Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make

it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and
transmitted from the past Karl Marx1

According to E.H Carr, one of the founding fathers on modern historiography, the
study of history is first and foremost a study of causes. 2 This statement not only shows the
importance of causal explanations in the study of history, it also places it firmly at the centre
of the writing of history. According to David Hume, a cause can be defined as, an object
precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are
placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the
latter.3 Speaking to the issue of causation, E.J Tapp asserts that it should be the foremost
concern of all historians; the great central pillar of historical thinking. 4 In other words, an
historical event requires for its adequate understanding, explanation by reference to those
close antecedent factors which are relevant to the event. In the light of the above,
causation/causal explanation simply put is the art of ascertaining what causes can ascribed to
events. Historians are interested in explaining the past. More than simply recount a sequence
of events, historians strive to explain why events happened as they did. This quest for the
why of historical events can only be elucidated through causal explanations. Causal
relationships are essential to establishing historical explanations and aiding in the
understanding of the past without it, historians are left with a collection of unrelated facts.5

1Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852. Accessed March
10 2015, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/
2 E. H. Carr, What is History?, 2nd Edition, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), 81
3 David Hume, A Treatise On Human Nature. (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
cited in Anton Froeyman, Concepts of Causation in Historiography Historical
Methods, Summer 2009, Volume 42, Number 3, 116
4 E. J. Tapp, Some Aspects of Causation in History, The Journal of Philosophy,
Vol. 49, No. 3, (1952), 68
5 James Brien, The Role of Causation in History History in the Making vol. 2 no.
1, 72

According to Anton Froeyman, It is often taken for granted that causation is an

unambiguous concept that can be easily defined or intuitively grasped 6. The application of
causal explanations has, however, raised several important issues which the historian must
consider. As Paul Conklin asserts, the debates about causation in history rarely focus on its
importance in adequate historical explanation, but rather on the implications of its use. 7
Various arguments have been levelled for and against the application and use of causal
explanation in history. One of the most obvious according to James Brien is the definition and
identification of a cause and the factors which make an event or condition one. 8 This in turn
highlights the difficulties of selecting from what is often a plurality of causes which may
affect any single event in the past. Causation also evokes considerations of which causes, if
any, may be deemed more important than others. The subjective selection by the historian
from these myriad events and conditions represents a significant aspect of the debate
regarding the role of causation in history. On some level, the concerns levelled against causal
explanation in history are to an extent, a case of semantics.
Some people therefore speak not of cause' in history, but of explanation' or
'interpretation', or of the logic of the situation', or of the inner logic of
events'or reject the causal approach (why it happened) in favour of the
functional approach (how it happened), though this seems inevitably to
involve the question how it came to happen, and so leads us back to the
question 'Why?'9
Finally, there are debates surrounding the role that determinism, free will and chance
play in causal explanations of historical events.10 Whilst these aspects of causation remain
fiercely debated, less contentious is the notion that causation plays an important role in
6 Anton Froeyman, Concepts of Causation in Historiography Historical Methods,
Summer 2009, Volume 42, Number 3, 116
7 Paul K. Conklin, Causation Revisited, History and Theory, Vol.13, No. 1, (1974),
1
8 Brien, The Role of Causation, 72
9 E. H. Carr, What is History?, 53-54
10 Ibid, 55

providing a coherent, intelligible explanation of the past. Perhaps as Stephen Rigby

recognised, the reason for such contention is that there no consensus on the identification of a
cause, nor do all historians understand the philosophy of causation. 11 It is in the light of the
above that some philosophers of history have developed a new approach, namely causal
pluralism.12 Causal pluralists argue that causation as a concept cannot be univocally defined. 13
According to causal pluralism, the monistic theories that have been developed over the years
all stress different aspects of causation, but none of them can fully capture the concept. Two
theories have been expounded by these philosophers to explain causal pluralism. These are
Counterfactual and Regularity Theories of Causation.14
Until well into the 20th century historians told a narrative of the past using the
available facts and evidence to answer the what question. 15 This approach is not specifically
concerned with causal relationships. The act of merely describing history has been criticised
by Carr who claims that one may describe history but explain nothing, indicating a failure on
the part of the historian in fulfilling their role. 16 According to Frederick Teggart, it is the
predominant view now that historians should not be content to write mere annals, but must
give something more than a record of events, they must discover the connection between one
event and the other.17 This is the essence of causation, and key to a greater understanding of
the past. When approaching the questions of how and why, the application of causation
11 Stephen H. Rigby. Historical Causation: Is One Thing More Important Than
Another?, History, Vol. 80, No. 259, (1995), 227-242.
12 Nancy Cartwright, Hunting Causes and Using Them, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), Ned Hall, Two concepts of causation, in Causation and
Counterfactuals, ed. J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul, 22576, (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2004), Leen De Vreese, Causal pluralism and Scientific Knowledge: An
underexposed Problem, Philosophica 77, 2006, 12550. These are books that
explain and discuss the philosophy of causal pluralism extensively.
13 Anton Froeyman, Concepts of Causation in Historiography, 116
14Froeyman in his work, Concepts of Causation in Historiography explained
these theories in details and their application to modern historiography
15 Mendel F. Cohen, Causation in History, Philosophy, Vol. 62, No. 241, (1987),
350
16 Carr, What is History?,

