Rule 67

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by Executive

Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MIAA),
Petitioners
vs.
HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, In his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 117, Pasay City and
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 166429 | 2005-12-19
TINGA, J.:
I Facts of the Case
The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal
III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as
the country's show window to the world. Regrettably, it has
spawned controversies. Regrettably too, despite the apparent
completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been
operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the
country, not to mention its deplorable discredit in the
international community.
In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO, the
contracts which the Government had with the contractor were
voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second
case now before the Court involves the matter of just
compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built.
We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that
pervades both the Court's 2004 Resolution in the first case and
the latest expropriation law.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of
the Court's decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003
(2003 Decision). This decision nullified the "Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III"
entered into between the Philippine Government (Government)
and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),
as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The
agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international
airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and
maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25
years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo
Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite

financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and

that the agreement was contrary to public policy.
II Issues of the Case
(i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present
expropriation proceedings;
(ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate
release of the amount of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO considering
that the assessed value as alleged in the complaint was only P3
Billion;
(iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from
enjoining the performance of acts of ownership;
(iv) that the appointment of the three commissioners was
erroneous; and
(v) that Hon. Gingoyon should be compelled to inhibit himself
from the expropriation case.
III Ruling of the Court
At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without
violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No.
8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow
that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter
of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's
requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be
payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government
may take over the property.
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the
system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate
payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure
projects.
The petition is partly granted. Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this
case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by
the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3
facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or
methods for the determination of just compensation.

Rule 67
METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD), Petitioner,
versus J. KING AND SONS COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 175983 | 2009-04-16
Tinga, J.:
I Facts of the Case
Before the Court is a Rule 45 petition which seeks the reversal of
the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 00810. The Court of Appeals' decision nullified the
orders and the writ of possession issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 23, allowing petitioner to take
possession
of
respondent's
property.
Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a governmentowned and controlled corporation created pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its purposes are to acquire,
install, improve, maintain and operate water supply and
distribution systems within the boundaries of the District.
Petitioner wanted to acquire a five (5)-square meter lot occupied
by its production well. The lot is part of respondent's property
covered by TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J. King and Sons
Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale of the latter's property.
Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioner's proposal. After the
negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated
expropriation proceedings through Board Resolution No. 0152004 which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). On 10 November 2004, petitioner filed a
complaint to expropriate the five (5)-square meter portion of
respondent's
property.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession. Petitioner wanted to tender the amount to
respondent during a rescheduled hearing which petitioner's
counsel had failed to attend. Petitioner deposited with the Clerk of
Court the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred
percent (100%) of the current zonal value of the property which
the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per
square meter. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion
and issued the writ of possession. Respondent moved for
reconsideration
but
the
motion
was
denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the
Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted.Thus,
petitioner was not able to gain entry to the lot.

On 26 July 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed

decision granting respondent's petition. It ruled that the board
resolution which authorized the filing of the expropriation
complaint lacked exactitude and particularity which made it
invalid; that there was no genuine necessity for the expropriation
of the five (5)-square meter lot and; that the reliance on Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8974 in fixing the value of the property
contravenes the judicial determination of just compensation.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was rejected.
II Issues of the Case
The issues raised by petitioner can be summarized as follows:
1. Whether there was sufficient authority from the petitioner's
board of directors to institute the expropriation complaint; and
2. Whether the procedure in obtaining a writ of possession was
properly observed.
III Ruling of the Court
The decision of the CA is reversed. Petitioner was supposed
to tender the provisional payment directly to respondent during a
hearing which it had failed to attend. Petitioner, then, deposited
the provisional payment with the court. The trial court did not
commit an error in accepting the deposit and in issuing the writ of
possession. The deposit of the provisional amount with the court
is
equivalent
to
payment.
Indeed, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that
"upon compliance with the guidelines...the court shall
immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the implementation of the
project." Under this statutory provision, when the government, its
agencies or government-owned and controlled corporations, make
the required provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial
duty to issue a writ of possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v.
PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, the Court
held that:
Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an
expropriation case...is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter
of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to
forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and
the court neither exercises its discretion or judgment in
determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties

to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974.
Rule 67
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD (TRB), Petitioner, versus HOLY TRINITY
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.
G.R. No. 172410 | 2008-04-14
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
I Facts of the Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Decision dated 21 April
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90981 which, in
turn, set aside two Orders dated 7 February 2005 and 16 May
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil
Case
No.
869-M-2000.
The undisputed factual and procedural antecedents of this case
are
as
follows:
On 29 December 2000, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the
RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against
landowners whose properties would be affected by the
construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon
Expressway. The suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 869-M-2000
and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent Holy
Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of
the
affected
landowners.
On 18 March 2002, TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a
sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal
value of the affected properties, in the total amount of
P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, South
Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized government
depository. TRB maintained that since it had already complied
with the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974[5] in
relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part
of
the
RTC.
The RTC issued, on 19 March 2002, an Order for the Issuance of
a Writ of Possession, as well as the Writ of Possession itself.
HTRDC thereafter moved for the reconsideration of the 19 March
2002
Order
of
the
RTC.

On 7 October 2002, the Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on

Writ of Possession stating, among other things, that since none of
the landowners voluntarily vacated the properties subject of the
expropriation proceedings, the assistance of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) would be necessary in implementing the
Writ of Possession. Accordingly, TRB, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion
praying for an Order directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the
implementation of the Writ of Possession. On 15 November 2002,
the RTC issued an Order directing the landowners to file their
comment
on
TRB's
Omnibus
Motion.
On 3 March 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw
Deposit, praying that the respondent or its duly authorized
representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of
P22,968,000.00, out of TRB's advance deposit of P28,406,700.00
with LBP-South Harbor, including the interest which accrued
thereon. Acting on said motion, the RTC issued an Order dated 21
April 2003, directing the manager of LBP-South Harbor to release
in favor of HTRDC the amount of P22,968,000.00 since the latter
already proved its absolute ownership over the subject properties
and paid the taxes due thereon to the government. According to
the RTC, "(t)he issue however on the interest earned by the
amount deposited in the bank, if there is any, should still be
threshed
out.
On 7 May 2003, the RTC conducted a hearing on the accrued
interest, after which, it directed the issuance of an order of
expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30 days to inquire
from LBP-South Harbor "whether the deposit made by DPWH with
said bank relative to these expropriation proceedings is earning
interest or not.
II Issues of the Case
Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the
interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation
account would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession, hinges on
the determination of who actually owns the deposited amount,
since, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is
conferred
by
ownership
of
the
principal
property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession
to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated
or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
III Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied. Considering that the expropriation
account is in the name of DPWH, then, DPWH should at most be

deemed as the trustee of the amounts deposited in the said

accounts irrefragably intended as initial payment for the
landowners of the properties subject of the expropriation, until
said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the same.
As a final note, TRB does not object to HTRDC's withdrawal of the
amount of P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account,
provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from
any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner
thereof.[21] The said conditions do not put in abeyance the
constructive delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the
latter's compliance therewith. Article 1187[22] of the Civil Code
provides that the "effects of a conditional obligation to give, once
the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the
constitution of the obligation." Hence, when HTRDC complied with
the given conditions, as determined by the RTC in its Order[23]
dated 21 April 2003, the effects of the constructive delivery
retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH.

Rule 67
CITY OF MANDALUYONG, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO N., FRANCISCO
N., THELMA N., EUSEBIO N., RODOLFO N., all surnamed
AGUILAR, respondents
G.R. No. 137152 | 2001-01-29
PUNO, J.:
I Facts of the Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court of the Orders dated September 17, 1998 and December 29,
1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City
dismissing the petitioner's Amended Complaint in SCA No. 1427
for expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in Mandaluyong City.
The

antecedent

facts

are

as

follows:

On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,

Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation entitled "City
of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio N., Francisco N., Thelma N.,
Eusebio N., Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar, defendants."
Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered
under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767
in the names of the defendants, herein respondents, located at 9

de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong; on a

portion of the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses
several decades ago which they had since leased out to tenants
until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other families
constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in
1983, the lots were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board
of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council as
an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under
Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a
result of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots
offered to purchase the land from respondents, but the latter
refused to sell; on November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an
association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin
Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a mediumrise condominium for qualified occupants of the land; on January
10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents offering to
purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter;
respondents did not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for
the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing of just
compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square
meter.
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died
in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to
purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their
land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose;
the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried
for socialized housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 per
square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As
counterclaim, respondents prayed for damages of P21 million.
Respondents filed a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" claiming that
the defenses alleged in their Answer are valid grounds for
dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents
prayed that the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary
hearing and that the complaint be dismissed. Petitioner replied.
II Issues of the Case
Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does
not exempt the same from expropriation in view of the fact that
the said lots have been declared to be within the Area for Priority
Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in

relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517. This declaration

allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso
facto, regardless of the area of the land.
III Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and
most of the original co-owners do not reside on the subject
property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila.Respondents
therefore appear to own real property other than the lots in
litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the ancestral
home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are owned
by respondents or any one of them. Petitioner did not present any
title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's testimony.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are
their only real property[58] and that they, particularly two of the
five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and
therefore do not own any other real property in Metro Manila.To
prove this, they submitted certifications from the offices of the
City and Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the fact
that they have no registered real property declared for taxation
purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were certified by
the City Assessor of Manila; Quezon City; Makati City;Pasay City;
Paranaque; Caloocan City; Pasig City;Muntinlupa;Marikina;and
the then municipality of Las Pias and the municipality of San
Juan del Monte as having no real property registered for taxation
in
their
individual
names.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the
possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and
the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants
of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong,
Branches 59 and 60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed
on September 17, 1997 which resulted in the eviction of the
tenants and other occupants from the land in question.

Rule 67

DEVORAH E. BARDILLON, petitioner, vs. BARANGAY MASILI of

Calamba, Laguna, respondent.
G.R. No. 146886 | 2003-04-30
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I Facts of the Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the January 10, 2001
Decision and the February 5, 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 61088. The dispositive part of the
Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present [P]etition for
[C]ertiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit."
The assailed Resolution
Reconsideration.

denied

petitioner's

Motion

for

The factual antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:

"At the root of this present [P]etition is the controversy
surrounding the two (2) [C]omplaints for eminent domain which
were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating a
ONE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land,
otherwise known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay Masili,
Calamba, Laguna and owned by herein petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 383605 of the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated
Credit Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute
Sale which was executed by and between the former and the
latter on October 7, 1996.
"The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3648 and entitled 'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita
A. Reblara, Eugenia Almazan & Devorah E. Bardillon,' was filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna ('MTC') on
February 23, 1998, following the failure of Barangay Masili to
reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer
of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The
expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of
providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and
benefit of its constituents.
"On March 5, 1999, the MTC issued an order dismissing Civil Case
No. 3648 'for lack of interest' for failure of the [respondent] and
its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC, in its Order dated

May
3,
1999,
denied
[R]econsideration thereof.

[respondent's]

[M]otion

for

"The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain, docketed as Civil

Case No. 2845-99-C and entitled 'Brgy. Masili, Calamba, Laguna
v. Devorah E. Bardillon,' was filed before Branch 37 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna ('RTC') on October 18,
1999. This [C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the said
Lot 4381-D for the erection of a multi-purpose hall of Barangay
Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this
[C]omplaint by alleging in the main that it violated Section 19(f)
of Rule 16 in that [respondent's] cause of action is barred by
prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
"On January 21, 2000, [the] Judge issued an order denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction
over the said expropriation proceeding.
"With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000261 on July 10, 2000, and the submission thereof in compliance
with [the] Judge's Order dated June 9, 2000 requiring herein
respondent to produce the authority for the expropriation through
the Municipal Council of Calamba, Laguna, the assailed Order
dated August 4, 2000 was issued in favor of Barangay Masili x x x
and, on August 16, 2000, the corresponding order for the
issuance of the [W]rit of [P]ossession over Lot 4381-D.
In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 37)[6] did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled
that the second Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No.
2845-99-C) was not barred by res judicata. The reason is that the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which dismissed the first Complaint
for eminent domain (Civil Case No. 3648), had no jurisdiction
over the action.
II Issues of the Case
The issues are as follows: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction
over the expropriation case; (2) whether the dismissal of that
case before the MTC constituted res judicata; (3) whether the CA
erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises; and
(4) whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
III Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit. To reiterate, an expropriation suit
is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the
land, because the subject of the action is the government's

exercise of eminent domain -- a matter that is incapable of

pecuniary estimation.