Anatomy of A Crisis - Education, Development and The

ANATOMY
OF A
CRISIS
Education,
Development,
and the
State in
Cambodia,
1953 1998
David M. Ayres
University of Hawaii Press

Honolulu
2000 University of Hawaii Press

All rights reserved
Printed in the
United States of America
05 04 03 02 01
00
5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ayers, David M., 1971
Anatomy of a crisis : education, development, and the
state in Cambodia, 1953 1998 / David M. Ayers
p.
cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0 8248 2238 2
1. Education and state Cambodia History
20th century. 2. Education Social aspects
Cambodia History 20th century. I. Title.
LC94.C16A94 2000
379.59609045 dc21
99 42870
CIP
University of Hawaii Press

books are printed on acidfree paper and meet the
guidelines for permanence
and durability of the Council
on Library Resources.
Designed by Kenneth Miyamoto
Printed by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group
Contents
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations and Acronyms
vii
ix
Introduction
1 The Traditional Setting: State, Society, and Education

before Independence
2 Sihanouk and the Sangkum: From Independence to Chaos
31
3 Lon Nol and the Republic: The Declining State
67
4 Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge: Building and Defending

Cambodia
94
5 The PRK and the SOC: The State in Transition
120
6 Ranariddh and Hun Sen: From Uneasy Alliance to Coup
150
Conclusion
184
Notes
References
Index
193
229
251
Acknowledgments
Writing this book would have been a much more difcult task if it
were not for the love and encouragement of my family. My wife and
my parents, Michael and Vicki, have endured my frequent absences,
holding the fort together while I have been overseas or bunkered in
my ofce. It is to each of them, and to my son, Dominic, that I dedicate
this book.
My work over the past several years would not have been possible
without the advice, assistance, encouragement, and support of many
people. Phillip Jones, at the University of Sydney, introduced me to the
eld of international education and development and has been an
outstanding and inspiring guide and mentor ever since. In Cambodia,
Vin McNamara generously shared with me his thoughts, materials, and
experiences and was instrumental in my gaining access to all levels of
the educational system. My debt to both of them is substantial.
Many other people have assisted me since I began researching Cambodian education. To those who have commented on and critiqued
drafts of my work, provided hospitality and introductions, lent me their
materials, or offered assistance and suggestions, I express my sincere
thanks. I wish to especially single out Nathan Waesch, who has lent me
his ear (and his proofreading skills) on more occasions than I can recall.
For their assistance, I need to also express my gratitude to the administrators, librarians, and archivists at the various libraries and document
centers I have visited in Cambodia.
vii
viii
Acknowledgments
My nal word of thanks is to the many Cambodians in Australia and

in Cambodia who welcomed me into their ofces and homes and
opened their lives to me over the course of my research. For some, our
time together provided an opportunity to relive memories of happier
times. Others selflessly shared with me recollections of days they would
prefer to forget. Each of them taught me a great deal and served to
heighten the enjoyment I derived from writing this book.
Abbreviations
and Acronyms
ADB
AEK
ASEAN
BLDP
CCC
CDC
CGDK
CIA
CIVADMIN
CPK
CPP
DK
EDUCAM
EU
FAO
FANK
FUNCINPEC
Asian Development Bank

Association des Etudiants Khmers (Association of
Khmer Students)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
Council for the Development of Cambodia
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
Central Intelligence Agency
Civil Administration (of the UNTAC)
Communist Party of Kampuchea
Cambodian Peoples Party
Democratic Kampuchea
Education Cambodia (Education arm of the CCC)
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization (of the UN)
Forces Armes Nationales Khmres (Khmer National
Armed Forces)
Front Uni National pour un Cambodge indpendant
neutre pacique et coopratif (National United
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and
Co-operative Cambodia)
ix
FUNK
ICORC
ICP
ICRC
ILO
IMF
KPNLF
KPRP
KR
MCRRC
MOEYS
NGO
NLF
NPRD
NVA
NWO
PCF
PDK
PRK
RGOC
RUPP
SAP
SEATO
SNC
SOC
SRP
STF
STV
UFNS
Front Uni National du Kampuchea (National United

Front of Kampuchea)
International Committee on the Reconstruction
of Cambodia
Indochinese Communist Party
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Labor Organization
International Monetary Fund
Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front
Khmer Peoples Revolutionary Party
Khmers Rouges (Khmer Rouge, Red Khmer or
Khmaer Krahom)
Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of Cambodia
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport
Nongovernment organizations
National Liberation Front (Vietcong)
National Program to Rehabilitate and Develop
Cambodia
North Vietnamese Army
New World Order
Parti Communiste Franaise (French Communist
Party)
Party of Democratic Kampuchea
Peoples Republic of Kampuchea
Royal Government of Cambodia
Royal University of Phnom Penh
Structural Adjustment Programs
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Supreme National Council
State of Cambodia
Sam Rainsy Party
Systemic Transfer Facility (IMF Loan)
Standard Total View
United Front for the National Salvation of
Kampuchea
UIF
UN
UNAMIC
UNDP
UNESCO
UNICEF
UNTAC
U.S.
USAID
USSR
WHO
WPK
WPV
xi
United Issarak Front

United Nations
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
United Nations Development Program
United Nations Educational, Scientic and Cultural
Organization
United Nations Childrens Fund (formerly United
Nations International Childrens Emergency Fund)
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
United States
United States Agency for International Development
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
World Heath Organization
Workers Party of Kampuchea
Workers Party of Vietnam
Introduction
At the heart of precolonial Cambodia, and at the heart of the countrys

