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SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.127772.March22,2001]

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
RIZALCOMMERCIALBANKINGCORP.,respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING,J.:

ThisappealbycertiorariseekstosetasidetheresolutionsoftheCourtofAppealsdatedNovember
21,1996[1]andofJanuary7,1997,[2]inCAG.R.No.SP42312,whichdeniedthepetitionforcertiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner against the Hon.
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 139, Regional Trial Court of
MakatiCity,theRizalCommercialBankingCorporation(RCBC),andthePeopleofthePhilippines.[3]
InvolvedinsaidpetitionweretheordersofJudgeJaimeD.DiscayaandJudgeTuasondatedOctober25,
1995[4]andApril11,1996,[5]respectively,issuedinCriminalCasesNos.91676162whichpetitioner
claimedwereviolativeofhisconstitutionalrightagainstdoublejeopardybutwhichrespondentappellate
courtupheld.
Thefactualantecedentsinthesecases,asculledbytheCourtofAppeals,areasfollows:
PetitionerisoneoftheaccusedinCriminalCaseNo.916761,forestafathrufalsificationofpublic
document,andCriminalCaseNo.916762,forestafa,withrespondentRCBCastheoffendedpartyin
bothcases.
TheinformationswerefiledonOctober22,1992.AfterpetitionersarraignmentonMarch18,1992,
pretrialwasheld,whichwasterminatedonOctober21,1994.Thereafter,thecaseswerescheduledfor
continuoustrialinDecember1994,andinJanuaryandFebruary1995,butthehearingswerecancelled
becausethePresidingJudgeofthecourtwaselevatedtothisCourtandnotrialjudgewasimmediately
appointed/detailedthereto.
ThehearingsetforJune21,1995,waspostponedforlackofproofofnoticetoalltheaccusedandtheir
counsel.ThehearingonJuly17,1995,uponrequestofprivateprosecutor,andwithoutobjectiononthe
partofpetitionerscounsel,postponedtoJuly24,1995.However,forlackofproofofserviceofnotice
uponpetitionersthreecoaccused,thehearingsetforJuly24,1995,waslikewisecancelledandthe
caseswereresetfortrialonSeptember8and25,1995.
OnSeptember8,1995,privatecomplainantfailedtoappeardespiteduenotice.Hence,uponmotionof
petitionerscounsel,respondentcourtissuedthefollowingorder:
Whenthiscasewascalledforhearing,privatecomplainantisnotinCourtdespitenotice.Atty.
Alabastro,counselforaccusedRobertoAlmario,movedthatthecaseagainstthelatterbedismissedfor
failuretoprosecuteandconsideringthataccusedisentitledtoaspeedytrial.
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WHEREFORE,thecaseagainstaccusedRobertoAlmarioisherebydismissed.Withrespecttoaccused
SpousesSusencioandGuillermaCruzandDanteDuldulao,1stwarrantbeissuedfortheirarrest.
SOORDERED.
Uponmotionoftheprivateprosecutoranddespitetheoppositionofpetitioner,respondentcourtinits
OrderdatedOctober25,1995,reconsideredtheOrderofSeptember8,1995.Thepertinentportionof
saidorderreadsasfollows:
InHipolitovs.CourtofAppeals(G.R.No.10847879,Feb.21,1993)theSupremeCourtheldthatthe
rightoftheaccusedtoaspeedytrialisdeemedviolatedonlywhentheproceedingsisattendedby
vexations,capriciousandoppressivedelays,orwhenunjustifiedpostponementsofthetrialareaskedfor
andsecured,orwhenwithoutcauseorunjustifiablemotive,alongperiodoftimeisallowedto(e)lapse
withoutthepartyhavinghiscasetried.Atleastthisrightisrelative,takinginto(the)accountthe
circumstancesofeachcase.
Therehasbeennovexations,capriciousandoppressivedelays,orunjustifiedpostponementsofthetrial,
oralongtimeisallowedto(e)lapsewithoutthepartyhavinghiscasetriedwhichwouldconstitute,
accordingtotheabovecase,violationoftherightoftheaccusedtospeedytrial.Afterarraignmentofthe
accused,thepretrialwassetandthesamewasorderedterminatedonOctober25,1994.OnJune21,
1995,thecasewassetforinitialpresentationofevidenceoftheproofofserviceofthenoticestothe
accusedandtheirrespectivecounsels.OnJuly17,1995,counselfortheaccuseddidnotinterpose
objectiontoprivateprosecutorsmotiontopostponeduetoabsenceofwitnesses.OnJuly24,1995,the
trialcouldnotproceedas,beingajointtrialofthreecriminalcases,thethreeotheraccusedwerenot
present.Therewereonlythreesettingsfromthedateofterminationofthepretrialfortheprosecutionto
presentevidenceandthesamewerepostponedwithvalidreasons.