becomes critical. The how question begs a causal response, although this is generally
achieved through a historical narrative. The Why questions also ask for a causal answer,
most easily summed up as because.
The concept of causation has always been prevalent, if not continually the focus in the
construction and interpretation of the past. 18 The historians goal of explaining the past has
meant that even in merely describing events, causation is implicitly part of their work. In
providing a sequence of events, causal relationships are implied as one event or force acts
upon and leads to another. In Carrs opinion, causal explanations persist even in our everyday
life; humans unconsciously give causal explanations to events as they unfold around them. 19
Whilst ancient historians predominantly produced narrative explanations, they often
incorporated causal relationships to explain past events. Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius
all sought to explain the past through narrative; yet causal relationships were implicit in the
selection and ordering of events, people and ideas.20 The narrative structure gave coherence
and order to events, demonstrating their interconnectedness. However, it is important to add
also that ancient Greek and Roman historians also strongly believed in fate and the will of the
gods. The outcome of events was never truly determined by cause and effect relationships,
but rather by divine will. This limited their attempts to explain the past through specific,
identifiable cause and effect relationships.21
Historical explanations during the Middle Ages were primarily reliant on the concept
of divine will.22 Christian scholars rejected the notions of astrological determinism which
had gained prominence prior to the medieval period, instead believing that the actions of men
17 Frederick J.Teggart, Causation in Historical Events, Journal of the History of
Ideas, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1942), 3
18 Tapp, Some Aspects of Causation, 68
19 Carr, What is History?, 57
20 Brien, The Role of Causation, 74
21 Ibid, 74
22 Ralph B. Smith, Historical Explanation: From Narrative to Causation and
Back?, History of European Ideas, Vol. 37, No. 3, (2011), 381

and women were in some way representative of the meanings of the Christian faith or the
plans of God.23 Many events, whether they were contemporary or historical, were attributed
to divine will. Augustines City of God, considered to be one of the most important early
historical works, differed slightly from this viewpoint. 24 Augustine saw history as a struggle
between the city of man and the city of god those who pursued earthly pleasures and
those who served God. He attributed the fall of Rome in 410AD to the moral decay of Roman
society, rather than the will of God which so many had believed beforehand. Nevertheless,
the concept of divine will remained the predominant means of explanation for a long period
of history.25
The development in the field of science in the 18 th century sparked similar study
structure in other disciplines. It was in this light that historians sought to go beyond just
recounting the past just for its sake to, just like the scientist, interpret their facts in the face of
available evidences. One important work that pioneered causal explanations in the 18 th
century when the foundations of modern historiography began to be laid was Baron de
Montesquieus Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans.
It was in this work that a noticeable emphasis was placed on causal factors in history.26
Montesquieu took as his starting point the principles that 'there are general causes, moral or
physical, which operate in every monarchy, raise it, maintain it, or overthrow it', and that 'all
that occurs is subject to these causes'.27 Montesquieu not only sought to explain the reasons
for the expansion and decline of the Roman Empire, but also potential general causes which
may have been attributable to other instances in history. Montesquieus lead was followed in
other great works of the era, like Edward Gibbons The History of the Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire. Later in the eighteenth century, ideas of total, progressive causal histories
23 Ibid, 383
24 Dana Gould & Terry L Mieth, Augustines City of God, (Nashville: Holman
Reference, 1999), 16-25 cited in James Brien, The Role of Causation in History
History in the Making vol. 2 no. 1, 72
25 Brien, The Role of Causation, 75
26 Smith, Historical Explanation, 384-385
27 Carr, What is History?, 53