modern conscience, are the awe-inspiring towers of Angkor Wat. Built
in the twelfth century by the Khmer king, Suryavarman II (r. 1113
1150), the temple embodies the two underlying tenets of Cambodian
traditionalism.1 First, it represents a palpable testament to the glorious
pages of Cambodias past, when the Khmer kingdom was among the
most powerful in Southeast Asia. Second, the cosmology associated with
Angkor Wat highlights the essential themes of traditional Cambodian
conceptions of power: absolutism and the primacy of hierarchy. The
story of Angkor Wats penetration of Cambodias modern conscience is
the story of the enmeshment of Cambodian traditionalism within Cambodian modernity.
The temple, like others constructed in the region during what is
now referred to as the Angkorean period, is an architectural representation of unity between kingship and cosmology. In its ideal form, the
perception of unity provided a framework establishing that the political
order was a microcosm of the cosmic order. 2 Providing legitimacy to
absolutist rule and a rigid political hierarchy, the traditional system,
which had declined in stature after the fall of Angkor, was bolstered by
the French, whose scholarship and restoration of Angkorean history
brought its long since forgotten grandeur back to life. The French endeavors to conserve Cambodian kingship, designed to secure the legitimacy of their colonial project, accorded judiciously with the indirect
Introduction
rule implied by Cambodias status as a protectorate. By according renewed prominence to kingship, and therefore reinforcing the associated notions of absolutism and hierarchy, the French effectively fused
those modern institutions they had implanted in dening a geographical space called Cambodge with those that had sustained the precolonial
Khmer polity. While the traditional political culture owed its renewal to
the demands of the modernity underpinning the colonial enterprise,
modernity in turn owed its limited successes to the legitimacy afforded
by Cambodian veneration of tradition.
Pol Pot, the gure most synonymous with what is now generally regarded as the tragedy of modern Cambodia, declared in 1977: If we can
build Angkor, we can build anything. His assertion amplies the extent
to which the perception of the eminence of Cambodias past has permeated its present. Once a source of pilgrimage for those Cambodian
peasants fortunate enough to move beyond their local world, Angkor
Wat, depicted on each of the countrys national ags since independence, now stands alone as the paramount symbol of Cambodian nationalism.3 Embodying the hierarchy and absolutism of the traditional
world associated with the precolonial Khmer polity, it has provided a reference point for modern political practice. It is within this setting, where
the tension between modernity and tradition is played out, that this
book considers questions of education, development, and the state.
The book is about Cambodias education system, its relationship to
change and development, the relationship between education and development, and the state. It unravels the crisis that has characterized
education in Cambodia since the country was reluctantly granted independence by the French in 1953. In so doing, it not only illuminates our
understanding of Cambodias rmly entrenched and pervasive educational problems but also contributes to a greater understanding of Cambodias tragic modern history and, importantly, a greater understanding
of the inextricable link between that tragic history and the conditions of
the present.
Alongside tragedy, 4 the idea of timelessness is one of the dominant
themes of Cambodias history. In one respect, the book amplies this
theme, demonstrating how time-honored notions of power, hierarchy,
and leadershipthe roots of tradition in Cambodiahave continued
to enjoy prominence in the countrys economic, political, and cultural
life. In another respect, the oversimplication associated with the idea
of an unchanging society is highlighted. With the political extremities
that have characterized Cambodia since independence as a backdrop,
Introduction
the book examines the social institution most readily associated with
change and dynamism in a country that continues to genuect before
the weight of tradition and the part-myth, part-reality perception of a
glorious past. The focus on education informs both the broader theme
of tragedy and the dichotomy between change and changelessness yet
also communicates its own complex story.
The notion of a crisis in education rst emerged in the 1960s, when
educational planners, politicians, social scientists, and economists
throughout the world realized that the great optimism associated with
the perceived potential of education to bring about desirable social
change had not been realized. Put simply, the crisis was, and continues
to be, a product of the disparity between the education system and the
economic, political, and cultural environments that it has been intended to serve.5 In order to examine the Cambodian crisis, as it has
been manifested, addressed, changed, and often ignored since independence, education is set within its historical and cultural context. In
this respect, the book is concerned with addressing the role of education in constructing, and paradoxically being constructed by, Cambodias past. It focuses on a tension that Cambodiaalong with many of
its counterparts in the developing worldhas played out time and time
again: pursuing development (and one of its symptoms, modernity) in
a manner at odds with tradition and the cultural underpinnings of
the state.
Education has been central to the tension between modernity and
tradition and between development and state-making. On one hand,
Cambodias leaders, with the notable exception of the notorious Pol Pot,
have considered the education system an essential institution through
which to create good citizens and realize their perspective on Cambodias future. In other words, embracing the same attitude as the leaders
of developing countries across the globe, they have seen education as
the key to modernization. On the other hand, these leaders, including
Pol Pot, have embraced education in order to promote and ensure their
personal power and legitimacy and that of the regimes over which they
have presided. Formal education, therefore, has served a dual role:
making Cambodia look modern and at the same time sustaining the key
tenets of the traditional polity, where leadership is associated with power
and where the nature of the state is perceived to be a function of that
power.
The crisis in Cambodian educationits disparity with the economic,
political, and cultural environmentsis easy to identify. Its symptoms
Introduction
were evident only a few years after independence. The quality of educational instruction was rapidly degenerating, infrastructure was being
constructed at a rate that was impossible to sustain, while unemployed
graduates and disgruntled intellectuals not only began to agitate for reform and change but became increasingly drawn to the promises of
equality whispered by those radicals who had rejected the status quo and
ed to the countryside to prepare for a revolution. The horrors of the
1970s, when a crippling civil war was followed by the Khmer Rouge reign
of terror, only served to exacerbate the problems for those entrusted
with reconstructing Cambodia during the 1980s. The political and continued military unrest that accompanied this period not only undermined development but reinforced the educational disaster. The continuity of the crisis is such that, in the 1990s, education in Cambodia is in
an arguably more parlous state than it was in the 1960s: teachers are
poorly trained, learning aids and teaching facilities are practically nonexistent, unacceptable numbers of students continue to repeat grades
and many others drop out before they have completed primary school,
and the budget for educational development provides little optimism
about the prospects for future improvements.
In the spirit of setting education within its historical and cultural context, and therefore taking account of the manner in which the tension
between tradition and modernity has become manifest over time, the
book embodies several aims. The rst is to examine the effects on education of the regimes that have ruled Cambodia since 1953. When
Prince Norodom Sihanouk assumed almost absolute power following
the countrys 1955 elections, he set in place a state ideology called Buddhist socialism. This ramshackle ideology was later replaced by the
equally decrepit neo-Khmerism of Lon Nol and then by Pol Pots commitment to self-reliance and self-mastery. In 1979, as Pol Pot and his
Khmer Rouge carried their utopian ideals to their jungle hideaway, their
replacements not only sought to rehabilitate Cambodia but also Cambodian socialism. When Eastern European Communism began its dramatic collapse in the 1980s, so too did these half-hearted attempts at
socialist rehabilitation. Communism was eventually replaced by an unbridled ofcial commitment to capitalism, to the free-market, and to the
ideals of the so-called New World Order. In and of themselves, the effects on education of each of these ideological shifts are worthy of detailed study. In effect, however, the ideologies are nothing more than a
small part of a bigger picture. How did the regimes promoting them assume state power? How did their behavior accord with these ideological
Introduction
convictions? In what ways did they change? What forces led to their eventual demise? Each of these phenomena needs to be explored and related
to the nature, structure, and form of education since independence.
The second aim of this book is to investigate the extent to which the
paradigms that have informed our ideas about development have
inuenced state ideals, and in turn education, in Cambodia. How were
Sihanouks Buddhist socialism and Lon Nols neo-Khmerism inuenced
by the modernization and human capital theories that dominated development agendas throughout the world from the 1950s through the
1970s? Although he would certainly have denied any such link, how
was Pol Pots commitment to development based on self-reliance inuenced by the ideas of exploitation, domination, and dependency that
were at the core of the underdevelopment theories that emerged in opposition to the Westernized modernization and human capital models?
How does the commitment to development based on free-market principles of the regime that has emerged in Cambodia since the United Nations sponsored elections of 1993 reect the key tenets of the New
World Order? While we can acknowledge that the development aspirations of Cambodias various post-independence regimes have not
emerged in total isolation, we also need to question the degree to which
these global development paradigms have been tempered and subverted by conditions tied rmly to the society and culture of Cambodia.
In essence, how has the weight of the past, embodied by tradition, impacted on aspirations for the future?
The books third aim, informing the educational analysis, is to provide a balanced account of the contributions separate regimes have
made to Cambodias political development. Unlike its more populous
neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, research and publications about
Cambodias recent past are decidedly thin. Apart from the information
explosion generated by the Khmer Rouge holocaust (19751979), few
scholars have attempted to account for developments in Cambodia
since independence. Even fewer, if any, have concerned themselves with
questions of social policy. In a review essay, Serge Thion wrote, explaining Cambodia is typically a foreigners business. 6 It is also, perhaps
unfortunately, a business often colored by the embroilment of those
foreigners in the politics of the Cold War. By weaving my narrative
around the key issue of for what end Cambodia has used its education
system, I have attempted to avoid political partisanship in the raging
academic debates that often characterize Cambodian scholarship. Instead, by presenting what is essentially a chronicle of the continued
Introduction
development and educational failures of every one of Cambodias postindependence ruling regimes, I have highlighted not the differences
between them that their sides in the Cold War may have required, but
the striking similarities.
In focusing on these similarities, the book works toward its nal aim:
pointing to the relationship between past practices and the problems of
the present. Through focusing on the relationship between tradition
and modernity, I have attempted to tie questions of history and politics
to those of culture. Within this framework, the book links the crisis in
contemporary Cambodian education, as with those of the past, to the
roots of Cambodian culturetraditional notions of power, hierarchy,
and leadership. In doing so, it debunks the idea that the Khmer Rouge
was some extreme historical anomaly whose legacy is the major impediment to development in contemporary Cambodia. It also, therefore,
debunks the popular myth, manifested in the desire by many Cambodians to realize their nostalgia for the past, that the Sihanouk era of the
1950s and 1960s was some kind of golden era for Cambodia and Cambodian development. In reality, while acknowledging the horrors and
debilitating effects of the Khmer Rouge period, it is evident that Cambodias prerevolutionary past is no more a golden era than is its present;
both are characterized by political repression, state-sanctioned violence, factionalism, corruption, and absolute contempt by those with
power for those over whom that power is exercised. It is the echoes of
the voices of the past in the circumstances of the present that resonate
through the chapters that follow.
The foundations of tradition and modernity are established in chapter 1, which overviews Cambodias traditional sociocultural setting before exploring its initial interaction with a European vision of modernity. The nature of traditional Khmer society, including its education
system, and the rst inklings of modernity advanced under the patronage of the French are the two embracing themes of the chapter. Critical
of French inertia in regard to the development of Cambodia, the chapter disentangles, through its examination of colonial educational development, a fundamental contradiction in the application of the mission
civilisatrice that underpinned the colonial enterprise. On the one hand,
it demonstrates the relative vigor with which the mission civilisatrice was
applied to the Cambodian elite, whose assimilation into the so-called
modern world represented a concerted French priority. On the other,
however, the chapter establishes that the local world of the Cambodian
peasant was left largely unvarnished by the brushstrokes of the colonial
Introduction
period, with the countrys traditional patterns of hierarchy and absolutist rule reinforced by the colonial administration. Finally, the chapter
reveals how it was the economic, political, and cultural changes ushered
in by this contradictory agenda that served to inuence the framework
for the nation-state, and the state-sponsored education system, that
emerged in Cambodia following independence.
The remaining chapters accord with the neatly arranged periodization of Cambodias modern history produced by the changes in the countrys ruling regimes. Consideration is therefore given, within separate
chapters, to the Sihanouk regime (1953 1970), the Lon Nol regime
(1970 1975), the Pol Pot regime (19751979), the Heng Samrin/Hun
Sen regime (1979 1993), and the Hun Sen/Norodom Ranariddh regime (1993 1997), whose tumultuous end was realized in a coup dtat
in July 1997. The chapters deliver analysis at several levels, with change
and changelessness, and the enmeshment of tradition and modernity,
emerging as central themes at each level. At one level, the chapters
trace the development of educational policy in Cambodia, illustrating its
relationship with the past, and the involvement of both international
(global) and indigenous (local/national) forces in shaping its orientation. At another level, related to the rst, the chapters examine the articulation of educational policies in practice, taking account of the range
of factorslocal, national, regional, and globalthat have affected the
implementation of educational policies in Cambodia since independence. A third level of analysis broadens the eld of exploration, relating
educational policy and practice to the construction of the nation-state,
taking account of the contradictions between the traditional ideals underlying the construction project and the state of modernity it has
generally embraced. The nal level of analysis, enveloping the rst three,
relates educational policy and practice, and the construction of the
nation-state, to the crisis in Cambodian education. It is at this level that
we are able to account for not only the failure of an education system
to fulll the expectations of national leaders, educational policy makers,
and citizens but also the failure of a political culture to deal with change
and to deal with the aspirations of those affected by that change.
A Note on Sources
The Cambodian revolution of 1975 has been described as a prairie re.7
For the researcher of Cambodia, the effects of that re were to have a
considerable and enduring impact. Given that the premise of historical
Introduction
research is to interpret past events by the traces they have left, 8 it

would seem that to interpret Cambodia is to comb the ashes of the re
for the traces not destroyed. It is a task that almost inevitably leads to a
methodological hotchpotch, characterized by the problems generated
by war, wanton destruction, genocide, and the geographical dispersion
of a people affected by each of these. In constructing my narrative, I
have attempted to accommodate these problems by drawing on a wide
range of sources: print media, the transcripts of speeches, government
reports, publications, legislation and decrees, and the reports of international and nongovernment organizations. Certain historical periods,
through no other reason but necessity, are dominated by a reliance on
certain groups of sources, while other periods are characterized by a
similar reliance on different sources. At almost every juncture of the
narrative, documentary and transactional records have been corroborated with data gleaned from personal interviews and discussions and
with the substantial contribution to our understanding of Cambodia
made by leading scholars.9
Keeping in mind the obvious constraints associated with reconstructing the past, and the more unique constraints presented by Cambodias
tumultuous modern history, the book provides for many Cambodian
voices to be heard. It is not intended to be a comprehensive history of
Cambodian education, development, or the state, and it is therefore acknowledged, and regretted, that many stories remain untold. What has
been undertaken is an attempt to peel away the many layers of Cambodias past, the ideologies of successive and radically different yet remarkably similar Cambodian regimes, to present a story about education. Like any other story, certain characters emerge, and twists and
turns in the plot are taken, while others are not paid the attention they
arguably deserve. While many other stories remain to be told, and a cacophony of voices remain to be heard, it is as a beginning and not an
end that this study contributes a small drop in the shallow pond that is
our understanding of modern Cambodia.
The
Traditional
Setting
State, Society,
and Education
before
Independence
Just how people came to inhabit the land that now forms Cambodia remains something of a mystery. As in many other Southeast Asian countries, mythical legends about the creation of Cambodia provide tales
rich in detail and adventure yet scant in terms of historical fact. One
story revolves around a Brahman prince who marries a dragon-princess.
The descendants of this couple, according to the legend, are the rst
inhabitants of Khmer lands, Kambuja. Like many such legends of emergence, Cambodias tale of Kaundinya has a number of variations, all established on similar themes.1 Although useless in terms of a historical
narrative, the tale represents an illuminating thematic introduction to
Cambodian culture and the Cambodian state.
What is important about the tale of Kaundinya is its Indian inuence.
The name Kambuja is Sanskrit, while the storys central protagonist,
Prince Kaundinya, was a Brahman. Like much of the prehistory of
Southeast Asia, and particularly Cambodia, the concept of Indianization, while rarely disputed, remains clouded. Scholars continue to grapple with questions about whether Indianization was a product of Indian
or local initiatives, whether it was an imposed or invited phenomenon,
and whether it began because of economic, political, or cultural concerns. Despite the many questions, there is general agreement that the
Indianization of Southeast Asia was a two-way interaction that profoundly affected the nature of social relations in the region.2
The social system that emerged throughout the Indianized Khmer
polity was one of reciprocal relationships and dependencies. A caste
10
The Traditional Setting
system, such as that in India, did not gain momentum in Cambodia. A

