Table of Contents VULNERABLE GROUPS and REMEDIES

REMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW...................................................................

A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus..............................................................................
CASE: VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN....................................................................
CASE: MONCUPA vs. ENRILE et. al....................................................................
CASE: In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Del Rosario, et al.....
CASE: CHAVEZ vs. CA.......................................................................................
CASE: GUMABON et al. vs. Director of Bureau of Prisons...............................
CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Abadilla, et al. vs.
Ramos, et al...................................................................................................
CASE: PACQUING vs. CA.................................................................................
CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of ILUSORIO, et al.
vs. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, et al...........................................................................
B. Writ of Kalikasan...........................................................................................
C. Temporary Protection Orders/Permanent Protection Orders..........................
D. Investigation by the Commission on Human Rights......................................
E. The Writ of Amparo.......................................................................................
CASE: SECRETARY vs. MANALO......................................................................
CASE: ROXAS vs. ARROYO et. al.....................................................................
CASE: BURGOS vs. ARROYO et. al..................................................................
CASE: CADAPAN vs. ESPERON et. al...............................................................

REMEDIES UNDER THE NATIONAL LAW

A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time
and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit
to and receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider
in that behalf. Hence, an essential requisite for the availability of the writ is
actual deprivation of personal liberty. (J. Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)

The 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article III Section 15 states that: The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
While under Article VII Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states
that: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall
not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested
or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.

CASE: VILLAVICENCIO vs. LUKBAN

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
GR 14639, 25 March 1919
Facts:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute,
which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed.
Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined
to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period,
the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor
for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and
Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers, At any rate, about
midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief
of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women
were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were
under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region
and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.
The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a
representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25. The vessels reached their destination at
Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and
Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as
parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were
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prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. Just about the
time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney
for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees
presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme
Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was
made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao
and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be
considered as including them. Some of the women married, others assumed
more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly
portion found means to return to Manila (7 of which became witnesses in the
present case).

Issue: Whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
acquire the persons of the prostitutes shipped to Davao.

Held: A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is

restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them
over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings,
they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where
they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they
freely and truly waived this right. Further, if the public official is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court
and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to
do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted
with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila
to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have the same means to
return them from Davao to Manila. The said officials, within the reach of
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process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by

forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. Both on
reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by the respondents
constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

The remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet a situation in which there is
restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be
proceeded against is also no bar to the institution of habeas corpus
proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas
corpus, it is proper for the writ to be submitted by some person in his behalf.
RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY. A prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential objects and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.

COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT. For respondents to fulfill the order of the court
granting the writ of habeas corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could
have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the
writ; (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or
infirmity these persons could not safely be brought before the Court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or

their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure,

Sec. 87.)

CASE: MONCUPA vs. ENRILE et. al

EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO
GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986
Facts:
Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on 22 April 1982 at
about 10:50 p.m. at the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon
City where he was detained. On 23 April 1982, on the allegation that he was
a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment
Order (PCO) was issued against him and 8 other persons. After two separate
investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr.,
Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by
Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that
Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both
investigators recommended the prosecution of Moncupa only for illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under
Presidential Decree 33. Consequently, two separate information were filed
against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of PD 33 before the City
Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed
were for violation of PD 885 as amended. Moncupa was excluded from the
charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. Moncupa's arraignment and
further proceedings have not been pursued, and yet, Moncupa's motions for
bail were denied by the lower court. Moncupa filed a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus. Juan Ponce Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar, Fernando
Gorospe, and Jose Castro contend that the petition has become moot and
academic must necessarily be denied, as Moncupa may have been released
from his detention cell (i.e. temporary release).
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Issue:
Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus has become moot and
academic in view of Moncupa's temporary release.

Held:
Attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him,
i.e. (1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner
gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila. (2) His
liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also
required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. (3) His
freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not
"participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to
the interest of national security." (4) He is required to report regularly to
respondents or their representatives. The reservation of the military in the
form of restrictions attached to the temporary release constitute restraints
on the liberty of Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement
of Moncupa. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ
of habeas corpus. In the light of the ruling in Villavicencio vs. Lukban, which
held that "a prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient," the present
petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A release
that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must
be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there
is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may
still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

CASE: In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Del Rosario, et al.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA,
petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971
Facts:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of
the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for
November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other,
at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. As a
consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including
practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained
extensive, as well as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not
been for the timely medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines (Marcos)
announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971
suspending, the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as
well as others who may be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by
them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed by
persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then
detained, upon the authority of said proclamation. Petitioners questioned the
validity of the said Proclamation.

Issue:

Whether the Proclamation 899, which suspends the privilege of writ of

habeas corpus is unconstitutional on the ground that President Marcos
arbitrarily issued the said proclamation order.

Ruling:

The President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as
amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional.
Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend
the privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the
Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must
require the suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under
consideration declares that there has been and there is actually a state of
rebellion and
that "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in
order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and
preserve the authority of the State." The President declared in Proclamation
No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.
Furthermore, In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, the President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action
open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces,
which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of
the two (2) other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least
harsh.

