTO necessary at this moment. Mongolia was
geographically positioned between the USSR and China, two great socialist states, and a
capitalist aggression against it was, they reasoned, unlikely. Gheorghiu-Dej pleaded with
the Soviet minister to
let us not transfer the divergences that have appeared at the level of parties
[relations] to the level of the states [relations]. Let us not precipitate, let us wait a
little. We [Romanians] would desire to postpone the discussion of Mongolias
request for admission to the WTO.
Gheorghiu-Dej further emphasised that the Plenum of the CC of the RWP had made no
decision with regard to Mongolias admittance to the Warsaw Pact and implied that the
Romanian delegation in Moscow would refuse to discuss the subject, if needed, on the
grounds that it had no mandate in that respect. Towards the end of the discussion with
Gromyko, Gheorghiu-Dej announced that he wanted to discuss the problem directly with
Khrushchev. The next day, on 24 July, during the first break of the session of the CMEA
summit, Khrushchev approached Gheorghiu-Dej, and to the satisfaction of the Romanian
side, declared that I agree that now it is not the opportune moment for [Mongolias]
admission. He added that Gromyko had been told to explain the situation to Tsedenbal
and to ask him to postpone the request. In the end, Khrushchev assured the Romanian
leader that the Mongolian comrades will understand.421
The Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (PCC) took place on 26 July 1963
in Moscow.422 During that meeting, the Romanian delegates did not openly oppose
Mongolias admission to the Pact, but they questioned its necessity. According to Soviet
archival sources, the Soviet leadership had already decided to not tease the Romanians
on this issue.423 Thus, on 26 July, Khrushchev agreed with the Romanians and used the
ongoing negotiations on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a pretext to postpone Mongolias
accession to the WTO.424 He claimed that there was a contradiction between admitting
Mongolia to the Warsaw Pact (which implied the existence of a threat, he argued) and the

421

Note regarding the conversation between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Emil
Bodnra, Leonte Rutu, Alexandru Brldeanu, Andrei Gromyko and N.S. Khrushchev, from 23-24 July
1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 24/1963, vol. II, 82-90; See also Note, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 16U/1963, 179-186.
422
Corneliu Filip wrongly argues that during this session of the WTO Political Consultative Committee,
Romania manifested its opposition to the rest of the bloc for the first time. As this study revealed, the
behind-the-scenes disagreements were much older. Tratatul de la Varovia n relaiile internaionale ale
epocii sale, 1955-1991, Cetatea de Scaun, Trgovite, 2007, 49.
423
Miller Center. Minutes 107a of 27 July 1963, available at
http://web1.millercenter.org/kremlin/63_07_23.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2013.
424
Vojtech Mastny, The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for dtente, in Journal of
Cold War Studies, Volume 10, No 1, Winter 2008, 3-25.

123

concluding of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty425 (which was a symbol of dtente).426
Tsendenbal went along, proposed the postponement of the decision on Mongolias
application, and all the other participants agreed. In the end, the Communiqu of the PCC
meeting noted that the summit had addressed only certain aspects regarding the state of the
armed forces of the pacts members.427
How exactly did the Soviet leadership want to use Mongolias admission in the WTO
against China was not very clear for the Romanian leaders though. Did the Soviets really
believe that the Chinese wanted to invade Mongolia? Did they want to use the pretext of a
Chinese anti-Mongolia move to start a war with China? If China did invade Mongolia, did
the USSR intend to use the pretext of Mongolias membership in WTO to drag the
Warsaw Pact into war against China? Such questions were raised by the Romanian leaders
in secret Politburo meetings in the summer of 1963 and, although the questions remained
without definitive answers, the Romanian leaders did formulate a conclusion a SinoSoviet war was a possibility and such a war would endanger Romanias interests.428
Moreover, they also observed that the (perceived) Soviet behavioural pattern tended to
confirm, that when the Soviets were unhappy with a Romanian move they threatened to
break off of the bilateral alliance. This was the meaning they gave to Gromykos indirect
threat that if a party did not comply with its obligations, the other party could forbid the
party in question to make use of its rights as stipulated in the [Warsaw] Treaty. 429

5.2.3 Towards a Romanian public position

The Romanian leaders returned from Moscow very concerned with the (perceived)
continuous deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, and on 31 July they decided that
Romania had to make officially public its views on the situation in the communist
movement through press material. According to Gheorghiu-Dejs directives, such a text
had to maintain Romanias neither-nor-position: to take no side, to criticise neither of the
two, to not address the matters in dispute, to strive for fraternal negotiations and to
reiterate the principles advanced in the 1960 Moscow Declaration. It had to clearly
advance a Romanian original, principled and objective position, so that the Chinese
could not accuse Romania of being pro-Soviet and the Soviets could not accuse Romania
of being pro-Chinese.
To the Chinese, such a text would prove that Romania was not dancing to the Soviet
beat, the Romanian leaders believed, but they further stressed that the impartial material
425

Propelled by the collapse of the Sino-Soviet (5-20 July 1963) talks, the negotiations on the Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty had been resumed in Moscow on 16 July 1963 and concluded on 25 July 1963; the treaty was
signed by the USSR, USA and Britain on 5 August.
426
Report on the 6th PCC Meeting (26 July 1963) by First Secretary of the MDP/MSzMP (Jnos Kdr) to
the Hungarian Politburo (31 July 1963), at PHP, www.isn.ethz.ch/php, by permission of the Center for
Security Studies at ETH, Zurich and the National Security Archive at the George Washington University on
behalf of the PHP network,
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=17907&navinfo=14465, accessed on 25
December 2012.
427
Communiqu, in Scnteia, 28 Iulie 1963.
428
The Minutes of the RWPs Plenum, from 17 February 1964, in Ctnu, 2004, 284.
429
The minutes of the 31 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 41/1963, 54-58.

124

had to clearly encompass Romanias views with regard to the problems of peace, war and
peaceful coexistence so that nobody [read the USSR] could argue that we [Romania]
flee from our [Warsaw Pact] obligations as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it.
A commission of four (Gheorghe Apostol, Leonte Rutu, Emil Bodnra and Nicolae
Ceauescu) was appointed to elaborate the text that was to express the position of the
RWP regarding the present problems of contemporaneity, as the Protocol of the 31 July
1963 Politburo meeting recorded.430 When the text was ready, the Politburo approved it
and then Nicolae Ceauescu read it at the 23 August 1963 manifestations celebrating the
national day, in front of foreign representatives in Romania. Published also in Scnteia,
this text addressed two main themes, the CMEA reform and the situation in the communist
movement. Without openly criticising the others CMEA integration views, Ceauescu
argued that Romania was committed to its Leninist policy of industrialisation, and that the
coordination of the long-term plans and the specialisation and cooperation in production
within the international division of labour were based on the principles of equality in
rights, national sovereignty and mutual advantage, and needed to respond to the
imperative of the economic levelling of development of the socialist states. Regarding the
Sino-Soviet dispute, Ceauescu noted that
we [the RWP], sorrowfully and with great concern find that the divergences that had
appeared with regard to the fundamental problems of contemporaneity persist and instead
of being solved through comradely talks within the normal party relations () have
reached lately a very dangerous escalation.

Ceauescu argued further that the existence of differences of opinions between parties
was normal, but that such differences do not give the right to any communist, and more
particularly do not give the right to any fraternal party, whether small or big, to interfere in
the domestic affairs of other parties, to throw all kind of epithets against another party and
its leadership.431
This was the first time when the Romanian leaders made public their position towards
the Sino-Soviet dispute. Prior to 23 August 1963, this position had been communicated
through different diplomatic channels or in bilateral official or informal talks, but it had
not been publicly voiced by a state or party official. Although Ceauescus speech did not
support the Chinese, it did not support the Soviets either, which was in itself a form of
public opposition to the Soviets. If prior to August 1963, the Romanian leaders opposition
to the USSR relating to the Sino-Soviet dispute could be inferred from the fact that
Romania and the RWP had not publicly condemned the Chinese, as the other bloc leaders
had done, Ceauescus August 1963 speech was clearly advancing a position that was
different from that of the Soviets.
Romania and China continued to show each other signs of goodwill during the entire
year of 1963. Romanias national day 23 August 1963 was celebrated in the Peoples
Republic of China through press articles, TV shows, film projections, exhibitions and
receptions, and congratulatory telegrams were sent to Bucharest by Mao Zedong, Liu
Shaoqi or Zhou Enlai. At the reception organised by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing on
430

Protocol no 16 and The minutes of the 31 July 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
41/1963, 3, 54-58.
431
Nicolae Ceauescus Speech, in Scnteia, 23 August 1963.

125

23 August, Zhou Enlai (Prim Minister) and Peng Zhen (Mayor of Beijing, First Secretary
of the Beijing Committee of the CCP and member of the Politburo) participated for the
first time in years, signalling, according to the Romanian leaders perceptions, the
improvement of the political relations between the two states and parties. Romania
reciprocated, celebrating in October 1963 the Proclamation of the Peoples Republic of
China through press articles, TV and Radio broadcastings, film projections and
exhibitions. Telegrams with felicitations were sent by the Romanian state and party
leaders to Beijing. The improvement of the Romanian-Chinese relations was also visible
in the commercial field, in 1963 the total value of the bilateral trade reaching the amount
of 27.2 million roubles in comparison with 14 million roubles in 1962. Moreover, in 1963
Romania and China signed, for the first time in the history of their relations, a cultural
agreement. China had previously signed such agreements only with North Vietnam and
Albania.432
Although officially the Romanian-Soviet friendship and common views and interests
continued to be praised433, in late 1963, a so-called campaign of de-Russification of
Romanian culture began. From September 1963 onwards, Russian language was no longer
compulsory in the Romanian school curricula, receiving the same statute as any other
foreign language. In September the Maxim Gorki Institute for Russian Language and
Literature was dissolved434 and in December, the Directorate for Propaganda and Culture
of the CC of RWP decided on the reorganisation of the activity of the Romanian
Association for Relations with the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Institute for
Romanian-Soviet Studies.
Moreover, the works of the Romanian authors Nicolae Blcescu, Mihai Eminescu, Titu
Maiorescu, or Nicolae Iorga were republished, while the publication of translations from
Soviet authors drastically diminished. This coincided with a process of rewriting
Romanias history with a weaker emphasis on the role of the USSR in the building of the
socialist regime in Romania. In November, the Romanian-language version of the Soviet
review New Times435 ceased to appear and a new Romanian weekly review Lumea (The
World) was established with the aim to treat the international problems in the light of the
appreciations of our [Romanian] party and government.436 As a Romanian diplomat
phrased it in December 1963, such Romanian domestic measures were received in the bloc
with concern.437
Some singular Romanian foreign policy moves followed. On 19 November 1963, in
accordance with the Politburos directives438, Romanias delegation to the 18th session of
432

Notes of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 57/1963, vol. I, 149159; The Romania Embassy in Beijing, Report, Fond China, Problema 20E/1963, 41-43; Scnteia, 1-2
October 1963.
433
Plan of actions, 2 October 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 51/ 1963, 35-37; Scnteia, 7 October
1963.
434
Ctlin Turliuc, Romanias Sovietization. Socio-cultural aspects, in Alexandru Zub, Flavius Solomon
(eds.), Sovietization in Romania and Czechoslovakia: history, analogies, consequences, Polirom, Iai, 2003,
59.
435
Novoye Vremya in Russian, Timpuri Noi in Romanian.
436
Reports, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 58/1963, 205-208, File no 51/1963, 50-51.
437
Horia Limans Report, Prague, 2 December 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 1/1963, 8587.
438
Protocol 19 of the 11 November 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 53/1963, 1-2.

126

the General Assembly of the UNO voted in favour of a resolution to establish a nuclearfree zone in Latin America439, while all the other bloc countries abstained. It was for the
first time that Romania voted differently than the other bloc states440 and, according to
Podgorny, this Romanian vote was seen in Moscow as a non-internationalist act through
which Romania used her sovereign rights to the benefit of other countries, meaning not
to the benefit of the socialist ones.441
Romanias vote in favour of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America is generally
explained by the Romanian leaders intention to obtain support for their own initiative
regarding the endorsement of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.442 However, in his own
words, Gheorghiu-Dej had no illusion in this respect and knew that the [nuclear-free]
zones in Latin America and in the Balkans would not be realised. According to the
Romanian leader, this vote was intended as a political sign of Romanias appreciation for
the position taken by Latin America443, as a signal for the leaders in Beijing that Romania
did not follow the Soviet lead, and as a warning for Moscow that the Romanian leadership
was determined to make public its different views regarding different international
matters. Gheorghiu-Dej was convinced that his policy was reaching its goals. On 11
November 1963, he argued with satisfaction during a Politburo meeting that due to the
positions that the Romanian leadership had taken in its foreign policy, Romanias prestige
abroad increased and the leading political circles [of the world] do no longer see us as a
negligible political force.444
While the Romanian leaders were signalling China that, in domestic or in foreign
policy matters, they had their own views and policies and did not follow the Soviet ones,
the other socialist states continued to publicly criticise the Chinese. The editorial office of
the international communist journal Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS) in Prague
became, in late 1963 and early 1964, the place where Romania and the rest of the bloc
openly confronted each other with regard to the dispute within the communist camp. The
Romanian leadership was convinced that the Soviets were using the PPS to fuel their
dispute with Beijing and that, under the pretext that every party had the right to express
its point of view, Aleksey Rumyantsev, the Soviet editor-in-chief, encouraged the
publication of anti-Chinese articles. On the other hand, Gheorghiu-Dej feared that, given
the publication of anti-Chinese articles in the PPS, the leaders in Beijing445 could accuse
Romania whose share in the budget of the review amounted to 43,119 US dollars in
1963 446 of implicit or even explicit participation in the polemics. Romanias
representatives at the PPS editorial office in Prague repeatedly asked the other participants
439

Scnteia, 21 November 1963.

Malia, 2007, 60-78.
441
Synthesis, July 1964 , ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 49/1959-1970, 17-18 .
442
Mircea Malitza, Romania at the United Nations, 1956-1993 in Keith Krause, W. Andy Knight (eds.),
State, society, and the UN system: changing perspectives on multilateralism, Tokyo, United Nations
University Press, New York, Paris, 1995, 138.
443
Note regarding the 22 November 1963 meeting between the Romanian and the Yugoslav state
delegations, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 34/1963, 8.
444
The minutes of the 11 November 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 53/1963, 20-33.
445
The Koreans left the PPS in June 1963, following the Chinese who had left the PPS in the winter of 1962.
Note, Report, 2 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 5/1963, 15-16.
446
Note; Aleksey Rumyantsevs letter addressed to Gheorghiu-Dej, October 1963; Protocol no 19 of the 11
November 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 53/1963, 1-2, 34-36.
440

127

to stop criticising the Chinese in the journal and repeatedly rejected the Soviets requests
to write and publish Romanian articles against China. 447
Soon, however, another controversy put the Romanian and the other representatives in
Prague on opposing sides, namely the CMEA integration problem. Although Romania
opposed it, on 7-10 October 1963, the PPS editorial office in Prague organised an
exchange of opinions on the fundamental problems of the development of the world
economic socialist system. While it was used by the Soviet delegates to criticise the
leadership of the CCP and some parties that oscillated in the Chinese problem, the PPS
seminar focused on the CMEA integration problem. Claiming that they were advancing
the results of pure, ideal, theoretical research, the Soviet delegates reiterated on this
occasion all the wrong theses on the CMEA integration, as the Romanian leaders put it,
including the necessity for creating common enterprises or a common planning body.
They also reasoned that the implementation of concrete measures towards a unique plan
for the world economy should not be postponed ad Kalendas Graecas. Rumyantsev
explicitly contended that some CMEA countries would have to develop their extractive
industry, others the processing industries and others agriculture, and that such a
development would not infringe on the sovereignty of those countries.
Willi Kunz (East Germany) maintained that the transition from coordination of plans
to common planning had to be realised in the next several years and that if such a
transition was realised smoothly and willingly it would not limit the states national
sovereignty. The Czechoslovak, Bulgarian and Hungarian delegates contended that it was
time for the CMEA to move to practical measures towards unified international planning,
and supported the creation of common enterprises. The Polish representatives advanced a
different position, though, stressing the necessity of industrialisation of less developed
countries and maintaining that in the current stage of development states had to pay
attention especially to the coordination of the plans of the national economies and not to
international planning.
After the first day of the Prague workshop, Barbu Zaharescu, Romanias representative
at the PPS, briefed the leaders in Bucharest on the talks. On 8 October, the Romanian
delegates448 in Prague were mandated to give a firm response to the wrong theses
advanced there, and so they did, openly and strongly criticising the others integration
theses and stressing that Romania would never agree to the creation of supranational
bodies which would infringe on Romanias national sovereignty and independence.
Informed about the Prague talks, Gheorghiu-Dej concluded that the CMEA integration
offensive was re-launched en force and under the Soviet guidance, which amounted in fact
to the abandonment of the June 1963 Romanian-Soviet agreement, he argued.449
The Romanian leader saw this opinion confirmed when in late October 1963 he was
presented with an article that had been published the previous month in the Soviet review
Planned Economy (Planovoe khoziaistvo). Entitled The Complex of Romanias national
economy component of the world socialist economy, the article was signed by a certain
447

Barbu Zaharescus Reports from Prague, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 43/1963, File
110/1963-1964, 22-2620-25; ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 37/1963, 10-11.
448
Barbu Zaharescu, Constantin Ionescu, Ion Rathmuth and Hutira Ervin.
449
Report of the Romanian delegation to the PPS meeting in Prague, 18 October 1963, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej; Indications for the Romanian delegation at the PPS meeting in Prague, 8 October 1963,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 5/1963, 18-29; File 11/1964, 13.

128

M. Petrescu (a Romanian name) who was introduced as a scientific collaborator of the

Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Petrescu argued that the complex development of
Romanias national economy was based on the advantages provided by the internationalist
division of labour and by the international specialisation and cooperation. Claiming that
Romania hold four fifths of the blocs resources of oil and methane gas (the USSR
excluded) and that these reserves were situated near the borders of those European
socialist countries that lacked such raw materials, Petrescu wrote that Romania being in
a favourable position from the point of view of the international division of labour should
export oil and methane gas to Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Romania also had favourable
conditions to increase her agricultural production of grain, vegetables or grapes and the
CMEA should analyse more closely the problem of the bloc's international division of
labour from that perspective as well, Petrescu concluded.450
Gheorghiu-Dej perceived this article as another Soviet manoeuvre, and it infuriated
him for several reasons. Firstly, as he phrased it, Petrescu partitioned Romania as if it was
his fathers property; secondly, the move marked the re-launching of the Soviet proCMEA integration offensive, signalling the abandonment by the USSR of the June 1963
Bucharest agreement; thirdly, the Soviets had used a Romanian citizen (or name) to
advance proposals regarding Romanias specialisation and integration, which could have
created, Gheorghiu-Dej argued, the wrong impression (both in Romania and abroad) that
Petrescu was advancing the opinion of the Romanian leadership; and forthly, it was seen
as a form of pressure on Romanias leadership to accept the Soviet lead in the Sino-Soviet
problems. But, if the Soviets believed that the reopening of the integration debates would
pressure Romania to accommodate Moscows views on the Sino-Soviet dispute, they
calculated wrongly, because the result was quite opposite, as, in late October 1963,
Gheorghiu-Dej decided that Romania had to publicly advance in a scientific, theoretical
and objective manner, just as the Soviets claimed to do when they reopened the
integration subject, he ironically noted its stand towards both the CMEA integration and
the Sino-Soviet dispute.451
As the Sino-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate in late 1963452, the (perceived)
Soviet pressures on Romania to take a position against China intensified. In the autumn of
1963 Aleksey Rumyantsev, the editor-in-chief of the PPS, sent Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej a
letter453 inviting him, under the (perceived) pretext that the third anniversary of the 1960
Moscow Declaration was approaching, and to write an article to mark the anniversary.

450

M. Petrescu, The Complex of Romanias national economy component of the world socialist
economy, in Planovoe khoziaistvo (Planned Economy), No 9/1963, 79-84, translated in Romanian language
and underlined by Gheorghiu-Dejs in ANIC, Collection Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, File 831, 86-89.
451
The minutes of the 24 October 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 51/1963, 14-16.
452
On 6 September 1963, the CC of the CCP published in its first of a long series of commentaries to the
14 July Soviet open letter, a strong and open attack against the Soviet leadership. The Origin And
Development Of The Differences Between The Leadership Of The CPSU And Ourselves Comment on the
Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and
Hongqi ,at MIA, http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/cpsu.htm#origin, accessed on 5
May 2012.
453
So far, this letter could not be found in the Romanian archives.

129

Rumyantsev also provided the title for the article The Declaration in action.454
Convinced that the Soviets expected from him an article to openly condemn China, the
Romanian leader was not very pleased with the request and contemplated a
countermeasure. He asked the Politburo to write an article advancing Romanias views
and position on both the CMEA and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Entitled The unshakable
foundation of the unity of the world communist movement, the article was published under
the signature of Ion Gheorghe Maurer, member of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP and
President of the Council of Ministers an indication that the text encompassed the
position of both party and state. The article was published for the first time in the
magazine Lupta de Clas (The Class Struggle), the official organ of the CC of the RWP,
in its October 1963 issue, and then republished in Scnteia on 4 November and in the
November issue of the Problems of Peace and Socialism.455
Much of what Ceauescu had declared on 23 August 1963 was reiterated in this article.
Maurer contended that the unshakable foundation of the unity of the international
communist movement was the 1960 Moscow Declaration which was seen as the charter
of the international communist movement. In accordance with this charter, the article
noted, the RWP and Romania strove for peaceful coexistence, peace, disarmament,
international dtente and promoted the development of Romanias economic, scientific
and cultural relations with all states, regardless of their social systems. Regarding the EastWest relations, Maurer stressed that the international litigation problems had to be solved
through negotiations. He also argued that the economic development of each socialist
country needed to rely on its own forces and natural resources and that the economic,
cultural, political collaboration between the socialist states needed to be based on the
principles of complete equality in rights, mutual advantage and sovereignty. Only on the
basis of these principles, Maurer reasoned, could the CMEA socialist states realise the
international socialist division of labour which in practice would be achieved through the
coordination of the plans of the national economies.
Through this article, the Romanian leadership proposed, for the first time publicly and
officially, the enlargement of the CMEA incorporating all the socialist countries. Although
China was not mentioned by name, the allusion was obvious. According to Maurer,
it is known that the present composition of the CMEA mirrors only in part the
configuration of the world socialist system. The development of economic collaboration
among all the socialist countries including those that are not presently members of the
CMEA is very important for the strengthening of the economic force of the socialist world
community. Finding ways together with these countries to allow the participation of the
socialist states in the CMEA activity is, in the opinion of our party, a task of the greatest
importance.

454

Barbu Zaharescus Report, 26 March 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 11/1964,
34; The minutes of the 7-8 April 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and John Gollan, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 14/1964, 2, 21; Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 27-28.
455
The minutes of the22-30 November 1963 discussions between the Romanian and Yugoslav state
delegations;Note regarding the 12 December 1963audience granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to Xu Jianguo,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 94/1963, 14; File 34/1963, 43; Barbu Zaharescus Report, 26
March 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 11/1964, 33-35.

130

Regarding the Sino-Soviet divergences, Maurer reasoned that the polemic has reached a
really dangerous escalation, that it is completely inadmissible for the communist parties to
promote attacks against other communist parties and that the divergences between the
parties of the socialist states, being expanded more and more over the relations between
the socialist states, endangered the unity of the communist and workers parties from these
countries. The article admitted that differences of opinions between the communist and
workers parties existed, but argued that such differences can and must be addressed
comradely and principled. Every party had the right to decide its foreign and domestic
policies and there are no superior parties and inferior parties within the communist
movement, all parties big or small are completely equal in rights. Maurer continued:
No party is allowed to impose upon other parties its line and decisions, to overrule the head
of the party leadership from one country or another, to appeal for [the party leaderships]
replacement, to support factions from within fraternal parties. The strict respect for the
principles of equality in rights and non-interference in the internal affairs of other parties is
the essential condition for a just solution of the divergent problems.

Maurer concluded with an appeal to the fraternal parties to put an end to the public
polemics and to consider beginning the preparations for the convening of a world
communist conference.456
Mioara Anton and Dan Ctnu argue that Maurers article was a naive and utopian
attempt to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute.457 The Romanian archival evidence does not
support this interpretation though, suggesting instead that the article was imagined to
block current and anticipated Soviet moves. The Romanian leaders hoped that once their
position was made public through Maurers article, the Soviets would cease to pressure
them to condemn China and that, afraid that Romania might take the Chinese side, they
would even abandon their (perceived) plan of reopening the integration talks.

5.2.4 Mutual promises of support

In November 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej declared to Tito that Romanias contacts with the
countries in Asia had just begun, that those contacts were at the stage of first steps and
that they had not yet yielded results.458 A month later, the Romanian leader openly asked
the Chinese to consider becoming a full member of the CMEA. This Romanian proposal
was precipitated by the (perceived) re-launching of the debate on the bloc integration in
the autumn of 1963.
On 12 December 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej, Bodnra and Brldeanu 459 had a talk of six
and a half hours with Xu Jianguo, Chinas ambassador in Bucharest. Gheorghiu-Dej
stressed first that the Romanian leadership very much regretted that it had supported the
456

Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Temelia de neclintit a unitii micrii comuniste internaionale, in Probleme ale
Pcii i Socialismului, No 11 (63) November 1963, 11-22, Scnteia, 4 November 1963.
457
Anton, 179; Ctnu, 2011, 327-330.
458
The minutes of the 22-30 November 1963 discussions between the Romanian and Yugoslav state
delegations, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 34/1963, 42.
459
According to the minutes of this meeting, Brldeanu made no intervention during the talks. His presence,
however, can be explained by the fact that the conversation to a great extent addressed Romanias CMEA
problems.