complex social hierarchy was, however, evident. The hierarchy can be
thought of in terms of a pyramid, with its labyrinth of internal entrances
and corridors representing a complex web of relationships between
people and institutions. It is this web that served to link the local worlds
of Cambodian villagers with the Khmer king. The social system was not
static, changing many times between the initial Khmer-Indian interactions and the arrival of the French in the mid-nineteenth century. Despite these changes, the underlying basis of the hierarchy endured.3
The hierarchical social system was certainly evident in the precolonial Khmer villages of the sixteenth century. The villages were generally
centered on a local wat (temple or pagoda). On the surface, they appeared loosely structured, with family and monkhood constituting the
only durable groups. Beyond these groups, cohesion was maintained
through a network of relationships between patrons and clients. People
living in a village could be identied as either neak mean (a person who
has), or neak kro (a person who does not have), depending on their status relative to each other. Weaker members of the village (neak kro)
sought protection from those of greater strength (neak mean), such as local monks, bandits, or minor government ofcials. These neak mean
were then considered neak kro in relation to ofcials from nearby centers who exercised greater power. Village life was a fragile, and often
savage, existence. Reliant on the vagaries of the weather, on minimal
protection or support from the state, and with no roads or means of
long-distance communication, people were largely dependent on each
other. In order to survive, alliances were formed and, as a result, the system of hierarchy endured.4
Cambodias social hierarchy was not unique. In many ways, it was
typical of hierarchical social systems evident in other Asiatic kingdoms Thailand, Burma, the Indonesian archipelago, and the Malay
peninsula being obvious examples. At the apex of Cambodias hierarchical pyramid was the king, considered to be the protector of society.
While self-preservation, motivated by a continued procession of rivals
and would-be challengers, was often the primary consideration for
Cambodias precolonial sovereigns, the institution of kingship was
revered by the peasantry, whose ideas about the monarch, according to
David Chandler, were grounded in mythology rather than experience. 5 A legacy of the idealized conception of the monarch inherited
from the Angkorean period, which bestowed on Cambodia the notion
of a God-King, was the widespread belief among the peasantry that it
State, Society, and Education before Independence
11
was the king who had determined the fertility of the soil and therefore
the survival or otherwise of their crops.
The village and the king were connected physically by the administrative cadre known as oknya. Like the villagers, they were participants
in the web of patronage and dependence. The oknya, reliant for their
status on continued royal patronage, were often directed by the king to
govern a particular srok (district), where as chaoway srok (governor), they
were provided with the authority to, among other things, conscript soldiers and impose taxes.6 Below the oknya were the people of the srok, often a number of villages, who were dependent on the continued patronage of the oknya.
Spiritually, it was Buddhism, and particularly the Buddhist sangha
(community of monks), that bound the system together by serving to legitimize both the status of the king and the system of social hierarchy
that owed from the monarchy. The relationship between the sangha
and the monarchy was a reciprocal one: the ideology of Buddhism
needed a supportive political power and the ruler beneted from a legitimating theology. 7 This theology stemmed from two key tenets of the
Buddhist doctrine: rst, that human beings are imperfect and need
guidance and protection; and second, that individuals alone are essentially helpless. The Buddhist concept of political authority asserted the
necessity of a king to balance these tenets and maintain social order.
Given human imperfection and helplessness, the king, having accumulated great merit in his former lives (and therefore unquestionably entitled to his place on the throne), through his conduct and actions, was
regarded as the determinant of the fortunes of his subjects.8 Belief in the
political system was maintained and reinforced by the sangha through
the moral and literary teachings of the monks at the village wat. 9
In respect of the present study, we need to keep in mind three
central features of the precolonial system. First, the individuals who
constituted Khmer societythe king, his ofcials, the clergy, and the
people of the villagesparticipated in the system through their involvement in a web of patronage and clientship. Survival at the bottom
of the hierarchy was reliant on securing powerful patrons, while survival
at the top depended on establishing a network of clients large enough
to neutralize potential rivals. Second, the notion of mutual obligation
did not exist. While those at the top governed, those at the bottom existed to be governed. The relationship between those with power and
those over whom that power was exercised owed in only one direction.
The result was that power became an end in itself: those with authority
12
sought to become more powerful while having absolutely no obligation

to better the lives of those on whom their authority had been established. The third central feature of the social system was its maintenance
through the teachings of local monks. It is to the essence of these teachings that we now turn.
Traditional Education
Piecing together the nature of the traditional education system is hampered by a lack of sources. Our rst evidence about how knowledge was
imparted among the early inhabitants of Cambodia is dated from the
late thirteenth century, some four centuries after the consecration of a
unied Khmer state. The zenith of the powerful Angkorean state had
long since passed when a Chinese embassy of Timur Khan, led by Chou
Ta-Kuan, arrived at the court of Indravarman III. Chous observations
highlight the centrality of religion, in terms of education, in Cambodian
life. Chou reported that one of the three religious groups within the
Angkorean city was referred to as pan-chi, or men of learning. He noted
that although there appeared to exist no school or seminary for the panchi, they were often able to rise to positions of high status within the
court. Chou also observed that Children of the laity . . . become novices
of the bonzes who teach them. As he conceded that he was unable to
make detailed investigation of this monastic-style education, we are able
to discern nothing about the exact nature of the schools: who was
taught, what was taught, where, what materials were used, and, importantly, how the provision of education diverged between the different
social strata in the society.10 In effect, Chou drew us a sketch, or an outline, while omitting the color.
Following Chou, there is a substantial gap in time before we encounter any further concrete evidence about the nature of education.
Louis Manipoud, who would later become the countrys chief inspector
of primary education, wrote that the bonzes . . . were not only the
agents of the moral and religious truth, but further, the guardians of total secular knowledge of their time. 11 There are striking parallels between Chous observations and those of Manipoud, who provided details of the education system observed by the French on their arrival in
Cambodia. Like Chou, he described how Cambodian children of the
laity (mainly boys, as girls were rarely admitted) were receiving instruction at the wat. The bonzes taught the children to read sacred Cambodian texts, such as the satras, instructed them in the precepts of Bud-
13
dhism, informed them about Cambodian oral and literary traditions,

and provided them with the opportunity to develop vocational skills,
such as carpentry, that could be easily associated with their rural
lifestyle. According to one Cambodian historian, the traditional education system taught students the principles of being a good individual
and of good social conduct. 12 Given the much noted continuity in aspects of Cambodian rural life between the Angkorean period and the
arrival of the French, it is not unreasonable to assume that there was
some degree of similarity in religious instruction through these years.
The key to understanding the nature of the traditional education system is to examine its relationship to the system of social relations described earlier. The hierarchical social system, legitimized on a perceived need to deal with human imperfection and helplessness, drew its
foundation from the interrelated Hindu-Buddhist notions of dharma, or
ideas, ideals, and truths; and vinaya, concepts associated with social regulation. It is from these notions that the king was able to assert his legitimacy and villagers were able to locate their positions, and the appropriate behaviors they required, within the social hierarchy. Through
probing how the concepts of dharma and vinaya were divulged, the nature and underlying ideology of Cambodias traditional system of education becomes apparent.
Cambodias oral and literary customs are intimately connected, and
both are connected with its Buddhist and Hindu traditions. Drawing on
themes related to Buddhist and Hindu teaching, the customs were disseminated primarily through the wat. Prior to the arrival of the French,
literacy (the ability to read and write text) was very low among the peasantry. For the vast majority, the only education they received was during
a stay as a novice at the wat. As a result of this widespread illiteracy, many
Khmers learned the rich cultural heritage contained in the countrys
proverbs, chbab (didactic poems), epics such as the Reamker (local version of the Ramayana story), and the Gatiloke (folk tales) through word
of mouth. According to tradition, copies of the texts, often printed on
palm leaves, were stored at the local wat. The printed word helped to
promote the integrity and originality of the texts and provided a source
of consultation and instruction for those entrusted with their teaching.
A consequence of the importance of the texts was the esteem accorded to those who were able to decode them. It has been argued of
premodern Thai communities neighboring Cambodia that monks assumed a pre-eminent social position commensurate with their monopolization of knowledge associated with written texts. 13 As in Cambodia,
14
the monastic order was able to draw on this monopoly to play a signicant role in determining what texts were worth reading and teaching
and therefore what knowledge was worth knowing. The teacher became an essential conduit in the support and maintenance of the social
and cultural systems.
Whether through what they heard, or through their own ability to
read, students of Cambodias monastic education system were socialized
to understand the importance of the texts to Khmer society. A discussion of three such texts follows.
Chbab
Chbab are the normative Cambodian poems, or folk laws, that incorporate ancient wisdom . . . into the context of Buddhist teachings. 14
Rather than describing norms of behavior, the chbab prescribed them.
They served, and continue to serve, as a guide for Cambodian children,
women, and men about what constitutes appropriate forms of behavior
between people. The poems legitimized the system of reciprocal relationships and dependencies.15 They were not to be questioned nor to
serve as a basis for critical discussion. Rather, they were a prescription
for harmony, balance, regularity, and conformity.
One of the poems emphasizes that An ofcial reaches heights because of the support of his men. 16 The chbab Rajaneti does not encourage the questioning of this social arrangement, nor does it query the apparent inequality. Instead, the poem counsels the participants about
how harmony can be maintained in this relationship. A second poem,
targeted at children, stresses that a good person does not boast or abuse
and exploit others. Rather, a good person acts like the snake, its head
lowered, disciplined and reserved. 17 The chbab Kun Cau thus emphasizes deference in ones dealings with other people.
Relationships in the educational process provided an important subject for the chbab, which often dealt with the lop-sided friendship between a teacher and student. A verse from the chbab Kram reads:
To know by oneself
Is like being lost
In the middle of the forest,
Or like a blind man
Left to himself, who sets out on his way
With no one to take his hand.
And when he looks for the path
He never nds it,
15
But wanders into the forest instead