CASE: CHAVEZ vs. CA

ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA,
respondents.
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G.R. No. L-29169

August 19, 1968

Facts:
Chavez (petitioner) with his co-conspirator was charged of qualified theft of a
motor vehicle. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. During
the trial, the prosecution presented the petitioner as their witness however
the counsel of the latter objected as he argued that as a matter of right, it
will incriminate the petitioner. The prosecution insisted to present the
petitioner as their ordinary witness and not a state witness, and proceeded
with the direct examination. The Presiding judge of the Court of first instance
Quezon City sustained the action of the Fiscal. The judge manifested that
there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness-stand including the accused. The judge assured that if there should
be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for defense
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him. The trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez
who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
theft. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). CA, however, dismiss
the appeal. The petitioner filed a petition invoking that he is entitled, on
habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the
trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right
not to be compelled to testify against himself.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled on habeas corpus and to be freed from
imprisonment on the ground that that in the trial which resulted in his
conviction, he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to
testify against himself.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court directed the respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila
or the Director of Prisons or any other officer or person in custody of
petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to discharge said Roger Chavez from
custody.
10

The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high

prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the
accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the
absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated.
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack,
which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the
Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs.
Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must
be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at
stake.
"A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested.
From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All
acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties
attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.

CASE: GUMABON et al. vs. Director of Bureau of Prisons

MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO,
EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
[GR L-30026, 30 January 1971]

Facts:
Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on 5 May 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno
Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of
11

rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made
to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on 8
March 1954 and, as to the third, on 15 December 1955. Lastly, Blas
Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses and on 12 January 1954 penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above
convictions. Each of them has served more than 13 years. Subsequently, in
People v. Hernandez (reaffirmed by People vs. Lava), the supreme Court
ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex offense. The
fear that the Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons ruling stands as an obstacle to
their release on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted Gumabon, et. al. to
ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded.

Issue: Whether habeas corpus the appropriate remedy where the accused
had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed,
and in light of the Hernandez ruling.

Held:
The writ of habeas corpus' latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of
restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not
known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the
grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for
a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even
for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any
deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions
even if presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was
demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen. Likewise in Conde v. Rivera, one that
broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a disregard of the
constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles
the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom." The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
The scope and flexibility of the writ its capacity to reach all manner of
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illegal detention its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with
the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice
within its reach are surfaced and corrected. Where, however, the detention
complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range
of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. Once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that
rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. Thus, the
continued incarceration after the 12-year period when such is the maximum
length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when
others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at
war with equal protection. Where a sentence imposes a punishment in
excess of the power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the
excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the
weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence is void only
as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being that
the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus
unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid. The only
means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the
accused is the writ of habeas corpus. Insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus
is concerned, the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting
the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true.
Gumabon, et. al. clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of
justifying their release.

CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Abadilla, et al. vs.
Ramos, et al.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO
N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in behalf of
the minors JUNE ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA.
13

THERESA, ANNA ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS and BART JOSEPH, all

surnamed ABADILLA, petitioners,
vs.
General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of Staff, AFP; Major General RENATO
DE VILLA, Commanding General, Philippine Constabulary & ViceChief of Staff, AFP; and Brigadier General ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
Commanding General, CAPCOM, PC, respondents.
[GR L-79173, 1 December 1987]
Facts:
On 27 January 1987, a group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized
control of the radio-television broadcasting facilities of the Republic
Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon City, ostensibly for
the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional government. While the
takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the
national capital, it did not succeed. On 29 January 1987, the mutineers
surrendered to the military authorities and the possession of the facility was
restored to the owners and managers thereof. Soon thereafter, the military
authorities conducted an investigation of the matter. On 18 April 1987, a
group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military
facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black
Saturday Revolt," did not succeed either. After the incident, the military
authorities also conducted an investigation. The first investigation was
concluded on 12 March 1987. The investigation disclosed that Colonel
Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of
the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA radio-television
facilities. The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that
the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that
the appropriate charges be filed against him for violation of Article of War 67
(Mutiny or Sedition 1, Article of War 94) in relation to Article 139 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of PD 1866, and such other offenses that
may be warranted by the evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was
prepared against the Colonel. The investigation conducted on "The Black
Saturday Revolt" ended on 27 May 1987. It was found at said investigation
that Colonel Abadilla was also involved in the mutiny. The Board of Officers
conducting the investigation also recommended that the case be endorsed
for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against
the Colonel. The Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly. Colonel Abadilla
was at large when both investigations were conducted. On 4 May 1987 or
some two weeks before the second investigation was concluded, Major
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General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and Vice Chief of

Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of Colonel
Abadilla. On 21 May 1987, AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued
General Orders 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular
officers of the AFP. On 7 July 1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City
filed an Information for Slight Physical Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla
(Criminal Case 0237558). On 27 July 1987, a combined element of the
Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla. He
was detained first in Camp Crame in Quezon City and later, up to the
present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati. On 30 July 1987, another Information,
this time for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition) was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City against
Colonel Abadilla. The case was assigned to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial
Court in Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-53382). On the same date, Mrs. Susan
S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their minor children
June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna,
Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went to the Supreme Court and filed the
Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the detention of
Colonel Abadilla.