131

Soviets in their June 1960 manoeuvre against the CCPs delegation at the RWPs
Congress. It was only later, Gheorghiu-Dej argued, that the Romanian leaders realised that
the June 1960 attack against the Chinese had not been right, had not been fair. He
further reasoned that the Soviets had first attacked China, then Albania and finally it was
the turn of Romania which, instead of being attacked in the field of ideology, was attacked
in the field of the economic collaboration. Xu Jianguo was told that the other CMEA states
led by the Soviet Union wanted to transform Romania into their own hinterland, market
and source of raw materials and that the Soviets intentions towards Romania resembled
very much the tendencies of the former German regime with Hitlers tendencies for
plunder. Gheorghiu-Dej stressed that
I cannot see any difference between these past [German] tendencies towards Romania and
the tendencies shown today by our best friends and brothers. Here [in Romania], there is a
proverb saying may God defend me from my friends; I can defend myself from my
enemies.

The Romanian leader then reviewed the integration attempts from the previous years
stressing that under the guidance of the USSR the other CMEA members had corroborated
their actions towards reforms completely isolating Romania. He analysed in detail the
Romanian-Soviet exchange of letters and negotiations in March-June 1963 and presented
the Romanian view on the June 1963 agreement with Khrushchev. Denouncing the
(perceived) constant Soviet tendency to interfere in the internal affairs of Romania,
Gheorghiu-Dej also criticised the interference of the USSR in the internal affairs of China
pointing out that the Soviets are very upset with us [Romanians] because we do not take a
position against China.
Arguing that Romania and China had the same enemy the USSR and therefore
similar problems, Gheorghiu-Dej inferred that, despite their difference of opinions, the
Romanian and Chinese leaderships could support each other in blocking/counteracting
different Soviet manoeuvres that threatened their interests. Then, claiming that the
CMEAs problems were economically relevant for all socialist states, the Romanian leader
advanced the idea that China was also entitled to formulate its position on the Councils
reforms. The Romanian leader stressed that
We [Romania] do not know your [Chinas] position toward the CMEA but, given that all
countries should discuss how the relations in the CMEA should be, we would like to
discuss this with your representatives; and [the relations] should not be as Khrushchev or
others would like them to be since they want Romania to become a source of raw
materials.

Romania wanted China to become a full member of the CMEA and then from inside the
CMEA to help Romania build a majority against the (perceived) Soviet integration
project, Gheorghiu-Dej reasoned. If the Chinese leaders were not interested in Chinas
participation in the CMEA, they could still allow Romania to use China-related arguments
to block the integration. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, Romania
would be interested to know the point of view of the Peoples Republic of China
concerning the problem of the relations in the CMEA; how should we [Romania] proceed;

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on what basis should we develop the collaboration; what methods should one use. () We
want to discuss this with the Chinese leadership in order to [be able to] establish [our] clear
position [to be used] to foil these very dangerous [integration] plans.

Thus, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, the Chinese response to these proposals would be the
decisive factor in determining the tactic that Romania would choose to apply in order to
block the anticipated CMEA integration. If the proposals were to be accepted, the
Romanian leaders would go with the tactic of making efforts to alter the integration
project together with China from within the CMEA, but if the proposals were to be
rejected they would have to elaborate a different stratagem to foil the (perceived) Soviet
plans. In return for Chinas support in the CMEA, the Romanian leader promised that
Romania would not take the Soviet side; that on the contrary it would oppose any Soviet
attempt to organise a world communist conference without Chinas participation. Romania
and China did have different positions on problems such as the peaceful coexistence,
peace and war, nuclear disarmament, relations with Yugoslavia but they still could work
together towards a common goal, namely blocking specific Soviet plans and actions that
threatened their interests as the Romanian leader concluded.460
The Chinese ambassador communicated Gheorghiu-Dejs inquires and proposals to
Beijing and, on 17 December, at 5 pm, the Romanian ambassador in China, Dumitru
Gheorghiu, were received by Liu Shaoqi, Vice Chairman of the CC of the CCP and
President of China. Responding to Gheorghiu-Dejs 12 December proposals, Liu Shaoqi
contended that it was not the right time to convene a high level Romanian-Chinese
meeting but added that it seems that the RWP adopts a principled position and does not
participate in the anti-Chinese and anti-Marxist movement led by Khrushchev.
The Chinese leader advised the Romanian leadership to not allow its position towards
the Sino-Soviet dispute to further strain the Romanian-Soviet relations and argued that it
is absolutely possible and necessary for the RWP to maintain a certain distance in its
relations with the CCP. Liu Shaoqi stressed that there are some differences in
viewpoints between the RWP and the CCP but agreed that these differences do not make
friendship and solidarity between us impossible. The Chinese leadership agrees with the
position adopted by the RWP with regard to the tactic they used to solve problems
between Romania and the Soviet Union related to the CMEA integration but, Liu Shaoqi
added, at the same time, we hope that comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the RWP
will use their position to intercede [for us] with some comrades461 from the [communist]
parties in Europe.
In other words, the Chinese leadership approved the Romanian leaders continued use
of China-related arguments as a means to solve their own CMEA problems with the
Soviets but asked Romania in return to take an adequate position and adequate
measures towards Chinas situation. As Liu Shaoqi reasoned, if the Romanians managed
to draw some of the comrades who are at the lead of other Eastern European communist
parties to the adequate side of the RWP, then that would isolate Khrushchevs clique
and would facilitate the prevention and avoidance of some damages for the CCP. Liu
Shaoqi further stressed that China does not envisage a participation in the CMEA, but
460

Audience note (Xu Jianguo recived by Gheorghiu-Dej), 12 December 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 94/1963, 1-32.
461
S intervin pe lng unii tovarai, in Romanian.

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the RWP may raise the issue of China, Albania, [North] Vietnam and [North] Koreas
participation in the CMEA and, when the Soviet Union decides to address this problem
[with China], we will state Chinas opinion, namely [we will ask] for the modification of
the character of the CMEA so that it would strictly respect the principles of
independence, sovereignty, etc. and, only after this reform was completed, the Asian states
would accept to become members of the Council.462
On the next day, 18 December, at 11 am, Emil Bodnra granted an audience to the
Chinese ambassador in Bucharest (at his request). Xu Jianguo knew that the reports from
the Romanian Embassy in Beijing usually arrived late in Bucharest463 and, given the very
urgent character of these problems, hurried to inform the Romanian leadership about the
gist of the conversation that had taken place in Beijing the previous evening. Summarising
the Chinese position, Xu Jianguo told Bodnra openly that China would like comrade
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and the CC of the RWP to influence 464 the fraternal parties and
leaders of Eastern Europe and that in return China would support Romanias position on
the integration, although without becoming a full member of the Council. According to Xu
Jianguo, the Chinese may consider the option of Chinas entering the CMEA but they
still thought that it is better for China to not participate in the CMEA.465
The Romanian leadership continued to insist on convening a high level meeting
between the Romanian and Chinese leaderships but this proposal was repeatedly
rejected.466 In the meantime, the Chinese began to ask Romanias opinion not only on the
Sino-Soviet dispute but also on Chinas building a nuclear bomb467 and improving the
Chinese-French relations.468 According to the Romanian archival evidence, the Chinese
leaders hoped that Romania would at least express no criticism or opposition to their
policy or at most try to influence to some extent the attitude of the other Eastern European
leaders towards Chinas policy. In return, in January 1964, the Chinese promised Romania
more support in the CMEA matter. On 24 January, for instance, Liu Shaoqi declared to
Dumitru Gheorghiu that, since its December response to Romanias proposals, the Chinese
leadership had better documented and better understood Romanias CMEA problems. If in
December 1963 the Romanians were told literally that China did not envisage to
participate in the CMEA, in January 1964 they were told that, in Liu Shaoqis words,

462

Note regarding the 17 December 1963 audience granted by Liu Shaoqi to Dumitru Gheoghiu, in Budura,
2008, 119-123.
463
Fearing the interception of the telegrams sent to Bucharest, the Romanian Embassy in Beijing used a
diplomatic courier when the matters were considered to be delicate. Note regarding the 17 January 1964
audience granted by Ion Gheorghe Maurer to the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 42/1964, 3-5.
464
S duc o munc n rndul, in Romanian.
465
Note regarding the 18 December 1963 audience granted by Emil Bodnra to Xu Jianguo, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, file 96/1963, 1-9.
466
Note regarding the 17 January 1964 audience granted by Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Xu Jianguo, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 42/1964, 3-5.
467
China successfully tested a nuclear bomb on 16 October 1964. John Wilson Lewis, Litai Xue, China
builds the bomb, Stanford University Press, 1991, 241-243.
468
On 27 January 1964, China and France re-established diplomatic relations. Garret Martin, Playing the
China card? Revisiting Frances recognition of Communist China, 1963-1964 in Journal of Cold War
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter 2008, 5280.

134

Presently, our [CCP] Central Committee is studying this problem. If together with [North]
Korea and [North] Vietnam we will accede to the CMEA, then you [Romania] will no
longer be alone [in the CMEA]. We will support you and other countries. We do not have
anything to gain from the accession of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to the
CMEA. China still thinks that the principles of equality and mutual respect are not closely
respected in the CMEA. () We consider that through the PRCs participation in the
CMEA we could support the Romanian Peoples Republic and other countries. This issue
will be settled by the CC of the CCP. () Anyway, the accession of China, [North] Korea
and [North] Vietnam to the CMEA will crush their [the Soviets] control over the
CMEA.469

The Romanian sources do not tell if the Chinese had a sincere intention to study the matter
or simply deluded the Romanians in order to enlist their direct or implicit support for
different foreign policy moves of China. However, the purpose of this study is not to
analyse the Chinese policy towards Romania and towards the CMEA. For this study, it is
relevant how the Romanian leaders used the information they had at hand, no matter if it
was accurate or not.
On 28 January, Van Tung, the charge daffaires470 of the Chinese Embassy in
Bucharest, was received by Emil Bodnra upon Tungs request for an audience. As
mandated, the Chinese diplomat briefed the Romanian representative on the 24 January
Beijing discussion between Liu Shaoqi and Dumitru Gheorghiu.471 Asking for Romanias
opinion on the improvement of the Chinese-French relations and the anticipated nuclear
bomb test of China, Van Tung stressed that the problem of Chinas participation in the
CMEA is being studied and probably as a form of capitatio benevolentiae requested
additional materials documenting the Romania-Soviet CMEA divergences. Emil Bodnra
promised to provide the Chinese Embassy with more information on the CMEA
disagreements and declared that Romania was glad to witness the improvement of the
Chinese-French relations.472 The response to the question about the nuclear bomb test was
delayed until 5 March 1964.473
However, in February 1964, the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations interrupted
the negotiations regarding the Chinese support for Romania in the CMEA. The Romanian
leaders perceived the increasing tension between Moscow and Beijing in early 1964 as a
direct, imminent and significant threat to Romanias interests, and it was in response to
this perceived threat that they issued the RWPs April 1964 Declaration as argued in the
next chapter.
469

Notes regarding the 21 January 1964 audience granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to Xu Jianguo, the 22 January
1964 talks between Corneliu Mnescu and Xu Jianguo, the 24 January 1964 audience granted by Liu Shaoqi
to Dumitru Gheorghiu, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 93/1963, 23-32.
File no 42/1964, 12-31.
470
In January 1964, Xu Jianguo left Romania being replaced by ambassador Liu Fang from April 1964
onwards.
471
Dumitru Gheorghius Report arrived later in Bucharest.
472
Note regarding the 28 January 1964 audience granted by Emil Bodnra to Van Tung, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 42/1964, 34-39.
473
When Liu Shaoqi asked directly If we conduct these [nuclear] experiments, will you [Romania] be
against it?, Maurer responded How could we oppose them? What material capabilities shall we have and
what reasons shall we have?. The Minutes of the 3-10 March 1964 talks between the Romanian and the
Chinese delegations, in Budura, 2008, 176-177.

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6 The April 1964 Declaration of Independence

Focusing on the proximate cause that triggered the issuing of the RWPs April 1964
Declaration, this chapter continues the investigation of Romanias opposition to the USSR
with regard to the two highlighted case studies the CMEA reforms and the Sino-Soviet
dispute. In April 1964, the RWP issued Declaration concerning the position of the
Romanian Workers Party with regard to the problems of the international communist and
workers movement. Calling it Declaration of Independence474 or Declaration of
Autonomy475, scholars generally agree that it marked the beginning of Romanias
breakaway from the Soviet Union and that it was published in response to the 1962-1963
attempts towards the CMEA integration. 476 The recent Romanian historiography contends
that the Romanian policymakers decided to prepare the Declaration at the Politburo
meeting on 26-27 February 1963 but needed more than a year to compose the text, from
February 1963 to April 1964.477
As presented in the previous chapters, in February 1963, the Romanian leaders did
consider the possibility of issuing a document that would encompass the Romanian
position on the fundamental international problems but at that time they were still
uncertain as to the form that such a document should have a letter to the communist
leaders, a letter to the world leaders, a party statement, an article or a published speech.
Then, due to the Romanian-Soviet secret negotiations, in June-July 1963, Khrushchev
agreed to put the CMEA integration on hold and in response Gheorghiu-Dej suspended
sine die the February 1963 idea of issuing such a document. In other words, the Romanian
leaders did not work on the April 1964 Declaration for over a year. In February 1963, they
did consider issuing a public document but they dropped the idea in June-July 1963. Later,
however, they reconsidered their previous decision and, on 2 April 1964, they decided to
issue a text to publicly announce Romanias different position. This time, the idea was
concretised and the text was written within a few days only, as this chapter will further
demonstrate.

6.1 The perceived threats of early 1964

According to the Romanian leaders perceptions, in early 1964, Romania was facing three
main types of imminent threats coming from three main directions, all related to the
internal Soviet bloc policies CMEA-related threats, Warsaw Pact-related threats and
threats related to the Sino-Soviet dispute. The question of whether these Romanian
perceptions corresponded or not to the actual Soviet intentions is beyond the goal of this
474

Ioan Scurtu, Istoria romnilor de la Carol I la Nicolae Ceauescu, Mica Valahie, Bucureti, 2010, 27;
Katherine Verdery, National identity under socialism: identity and cultural politics in Ceauescus regime,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995, 105; Ctnu, 2011, 327; Kansikas, 2012, 39.
475
Rus, 24.
476
Boldur-Lescu, 49-50, Kristen P. Williams, Romanias resistance to the USSR, in Kristen P. Williams,
Steven El Lobbel, Neal J. Jesse (eds.), Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why secondary states support,
follow or challenge, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 2012, 39; Verdery, 105; Tismneanu, 2003, 190.
477
Filip, 69; Banu&ranu, LXXXV; ranu, 2007, 163-169; Costache, 2012, 62.

136

study which argues instead that the foreign policy decisions of the Romanian leaders were
driven by their interpretations, no matter if those were based on realistic perceptions or on
misperceptions.

6.1.1 A Warsaw Pact body of coordination

On 2 January 1964, Khrushchev sent a letter to the first secretaries of the communist and
workers parties that proposed the creation of a new bloc institution a regular conference
of all ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Pact member states to presumably
enhance the practice of consultations among the socialist countries on the problems of
foreign policy.478 All members of the Warsaw Pact accepted this proposal except for
Romania.479 The Romanian leaders believed that Khrushchev aimed at creating a body of
coordination as Ceauescu put it to provide the USSR with the legal framework that
would allow it to impose its will upon all the Warsaw Pact members in all matters of
international policy, including those related to the CMEA integration, the Sino-Soviet
dispute, or the East-West relations, in which Romania had demonstrated a different
position.480
In a letter of response, on 13 January 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej rejected the proposal
arguing that the Warsaw Pact already had a body specifically created to facilitate the
consultations of the member states on problems of international policy namely the
Political Consultative Committee (PCC)481. Rather than creating another body, the PCC
should have been reformed to function in such a way that the events following the missile
deployment in Cuba in 1962 that had occurred without any PCC consultation would not
happen again, the Romanian leader wrote. Further criticising the operation of the PCC,
Gheorghiu-Dej also complained that many times the Warsaw Pact leaders had been
summoned without being informed in advance about the meetings agenda and actually
forced to simply take cognizance of some measures and initiatives.
Gheorghiu-Dej wrote explicitly that Romania cannot agree with the transformation
of the conference of the ministers of foreign affairs into a permanent body because such
a body cannot solve the main problem that concerns us, [namely] the coordination of the
position of the socialist states regarding the important international policy actions. In
solving that problem, the Romanian leader continued, one had to consider that the
governments of the Warsaw Pact states were the only ones responsible for the foreign
policy of every state. In other words, according to the Romanian leadership, coordination

478

Khrushchevs 2 January 1964 letter , ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 19U/1964, 29-31.
Filip, 69.
480
The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
6/1964, 32; The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu and ranu, 69-71.
481
Article 6 of the Warsaw Pact Treaty provided that for the purpose of holding the consultations provided
for in the present treaty among the states that are parties to the treaty, and for the purpose of considering
problems arising in connection with the implementation of this treaty, a political consultative committee
shall be formed in which each state that is a party to this treaty shall be represented by a member of the
government, or any other specially appointed representative. The Warsaw Treaty at PHP,
http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_pcc/wapa_treaty.cfm, accessed on 5 May 2013.
479

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of the foreign policy of the socialist states was not possible because every government had
the right to adopt an independent that is non-coordinated foreign policy position. 482
The Soviet leadership did not respond to Gheorghiu-Dejs letter but, on 25 January
1964, Walter Ulbricht sent a circular missive to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact states
proposing the convening of a conference of the Political Consultative Committee.
Although the letter made no reference to the agenda of the proposed meeting, the
Romanian leadership believed that it was a follow-up to Khrushchevs 2 January missive.
In another circular letter from 12 February, Khrushchev accepted Ulbrichts proposal
prompting the leaders of the Warsaw Pact member states to send their responses not to
Moscow but to Berlin and proposing the convening of the PCC meeting on 25-26
February or 13-14 April 1964.483
In the following months, Khrushchev and Ulbricht repeatedly proposed the convening
of the PCC meeting but the Romanian leaders repeatedly and successfully opposed the
idea. They feared that Khrushchev, supported by other bloc leaders, might use the PCC
gathering to impose the establishment of an institution for bloc coordination which was,
they believed, a direct threat to Romanias interests. They also feared that Khrushchev
would use the PCC meeting to achieve other objectives of his (as perceived in Romania),
to impose collective condemnation of the Chinese, to reopen the subject of the bloc
economic integration or even to force the implementation of the bloc integration.484
Thus, this new Romanian opposition to Khrushchevs move was triggered also by
some perceived imminent threats to Romanias interests. This opposition was also implicit
and, instead of saying no to Khrushchev, the Romanian leaders advanced various
arguments to postpone the meeting. Gheorghiu-Dej formally agreed on the PCC
convention but argued that, until the meetings agenda was announced, the RWP could not
state its opinion on the meetings date and that the complexity of this agenda would
determine how much time the Romanian leadership would need to prepare for its
participation.485 The other bloc members did not announce an agenda for the intended
PCC meeting and the Romanian leaders continued to use this argument until the two
conference dates proposed by Khrushchev had already passed.
On 15 March 1964, during the Romanian-Soviet talks held in Pitsunda, Khrushchev
supported Ulbrichts initiative once more. Khrushchev argued that the East German leader,
as any other bloc leader, had the right to propose the convening of a meeting and to be
heard without announcing any particular agenda. He also stressed that all Warsaw Pact
members except for Romania had agreed on the PCC convention on 13-14 April 1964. In
response, Ceauescu and Maurer agreed once more on convening the meeting but reasoned
that Romania had to be informed in due time what problems Ulbricht intended to raise in

482

Gheorghiu-Dejs 13 January 1964 letter to Khrushchev, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
19U/1964, 39-42.
483
Ulbrichts 25 January 1964 letter to Gheorghiu-Dej; Khrushchevs 11 February 1964 letter; The minutes
of the 17 February 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1964, 44-46; File
6/1964, 31-46.
484
The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964, 31-46;The minutes
of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu& ranu, 69-71.
485
Gheorghiu-Dejs 19 February 1964 letter to Khrushchev, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
19U/1964, 142-145.

138

the PCC.486 On 27 March 1964, in another letter addressed to Gheorghiu-Dej, Ulbricht

complained that Romania had remained the only country that had not responded to his
missive of 25 January 1964. This time, however, the East German leader offered to send
Bruno Leuschner to Bucharest to discuss the agenda of the PCC meeting. 487
In a letter of response from 3 April, Gheorghiu-Dej agreed in principle on Leuschners
visit but advanced yet another argument to postpone the convention of the PCC. This time,
he reasoned that convening the PCC meeting on 13-14 April was not convenient because a
plenary session of the CC of the RWP was scheduled to begin on 15 April 1964.488 Thus,
once again, the Romanians blocked a proposal by Khrushchev because they perceived it as
a threat to Romanias interests. Once again, the aim of their opposition was to eliminate
the perceived Soviet threat as smoothly as possible without antagonizing the Soviets. And,
once again, the proposal was blocked by means of postponing it.

6.1.2 CMEA-related threats

In late 1963 and early 1964, the Romanian leadership anxiously observed (perceived) that
the integration offensive had been re-launched and pushed forward across the bloc through
declarations of various bloc leaders or articles signed by economists and scholars. 489 The
Romanian leadership assigned several economists to respond to such theses in various
Romanian economic magazines, thus making Romanias principled position on the
integration public. To fulfil this task, the Romanian economists contested the integration
theses drawing from the Marxist-Leninist theory and the principles of the 1960 Moscow
Declaration. This contestation formally targeted only the theses advanced by other bloc
economists and did not openly antagonize any bloc leader.
For instance, in August 1963, Costin Murgescu, editor in chief of the weekly Viaa
Economic (Economic Life), responded to an article that had been published in the
monthly East German magazine Wirtschaftswissenschaft in April 1963 under the name of
Gerhard Huber. The East German economist argued that small socialist states like
Romania and Bulgaria should develop further their agricultural sector and not their
industry. On 23 August 1963, Murgescu challenged strongly Hubers arguments in an
article entitled Pseudo-theories which attempt to disparage industrialisation. Reasoning
that in terms of population and territory East Germany was a smaller country than
Romania, Murgescu branded Hubers theory un-Marxist and argued that the interests of
the world socialist system demand that every socialist country, large or small, should
consistently follow Lenins policy of industrialisation. Following Murgescus article, on 7

486

The minutes of the15 March 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, in Pitsunda, in
Budura, 2008, 266-269.
487
The Minutes of the 30-31 March 1964 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 12/1964, 34.
488
The minutes of the 11 April 1964 talks between Chivu Stoica and E.D.Karpishchenko, Bucharest, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Office, File 15/1964, 6-8.
489
For instance, Radoslav Seluckys article entitled 15 years of the CMEA and published in the
Czechoslovak magazine Kulturni Tvorba, translated in Romanian and annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Fond 80, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 833/1964, Vol. I, 25-27.

139

October 1963, Karl Morgenstern repudiated Hubers article in Die Wirtschaft. On 18

October, Viaa Economic dedicated three columns to praise Morgensterns article. 490
The CMEA controversy continued in the editorial office of Problems of Peace and
Socialism in Prague. In early 1964, the Soviet chief editor, A. Rumyantsev, supported the
publication (in a collected volume491 or as separate articles in the PPS) of the papers that
had been presented at the October 1963 PPS seminar. The Romanians appealed to the
other participants to not publish the theses on the bloc integration and specialisation the
way they were formulated at the seminar but Rumyantsev insisted that every party had the
right to express its point of view (including on the pages of the PPS) on the economic
development of the bloc. The Romanians argued in response that the publication of prointegration articles in the bloc press would mean that the agreement reached with
Khrushchev in Bucharest in June 1963 was no longer in force. They further stressed that
Romania had closely respected the moratorium492 on revealing divergences but that,
under the new circumstances, the Romanian leadership reserved its right to publicly
express its point of view regarding the CMEA integration.493
Despite this warning signal, in February 1964, the PPS published an article by Piotr
Jaroszewicz Polands representative at the CMEA entitled The CMEA, an instrument
of the collaboration between the socialist states. The article promoted the international
division of labour, criticised the tendency towards autarchy of some countries and
proposed joint exploitation of the natural resources of the CMEA states as well as
common planning of their economic development.494 The Romanian language editions of
the PPS were censured and such articles were not published in Romania in March-June
1964 in contrast to other bloc states.495 Gheorghiu-Dej was convinced that the articles
supporting the CMEA integration (published in the PPS as well as in various national
magazines across the camp) were written on the behest of the CC of the CPSU.496
Moreover, the Soviet Union itself participated in this public debate on the integration.
The Romanians observed, for instance, that in early 1964 the Ekonomika Publishing
House in Moscow published a book by I. V. Popov and L. M. Tomashpolski entitled The
energy and fuel basis of the world socialist system. According to a Romanian (non-public)
review, the book reiterated all the Soviet theses regarding the role of the CMEA such as
the creation of common planning bodies for different economic sectors of the bloc, the
establishment of joint enterprises and supranational economic institutions, and Romanias
alleged internationalist duty to provide the other CMEA members with fuel (especially oil
490

OSA, Radio Free Europe Report, Foreign Relations Series: Economics, Rumania Scores an Economic
Point, 23 October 1963, at http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=36644, accessed on 1
January 2013.
491
Such a volume was published in late 1964. Barbu Zaharescus Report from Prague, 23 November 1964,
annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej. ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 52/1964, 1-3.
492
A respectat cu striectee consemnul, in Romanian.
493
A. Rumyantsevs letter from 8 February 1964 to the CC of the RWP; Note, 11 February 1964, ANIC, CC
of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 11/1964, 15-18.
494
Report, 17 March 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 11/1964, 24-28.
495
OSA, Radio Free Europe Reports, Problems of Peace and Socialism Rumanian Style [Country Series:
Romania] 23 September 1964, HU OSA 300-8-3:50-2-18, OSA, http://fa.osaarchivum.org/backgroundreports?col=8&id=56521, accessed 14 January 2013.
496
See, for instance, Gheorghiu-Dejs annotation on such articles, ANIC, Fond 80, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej
Collection, File 927/1952-1964, 117-123.

