FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO,

respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decisioni[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the
decisionii[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,iii[3] while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).iv[4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection
of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner
be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand
pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she
(petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pagibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the
trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place

during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity
of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that
she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only
at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as
the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;v[5] and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June
20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License
number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal
purpose it may serve.vi[6]

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00,
half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.vii[7]

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY

IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE

CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED
AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.viii[8]

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free

from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. ix[9]
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. x[10] In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.xi
[11]

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of
who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage,xii[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, xiii[13]
renders the marriage void ab initio.xiv[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,xv[15] the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance
of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could
have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license,
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement,
is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage

of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under
scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40
of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of
the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. xvi[16]
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
alliances of the same married man,xvii[17] ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.xviii[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of
these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife
of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

xxx

xxx

xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto. xix[19] Conformably, even if the disputed
death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share
one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of
Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,xx[20] where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other
half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands
share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this
Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was

celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration
of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.xxi[21]

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule
which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the
reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance
with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,xxii[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the
Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an
all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party
who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The
same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are
not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,xxiii[23] the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), ED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISKapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno J., on official leave.

[1]
ii[2]

Rollo, pp. 43-47.

Rollo, pp. 49-55.

iii[3]

Exhibit F, Records, p. 38.

iv[4]

Ibid.

v[5]

Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36

vi[6]

Exhibit E, Records, p. 37.

vii[7]

Rollo, p. 55.

viii[8]
ix[9]

Rollo, p. 18.

Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].

x[10]

Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.

xi[11]

Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra.

xii[12]

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)

Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2)

Their consent, freely given;

(3)

Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4)

A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

xiii[13]

ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article
75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides.
xiv[14]

ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx
(3)
xxx

xv[15]

xxx

xxx

Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

xxx

xxx

236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.

xvi[16]

Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
xxx
(2)

xxx

xxx

The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved

and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation
of law.
xvii[17]

Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995).

xviii[18]
xix[19]
xx[20]

Id., p. 234.

Id., p. 230.

37 SCRA 316 [1971].

xxi[21]

Id., p. 326.

xxii[22]

Supra.

xxiii[23]

Supra.

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decisionOn September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old,
married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on
January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house
in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws.On October
1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained
to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally,
Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.Virginia
testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City
but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She
testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order
giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he
would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation,
the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and
found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in
the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the

investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino
Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of
Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on
the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991
to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After
requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The
observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not
enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in
marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity
existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children
since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown.
He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the
failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined
and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are
uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became
manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of
marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family
members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General,
these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the
sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New
Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error
that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A
VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW
NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform
the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the
right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code

of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."Hence, the present petition for review ,The Solicitor
General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts
constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the
marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband
suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual
alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.In Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."Taking
into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned
evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the
root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was
not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,"Moreover, expert testimony should have been
presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order
to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.
)"WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RE S O LUTI ON

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge
Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia
Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn ComplaintAffidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been
married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan
City.Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What
he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.After an evaluation of the
Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing
to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered
in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal
of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the
Court to two separate affidavitsWe find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.Not all
of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also,
in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.The fact that
Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not
severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in

the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of
time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground
for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special
application to judges,ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge
Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001]

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in
C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975
while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they
got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was
still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an oceangoing vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established
their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City
where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the
year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four
children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed
signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an
emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent
would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and
threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in
the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months
later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to
change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.

On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for
about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She
submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed
her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay
authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her
sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the
Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological
incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support
pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April
1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his
appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look
into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994,
submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion
between the parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the
same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of
his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex
"A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however,
the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its
decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio
on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court
erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in
denying his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs
of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as
so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the
marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a
psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified
medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent
and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity."[1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on
the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January
1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on
13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling
could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory
and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina
dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its
dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for
there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the
term has been so defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in
Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
`psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic
Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
`Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.[4] The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of
lex prospicit, non respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel
provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the
concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has
given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist
the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in
her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone
at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates
with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that

relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law
has not quite given up, neither should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the
January 7, 1999 Decision"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia
and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both
parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."The assailed
Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as
shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.Starting
October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May
16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.On March 3, 1998,
petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of MarriageIn his Answer, respondent
averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while
the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down."Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action.Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on
the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of
legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by

respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial
union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage
to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53
of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."The
Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on
these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign
law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the
marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.A
comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read
as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

xxxxxxxxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same
shall not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attestedThe
divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court.Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May
18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.On its face, the

herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."This quotation bolsters our contention
that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39Significance of the Certificate
of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to
marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.As it is, however, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the
records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower
court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" Complaint;Based on the above records, we cannot
conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated
to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a
quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity
to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal
law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which
show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999]

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.

HERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated
January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated
April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).[2]
Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),[3] Lyra,
born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),[4] and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).[5]
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the
time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the
family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in
drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having
affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent
endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred
that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married
life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to
give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be
awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of
land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during
the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the
conjugal home on June 12, 1992.[6]
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial
court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to
determine if there was collusion between the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the investigation
on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and
recommended that the case be set for trial.[8]
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:[9]
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in
Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her
first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her
student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was
no longer private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his
tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family
income came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University.
Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the
buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that
he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because
her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private
respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks.
In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a
certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose

husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he
admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end
her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the
affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner
and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private
respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at
Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent
was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan
offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount
for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire
amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking,
gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on
relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie,
who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road
Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and,
Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).
[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as
a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite
on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).[11]
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct
during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected
petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote,
Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).[12]
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest
child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was
never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)[13] with F & C Realty
Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights
Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May
26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly
installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)[14] was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529
(Exh. M)[15] was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter[16] to private
respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile.
In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney[17] and to
divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her
intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was
not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private
respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when
petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted
to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent

was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared
happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started
drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that
private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and
continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized
because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro
tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro
said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.[18]
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing the petition for
annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:[20]
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in
support of her claim that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are
among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55
of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment
thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological
incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the
above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been
enumerated as grounds for legal separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner
under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that
the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five
(5) years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of
Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45,
paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would
require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence,
the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved
in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its
decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21]
the Court of Appeals held:[22]
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of
prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her
respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her
respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the

happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36

of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondenthusbands youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitionerappellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitionerappellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn,
Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage
and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST
FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER
FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO
THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
should be annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that
private respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She
argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[23]
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions

of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the
fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological
defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to
show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset
of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents
parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found
a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire
amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job
and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering,
and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is incurable,
causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due
to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court
held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis
(citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[26]
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[27]
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondents
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.[28]
Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be

overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective
support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation,
dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS,
respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by
the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which
declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by
the decisions of the court a quoIt was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to
a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called
up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration
of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where
he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01
April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all
his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible
and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled
out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.Leouel
appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.The petition should be
denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of nonshopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions
of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the
import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested
that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the
sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason."
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is
lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable.
Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of
judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's
marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the
reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with
which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice
(Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with
another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio
marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to
the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in
the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable
of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as
going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is
that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years
of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage
which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In
other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and
if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no
concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response,
Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice
Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of
the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are
also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice
Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the
marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.xxx
xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for
void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances
the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they
can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already
he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void

marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage,
one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise
be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in
degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities
are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why
it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from
vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into
the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages
arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law,
are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The
other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in
application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of
church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice
Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for
retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has
been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June
1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving
of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather,
the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,Canon 1095.
They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial
rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless,
cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the
codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf.
SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to
enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family
Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the

meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have
some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The wellconsidered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might
be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate
in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and
the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required
to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his
present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's
ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way
clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and
cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that
petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand
and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice

Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.

While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by
the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but
she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine
Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the
part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without
Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed
that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for
instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner,
bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons,
husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always
remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent
spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition
and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In
fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her
whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations,
although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a
wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a
"habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with
emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private
respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and
to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident

purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by
declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an
essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the
basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law
Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a
number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a
proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal
separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in
another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later,
even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this
matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice
Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved
or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due
discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting
physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to
above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a
marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological
incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a
case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed."The constitutional and statutory provisions on the familyAny criticism directed at the
way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married
couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate
and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after
an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that
there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to
comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein
petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his
wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage,
the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage,
as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples
who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this
contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against
collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did
and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in
the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted
efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar
efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating
her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.

e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the
former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious
disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances
when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the
absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and
whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no intention of
cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that
she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and
cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made
manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of
fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in
effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to
maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought
from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I
submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like
petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos
and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letterDuring its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been
tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in
favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage
and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time
to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of

absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based
on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family
Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice
Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis
of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved
or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due
discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting
physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to
above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a
marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological
incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a
case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological
incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of
marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed."The constitutional and statutory provisions on the familyAny criticism directed at the
way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married
couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate
and distinct from the other.

[G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996]

EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L.