Issue: Whether Colonel Abadilla's confinement is illegal because under Article

of War 70, a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is
charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.

Held:
Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987,
Colonel Abadilla was a military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to
military law. Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which
discusses court-martial jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be
"The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets,
soldiers, and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on
discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to
an offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not
revived by a reentry into the military service."

15

Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the

Section, to wit "So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is
tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable
discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the
offense." This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as
he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior
officers, and his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a
dishonorable discharge. Section 1 (b) of PD 1860, as amended, even
acknowledges instances where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an
individual even after he shall have been separated from active service, which
provides that "all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the
aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the aforementioned situations, the
case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities
when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article
38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction
over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service
without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law." Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military
authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a
serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared
against him, which satisfies the requirement of Article of War 70, which
provides that a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is
charged with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War. Thus, as
the detention of Colonel Abadilla under the circumstances is not illegal, the
Petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit.

CASE: PACQUING vs. CA

NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL
WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 122954
16

February 15, 2000

Lessons related to Habeas Corpus:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to
antiquity was devised as a speedy and effectually remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice and to have the
issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint rests on the
petitioner who attacks the restraint
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is
so charged its judgement, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack
by habeas corpus.

Facts:

Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21, 1981, up
to present by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
in Criminal Case 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, for
the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps Volunteer
Margaret Viviene Carmona. Some 12 years later, or on 9 June 1993, Feria
sought to be transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections
in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the
Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be
effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the
Commitment Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information. It was then
discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing. In response to the inquiries made by counsel of
17

Feria, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court
of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the
records of Criminal Case 60677 could not be found in their respective offices.
Upon further inquiries, the entire records appear to have been lost or
destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second and third floor of the
Manila City Hall on 3 November 1986. On 3 October 1994, Feria filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court
against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch
2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying
for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued
detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process. In its Resolution dated 10 October 1994,
the Second Division of the Supreme Court resolved (a) to issue the Writ of
Habeas Corpus; (b) to order the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila to conduct an immediate raffle of the case among the incumbent
judges thereof; and (c) to require [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to
set the case for hearing on 13 October 1994, try and decide the same on the
merits and thereafter furnish the Supreme Court with a copy of his decision
thereon; [2] the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, et. al. to make a return of
the Writ on or before the close of office hours on 12 October 1994 and
appear personally and produce the person of Norberto Feria y Pacquing on
said date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom the case is raffled, and
[3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly
authorized representative(s) to serve the Writ and Petition, and make a
return thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his duly authorized
representative(s) to appear personally and escort the person of Norberto
Feria y Pacquing at said date and time of hearing. The case was then raffled
to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which on 15 November
1994, after hearing, issued an Order dismissing the case on the ground that
the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or
commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper
remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be
filed with the court which rendered the decision. Feria duly appealed said
Order to the Court of Appeals, which on 28 April 1995, rendered the Decision
affirming the decision of the trial court with the modification that "in the
interest of orderly administration of justice" and "under the peculiar facts of
the case" Feria may be transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements. With the motion for
reconsideration being denied for lack of merit, Feria filed the petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
18

Issue: Whether the mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case
subsequent to conviction of the accused would render the judgment of
conviction void, or would it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a
writ of habeas corpus

Held: The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to
antiquity, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defence of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the
cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to
have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. 15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the
first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is
violative of his constitutional right to due process. Herein, based on the
records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient
evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as
the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial admissions, both
verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment "habang
buhay". Further, the records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly
Report dated January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the
fact that Feria was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on 11
January 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records
under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is
prima facie evidence of facts therein stated. As a general rule, the burden of
proving illegal restraint rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. If
the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the
return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and
the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
Since the public officials have sufficiently shown good ground for the
detention, Feria's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4
of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, there is also no showing that
19

petitioner duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with

Homicide, hence for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already
become final and executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is
not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Put another way, in order
that a judgment may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it
must be void for lack of jurisdiction.

CASE: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of ILUSORIO, et al. vs.
ILUSORIO-BILDNER, et al.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES
and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789
July 19, 2001

Lessons re Habeas Corpus:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention or by which is withheld from one entitled thereto it is available
where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedom, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all the manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom
if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of
liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.

20

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live

with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs. That is a matter beyond judicial
authority.

Facts:

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano

Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman
of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On 11 July 1942, Erlinda
Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of 30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave.,
Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo
City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (present age, age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age
50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). On 30
December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia
and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano
an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, USA. As a consequence, Potencianos
health deteriorated. On 25 February 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property
of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. On 31 May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On 11
March 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio-Yap refused Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorios
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo City. After due hearing, on 5 April 1999, the Court of
Appeals rendered decision, ordering Bildner and Yap to allow visitation rights
to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children,
21

notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, and ordering the writ of
habeas corpus previously issued be recalled and the petition for habeas
corpus be denied due course. Hence, the two petitions, which were
consolidated and are jointly decided.