140

and methane gas).497 Moreover, the Romanian leaders were anxious and, in early 1964,
they indignantly observed that the other CMEA members were re-launching their
proposals not only for economic integration but also for cultural integration. 498
On 3-6 April 1963, Khrushchev himself publicly advocated for the CMEA integration
arguing that the CMEA economic cooperation had to surpass the national narrowness
inherited from the past and that both the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact had to establish
new organisational forms.499 According to the Romanian leaders, such declarations
represented, on the one hand, a transgression of the [Romanian-Soviet] agreement
reached in June 1963, according to which the divergent problems should not be made
public and, on the other hand, a renewal of the 1963 Soviet fait accompli tactics
(presumably) designed to impose integration without Romanias input, approval or
knowledge. 500
In early 1964, the Romanian leaders feared that the Soviets intended to use the first
occasion that would bring the bloc leaders together to reopen the talks on concrete
measures towards the CMEA integration. This was one of the reasons they constantly
opposed the convening of any top level bloc meeting in the spring of 1964, regardless
whether related to the CMEA, the Warsaw Pact, the Sino-Soviet dispute or any other
issue.501 Having such perceptions, the Romanian leaders decided to employ two main
types of countermeasures: to no longer participate in any top level bloc meeting, formal or
informal, if its agenda had not been thoroughly analysed and generally agreed on in
advance, and to make Romanias views public, which was an implicit acknowledgement
of the Romanian-Soviet disagreements.
During the April 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, the Romanian leaders argued
that revealing Romanias divergences with the rest of the bloc represented, on the first
place, an attempt on the part of Romania to clarify the diverse problems by finally
putting an end to the other countries proposals for coordination and, on second place, a
way to stop the Soviets from making decisions and talking on behalf of Romania. In other
words, it was meant to prevent Romanias involvement without the consent or even the
knowledge of its leaders into a catastrophe from which there was no turning back, as
they phrased it during the same plenum.
Moreover, by April 1964, the bloc perseverance in promoting integration had begun to
exasperate and annoy the Romanian leaders. They established that after four years of
secret negotiations, bargaining, explanations, argumentations, defensive tactics and
compromises between Romania and the Soviet Union, Khrushchev and his supports still
497

Report, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 9/1964, 69-74.
Report regarding the cultural collaboration among the socialist countries, March 1964, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, Fond 80, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 927, 16-19; Interviews with
Mnescu, in Betea, 2008, 516; Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 49, 84; Apostol, 173.
499
Documentary Report, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 140/1964, 1-8; Press Reports in The Agerpres
Bulletins from 3-6 April 1964, underlined by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Fond 80, Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 834/1964, vol. II, 1-5, 15-23.
500
The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu & ranu, 44-277; Note concerning the 5 June
1964 discussions between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang; Note regarding the 28 July 1964 audience granted
by Gheorghe Apostol and Emil Bodnra to Liu Fang, in Budura 2005, 470-471, 491.
501
The minutes of the 11 April 1964 talks between Chivu Stoica and E. D. Karpishchenko; The minutes of
the 29 April 1964 talks at Gheorghiu-Dejs residence, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 15/1964, 6-21, File
18/1964, 7.
498

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sought ways to impose integration. Starting to lose their patience, in April 1964, the
Romanian leaders decided that enough was enough and it was time to finally make public
(albeit indirectly) the Romanian-Soviet disagreements in relation not only to the SinoSoviet dispute but also to the CMEA integration.502
The April 1964 Declaration of the RWP did incorporate a part dealing with the CMEA
disagreements although it was not issued in response to the (perceived) threats to
Romanias interests that were posed by the early 1964 debate on the bloc integration.
Neither was it issued in response to Khrushchevs early 1964 proposals regarding the
reforms of the Warsaw Pact. The proximate cause that triggered the decision to issue the
Declaration came from the Romanian leaders perceptions of the threats to Romanias
interests posed by the (perceived) deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations in early 1964,
as this chapter further argues.

6.1.3 Where two are fighting, the third does not win
On 4 February 1964, the seventh Chinese comment to the Soviet open letter from 14 July
1963 was published in Hongqi under the title The leaders of the CPSU are the greatest
splitters of our times. The article argued that the leaders of the CPSU headed by
Khrushchev were the chief representatives of modern revisionism as well as the greatest
splitters in the international communist movement. The Soviets had made a mess of the
wonderful socialist camp, pursued a policy of great-power chauvinism and constantly
brought political, economic and even military pressures upon the fraternal countries, the
Chinese contended.503 In response, the Soviet leadership organised a plenum of the CC of
the CPSU during which, on 14 February, Mikhail Suslov read a 150-page long report
which condemned the Chinese leaders for provoking the imminent danger of a split.504
Two days earlier, in a circular letter from 12 February, the Soviet leadership had
announced to the other communist parties its intentions to publish the proceedings of the
CPSU Plenum and to propose to convene a meeting of the representatives of the
communist and workers parties in order to organise a collective riposte against the
Chinese. 505 Received in Bucharest on 13 February, this letter provoked great concern
among the Romanian leaders. They believed that the Soviet intention of mustering a
collective riposte against the Chinese directly threatened Romanias interests for three
main reasons. Firstly, this would place Romania in between two great powers and parties
in conflict; secondly, it would result in additional Soviet pressure on Romania to take the
Soviet side; and, thirdly, it would create a dangerous precedent for the relations between
the states and parties within the camp. The Romanian leaders feared that, once the

502

The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP, in Banu & ranu, 44-277; The
minutes of the 24 June 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 28/ 1964, 79-80.
503
The Leaders of the CPSU are the greatest splitters of our times Comment on the open letter of the
Central Committee of the CPSU (VII), Renmin Ribao, 4 February 1964, the Marxist Internet Archive,
http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/splitters.htm, accessed on 1 March 2012.
504
Lhti, 279-280.
505
The 12 February 1964 letter of the CC of the CPSU addressed to the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 19U/1964, 122-126.

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institution of collective condemnation of a socialist state and a communist party was

established formally, Romania and the RWP would eventually face a similar treatment.
In Gheorghiu-Dejs words, the Soviet decision to publish the proceedings of the CPSU
Plenum aimed to consecrate the split of the communist camp in two groups of states and
parties around the two centres, Moscow and Beijing. It did not matter how many parties
and countries would support each of the two centres, Gheorghiu-Dej argued. The only
important thing was that two parties so big [and] so powerful, two socialist countries so
big [and] so powerful will confront each other, while the small communist parties and
socialist states would be forced to take sides in this confrontation.
Taking into account factors such as the (perceived) great-power status of China and the
USSR, the many Sino-Soviet border clashes, the (perceived) emergence of China as a
nuclear power and the (perceived) Soviet attempt of 1963 to bring Mongolia in the
Warsaw Pact, in February 1964, the Romanian leadership feared that the confrontation
between Moscow and Beijing could escalate so much as to reach the point of a war
breaking out. According to the Romanian leaders interpretations and perceptions, the
Chinese and Soviet leaderships were equally responsible for the deterioration of the
situation and equally employed great power tendencies to the detriment of the interests
of the small states and parties. Gheorghiu-Dej thought that both China and the USSR
wished to bring the small states and parties (Romania and the RWP included) under their
baton, that both were ambitious, insane and powerful, and that their actions incurred
a risk to create a conflict capable of dragging the small states into a catastrophe against
their will.506
For many years to come, the Romanian leaders would remain much concerned about
the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war. They believed that, if such a war occurred, Romania
had to face tremendous strategic problems. They feared that, in the event of a war in Asia,
the USSR would take drastic measures to avoid any kind of unwanted surprises in Europe
coming from its untrustworthy neighbour Romania. The leaders in Bucharest believed
that Romania was seen by the USSR as a potential enemy rather than as a trusted ally and
that, in the event of a war with China, the Soviet Union might consider it necessary to take
measures to eliminate this perceived threat at its western border. Given Romanias
geographical proximity to the USSR and its incapability to resist the Soviet military
strength, such strategic Soviet measures would have devastating consequences for
Romania, the Romanian leaders believed.
As Maurer later phrased it, every time there were tensions between Moscow and
Beijing, the Romanian leadership got worried because tensions in the Sino-Soviet relations
could prompt the Soviet Union to do stupid things not only towards China at its eastern
border but also towards Romania at its western border so that [the USSR] would be able
to say: my hands are free [in Europe], I can do whatever I want there [in Asia].507
Corneliu Mnescu made a similar argument in 1964 that the aggravation of the SinoSoviet relations was a danger for the entire mankind, including Romania, because the
two brought the divergences between parties in the field of inter-state relations generating
inimical attitudes and hostile actions even among the socialist states in a context in which,
506

The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964, 4-32.
The minutes of the 7 and 11 September 1969 talks between Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Zhou Enlai, in
Budura, 2005, 952, 966-967.
507

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as Mnescu further reasoned, China was a world great power having the capabilities to
oppose the USSR.508
In early 1964, the Romanian leadership was convinced that, between the USSR and
China, between the CPSU and the CCP, there was a struggle for political hegemony and
not only a theoretical ideological dispute.509 As Brldeanu phrased it, the real origin of
the [Sino-Soviet] conflict was not related to ideological problems but to problems
concerning the struggle over leading the world [communist] movement and the world
politics, [it was about] the struggle for hegemony. Under the so-perceived conditions, the
Romanian leaders decided that it would be detrimental for Romania to take sides or to get
in between two great and powerful parties and states on the verge of an open
confrontation.510 According to the Romanian leaders, the (perceived) Soviet and Chinese
willingness to bring the camp on the verge of an open confrontation only to satisfy their
(perceived) great power ambitions were not only irrational but also irresponsible, as it
showed no concern for the consequences of their actions on third parties.
Thus, the early 1960s foreign policy choices of the Romanian leaders were greatly
defined by a strong sense of vulnerability. According to their views, Romania was a small
state lacking military capabilities and economic strength, vulnerable not only to the Soviet
power and constraints but also to the (perceived) power game played by the great powers.
According to the Romania leaders, both the Soviet and Chinese leaders (or, for that matter,
the Soviet and American leaders) were inclined and willing to treat Romania as a pawn
that was supposed to simply go along with the decisions made by the leaders of the world
superpowers regardless of Romanias own interests.511
In February 1964, the Romania leaders also reasoned that, although Romania and
China had had similar experiences and problems with the neighbouring Soviet Union,
there was one major difference between them that called for differentiating Romanias
reactions and policy towards the USSR from those of China, namely Romania was a small
country, with little if any influence in international affairs, while China was a powerful
state, capable, if need be, to stand alone against the USSR. 512 As Maurer later phrased it,
there is a difference between Romanias and Chinas approach to the USSR, Romania is
much smaller than China and the caution with which we [the Romanians] consider all
these [relations with the USSR] is [therefore] much greater. For this chief reason, Maurer
continued, despite the sad Soviet actions towards Romania,
We [Romania] must take into consideration that the Soviet Union is beside us. We are
separated from the Soviet Union by a river less than 40 meters wide. The Soviet Union has
a great military power. The crazier the people that lead [the USSR] are, the more
dangerous this thing [the Soviet Unions proximity to Romania] is for us. One thing is
508

The minutes of the 19-22 May 1964 meeting with the employees of the Ministers of Foreign Trade and
Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, File 24/1964, 170-201.
509
For instance, The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu & ranu, 49.
510
The minutes of the 19-22 May 1964 meeting with the employees of the Ministers of Foreign Trade and
Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 24/1964, 185-197.
511
See for instance The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office,
File 4/1963, 23-135.
512
The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964, 4-9, 16-32; See
also, Note concerning the 5 June 1964discussion between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005,
482.

144

certain: we do not seek to provoke a conflict [with the USSR]; we wish to get along with
the Soviet Union, yet not just under any circumstances but only on the basis of specific
principles.513

Moreover, the Romanian leaders feared that, had it been put into practice, the collective
riposte against the Chinese planned by the Soviets would constitute a dangerous precedent
in the relations between the communist parties and the socialist states. Had such a
precedent been allowed to occur, any other party and state could face the danger of being
collectively condemned if its policies would not receive the approval of the Soviets. Or
they believed that, given their opposition to the perceived Soviet attempts at bloc
coordination (within the CMEA, the Warsaw Pact, the communist movement or in the
field of the East-West relations), such a precedent would be particularly threatening for
Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej also feared that the Soviets might use the collective
condemnation of the Chinese leadership as an opportunity to try to replace the
inconvenient leaderships of other parties and states, including the leadership of Romania
and the RWP. I am afraid that one will go again on a witch hunt, he reasoned in April
1964, that one was maybe ready to go as far as to arrest and condemn somebody,
as it had happened with the Yugoslavs in the late 1940s, he reasoned.514
Thus, while scholars often argue that the early 1964 deterioration of the Sino-Soviet
relations provided a favourable context for Romania to affirm its independence from
Moscow515, in the perceptions of the Romania leaders, it represented an imminent threat to
Romanias interests. Given the so-perceived circumstances and these interpretations, in
February 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej decided that Romania could have only one response to the
emerging Sino-Soviet conflict, namely to stay aside, to not get involved in this fight, to
remain objective and realist, and to do everything it can to appease the two sides.
Hence, Romanias early 1964 initiative of mediation between the Soviets and the
Chinese.516

6.2 Attempts at mediation

At the Politburo meeting on 13 February 1964, the Romanian leaders decided to propose
to both the Soviet and Chinese leaderships to temporarily cease the public dispute and to
meet with Romanian leaders in order to discuss bilaterally the extremely serious situation
that had been created within the camp. Gheorghiu-Dej believed that both the Soviets and
the Chinese would most likely reject such a proposal but he argued that the proposal still
had to be made as a pretext to present once more Romanias position on the Sino-Soviet
conflict to the Soviets as well as to the Chinese.517 On the following day, 14 February
1964, the CC of the RWP sent the CC of the CPSU a letter containing a comradely and
513

The minutes of the 7 September 1969 talks in Beijing between the Romanian and the Chinese delegation,
in Budura, 2005, 952.
514
The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu & ranu, 55.
515
Anton, 181; Ctnu, 2011, 330-331; Croitor, 2012, 316-317.
516
The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964, 4-9, 16-32.
517
Ibid., 4-9, 16-32.

145

insistent appeal to not publish the proceedings of the plenary session of the CC of the
CPSU regarding the divergences with the CCP. The letter mentioned that the same appeal
would also be sent to the Chinese.518 On the same day, the Soviets accepted the proposal
provided that the Chinese would also respond favourably. 519
Having the Soviet consent, late in the evening on 14 February, the same proposal was
advanced to the Chinese. Stressing that their position on the problems within the world
communist movement had not changed520, the Romanian leaders proposed to the
Chinese to agree on a temporary cessation of the public polemics and on convening a
meeting between representatives of the CCP and the RWP to discuss the problem of the
socialist camp and the world communist movement. 521 The Chinese leadership, however,
seemed less inclined to accept such proposals which, they believed, were inspired by the
Soviets. Nevertheless, considering that talking with a Romanian delegation might reveal
Khrushchevs plans to them 522, the Chinese agreed to halt the public polemics for a while
and meet with a Romanian delegation in Beijing.523
On 15 February, in a circular letter sent to the leaderships of the communist and
workers parties, the Soviet leadership announced its intention to cease the polemics with
the Chinese for a while. In this letter, Khrushchev argued that different fraternal parties
had declared their support for the previously announced Soviet intention to organise a
collective strong riposte against China but that, since some fraternal countries had
addressed the CPSU with an insistent appeal to immediately cease the open polemics,
the leadership of the CC of the CPSU considered it convenient to agree and to abstain for
some time from publishing in the press the materials against the secessionist action of the
Chinese leadership.524
This missive was received unsigned in Bucharest on 17 February. Its content
infuriated the Romanian leaders for several reasons. They believed that the Soviet
leadership had not intended to send the letter to Bucharest, that some employee at the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had made a mistake sending it to Romania and that
with this document the Soviets attempted, in Gheorghiu-Dejs words, to mystify and
falsify the truth about Romanias 14 February initiative in several ways. Firstly, it
attempted to conceal Romanias role and its initiative in proposing the cessation of the
dispute. Secondly, by arguing that different parties had approved the Soviet proposals
from the letter of 12 February 1964, it implied that the RWP had also agreed with the
collective strong riposte against the Chinese. And thirdly, the letter contained polemical
phrases that would further upset the Chinese, thus jeopardizing Romanias initiative.
518

The 14 February 1964 letter of the CC of the RWP to the CC of the CPSU, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 19U/1964, 132.
519
Leonte Rutus 14 February 1964 telephone conversation with Y. Andropov, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relation, File 20U/1964, 26-27.
520
Note regarding the 14 February 1964 audience granted by Maurer and Bodnra to Van Tung, charge
daffaires at the Chinese Embassy in Bucharest, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 42/1964, 45-50.
521
The 14 February 1964 letter of the CC of the RWP to the CC of the CCP, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 19U/1964, 133.
522
Radchenko, 98.
523
The 16 February 1964 letter of the CC of the CCP addressed to the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 6/1964, 15.
524
The circular letter of the CC of the CPSU from15 February 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations,
File no 20U/1964, 190-191.

146

Accepting a proposal by Gheorghiu-Dej, the members of the Politburo decided

therefore to send a circular letter to all the communist and workers parties in order to let
them know the truth namely that the Romanian leadership had been the one to propose
a temporary cessation of the public polemics and not some fraternal parties; that both the
Soviets and the Chinese had accepted the proposal; and that the Romanian leadership was
to soon pay a visit in China. In the opinion of the Romanian leaders, such a letter could
have also encouraged other communist and workers parties to abstain from participating
in the public polemics.525 The letter was sent to the communist and workers parties from
socialist as well as capitalist states on 18 February.526 The responses, although generally
approbatory, were not very optimistic and arrived in Bucharest rather late (in March-April
1964).527
In the meantime, in early March 1964, a Romanian delegation travelled to Beijing and
Moscow in an attempt to mediate between the two major socialist powers, a fact with no
precedent in the history of the socialist camp, as Radchenko observed.528 Regarding the
Romanian objectives in this action, scholars tend to agree that, by mediating directly in
the Sino-Soviet dispute, the RWP sought to bolster its national autonomy or to claim
neutrality and assert an independent posture vis--vis the Soviet Union. At the same time,
Ctnu argues that it was used as a pretext by the Romanian leaders to forward their
policy of de-satellisation.529
Mihai Croitor advances a similar, yet more elaborated interpretation. He contends that
in early 1964 the Romanian leaders were pursuing a pragmatic policy of disengagement
from Moscow designed to counterbalance the hegemonic tendencies of Kremlin. To
reach their goal, Croitor continues, they needed a rapprochement with China and, in
order to secure this rapprochement, they sought a meeting with the Chinese leaders.
However, the Romanian leaders feared that their trip to Beijing would raise the Soviets
suspicions and, for this reason, they refrained from making the trip. But when in February
1964 the Sino-Soviet quarrel broke out, the Romanian leaders ingeniously decided to
use their mediation strategy as a pretext to send a high level party and state delegation to
Beijing to concretise a Romanian-Chinese rapprochement.
Croitor further contends that the increasing tension between China and the Soviet
Union in February 1964 did not worry the Romanian leaders who saw it instead as a
favourable condition to pursue their goals and used it as pretext to take Romania further
down the path of its detachment from Moscow. Thus, the preservation of the communist
camps unity was not the real objective of Romanias March 1964 strategy of
mediation in the Sino-Soviet conflict; mediation was only a pretext used by the

525

The Protocol no 2 and The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
6/1964, 1-20; Note regarding the 18 February 1964 audience granted by Emil Bodnra to Van Tung,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 42/1964, 56-64.
526
The 18 February 1964 letter of the CC of the RWP to the communist and workers parties, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 19U/1964, 148-152.
527
Synthesis regarding the responses of the communist and workers parties to the 18 February 1964 letter of
the CC of the RWP, 4 April 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations, File 12/1964, 35-41.
528
Radchenko, 98.
529
Gerard Segal, The China Factor, Croom Helm, London, 1982, 136-138; Radchenko, 84, 98-102; Anton,
179-181; Ctnu, 2011, 329-330.

147

Romanian authorities to organise direct talks with the leaders of the CCP without raising
the Soviets suspicions, Croitor concludes.530
Although the recent Romanian historiography often contends that the Romanian
leaders objective was to counterbalance the Soviet hegemonic power (with China),
scholars do not tackle the questions of what this actually meant in practice or of what type
of alliance or agreement the Romanian leaders expected from China.531 The recently
declassified archival evidence, however, provides valuable information on the Romanian
leaders conceptions and objectives concerning Romanias attempts at mediation between
Moscow and Beijing in early 1964.

6.2.1 The official Romanian objectives

The Romanian leaders commissioned their delegation leaving for Beijing in March 1964
with two main types of objectives: official (which they publicly declared to have achieved)
and secrete, operative objectives. The Romanian delegates left for Beijing and Moscow
instructed to propose a temporary cessation of the public polemics and an onset of the
preparations for convening a world communist conference to address the problems within
the communist movement. Romanias official objectives were to convince the two sides to
accept these proposals. These objectives were presented to the Soviet and Chinese leaders
and the Romanian party members in secret party meetings but they were not published
until the April 1964 Declaration was issued.
However, by advancing these two proposals, the Romanian leaders did not aim at
resolving the Sino-Soviet disagreements which they considered an unattainable goal.
They wanted instead to help the two sides re-open some channels of communication and
thereby to postpone the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, the Romanian
leaders secret objectives of mediation were narrowed down to limiting the (perceived)
damages that the (anticipated) deterioration of the Moscow-Beijing relations would inflict
on Romanias interests.
Contemplating the (anticipated) aggravation of the external situation, the Romanian
leaders took into consideration a hierarchy of goals, aims and objectives. In their view, the
ultimate (theoretical) goal of a third party mediation between Moscow and Beijing would
be the resolution of the Sino-Soviet ideological and non-ideological disagreements.
However, Gheorghiu-Dej believed that it was impossible for Romania to achieve such a
goal and, therefore, the Romanian delegates to Beijing and Moscow were repeatedly and
explicitly instructed to not address the subject matter of the dispute and to avoid being
tricked (by one of the two sides) into discussing any of the Soviet or Chinese arguments.
On 17 February 1964, a Plenum of the CC of the RWP was convened to establish the
directives for the delegation that was scheduled to travel to Beijing and Moscow in March
1964. On that occasion, Gheorghiu-Dej stressed that the delegates had to try to convince
the two sides to end the public polemics and to try to create a favourable climate for
convening a meeting of all communist and workers parties (including the CCP) to discuss
various problems. However, the Romanian leader was pessimistic about the Romanias
530
531

Croitor, 2012, 314-317.

Anton, 171; Croitor, 2009, 16, 213.

148

proposals chance of acceptance 532 and believed that Romanias attempt to convince the
Chinese to end the public polemics was tantamount to throwing out feelers 533 and would
most likely fail.534 Taking notice, on the one hand, of the failure of the previous SinoSoviet attempts to settle their divergences through bilateral talks and, on the other hand, of
the recent evolution (in February 1964) of the Moscow-Beijing relations, the Romanian
leadership considered it very unlikely that anybody (not only Romania) would be able to
prevent the further deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations.
There were several reasons why Gheorghiu-Dej and his Politburo fellows thought that
Romanias two official proposals would most likely be rejected, especially in Beijing.
Firstly, in their opinion, the two conflicting parties were showing virtually no interest in
any kind of mediation. The conflict was in an incipient stage, the two parties had not yet
been exhausted by their struggle and each was convinced that it had the capability to
impose its will upon the other. Both the Chinese and the Soviet leaderships believed
according to Gheorghiu-Dej that accepting a third party mediation (especially when the
third party was a small party and state as the RWP and Romania) would signal their
readiness to make concessions and would thus show their weakness. Secondly, GheorghiuDej observed that Romania lacked the capability to exercise any leverage over China or
the USSR. Romania had no influence on the policies of the big capricious states. Being a
small country, Romania does not have enough strength to force the big one [to do
anything] and, even if we wanted [to force them], it would not be just or possible in
practice, because the big one brushes you aside and says go away and let me be,
Gheorghiu-Dej reasoned during the 17 February 1964 Plenum.
Lacking any means to impose its proposals with promises of payments or threats of
sanctions, the Romanian delegation was instructed to try to reason with the two sides, to
stress that the superior interest of the communist cause and the common interests of the
socialist states requested the cessation of the public polemics; to insist that the quarrel ran
the risked of aggravating the relations among the socialist states, thereby weakening the
socialist camp and benefiting the imperialist camp; or to reason that each side could
maintain its position without resorting to epithets and mutual accusations. The Romanian
delegates leaving for Beijing were instructed to argue that their proposals were meant to
preserve the unity of the camp which was an indispensable condition for the victory of
communism in its struggle against imperialism. However, secretly, the Romanian leaders
were convinced that these arguments would not work and that their two official proposals
would most likely be rejected (especially in Beijing).535
The assignment of the Romanian delegation (Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Emil Bodra,
Chivu Stoica and Nicolae Ceauescu) to Beijing and Moscow was confirmed during the
Politburo meeting on 28 February 1964 when the delegates were explicitly instructed once
more to avoid discussing the divergences between the CC of the CCP and the CC of the
CPSU, and to work instead towards finding some ways that can contribute to a
rapprochement between the CPSU and the CCP. The delegation was commissioned to
532

The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964, 9-32.
ncercm marea cu degetul, in Romanian.
534
Note regarding the 24 February 1964 audience granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to I.K. Zhegalin, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relation, File 6/1964, 4-6.
535
The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964, 9-32.
533

149

strive for the renunciation of public polemics and advance the next concrete proposal a
small number of parties from Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa (that had
participated to a lesser extent in the public polemics) to address the CCP, the CPSU and
the rest of the communist and workers parties with a cordial appeal to temporarily
suspend the public polemics for six months or one year. During this armistice the
Romanian delegation was instructed to argue a new meeting of the representatives of all
communist and workers parties could be prepared, the emphasis being on all, which
meant that the Romanians would not support the convening of such a conference without
the participation of the CCP. On 28 February, however, Gheorghiu-Dej stressed once more
that these proposals would most likely be rejected.536
In conclusion, the Romanian leaders were convinced that their attempt to persuade the
Soviets and the Chinese to end (even temporarily) their public polemics and agree to start
the preparations for convening a world communist conference would most likely fail. But
then, why did they bother to send their delegates to Beijing and Moscow in March 1964?
The response to this question lies in the secret objectives of the Romanian leaders.