TUASON, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT; ALLOWED
ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES WHERE THERE IS NO OTHER AVAILABLE OR
ADEQUATE REMEDY. - A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed
only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be
used to revive the right to appeal which have been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILED MUST BE BASED ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD,
ACCIDENT, MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE AND THAT IT IS SHOWN THAT
PETITIONER HAS A GOOD, SUBSTANTIAL AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR CAUSE
OF ACTION. - A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court. A final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside
on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must
assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the
petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new
trial had been granted therein.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICES SENT TO COUNSEL OF RECORD, BINDING UPON THE
CLIENT. The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable
him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment
resulting in the loss of this right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular
on its face.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNSEL REQUIRED TO INFORM THE TRIAL COURT THE
REASON FOR HIS CLIENTS NON-APPEARANCE AT THE SCHEDULED HEARINGS. Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioners
confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings.
Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not
inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision on
the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of
petitioners counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT UPHELD ABSENT PROOF THAT THE WITNESSES TESTIMONIES ARE
CLEARLY AND MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS. - Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court
as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage
is final and binding on us. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners defenses are
clearly and manifestly erroneous.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS;
NOT VIOLATED IF PETITIONER WAS GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. - Petitioner
cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present evidence
but he was not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel, actively
participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private
respondents witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondents motion for dissolution

of the conjugal partnership of gains.

7. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT, DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
LEGAL SEPARATION; PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR FISCAL MAY BE ORDERED BY
THE COURT TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE TO PREVENT COLLUSION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. - A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the
state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence
is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot
declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion
exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-INTERFERENCE OF A PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IS NOT
FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT IF
PETITIONER VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED THE ANNULMENT OF THEIR MARRIAGE IN
THE SAID COURT. - The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack
of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Seguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for private respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29,
1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioners appeal from an order of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to
petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner
were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the
marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between
husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private
respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that
petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a oneyear suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer, and in
1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he
presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave
minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children
compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends;
that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit

card companies and other financial institutions, without private respondents consent; that
attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to reform.
In addition to her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of
administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.[1]
Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he
claimed that he and private respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years
of their marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that
they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and
dignity due him as a husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the extreme
animosities between them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a cooling-off period in
1984; that it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair
with another man; that petitioners work as owner and operator of a radio and television station
exposed him to malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and the entertainment
world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial reverses in his business and was compelled,
with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and
country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and
continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage
counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the
spouses, and Any. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondents counsel. Private respondent likewise
submitted documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husbands relationship
with other women, his apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies
of a prior church annulment decree.[2] The parties marriage was clerically annulled by the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.[3]
During presentation of private respondents evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed
his Opposition to private respondents petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioners
evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the
first week of June.[4] The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.[5]
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent.
The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason
and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void oh initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the Family Code. Let herein
judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage
was contracted and in the registry of Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby
awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment
as provided for under Arts. 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the Philippines.[6]

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken
from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties.[7] Petitioner
opposed the motion on October 17, 1990[8]
Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the
trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.[9]
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his
petition for relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the order of the trial court.[10]
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceedings
thereof. - When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a
court of first instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition
in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must
assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action.[11] If
the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted therein.[12]
In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to private respondent had
already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary
period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for
violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to
appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present
evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner
justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then confined for medical and/or
rehabilitation reasons.[13] In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a
certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F. Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug
Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment
of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig,
Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police.[14] The records,
however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of this
confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country
for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.[15]
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable
him to appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment
valid and regular on its face.[16]
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of
petitioners confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or

unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case
deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent
alone. To compound the negligence of petitioners counsel, the order of the trial court was never
assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have
lost his right to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the records show,
petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to
the petition, cross-examined private respondents witnesses and even submitted his opposition to
private respondents motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.[17]
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of
this petition.[18] Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.[19]
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family
Code which provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the
prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor upon the
haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when he failed
to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to
intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.[20]
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxxxxxxxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.[21]
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the
danger of collusion.[22] Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and
legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for
the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties.[23] The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own
evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.[24] Our Constitution is
committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.[25] Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the

concern alone of the family members.

The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the
Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer.
Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private
respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and crossexamining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel
Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able
to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at the time
of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived
together with their children as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his family
even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator of a radio and
television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for malicious gossip
linking him with various women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for
annulment of his marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us.[26]
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners defenses are clearly and
manifestly erroneous.[27]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997]

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the
works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the

ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision on November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court
of Appeals[1] in its decision are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,
xxx Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
"After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no
sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together
with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in
the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husbands examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was
also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the
doctor to return but he never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married
her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to
publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured.
He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or scienceK

"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The
defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against
him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis
of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had
only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further
erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a
woman.
"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated.[2]
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered
into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another
copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
"SO ORDERED. "
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion

except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and
should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the
admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced
since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.[3]
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision
seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on
such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial
court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other,
he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical
disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates
an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January
4, 1995)."[4]
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, - i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, - why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on
who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to

declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he
wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record
to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What
he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection.[5] Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological
but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity."[6]
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she balked
(Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were
true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to
court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife
whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy.
Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose
her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness
or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love
very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.[7]
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no

man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is
so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent.
That is - a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by
having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a
two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children
but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to
those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
"psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with
various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in
specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay
down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January
25, 1993 DecisionThe Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin ChurchIn his
Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2)

Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure
to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on
July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita HidalgoSison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked
as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed
Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court reliedAs ground for annulment of
marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct
on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of AppealsOn the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing
to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr.
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis
existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced
by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, The Family Code (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36
was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. Since the purpose of including
such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only
because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological
incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v.
Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240
SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity
on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion.
Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that
"opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did
not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For
if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45
of the Family Code.