Issue: Whether a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal Bliss

Held: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully
denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the
petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral. Herein, there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that
would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio
is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make
choices. The crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts
to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration,
and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Still, with his full mental capacity coupled
with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
22

right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it
awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never
even prayed for such right.

B. Writ of Kalikasan
Overview
Then Chief Justice Reynato Puno said that while the writ of habeas corpus
originated in England as a legal recourse for those wrongly detained, and the
writ of amparo came from Latin America to address its own brush with
human rights violations, the writ of kalikasan is proudly Philippine-made to
deal with cases in the realm of ecology.
History
In 2009, the Supreme Court held a forum on environmental protection in
Baguio City where difficulties in the prosecution of ecology-related crimes
and the huge backlog pending in the courts were identified as among the
issues affecting the implementation of environmental laws.
The high court then came out with the writ of kalikasan the following year
when it issued the rules of procedure for environmental cases as a special
civil action to deal with environmental damage of such magnitude that it
threatens life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Provision for the Writ of Kalikasan was written in 2010 by the Supreme Court
of the Philippines under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases as a Special Civil Action. The Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Reynato Puno took the initiative and issued Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Case because Section 16, Article II of the Philippines' 1986
Constitution was not a self-executing provision.
A non-self-executing provision refers to one that cannot be invoked before
the courts as it is. There must first be an enabling legislation or some other
legal means by which the same can be effectuated and be a basis of a legal
cause of action. (Tanada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997)
Writ of Kalikasan; defined
23

"Kalikasan" is a Filipino word for "nature".

A Writ of Kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law that provides
protection of one's Constitutional right to a healthy environment, as outlined
in Section 16, Article II of the Philippine Constitution, which says the "state
shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
The Writ of Kalikasan means a legal remedy available to any natural or
juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces. (Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC Rule 7, Sec. 1)
Who and Where shall be filed?
The writ of kalikasan may be sought by anyone
a) whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated,
or
b) whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
threatened with violation, by an unlawful act of omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity and such violation or threat involves
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants of two or more cities, or provinces. (Rule 7, Section
1)
The petition for the writ of kalikasan shall be filed with the Supreme Court or
with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals. (Rule 7, Section 3)
Note, however, that the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions. (Rule 7, Section 17)
Within 3 days from filing the petition deemed sufficient in form and
substance, the Court shall issue the writ and require the respondent to file a
return. (Rule 7, Section 5)
24

In response, the respondent is required to file a return containing his

defenses and supporting evidence within a non-extendible 10-day period
after the service to him of the writ. He must raise all defenses in the return,
otherwise they are deemed waived. A general denial of the petitioners
allegations shall be deemed an admission by the respondent. (Rule 7,
Section 8)
If the petition fails to file a return, the hearing shall proceed ex parte (i.e.,
the hearing will proceed with only 1 side being heard). (Rule 7, Section 10)
The penalty of indirect contempt may be meted out to a) a respondent who
refuses to file the return, b) a respondent who unduly delays the filing of a
return, c) a respondent who falsifies a return, or d) anyone who disobeys or
resists a lawful process of court order. (Rule 7, Section 13)

Highlights of rules
1. Highlights of the Rules include provisions on: (1) citizen suits, (2)
consent decree, (3) environmental protection order, (4) writ of
kalikasan, (5) writ of continuing mandamus, (6) strategic lawsuits
against public participation (SLAPP) and (7) the precautionary principle.
2. The provision on citizen suits liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws. Citizen suits have proven critical in
forcing government and its agencies to act on its duty to protect and
preserve the environment. The terminology of the text reflects the
doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July
30, 1993). To further encourage the protection of the environment, the
Rules enable litigants enforcing environmental rights to file their cases
as citizen suits. As a procedural device, citizen suits permit deferred of
payment of filing fees until after the judgment
3. The use of a consent decree is an innovative way to resolve
environmental cases. It allows for a compromise agreement between
two parties in environmental litigation over issues that would normally
be litigated in court, and other matters that may not necessarily be of
issue in court.
4. An environmental protection order refers to an order issued by the
court directing or enjoining any person or government agency to
25

perform or desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve

or rehabilitate the environment. It integrates both prohibitive and
mandatory reliefs in order to appropriately address the factual
circumstances surrounding the case. This remedial measure can also
be prayed for in the writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus.
5. Similar to the writs of habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data, the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan is immediate in nature. It contains a
very specific set of remedies which may be availed of individually or
cumulatively, to wit it is available to a natural or juridical person,
entity authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental
organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered
with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The
petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan can be filed with the
Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals.
Likewise, the summary process leading to the issuance of the writ of
kalikasan dispenses with extensive litigation; this facilitates the prompt
disposition of matters before the court.
6. Another innovation is the rule on the writ of continuing mandamus
which integrates the ruling in Concerned Residents of Manila Bay v.
MMDA G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 8, 2008) and the existing rule
on the issuance of the writ of mandamus. Procedurally, its filing before
the courts is similar to the filing of an ordinary writ of mandamus.
However, the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order
is made available as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the
writ itself.
7. As a special civil action, the writ of continuing Mandamus may be
availed of to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by
law. It permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under
the court's decision. For this purpose, the court may compel the
submission of compliance reports from the respondent government