6.2.2 The secret Romanian objectives

One of the secret objectives of the Romanian delegation that travelled to Beijing in March
1964 was to persuade China to become a full member of the CMEA and then to help
Romania, from inside the Council, block the (perceived, current and anticipated)
integration attempts of Khrushchev. During the Politburo meeting on 17 February 1964,
Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceauescu argued that Alexandru Brldeanu, Romanias top expert on
the CMEA problems, should also be appointed to go to Beijing. However, after a short
debate, the Politburo concluded that Brldeanus trip to China could raise additional and
unnecessary Soviet suspicions against Romania. Therefore, it appointed other delegates to
advance Romanias CMEA proposals in Beijing, while Brlndeanu stayed home.
Proposing the temporary cessation of the public polemics and the initiation of
preparations for convening a world communist conference, the Romanian leaders had
another long-term goal in mind namely to avoid or limit the (perceived) damages that the
(anticipated) deterioration of the Moscow-Beijing relations could inflict on Romanias
interests. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, there were several intermediary steps that the
Romanian leadership could take to facilitate the fulfilment of this goal, namely blocking
the announced collective riposte against China; blocking (anticipated) foreign attempts to
involve Romania in the conflict (against its own will or without its knowledge); and
preventing the split of the communist parties and socialist states in two groups around the
two centres.
During the 17 February 1964 Plenum, Gheorghiu-Dej argued that the Romanian
official proposals ending the public polemics and beginning the preparation for a
communist conference was Romanias way to try to avoid the split of the communist
parties and socialist states in two conflicting groups organised around the two centres. De
facto Gheorghiu-Dej argued on that occasion the communist parties and socialist states
536

The protocol no 9 and The Minutes of the 28 February 1964 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 9/1964, 1-26.

150

had already been divided in two groups around Moscow and Beijing but a collective
strong riposte against China if allowed to happen would consecrate the split of the
camp into two de jure opposing state coalitions ready for an open confrontation. He even
believed that a war could break out between the USSR and China (and their respective
coalitions) and feared that Romania might be involved in this conflict against its own will
or even without its knowledge. To be able to limit the negative effects of the anticipated
deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations on its interests, Romania had to maintain its
previous position, to take no sides and to strive to prevent this [de jure] split even if the
split had already [de facto] occurred, Gheorghiu-Dej reasoned on 17 February 1964.537
Gheorghiu-Dej argued that although the two official Romanian proposals would be
rejected (as he believed), they still had to be advanced in order to create an opportunity or
a pretext for the Romanians to emphasize once more to both the Soviets and the Chinese
that Romania was determined to not take sides and to not get involved in any way in the
present or future confrontation between Moscow and Beijing.538 In an interview, Corneliu
Mnescu corroborates the archival evidence confirming that the main objective of the
Romanian delegation to Beijing and Moscow in early 1964 was not to resolve the SinoSoviet disagreements but to disclose Romanias position on the (perceived) increase of
tensions so that both sides would understand that, in the event of a further deterioration in
their relations, Romania would take no sides.539
In his Memoirs, Ion Porojan who in 1964 was a low ranking diplomat at the
Romanian Embassy in Moscow contends that, given the rapidly unfolding conflict
between the USSR and China, Romanias main objective in early 1964 was to alleviate the
danger of being pressured to take sides, and that advancing its own views was the means
that the Romanian leadership imagined to be adequate to achieve such a goal. 540 In an
interview, Ion Gheorghe Maurer also insisted that the mission of the Romanian delegation
in Beijing in March 1964 was not to mediate between Moscow and Beijing but to explain
to the Chinese that Romania was not taking the side of the USSR, that Romania had its
own position and views, and that it did not intend to participate in the Sino-Soviet
conflict.541
The Romanian leaders anticipated that, as the Sino-Soviet relations would get tenser,
the Soviet pressure on Romania to take part in the collective riposte against China would
also increase. Determined to resist the Soviet pressures that they anticipated, the
Romanian leaders took measures to receive formal approval by the party members for the
party leaderships decisions on this matter. On 3 March 1964, 15,000 copies of a six-page
report dealing with Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet divergences were sent
throughout the country. Between 4 and 12 March 1964, the local party chiefs read the
report to party members and other citizens, and then returned the copies to the regional
party committees to be destroyed, as they were instructed by Bucharest.
This report noted that the RWP was deeply concerned with the serious divergences
that undermined the unity of the world communist movement and the on-going intense
537

The minutes of the 17 February 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 6/1964,9-32.
The Minutes of the 28 February 1964 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 9/1964, 7-26.
539
Interviews with Mnescu, in Betea, 2008, 484-486.
540
Porojan, 73-74.
541
Interviews with Maurer, in Betea, 2008, 324-325.
538

151

polemics regarding these divergences. It announced that a Romanian party delegation was
in China at the moment to present the point of view of our party with regard to the urgent
need to deter the split, to stop the public polemics between the fraternal countries, and
thereby to create the necessary conditions for a comradely debate on the existing
divergences, regardless how serious they might be.542 The content of this secret document
corroborates the conclusion that the main (albeit secret) objective of the Romanian
delegation to Beijing was to advance Romanias position on the present or future situation
within the communist movement. Discussing this Report, Romanian people gave their
formal approval for the position of the RWPs leadership with regard to the present or
anticipated Sino-Soviet divergences, thus legitimising it. From this moment on, the
Romanian leaders could argue in their talks with the Soviets (and indeed they argued543)
that, by not taking sides in the Sino-Soviet disputes, they were simply enacting a decision
made by the ordinary party members.

6.2.3 The results of the mediation

Arriving in Beijing on 2 March 1964544, the Romanian delegation was handed a copy of
the Chinese letter from 29 February 1964 (written in response to the 23 November 1963
letter of the CPSU). The Romanian delegates took the content of the February missive
with mixed feelings since, on the one hand, it suggested that the Chinese would continue
their polemics with the Soviets but, on the other hand, it seemed to confirm that the
Chinese would support Romanias CMEA cause, as agreed in January 1964.545
In its letter from 29 February 1964, the leadership of the CCP wrote that the Soviet
leadership had infringed the independence and sovereignty of the fraternal countries,
opposed their policies of industrialisation, tried to force them to remain agricultural
countries and attempted to transform them into sources of raw materials for the Soviet
Union and outlets for the Soviet goods. These Soviet actions were wrong, the Chinese
missive continued, and in the economic, scientific, technical and cultural spheres, we [the
CCP] stand for relations of cooperation of a new type, based on genuine equality and
mutual benefit, between China and the Soviet Union as well as among all socialist
countries. Furthermore, the Chinese document noted that
We hold that it is necessary to transform the present CMEA in accordance with the
principle of proletarian internationalism and to turn this organisation, which is now
controlled solely by the leaders of the CPSU, into one based on genuine equality and
mutual benefit, which the fraternal countries of the socialist camp may join of their own
free will. It is hoped that you [the Soviet leadership] will respond favourably to our
suggestion.546
542

Note and Report, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1964, 36-41.

See, for instance, The minutes of the 27-28 July 1964 talks between N.V. Podgorny and Gheorghiu-Dej,
Apostol, Bodnra and others, Eforie (Romania), ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 16/1964, 63.
544
Radchenko argues that, on its way to Beijing, the Romanian delegation made a stop in Moscow but the
Romanian archival evidence reveals that such a stop did not occur. Radchenko, 99.
545
Maurers Note, 3 March 1964, Beijing, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 5/1964, 1-3.
546
The 29 February 1964 letter of the CC of the CCP to the CC of the CPSU, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File no 9C/1961-1964, 142-201. I used the English translation of this letter provided by the MIA,
543

152

This part of the Chinese letter encouraged the Romanian delegation in Beijing to approach
the CMEA topic. On 3 March, Ion Gheorghe Maurer presented Liu Shaoqi with two
problems, as he put it. The first referred to the situation within the camp and was related
to the two Romanian proposals the temporary cessation of the Sino-Soviet public
polemics and the convention of a world communist conference. The second problem
referred to the Romanian-Soviet CMEA divergences which had been only postponed
and not resolved and, according to the Romanian leadership, could be solved by
transforming the CMEA into an organisation of the entire socialist camp, Maurer argued
on this occasion. In this indirect way, Maurer raised the problem of Chinas membership
in the CMEA already on the first day of the Beijing talks.547
The Romanian delegates in Beijing provided the Chinese leaders with a detailed
review of the Romanian-Soviet relations emphasising in particular (though not only) the
CMEA divergences. The USSRs actions and policies regarding Yugoslavia (1948), China
(1960), Albania (1961) or the Cuban Crisis (1962) as well as the Soviet attempts to impose
the integration of the CMEA and the coordination of the Warsaw Pact the Romanian
delegates argued all proved that the Soviet leaders wanted to dictate their will to the
other communist parties and socialist states, without respect for their own interests.
Romania and the RWP opposed such tendencies but, the Romanian delegates added,
Romanias opposition to the USSR had to take into consideration the geographical
proximity of the USSR and its power capabilities. Emphasising that Romania and China
had to resist similar types of threats and pressures from the Soviet Union, the Romanian
delegates further argued that despite some difference of opinions on problems such as
peace and war, peaceful coexistence, relations with Yugoslavia, etc. Romania and China
should support each other in order to resist or block specific Soviets manoeuvres that
threatened their common or individual interests.
Although the CCP letter from 29 February made no explicit reference to Romania, the
Romanian delegates in Beijing interpreted the missives section concerning the CMEA as
an indirect Chinese support for Romanias CMEA position and an implicit consent from
China on its future membership at the Council. On 7 March, Chivu Stoica declared to the
Chinese representatives that it is very important that in your letter [from 29 February] you
announced that you wish to participate in the CMEA and, as we understood, not as
observers but as active members of the CMEA. Romania wanted China and other Asian
states to become full members of the Council in order to increase the number of those
willing to block, together with Romania, the Soviet attempts at reforms through
integration. As Nicolae Ceauescu explained in Beijing, the Romanian stratagem
contained several stages. Firstly, China would resume its participation in the CMEA as an
observer; secondly, Albania would resume its participation in the Council as a full
member; thirdly, the Asian states China, North Vietnam and North Korea would
become full members; and then we that is Romania, China, Albania, North Vietnam
and North Korea would work and consult with one another on how to reform this
organisation [the CMEA] to make it comply with the principles that we agree upon.

at http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/sevenlet.htm#l4, accessed on 13 November

2012.
547
Maurers Note, 3 March 1964, Beijing, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 5/1964, 1-3.

153

Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping called the Romanian delegates for moderation and
stressed that their 29 February letter did not imply that China was ready to join the
Council as a full member. The letter meant only, the Chinese leaders argued, that the
CMEAs fundamental rules needed to be revised (by its current members) along the lines
of respecting the fundamental rights of the socialist states. The Councils current members
had to reform the organisation in accordance with the principles of equality, independence,
etc. and, only when these reforms were implemented, other states could consider the
possibility of joining the Council, the Chinese further argued. Closing the talks with the
Romanian delegation, on 10 March 1964, Mao Zedong reasoned that, instead of asking for
Chinas support in the CMEA, the Romania leadership should try to persuade other
Eastern European states to help it resist the Soviet integration plans.
As regards the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Romanian delegates, as they were mandated,
argued that, regardless of the differences of opinions, the entire camp should work
together to avoid the split and to preserve the unity. They proposed a temporary cessation
of the public polemics a mandatory condition, they argued, for starting the preparations
to convene a world communist conference. While the Chinese delegates (Liu Shaoqi,
Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Kang Sheng, Mao Zedong) insisted on presenting their views
on their divergences with the Soviet leaders, the Romanian representatives constantly
strove for the temporary cessation of the dispute, and insisted that Romania did not
dance to the Soviet drum and did not intend to participate in the public polemics.
Refusing to address the subject matter of the dispute, they argued that only a world
communist conference (that they proposed to be prepared) had the credential to tackle
such a problem. However, as Gheorghiu-Dejs had anticipated, these proposals were
rejected by Beijing. Exasperated with the Romanians refusal to address the subject of the
dispute, on 10 March, Mao Zedong himself directly asked the Romanians which side they
supported with regard to the Moscow-Beijing quarrel.
You see, within only one year, your [Romanians] attitude has changed. What are you for?
[Do you have] a left, right or centrist doctrine? Are you dogmatic or revisionist? Or do you
adopt a middle-ground attitude?

Ceauescu vaguely responded that

We are Marxist-Leninists. The leadership of our [RW] Party considers that there is no
room for epithets in the relations among the communist and workers parties. Of course,
one may have a different opinion but without [using] epithets, without attacking anyone.548

This answer has triggered many interpretations in the recent Romanian historiography.
Florin Constantiniu contends, for instance, that it did not prove the attachment of the
Romanian leaders to the communist ideology, but the[ir] attachment a thousand times
stronger to [preserving their domestic political] power, while Florian Banu and Liviu
ranu argue that it proved that, as far as the Sino-Soviet dispute was concerned, the
Romanian leadership had already chosen a third way, a position of neutrality.549
548

The Minutes of the 3-10 March 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations, in
Budura, 2008, 179-210.
549
Constantiniu, 487 ; Banu&ranu, LVIII-LXV.

154

However, the significance of Ceauescus response is overrated in historiography. By

resorting to such an answer, Ceauescu tried to avoid, as mandated, giving Mao a straight
answer and thus taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the opinion of the Romanian
leaders, Mao presented the Romanian leadership with an either/or choice that is either
with Moscow or with Beijing and Ceauescus tactic of referring to Lenin was a trick
used to avoid this (perceived) trap of an either/or dilemma. The reference to Lenin
remained the main tactic that the Romanian representatives abroad were instructed to use
when being asked on which side Romania and the RWP stood with regard to the SinoSoviet divergences. On 26 June 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej openly declared to the Soviet
ambassador in Bucharest that all Romanian representatives abroad had been instructed to
respond when being asked on which side Romania and the RWP stood in the SinoSoviet dispute that we are on Lenins side.550
On 12 March, a very brief and elusive joint Communiqu in Scnteia announced that
the Romanian and Chinese delegations had had an exchange of opinions on problems of
common interests and that the talks had been held in a friendly atmosphere.551 After a
short vist in North Korea, on its way back from Asia, the Romanian delegation made a
stop in the Soviet Union where it met with N. S. Khrushchev, Y. V. Andropov, A. I.
Mikoyan and V. P. Mdjavandze in Pitsunda on 12-15 March.
On this occasion, the Romanian delegates argued that, despite the Chinese
determination to continue the polemics, the Soviets should unilaterally refrain from
publishing new polemical texts. Rejecting this proposal which is against us and defends
China, as Khrushchev put it, the Soviet leader proposed the Romanian leadership to take
the initiative to ask the CCP to sign a tripartite appeal with the RWP and the CPSU to end
the polemics which would then be sent to all other parties. If the Chinese accepted such a
proposal, then the Soviet leaders gave their word that the CPSU would not publish the
proceedings of its February 1964 Plenum, the Soviets declared in Pitsunda.Khrushchev
proposed the elaboration of the appeal in situ, in Pitsunda, but the Romanian delegation,
though agreeing to present this proposal to the Politburo of the RWP, did not accept the
idea of drafting the appeal in Pitsunda.552
On 18 March 1964, the Politburo of the CC of the RWP decided to accept
Khrushchevs proposal and appointed a commission to draft such an appeal as fast as
possible. The Romanian leaders believed that there were very little chances for this new
proposal to be accepted by the Chinese but they decided to forward it nonetheless for two
reasons. Firstly, because the initiative came from Moscow and hence accepting it was a
gesture of goodwill towards the Soviet leaders and, secondly, because it provided the
Romanian leadership with another opportunity to present its different view with regard to
the dispute to both the Soviets and the Chinese. 553 The draft of the appeal was elaborated
by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnra, Nicolae Ceauescu, Chivu

550

Note regarding the 26 June 1964 audience granted by G. Gheorghiu-Dej to I.K. Zhegalin, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1964, 34.
551
Scnteia, 12, 13 March 1964.
552
The minutes of the 15 March 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations in Pitsunda,
in Budura, 2008, 223-269.
553
The minutes of the 18 March 1964 Politburo meeting, in Ctnu, 2004, 298-311.

155

Stoica and Leonte Rutu, and then approved by the Politburo.554 On 26 March, it was sent
to Moscow and Beijing.555
In their Project of Appeal, the Romanian leaders wrote that, after consultations, the
CPSU, the CCP and the RWP ask together all communist and workers parties to
immediately stop the polemics. They argued that the differences of opinion and the public
polemics had distracted the communist parties from their duties and influenced the state
relations allowing the enemies of socialism and peace to benefit from this situation. The
social practice confirmed that there were no common forms and models applicable in all
countries and parties, and the problems that generated divergences among the parties had
to be discussed in a comradely and principled manner, in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism,
the Romanians further wrote. Arguing that there are no superior and subordinate parties,
that all parties, big or small, are completely equal in rights, that every party had the right
to decide independently on its political line, objectives and methods, the appeal stressed
further that the relations between the socialist states
were based on the principles of independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in
internal affairs, equality in rights, mutual advantage, comradely support as well as the
principles of proletarian internationalism.556

In a letter from 28 March, the Soviets responded that they were ready to immediately
begin the examination of the Romanian-produced Project of Appeal together with
representatives of the CCP and the RWP, provided that the Chinese response would also
be favourable. However, if the Chinese leadership delayed its response and continued the
open polemics, then the CPSU intended to publish the proceedings of its February 1964
plenum as soon as possible, the Soviet letter concluded.557 This Soviet letter, however,
was delivered to the Romanian leaders two days later, on 30 March.558

6.3 Romanias public dissent

The Chinese did not rush to respond to the Romanian proposal from 26 March. Moreover,
on 31 March, the CCP published its eighth comment to the Soviet open letter from 14 July
1963. On the same day, Khrushchev sent another letter to the CC of the RWP announcing
that, given the Chinese lack of response, the CPSU had revised its own response from 28
March and decided to publish the proceedings of its February 1964 Plenum in the next
days.559 This announcement prompted the Romanian leaders to issue what later became
known as the RWPs April 1964 Declaration of Independence.
554

The Protocol no 9 of the 18 March 1964 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1964, 1-2.
Note regarding the 26 March 1964 audience granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to Zhegalin, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 6/1964, 21-22.
556
Project of Appeal, 25 March 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 9C/1961-1964, 234-242.
557
The letter from 28 March 1964 addressed by the CC of the CPSU to the CC of the RWP, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 20U/1964, 2-6.
558
Note regarding the 30 March 1964 audiences granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to I.I. Iliuhin, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 6/1964, 13-15.
559
The letters from 28 and 31 March 1964 addressed by the CC of the CPSU to the CC of the RWP, ANIC,
CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 20U/1964, 2-6, 18-19.
555

156

Khrushchevs letter from 31 March 1964 was submitted to the Romanian leaders by
the Soviet Ambassador in Bucharest, I. K. Zhegalin, only several days later, in the
afternoon of 2 April 1964.560 Immediately after receiving the letter, the Romanian
leadership convened a Politburo meeting (which was held late in the evening on 2 April, at
8 pm) to decide on Romanias next move. The Romanian leadership thought that the
publication of the proceedings of the February 1964 Plenum of the CPSU would aggravate
the Sino-Soviet state relations and would be followed by Soviet manoeuvres to organise a
collective riposte against the Chinese. The two anticipated outcomes of Khrushchevs 31
March letter were seen by the Romanian leaders as direct threats to Romanias interests
for reasons presented earlier in this chapter.
Expecting that Soviets would pressure Romania to participate in the condemnation of
the Chinese and fearing that the Soviet leadership might speak on behalf of Romania
when mustering the collective condemnation of the Chinese, at the Politburo meeting on 2
April 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej argued that it would be very difficult for us to stay outside the
polemical struggle unless we uphold our position, and that the best way to make
Romanias position known was to issue a public and comprehensive declaration of the
RWP. Although by issuing this declaration the Romanian leaders aimed to prevent
Romanias forced involvement in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, the text had to be presented
officially Gheorghiu-Dej explicitly stated so as just another Romanian appeal to the
communist and workers parties to end the public polemics. Since to say that only one
party is responsible would be unfair, the declaration had to be complete, balanced,
principled and objective and to repeat Romanias position as expressed in many other
documents (such as Maurers article from October 1963 or the March 1964 Project of
Appeal). Gheorghiu-Dej further stressed that such a text needed to be drafted as soon as
possible. In his own words,
It is necessary to begin immediately to prepare a comprehensive declaration regarding the
position of our party on all fundamental problems of the international communist and
workers movement, from which one will see that we do not engage in polemics neither on
the side of the CPSU nor on the side of the CCP. () I repeat, I think that with no delay
we must make such a declaration. () I ask the Politburo to accept this proposal and to
start without delay to elaborate this document. () I consider that we should begin drafting
the document as early as tomorrow.561

Thus, the scholarly interpretation that the Romanian leadership had needed more than a
year to draft the April 1964 Declaration is proved wrong by the minutes of the 2 April
1964 Politburo meeting. Corroborating the archival evidence, Brldeanu recalls that, once
the decision was made, the Declaration was drafted in three days.562
On 3 April 1964, Pravda published Suslovs report under the title The struggle of the
CPSU for the unity of the international communist movement, which reasoned that today
the policy and actions of the Chinese leaders represent the main danger to the unity of the
560

Note, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 20U/1964, 1. The next day, on 3 April 1964, Pravda
published Suslovs report.
561
Protocol no 8 of the 2 April 1964 Politburo Meeting; Notes from the 2 April 1964 Politburo Meeting,
ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File . 13/1964, 1-10.
562
Interviews with Brldeanu in Betea, 2008, 133.

157

world communist movement. The text published in Pravda also advocated for the
convention of a regular conference of the fraternal parties for discussing the fundamental
problems of the day. Although on 4 April the Bulletin of the Romanian press agency
Agerpres reprinted the report in 220 copies563, the document was not published in
Romania. It was known only to the Romanian leaders and top party members. While the
European communist and workers parties rapidly rallied round the Soviet position, the
RWP remained the only party in Europe (except for the Party of Labour of Albania) that
did not condemn the Chinese.564
Immediately after that, the Soviet leadership began to manoeuvre the Romanian
leaders argued to convince Romania and the RWP to take the Soviet side. On 11 April
1964, E. D. Karpishchenko (a worker in the apparatus of the CC of the CPSU) came to
Bucharest and asked the Romanian leadership to agree with convening a communist
conference without the participation of China. The Romanians indirectly rejected the
proposal by arguing that the Plenum of the CC of the RWP had not yet formulated an
opinion on the matter.565 As already noted, in April 1964, the Romanian leaders feared that
the Soviet leaders intended to use any occasion that brought together the leaders of the
communist parties to force a collective condemnation of the Chinese. For this reason, in
the spring of 1964, they avoided all top level meetings, no matter if formal or informal,
bloc or camp gatherings. For this reason, under different pretexts, Gheorghiu-Dej did not
attend the celebration marking the 19th anniversary of Hungarys Liberation Day (4 April)
or the celebration of Khrushchevs 70th birthday (on 17 April).566

6.3.1 The April 1964 RWPs Declaration

Officially convened to debate the report of the Romanian delegation that had travelled to
Beijing and Moscow on 3-15 March 1964,567 the Plenum of the CC of the RWP held on
15-22 April had the secret objective to establish Romanias point of view regarding the
fundamental problems of present days, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the methods used in
the polemics, as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it at the opening of the plenum.
The transcripts of the March 1964 Romanian-Chinese and Romanian-Soviet talks in
Beijing and Pitsunda as well as the letters exchanged among the Soviets, Chinese and
Romanians in February-March 1964 were read and commented upon during the Plenum.
On that occasion, the CPSU and the USSR, the CCP and China were equally criticized for
having allowed the polemics to reach a high level of tension and for their hegemonic
tendencies. Considering the Soviet intention to condemn the Chinese, the Romanian
leaders argued once again that each party had the right to decide independently on matters
of domestic and foreign policy no matter if the decisions were, as he put it, right or
563

Agerpres Bulletin, 4 April 1964, ANIC, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 834/1964, Vol. I, 70201.
564
Croitor, 2012, 317.
565
The minutes of the 11 April 1964 talks between Chivu Stoica and E. D. Karpishchenko, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Office, File 15/1964, 2-20.
566
Notes from Moscow, April 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File no 16/1964, 80-87; File
1/1964, 27-28; The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu& ranu, 62-63.
567
Scnteia, 4 April 1964.

158

wrong. Gheorghiu-Dej insisted that the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet party relations
was all the more worrying as it triggered the aggravation of the state relations within the
camp. Reiterating the arguments and interpretations that he had presented at various closed
party meetings in February-April 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej stressed at this occasion too that it
was not in Romanias interests to get involved in the escalating Sino-Soviet conflict. The
Project of Declaration was also discussed and then approved unanimousl.568
On 23 April, an elusive and very brief press communiqu announced that the April
Plenum had approved unanimously the activity of the Politburo of the RWP regarding the
public polemics and the activity of the RWPs delegation which travelled the previous
month to China, North Korea and the USSR.569 Domestically, the Declaration adopted by
the Plenum was published in seven central and 25 local newspapers simultaneously (on 26
April) with a total circulation of 2.9 million copies, out of which 238,000 in Hungarian,
100,000 in German and 1,000 in Serbian. In addition, the Declaration was published as a
brochure with a total print-run of 228,000 copies, out of which 20,000 in Hungarian, 5,000
in German and 3,000 in Serbian.570
Addressing the problems of peace and war, peaceful coexistence, nuclear disarmament
and transition from capitalism to socialism, the Declaration placed the RWPs position on
the Soviet side. It argued that, given the existence of nuclear weapons in the world, a war
would have destructive effects for the entire humankind and would lead to the
destruction of all countries and peoples, belligerent or not. The international tensions had
to be resolved through negotiations and, in the search for solutions to the fundamental
problems of mankind, all states, big or small had to be allowed to participate and show
initiative. The Declaration further noted that
At the base of socialist states foreign policy is the principle of peaceful coexistence among
countries with different social systems. This principle implies solving contested
international problems by means of negotiations, without resorting to war, on the basis of
recognition for the right of every nation to determine its own fate, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of states, complete equality and non-interference in internal affairs.