began to emerge, other notable scholars that followed in this tradition includes Hegel and
Karl Marx who proposed a view of history based on historical materialism.28
To David Hume, the 18th century philosopher, it was the human mind that formed the
causal link between the two events. He argued that a cause and effect relationship could not
be proven; merely the relationship between two objects or events observed. Even if event A
was always followed by event B, it could only be said that it is likely to occur. 29 Although
Hume was cynical about this topic, he was reluctant to fully reject the notion of causation.30
Another important concern in discussing causation is the identification of a cause, in
other words, what constitutes a cause? Simply because one event follows after another it does
not mean that the former was the cause of the latter. There are usually multiple factors at
work to bring about an event. According to E. J. Tapp, it is only by appreciating close
antecedent factors which are relevant to the event can a proper understanding of the past be
achieved.31 To do this, Tapp supported the practice of identifying necessary and sufficient
conditions. Necessary conditions are conditions without which an event could not happen.
These may be broken down further into absolute conditions, without which the event
definitely could not happen, and relative conditions, without which the event probably would
not happen.32 Sufficient conditions are conditions that, when present, may reasonably be
assumed to be a factor in an event. However, these conditions may be relative to prevailing
background conditions concurrent with the event in question. This approach to causation has
been criticized by some historians. For instance, Paul K. Conklin believes that the search for
sufficient conditions has confused the debate about causation in history.33 Whilst necessary
28 Michael Rosen, Karl Marx

29 Michael Stanford, Causation, New Perspective, Vol. 7, No. 1, (2001).

30 Brien, The Role of Causation, 75
31 Tapp, Some Aspects of Causation, 67
32 Ronald F. Atkinson, Knowledge and Explanation: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of History, (London: MacMillan Press, 1978) 104, cited in Brien, The
Role of Causation, Tapp, Some Aspects of Causation, 67.
33 Conklin, Causation Revisited, 4.

and sufficient conditions may prove to be the best indicators of causal links and may give
way to discovering patterns in history, they are also very hard to identify. Conklins concern
here was that the accumulation of necessary antecedent causes could also give the impression
of inevitability and determinism. There are numerous other ways historians may identify
causes. Michael Stanford on the other hand advocates that true causes must be sought in
human action and decision, and the motivations for making them. 34 In order to truly
understand why an event happened, historians must seek out the participants intentions and
examine the conditions under which they acted. This is similar to Robin Collingwoods
argument that a cause refers to what brings about free human action and that to understand
the past we must see events from the inside.35
In their investigations, historians are faced with a multitude of facts, conditions,
events, actors and ideas that may contribute to the explanation of the questions they are
seeking to answer. This according to Carr is the first characteristic of the historians approach
to causal explanation.36 A problem central to the philosophy of causation and historiography
is the theme of multiple causes. Generally speaking, in history, there is the strong notion that
events are not monocausal, that is, there is always a causal chain. This idea of causal chain is
what John Stuart Mill explained as multiplicity of causes. Despite the fact that we normally
select one specific antecedent as the cause, Mill insisted that we should call the complete set
of antecedents the cause
In such cases it is very common to single out only one of the antecedents
under the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions.The
real Cause, is the whole of these antecedents; and we have philosophically
speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the
others.37
34 Stanford, Causation.
35 Robin G. Collingwood cited in Atkinson, Knowledge and Understanding, 148
36 Carr, What is History?, 84
37 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being A
Connected View of The Principles of Evidence And The Methods Of Scientific
Investigation, ed. J. M. Robso, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) 327328

In Mills view, singling out one of the antecedents as the cause (and thus distinguishing the
cause from mere conditions) may be useful in everyday life, but it should not be done in
philosophy or in scientific investigation.
Herbert Hart and Tony Honore were the first to develop an explicit criterion for a
selection of multiple causes.38 They stated, more or less, that our identification of causes
depends on contextual factors in the sense that only phenomena considered to be at odds with
the normal course of events can be considered to be causes. According to Hart and Honore,
the condition we select as cause is regarded as such because it stands out with respect to a
certain default status of the world.39 Conversely, Mill believes that it is only the Method of
Difference that is capable of providing reliable knowledge on causes and effects.
If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all
the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given
phenomenon.If an instance in which the phenomenon under
investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have
every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the
former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the
effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the
phenomenon.40
However, even in accepting a plurality of causes, historians may disagree over the
selection and the significance of each cause. The selection of causes and the subjective
judgements historians make in determining them is therefore a critical aspect of the causation
debate. Carrs conception of the true historian was one who, just as they gather facts and
discard the irrelevant, does the same with contributing causal factors. It is then up to the
historian to marshal these causes in order of their importance.