Because he has learned things by himself
With no one to take his hand.18
In a world where day to day existence offered little security, the chbab
stressed that people needed others to guide them and that solitude
should be avoided. The presence of the forest in this poem is important.
The Khmers associate the prei (forest) with connotations of what is wild
and uncivilized. Thus the poem also emphasized the importance of
maintaining the correct social relationship between the student and the
teacher as a means of maintaining civilized behavior in society.
Reamker
The Reamker is the Cambodian interpretation of the Hindu epic, the
Ramayana. The story depicts the classical battle between good and evil.
Cambodias version of the story is only vaguely related to the original Indian text, having been altered to t the Khmer language and the Theravada Buddhist world of Cambodia.19 The plot of the story is summarized here:
The skullduggery of his step-mother forces Prince Ream (Rama) to
leave the kingdom he was about to inherit. Accompanied by his wife,
Sita, and his younger brother, Leak (Laksmana), Ream travels in the
forest, encountering many friends and foes. Sita is eventually taken
away by the ruler of the city of Langka, the evil Prince Reab (Ravana).
With the assistance of Hanuman, the prince of the monkeys, Ream
attempts to rescue his wife by attacking Langka. He wins a series of
battles against the evil forces before the narrative abruptly ends.20
While the story does not directly reinforce the hierarchical social order,
it does emphasize the necessity of maintaining a social balance. Like the
chbab, the Reamker draws on the metaphor of the forest, contrasting the
goodness of civilized behavior with that of the prei, associated with evil
and wildness. The association between the forest and evil is introduced
at an early juncture in the story, when Prince Reab refers to an ogre
as a vulgar ascetic of the forest. 21 Residing in the forest, Prince Reab,
is associated with chaos and the overturning of the natural order, although his outward appearance is often austere and elegant. Prince
Ream, on the other hand, represents virtue, goodness, and inward austerity, an embodiment of the dharma, or laws of the universe.
The Reamker, since the era of Angkor, has formed a cornerstone of
Cambodian cultural life. The epic is widely presented in dance, lkhaon
16
khaol (masked theater), sbek thom (shadow theater), and mural art. In
addition to this inspiring cultural exposure, it was also the subject of
more detailed study within the traditional education system. The themes
of the Reamker, its characterization, and the ideals it promoted were
not open to discourse. Instead, the emphasis was on memorization and
emulating the qualities of the heroes rather than a search for a deeper
analysis of the meaning of the conict depicted. 22
Gatiloke
The Gatiloke is a collection of Khmer folk stories developed over
centuries. They have been used by Cambodias monks in teaching about
virtuous behavior. Literally, gati means the way, and loke means the
world, leading to the interpretation that Gatiloke means the right way
for the people of the world to live. 23 In this respect, the stories draw on
a didactic notion similar to that presented in the Reamker. The signicant difference between the two is that while the Reamker portrays a
mythical world, the stories of the Gatiloke draw on the lives of ordinary
people in ordinary situations and in local settings resembling those encountered in the daily lives of Cambodias peasants.
The narrative style of the tales reinforces their role in moral guidance
and instruction. The meaning of the stories is generally made explicit,
demonstrating clearly the consequences of acting contrary to the social
order. Unlike many Western tales, the stories from the Gatiloke do not
conclude with a dening coda. Rather, the coda permeates the entire
story.24 The tale of the Chief Monk of the Monastery of Sohtan Koh,
for instance, tells the story of a chief monk dissatised with his simple
life, and a rascal, called Sao, from a neighboring district. Through
parading as a wealthy businessman, Sao is able to swindle a large amount
of money from the chief monk, purporting to use the money to purchase ne silks to make him a new robe. The story does not conclude
with goodness prevailing over evil, as to do so would ignore the stupidity and vanity of the monk. Instead, the tale concludes with the chief
monk forced to return to his temple without money, a natural consequence of his actions throughout the story.25
The Gatiloke folk stories were not written down until the nineteenth
century. Their value, in terms of traditional education, was not to enhance the rudimentary literacy instruction provided at the wat. The
main purpose of the tales was to serve as a source of moral guidance and
instruction. The monks would base sermons on particular Gatiloke
tales, seeking to incorporate Buddhist teachings into the Cambodian
17
way of life. In this manner, students were provided with advice concerning human relations, individual responsibility, punishment and reward,
killing animals, and greed and ingratitude. The tales provided a model
for living, urging their listeners toward the virtues of prudence, moderation, and foresight.26 In many respects, they provided a strategy for survival in the fragile Khmer social world.
Examined collectively, Cambodias literary traditions, including the
chbab, Reamker, and tales of the Gatiloke, have contributed to the creation of a plethora of didactic Khmer proverbs. Their central themes,
and the virtues that they promote, have provided Khmer culture with an
abundance of rules and advice about proper conduct, status, and interpersonal relations. One such theme is the observance of proper social
relationships, implied either explicitly or implicitly in the three texts
and genres discussed earlier. For the neak mean, a proverb advises that
the rich should take care of the poor like the cloth which surrounds
you. 27 The relationship is not one-sided, however, as the accumulation
of clients from among the neak kro inevitably stems from such assistance.
A second theme drawn from the proverbs is the maintenance of the
status quo. In a society where survival was always a conscious motivation,
revolutionary ideas were practically nonexistent. To try something new,
or to experiment, may have resulted in disaster, starvation, pillaging at
the hands of a hostile antagonist, or even death. People were encouraged to respect traditions and the way things had always been done:
Dont reject the crooked road and dont take the straight one; instead,
take the road traveled by the ancestors. 28
To examine these texts as constituting the curriculum for instruction
at the wat is particularly problematic. It does not account for the overall
structure of school instruction and ignores the attention paid to vocational skills and methods of literacy instruction. If the texts are taken as
extracts of a wider instructional curriculum, however, they do serve to
illuminate the nature and importance of traditional educational instruction in precolonial Cambodia. A denitive conclusion to be drawn
from the instruction was its compatible relationship with the countrys
hierarchical social system. Traditional education reinforced the social
hierarchy presided over by the king and legitimized by the countrys
Buddhist monastic order. Social regulation was not based on a discernible political ideology. Rather, it was based on a pragmatic acceptance of the necessity of regulation for survival. In essence, social regulation was the embodiment of the hierarchical political culture and was
agreed to in principle, and in conduct, by those it exploited. Traditional
18
education broadly reected and reinforced this pattern of social regulation. The Buddhist notion of the helplessness of the individual served
as a central socializing factor. Students were equipped to become citizens in a system in which they were taught to refer to themselves as
knjom (slave) and to willingly accept the necessity of their subservience
to individuals of higher social status.
If a harmonious balance between the social system and education was
a fundamental characteristic of precolonial Cambodia, then the impact
of the French was to see a rigid fracture of past practices. The French
paid scant regard to the traditions of Cambodian education. They
sought to impose on the country an ideology that, while largely ignoring the peasantry, encouraged the loyalty and acquiescence of the elite.
For these people especially, notions of modernity fostered and promoted by the French came into conict with Khmer traditions, resulting
in an irreconcilable fusion of conicting cultural and political ideals
that were to endure beyond independence. Colonialism, as we shall see,
would serve to spawn the emergence of two distinct and ideologically
opposed political cultures in Cambodia. The education system, as events
unfolded, was to become one of their key battlegrounds.
Enter the French

In 1863, after lengthy negotiations, the French concluded a treaty of
protection with Cambodias King Norodom. The treaty was a lifeline for
Cambodia, after continued Vietnamese and Thai annexation had
threatened its very existence.29 French intentions, although marked with
the air of self-righteous piety that characterized the French colonial experience in other countries, were decidedly nonchalant. Early French
explorers, although exotic in their descriptions, generally believed Cambodia was inhospitable and its people lazy. The benet to the French in
establishing a Cambodian protectorate was to exploit its strategic geographic location. France was able to offer Cambodia protection against
its predatory Thai and Vietnamese neighbors. In return, for no other
reason than its position, Cambodia would protect the lucrative French
colony in Cochinchina (now southern Vietnam) against encroachments
by both Thailand and the British colonies west of Cambodia.
It is difcult to understand what the French hoped to achieve in
Cambodia. There is little doubt that for at least some of the French
authorities, the mission civilisatrice was a fundamental concern. How
much of a concern may never be known. There is also little doubt that
19
in comparison to the neighboring Vietnamese colonies, the French

demonstrated very little interest in establishing a serious presence in
Cambodia. A revenue crisis, caused by King Norodoms administrative
ineptitude, in tandem with the righteous conviction conjured up by the
mission civilisatrice, led to an increase in French intervention toward the
end of the nineteenth century. At no stage was this intervention to seriously inltrate the world of the Cambodian peasantry.
French Colonial Ideology