26

agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its

decision.
8. Its availability as a special civil action likewise complements its role
as a final relief in environmental civil cases and in the writ of kalikasan,
where continuing mandamus may likewise be issued should the facts
merit such a relief.
9. Both petitions for the issuance of the writs of kalikasan and
mandamus are exempt from the payment of docket fees.
10. Since formidable legal challenges may be mounted against those
who seek to enforce environmental law, or to assert environmental
rights, in light of this, the Rules make available a formidable defense in
these by creating a rule on strategic lawsuit against public
participation (SLAPP). . These legal challenges may be pre-emptive in
character and may be done in order to chill the latter.
11. Another significant aspect of the Rules that derives from the
transboundary and temporal nature of ecological injury is the adoption
of the precautionary principle. In this context, the precautionary
principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases
before the courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases
where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be achieved. By
applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of
facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of
preserving and protecting the environment. This may be further
evinced from the second paragraph where bias is created in favor of
the constitutional right the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
12. Some important provisions on criminal procedure can also be found
under the Rules.
The rule on bail makes available to the accused the privilege of bail
from any court, within and outside the jurisdiction of the court which
had issued the warrant of arrest. The immediate availability of bail is
intended to obviate long periods of detention.
13. One important innovation under the rule on bail is the execution of
an undertaking by the accused and counsel, empowering the judge to
enter a plea of not guilty, in the event the accused fails to appear at
the arraignment. This authorization permits the court to try the case in
27

absentia, thereby addressing a fundamental concern surrounding the

prosecution of criminal cases in general, where the accused jumps bail
and the court unable to proceed with the disposition of the case in view
of the absence of the accused and the failure to arraign the latter.

C. Temporary Protection Orders/Permanent Protection Orders

Republic Act 9262 "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004".

It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination
of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of
the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party. (Sec. 2, RA9262)

It seeks to address the prevalence of violence against women and

children (VAWC), abuses on women and their children by their intimate
partners like:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Husband or ex-husband
Live-in partner or ex-live in partner
Boyfriend/girlfriend or ex-boyfriend/ex-girlfriend
Dating partner or ex-dating partner

The Act classifies violence against women and children (VAWC) as a public
crime.

What is Violence against Women and their Children?

28

It refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a

woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. (Par a, Section 3, RA 9262)

It includes acts such as:

1. Physical Violence
2. Sexual violence
3. Psychological violence
4. Economic abuse
What are the acts that can be classified as Violence against Women
and Their Children?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. (Sec. 5 of RA 9262)

What can women and children do under the law?

-

The law allows women and their children to secure barangay

protection order and/or temporary or permanent protection order from
the courts.

They can also file an independent civil action for damages and criminal
action for the violation of anti-VAWC Act.

Who gets protected under the Law?

29

The law recognizes the unequal relations of a man and a woman in

an abusive relationship where it is usually the woman who is the
disadvantaged. Thus, the law protects the woman and her children.

The victim, the child who is a minor (legitimate and illegitimate),

and a person aged 18 years and beyond who doesnt have the
ability to decide for herself/himself because of an emotional,
physical and mental illness can make full use of the law.

Any child under the care of a woman is also protected under the
law.

What are Protection Orders?

It is an order prescribed in the Anti-VAWC Act to prevent further abuse

of or violence against a woman and her child. It also provides them
relief from said abuse or violence. (Sec. 8 of RA. 9262)

What do Protection Orders provide?

The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of

safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption
in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of
the victim to independently regain control over her life.

What are the types of Protection Orders?

1. Barangay protection order (BPO)
2. Temporary protection order (TPO)
3. Permanent protection order (PPO).
What are the reliefs provided by Protection Orders?
1. Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts that
constitute violence against women and children mentioned in Section 5
of RA 9262.
2. Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly;
3. Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the
petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily
for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no
property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal
30

effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement
agent to accompany the respondent has gathered his things and escort
respondent from the residence;
4. Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated
family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and
to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any
specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family
or household member;
5. Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and
other essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing
the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to
the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely
restored to the possession of the automobile and other essential
personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or respondent's
removal of personal belongings;
6. Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the
petitioner;
7. Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her
child if entitled to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of the income
or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted
directly to the woman.
8. Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm
or deadly weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for
appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of license
and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a
firearm;
9. Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted,
including, but not limited to, property damage, medical expenses,
childcare expenses and loss of income;
10.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO
shall not preclude a petitioner from applying for, or the court from
granting a TPO or PPO. (Sec. 8 of RA 9262)
Who may file Petition for Protection Orders?
1. Parent or guardian
2. Grandparents
3. Children and grandchildren
4. Relatives (aunts, uncles, cousins, in-laws)
5. Local officials and DSWD social workers
6. Police
7. Lawyers
8. Counselors
9. Therapists
10.
Health care providers (nurses, doctors, barangay health workers)
31

11.
Any two people who came from the city or municipality where
VAWC happened and who have personal knowledge of the crime (Sec.
9 of RA 9262)
Where to file an application for a Protection Order?