The Declaration also identified the methods that had to be used to enforce the policy of
peaceful coexistence: negotiations and flexibility in interactions with international
partners; developing relations with all states regardless of their social system;
disarmament; abolition of the military blocs; establishment of nuclear free zones;
conclusion of the German Peace Treaty; and enlargement of the United Nations
Organisation.
Furthermore, the Declaration contended that, at the base of the relations among the
socialist states, there lied the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality
in rights, mutual advantage, non-interference in internal affairs and territorial integrity.571
There were no patterns or common recipes; no one could decide what was right or wrong
for other countries or parties; every socialist state had the sovereign right to elaborate,
568

The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu& ranu, 30-291.
Communiqu in Scnteia, 23 April 1964.
570
Measures regarding the dissemination of the documents of the April 1964 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 29/1964, 1-3; The Declaration in Scnteia, 26 April 1964.
571
Alesandru Duu wrongly argues that with the April 1964 Declaration Romania for the first time strove
for the application of these principles in the relations among the socialist states. Duu, 2010, 36.
569

159

choose or change the forms and methods of building socialism, and the style of building
communism had to comply with the national conditions of every country, the Romanian
leaders argued in this document. They added that
Every party has the right to elaborate its political line and objectives, [and] the means and
methods to reach them; every party has the right to solve its political or organisational
problems, to elect its leadership and to decide on internal or international matters. () The
disputes must be solved through negotiations, discussions () [and] when it is impossible
to reach a common point of view we could let life and social practice prove the rightness of
one position or the other. () The existence of an international centre designed to solve
the problems of the communist movement in one country or another no longer corresponds
to the level of development reached by the international communist and workers
movement. () There is no and there can be no party-father and party-son, superior parties
or subordinated parties, all parties are equal.

The document argued again in favour of the cessation of the public polemics noting that, if
it was carried on, the dispute would continue to strain the relations among the communist
and workers parties, among the socialist states, among the peoples of these states
increasing the danger of a split in the world communist movement and the socialist camp.
Although the decision to issue the Declaration was triggered by the (perceived)
situationn with the Sino-Soviet dispute, it also targeted the activity of the CMEA, thus
being the first document in Romanias post-war history that publicly and officially
acknowledged (albeit indirectly) the existence of disagreements on the CMEA integration
between Romania, on the one hand, and all the other members of the bloc, including the
USSR, on the other hand.
The Romanian leaders wrote in their Declaration that within the Council somebody
had made proposals regarding the creation of supranational bodies and that the RWP had
rejected the idea of creating a unified planning body, inter-state technical-productive
branch unions and enterprises with joint ownership of two or more states because they all
violated the rights of state sovereignty. If some socialist countries wanted to develop
such forms of collaboration, then that is a problem that concerns exclusively those
countries, the Declaration noted. It also argued that the CMEA did not reproduce the
exact configuration of the world socialist system since it incorporated only eight out of 14
socialist states in the world. In this document, the Romanians reasoned that the objective
of developing economic collaboration among all socialist states would be achieved much
easier if all socialist states would establish together the best ways, forms and methods of
collaboration capable of securing the inclusion of other states in the CMEA, which was a
rather transparent allusion to the Romanian idea of engaging the Asian states in the talks
about the CMEA reforms.572
As regards the CMEA dispute, the Declaration reiterated the position that the
Romanian representatives had presented several years earlier on many occasions such as
closed CMEA meetings or secret bilateral talks with Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, East
German or Hungarian representatives. A mild version of this position had been previously
572

The declaration concerning the position of the Romanian Workers Party with regard to the problems of
the international communist and workers movement adopted by the Plenum of the CC of RWP from 22nd of
April 1964 in Scnteia, 26 April 1964.

160

articulated publicly by Ceauescu in his 23 August 1963 speech (also published in

Scnteia) or in Maurers article published in Problems of Peace and Socialism in
November 1963. Thus, the element of novelty in the April 1964 Declaration was not the
announcement of the existence of a CMEA-related disagreement between Romania and
the other states, as everybody was familiar with this information. The new element was
that one of the two sides in the disagreement (namely Romania) acknowledged publicly
and officially the existence of the divergences and, by doing so, it also publicly (albeit
implicitly) accused its CMEA partners in attempting to infringe Romanias sovereignty
and independence.
Although the proceedings of the RWPs Plenum in April 1964 were not published, the
content of the debates was presented in detail to the party members and ordinary people
across the country. The press organs were also given directives to publish articles on
themes included in the Declaration.573 According to a report of the Propaganda and
Agitation Section of the CC of the RWP, in the period 6-19 May 1964, 188,339 people
debated the Declaration at 1,328 meetings organised around Romania. During these
meetings, the Soviet and Chinese leaderships were openly and severely criticised for
having allowed the situation within the communist movement to reach such high levels of
mutual distrust. The participants in these meetings approved the position of the RWPs
leadership on the Sino-Soviet dispute. They also
firmly challenged the wrong theses of some party leaders from socialist states in support of
the need for a unified planning body for all member states of the CMEA and the creation of
inter-state unions and enterprises as joint property of several countries, as that would lead
to an infringement of national sovereignty and independence [and] to a decline in the role
of the party and governmental role in managing the national economy.

During such public meetings, the Soviet leadership and the USSR were severely and
explicitly criticised (though only verbally) for their (perceived) previous or present
policies that were detrimental to Romanias interests but the accusations were not
published in any written (public) texts (an article, a brochure or a speech). The written
documents advanced instead a principled tone and a principled position, as a report
from May 1964 noted.574
Corroborating the archival evidence, Niculescu-Mizil recalls that, after the April 1964
Plenum, the Romanian leadership carried out only a verbal campaign against the Soviets,
the Romanian-Soviet divergences were openly discussed only at conferences, lectures,
expositions, party meetings and nothing of this criticism was conveyed in writing, in press
articles, published speeches, party or state documents, which instead were constructed
around Romanias internationalist duty to defend and preserve the supremacy of the
principles of sovereignty, independence, etc. in the relations among the communist parties
and the socialist states.575
The Declaration was also circulated abroad. The Romanian News Agency Agerpres
published it in its two bulletins for foreign audiences The Information Bulletin of the CC
of the RWP and Romania: Documents, Articles, Information. These bulletins were
573

The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu & ranu, 291; Plan of measures regarding the
debate of the RWPs 1964 Declaration, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 111/1964,1-6.
574
Report, 20 May 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 35/1964, 1-7.
575
Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 279.

161

disseminated abroad among diplomatic offices, press correspondents, international

organisations and institutions (Table 2).
Table 2: The dissemination abroad of the RWPs Declaration

Language
Russian
English
French
German
Spanish

The Information Bulletin Romania: Documents,

of the CC of the RWP
Articles, Information
Circulation
2,000 copies
1,850 copies
500 copies
2,750 copies
500 copies
1,650 copies
400 copies
1,000 copies
350 copies
900 copies

Moreover, on 26 April 1964, the Declaration translated in four languages (Russian,

English, Serbian and Spanish) was sent to eight international news agencies, TASS
(USSR), Associated Press and United Press Associations (USA), France Press (France),
Reuters (UK), Taniug (Yugoslavia), New China (China) and Prensa Latina (Cuba). The
foreign press correspondents in Bucharest were also handed copies of the translated
Declaration. 576

6.3.2 The Declaration and the CMEA

This study argues that the decision to issue the April 1964 Declaration of the RWP was
made on 2 April 1964 in response to the perceived threats to Romanias interests posed by
the (anticipated) deterioration of the Sino-Soviet dispute. But, if this was a reaction to the
Sino-Soviet dispute, why did the Romanian leaders address also the CMEA problems in
their Declaration? This question has several corroborating answers.
Firstly, although the proximate cause of the decision was related to the Sino-Soviet
quarrel, the Romanian leaders decided to respond by elaborating in their own words a
comprehensive declaration regarding Romanias position on all fundamental
international problems. Moreover, the CMEA integration was one of the most important
problems that had been of concern to the Romanian leaders for years. Secondly, as already
noted in this chapter, in April 1964, the Romanian leaders were worried and even angry
that Khrushchev had broken (in their interpretation) the June 1963 Bucharest agreement
by allowing and even openly supporting the re-emergence of the CMEA integration
talks. 577 From this point of view, the Declaration was the concretisation of the Romanians
threats of 1963 to make their disagreement public if the integration project was not
abandoned.
Thirdly, in March 1964, the Chinese leadership firmly declined Romanias proposals
regarding Chinas membership in the CMEA, which made the Romanian leaders believe
576

Measures regarding the dissemination of the documents of the April 1964 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Propaganda and Agitation Section, File 29/1964, 1-3.
577
See supra, subchapter 6.1.2.

162

that they needed to employ a different tactic in order to block the anticipated CMEA
integration attempts and the tactic they identified as suitable was to make the CMEA
divergences public, which they did on the pages of the April 1964 Declaration. Thus, this
document was also envisaged by the Romanian leaders as their main instrument to block
any further CMEA integration attempts that they anticipated to take place. The Romanian
leaders believed that the Soviets were interested in preserving the image of the blocs
unity and that, once the RWPs Declaration was made public, Moscow would refrain from
publicly advancing projects, proposals and conceptions that contravened the Romanian
text. If the leaders in Moscow acted any other way, then they would indirectly
acknowledge the intra-bloc divergences, the Romanians believed. Thus, the Declaration
was meant to deter the Soviets from pursuing their integration project.
This document contained also a warning, an indirect threat to the Soviet (perceived)
interests namely if the USSR would continue pushing forward projects that Romania
opposed in secret bloc or bilateral talks, then the Romanian leaders were inclined to make
public their disagreements with the rest of the bloc and with the Soviets not only implicitly
(as they had done in the Declaration) but also explicitly.
However, the Romanian leaders also contemplated the possibility that such a tactic
would not work and that, despite issuing the RWPs Declaration, the Soviets would
continue their (perceived) coordination policy and (perceived) fait accompli tactic, and
would also implicitly or explicitly speak on behalf of Romania when announcing some
allegedly consensual measures or proposals regarding the CMEA, the Warsaw Pact or the
communist movement. To this Soviet manoeuvre that they expected, the Romanians
responded by issuing the April 1964 Declaration so that, when the Soviets would attempt
to speak on behalf of Romania, the rest of the world would not believe them knowing
Romanias real position from its Declaration.
Since the Declaration was officially designed to formulate the RWPs position on the
problems in the communist movement, the Romanian leaders felt that they needed a
pretext to justify tackling also the CMEA problems in this document. In this respect, they
argued that the CMEA problems had been one of the subjects in the dispute between
Moscow and Beijing, and that therefore the RWP could not state its position on the SinoSoviet dispute without also addressing the problem of the relations among the CMEA
states. The Chinese and Soviet leaderships had a public controversy over the conception
on the CMEA as Maurer phrased it at a party meeting in May 1964 and for that reason
the RWPs Declaration had to necessarily advance Romanias position on the CMEA
matters as well. Criticising the Soviets tendency to make decisions without consulting
their allies, in May 1964, Maurer rhetorically asked his party fellows what would have
happened if in the Declaration the Romanian leadership had articulated its position on all
controversial problems of the present day except for the CMEA problem? Would not the
Soviets assume that Romania had finally agreed with the integration and coordination
proposals and then pursue their plans accordingly?
In other words, the RWPs Declaration of 1964 was intended primarily as a defensive
tool against any perceived present or anticipated Soviet threats, including the CMEA
threat. It was designed to deter the Soviets from talking and making decisions on behalf of
Romania with regard to the CMEA, the Warsaw Pact, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the
activities of the United Nations Organisation, etc. As Brldeanu put it the Declaration

163

responded to the danger that Romania was facing in April 1964, namely finding its
position intentionally falsified and misinterpreted or even abusively placed under the
baton of the USSR whose main purpose, Brldeanu continued, was to impose collective
measures against the Chinese and to advance the CMEA integration.578 Later, Emil
Bodnra made a similar argument that, by issuing the Declaration, we [the Romanian
leaders] decided that it would be us to explain our position rather than let others do this for
us adding virgules and dots where they were needed, but especially where they were not
needed.579
Convinced that the Soviet leadership tried (and would continue to try) to impose its
coordination on Romania in relation not only to the Sino-Soviet dispute but also to the
CMEA integration, the activity of the Warsaw Pact Organisation, Romanias relations
with the Western states, etc., Gheorghiu-Dej envisaged the Declaration as a long-lasting
guide for the activity of the diplomatic corps of Romania which had to resist and reject
any attempt of (perceived) Soviet coordination when Romanias interests were in
danger.580 In May 1964, the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs were instructed to use this Declaration as a guide which told them
which proposals to accept or reject, how to recognise a concealed threat to Romanias
interests and what counterarguments to use to oppose the proposals of the other bloc
members, including the USSR, though without creating divergences vis--vis them.581

6.3.3 The Valev Plan

To this day, some scholars argue that the April 1964 Declaration was issued in response to
the so-called Valev Plan. Larry L. Watts even claims that Valevs article had been harshly
criticised in the April 1964 Plenum of the CC of the RWP.582 However, there is no
reference to Valevs article in the minutes of that Plenum and the archival evidence
indicates that this text was not known in Bucharest until early June 1964.583
The Romanian leaders often admitted and even regretted, as Gheorghiu-Dej
phrased it, that they had not been aware of the existence of Valevs article prior to
issuing the Declaration. 584 The article was published in February 1964 in the Soviet Union.
The Romanians closely monitored the publication of such texts in the Eastern Bloc but it
usually took several weeks, sometimes months, for the report or the translation of a
particular text published abroad to be brought to the attention of the Romanian leaders.
578

The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu & ranu, 44-277; The minutes of the 19-22 May
1964 meeting with the employees of the Ministers of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 24/1964, 1-224.
579
The minutes of the 12 May 1966 talks between Emil Bodnra and Zhou Enlai, in Budura, 2008, 281.
580
The minutes of the 15-22 April 1964 Plenum, in Banu & ranu, 44-277.
581
The minutes of the 19-22 May 1964 meeting with the employees of the Ministers of Foreign Trade and
Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 24/1964, 1-224.
582
Tismneanu, 2003, 179; Ivan T. Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: detour from the
periphery to the periphery, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 132; Costache, 2012, 55; Watts, 249.
583
In their Memoirs, Gheorghe Apostol and Sorin Toma imply that the 1964 RWPs Declaration was issued
in response to the Valev Plan but this is just one of many errors in these books. Apostol, 176-178; Toma,
187.
584
Note on the 5 June 1964 discussion between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005, 466-472.

164

This was also the case with Valevs article. On 3 June 1964, G. Marin, Secretary II at the
Romanian Embassy in Moscow, openly complained to E. B. Valev how difficult it was for
Romanian diplomats in Moscow to find a copy of the article.585 In the period between
February and April 1964, there is no reference at all to Valevs article in any archival
documents recording Politburo meetings, plenums of the CC of the RWP or talks with
representatives of various states but, starting in early June 1964, this situation changed
from this moment onwards, Valevs text was being openly and harshly criticised at
Politburo meetings, party plenary sessions or talks with Soviet, Chinese or Yugoslav
representatives.586 Thus, the correct conclusion is that Valevs article became known in
Bucharest no sooner than early June 1964.
Officially entitled The problems of the economic development of the Danube rayons
from Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR, the article was published in February 1964 in the
newspaper Vestnik Moskovskogo Universitata of the Lomonosov University in Moscow. It
advocated for the creation of inter-state economic unions that would include territories of
Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. 587 According to Gheorghiu-Dej, Valevs
economic project had two types of goals, economic and political. It aimed, the Romanian
leader believed, to impose complete control over the natural resources of Romania, which
would give the Soviets additional economic leverage to secure complete political
dominance over Romania. Because Valevs project came in a context abound in CMEA
integration proposals, declarations of Khrushchev prompting the revision of the borders of
the bloc states, Warsaw Pact attempts at coordination, etc., the Romanian leaders
considered that it cannot be regarded as simply a fantasy of a scientific researcher.588
Gheorghiu-Dej believed that the Valev Plan was a Soviet attempt to create the
framework necessary for the implementation of the theory of the inter-state regions/rayons
that had been brought into the CMEA debate in 1962 by Khrushchev himself. As
summarised and interpreted by Gheorghiu-Dej, the Lower Danube Rayon proposed by
Valev had 150,000 square kilometres and 12 million inhabitants. In this complex,
Romania participated with 42% of its territory, 48% of its population, 48% of its industrial
production, 58.8% of its wheat production and 60% of its maize production. Thus, the plan
was a clear reflection of the Soviet annexationist plans, the Romanian leader reasoned
convinced that, if another two or three rayons like this one were further envisaged by the
USSR and other CMEA members, then Romania will disappear in the name of
internationalism. Gheorghiu-Dej was convinced that, although Valev was an obscure
economist, his article reflected the positions and directives of the Soviet leadership itself.
585

The Romanian diplomat was under the impression that, after issuing the April 1964 Declaration, the
Soviet leadership ordered the magazine including this article to be withdrawn from libraries. Note regarding
the 3 June 1963 conversation between G. Marin and E.B. Valev, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File
1/1964, 20-26.
586
For instance, Note on the 5 June 1964 discussion between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005,
466-468; Nicolae Guins Report from Moscow, 15 June 1964, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 46/1964, 1-12; The minutes of the 24 June 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Office, File 28/1964, 64-81.
587
E.B.Valev, Problemele dezvoltrii economice a raioanelor dunrene din Romnia, Bulgaria i URSS, in
Viaa economic, Anul II, nr. 24 (43), 1964, 5-7.
588
The minutes of the 7-14 July 1964 meeting between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, in Buga,
98-99; Note regarding the 28 July 1964 audience granted by Gheorghe Apostol and Emil Bodnra to Liu
Fang, in Budura, 2005, 484-504.

165

He was furious that Valevs text made no reference to Romania, although it partitioned its
territory. As Gheorghiu-Dej put it, the Soviets
speak of this [Romanias] territory as if it would be on the Moon! They speak in this
document [the Valev Plan] in detail about the existing objectives, the great perspectives
that this rayon has and its great importance for the community of the socialist countries,
members of the CMEA589, but they do not say a word about Romania, () not a word
about the Romanian nation! Instead of the term nation, the author uses the term
international workforces!

Recognising (perceiving) again the Soviets fait accompli tactic, Gheorghiu-Dej was very
concerned not only with the content of the project but also with the fact that it was not
advanced as a proposal but as a done deal, as if all the CMEA states, including Romania,
had discussed it and agreed with its existing objectives and great perspectives. In
Gheorghiu-Dejs words, in this case, the threats to Romanias interests were concrete
and they affected not only the states economic interests but also its territorial integrity,
since with this plan the USSR wanted to distribute territories that did not belong to the
USSR. According to Gheorghiu-Dej,
They [the Soviets] set their eyes on some territories of our country [Romania] and they
have big plans in light of [the theory of] the industrial inter-state unions. () These unions
imply the removal of some territories from the jurisdiction of the respective countries,
nesting them instead in the industrial rayons. () Industrial rayons mean
internationalism590! The formula of the industrial rayons is claimed to be Marxist but it
does not differ from the demands of Peter the Great to extend his borders! These are not
merely abstract desires!

The Romanian leader continued his interpretation and argued that dividing Romanias
territory into rayons was an action of state disintegration, concerned the
disestablishment of the nation as a nation and the dissolution of the state through
administrative measures in the name of the proletarian internationalism, in the name of the
interests of the world socialist system, in the name of the interests of socialism and
communism. According to Gheorghiu-Dej, it seemed that the Soviet comrades show
tendencies of political, economic and military domination and, when they can no longer
continue in this sense, they try to absorb you piece by piece. As regards Romanias
annexation to the Soviet Union, in June 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej noted that
We [Romania] cannot say [openly, publicly] that they [the Soviets] have insane
[annexationist] thoughts but they are capable of many things. As they took Northern
Bukovina from us as compensations, they can take the entire Romania!591

Niculescu-Mizil convincingly argues in his Memoirs that the Soviet plans and attempts
regarding the political, economic, territorial, cultural and ideological integration seem
now, when I write about them [in the 1990s], weird, abnormal, unbelievable but that, in
the early 1960s, the Romanian leadership genuinely considered them real and imminent
589

Quotation marks in original.

Quotation marks in original.
591
Note on the 5 June 1964 discussion between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005, 466-472.
590

166

threats.592 Given these perceptions of threats, the Romanian leadership decided to publish
Valevs text and an article in response so that, in Gheorghiu-Dejs words, the people and
the world would know what internationalism means and what nationalism593 means
because at present, we [Romania] cannot do anything else but practise the diplomacy of
laying the cards on the table.594
Until March 1964, the Romanian leaders had hoped to be able to block the other
countries attempts at CMEA (anticipated) integration with the help of China. In March
1964, however, when the Chinese leadership firmly rejected Romanias proposal of China
becoming a full member of the CMEA, the Romanian leaders concluded that they needed
a new tactic in that respect and decided that making Romanias divergent position public
had to be this tactic. In early June 1964, convinced that the Valev Plan posed direct and
imminent threats to Romanias interests, they chose once again to block this (perceived)
new threat by making their views on the matter public. They were, again, convinced that
confronted with their public reaction, the Soviet leaders would eventually accommodate
Romanias views in order to preserve the image of the blocs unity.
Valevs article was published in Romania on 12 June 1964 in the economic journal
Viaa Economic together with a Romanian response, Costin Murgescus article595 entitled
Conceptions opposing the basic principles of the economic relations among the socialist
countries: About the inter-state economic complex in general and about its Danubian
concretion. Murgescus article was envisaged in Bucharest as an addition to the April
Declaration and meant to deter the Soviets from any other future attempts to retailor
Romanias borders with the same (perceived) ease as Valev had just done as GheorghiuDej phrased it.596 Officially, though, the Romanian leaders motive for this action was
their internationalist duty of defending the principles that lay at the basis of the relations
among the socialist states: sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, etc.597
Murgescus article formulated no direct anti-Soviet criticism but it harshly criticised
Valevs theses and conceptions and noted that similar theses had been advanced in the
last years in some fraternal counties as well. Romania firmly rejected Valevs proposals
because they have most serious economic and political implications, severely infringing
the national independence and sovereignty of the [intended rayons] member states as
well as the principles of equality in rights, mutual advantage, mutual aid, non-interference
in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity. Murgescu openly argued that the plan
targeted Romanias territorial integrity and natural resources but did not blame directly the
Soviet Union. The hallucination of the author is his personal business. Indeed that would
592

Niculescu-Mizil, 1997, 213-215.

Quotation marks in original.
594
n prezent nu avem altceva de fcut dect s facem diplomaia crilor deschise, in Romanian. Note on
the 5 June 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005, 466-468.
595
An editorial note of Viaa Economic specified that the article responding to Valevs text was our point
of view that is the point of view of the journal and the article had no author. However, the article is
usually attributed to Costin Murgescu, the editor in chief of the journal. Costin Murgescu, Concepii
potrivnice principiilor de baz ale relaiilor economice dintre rile socialiste. Despre complexul economic
interstatal n general i despre concretizarea lui dunreana n special in Viaa Economic, Anul II, 24 (43),
8-12. A copy of this issue of Viaa Economic with Gheorghiu-Dej annotations on the articles of Murgescu
and Valev is available in ANIC, Fond 80, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, File 832/1964, 1-8.
596
The minutes of the 24 June 1964 RWPs Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 28/1964, 64-81.
597
The minutes of the 7-14 July 1964 meeting between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, in Buga,
193
593

167

be the case if the author would not have tried to pencil our motherland on the map. And
we cannot allow this, the Romanian economist wrote adding that we must appreciate
Valevs plan because it gave us the possibility to decipher, in a concrete plan, the real
meaning of the wording inter-state economic unions598 which was in fact he
concluded the disintegration of the Romanian state.599
The issue of Viaa Economic that published Valevs article and Murgescus response
had a circulation of 75,000 copies. The two texts were also published in a brochure with a
circulation of 400,000 copies. They were also translated and printed in Russian, English,
French, German, and Spanish, and circulated abroad.600 This measure infuriated the Soviet
leaders who argued that the Romanian leadership had artificially exaggerated the Valev
case601 by responding to an article published (allegedly) in a magazine that has a
circulation of only 1,500 copies and is read only by geographers with Murgescus ten
times longer article published in an important economic journal with a circulation of
hundreds of thousands of copies. In July 1964, Podgorny openly reproached the Romanian
leaders that, although Valev never aimed at the disintegration of Romania, the Romania
leaders, through their disproportionate reaction, transformed Valevs opinion into a
problem of inter-state relations.602
On 4 July 1964, as a reaction to Murgescus article, Isvestia strongly criticised Valevs
plan in an article entitled For a more profound elaboration of the problems of the
collaboration of the socialist states by O. Bogomolov. Valev had defied the extremely
important principle according to which the collaboration between the socialist states
implied mutual advantage and voluntary participation in the international division of
labour, and his approach was profoundly wrong and did not correspond to the policy of the
CPSU which aimed to strengthen the economic ties with the fraternal countries on the
basis of the principles of equality in rights and sovereignty, Bogomolov argued. Other
magazines from around the bloc signalled the publication of Bogomolovs review in
Isvestia 603 but Gheorghiu-Dej considered that this bloc criticism to Valevs text, although
instructive for Romania, was insufficient and futile, dust in the eyes of the fools, as he
put it. The Romanian leader believed that this was yet another temporary Romanian
victory and that the Soviets would not renounce their integration plans. 604 Murgescus
article was not published in the USSR but it was published in China.605
On 5 June 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej had presented Liu Fang, the Chinese Ambassador in
Bucharest, with his interpretations of Valevs article. Stressing once more that Romania
598

Quotation marks in original.