ThedismissalintheOrderdatedSeptember8,1995,didnotresultintheacquittaloftheaccusedsince
therightoftheaccusedtospeedytrialhasnotbeenviolated,anditsdismissalhavingbeenmadeupon
themotionoftheaccusedthereisnodoublejeopardy.
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theOrderdatedSeptember8,1995dismissingthecharge/case
againsttheaccusedRobertoAlmarioisreconsideredandsetaside.
SOORDERED.
Petitionersoughtareconsiderationoftheaboveorder.ActingontheMotionforReconsiderationdated
November9,1995,respondentJudgeissuedhisassailedOrderofApril11,1996,thedispositiveportion
ofwhichreadsasfollows:
INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,theMotionforReconsiderationdated9November1995ishereby
deniedforlackofmeritconsideringthat,basedontheforegoingfacts,theproceedingsinthiscasehave
notbeenprolongedunreasonablynorwerethereoppressivedelaysandunjustifiedpostponementsin
violationoftheAccusedsconstitutionalrighttospeedytrial.
SOORDERED.[6]
Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswithpreliminaryinjunctionagainstthepresidingjudgeofBranch
139oftheRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity,RCBCandthePeopleofthePhilippines.Inaresolution
datedNovember21,1996,respondentappellatecourtdeniedthepetitionduecourseanddismisseditfor
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lackofmerit.Petitionersmotiontoreconsideritwaslikewisedeniedforlackofmeritinaresolution
datedJanuary7,1997.
Before us, petitioner maintains that theappellate court erredinsustainingthe trial courtwhich,in
turn,hadgravelyabuseditsdiscretion,amountingtolackofjurisdiction,whenitreconsideredtheorder
whichdismissedthecriminalcasesagainsthim.Petitionerassertsthatthisreversalwasaviolationofthe
doctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of
petitionersconstitutionalrighttoaspeedytrial.[7]
The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioners cases, double jeopardy had set in so that
petitionersconstitutionalrightagainstsuchjeopardyhadbeenviolated.
ArticleIII,Section21ofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
Sec.21.Nopersonshallbetwiceputinjeopardyofpunishmentforthesameoffense.Ifanactis
punishedbyalawandanordinance,convictionoracquittalundereithershallconstituteabartoanother
prosecutionforthesameact.
Section7,Rule117oftheRevisedRulesofCourtprovides:
SEC.7.Formerconvictionoracquittaldoublejeopardy.Whenanaccusedhasbeenconvictedor
acquitted,orthecaseagainsthimdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouthisexpressconsentbya
courtofcompetentjurisdiction,uponavalidcomplaintorinformationorotherformalchargesufficient
informandsubstancetosustainaconvictionandaftertheaccusedhadpleadedtothecharge,the
convictionoracquittaloftheaccusedorthedismissalofthecaseshallbeabartoanotherprosecutionfor
theoffensecharged,orforanyattempttocommitthesameorfrustrationthereof,orforanyoffense
whichnecessarilyincludesorisnecessarilyincludedintheoffensechargedintheformercomplaintor
information.
xxx
Clearly,jeopardyattachesonly(1)uponavalidindictment,(2)beforeacompetentcourt,(3)after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted,orthecasewasdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouttheexpressconsentoftheaccused.
[8]

Inthecasesatbar,theorderofdismissalbasedonaviolationoftherighttospeedytrialwasmade
uponmotionbycounselforpetitionerbeforethetrialcourt.Itwasmadeattheinstanceoftheaccused
beforethetrialcourt,andwithhisexpressconsent.Generally,thedismissalofacriminalcaseresulting
in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of
evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.[9] Double jeopardy may attach when the proceedings
havebeenprolongedunreasonably,inviolationoftheaccusedsrighttospeedytrial.[10]
Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that
violationoftherighttospeedytrialoftheaccused,hereinpetitioner,resulted.Foritmustberecalled
thatintheapplicationoftheconstitutionalguarantyoftherighttospeedydispositionofcases,particular
regardmustalsobetakenofthefactsandcircumstancespeculiartoeachcase.[11]Boththetrialcourtand
the appellate court noted that after pretrial of petitioners case was terminated on October 21, 1994,
continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994, and January and February of 1995. The
scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding judge was promoted to the Court of
Appeals,andhissuccessorastrialjudgewasnotimmediatelyappointed,noranotherjudgedetailedto
hissala.