French colonial policies were almost always developed in Paris. From
there, they were sent to the furthest realms of French occupation. Any
denition of French colonial ideology must therefore take account of
what was happening in the French capital, where debates about the economic benets of colonialism were coupled with a righteous sense that
colonization would benet uncivilized natives. As early as the sixteenth
century, French colonists were accompanied on their journeys by a belief in the righteousness of their actions. A noted historian of the
French colonial presence in Vietnam and Cambodia argued that a
dominant theme of colonial theory, in both Cochinchina and Cambodia, was the belief in a French mission civilisatrice. 30 It was an argument
rmly grounded in the writings of the early French explorers who traveled to the region, and it served to justify the French commitment to
assimilation.31
Assimilation was arguably the backbone of French colonial ideology.
The theory was aimed at the elimination of parochial cultures and the
creation of men who are peers and culturally undifferentiated. 32 Its
roots were grounded in the deep-seated political and philosophical traditions inherited and absorbed by postrevolutionary France: notions of
egalitarianism, a commitment to administrative centralization, and a
desire for precision in legal and constitutional matters.33 Each of these
inuences helps us to understand the French attempt to impose uniformity and European rationality on its socially, geographically, and culturally diverse colonies.
Before arriving on the Indochinese peninsula, the French had actively pursued their assimilationist doctrine in Africa. Typical French
colonial policy there was characterized by annexation, the attempted
destruction of native culture, the destruction of native government, and
the economic principle of lexclusif, a tariff arrangement whereby French
colonies could only export to France and could import only from or
through France using French ships. The French initially approached
20
Indochina in much the same way as they had approached Africa. The
years that followed the establishment of the Cochinchinese colony saw
protectorates established in the other states of Indochina, Cambodia being the rst. Disregarding indigenous cultures, France attempted to
lump ve dissimilar states into a loose union. 34
In terms of our understanding of French Indochina, the period of
early French involvement is remarkable only in terms of the depth of its
failure. The French soon realized, in a most expensive manner, that
Southeast Asian trade patterns bore no similarity to those of Africa and
that traditional systems of authority and government were of considerable strength. The problems were compounded by the fact that colonial
policy, directed with global uniformity from Paris, was placed increasingly under the microscope and was widely criticized by those humanitarians inspired by the Enlightenment.
The impact of the doctrine of assimilation on Cambodia was negligible. The early years of French administration have been described
as a heroic period, where the government remained in the hands of
young naval ofcers hungry for glory, eager for promotion, and entranced by the exotic setting in which they found themselves. 35 By the
late 1870s, with a reasonable degree of control established in Vietnam,
the French increasingly turned their attention to Cambodia. They were
immediately repulsed by the oppressive yet haphazard administration of
King Norodom and his many sycophants. The French reaction, fueled
by economic concerns, was the treaty forced on Norodom in 1884 by the
governor-general of Cochinchina, Charles Thomson.
The two main elements of the treaty were the placement of French
rsidents in provincial centers and the abolition of slavery. The presence
of French ofcials throughout the country did little to incite the Cambodian elite. Their major contention arose from the decision to abolish
slavery, a move that would signicantly undermine the traditional system of exploitation through which the precolonial state had been maintained. The treaty, although ratied in 1886, was never fully implemented, after a nationwide rebellion sponsored by the elite broke out in
1885. The event was not an outright defeat for the French. Instead, it
signaled the beginning of a shift in approach. In the following years,
rather than directly attack the Cambodian monarch, French ofcials
surrounded Norodom with an entourage of sympathetic advisers.36 In
doing so, they were intricately weaving the threads of European modernity with the fabric of the traditional polity.
Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, the French slowly began to exert
greater inuence at the Cambodian court, although at no stage was it
21
extended to the masses in the countryside. Elsewhere in Indochina, the

French were having difculty establishing control. Eager to hear of
French conquests and victories throughout the empire, Parisian policymakers became disillusioned with the region, whose checkered history
was a pall on the colonial landscape.37 It was within this atmosphere that
Paul Doumer arrived in Indochina in 1897. Firmly committed to a rigid
system of organization, Doumer believed he could bring economic development to the region. His appointment as governor-general is signicant in that association, rather than assimilation, was more actively
pursued in Indochina.
The policy of association, in contrast to that of assimilation, emphasized the need for variation in colonial practice. 38 In effect, it adopted
many of the practices of British colonial policy, where indirect rule
through the retention and utilization of native institutions was a dening feature. Central to association policy was the achievement of economic development, as it was believed that cooperation would lead to a
more responsive labor force whose efforts would increase productivity.
The mission civilisatrice, rather than repudiated, was modied. The
French, by their mere presence in a foreign land, still felt a moral obligation to improve the social, cultural, and material status of the natives.
For Paul Doumer, Cambodia remained virgin territory. Indigenous
institutions, although tinkered with by his predecessors, had functioned
largely without the involvement of colonial administrators. Doumers
approach was to allow Norodom and his appointed ofcials to govern as
they had been, while continuing the delicate enmeshment of modernity
and tradition by limiting French rsidents to completely advisory functions. Like Thomson, he reinforced the presence of rsidents throughout
the country and attempted to abolish slavery. In terms of Cambodias
development, the difference between Doumer and his predecessors was
Doumers land titles ordinance of 1897, which recognized French titles
to land.39 This new edict signaled the beginning of a more steady French
inltration of the Cambodian countryside.
Despite Doumers inuence and efforts to restructure the Cambodian bureaucracy, the French never seriously pressed their claims for a
substantial role in Cambodian administration. Two notable events illustrate the limited extent to which the French had inltrated the village
world in the countryside. The rst was the protests of 1916, when Cambodian peasants seeking to have the tax burden on them reduced, bypassed the French administration and presented their grievances directly to the king. It was only after the king canceled any further corve
for 1916 and ordered the peasants back to their villages that the protest
22
delegations ceased.40 The second event, in 1925, was the assassination of

French rsident, Felix Bardez. After addressing an assembled crowd at
the village of Kraang Laev, and arresting a number of delinquent tax
payers, Bardez was set upon by a small group of people. The result of the
struggle that ensued was the violent mutilation of Bardez and his companions. Reacting to the imperatives of local leaders, the large crowd
that had earlier gathered to listen to Bardez then marched to Kompong
Chhnang, demanding the remission of their taxes.41 In both cases,
French administration, the French justice system, and French authority
were all rmly rejected, and ignored, by the angry peasants.
The protests and the assassination of Bardez provide important anecdotal evidence that the French grossly underestimated the strength of
Cambodian social organization. In 1916, and again in 1925, the French
were relying on their misguided perception of the docility and navet
of Cambodias peasants in order to increase the degree of their exploitation. Both events were the result of the French attempting to increase their tax receipts in Cambodia, even though the country was already the most heavily taxed of the French concerns in Indochina. The
marches on Phnom Penh and Kompong Chhnang are both evidence of
the ability of the Khmer to organize and mobilize themselves and to
establish effective lines of communication through their indigenous system of social relations. In turn, the so-called 1916 Affair and the assassination of Bardez point to a complete lack of French understanding of
Cambodia and its people.42
At no stage did French policies in Cambodia ever reect the idea of
assimilation. On the surface, we could entertain the idea that association was more actively pursued in the Cambodian protectorate. A
deeper analysis reveals, however, that this is clearly not the case either.
The French did not pursue a coherent policy of indirect rule in Cambodia that would benet both themselves and the native population. Instead, their policy direction, although characterized by a greater degree
of control in matters of administration, resembled a series of contingencies, each determined by inadequate personnel and a complete lack
of continuity.
The impact of French control on the lives of Cambodias peasants, in
the main, had been insignicant. Preoccupied with their day-to-day survival, with the food on their table, with rice cultivation, and with their
Buddhist lifestyle, Cambodians continued to be locked into a cycle of localized patron-client relationships. They continued to pay taxes to a
higher authority as they had always done, supporting the lifestyle of an
elite whom they rarely saw and with whom they had little in common.
23
French Educational Reforms

Early French efforts in regard to education in Cambodia reected
the nonchalance of initial attempts at administering the protectorate. In
1867, after only four years of the protectorate, King Norodom, under
French patronage, established the rst secular school in Cambodia, for
the children of the royal family. A second school was established by Ferreyrolles, a French military ofcer, in Phnom Penh in 1873.43
Little is known about these schools. French concepts of reform in
Cambodia, and their idealistic desire to civilize its people, were consistent with their policies in Cochinchina. The difference between the two
lies in Cambodias status as a protectorate and Cochinchinas status as a
colony, where a concerted attempt at full assimilation was pursued. With
a shortage of personnel, and operating under the pretext of indirect
rule, Cambodias protectorate status was honored to the extent that
French interference stopped short of the mass of the people. 44 The
schools established in the early years of the protectorate were testament
to this pattern. Their most discernible characteristic was their establishment by French residents and their exclusive use by the children of
French residents, members of the Cambodian elite, Chinese merchants,
and children of Vietnamese immigrants, recruited by the French to undertake tasks of administration in Cambodia.45
The French education system had not touched the lives of the peasantry. Early attempts to extend secular education beyond the elite had
been met with a lack of commitment and foresight. A program integrating secular with Buddhist education established by M. Baudoin, in
conjunction with a French teacher, M. Menetrier, in Kompong Cham
province, for example, had not been pursued by his successors, seemingly because of a lack of ofcial instructions.46 The appointment of
Albert Sarraut, a noted advocate of association policies, as governorgeneral of Indochina, marked a broadening of the mission, where education based on Western notions of formal schooling was to be extended
to the local worlds of Cambodias peasantry. Prior to that, the token educational efforts of the colonial sovereign had catered to Cambodias
ruling class. Cambodias peasants continued to be educated at the wat.
In 1918, Sarraut approved an educational blueprint whereby the
children in the ve countries of Indochina would receive identical
schooling. It is worth noting that the proposed system for French children and that for the non-French majority would differ. Whereas children from France would receive an education identical to that received
in France, children native of the Indochinese countries would receive
24
an education similar to that of their French counterparts.47 While critics