Murgescu, 8-12.
600
Report, 19 June 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File 10/1964, 108-114.
601
Note on the 7 July 1964 informal talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 36/1964, 171-174.
602
The minutes of the 7-14 July 1964 meeting between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, in Buga,
2012, 45.
603
For instance, CMEA collaboration and sovereignty in Polytika (Poland), No 28(384), 11 July 1964,
translated in Romanian and annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Propaganda and Agitation, File
4/1964, 115-120.
604
Note on the 7 July 1964 informal talks between the Romania and the Soviet delegations, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 36/1964, 171-174.
605
The minutes of the 19 august 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations, in Budura,
2005, 510-511.
599

168

would not participate in any collective riposte against China, the Romanian leader asked in
return (although indirectly) for Chinas economic, military and propaganda support against
the USSR. At that time, Gheorghiu-Dej and his party fellows feared that the publication of
a strong response to Valevs text might significantly deteriorate the Romanian-Soviet state
relations. In practical terms, Gheorghiu-Dej and Bodnra believed that Romania could
expect several types of Soviet countermeasures to the Romanian public opposition to
Valevs plan a breaking-off of Soviet commercial and diplomatic relations with
Romania; a denunciation of the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance
with Romania; and finally a declaration of war against Romania.
Gheorghiu-Dej was anxious to observe that, in May-June 1964, the Soviets had
increased their military forces at the border with Romania but he still hoped that the
USSR would refrain from starting a war against Romania if for no other reason, then at
least because a military action [against an ally] would ridicule them. However, he also
believed that the Soviets are capable of everything. Another (anticipated) Soviet
countermeasure that the Romanians feared in 1964 was for Khrushchev to ask Hungary to
reopen the dispute on Transylvanias territory so that he could act as an arbiter between
Romania and Hungary. Presenting the Chinese with these Romanian perceptions and fears
of present and anticipated threats coming from the Soviets, on 5 June, the Romanian
leader asked for Chinas economic, military and propaganda support against the USSR. 606
On 17 July, Zhou Enlai responded by telling the Romanian ambassador in Beijing that
China was ready to improve its trade relations with Romania in order to help Romania
resist the Soviet economic pressures that it was anticipating. The Chinese leader also
announced Chinas readiness to deliver arms to Romania so you can resist the pressures
if one day [the Soviets] would stop delivering [arms to you] and you will find yourself in a
difficult situation. Moreover, China intended to publish Romanias views on the Valev
Plan, Zhou Enlai noted, stressing that
Our [CC] Party admires your resistance against the pressures exerted by the USSR because
you are in a worse situation than us, as you are surrounded by countries headed by
revisionists. The pressures exerted by the USSR are especially big. We [the Chinese] can
talk [publicly] about many problems, while you cannot. We consider that we [China] must
support you.607

The last phrase in the above quote was underlined three times by Gheorghiu-Dej, which
suggests once again that the Romanian leader had placed great expectations on China with
regard to Romanias tactic of resisting the (perceived) present or anticipated Soviet
pressures or threats. One week later, on 26 July, Renmin Ribao published Valevs article
and the Romanian and Soviet responses Murgescus article from 12 June and the article
in Isvestia from 4 July 1964.608
The reaction of the Romanian leaders to the Valev Plan confirms once more the pattern
in Romanias opposition to the USSR identified in this study. In this case too, the
Romanian opposition was triggered by a perceived imminent and specific Soviet threat to
606

Note on the 5 June 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005, 472-474.
Note regarding the 17 July 1964 audience granted by Zhou Enlai to Dumitru Gheorghiu, ANIC, CC of
RCP, Foreign Relations, File 93/1963, 41-53.
608
Liu Yong, 194.
607

169

Romanias interests. By publicly criticising Valevs project, the Romanian leaders were
interested in preventing its concretisation; they did not aim at antagonising or publicly
denigrating or punishing the Soviet leaders for having initiated the project. The opposition
aimed to eliminate that specific threat without causing additional conflicts between
Romania and the USSR. Making Romanias divergent views public as an implicit public
acknowledgement of the Romanian-Soviet disagreements was the main tactic that the
Romanian leaders used to deter the perceived Soviet threats against Romania. When the
specific threat was eliminated/postponed, Romanias opposition stopped because the
Romanian leaders feared that, by opposing specific smaller (less-than-ultimate) Soviet
threats to Romanias interests, they risked to trigger the perceived ultimate threat to
Romanias security a major confrontation with the USSR.

6.4 Soviet reactions to the RWPs Declaration

In April-May 1964, the Soviet officials formulated no official position towards the RWPs
Declaration.609 They continued, however, to try to convince the Romanian leaders to agree
with the convention of a communist conference (without Chinas participation). Prior to
issuing its Declaration, the Romanian leadership postponed their response to this proposal
on the grounds that the RWP had not yet made a decision in this respect, but afterwards it
argued that Romania and the RWP could only employ the decision of the party members
as expressed at the April 1964 Plenum and the many meetings organised throughout the
country in April-May 1964. Thus, the RWPs official position was that a communist
conference could be convened only if all the 81 communist and workers parties that had
participated at the 1960 Moscow conference would agree to participate.610
By early June 1964, over 50 communist and workers parties had condemned the socalled anti-Leninist policy of the Chinese leadership, its alleged great-nation chauvinism
and petty-bourgeois adventurism by resolutions of their party congresses, decisions of
their Central Committees, statements of their leaders or articles in their party press.611 On
15 June, during the opening of the Fourth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party,
Gomuka declared that those parties which do not take part in a conference thus prepared
will prove that they have placed themselves beyond the pale of the international
movement.612 The Romanian leaders perceived this Polish declaration in their own
words as a threat not only to China but also towards Romania because, they argued, it
signalled a risk of creating a precedent. Or, as Gheorghiu-Dej reasoned, nobody has the

609

Ctnu, 2011, 340-342.

Notes on the 29 April 1964 and the 21 June 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Zhegalin, ANIC, CC
of RCP, Foreign Relations, File no 6/1964; 25-32.
611
OSA, Radio Free Europe Report, Foreign Relations Series: Eastern Europe, The Question of the 52
Parties, 5 June 1964, HU OSA 300-8-3:109-2-33, at http://fa.osaarchivum.org/backgroundreports?col=8&id=41575, accessed on 21 January 2013.
612
OSA, Radio Free Europe Report, Country Series: Poland, Polish Party Conference Analysis, 17 June
1964, HU OSA 300-8-3:41-4-80, at http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=54803,
accessed on 22 January 2013.
610

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right to exclude a communist party from the movement and a socialist country from the
camp just because this party and this state had a different opinion on some problems. 613

6.4.1 Accusations in anti-Sovietism

Between 26 May and 9 June 1964, a Romania party delegation formed mainly of
economists such as Cornel Onescu, Ion Drgan and Aldea Militaru, and headed by Chivu
Stoica visited the USSR for an exchange of experience. However, the secret objective of
the visit was, in Gheorghiu-Dejs words, to counter the influence that the visit of a
Romanian economic delegation in the USA at the same time could have in Moscow.614
Visiting the USSR, the Romanian delegation was accompanied by low-ranking Soviet
representatives and the talks focused on exchanging experiences in several economic
fields615, but in the last day of the visit the Soviets opened fire.
On 7 June, at 11:30 pm, Chivu Stoica was informed that the leadership of the CC of
the CPSU wished to meet him on the following day to discuss problems that concern our
two parties. This night, Chivu Stoica asked for instructions from Bucharest and was
mandated to only listen carefully to what the Soviets had to say. On 8 June, the Romanian
delegates were received at the headquarters of the CC of the CPSU by Mikoyan, Podgorny
and Andropov who openly complained that the people in Romania had made
unacceptable attacks against the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership, and had
developed anti-Soviet attitudes. As Podgorny put it,
The people [in Romania] say that the Soviet Union has allegedly not been a friend to the
Romanian people, that it has not been of any help, that it only exploited the Romanian
people, () that we [the USSR] have exploited Romania, that Romania has not been after
all an independent state, that only now Romania has begun to invigorate616, that only now
Romania has obtained its true independence and that now you [Romanians] must take a
new stance towards the Soviet Union.

Mikoyan added that there were rumours that, besides the Declaration, the [April 1964
RWPs] Plenum has adopted a secret resolution regarding the relations between Romania
and the Soviet Union, a resolution adopting an anti-Soviet attitude. Podgorny openly
complained that the Romanian leadership had not condemned the Chinese and that the
Declaration was not objective since it criticised equally the Soviet and Chinese
leaderships. Arguing that there is no smoke without fire, the Soviet leaders declared
being very worried with the evolution of the Romanian-Soviet relations and considered
that the two leaderships had to meet in order to talk the problems through so that the two
states could be able to continue having friendly relations.
Making allusions to the USSRs geographical proximity to Romania and its power, the
Soviet representatives argued that it was in Romanias interest to struggle to have good
relations with the USSR and to not allow the Soviet and Romanian people turn against
613

The minutes of the 24 June 1964 Plenum, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 28/ 1964, 78.
Note on the 5 June 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang, in Budura, 2005, 471.
615
Note regarding the economic talks; The minutes of the 26 May 1964 talks between the Romanian and
Soviet delegations, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, file no 16/1964, 99-103 ; File 34/1964, 4-13.
616
S prind aripi, in Romanian.
614

171

each other. Mikoyan declared that the Soviet leaders did not want to quarrel with the
Romanian leaders but added that the USSR had not yet made any decision in this respect.
First the Soviet leaders wanted to check whether the rumours regarding Romania were
true and only then could they decide whether to begin the quarrel or not. On 8 June, in
Moscow, Chivu Stoica denied these Soviet accusations and allusions which, when
reported in Bucharest, were interpreted as clear threats.617
On the same day, 8 June, in Leningrad, Khrushchev complained to Tito that the
Romanian leaders had (allegedly) initiated an anti-Soviet campaign, taken measures
against the Hungarian population in Transylvania and formulated claims over Bessarabias
territory during the April 1964 Plenum. On 15 June, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow,
T. Miatovich, confidentially and friendly informed Nicolae Guin, the Romanian
ambassador in Moscow, about the 8 June talks between Khrushchev and Tito.
Presented with Nicolae Guins report, Gheorghiu-Dej concluded that, with such false
accusations, the Soviet leadership was in fact trying to find pretexts to start the offensive
against Romania.618 Wondering what aims Khrushchev was trying to achieve trough such
manoeuvres, the Romanian leader contemplated several possibilities. Maybe, Khrushchev
was trying to persuade Tito in the idea that Romania contested the borders with its
neighbours, including the border with Yugoslavia.619 Maybe, Khrushchev was trying to
make Yugoslavia a full CMEA member knowing probably that Yugoslavia would support
the CMEA integration project. Maybe, the Soviet leader was intending to transform the
Romanian-Soviet relations into an international problem that had to be mediated by a third
party such as Yugoslavia. 620 Maybe, Khrushchev was reopening the Transylvanian
question in order to have additional leverage against Romania. Were the Hungarian
nationalists really interested in taking over Transylvanias territory or had Khrushchev had
asked them to tackle the problem publicly so that he could act as an arbiter between
Romania and Hungary, Gheorghiu-Dejs further asked himself?621
Deeply troubled by such expectations and questions, Gheorghiu-Dej summoned
Yugoslavias Ambassador in Romania, Arso Milatovich, to a talk on 19 June 1964.
Gheorghiu-Dej told the Yugoslav diplomat that Khrushchevs accusations against
Romania were false and diversionist, that Romania was committed to respecting the
617

The minutes of the 8 June 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegates, annotated by
Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 34/1964, 172-199.
618
Nicolae Guins Report from Moscow, 15 June 1964, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File no 46/1964, 1-12.
619
During the Second World War, there were discussions regarding the possible Romanian annexation of
territories belonging to Yugoslavia. There is a historical controversy on this subject. Some argue that Ion
Antonescu asked Hitler to give the Serbian Banat to Romania, while others contend that Hitler offered
Romania this territory but Antonescu refused. Rebecca Ann Haynes, A new greater Romania? Romanian
claims to the Serbian Banat in 1941, in Central Europe, Vol. 3, No 2/2005, 99-120.
620
According to a CIA report from July 1964, the Americans also tended to consider Tito a possible
mediator in the Romanian-Soviet relations. However, as interesting as this issue may be, it remains to be
reviewed by further studies, as it is beyond the scope of this one. CIA FOIA, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 8
July 1964, at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP79T00975A007800020001-3.pdf, accessed on 7 October 2013.
621
For instance, Note on 5 June 1964 talk between Gheorghiu-Dej and Liu Fang; Note regarding the 28 July
1964 audience granted by Gheorghe Apostol and Emil Bodnra to Liu Fang, in Budura 2005, 466-473,
498-499; The minutes of the 24 June 1964 Plenum; Report on the 22 June 1964 talks between GheorghiuDej and Tito, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 28/ 1964, 64-88, 100-106.

172

international treaties determining the borders between states. Moreover, the Romanian
leader argued that Khrushchev was the one who had publicly and repeatedly argued ever
since his 1959 speech in Leipzig that the borders of the socialist states were not definitely
settled. The Valev Plan which distributed some territories from the region of the Lower
Danube basin was the ultimate proof of Khrushchevs intentions regarding the territories
of the Eastern European states. Maybe tomorrow they [the Soviets] will propose a rayon
in the Upper Danube, Gheorghiu-Dej declared to Milatovich suggesting that, in such a
rayon, regions from Yugoslavia could also be incorporated.622 Two days later, on 21 June,
in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej rejected again
all accusations of Romania being anti-Soviet and stressed that
One thing must be clear: we do not need an arbiter, a mediator; we are capable to affirm
our opinion ourselves when we have a position on one problem or another. The fact that we
have our own position on one problem or another is the result of our own thinking and
judgment and this cannot be considered an anti-Soviet position.623

In the summer of 1964, the Romanian leadership was convinced that the Soviet leaders
were again fabricating rumours, as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it, about Romanias antiSovietism so that Moscow could again present Romania with an either/or alternative to
be either devoted and loyal friends following without questions the Soviet lead or enemies.
The Soviet leaders used this false dichotomy intentionally as a means to impose the Soviet
Unions decisions on Romania, the Romanian leaders argued. They believed that, every
time Romania made a domestic or foreign policy decision that displeased Moscow, the
Soviet leaders reacted by accusing Romania and its leadership in selling the country to
capitalism, betraying the socialist bloc and the communist cause, being anti-Soviet, antiLeninist, nationalist, being a security threat to the Soviet Union, etc.
Such accusations were constantly thrown at Romania in the summer of 1964624, both
officially and un-officially. When traveling around the bloc, Romanian students, teachers
or diplomats were often approached by strangers, students or diplomats and presented with
accusations that Romania had raised claims on Bessarabia 625, that it intended to withdraw
from the CMEA and that, with its CMEA positions, Romania undermined the unity of the
socialist countries. It was said that in Romania the workers spirit was weak, that
Romania intentionally isolated itself from the workers movement and instead made
concessions to capitalism. Through their policy, the Romanian leaders betrayed the
interests of the fraternal countries, sold Romania to capitalism and allowed bourgeois
nationalism to develop in the country, the accusations went on.626 According to
Gheorghiu-Dej, these were ungrounded accusations that had been in fact invented in
622

Note regarding the 19 June 1964 audience granted by Gheorghiu-Dej to the Yugoslav ambassador in
Bucharest, Arso Milatovich; The minutes of the Plenary session of the CC of the RWP from 24 June 1964;
Report on the talks from 22 June 1964 between Gheorghiu-Dej and Tito, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File
7/1964, 1-11; File 28/ 1964, 64-88, 100-106.
623
Note regarding the 21 June 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Zhegalin, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign
Relations, File 6/1964, 28-32.
624
Watts wrote in extenso about what he called the Soviet efforts to discredit Romania. Watts, 223-234.
625
The Romanian diplomatic personnel were specifically instructed to avoid any discussion about
Bessarabia and to not answer the challenge in that respect. Porojan, 99.
626
Notes and Reports, June-July 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 16/1964, 95-97; File
24/1964, 1-16; Porojan, 99.

173

Moscow as a means to pressure Romania to accept the Soviet bloc coordination. These
accusations were, the Romanian leadership believed, Khrushchevs direct response to the
Romanian opposition against his coordination and integration plans.627
At the same time, the blocs historical debates on the problem of Transylvanias
territory and Romanias participation in the Second World War were reopened.628
According to the Romanian leaderships interpretations, several menacing and false
theories were raised in these bloc debates, among them the theory about the significant
role of the Soviet Army in Romanias liberation in 1944, the idea that Transylvania had
been given to Romania by the USSR at the end of the war, the assertion of Hungarys
rights over Transylvanias territory or Romanias participation in the anti-Soviet war on
the Soviet Unions territory.629
On 8 May 1964, Leontin Sljan, the Romanian Minister of Armed Forces, sent
Gheorghiu-Dej a detailed report regarding the way in which Romanias participation in the
Second World War had been tendentiously and distortedly presented between 1961 and
1963 in various scientific or literary Soviet works. The report analysed seven works
published in 1963 (with a total circulation of 722,000 copies), two works from 1962
(16,000 copies) and one from 1961 (100,000 copies). Convinced that no study could be
published in the USSR without the partys approval, Leontin Sljan believed that, with
such works, the Soviet leaders aimed to cultivate an anti-Romanian attitude within the
Soviet population that could later be used by the Soviet leaders against the alleged antiSoviet Romania.630
During the July 1964 Romanian-Soviet talks in Moscow, Khrushchev made an
ultimate threat to Romania reiterating his threat of 1963 to not allow the bilateral relations
to return to what had been their status in Ion Antonescus time which in fact meant a
war. On this occasion, Khrushchev declared that
We [the Soviets leaders] do not approve the article [Murgescus June 1964 article]. I
consider that you [the Romanian leaders] should not have written that. If one [Romania]
wants our [Romanian-Soviet] relations to be clear and fair, I do not think that you should
have said that one must show respect for the borders. Do you really believe what you
wrote?631 You used this [article] to support the activity that you conduct against us.
Antonescu [too] fought against us. 632 In Romania, there are [still] many anti-Soviet, anti627

Note regarding the 28 July 1964 audience granted by Gheorghe Apostol and Emil Bodnra to Liu Fang,
in Budura, 2005, 490.
628
Cezar Stanciu argues that the early 1960s Romanian-Soviet quarrel on the role of the Red Army in
Romanias liberation in 1944 stemmed mainly from Gheorghiu-Dejs attempt to find a place for the
[Romanian] Communist Party in Romanias recent history. According to Stanciu, the early 1960s
reinterpretation of the historical facts was used by the Romanian leader as a means to gain legitimacy in
the context of de-Stalinization. Cezar Stanciu, Communist regimes and historical legitimacy: polemics
regarding the role of the Red Army in Romania at the end of the Second World War in European Review of
History: Revue europeenne d'histoire, 20:3, 445-462, DOI: 10.1080/13507486.2012.745832.
629
Report, 20 May 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 140/1964, 44-49.
630
Leontin Sljans Report, 8 May 1964, ANIC, CC of RCP, Administrative-Political Section, File no
10/1964, 39-77.
631
Yes Gheorghiu-Dej annotated.
632
You immediately invoke Antonescu. Why is that? Do you want to intimidate [us]? Gheorghiu-Dej
annotated.

174

Russian elements, and if they will be heaved up, then we [the Soviet leadership] do not
know what might happen. [If] you want [to have] relations with us [that is] good. [If] you
do not want then do not do trade [with us]. You will live without us633. But together it
will be better. () Let us [the Romanians and the Soviets] talk openly. We [the Soviets]
are ready for anything. We are ready to be friends [with you] and we are ready to
polemicise in public [with you]. If you will continue, we will inform the [Soviet] party and
people [about Romanias anti-Sovietism]. For now, we [the Soviets] act like an ostrich. We
put our head in the sand, leave our back out and pretend we do not know anything.

These allusions were interpreted in Bucharest as Soviet threats and attempts to intimidate
Romania.634 The Romanian leaders believed that they had identified a pattern in the
Soviets reactions towards Romania: when the Soviets were dissatisfied with a Romanian
stance or policy, they invented rumours and pretexts to act against Romania, they made
allusions or even threats that it would be to Romanias disadvantage to revive the tensions
with its great neighbour, the USSR. They even inferred that an open war could break out
between the two states. They also believed that such Soviet threats should not be
considered a bluff, that the Soviets were capable to use the pretext of Romanias antiSovietism and anti-internationalism to even launch an attack against Romania.635

6.4.2 A new compromise

As already noted, on 8 June 1964, the Soviets argued that the two countries leaderships
had to meet to talk the problems through. The Romanians accepted this proposal and
between 7 and 14 July a Romanian delegation formed of Alexandru Brldeanu, Leonte
Rutu, Emil Bodnra, Andrei Pcuraru and Ion Gheorghe Maurer was in Moscow
conducting talks with the Soviet leaders (N. S. Khrushchev, N. V. Podgorny, A. N.
Kosygin, Y. V. Andropov and M. A. Lesechko).
The Romanians placed 83 specific problems on the meetings agenda, which were
grouped in 16 subchapters and in three main chapters. On this occasion, they openly raised
some issues such as the SovRoms as examples of joint enterprises; the role of the Soviet
and Romanian armies in liberating Romania in 1944; the public insinuations around the
bloc that Romania was anti-Soviet and anti-Leninist, and wanted to leave the bloc or to
sell the country to capitalism; the presence of Soviet spies in Romania; the RomanianSoviet agreement of June 1963; the reference to the CMEA divergences in the April 1964
RWPs Declaration; Valevs proposals; the USSR raising the problem of Transylvanias
territory; the CMEA integration problems; Romanias stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute;
Romania not being consulted in the Warsaw Pact, etc.636
Addressing all these problems, the bilateral talks from July 1964 were at times very
tense. While the Soviets maintained their accusations that the Romanian leaders had antiSoviet attitudes and allowed anti-Sovietism to grow in Romania, the Romanian delegates
633

Very instructive Gheorghiu-Dej annotated on the margins of the text.

Note regarding the talks between the Romanian delegation, Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation, 13
July 1964,annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 36/1964, Vol. II, 190211.
635
Ibid., 190-211; and Synthesis, ANIC , CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 49/1959-1970, 17-21.
636
Note, 6 July 1964, in Buga, 32-36.
634

175

emphasised that, despite some concrete divergences, the friendship between our parties
and states is one of the fundamental principles in the policy of our party and government,
which was for Romania not only a sentimental matter; it is first and foremost a rational
matter based on many considerations, as Maurer argued. Romania respected both the
interests of the socialist camp and the national interests, and although it had different
opinions on the Warsaw Pact, the CMEA, the United Nations Assembly or matters of
domestic policy, this did not imply an anti-Soviet attitude, the Romanian delegates openly
and repeatedly stressed. After long and tense discussions, the only common conclusion
that the two delegations could reach was that each side maintained its initial position and
that both were willing to discuss the problems further in order to secure the bilateral
friendship.637 In other words, the resolution of the problems was once again postponed.
As the meeting ended with no clear conclusion, Khrushchev proposed a second round
of talks at the level of first secretaries to take place in Moscow, in August 1964.638
Romania did not respond to this proposal and such a meeting never took place. On 27-28
July, Podgorny visited Romania in a new (unsuccessful) attempt to convince its leaders to
agree with the convention of a communist conference without Chinas participation. On
that occasion, Podgorny stressed again that Romanias friendship did not seem to be
sincere.639 However, a month later, the Soviet position seemed completely changed. In
August, Mikoyan was in Romania attending the celebrations of Romanias National Day.
On 25 August, he had a talk with Gheorghiu-Dej but no direct or implicit criticism
towards Romania was formulated on that occasion. On the contrary, the Soviet
representative declared that the Soviet leadership accepted all viewpoints that the
Romanians had advanced in the last years on both domestic and foreign policy matters.
Romanias domestic economic line including the development of chemical and heavy
industries and diversified agriculture was good, Mikoyan noted.
The Soviet delegate further declared that the Soviet leadership agreed with the
conception that the Romanian leaders had often advanced in 1963-1964, namely that some
of the so-called concrete problems generating bilateral divergences did not have to
intervene with the general line of bilateral friendship. The small problems between
Romania and the USSR had to be talked through whenever they resurfaced but they
should not be allowed to ruin the Romanian-Soviet relations of friendship, Mikoyan
stressed. In response, Gheorghiu-Dej complained that the Romanian leadership had been
accused of betraying the interests of the socialist bloc, selling the country to capitalism and
using the Sino-Soviet conflict to oppose the Soviet Union.
Mikoyan reasoned that such accusations had been based on speculations and had been
proven inconsistent with reality. He stressed that the USSR did not want anything from
Romania except her friendship, that the bilateral relations had to be based on mutual
trust from now on and that the Soviet leadership accepted Romanias position on all
matters. However, what it asked in return, Mikoyan added, was that Romania would
637

The minutes of the 7-14 July 1964 meeting between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, in Buga,
36-212.
638
Note on the 28 July 1964 audience granted by Gheorghe Apostol and Emil Bodnra to Liu Fang, in
Budura, 2005, 496.
639
The minutes of the 27-28 July 1964 talks between N.V. Podgorny and Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe Apostol,
Emil Bodnra, Nicolae Ceauescu, Andrei Pcuraru, Vasile Vlcu, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations,
File 16/1964, 26-74.

176

abstain from making her different views public. In Mikoyans words, Romanias position
is one hundred per cent acceptable but there are some problems that one must not
expose. Accepting Mikoyans proposal to settle the divergences, Gheorghiu-Dej stressed
that nonetheless Romania intended to maintain its position in relation to the CMEA
integration or the communist conference. Mikoyan promised that Romanias views would
be accepted because Romania and the USSR do not need to quarrel over this.640
Thus, in August 1964, the Romanian-Soviet divergences were once more settled to the
benefit of Romania with another implicit agreement: the Soviets declared that Romanias
principled position was acceptable, while the Romanians promised in return to not
expose their different views as long as those views were secretly tolerated. What made
the Soviets change their minds is a question that needs to be tackled by further studies in
the Soviet archives. Yet, the Romanian leaders believed that the Soviet leadership had
finally accepted the Romanian stand for several reasons.
Firstly, Romanias position was principled which meant that it was constructed
around the idea that the state defended the principles guiding the relations among the
socialist states. Khrushchev could not openly argue against such principles, the Romanian
leaders believed.641 Secondly, they thought that the Soviet leadership still feared
Romanian-Chinese collaboration and that it tolerated Romanias view in order to prevent
further rapprochement between Bucharest and Beijing. Due to these perceptions, the
Romanians continued to cultivate the perceived Soviet fear of Romanian-Chinese
collaboration. Thirdly, the Romanian leaders believed that for Moscow this was also a
matter of prestige and that the Soviets wanted to prevent Romania from making her
disagreements with Moscow public in order to preserve the image of the bloc being united
around its core Moscow. And fourthly, they reasoned that for economic, prestige and
security reasons, the Soviets were also interested in preserving the alliance and friendly
relations with Romania. In other words, despite their threats, the Soviets were not ready to
throw away the economic, military and political alliance with Romania.
On 14 October 1964, Khrushchev was forced to retire, and Leonid Brezhnev became
first party secretary and Alexei Kosygin prime minister.642 Despite the change of
leadership in Moscow and the August 1964 settlement of the bilateral problems, in late
1964, the Romanians were still convinced that nothing had actually changed in the Soviet
leaders conceptions and theses as far as the intra-bloc or intra-camp relations were
concerned. They continued to expect certain attempts at the CMEA integration, the
Warsaw Pact coordination or the imposition of a strong riposte against China. However,
the Romanian leaders were determined to keep blocking such Soviet threats whenever
they encountered them by employing the same arguments and tactics that they had
perfected between 1960 and 1964. They also remained committed to the idea of containing
Romanias opposition so that the Soviets would not be given any reasons to revive their
640

The minutes of the 25 august 1964 talks between Gheorghiu-Dej and Mikoyan, ANIC, CC of RCP,
Foreign Relations, File 16/1964, 110-122.
641
The minutes of the 19 august 1964 talks between the Romanian and Chinese delegations, in Budura,
2005, 510.
642
According to some published Soviet sources, Khrushchevs offensive attitude towards the Romanian
leadership was one of the factors that the Soviets took into consideration when they decided to retire
Khrushchev. Fursenko, 2003, 865; Martin McCauley, The rise and fall of the Soviet Union, Harlow,
England, New York, Longman, 2008, 343-344.