That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision
Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of
marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the
provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that
these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not
the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect
in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that
there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations
attendant
to
marriage."My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is,
in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they
will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time,
took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a
number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes
of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil
law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in
existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding
and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of
carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first
time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan
Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid

consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.Rotal decisions
continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but
to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the
right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the
community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true
intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to
Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill
the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind,
lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with
the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume
or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised
at the time the marriage was entered into.In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of
the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or
to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity
as to render the marriage a nullity.However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,The
Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage
tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia,
and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term
"psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and
construction of the statutory enactment.The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that
the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as
distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a
petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied
so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;(T)he use
of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the
Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its
overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and

Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a
alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out,
even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise,
there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself,
no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The
1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It
is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be
simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

THIRD DIVISION
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE,
Petitioner,
- versus ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.

G.R. No. 161793

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court
treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has
unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTe in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then
initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man
decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first
meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation
and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family
was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then
25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward
was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask
for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they
should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then
parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on
the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.
[11]

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the
City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the parties.
[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born
Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification
of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P.
Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient.
This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to
be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried
his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself
from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient
wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with
her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the
foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent
that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her
family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had
insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not
prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the
idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent,
but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried
to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and
seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole
family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while
petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by
phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at
their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted
irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again.
Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know
what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize
his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this
point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed
to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,]
and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge.

Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military
friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish,
the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996,
petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they
forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them
that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred
for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to
live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused
the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own
and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of
whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not
knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent
refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop
harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does
not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any
money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck
and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment
and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she
was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
MMPI
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly
impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different
notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready
so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in
life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle
that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of
respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved
and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious
type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner
will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams
realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon
the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the

relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before
submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious
institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it
is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware
of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be
unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she
is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality
Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display
psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely
filed its notice of appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that petitioner failed to prove
the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[22] The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the
OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may
be, the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed
January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On
June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter
represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court
orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment petition filed
before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to
comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the
petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties
was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist
did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in
Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes CojuangcoTeodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked
by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor
of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage
and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the
spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would
have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time
to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and
society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of
marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to
again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those
proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New
Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such

lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a
final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be
dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack of
due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age
or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance,
cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of
machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting
physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage and
to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation. There
being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is
the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid
intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental impotence,
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an invention of
some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He
said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase and is
incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and special
situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between
two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite
a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds in the
eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless
of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of
three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in
marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the
wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the
kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first
time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not
present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious
willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan
Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary
judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge,
explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to
Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract,
there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and
prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them.
This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not
deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both
have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house
and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist.
The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both
valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing
of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of

consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he
elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic
incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing
trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is
a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment,
and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact
the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence
from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may
impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency
[nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality].
However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain
intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is
and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is
whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be
able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit
consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or
incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the
intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment
lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the
influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it
was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is
precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under
such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to
think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly
and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically
ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to
be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the
consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object
that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more
clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other.
It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually
able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent
consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent,
experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge,
had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of
consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it
affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent)
can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a
mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac
affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also,
and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in
such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no
difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of
those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the
faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from
the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render
the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly
renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed
by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are
not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where
one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to
begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second
incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a
heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could
arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks,
not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed
incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of
procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the
bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and
individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case
concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he
was not capable of assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations
of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the
obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto
esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to
assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the
basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder.
A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of
entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise

common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve
ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One
of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not
have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all
of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some
characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality
invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the
inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as
incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with
charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is
said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object
of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that
homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional
cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental
infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties.
Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable
to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the
defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause
is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this
juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution
which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference
being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one
accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source of
the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the
lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the
trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained that when private respondent
testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual
by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is

clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred
in the result and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose
their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according
to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world.[50] The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.[52] The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital

abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand,
the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality
disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the
latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in
January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The
psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder,
and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the
advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the allimportant connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a
person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, not only
to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality
the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship.
Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage
as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other
oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but
involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity
for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation
but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to
fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom
of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has
a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional
categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of
the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony
to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a

conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[62]

Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an
option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are
no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case.
The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert
witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes
but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality
disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less
obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of
character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead
to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a
tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes
of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave
activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral
stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from
fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an
inability to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little evidence that
early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the
etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may
be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found
that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures
of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with
low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in
antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of
borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19
percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals
who have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise specified, that
can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of
the specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.[64]
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a
quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may
allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with
people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their
own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[65]
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical
fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others.
There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for
mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some
individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard
for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four
dramatic personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further
consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the
same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people
even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do
things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or

helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown
in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak
of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being
afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
JOCELYN M. SUAZO,
Petitioner,
- versus ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. G.R. No. 164493
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 10, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N BRION, J.: We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo
(Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443,

which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay
City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with
respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito
and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito
and after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and
Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony
officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos
parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and
worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work
and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often
resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman
with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged
in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their
relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and
emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her
every time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work
or his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff
causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their
marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent and
incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion
existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the
trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the
alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained
firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before
they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.

Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his behavioural
(sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you got married
(sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the marriage the
respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently
incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when I
examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital relationship
with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a statement rather on the last
page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned that marriage between the
two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s)
immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having
blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from
Anti Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his
capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and
long-standing in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the
wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He apparently
grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long before he
entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because psychological
disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic) because the person who have
this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or at the time of
the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, maam.
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality
Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment exploitative
and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are suffering
that kind of disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often than not he
even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent is not aware
that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under the influence
of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during the less than one year and one
thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should
provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it
is also the petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital relationship but
what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality Disorder,
he is good for nothing person.[4]
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report pertinently
states:[5]
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for Nullity of
Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY

xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so much
so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of drives and
motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in
goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that she set
simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs
to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration
appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends
appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed with the
RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him
was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered as
psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a person to be
unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to
support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual
alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks (The
Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life
with the respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the
petitioner manifested by the formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard
and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the misbehavior and
attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of messy days, to leave the
respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life
with the respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted
upon her and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to
sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living with her husbands family, she was
obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a battered wife coupled with the
fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time of
their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage by her
relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court
in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony quoted
above] would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological

incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.

Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting
that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential marital
obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief
prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent is a
speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as
the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although they are now
separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag
during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to protect persons
with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision,
ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of
Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that
medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse,
children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and
psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential
duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court in
Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a
deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to
work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent
compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more
stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married life
of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be
extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a

reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family
that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize
what in reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the CA
ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal basis
of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate,
should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or
non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding
on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings
and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are
clearly and manifestly erroneous;
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this omission was
intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term without being shackled by
statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which gives three conditions that would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental
incapacity as follows:
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial
rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a
psychic nature.
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC,
being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity based on
existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define
what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on
generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually
exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with
Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting
aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced an
abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual obligations of
marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must
therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and
developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that

concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law
in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement

or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of
Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[15]
Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending,
under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively
in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court took
effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be
alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of
evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of
receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina
guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give
any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the applicability of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon
Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.[19]
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that of
the Canon Law.

Going back to its basic premise, Te said:

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the
lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic
marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which
the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted,
as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of
strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina,
but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that should also govern the
disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. VelezTing[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning
Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation
given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist
have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants.
It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as
follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decisionmaking, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to
be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must

show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.[23]
[Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36 of
the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the application of
Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the psychological illness
that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the
respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of the
differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns
presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show
the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence
the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological
condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the
evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical
in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though
of a partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him

(such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of
Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility
gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile
and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed
simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological
incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony simply
provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously
silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization
she gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or
incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even
during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support
this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that
Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists
own equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized
that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based
entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent
was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos
awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or
requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the
psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find out
whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological
incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on
Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings
she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her
testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a
personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him.
She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took place whether
it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This is a clear
evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence require
that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the

absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we
may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns,
such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that
there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is
irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist cannot be
relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of the physical beatings she received
from Angelito were true, this evidence does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related
jurisprudence, specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now
find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of the
factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her
present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the
CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.
-SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of
the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure
of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix
Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 2 dated April 20,
2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in toto the judgment of the
trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present
at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony

failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was
denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. 7 The Court required respondent
Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2,
2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to
deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of
such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, 11 save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues
of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here,
appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record
did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of

some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a
year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and
contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning,
respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner
started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to
perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack
of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent
could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent
has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and
avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality
disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the
realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had
extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root
cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive
and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But
this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner.
Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling
factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital
obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed
psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be
held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing
nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates
than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with
his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological
defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of

psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. 19 No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read
in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution
dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH
FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.