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Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the private
prosecutor without objection from petitioners counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995 was reset,
despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service of notice to co
accusedDanteDuldulaoandthespousesSusencioandGuillermaCruz.[12]
Asobservedbyrespondentappellatecourt,delayinthetrialwasduetocircumstancesbeyondthe
controlofthepartiesandofthetrialcourt.Thefirstandthirdpostponementswereclearlyjustifiedon
the ground of lack of notice to accused, coaccused, and/or counsel. Another was made without
objectionfrompetitionerscounsel.However,onSeptember8,1995,counselforpetitionermovedfor
dismissalofthiscase,becauseoftheabsenceoftheprivateprosecutorduetoasevereattackofgoutand
arthritis,althoughhehadsenthisassociatelawyeracceptabletothecourt.[13]Allinall,therewereonly
threeresettingofhearingdates.Thus,afteracloseranalysisofthesesuccessiveevents,thetrialcourt
realizedthatthedatesofthehearingsweretransferredforvalidgrounds.Hence,thetrialcourtsetaside
its initial order and reinstated the cases against petitioner,[14] which order the appellate court later
sustained.
That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearingswiththereasonsfortheirpostponementsortransfers.Petitionercouldnotrefutetheappellate
courts findings that petitioners right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial and
appellatecourtshavetakenpainstodemonstrate,therewasnounreasonable,vexatiousandoppressive
delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial as there were no
unjustifiedpostponementswhichhadprolongedthetrialforunreasonablelengthsoftime.[15]
Therebeingnooppressivedelayintheproceedings,andnopostponementsunjustifiablysought,we
concurwiththeconclusionreachedbytheCourtofAppealsthatpetitionersrighttospeedytrialhadnot
beeninfringed.Wheretherightoftheaccusedtospeedytrialhadnotbeenviolated,therewasnoreason
tosupporttheinitialorderofdismissal.
It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
orderwasreconsideredseasonably.[16]Foraspetitionersrighttospeedytrialwasnottransgressed,this
exceptiontothefifthelementofdoublejeopardythatthedefendantwasacquittedorconvicted,orthe
casewasdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouttheexpressconsentoftheaccusedwasnotmet.
Thetrialcourtsinitialorderofdismissalwasuponmotionofpetitionerscounsel,hencemadewiththe
express consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double
jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202)
reiterated in People vs. Leviste,[17] where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court
predicatedontherighttospeedytrial
Itistruethatinanunbrokenlineofcases,wehaveheldthatthedismissalofcasesonthegroundof
failuretoprosecuteisequivalenttoanacquittalthatwouldbarfurtherprosecutionoftheaccusedforthe
sameoffense.Itmustbestressed,however,thatthesedismissalswerepredicatedontheclearrightofthe
accusedtospeedytrial.Thesecasesarenotapplicabletothepetitionatbenchconsideringthattheright
oftheprivaterespondentstospeedytrialhasnotbeenviolatedbytheState.Forthisreason,private
respondentscannotinvoketheirrightagainstdoublejeopardy.
BoththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealswerethusnotinerrorwhentheyallowedreinstatement
ofthecasesagainstpetitioner.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. SP42312, dated
November21,1996andJanuary7,1997,whichupheldtheordersoftheRegionalTrialCourtofMakati,
Branch139,inCriminalCasesNos.91676162,areherebyAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioner.
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SOORDERED.
Bellosillo(Chairman),Mendoza,Buena,andDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
[1]Rollo,pp.8490.
[2]Id.at98.
[3]Id.at6781.
[4]Id.at4950.
[5]Id.at6266.
[6]Id.at8486.
[7]Id.at5.
[8]Peoplevs.Nitafan,302SCRA424,440(1999).
[9]Peoplevs.Bans,239SCRA48,55(1994).
[10]CommissiononElectionsvs.CourtofAppeals,229SCRA501,507(1994).
[11]Socratesvs.Sandiganbayan,253SCRA773,788(1996).
[12]Rollo,pp.8889.
[13]Id.at49.
[14]Id.at6266.
[15]SeeGuerrerovs.CourtofAppeals,257SCRA703,713(1996).
[16]Peoplevs.Leviste,255SCRA238,249(1996).
[17]Ibid.

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