177

1963-1964 accusations that Romania had betrayed the interests of the socialist bloc and
the communist cause, that it was nationalist, anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet accusations
that the USSR could use, the Romanian leaders believed, as a pretext to start even an open
confrontation with Romania.643
For years to come, Romania maintained this type of ambivalent position towards the
USSR neither a friend, nor an enemy, a supporter in some cases and a public contester in
others.644 In the following decades, Romanias relations with the USSR remained in the
framework that was conceptualised by the Romanian leaders between 1960 and 1964.
Romania opposed the USSR when it perceived specific (less-than-ultimate) Soviet threats
to her interests. The opposition was contained so that it would not trigger the (perceived)
Soviet ultimate threat to Romanias security an open confrontation. In 1964, in Romania,
the Soviet Union was still regarded as the main threat to the states security, and the
Romanian leaders believed that Romania had but one option if it wanted to alleviate this
threat to continue to bandwagon with the Soviet Union (the perceived threat), which
implied, they thought, a mandatory preservation of the framework of friendship and
alliance with the USSR despite the Soviets proposals regarding the CMEA or the Warsaw
Pact that threatened Romanias interests.

643

The minutes of the 7-8 October 1964 talks between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations, in Budura,
2005, 575-600.
644
See, for instance, Suvi Kansikas, Room to manoeuvre? National interests and coalition building in the
CMEA, 1969-1974, in Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Katalin Miklssy (eds.), Reassessing Cold War Europe,
Routledge, 2011, 193-209; Eliza Gheorghe, Atomic Maverick: Romanias negotiations for nuclear
technology, 1964-1970, in Cold War Europe, Volume 13, No 3, August 2013, 373-392.

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7 Conclusion
After the Second World War, Romania acted domestically and internationally as the most
loyal and obedient satellite of the Soviet Union but in the early 1960s its leaders initiated a
policy change towards Moscow which has triggered a considerable scholarly interest ever
since. Calling it a detachment, a dissidence, a deviation, an independent or autonomous
line, a new foreign policy doctrine or a new state security strategy, earlier studies propose
an objectivist perspective with a focus on the external permissive conditions that allowed
this change, emphasise the role of the external environment and pay little if any attention
to what had changed. Working within a paradigm which maintains that after the Second
World War Romania allied (balanced) with the USSR against the Western threat and
contending (or implying) that Romanias alliance with the USSR and opposition to the
USSR were mutually exclusive, some scholars even argue that no real change actually
occurred in Romanias relations with the USSR in the early 1960s.645
Focusing on Romanias early 1960s policy change towards the USSR, this study
addressed two main questions: why did the change occurred and what did actually change?
Drawing from recently declassified archival materials, it proposed a perceptual approach,
worked within a paradigm that argued that post-war Romania bandwagoned with the
USSR (the perceived threat), focused on the proximate causes triggering the change, and
proposed a conceptualisation of this change. The study investigated the emergence of
Romanias opposition against the USSR with respect to two case studies, the CMEA
reforms and the Sino-Soviet dispute. It covered the period between 1960 and 1964, that is
between Romanias first definitive (albeit non-public and indirect) opposition against the
USSR which was manifested in the CMEA framework, and the issuing of the RWPs
Declaration of April 1964 which marked the the Romanian leaders first public and
official (albeit indirect) acknowledgement of the Romanian-Soviet disagreements.
Aiming to provide an adequate background for the study, the second chapter advanced
an innovative way of understanding the Romanian-Soviet post-war relations arguing that
after the war Romania entered (and preserved) a bandwagoning alliance with the
perceived source of danger the Soviet Union. Attempting to establish Romanias postwar (long-term) grand strategy, in 1944-1947, the Romanian officials took into
consideration two sets of variables the perceived threat to Romanias security posed by
the Soviet Union and Romanias previous experiences with alliances. They reasoned that
Romania which they saw as a small state defeated in war, having little resources and
enjoying no external support could not resist and should not antagonise the Soviet Union
any further. Evaluating the (perceived) Soviet threat, the Romanian officials took into
consideration variables such as the USSRs power (its victory in the war, its perceived
unlimited economic and military resources), geographical proximity to Romania and
(perceived) aggressive intentions towards Romania, or the perceived role that the USSR
was to play in the post-war world. Furthermore, in light of Romanias previous alliance
experience, the Romanian officials reasoned that an alliance with distant Western states or
small Eastern European states could not safeguard Romania against the (perceived) Soviet

645

See supra, subchapter 1.3.

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permanent threat. Moreover, they observed that such alliances were not an option for
Romania after the war.
Thus, in the aftermath of the war, the Romanian officials concluded that the states
future independence and security depended on earning and preserving the USSRs trust.
Between 1944 and 1948, the Romanian governments acted to obtain from the USSR the
official recognition through a treaty of friendship, collaboration and alliance of the
principle of friendship and collaboration as the basis of the bilateral future long-term
relations. In other words, after the war, Romania opted for a grand strategy of appeasing
the (perceived) Soviet threat. Based on a bandwagoning alliance with the USSR,
Romanias grand strategy relied on two main pillars the 1948 bilateral TFCMA and the
multilateral 1955 Warsaw Pact. This grand strategy served, throughout the Cold War, as
the main guide of strategic thinking and of policy choices of the Romanian leaders.
Between 1948 and the late 1950s, the Romanian leaders continued to act within a
policy of appeasement towards the USSR, which was designed to reduce the (perceived)
Soviet lack of trust in Romania and to alleviate the grievances. This policy involved
compromises and the accommodation of the Soviet Unions interests and demands even
when Romanias own interests were infringed. Through this policy of loyalty, the
Romanian leadership aimed, on the one hand, to persuade the Soviet leaders to alleviate
some of the burdens that had been imposed upon Romania in the aftermath of the war,
and, on the other hand, to deter any other new Soviet measures affecting Romanias
security. In other words, this policy was guided also by the aim of reducing the chance of
Romania being again treated by the USSR in a hostile manner, by avoiding any future
cause for bilateral tensions and disagreements. When in the 1950s the USSR agreed to
withdraw its troops and counsellors from Romania or to liquidate the SovRoms, the
Romanian leaders concluded that their policy of appeasement had proven successful and
that it should therefore be continued.
However, in the early 1960s in the context of the Soviet-intended bloc integration
and coordination the Romanian leaders began to perceive new and imminent Soviet
threats to Romanias security and interests and, in response, they began to combine loyalty
and appeasement with opposition and deterrent threats.
Some scholars like Ungureanu or Miroiu argue that in the early 1960s the
Romanians' declared concern with the states national interests was not genuine, but
simulated.646 Others like Tnase, Stanciu or Tismneanu contend that the RomanianSoviet 1960s divergences were not about Romanias sovereignty, independence or
economic interests as the Romanian leaders claimed, that the Romanians sovereigntyrelated arguments were merely propaganda.647 However, this study found that in the early
1960s the Romanian leaders were genuinely convinced that the Soviet leadership intended
to infringe on Romanias national sovereignty, independence or even territorial integrity
and national identity.
The third and the fourth chapters investigated the emergence of Romanias opposition
to the USSR in the context of the intended CMEA specialisation and integration. They
found that, as early as 1960-1962, the Romanian leaders argued within closed Politburo
meetings that, if accepted, the Soviet intended CMEA reform would have had economic
646
647

Ungureanu, 94; Miroiu, 136-186.

Tnase, 187-189; Stanciu, 2009, 280-281; Tismneanu, 2003, 179.

180

and political negative consequences for Romania. Economically, Romania would be

forced into inefficient commercial relations having to sell cheaply raw materials and
agricultural products and to import expensive industrial products, they reasoned.
Politically, Romanias attribute of making independent foreign policy decisions would be
taken away, Romania having to comply with the decisions made (against her interests) by
supranational bloc bodies, or by other bloc leaders, the Romanian leaders believed. In this
perceived context, the Romanian leaders, and especially Gheorghiu-Dej, decided, as early
as 1960, that bloc specialisation was unacceptable, that it had to be opposed and blocked,
but that Romanias opposition needed to be engineered so that it would not cause
additional tensions or even open conflicts with the Soviet Union.
The English-language scholarship generally contends that Romanias opposition in the
CMEA manifested itself from 1962-1963 onwards.648 The recent Romanian-language
historiography, benefiting from the opening of the Romanian archives, correctly asserts
that Romanian opposition to the bloc specialisation was formulated in different CMEA
bodies as early as 1958 or 1959 and that the 1962-1963 opposition represented rather a
pick of previous occasionally acute bloc disagreements on specialisation. Liviu
ranu, the author of the (so far) most comprehensive but generally descriptive work
on Romanias participation in the CMEA between 1949 and 1965 presents detailed
accounts on this very early Romanian opposition to bloc specialisation. 649 However, not
even this recent Romanian scholarship shows an interest in the 1960 Moscow Agricultural
Conference, despite its significance. There are two historiographical approaches to
Romanias participation in this event. Some historians such as Constantin Moraru
briefly mention Romanias participation in the conference, without making any reference
though to Romanian opposition650, while others such as ranu, Stanciu, or Ctnu
very briefly note Romanian opposition. The latters studies, however, employ a descriptive
narrative and do not analyse Romanias reasons for opposing the others specialisation
projects or the tactics the Romanians used in 1960 to successfully block specialisation.651
This study found that a Romanian strong opposition against the Soviet intended
specialisation manifested itself as early as February 1960 at the so-called Agricultural
Conference in Moscow and that this opposition was a response to perceived Soviet threats.
The third chapter argued that Romanias opposition to the USSR gradually emerged in the
context of the intended CMEA international division of labour, which the Romanian
leaders perceived as a direct threat to Romanias economic and political interests.
According to the Romanian leaders, the CMEA integration (had it been accepted) would
have made Romania even more economically dependent on trade with the CMEA and
with the USSR and, consequently, more vulnerable not only economically, but also
politically. They even believed that the integration project was an economic subterfuge
used by the USSR and its supporters to deepen Romanias political dependency and
subordination to the USSR in particular and to the bloc in general.
648

Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: twentieth century, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1983, 374; Adam Zwass, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: the thorny path from
political to economic integration, Sharpe, Armonk, 1989, 198; Tismneanu, 2003, 179182.
649
ranu, 134137; Stanciu, 2009, 237249; Croitor, 2009, 214.
650
Moraru, 37-38.
651
ranu, 137-139; Stanciu, 2009, 237; Ctnu, 2005, 73-74.

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Thus, the first and imminent (perceived) Soviet threat to Romanias interests was
identified by the Romanian leader in the CMEA framework in relation to the Councils
intended reform. Whether the Soviets intentions were such as perceived in Romania or
not was beyond the aim of this study, which instead argued that the Romanian leaders
responded to perceived threats rather than to actual threats. However, this opens up new
research questions and future studies in the former Soviet, East German or Czechoslovak
archives could answer the question of whether the Romanian leaders perceptions were
misperceptions or not. This leads to another future research question, important not only
for the historical context but also for todays policymakers to what extent are leaders
foreign policy decisions based on misperceptions?
By early 1963, the Romanian leaders became also concerned with the (perceived)
territorial and strategic threats posed to Romanias interests by different Soviet policies.
They observed (perceived), for instance, that different bloc economists, scholars,
journalists or leaders (Khrushchev included) had started to question the necessity of the
existence of the national borders between the socialist states. They also worryingly noted
that different bloc scholars (Soviets included) reopened the problem of Romanias border
in relation to Transylvanias territory. In this (perceived) context, the Romanian leaders
began to fear that the CMEA integration might have been envisaged in order to provide
the USSR seen as an expansionist great power with a pretext to allow the annexation to
the USSR of parts of Romania.
In early 1963, soon after the Cuban Missile crisis, the Romanian leaders argued that
given the USSRs (perceived) unpredictability, carelessness, arrogance and aggressiveness
the Romanian-Soviet alliance was in fact a security vulnerability for their state, risking
to involve Romania (without its leaders even knowing it) in different international crises,
including war. According to the Romanian leaders views, Romanias alliance with the
USSR was absolutely necessary in order to protect Romanias security from the
(perceived) continuous Soviet threat, but it also encompassed the risk of bringing Romania
(against its own will or even without its knowledge) in open conflict with the Soviet
Unions adversaries.
Currently, the Romanian archives do not provide relevant information on the 1962
Romanians reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis, but documents produced in 1963 and
1964 suggest that the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR was triggered by the
(perceived) imminent threats posed to Romanias interests by the CMEA integration
project and not by the Cuban Missile Crisis. It seems that the Cuban Crisis provided the
Romanian leaders with an example of the USSRs (perceived) unpredictability and
carelessness, a factor that was taken into consideration in refining Romanias policy
towards the USSR, but there is no archival data available yet suggesting that the Cuban
Missile Crisis functioned as a proximate cause of Romanias policy change towards the
USSR.652 This problem, however, remains to be tackled when relevant Romanian archival
material will become available.
Although the Romanian leaders were convinced as early as 1960 that the intentions of
the other bloc states to reform the CMEA were detrimental to Romanias interests and that
such projects had to be rejected and blocked, until April 1964 they refrained from
652

See, for instance, The minutes of the 26-27 February 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office,
File 4/1963, 23-135.

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opposing the CMEA reform publicly and officially. Until April 1964, publically (in
articles, in declarations) the Romanian leaders made at most allusions to a different
Romanian position, but in non-public bilateral talks or non-public multilateral bloc
gatherings Romanias opposition to the CMEA reform was clearly formulated as early as
1960. The Romanian leaders believed that the initiator of the integration project was the
Soviet leadership, but, at first, Romanias secret bloc opposition was intentionally
targetted against the East Germans, Poles or Czechoslovaks, and not against the Soviets.
Another particularity of Romanias 1960-1962 opposition was that, while in closed
meetings, the Romanians argued that specialisation and integration had to be
blocked/postponed because they threatened Romanias national interests, in different bloc
sessions, Romanias representatives opposed the CMEA specialisation only indirectly, by
resorting to different postponing arguments, to arguments from authority, to altering
tactics etc., as described in detail in the third chapter of this study.
As early as 1960, Romanias opposition in the CMEA took a dual form. At top-level
bloc gatherings, the Romanian top leaders refrained from opposing and antagonising the
Soviets and their pro-reform ideas, but during low-level CMEA sessions, Romanian low
ranked representatives openly opposed their Soviet counterparts when Romanias interests
were (perceived as being) endangered. There were two moments when the Romanian
leaders were on the verge of making public their opposition to the USSR at a top bloc
gathering, namely during the CMEA annual conferences from 1962 and 1963.
The Romanian leaders feared that the other bloc members lead, they believed, by the
USSR intended to use those two conferences to advance bloc integration as a fait
accompli that could no longer be undone. Had that happened, then the Romanian
delegations to the conferences were mandated to respond by openly opposing bloc
integration. In both cases, the decision to make public Romanias opposition to the USSR
and to its integration project in a bloc top-level gathering was a reaction to a perceived
imminent threat to Romanias interests and was envisaged as a means to avoid Romanias
integration. Had the opposition confined to the CMEA secrete gatherings failed to block
the CMEA project, then the Romanian leaders intended to move forward and to publish a
document encompassing Romanias different position, making in this way the RomanianSoviet disagreements public. This tactic was contemplated in 1962 and perfected in 1963
and was, according to the Romanian leaders, their only way of blocking the Soviets
intention of integrating Romania. However, when the CMEA integration proposals were
abandoned, the Romanian leaders decided that it was no longer necessary to create
divergences, as they phrased it, with the rest of the bloc and especially with the Soviets,
and Romanias opposition retuned to the secret bloc or bilateral talks.
Another tactic that the Romanian leaders contemplated in 1962 and perfected in 1963
was the one this study called playing the China card. This tactic involved insinuations
made to the Soviets that if Romanias position in the CMEA problem was not
accommodated the Romanian leaders might support the Chinese in their dispute with
Moscow. It also encompassed the argument that, given its economic strength, China had to
become a full member of the CMEA and had to be asked its opinion about the CMEA
reform. The Romanian leaders hoped that the Soviets would respond to such indirect
threats to their interests by abandoning or postponing their CMEA integration plans.

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Thus, as early as 1962, making public the Romanian-Soviet disagreements on

integration and involving China in the CMEA integration debates represented two
practical ways (tactics) that the Romanian leaders had envisaged to block the (perceived)
Soviet-intended integration of Romania. In other words, the Romanian leaders
conceptualised the change in Romanias policy towards the USSR in a very concrete and
limited manner opposing specific Soviet policies/proposals perceived as threats to
Romanias interests. It was not about opposing the USSR per se, but about blocking
specific Soviet projects contravening Romanias interests, without causing additional
conflicts with the USSR.
The third and the fourth chapters of the study also provided an account of the tactics
and arguments that the Romanian leaders used in 1960-1963 to (successfully)
block/postpone the CMEA-related perceived threats. In addition to the tactics used in
1960-1962 (postponing tactics, altering tactics, arguments from authority), in 1963 the
Romanian leaders also employed the China-related arguments, the indirect threat (to the
Soviets) of making the different Romanian position public, and the argument of
sovereignty, which was developed especially after the 4th Session of the Executive
Committee of the CMEA, held in February 1963 in Moscow.
Prior to February 1963, the Romanians opposed the CMEA reform indirectly. They
argued that Romania agreed with the idea of bloc specialisation and integration, but not in
this phase. They argued that, prior to tackling the integration problem, detailed studies
needed to be carried out on the necessity of reform, or that Romania needed more time to
formulate an official position on the matter. From February 1963 onwards, though, the
Romanian leaders openly opposed integration on the ground that it contravened the
principle of sovereignty, and that Romanias internationalist duty was to defend that
principle. Thus, from February 1963 onwards, the Romanian-Soviet integration
controversy was transformed to a great extent into a debate on the meaning and content of
the principle of sovereignty.
On 9 March 1963 Khrushchev proposed the creation of a common Danube River
Complex. The Romanians believed that the Soviet leader targetted the project of the
Romanian-Yugoslav Iron Gates Power Plant, and that he wanted to transform the Iron
Gates Power Plant into a Danube common enterprise to be used to control Romanias
energetic water resources. They also feared that Khrushchev intended to appeal again to
the perceived fait accompli tactic, to decide on the creation of the Danube Complex with
the participation of the other socialist states (Romania excluded) and to present this
decision to Romania (on the occasion of the CMEA 1963 conference) as a done deal that
could no longer be changed. In his 15 March 1963 letter of response, Gheorghiu-Dej
informed all the bloc leaders that Romania was categorically against Khrushchevs
proposal because, he argued, it infringed on the principle of sovereignty.
This reaction was followed by four months of secret and tense Romanian-Soviet
integration negotiations, during which the Romanians used three main tactics to bloc the
Soviet perceived threats the sovereignty argument, the (indirect) threat of making public
(through a declaration) the Romanian-Soviet disagreements and the China card tactic. The
Romanian leaders hoped that given the ongoing Sino-Soviet public divergences the
Soviet leadership would most likely respond to Romanias indirect threats by
accommodating her views on the CMEA integration.

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However, in the early 1960s, the Romanian leaders felt trapped in a no-win situation.
On the one hand, they believed that accepting CMEA integration would severely
jeopardise Romanias interests, but, on the other hand, they feared that Romanian
opposition to integration could trigger Soviet anti-Romanian measures that might have
similar or even worse consequences. They anticipated that the Soviet leaders could
respond to Romanias opposition with economic and political pressure, with accusations
of Romania being anti-Soviet and a threat to the Soviet Unions security, or even with
open confrontation. These fears were confirmed to some extent when, during the MarchJune 1963 Romanian-Soviet negotiations, the Soviet leaders threatened to break off the
bilateral relations of friendship, which as Khrushchev phrased it would have lead to
the return of the Romanian-Soviet relations from [Ion] Antonescus time653 which
meant in fact war. The Romanian leaders believed that every time the Soviets were
displeased with a Romanian decision, they accused Romania of being anti-Soviet and a
threat to the USSRs interests and security. In their opinion, the Soviets intentionally
presented Romania with this false dichotomy either loyal friends or enemies as a
means to force upon Romanias leaders choices that they were reluctant to accept.
Despite their disagreements, in June 1963 the Romanian and the Soviet leaderships
managed to reach a compromise which took the form of a tacit accord through which the
Romanian party agreed to refrain from making public its different position (on the CMEA
reform and on the Sino-Soviet dispute), while Khrushchev promised in return to smother
the CMEA integration project. During the July 1963 CMEA annual conference,
Khrushchev kept his part of the bargain and the Romania leaders decided to reciprocate
and refrain from announcing publicly the existence of the Romanian-Soviet
disagreements. However, as the fifth and sixth chapters presented, when the bloc prointegration campaign was re-launched (as the Romanian leaders perceived) in late 1963early 1964, the Romanians decided to make public the Romanian-Soviet disagreements.
In conclusion, the third and the fourth chapters of the study found, firstly, that the
proximate causes of the early 1960s change in Romanias policy towards the USSR were
provided by the (perceived) imminent threats posed to Romanias interests by the Soviet
intended CMEA reform through specialisation and integration. Secondly, they pointed that
the change, as conceptualised by the Romanian leaders, did not refer to opposing the
Soviet Union, but to opposing (perceived) specific Soviet threats to Romanias interests,
and that this opposition was handled by the Romanian leaders so that (in their view) it
would not cause additional tensions or confrontations between Romania and the USSR.
From February 1963 onwards, the Romanian leaders played the China card tactic
simultaneously in their relations with the Soviets and in their relations with the Chinese,
but, to facilitate the analysis, the study addressed the two levels of relations separately. If
the fourth chapter discussed how the Romanian leaders used the China-related arguments
during the 1963 integration negotiations with the USSR, the fifth and the sixth chapters
without aiming to produce an exhaustive study of the Romanian-Chinese relations or of
Romanias position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute focused on the Romanian leaders
1963 attempts to balance with China against the Soviet integration plans. In addition, the

653

Note regarding the 8 June 1963 conversation between comrade N. Ceauescu and comrade N. S.
Khrushchev in Moscow, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations-Alphabetical, File 17 U/1963, 33-52.

185

chapters provided a detailed analysis of the emergence of Romanias opposition to

Moscow in relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute.
This study dealt only with the Romanian leaders perceptions, objectives and
manoeuvres and did not focus on the Chinese interpretations or views regarding Romania.
However, it did open new questions in this regard and it would be interesting to do further
research to establish how exactly the Chinese leaders conceptualised in 1963-1964 the
Romanian-Chinese anti-Soviet CMEA collaboration (if there was such a concern in
Beijing) or Romanias role in Chinas anti-Soviet manoeuvres.
If between 1960 and 1962 the Romanian leaders publicly supported the Soviets and
criticised the Chinese, from 1962 onwards, despite the (perceived) external (Soviet or
Chinese) requests to pick a side, they employed a neither-nor-position. The Romanian
leaders preferred to define their stand towards the Sino-Soviet dispute through negation
it was not neutrality; it was not anti-Soviet or pro-Soviet; it was not anti-Chinese or proChinese. Although officially they motivated their choice through the RWPs commitment
to the stipulations of the 1960 Moscow Declaration and to the idea of strengthening the
unity of the international communist and workers movement on the basis of MarxismLeninism, this study found that the Romanian leaders 1962 motives for choosing a
neither-nor-position towards the Sino-Soviet dispute were not primarily ideological as
previous studies often argue654 but related to the states self-interest.
Thus, this study found that the 1962 change in Romanias attitude towards the SinoSoviet dispute occurred simultaneously with the development in Romania of the China
card tactic, which had been envisaged to bloc the Soviet CMEA integration. In other
words, when the Romanian leaders decided to look to balance with China against the
Soviet perceived threats of integration they stopped supporting the Soviets in the SinoSoviet dispute. This change was, however, motivated by other (secondary) types of
perceptions and interpretations as well. For instance, as early as 1962-1963, the Romanian
leaders began to perceive the communist camp as an emerging bipolar subsystem about to
be organised around two centres of power, Moscow and Beijing. According to their views,
China was a rising economic and military superpower, on the verge of possessing the
atomic bomb, and soon capable to resist and respond to any type of Soviet pressure or
threat. Noting the (perceived) increase of Moscow-Beijing tensions and reasoning that the
circle was too big for Romania, as Gheorghiu-Dej phrased it in June 1963655, the
Romanian leaders believed that it was not in Romanias interest to get involved in the
middle of two (perceived) capricious and unpredictable superpowers about to open fire
against each other.
The Romanian leaders were convinced that the development of a new centre of power
within the communist camp (in Beijing) would eventually lead to the formation of
competing state coalitions or even to military blocs within the camp, and considering
also the (perceived) increasing level of tensions between the USSR and China they
expected considerable tensions between the two to-be-formed coalitions or military blocs.
They further believed that had such a situation occurred, Romanias interests were to be at
risk. They feared, for instance, that the Soviet leadership might attempt to involve the
whole Warsaw Pact in the expected conflict with China, and that in doing so it might not
654
655

For instance, Croitor, 2009, 16, 213, 146; Anton, 171.