An application for a TPO or PPO may be filed in the regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial
court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of the
petitioner.
Provided, however, that if a family court exists in the place of
residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that
court. (Sec. 10 of RA 9262)

How to Apply for a Protection Order?

The application for a protection order must be in writing, signed and
verified under oath by the applicant.
It may be filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in any
civil or criminal case.
If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be
accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to
a. The circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim
b. The circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of
the application.

When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her
life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant
shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over
which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing
address for purpose of service processing.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the
preparation of the application. Law enforcement agents shall also
extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases
brought to their attention. (Sec. 11 of RA 9262)

How are Protection Orders enforced?

All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. (Sec. 12 of RA 9262)
What are the penalties for offenders of the Law on Violence against
Women and Children and violators of the Protection Orders?
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of
support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall
render the respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of
court.
32

If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall order the
offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate
authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on
matter.
Violation of Protection Orders shall be punishable with a fine ranging
from Five Thousand Pesos (P5, 000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,
000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.
Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30)
days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the
offended party may file for any of the acts committed.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall
constitute contempt of court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action that the
offended party may file for any of the acts committed. (Sec. 8, 12 and
21 of RA 9262)

What is a Barangay Protection Order (BPO), who may Issue (BPOs)

and How?
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued
by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of RA. 9262.
A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after
determination of the basis of the application.
If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a
BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad.
If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that
the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of
the BPO. (Sec. 14 of RA 9262)
How many days will the BPO be effective?
BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. (Sec. 14 of RA 9262)
What are Temporary Protection Orders?
Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order
issued by the court on the date of filing of the application
determination that such order should be issued. (Sec. 15 of RA 9262)
How many days will the TPO be effective?
A TPO shall be effective for thirty (30) days.(Sec. 15 of RA 9262)

33

What may be granted or included in a TPO?

A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in
RA 9262. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO
prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. (Sec. 15 of RA
9262)
What is a Permanent Protection Order?
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection order issued by
the court after notice and hearing.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section
8 of RA 9262 in a PPO.(Sec. 16 of RA 9262)
How are Protection Orders applied to Criminal Cases?
The foregoing provisions on protection orders shall be applicable and
impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence against
women and their children.
(Sec. 22 of RA 9262)
Where to seek help?

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Women and children who are victims of violence may seek help from
the following offices or agencies:
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
NCR Ugnayang Pag-asa Legarda, Manila Crisis Intervention Unit (CIU).
Philippine National Police (PNP)
Women and Childrens Concern Division (WCCD)
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Violence against Women and Childrens Desk (VAWCD)
Public Attorneys Office, DOJ
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) Womens Desk
Womens Crisis Center Women and Children Crisis Care & Protection
Unit East Avenue Medical Center (WCCCPU-EAMC) (Sec. 39, RA 9262)

D. Investigation by the Commission on Human Rights

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XIII Section 17 par. 1 There is hereby
created an office called the Commission on Human rights.

34

As to constitutional status, it is not the same level as compared to the

other constitutional commissions in Article IX of the Constitution.
The inherent weakness in the enforcement system of human rights in
the Philippines can be attributed to the provisions in the Philippine
Constitution. The Commission on Human Rights, established as a
constitutional independent body to pursue the state policy on the

promotion and protection of human rights, has been empowered to

investigate only all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. (J. Coquia, Human Rights, 2012 )

Section 18 provides the powers and functions of the Commission which

in essence is only investigative. (J. Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, 2011)

INVESTIGATE, on its owner on complaint by any party all forms of human

rights violations involving civil and political rights;

ADOPT its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the rules of Court.

PROVIDE appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of

all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad and
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

EXERCISE visitorial powers over jails prisons or detention facilities;

ESTABLISH a continuing program of research, education and information to

enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

RECOMMEND to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights

and to provide for compensation to victim of violations of human rights, or
their families;

MONITOR the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights;

35

GRANT immunity from prosecution to any persons whose testimony or

whose possession of documents or other evidences is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or
under its authority;

REQUEST the assistance of any department, bureau, office or agency in the

performance of its functions;

APPOINT its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

PERFORM such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483 (1991), declared that
the Commission did not possess the power of adjudication, and emphasized
that its functions were primarily investigatory.
In Simon Jr. vs. Commission on Human Rights, 229 Scra 117, the Supreme
Court said that the commission can only protect civil and political rights as
distinct from less traditional social and economic rights.
It can only issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders. To exercise
such powers, it has to seek authority from the regular courts (EPZA vs.
Commission on Human Rights, 208 Scra 125 1992)

How Investigation by Commission on Human Rights conducted

Complaints filed to the CHR may come directly from victims, by way of motu
proprio or from community level. Predominantly, most complaints originate
from organizations or agencies. The commission recognizes this fact and so it
maintains benevolent and yet stern relationships to these groups.