38 Anton Froeyman, Concepts of Causation, 117

39 Herbert Hart and Tony Honore, Causal Judgement in History and the Law, in
Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. W. Dray, 21337. (New York: Harper &
Row,1966) 33
40 Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive 390

The true historian, confronted with this list of causes of his own
compiling, would feel a professional compulsion to reduce it; to order,
to establish some hierarchy of causes which would fix their relation to
one another, perhaps to decide which cause, or which category of
causes, should be regarded 'in the last resort' or 'in the final analysis'
(favourite phrases of historians) as the ultimate cause, the cause of all
causes. This is his interpretation of his theme; the historian is known
by the causes which he invokes.41
To Carr, the organisation of causes is the pinnacle of historical investigation: the
essence of their interpretation. In fact, it seems a common-sense approach for the historian.
The historian can only account for so much and must select only what they deem is relevant.
Every historical argument revolves round the question of the priority of causes.
Some historians may use a rational approach to this selection, whilst others may allow
emotion or value judgements to influence their decisions and interpretations. More often than
not, a historians selection will be influenced by both factors, leading to unique and
independent interpretations of causal relationships. Hence, true historical works are never
titled The history of., but rather, A history of.... This is so because typically, two
eyewitnesses to the same event, at the same time and the same place would have different
causal explanations to give regarding what they just observed. This difference does not
necessarily mean that the account of one person has been doctored (although not impossible),
but the difference for instance might be due to the dissimilar vantage points the eyewitnesses
were standing to view the event, their state of mind at the said time, their biases amongst
many other things. As a result, the list of causes both witnesses would draw up in explanation
to the incident might be totally different and even when the causes are the same, their
ordering, in terms of to which cause all other causes become subordinate might be different.
The interpretation of historical facts and causes is a process of selection in terms of historical
significance, influenced by the perspectives of the historian. Hayden White believes that the
importance placed on a cause is not intrinsic, but rather determined by a historians point of
view.42
41 Carr, What is History?, 82-84, 97, 99
42 Hayden White in Atkinson, Knowledge and Understanding, 159-160.

Herbert Hart and Tony Honore have posited that historians should be weary of the
notion of seeking a hierarchy of causes because it is subjective, arbitrary and based on value
judgements.43 In other words, the argument here is that hierarchical ordering of causes might
diminish the objectivity of any historical account as the process of ordering most time is
value-laden. Conversely, Mendel Cohen believes that causal interpretation needs some form
of value judgement, and to avoid such a practice would drastically alter the discipline. 44 In
acknowledging a multiplicity of causes at work, and then making a selection based on
perceived importance, the historian highlights their aims and contributes to an everexpanding base of knowledge and research as to why events happened as they did. In
Atkinsons opinion, far from damaging the discipline, the openness, reassessment and
possibilities of causal interpretation must be seen as positive contributions to the study of
history.45
Similarly, Carr believes that just like in science where there is a dual and apparently
contradictory move 'towards variety complexity' and towards unity and simplicity', history is
advancing in the same manner- complexity and multiplicity of causes and unity and
simplicity of causes. The historian, by expanding and deepening his research, constantly
accumulates more and more answers to the question, 'Why?'
When Bertrand Russell observed that 'every advance in a science takes us
further away from the crude uniformities which are first observed into a
greater differentiation of antecedent and consequent, and into a continually
wider circle of antecedents recognised as relevant'," he accurately described
the situation in history. But the historian, in virtue of his urge to understand the
past, is simultaneously compelled, like the scientist, to simplify the
multiplicity of his answers, to subordinate one answer to another, and to
introduce some order and unity into the chaos of happenings and the chaos of