The minutes of the 22 June 1963 Politburo meeting, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 33/1963, 53-72.

186

even consult or inform its allies, which meant that Romania risked to find herself drawn
even into a war. To mitigate the effects of such an anticipated threatening situation, in
early 1964, the Romanians decided that they could take but one position support none of
the two sides (which, they explicitly declared that this did not mean neutrality) and
formally strive instead for the preservation of the unity of the movement and of the camp.
Although, in 1962, the Romanian leaders had ceased to produce any type of public
criticism against the Chinese, the Bucharest-Beijing relations did not immediately
improve, remaining scarce and rather cold. One year later in response to the integration
proposals advanced during the February 1963 4th Session of the Executive Committee of
the CMEA, which exacerbated the Romanians perceptions of threats Gheorghiu-Dej
and his party colleagues decided to begin employing the China card tactic as the main
means to block CMEA integration. On the one hand, they intended to use China-related
arguments to bloc the Soviets integration plan. In practice that meant that they intended to
inform the Soviets that China had to be asked its opinion about the CMEA reform; that
Chinas full membership in the CMEA would increase the economic efficiency of the
Council; that the CMEA reform, if carried out in the proposed form, would negatively
affect the unity of the communist movement and that, therefore, China had to be involved
in the CMEA integration talks. The Romanian leaders believed that their China-arguments
would alarm the Soviet leaders with the thought of some kind of Romanian-Chinese
collaboration and that, in order to avoid such an outcome, Moscow would accommodate
Romanias anti-integration views.
However, given the rather cold and sporadic Romanian-Chinese relations, in early
1963, Gheorghiu-Dej considered that playing the China-arguments against the Soviets had
to be accompanied by a display of (real or apparent) rapprochement between Romania and
China. Otherwise he believed Romania risked facing two reactions that could doom
the Romanian China tactics to fail. He believed that if the Chinese publicly declared that
China had no interest in the CMEA problems, the Romanian party could no longer appeal
to its China-related arguments in its integration talks with the Soviets. The Romanian
leaders also feared that if the Soviets considered that the Romanian China-related threats
were a bluff, then the tactics would become useless. To avoid these two anticipated risks,
from early 1963 onwards, under Gheorghiu-Dejs leadership, the Romanians mastered a
gradual rapprochement with China.
Furthermore, this study found that in 1963-1964 the Romanian leaders did build some
hopes (albeit small) of convincing the Chinese leaders to help Romania balance with
China against the Soviet Union in relation to the CMEA integration. For that, they tried to
persuade China to pursue its full membership in the Council, and the Romanians hoped
that once China became a full member of the CMEA, Romania and China could block
together from inside the Council the (perceived) Soviet CMEA integration plans and could
initiate together the reform of the Council towards a direction less threatening to
Romanias interests. The Romanians also asked the Chinese to not object publicly to
Romania using China-related arguments in their integration talks with the Soviets, a
request that the Chinese accepted after months of negotiations.
Approaching the Chinese in early 1963, the Romanian leaders tried to convince them
that, in terms of state security and interests, Romania and China had a common enemy
the USSR and, therefore, common problems. Attempting to build Romanias

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rapprochement with China around an enemy of my enemy is my friend approach, they

argued that both China and Romania had been facing Soviet economic, political or
military pressures and threats, that both had been regarded as a source of additional
territories and resources for the USSR, that both had been suffering from the Soviet
leaders interference in their domestic state or party affairs, and that both had faced Soviet
public criticism against their leaderships and policies. The Romanian leaders proposed
therefore an alliance of necessity between Romania and China, and argued that the two
leaderships did not have to agree in all (ideological or non-ideological) matters in order to
work together towards a common goal, which was supporting each other against specific
Soviet plans and actions that threatened their interests.
However, the Romanian leaders believed that their attempts to balance with China
against the USSR in CMEA matters could trigger adverse reactions from the Soviets who
may have felt, they thought, threatened. To avoid such a perceived risk, the Romanian
leaders proposed the Chinese an informal and secret alliance of necessity, limited to
providing (secret) mutual support against specific Soviet policies perceived as threatening
Romania or to Chinas interests.
Despite their initial reticence, by December 1963-January 1964, the Chinese promised
to support Romanias CMEA cause in several ways. On the one hand, they agreed to not
oppose in public the Romanians China-related arguments. Although the Romanians were
openly and repeatedly told that China was not interested in becoming a member of the
CMEA, the Chinese leaders allowed the Romanian leaders to argue otherwise in their talks
with the Soviets. Moreover, the Chinese even occasionally promised Romania that they
intended to begin studying the problem of Chinas actual full membership in the CMEA.
Despite such encouraging promises, the Romanian-Chinese rapprochement suffered an
important setback in early 1964, when the Sino-Soviet relations rapidly deteriorated.
In February 1964, the Soviet leaders announced their intention to organise a collective
strong riposte against China. In response, the Romanian leadership proposed both the
Soviets and the Chinese to temporarily cease their public polemics and to agree to the visit
of a high-level Romanian delegation to Moscow and Beijing, which officially aimed to
address the extremely serious situation that had been created in the camps relations.
Although the Chinese agreed, they suspected that the Romanians move had been dictated
by Moscow, and this high level of suspicion negatively affected the still rather fragile
Romanian-Chinese relations.
However, this study did not aim to provide an exhaustive analysis of the RomanianChinese bilateral relations in the context of the 1964 Sino-Soviet dispute. It addressed the
subject only in so far as those relations were relevant in understanding Romanias early
1960s policy change towards the USSR. In this respect, the study found that the Romanian
leaders perceived the early 1964 increasing tensions between Moscow and Beijing as a
source of imminent threats to Romanias interests. Reiterating their previous 1962-1963
beliefs, in February 1964, the Romanian leaders argued that Beijing had already emerged
as a new pole of power in the socialist camp capable to balance the Soviet centre and
capable to group around itself a party and state (albeit de facto) coalition ready to oppose
the (perceived) coalition formed around Moscow. The Romanian leaders feared that, if
allowed to occur, the Soviet-proposed strong collective riposte against China would
consolidate the split of the camp into two opposing de jure state coalitions ready to

188

openly confront each other. They believed that even a war could break out between the
USSR and China (and their respective coalitions) and feared that Romania might get
involved against her will or without her knowledge in this anticipated conflict.
Analysing the ideological aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute, in February-April 1964,
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer or Alexandru Brldeanu argued that
neither of the two was entirely correct or entirely wrong in their argumentations and that
the dispute was not about ideological interpretations, but about political hegemony, about
the struggle between two great powers and parties for political domination over the other
small states and parties, Romania and the RWP included. They believed that China and the
USSRs leaderships were equally unpredictable, arrogant, impulsive, certain of their own
strength and capable to lead the camp to open warfare, while Romania was seen as a small
state incapable of opposing the strength of those great powers and their (perceived)
equally aggressive international policies.
On the other hand, in early 1964, Gheorghiu-Dej reasoned that Romania had no
rational reason to treat China an emerging world economic and military superpower,
soon capable to resist even the USSR and the USA, he believed with disrespect. On the
contrary, he considered that by cultivating good relations with Beijing, Romania could
eventually obtain Chinas economic or even military (for instance supplying Romania with
arms) support to balance against the perceived Soviet current or anticipated threats and
pressures.
In early 1964, the Romanian leaders were convinced that the Soviet leaders saw
Romania as an unreliable ally and as a potential security risk for the USSR, and this is
why they feared that if the Sino-Soviet dispute escalated to a military conflict, the Soviet
leadership might take some measures, including military, to eliminate the (perceived)
Romanian threat from the USSRs Western border. Thus, one of the unofficial (and secret)
objectives of the high party and state Romanian delegation visiting Beijing and Moscow in
early March 1964 was to try to calm to some extent the Sino-Soviet tensions.
Officially, the Romanian delegates proposed a temporary cessation of the public
polemics and the beginning of preparations for the convening of a world communist
conference to address the dispute. Officially, Romanias mediation aimed to preserve the
unity of the communist camp, but this study found that the Romanian leaders secret
objective of mediation between Moscow and Beijing aimed to limit the perceived damage
that the perceived anticipated deterioration of the Sino-Soviet state relations could have
inflicted upon Romania.
Romanias attempt to mediate failed and in late March 1964 the Soviet leaders decided
to publish Suslovs Report. Communicated to the Romanian leaders on 2 April 1964, this
Soviet decision triggered in Romania the response of issuing the RWPs April 1964
Declaration. While previous studies contend that the early 1960s Sino-Soviet dispute
represented a beneficent context for Romanias detachment from Moscow and that the
Moscow-Beijing early 1964 tensions did not worry the Romanian leaders, as Croitor
phrased it656, this study found that the early 1964 deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations
was seen in Bucharest as a threat to Romanias interests and that this perceived threat was

656

Ctnu, 2011, 31; Neagoe-Plea, 231-240; Tismneanu, 2003, 178-181; Croitor, 314-317.

189

the proximate cause for the issuing of the April 1964 Declaration, which marked
Romanias first public and official (albeit indirect) opposition to the USSR.
According to the Romanian leaders, the Soviet decision to publish Suslovs Report was
a threat to Romanias interests for several reasons. Firstly, they believed that the Soviet
manoeuvre risked triggering an escalation of tensions between Moscow and Beijing (and
between their de facto coalitions), creating a general conflict situation in which no state
would be safe, not even Romania that had repeatedly and publicly announced her noninvolvement with either side. Secondly, the Romania leaders feared that, as the SinoSoviet relations tensions rose, Moscow would exert additional pressure on Romania to
force it to join the Soviet coalition against Beijing.
Thirdly, worried by the (perceived) Soviet method of making decisions for the entire
bloc and of publicly speaking on behalf of the entire bloc without actually consulting or
informing its allies, the Romanian leaders believed that in early 1964 as Brldeanu put
it Romania was facing the danger to find her position intentionally falsified and
misinterpreted or even abusively subjugated under the baton of the USSR which main
purpose was (the Romanians believed) to move towards collective measures against the
Chinese and to bloc integration and coordination.657 And fourth, they believed that a
strong riposte against China or a collective condemning of China, if allowed to happen,
would have created a dangerous precedent that the USSR and its bloc supporters could
later use to condemn Romania, the RWP and its leadership, already notorious for its
opposition to the Soviet Union and its bloc or camp policies.
Regarding the substance of the Sino-Soviet dispute, in the early 1960s Gheorghiu-Dej
considered that it was irrelevant if the Chinese leaders were right or wrong, and that the
only relevant aspect was that the leadership of any communist party and of any socialist
state had the right to make its own decisions, whether considered in Moscow to be correct
or wrong. All this considered, on 2 April 1964, the Romanian leadership decided to
publish a declaration concerning Romanias position on the international fundamental
problems, a document which was intended mainly as a defence against the perceived
current or anticipated Soviet threats.
This study found that the Romanian leaders early 1960s policy choices towards the
USSR were to great extent based not only on their perceptions of current threats, but also
on their perceptions of anticipated threats. Their perceptions of the threats posed to
Romanias interests (by the Soviet-intended CMEA reform, or by the deterioration of the
Sino-Soviet state relations, for instance) never materialised, but were the Romanian
leaders efforts needless and targetted towards eliminating some current or anticipated
threats that did not actually exist? Or did the Romanian leaders early 1960s opposing
tactics successfully eliminate the Soviet threats before they materialised? These are very
important questions that could be tackled by future studies.
In April 1964, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej decided that the RWPs declaration had to
include Romanias position not only towards the Sino-Soviet dispute, but towards all the
fundamental international problems, the CMEA integration or the East-West relations, as
well. According to the Romanian leaders, by April 1964, the Soviet leadership had relaunched the CMEA integration offensive, presenting again publicly the CMEA
657

The minutes of the 19-22 May 1964 meeting with the employees of the Ministers of Foreign Trade and
Foreign Affairs, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 24/1964, 185-221.

190

integration as a decision upon which everybody in the bloc, including Romania, had
already agreed. In these perceived circumstances, they considered that Romania had no
other alternative but to make her position public. Otherwise the Romanian leadership
considered Romania risked finding the Soviet leadership abusively talking on behalf of
Romania, falsifying her position when addressing not only the Sino-Soviet dispute, but
also the CMEA integration or the creation of a Warsaw Pact foreign policy body of
coordination, as Ceauescu called it. Thus, as Emil Bodnra later phrased it, by issuing
the April 1964 Declaration, the Romanian leaders preferred to be those who explained
their position, than let the Soviets do so for them, adding virgules and dots where they are
needed, but especially where they are not needed.658
In conclusion, the RWPs April 1964 Declaration was the Romanian leaders response
to perceived Soviet threats. It was designed to prevent Romanias involvement against its
will or without its knowledge in the anticipated Sino-Soviet conflict. It was also meant to
deter the Soviets from publicly fostering projects or policies that Romania opposed (such
as the CMEA integration or the collective condemnation of China). The Romanian leaders
believed that, once their Declaration was made public, the Soviet leaders would most
likely refrain from publicly advancing proposals or projects that contravened the substance
of the Romanian text. Had they acted differently, the Soviets would have publicly
(although implicitly) acknowledged the existence of the intra-bloc disagreements,
affecting therefore the USSRs international prestige, the Romanian leaders believed.
The Declaration also was intended as a means to inform other international actors
(such as China or the USA) that the USSR was not the spokesman of Romania, that
Romania had views that were fundamentally different from those of the USSR and that
Romania should not be treated, in case of conflict, as the obedient follower of the USSR.
Finally, the Declaration was intended as a guide to teach the Romanian representatives
how to recognise those Soviet proposals that threatened Romanias interests, and how to
oppose them, without provoking an open confrontation with the USSR. Thus, GheorghiuDej envisaged the RWPs 1964 Declaration as a lasting ars poetica of Romanias domestic
and foreign long-term policy. Just as a poet reflects in his or hers ars poetica poem on his
or hers own art of poetry, the Romanian policy makers reflected in their 1964 Declaration
on their own art of policy making, encompassing there goals, conceptions and tactics,
explanations about previous or current policy choices, hints about what Romania could
accept or not in her current or future domestic or foreign policy, indications to Romanias
future policy choices. On the one hand, the Declaration confirmed Romanias commitment
to the alliance with the USSR, but on the other hand it signalled the areas in which
Romania was determined to oppose the USSR.
The Soviet leaders complained to the Romanians that the April 1964 Declaration
allowed too much of the secret bilateral disagreements to reach the public sphere, which
proved they further reasoned that Romania was not loyal to the communist cause and
to the friendship with the Soviet Union, that it was a in fact a threat to Soviet security. The
Romanian-Soviet tensions reached such a high level, that in July 1964 Khrushchev
threatened the Romanian leaders with breaking off of the friendship and alliance relations,
which would have meant the Soviet leader added that Romania and the USSR would
658

The minutes of the 12 May 1966 talks between Emil Bodnra and Zhou Enlai, in Budura, 2008, 281.

191

return to the same type of relations that they had experienced during Ion Antonescus
regime, which meant in fact war a threat that Khrushchev had also employed in his
relations with the Romanian leadership in 1963.
The Romanian and the Soviet leaderships met in Moscow in July 1964 in an attempt to
settle once more their difference of opinions. This encounter confirmed the Romanian
leaders convictions that the Soviet leadership, unjustly and deliberately, used a very loose
definition of what being anti-Soviet meant against Romania. Basically, the Romanian
leaders concluded, any (public or non-public, official or informal) Romanian point of view
that was different from that of the USSR was interpreted in Moscow as a manifestation of
Romanias anti-Sovietism, which was further presented as equal to Romania being a threat
to the security interests or to the general interests of the USSR. It would be very
interesting to do further research in the Soviet archives and to establish whether the Soviet
leaders were genuinely worried in 1963-1964 about an emerging Romanian anti-Sovietism
or whether they pretended to identify such threats in order to pressure the Romanian
leaders into accepting bloc coordination or other Soviet policies.
Taking into consideration factors such as the Soviet Unions power, geographic
proximity and (perceived) aggressive intentions, the Romanian leaders believed in the
early 1960s that preserving the bandwagon alliance with the (perceived) threatening USSR
was their only option to provide security for Romania. On the other hand, they were
convinced that the Soviet recent bloc integration and coordination plans (if allowed to
happen) would severely affect Romanias national interests. Hence, they set for
themselves the seemingly contradictory goal of opposing those less-than-ultimate
(perceived) Soviet threats to Romanians interests without jeopardising though the state
grand strategy of friendship and alliance with the USSR.
To reach this goal, in 1963-1964 the Romanian leaders advanced, during their
negotiations with the Soviet leaders, the formal distinction between the level of bilateral
friendship and alliance (which Romania never questioned, they repeatedly emphasised)
and the level of some (allegedly) minor, concrete, tangible problems, differences of
opinion or divergences, as they called them, such minor problems being the CMEA
integration, the coordination of a bloc collective strong riposte against the Chinese, the
creation of a Warsaw Pact foreign policy body of coordination, etc. The Romania leaders
often argued that the two states could have differences of opinions in different concrete
problems, but that such a fact did not mean that the bilateral friendship and alliance
framework had to be affected in any way. In August 1964, the Soviet leaders finally
accepted this point of view, and promised that it would be accommodated provided that
the Romanian leaders would refrain from making public their different views.
This study found that Romanias early 1960s policy change towards the USSR had as
proximate cause the Romanian leaders perceptions of the threats posed to Romanias
interests by different Soviet specific policies or proposals. However, deciding to oppose or
block such perceived threats, the Romanian leaders were concerned not to cause what they
saw as the ultimate threat to Romanias security an open confrontation with the USSR.
Thus, they conceptualised Romanias early 1960s change of policy towards the USSR not
in terms of state grand strategy, namely in terms of breaking away from the alliance with
the USSR, but in terms of finding practical ways (tactics) to block specific Soviet
proposals perceived as threats to Romanias interests.

192

In 1966, Emil Bodnra summarised the conception of the Romanian leadership with
regard to Romanias relations with the USSR as follows: Despite all the differences we
[Romania and the USSR] have, we [Romania] are interested to have good relations with a
powerful neighbour and for that reason anywhere we [Romanians] meet them [the
Soviets], we say no to the problems we disagree with, but we seek the point where we can
say yes.659 A preliminary research for the post 1964-period in the Romanian archives
suggests that, once defined in the early 1960s, this conceptualisation of Romanias
relations with the USSR remained valid for the next decades, which means that trough its
findings, this study opens new research perspectives on the Romanian-Soviet post-1964
relations in general.

659

The minutes of the 12 May 1966 talks between Emil Bodnra and Zhou Enlai, in Budura, 2008, 283.

193

Annex Biographical information660

Apostol, Gheorghe (1913-2010): Member of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP (19481965); Member of the Political Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP (19651969); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1952-1954); First Vice-President of
the Council of Ministers (1961-1967); Romanias Ambassador in Argentina (19771983), Uruguay (1981-1988), Brazil (1983-1988).
Brldeanu, Alexandru (1911-1997): Secretary General of the Ministry of National
Economy (1946); Secretary General of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (19471948); Minister of Foreign Trade (1948-1953); President of the Planning State
Committee (1955-1956); Romanias representative at the CMEA (1955-1966); Vicepresident of the Council of Ministers (1955-1969); Alternate member of the Politburo
of the CC of the RWP (1963-1965); Member of the Political Executive Committee of
the CC of the RCP (1965-1969).
Bodnra, Emil (1904-1976): Member of the CC of the RWP/RCP (1945-1976); Member
of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP (1948-1965); Member of the Political Executive
Committee and of the Permanent Presidium of the CC of the RCP (1965-1976);
Minister of Defence (1947-1955); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (19541955, 1957-1967); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1955-1957);
Minister of Transportation and Telecommunications (1957-1959); Vice-President of
the State Council (1967-1976).
Boril, Petre (1906-1973): Member of the CC of the RWP/RCP (1948-1969); Member of
the Politburo of the CC of the RWP/Member of the Political Executive Committee of
the CC of the RCP (1952-1969); Deputy of the Minister of National Defence (19491950); Minister of Construction (1950); President of the Commission for State Control
(1951); Minister of Food Industry (1953-1955); Vice-President of the Council of
Ministers (1954-1955, 1957-1965); Member of the State Council (1965-1969).
Bunaciu, Avram (1909-1983): Public Prosecutor at the Peoples Tribunal (1945);
Secretary General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (1945-1948); President of the
Commission for State Control (1949); Minister of Justice (1948-1949, 1957-1958);
First Deputy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1950-1952); Minister of Foreign
Affairs (1958-1961); Vice-President of the State Council (1961-1965); Alternate
member of the CC of the RWP (1948-1955); Member of the CC of the RWP/RCP
(1955-1969).
Ceauescu, Nicolae (1918-1989): Deputy of the Minister of Agriculture (1949-1950);
Deputy of the Minister of National Defence (1950-1954); Member of the CC of the
RWP/RCP (1945-1948, 1952-1989); Member of the Politburo of the CC of the
660

Florica Dobre (Coordinator), Membrii CC ai PCR (1945-1989), Bucureti, Enciclopedic, 2004; Stan
Stoica, Dicionar biografic de istorie a Romniei, Bucureti, Meronia, 2008.

194

RWP/member of the Political Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP (19651989); Secretary of the CC of the RWP (1954-1965); First Secretary/Secretary General
of the CC of the RWP/RCP (1965-1989); Member in the Presidium of the Grand
National Assembly (1950-1955); President of the State Council (1967-1989); President
of the Socialist Republic of Romania (1974-1989).
Coliu, Dumitru (1907-1979): Romanias Military Attach in the USSR (1949-1951);
Member in the CC of the RWP/RCP (1945-1979); Member in the Presidium of the
GNA (1953-1955).
Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe (1901-1965): Secretary General of the CC of the RCP/RWP
(1945-1954); First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1948-1952); President
of the Council of Ministers (1952-1955); First Secretary of the CC of the RWP (19551965); President of the State Council (1961-1965).
Guin, Nicolae (1911-1999): Member in the CC of the RWP/RCP (1955-1979);
Romanias Ambassador in Yugoslavia (1954-1959), in the Soviet Union (1960-1966),
in Mongolia (1960-1964).
Marin, Gheorghe Gaston (1918-2010): Secretary in the Ministry of Industry (1948);
Minister of Electrification (1949); Minister of Electric Energy and Electro-technical
Industry (1951-1954); Vice-President of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy
(1954); President of the State Committee for Nuclear Energy (1956); President of the
Planning State Committee (1956-1965); Member in the CC of the RWP/RCP (19601984); Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1962-1969).
Maurer, Ion Gheorghe (1902-2000): Secretary General in the Ministry of
Communication (1944); Undersecretary of State at the Communication and Public
Works Ministry (1945) and at the Ministry of National Economy (1946);
Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (1947); Deputy of
the Minister of Industry (1948); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957-1958); President of
the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly (1958-1961); Vice-President of the
State Council (1961-1965); President of the Council of Ministers (1961-1974);
Member of the CC of the RWP/RCP (1945-1955, 1960-1974); Alternate member of
the CC of the RWP (1955-1960); Member of the Permanent Presidium of the CC of
the RCP (1965-1974); Member of the Politburo/from 1965 Political Executive
Committee (1960-1974).
Niculescu-Mizil, Paul (1923-2008): Member of CC of the RWP/RCP (1955-1989);
Member of the Political Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP (1965-1989);
Secretary of the CC of the RCP (1965-1972); Member of the Permanent Presidium of
the CC of the RCP (1969-1972); Deputy in the GNA (1957-1989); Chief of the Section
Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the RWP (1956-1968); Vice Prime Minister
(1972-1981); Minister of Education (1972-1976); Minister of Finances (1978-1981);
Romanias permanent representative at the CMEA (1979).

195

Mnescu, Corneliu (1916-2000): Member of the CC of the RCP (1965-1980); Deputy of

the Minister of National Defence (1948-1955); Romanias Ambassador in Hungary
(1960-1961); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1961-1972); Romanias representative at the
UNO (1967-1968); Romanias Ambassador in France (1977-1982).
Moghioro, Alexandru (1911-1969): First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers
(1954-1957); Vice-president of the Council of Ministers (1957-1965); Member of the
CC of RWP/RCP (1945-1969); Member of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP (19481965); Member of the Executive Political Committee of the CC of RCP (1965-1969);
Secretary of the CC (1948-1954, 1965-1969); Member of the GNAs Presidium (19481954).
Rutu, Leonte (1910-1993): Member of the Politburo/Political Executive Committee
(1955-1981); Secretary of the CC of the RCP (1965-1969); Vice-president of the
Council of Ministers (1969-1972); Chief of the Section Propaganda and Agitation
(1948-1965); Deputy in the Grand National Assembly (1948-1985).
Sljan, Leontin (1913-1966): Member in the CC of the RWP/RCP (1948-1966);
Alternate member of the Politburo (1955-1965); Member of the Political Executive
Committee (1965-1966); Deputy in the GNA (1948-1966); Minister of the Armed
Forces (1955-1966).
Stoica, Chivu (1908-1975): Vice-President of the Council of Ministers (1950-1954);
President of the Council of Ministers (1955-1961); President of the State Council
(1965-1967); Member of the CC of the RWP/RCP (1945-1975); Member of the
Politburo of the CC of the RWP (1945-1948, 1952-1965); Secretary of the CC of the
RCP (1967-1969).
Vas, Ghizela (1912-2004): Alternate member of CC of RWP (1948-1952); Member of the
CC of the RWP (1952-1984); Chief of the Foreign Relations Section of the CC of the
RWP (1957-1965); Chief of the International Section of the CC of the RWP (from
November 1965); Deputy to the chief of the International Relations and International
Economic Cooperation Section of the CC of the RCP (1975-1982).
Zaharescu, Barbu (1906-2000): Alternate member of the CC of the RWP (1955-1960);
Member of the CC of the RCP (1965-1974); Romanias Ambassador in Argentina,
Turkey, China and Vietnam (1955-1961).

196

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Scnteia
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1960: 28 June.
1961: January-June 1961 (every day); 7 December, 8 December, 9 December.
1962: 31 May, 17 June, 19 June, 21 June, 23 June, 25 June, 28 June, 20 November.
1963: P March, 9 April, 27 May, 4 June, 20 June, 17 July, 18 July, 28 July, 23 August, 1
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206