could not claim that the system, directed from Hanoi, had been designed in Paris and standardized for all colonies, its primary aw was
that it failed to take account of the diversity of Indochina. The religious,
cultural, geographic, and demographic differences existing between the
countries that made up the French union were steadfastly ignored.
Even casting aside its ignorance of diversity, Sarrauts system was not
without other shortcomings. It was soon realized that few children remained at school longer than three years; that parents preferred for
their sons to continue to receive an education at the temple; that cultural
constraints excluded girls from regular participation; that a signicant
shortage of trained teachers existed; that the scarcity of the population
meant that village schools were not accessible to many pupils; and nally,
that the public was largely apathetic to the system. Writing from a perspective sympathetic to French colonial interests, one analyst prophetically declared that it is natural for [Cambodian peasants] to think that
a peasants son can acquire little information at the state school, where
much French is taught but no agriculture. 48
To overcome the obstacles, it was decided to use the temple schools,
but to reform them. The reason for reform, it was stated, was that the
temple schools, without curriculum, timetable, inspectors, or examinations, were inadequate and in a state of degeneration.49 To be fair, as
one Cambodian historian observed, the temple schools were not without problems. The students often spent time engaging in activities in
which their learning was limited, while the fact that monks could leave
the pagoda as they pleased disrupted the stability of the system.50 While
temple schools offered insufcient instruction, the underlying reason
for the reforms sponsored by the French was that the monastic system
was not synonymous with the Western notion of formal schooling. After
deeming successful a teacher training program carried out in Kampot
province in 1924, it was decided to expand the new system throughout
the country.51 It is tempting to conclude that the severe jolt inicted by
the Bardez assassination in April 1925 was related to the rapid acceleration in the expansion of the use of reformed temple schools and
therefore the potential expansion of French sovereignty in the following years.
It could easily be argued that the modernized temple schools were
a ne example of association, in which colonial ideas and native institutions were blended in harmony. A more cynical and possibly realistic
assessment is that the modernization of the temple schools was a nan-
25
cially prudent move for the French. Rather than nance an entire education system, they were able to rely on existing teaching staff and existing infrastructure nanced by the villages themselves.52 Although it was
stated that the modernized temple schools were only a temporary measure, with the aim being the establishment of universal Franco-Khmer
public schools, very little progress was made in the transformation phase
or, in fact, at any other level of education.
Considering that modern education was regarded as a touchstone in
the mission civilisatrice, the statistics of educational development prior to
the onset of World War II paint a damning picture. In 1932/1933, there
were 225 modernized temple schools in Cambodia. By 1938/1939, the
number had increased to 908. Franco-Khmer public schools, offering
the full primary curriculum, numbered 18 in 1932/1933, with the same
number of establishments in 1938/1939. Despite the policy of transformation, there was not a single Franco-Khmer primary school inaugurated during these years. Enrollments at Franco-Khmer primary schools
increased by approximately 150 percent during the period, compared
with almost 500 percent for modernized temple schools. In 1938/1939,
only 294 students passed the Certicat dtudes primaires complmentaires
(Certicate of Complementary Primary Studies), despite the fact that
almost 60,000 students were enrolled at primary schools.53 Full secondary education was offered for the rst time only in 1935, when the
Collge Sisowath was given full lyce status.54 Although some technical
and administrative education was available, students from Cambodia
wishing to pursue further studies were forced to travel to Saigon, Hanoi,
or Paris.55
It is questionable whether the French were ever truly serious about
providing Cambodias peasants with modern education. Given the
steady decline in French activity, it appears that the enthusiasm generated by Sarrauts reforms quickly subsided in an avalanche of impediments and problems. It is obvious that Cambodia was never afforded the
same degree of French commitment to education as were the French
colonies in Vietnam. In order to carry out their mission civilisatrice there,
the French had eagerly, doggedly, and eventually successfully pursued a
policy of romanizing the Chinese-based Vietnamese character script.56
After initial resistance in Cambodia, concentrated in the monastic order, no concerted attempts were made by the French to change the sanscritized Khmer script.57 To be sure, the adoption of temple schools saw
Khmer maintained as the language of instruction in elementary education. Similarly, the French in Vietnam were concerned with providing
26
education to the countrys minority ethnic groups, such as the Montagnards.58 No such effort was made in relation to Cambodias modest minority population. The French were well aware that the teaching standards in temple schools were poor, yet they did very little to correct
them. They were also aware of intermittent attendance by children, yet
they seemed to let the problem pass unnoticed. The vexing question
then arises: What was the purpose of the token education provided to
the peasantry?
It is obvious that education was not provided to promote the development of the Cambodian peasantry. Rather, the provision of education accorded with a concerted French attempt to engender indigenous
loyalty. The 1918 reforms implemented throughout Indochina occurred
only after stirrings of discontent had begun to shake the corridors of
colonial power in Vietnam. In providing the masses with access to modern education, the French could argue that they were providing people
with a return on their taxes and possibly with a means of access to the
administrative corps, considered a gateway to the Cambodian elite.
The onset of World War II saw the Japanese arrive on the IndoChinese peninsula. As if to assert their authority, the French immediately increased their educational prole in the provinces. In 1942, they
opened the Collge Norodom Sihanouk at Kompong Cham.59 Named
in honor of the recently crowned monarch, who was plucked by the
French from the Lyce Chasseloup Laubat in Saigon,60 the collge was an attempt by the colonizers to engender indigenous loyalty. To be sure, its
name was no doubt chosen to boost the prestige of and reinforce French
allegiance to the king.61
The Japanese occupation provided Cambodias students, especially
those members of the elite privileged enough to be receiving a secondary education, with an interesting contrast. While they sat in class
learning about the history and grandeur of Frances Third Republic,
they were also witnessing rsthand the deterioration, and humiliation,
of French sovereignty throughout Indochina. As in many other Southeast Asian nations, the legacy of Japanese occupation during the Second
World War worked to fuel the emergence of an embryonic nationalist
movement, whose leaders, in the Cambodian case, were able to draw on
the rich and glorious history of the Angkorean empire. It is ironic that
this history had been deciphered for them by French historians and
archaeologists.62
The Japanese occupation saw the French attempt to accelerate the
enmeshment of their project of modernity, the mission civilisatrice, with
27
Cambodias traditional political order. A primary feature of the French

reaction to the Japanese occupation was their attempt to associate
themselves with the prestige of the Cambodian monarch and therefore
with Cambodias hierarchical political and cultural traditions. The attempt proved ill-fated after the Japanese coup de force in March 1945. On
March 10, in response to a Japanese directive, King Norodom Sihanouk
proclaimed the end of the French protectorate in Cambodia and advised that the kingdom would be known as Kampuchea.63 While in
many respects the coup merely substituted French supervision with that
of the Japanese, the new king did move swiftly to abrogate the law regarding the romanization of the Khmer script. The aftermath of the
coup effectively ensured that no matter what the outcome of the war,
the French would not simply pick up where they left off if or when they
returned to Indochina.
The French decision to align themselves with the Cambodian monarch had three important consequences. The rst was that the prestige
of the monarchy, arguably in decline since the fall of Angkor, was reinvigorated. The second was the increased prole, and political awakening, of the young King Sihanouk, who was able to draw on the resurgence in the renewed eminence accorded his title. As a result, those
Cambodians who were vehemently opposed to the return of the French
were to provide the third consequence: a distinctly antimonarchic
strand of the emerging Cambodian elite. Drawn largely from the alumni
of the Lyce Sisowath, from the readership of Nagara Vatta (Pali for
Angkor Wat), Cambodias rst Khmer-language newspaper, and from
the intellectual element associated with the Buddhist Institute,64 these
awakened nationalists evolved into a distinct opposition to the monarchy. The 1946 Franco-Cambodian modus vivendi, negotiated after the
French returned to Indochina, allowed Cambodians to form political
parties and provided a vehicle through which the antimonarchic nationalists could be coordinated into a political force.
Evaluating the French

It would be easy to argue that the overall impact of the French in Cambodia was minimal. On the surface, their inuence would not appear
great. They erected a Royal Palace (in Phnom Penh), sponsored the
arts, and oversaw the restoration of the Angkorean temples.65 From this
perspective, the French seemed to have touched the lives of only a select
few people in the nations capital and other provincial towns. However,
28
when we begin to pay attention to those the French seemed to ignore,

Cambodian peasants, we are able to reveal a more enduring and substantial legacy of the French colonial era.
Cambodias traditional education system, centered on the wat, laid a
foundation for survival in the harsh and fragile environment of precolonial Cambodia. Monastic instruction stressed the importance of
appropriate conduct and behavior and of maintaining the correct relations between members of society. While it could be argued, with considerable justication, that the system was inadequately equipped to
deal with social change, it did provide a strong and explicit tie between
rural life and religious ideology. In simple terms, it perpetuated the notion of taking the children from the rice-elds and giving them back to
the riceelds. 66 It has been written that traditional educational ideology, in the Durkheimian sense, could be regarded as contributing to the
mechanical solidarity of the society, ensuring social cohesion and the
maintenance of traditional values. 67
For Cambodias peasants, the colonial legacy in education, as the statistics would indicate, was not the erection of an educational infrastructure. Rather, it was the importation of a Western formal school system,
its haphazard implementation, and the undermining of its traditional,
religious counterpart. Ben Kiernan best illuminates the undermining of
this traditional educational authority when he suggests that the French
colonial period saw a severe decline in traditional intellectual institutions, but did not provide a compensatory development of a modern
educational system. 68
For the peasantry, it was the introduction of the concept of social mobility that proved a signicant factor in undermining the solidarity of
the traditional, cohesive social system. The provision of modern education to Cambodian peasants was akin to a subtle social revolution. Unlike neighboring Vietnam and nearby China, where traditional education provided an avenue of social mobility through the arduous series of
Mandarin examinations, Cambodias traditional education system had
always reinforced the concept of helplessness, the idea that a person was
unable to determine their position within the social strata. Like the pesantren of Java, the system promoted social cohesion by maintaining a
sense of group identity. Through its association with the village wat, it
provided a link between the elite and the peasantry.69 The provision of
modern education, although slowly accepted by the peasantry, was to
irrecoverably compromise the traditional scenario in Cambodia, opening windows where the panorama stretched beyond the local world of
the village.
29
The mission civilisatrice was applied to the Cambodian peasantry to

the extent that it did not impose on French resources in the protectorate. While the peasantry had to wait until Albert Sarrauts reforms in
1918 to be considered for modern education, the Cambodian ruling
class, for whom the mission civilisatrice was pursued with relatively more
enthusiasm, was afforded modern education much earlier. It was never
pursued, however, with the same vigor as with the French concerns in
Vietnam. The forerunner to the Lyce Sisowath, the Collge du Protectorat, was founded in 1893 on the premise of training Cambodians to assist with the work of colonization. It was followed, in 1917, by the establishment of the Ecole dAdministration Cambodgienne, to train boys
for the higher ranks of the civil service. 70 Those at the highest echelons
of the elite, generally members of the royal family, were provided with
access to higher education in the Vietnamese colonies and with the possibility of attending an institution in Paris. For these people, assimilation
into the modern world envisaged by the French was a possibility.
By 1950, after the French had turned control of education over to
an indigenous government, there were approximately one hundred
Khmer students studying in France. Many returned to Cambodia, where
they enjoyed privileged positions in the civil service and in the local
business community. For another group, the intellectual environment
of France spawned an awakening that caused them to question the very
nature of the Khmer social system. For these elite students, the wave of
Communism sweeping through Europe proved a catalyst and provided
them with an increased motivation to remove the French and achieve
independence in Cambodia. Among these emergent revolutionaries
were Ieng Sary and the future Pol Pot, Saloth Sar. These radical Cambodian intellectuals, upon their return to the country throughout the
early 1950s, were to prove the vanguard of the Cambodian revolutionary movement and the overseers of the radical egalitarian political culture that established itself in competition with the entrenched hierarchical status quo.
Cambodia achieved independence in 1953, with much credit, either
rightly or wrongly, lauded on King Sihanouk. For many nationalists,
their goal had been achieved, and they soon rallied to embrace the politics of the king. At the same time, many of the French returnees aligned
themselves with the local Democrat Party, formed after the French returned to Cambodia following the Second World War. The departure of
many moderates, combined with the inux of a Marxist leaning intellectual corps, saw the ideology of the Democrats shift to the left.71 Although battered and repressed by royalists in the following years, these
30
opponents of the political, and therefore hierarchical status quo, were