43 Brien, The Role of Causation, 78

44 Cohen, Causation in History, 358
45 Atkinson, Knowledge and Understanding, cited in Brien, The Role of
Causation 79

specific causes.But the fact remains that the historian must work through the
simplification, as well as through the multiplication, of causes.46
The prominent role of causal explanations in history over the years has given rise to
debates over the nature of free will, determinism and chance events in history. The
application of causation to history has been resisted by some on the grounds that it negates
the idea of free will and instead posits a determinist perception of the past. One of the most
criticised approaches is the great cause, which aims to provide an all-encompassing
explanation to past events.47 These great cause explanations form part of the historicist
school of thought and include theories such as divine will, Hegelian idealism and Marxian
economic theory.48
These movements may imprecisely give the impression of inevitability, with all
events and individuals guided by certain external forces throughout history and into the
future. The application of laws to history has also been seen as advancing a determinist view
of the past. These approaches were popular during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but
have since been passed over by most contemporary historians. However, there is no reason to
assume that causation implies determinism, or that notions of free will and determinism are
mutually exclusive. It is possible to break the determinist view into two parts, opening a new
avenue for consideration.49 Firstly, there is absolute determinism, whereby events have only
one way in which they could have occurred, with relationships and causes fixed.
Alternatively, there is limited determinism, in which there is an end result, but the way in
which it is reached may come about in different ways. For instance, a good example of
limited determinism in an event like World War II would be the position of Richard Evans
who argued under the notion of limited determinism that the war could have occurred even
without Adolf Hitler in power in Germany. He suggests that the political, social and economic
conditions within Germany such as the humiliation imposed by the Versailles Treaty and the
46 Carr, What is History?, 92
47Neil Munro, Causation in History, Pathways School of Philosophy Accessed
March 10 2015, http://www.philosophypathways.com/essays/munro2.html
48 Brien, The Role of Causation, 79
49 Ibid, 79

attitudes of leading members of the German military may have been sufficient causes to spark
a war.50 However, the actual events and conditions which may have led to the outbreak of
war, and the course of the war itself, may have been greatly different.
Similarly, it is impossible to believe that free will is indeterminate or impervious to
external forces. According to Tapp, decisions and actions are informed by experience and
knowledge of causal consequences, as well as external pressures.51 In Carrs opinion, the
axiom that everything has a cause is a condition of our capacity to understand what is going
on around us.52 In other words, causal explanations are the ways by which we make sense of
the society around us. Even when there are no obvious causes, we try to reduce things
happening around to cause and effect. Carr writes that The logical dilemma about free will
and determinism does not arise in real life. It is not that some human actions are free and
others determined. The fact is that all human actions are both free and determined, according
to the point of view from which one considers them. 53 The application of causal explanation
does not reject the notion of individual moral responsibility or decision making, although the
recognition of external factors working on human agency is a fundamental part of causal
explanation.54 People are constantly under pressures outside of their control, be they political,
social, cultural, economic or psychological.
It is therefore apparent from the many and varied attitudes towards causation that it
plays an integral role in historical explanation, though it raises many complex issues for the
historian to consider when interpreting the past. Despite this general consensus that causation
does have a significant role to play in historical explanations, there is no single agreed upon
approach to its use or implementation, making it one of the most contentious aspects of
historical methodology.55 Causation is a crucial component in providing a more complete and
coherent explanation of the past. Without causation, the historian is left with a collection of
50 Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History cited in Brien, The Role of Causation,
79
51 Tapp, Some Aspects of Causation, 76-78.
52 Carr, What is History?, 98
53 Ibid, 98
54 Brien, The Role of Causation, 80

facts, ordered sequentially but unrelated. To truly understand a past event, it is important to
understand the factors and forces which link events and issues to one another, and from this it
is possible to understand more clearly why events occurred as they did. Whilst the selection
and identification of causes is one of the most controversial aspects of the causation debate,
the variety of approaches indicates how great an emphasis has been placed on this facet of
historical explanation. The selection of causes is also greatly influenced by the historians
interpretation of the available evidence, their values, beliefs and perspectives. This therefore
links causation to interpretation another key feature of historical methodology.
Finally, causations greatest contribution perhaps is in highlighting the influence
external factors can have on human agency, helping the historian to understand why people
acted as they did. By assessing the issues of subjectivity, selection, determinism, free will and
the identification of causes that it raises, it is possible to develop a balanced and practicable
common-sense approach to applying causation to historical explanations. Causation should
be fundamental to all well informed explanations of the past. It helps to offer answers to the
question many historians ask why did events happen as they did? The explanation of the
past is inadequate without it. Causation links events and issues to one another, giving
coherence and meaning to the past. Like Tapp opined, without a concept of causation there
can be no history. This reality is very much at the forefront of the 21 st century historians
mind. Without an adequate grasp of causation, history merely becomes a collection of facts
and events. It is key to historical methodology and to all historical explanations. A theory of
causation is not, in the end, something historians can dispense with.

HIS 602
TERM PAPER
55 Ibid, 81

CAUSATION IN HISTORY

ARP13/14/H/0848
ADETUTU, Adedotun R.

Submitted to:
Prof. Adediran