36

After the processing of documents, a special investigator and an attorney

officer would handle the case. The investigator would study if the case needs
an investigative inquiry or just verification of complaint details. Meanwhile,
the attorney officer shall check whether a violation was really committed and
if conciliation/mediation could be undertaken to resolve the case.

The success of all of these actions depend on the conduct of relations of CHR
officers to the concerned groups and government agencies. Through the
process of inquiry up to recommendation, the CHR will need the police
agency. It might also request for the aid of other agencies that would better
address the problem.

If the parties agree for an amicable settlement or one party promises to

rectify and make amends, CHR will make sure that things agreed upon are
followed. If some circumstances arise that merit judicial intervention, CHR
will forward the case to the court.

To this point, CHR has to mobilize its units properly and at the same time
cooperate with the appropriate government agencies to swiftly respond and
hopefully resolve cases.

To this point, CHR has to mobilize its units properly and at the same time
cooperate with the appropriate government agencies to swiftly respond and
hopefully resolve cases.

E. The Writ of Amparo

37

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights states that

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

While the 1987 Philippine Constitution, ARTICLE 3 Section 1 provides,

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
What is the Writ of Amparo?
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof. (J. Coquia, Human rights 2012)
What rule governs petitions for and the issuance of a writ of
amparo?
It is governed by The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC ),
which was approved by the Supreme Court on 25 September 2007. This Rule
also governs existing cases involving extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
What is the Supreme Courts basis in issuing the Rule?
The Rule was drafted pursuant to the Supreme Court constitutional power to
promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
under Article VIII Section 5 (5) which provides,
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

When does the Rule take effect?

The Rule takes effect on 24 October 2007, following its publication in three
(3) newspapers of general circulation.
Who may file a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo?

38

The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person
or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is
no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other
authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition
by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of
all others, observing the order established herein.

Where can the petition be filed?

The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of
its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be
returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their
justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to
any Regional Trial
Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of
its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred.

39

How much is the docket or filing fees for the petition?

There is NO docket and other lawful fees for the petition. The court, justice or
judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately.
What are the required contents of the petition?
The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for
the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for the petition may include a general prayer for other
just and equitable reliefs.
When is the writ of amparo issued?
Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately
order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ under his or her own
hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it. The writ shall also
set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be
later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Is there any penalty in case of refusal to issue or serve the writ?

40

Yes. A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a
deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the
court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions.
How is the writ of amparo served?
The writ is served on the respondent by a judicial officer or by a person
deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to
make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
After the writ is served, what should the respondent do?
Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall
file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall,
among other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible
for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to
the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further
state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance
of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of
the person or persons responsible;
(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
death or disappearance;
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance;
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or

41

disappearance; and
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its
resolution and the prosecution of the case. A general denial of the
allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. All defenses shall be raised in
the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.
What happens if the respondent fails to file return?
The court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte or even
without the appearance of the respondent.
What is the nature of the hearing on the petition?
The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the
parties. The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the
same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.
What are the interim reliefs available to the petitioner?
Upon filing of the petition or at any time before final judgment, the court,
justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion
or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency
or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and
securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or
institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall accredit the
persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family,
in accordance with guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons
and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may
be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion
and after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
42

relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in detail the
place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the motion is
opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers
to determine the merit of the opposition. The movant must show that the
inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time,
place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall
expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for
justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to
produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on
behalf of the movant. The motion may be opposed on the ground of national
security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for
admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the
witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
Are these interim reliefs also available to the respondent?
Yes, but only the interim reliefs of Inspection Order and the Production Order.
These interim orders may be issued only after a verified motion is filed by
the respondent, supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having
personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent, and after due
hearing.
43

What is the required burden of proof?

The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. The
respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed
in the performance of duty. The respondent who is a public official or
employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
Can the respondent invoke the legal presumption (Rules of Court, Rule
131, Sec. 3[m]) that official duty has been regularly performed?
No. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade
responsibility or liability.

How long does the court have in deciding the petition?

The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied.
What happens if the court determines that it cannot proceed for a
valid cause, such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear
due to threats on their lives?
The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it. The amparo
court may, on its own or upon motion by any party, order the revival of the
petition when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed
with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2)
years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
Does the filing of the petition preclude the filing of separate
criminal, civil or administrative actions?
No. However, when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed, but the reliefs under the writ shall be
available by motion in the criminal case, and the procedure under this Rule
shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.
44

When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the
writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the
criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall
continue to apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.

CASE: SECRETARY vs. MANALO

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
G.R. No. 180906
October 7, 2008

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in

the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by
the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a
broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances," hence "representatives from all sides of the
political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice
system" participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." It was an
exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules
to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances,"
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
45

process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the

other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside
the protection of law."

The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means

"protection" in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America
became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the
practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. One
of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his
native state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all persons
in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was
incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise
and preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by
laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and
Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to
granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general
declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican

constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional
right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to
restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo
thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting
individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power
to make law for the entire nation.