to prove a signicant force in postcolonial Cambodian politics.
The overriding theme of the French presence in Cambodia is neglect. The colonial period represents a litany of half-hearted and rarely
completed policies and plans that were immediately disbanded upon
the realization that their costs, or the effort required to implement
them, would outweigh those initially envisaged. French efforts in regard
to education provide a glaring testament to this pattern. In hindsight,
the French never appeared to have been concerned with the development or modernization of the Cambodian peasantry. Their token efforts at educating the peasantry, with legitimacy rather than development in mind, were never pursued with any vigor, and resulted only in
undermining a system of semiformal instruction perceived by its users
to be both successful and relevant.
The French did not as quickly dismiss the Cambodian elite. Although
never afforded the same commitment to modernization as were the
Vietnamese, the French did offer selected members of the elite a window through which they could see aspects of a world very different to
traditional Cambodian society. A small number of Cambodians were to
step outside the walls enclosing this window and to embrace the Western world. It is here that some were to question the inherent inequality
present in Khmer society and to seek alternatives to a system based on
exploitation and patronage. Although their ideas were never widely embraced by the wider Cambodian population, the proponents of equality
were to fracture the Cambodian social and political system, providing an
opposition to the status quo that would endure for over forty years. The
battle between the hierarchical political culture that has dominated
Cambodian society for many centuries and the egalitarian culture,
spawned by the French enmeshment of tradition and modernity, that
has opposed it since colonial times, emerges as one of the recurring subthemes of this book.
Sihanouk
and the
Sangkum
From
Independence
to Chaos
When King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the Cambodian throne to

contest the 1955 elections, he brought to an end two years of bitter political conict as independent Cambodia had struggled to contend with
its newly granted freedom. Drawing on the divine status accorded to his
former title, Sihanouk seized control of the emergent Cambodian state,
formulated its ideology, and exerted his inuence on the direction of
public policy. It was during the following years, under Sihanouks guidance as the builder of the modern Cambodian nation-state, that the
country was popularly portrayed as an oasis of peace, a Southeast
Asian Camelot. 1
From the mid-1960s, aws became evident in the aspirations of
Sihanouks development agenda. Domestically, the prince was under
pressure from the Cambodian left, whose inuence he had sought to
nullify, and the right, who had become frustrated with his blatant political autocracy and left-leaning economic agenda. Beyond Cambodias
borders, the escalating Vietnamese conict was also beginning to impact
on political and economic life. The countrys woes climaxed in 1970,
when the National Assembly deposed Sihanouk.
For the education system, the period began as one of great expectation. A foreign expert, sent to Cambodia in 1955/1956, provided ample
evidence of the optimism that not only accompanied Cambodias emergence from colonial rule but also encapsulated the goodwill of the
entire international community in respect to the developing world. He
wrote:
31
32
Sihanouk and the Sangkum

Cambodia seems to stand at the extended new road to life among the
many nations. She has passed several tollgates and is entering the main
highway. . . . In certain places in the world, there are unspoiled places
awaiting training and education for the new era; Cambodia is one of
those places.2
Over time, the optimism subsided. Goodwill was replaced by unattained

aspirations, increased disillusionment, political awakenings, and despair. As in many other nations of the developing world, education was
pursued in Cambodia with the promise of rapid economic development and modernization. These anticipated successes were not forthcoming, resulting in widespread discontent, especially among the nations students.
This chapter picks up where the French left off, in the aftermath of
the Second World War, with Cambodia moving steadily toward independence. The French never really left the educational picture. Their
continued inuence and intransigence emerged as a dominant motif
throughout the period. But the French were not responsible for the educational crisis in Cambodia. The policy of Cambodianization, another
motif that emerged, although threatened by the French, failed at the
hands of Cambodians. Particularly culpable was Norodom Sihanouk,
who had slavishly pursued the expansion of educational provision in order to promote and ensure his uncontested legitimacy. Sihanouks interference in all spheres of educational policy represents a third motif.
As the educational chronology of the 1950s and 1960s unfolded, the
voice of the former king faded in and out of the picture, his presence often marked by whimsical or ippant observations, his search for a scapegoat in the face of economic or political turmoil, or by his occasional, if
relatively short, period of serious concern with educational provision.
A nal motif to emerge throughout the period was the continued development of contending Cambodian nationalisms. One such concept
of nation was that of Sihanouk, whose aspirations for Cambodia continued to reect a political culture based on its hierarchical precolonial
predecessor. Sihanouks nation-building effort created a stark paradox.
On one hand, the prince was fervent in his pursuit of economic development and modernization. On the other, he was equally fervent in reinforcing a political status quo that saw his rule unquestioned. The result of the paradox was the manifestation of discontent and dissent
among the nations students and teachers. The other nationalism to
From Independence to Chaos
33
emerge during the period, promoting ideals of egalitarianism, drew

support from those disenchanted with the status quo. While the education system became a key battleground for these two opposing nationalist cultures, it was the nature of the entrenched hierarchical political
culture that played a signicant role in the manifestation of a Cambodian educational crisis.
The Prince, the Organization, and the Ideology

The years that followed the achievement of Cambodian independence,
not inclusive of the interregnum before the 1955 national elections, are
widely regarded as the most politically stable in postindependence Cambodian history. They are also characterized by the ubiquitous presence
of Norodom Sihanouk, whose rise to political supremacy began with his
self-titled Royal Crusade for Independence. Once described by a senior United States (U.S.) government ofcial in a condential memo
as selsh, arrogant, personable, pragmatic, [and a] highly egocentric
individual, Sihanouk often appeared erratic and his actions spontaneous. Throughout the crusade, Sihanouk went into voluntary exile, as
he would do many times later, providing an opportunity, as his biographer would say, for his compatriots to come to their senses. 3 He also
traveled the world, seeking foreign support and sponsorship of his
ideas, another tactic that would be repeated over the years.
Following the success of the crusade, Sihanouk practically usurped
political authority in Cambodia. His complete control seemed assured
until the 1954 Geneva conference, which ratied the cessation of the
First Indochina War 4 and which decided that Cambodia should conduct
a national election. The decision came as a blow to the increasingly politically aware young king, providing an opportunity for the Democrat
Party to attempt to regain the momentum it had enjoyed before Sihanouks independence crusade had effectively neutralized its central
policy objective. In conjunction with the new Citizens Group, it was
widely believed that the Democrats would win enough National Assembly seats to form at least an effective left-leaning parliamentary minority.
Quite rightly, Sihanouk feared that the elections would erode the political dominance he had thus far achieved. In order to participate fully
in the new political system, he surprised both friends and foes by abdicating the Cambodian throne in favor of his father, Prince Suramarit.
Stressing that he was now merely a private citizen, Sihanouk nonetheless
34
accepted the title of prince and became Samdech Upayuvareach, the

Prince Who Has Been King.5 Shortly after, he claimed:
I hope that in abandoning my reign, my crown and my throne, my
sacrice will help to call the attention of our elite to the great importance of raising our Nation from its present state, which prompts foreigners to say that we do not know how to conduct ourselves with the
dignity and courage required by the statute of independence. 6
The princes reections provide signicant insight into two of his central aspirations that, despite the changes and convolutions in his
adopted stance on many issues, would remain constant throughout the
years when he ruled Cambodia. First, Sihanouk was determined to enhance the development of Cambodia; and second, he strove to have the
country recognized, if not admired, by the international community.
His power absolute, and alone at the helm of the Cambodian boat, the
former monarch was in a position to chart the formation of the Cambodian state, promoting both development and nationhood. 7
In the rst denitive act of nation building following his abdication,
the prince announced the formation of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum
(Peoples Socialist Community). The Sangkum was not a political party
but a vast assemblage or organization, embracing players from both the
left and the right of the ideological spectrum.8 From the elections of
September 1955 through the elections of 1958, 1962, and 1966, no nonSangkum politician was elected to Cambodias National Assembly. Prior
to the elections of 1966, Sihanouk personally selected the Sangkum candidates for each electoral district. Throughout these years, until he refused to select candidates for the 1966 election and subsequently lost
control of the Assembly, the Sangkum-controlled national body was to
become nothing more than a rubber stamp for the prince and his policies. Put simply, the Sangkum, and the political institutions with which
it was associated, merely reinforced Cambodias traditional political culture, where the power and position of the ruler were exalted, where the
credentials of political opposition were not recognized, and where
the aspirations of the ruled were largely ignored.9
With his capacity to control the Cambodian state seemingly assured,
Sihanouk was in the enviable position of being able to formulate its direction. The ideology set down by the prince, Buddhist socialism, accorded entirely with his personal political convictions and with his aspirations for the Khmer nation. The ideology, the prince acknowledged,
was formulated in contradiction to many of the basic tenets of Marxism.
35
Its cornerstone, according to Sihanouk, was not a Western political ideology but the religious traditions of Cambodian life. Buddhist socialism
asserted that the ruler should treat the people equally, with empathy
and with goodness. This assertion repudiated the Marxist view that the
ruled (the weak) should overthrow and eliminate the rulers (the strong)
and establish a proletarian dictatorship. Marxist socialism advocated the
abolition of private property ownership and encouraged state or collective ownership of all capital. Sihanouk opposed this belief, arguing that
citizens should not be dispossessed of the fruits of their labor. Drawing
on Buddhist beliefs, the rich, the prince argued, should be encouraged
to give to the poor in order to gain merit.10
At best, the ideology was a hazy abstraction. An editorial in Kambuja
magazine in 1966, published primarily for foreign consumption, attempted to explain and rationalize Buddhist socialism. In it, Sihanouk
claimed that Buddhism is a religion of stoic energy, of resolute perseverance, and of very special courage. As a result, the prince was able to
embrace an essentially conservative state ideology that, while preserving
his own base of power, emphasized a struggle against social injustice
and underdevelopment and was compatible with the goals of economic, if not social, modernization.11
Buddhist Socialism and the International Community