46

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere,

gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of
each country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to
the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity,
her own painful history conceived." What began as a protection against acts
or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later
evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra
leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a
judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries
adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of
constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights. Other countries like
Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or
fundamental rights.

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for
the writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed
by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo
casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of
judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.

47

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause
through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may
not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a
petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo
Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out
of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of
a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing
the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation
and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles
is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition,

Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order" to stop petitioners and/or their
officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty
and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,prior to the promulgation of the
Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5)
of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have
their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and
48

suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced

disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
CASE: ROXAS vs. ARROYO et. al
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,
MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N.
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH
VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 189155

September 7, 2010

FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United
States, enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of
which she is a member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her
companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat.
While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in
civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.
When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New
Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her companions and
was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise
of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to
abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named RC
that those who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group and
that she was abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.

49

On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone
with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the
group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.
After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell
phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim
card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the highranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief
that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case
to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate
action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and
habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it
was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction
and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in
an amparo petition.
2.
Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and
affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the
privilege of the writ of amparo.
3.
Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is
necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
ANSWERS:
1.
No.
2.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence.
3.
Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1.
DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF
AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents
is legally inaccurate The use of the doctrine of command responsibility
as justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is
legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law
50

that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis
to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of
Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable
substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a
full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility does not preclude impleading military or police commanders
on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather
on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence In amparo proceedings,
the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of
other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when
obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on
patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ
may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual
or threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the
respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and
torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept
in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant
of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITIVE:
51

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it
modified the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as
follows:
1.

Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence,
take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioners abduction and torture.
2.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or
his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his
successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR,
including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.
Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to
furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of
this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.
Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its
investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide
or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit
to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by
this Court.
The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals,
for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and
determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations,
there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with
recommendation to the Supreme Court for its consideration. It was declared
that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in
order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

52

CASE: BURGOS vs. ARROYO et. al

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO
GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 183711

June 22, 2010
FACTS:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a
farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was
forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from
the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground
floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and
announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner
sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son
Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation Office
(LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was
registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong.
The said vehicle was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for
transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas
abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of
this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare
parts were cannibalized. The police was likewise able to generate
cartographic sketches of two of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview
of eyewitnesses.

53

On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and

Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris,
Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka
Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the New Peoples Army
(NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition
for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioners motion
to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that
the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found
that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert
their effort in the conduct of investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the
burden of connecting certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Ramon
and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the Order of Battle. As
for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as rather shallow and
conducted haphazardly.
PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct
an exhaustive and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
ANSWER: Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and our
review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the
AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation
into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary
diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot
rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, is undertaken.
DISPOSITIVE:
54

In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives:
DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate
investigative proceedings, including field investigations acting as the
Courts directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo
REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the
Commission on Human Rights, of all documents and records in their
possession and as the Commission on Human Rights may require, relevant to
the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the
Commission on Human Rights the records and results of the investigation the
PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, which
were not included in their previous submissions to the Commission on
Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights
may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the
Commission on Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority
granted under this Resolution;
AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive
and exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not
limited to the specific directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary
measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report
with its recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent
Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment
of the other respondents who have all been impleaded in their official
capacities, all subsequent resolutions and actions from the Supreme Court
were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents of the
impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present
respondents shall continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the
responsibilities and accountabilities they may have incurred during their
incumbencies.
55

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.

CASE: CADAPAN vs. ESPERON et. al

ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.)
GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL.
ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 184495, 187109
31May 2011
Facts:
Following the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel
Merino by armed men from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy Bulacan,
spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the court impleading Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac,
Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Mirabelle asrespondents. By resolution, a writ of
habeas corpus was issued returnable to the presiding justice of the Court of
Appeals.
By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied
that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the
Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who
all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had
inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and
disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing.
Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise:
As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino are indeed missing,
the present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since
the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality
of ones detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody
of the persons subject of the petition. It being the situation, the proper
56

remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by

initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by
law.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration , Erlinda Cadapan and
Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo With
Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents. The petition
impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the
addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the
Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police
(PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped
as respondent in light of her immunity from suit.
By Resolution, the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to the Special
Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the
consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus
petition.
By Decision, the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in
the habeas corpus case and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino in the amparo case.
In the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any
inspection order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier
ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees right to
life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately
release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct
the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough
leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the
appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and
detention of the three.

Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the

appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure
of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply with
the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing
persons. The appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
57

While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents to

immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, the decision is not
ipso facto executory. The use of the term immediately does not mean that
that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately executory.

Issues:
A.Whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his
subordinates in an amparo proceeding?

B. Whether or not there is a need to file a motion for execution in an Amparo

Case?

Held:
A.
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or
administrative liability.

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the

criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of
a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to
direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the
constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo

cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power
to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In
such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility
but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to
protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
58

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be

a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still
subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.

B.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion
for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life,
liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be
delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very
rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.

The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory
application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than
weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with
dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is
inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by
an amparo proceeding.
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately
release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that
would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo
petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately
executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.

59