The formation of the Sangkum, and particularly the promulgation of
Buddhist socialism, provided a basis for Cambodias state-making efforts
during a period when the state, and state intervention, was considered
central to achieving development.12 The core of Buddhist socialism, an
intense and constant crusade for national development, 13 was warmly
welcomed within international circles at the time. The 1950s and 1960s
had seen structural-functionalism emerge to dominate sociological
thinking in the Western-oriented developing world. In relation to development, structural-functionalism resulted in the emergence of both
modernization theory and human capital theory. Together, they shed
some light on the nature of Sihanouks state ideology and on the unbridled drive for educational expansion that it accompanied.
Modernization theory emerged during the early years of Sihanouks
dominance of Cambodian political life. The theory asserted that industrialized societies had reached the new or modern era. Their past,
the theorists assumed, would provide the path for the nations of the developing world to follow in their quest for modernity. Modernization
was in no way denitive. Essentially, it implied Westernization, but to the
36
leaders embracing it, the term also connoted recognition by the global
community, mechanization, industrial development, and enlightenment. Although the meaning of modernization was unclear, it was the
provision of modern, secular education that was at its core. Cambodian education looks simultaneously in two directions: backward to a
uniquely integrated Buddhist culture, and forward to modern, secular
democratic forces, wrote Jeanette Eilenberg in 1961.14 The provision of
modernizing institutions, such as a school education system, were popularly regarded as the carts on which governments could ride in order
to acquire modern behavior, modern values, and to become a modern
society.
If education had the potential to modernize minds, then it also had
the potential to enhance economic development. While modernization
theory preoccupied sociological thinkers, economists began to focus on
manpower needs in the development process. The result of their thinking was human capital theory, articulated by Theodore Schultz in the
celebrated article Investment in Human Capital. 15 The theory viewed
education not as a form of consumption but as an investment that would
provide the type of labor force necessary for industrial development and
economic growth. As with modernization theory, human capital theory
provided the builders of the worlds new nation-states, such as Prince Sihanouk, with a justication for large public expenditure on education.
Education: Looking Back

The period surrounding and including the Second World War shaped
the postindependence educational landscape in Cambodia. With the
dawning of the belief that receiving a modern education would offer the
prospect of upward social mobility, the queues at the enrollment desks
of Cambodias public schools steadily lengthened. Increased demand
resulted in unchecked expansion, constrained only by the nancial capacity of the administration; problems were augmented, and the rst
UNESCO education advisers arrived in Cambodia.16 The extent to
which their recommendations were adopted, and often ignored, is a recurring theme throughout this chapter.
In the years preceding the war, the prospect of upward social mobility motivated many Cambodians to demand access to modern education. Unfortunately for these people, the French were unwilling to meet
the demand. The 1936/1937 report of the head of the colonial Educational Service noted that schools have been attended . . . by a total of
37
17,725 pupils, before concluding that these gures are nothing compared to what they would be if we were in a position to satisfy all requests
for admittance. 17
The threat to the French administration caused by the war saw them
begrudgingly begin to address the increased popular desire for education. The impetus for demand for the expansion of educational facilities came not only from among the peasantry and those who believed
they would personally benet from such provision but also from selected
members of the Cambodian elite who believed that modern education
would enhance the development of the country. An example was Sihanouks enduring ally, Nhiek Tioulong, who was the governor of Kompong Cham province between 1939 and 1945. During a period of tenure
overshadowed by the Second World War, the number of primary education graduates in his province increased from nine annually to over
ninety.18 Figures such as these were reected throughout the country.
The Japanese occupation of Indochina and the subsequent modus
vivendi of 1946, which moved Cambodia further in the direction of independence, saw control of the Ministry of Education transferred to
Cambodians. Government expenditure on education provides clear evidence of the emphasis the new indigenous Cambodian educational administration placed on expansion, increasing from an outlay of only
984,900 piastres in 1938 to over 165 million by 1952.19
With expansion came problems and the rst evidence of the possibility of an emerging educational crisis. Speaking in 1952 about expenditure on public education, King Sihanouk stated:
For these socially and culturally useful projects, which are of such vital
importance for the kingdom, I must admit that we are sadly lacking in
funds. To be frank, I have no great hope of improving this lamentable
situation to any appreciable extent.20
Yet it was not only nancial constraints that troubled the administration.
There was a high number of adult illiterates; poor attendance by girls at
school; widespread difculties in communications; a scattered population distribution; the problems of hygiene and water supply within educational facilities; and of course, a severe shortage of adequately trained
educational personnel.21
It was within this context that the rst UNESCO experts were sent
to Cambodia to study the problems in education and to make recommendations for the future. The UNESCO report, written during a period when there existed no signicant body of literature on the negative
38
aspects of the colonial legacy in education, applauded the progress

made in the development of education in Cambodia. It praised the
foundation of the Cambodian system on the French model, which is
one of the best organized in the world, stating that Cambodia could
indeed be regarded as an example [to other developing nations].
Although critics could later argue that its faith in the French educational model reeked of neocolonialism, the UNESCO reports key recommendations were insightful. In the rst place, the report advised that
educational expansion be tempered so as to be affordable and to provide time for the development of necessary resources; and second, it advised that the school curriculum be revised to adapt to the needs of
Cambodia. The report concluded that the nal curriculum is thus
bound to differ appreciably from that of Western countries. UNESCOs
primary concern was with the attainment of compulsory education in
Cambodia, a stated ambition of the Cambodian government. While
agreeing that providing all children with a certain minimum of education was a laudable ambition, the report sternly warned that it would
be Utopian to attempt enforcing such a system immediately . . . The effort would be beyond the countrys power. 22
UNESCOs proposals were embraced by the Cambodian Ministry of
Education during a period of heightened political instability. Sihanouk
went abroad attempting to gain support for his Royal Crusade; much
of the countryside was in conict as the Communist-backed Issarak (independence) movement attempted their own campaign to dislodge the
French; the Geneva conference of 1954 contributed to wider regional
uncertainty; and the ensuing election campaign was among the most
colorful, and violent, in Cambodian history.23 It was a climate hardly
conducive to the implementation of educational policy reform, and the
series of UNESCO-sponsored proposals, characteristic of the global educational imperatives of the period, were shelved until the domestic political environment was more accommodating. The state of the Cambodian education system in the aftermath of the elections was succinctly
summed up by one observer with the following remarks:
Cambodia found itself faced with too many pupils and students in
crowded schools, taught by too few teachers who were inadequately
prepared for their task. They used teaching approaches and methods
which were copied from schools in France and which were intended to
impart knowledge necessary for administrative assistants to French
colonial civil servants.24
39
In other words, educational demand outweighed supply, curricula were

irrelevant, the quality of instruction was inadequate, and there was increasing disparity between the education system and the national economy. An educational crisis was already looming in Cambodia and, it
should be noted, elsewhere in the states of the newly independent
world.
1955 1958: A First Attempt at Cambodianization

In a variation of ltat cest moi, a French author titled a chapter about
Sihanouk ltat cest lui. 25 The title of the chapter adequately captures
the milieu of a period when Sihanouks rule was largely unopposed. 26
While UNESCO had called for educational expansion only in line with
Cambodias nancial capacity, the prince had other ideas. Ignoring the
recommendation that Cambodia attempt to achieve universal primary
education, Sihanouk was driving for compulsory secondary education.
The unregulated expansion of educational facilities, encouraged by the
prince, was a critical theme of these early years after independence. Another, more in accordance with UNESCOs proposals, was the emergence of the idea of Cambodianization and the development of educational curricula suited to Cambodian needs and the building of the
Cambodian nation. A nal theme was the return from France of many
of the students who had associated themselves with the international
Communist movement. Many of these former students gravitated to the
teaching profession.
Cambodianization
The enthusiastic embrace of educational expansion following the
elections of 1955 was reected in the statistics. The number of modernized temple schools between the years 1955/1956 and 1957/1958 increased by only 47. During the same period, the number of Khmer public schools (formerly Franco-Khmer public schools) increased from
1,352 to 1,653. In the eld of secondary education, not yet a priority, the
increases were proportionately even greater: from 11 establishments in
1955/1956 to 18 by 1957/1958, and 29 by the following year.27 Despite
the expansion, the system was poorly suited to the needs of Cambodia.
It continued to reect the centralized, rigid, and competitive French
school system. Like the French system, the ne details of curriculum
content were prescribed by regulation, including the number of hours
40
teachers were to spend on each subject per week. The history and geography syllabi failed to provide students with an understanding of
Cambodia or the Southeast Asian region, while French was the dominant language of instruction in all but the formative school years.
The education system had originally been designed to impart the
knowledge needed by administrative assistants to French colonial civil
servants. Two consequences of such a model were apparent. The rst
was that while the system assumed students would progress beyond primary and even secondary school, by 1955 less than 1 in 3,000 students
was enrolled in upper secondary school and less than 1 in 60 in lower
secondary.28 A second consequence was that graduates of the system assumed they would nd employment in the civil service. In February
1956, Prince Sihanouk declared that students must adapt themselves
to various professions. Unfortunately everybody wants to become a
red tape artist. In the same speech, Sihanouk noted that in order for
the school system to achieve its functions, priority must be given to the
reform of both primary and secondary education.29 A natural consequence of an education system that trains students to fulll roles as
fonctionnaires is that its graduates will expect to be employed in the area
in which they received their training. Sihanouk, probably made aware
of the relationship between students aspirations and the school curriculum, lent guarded support to those ofcials who were advocating
reform.30
The rst attempts at Cambodianization, embracing UNESCOs proposals, were pursued within the boundaries of a limited charter. The central concerns of the reforms were the language of instruction, the structure of the primary education course, and school textbooks. The reforms
adopted by the ministry included relegating French to the status of a second language in primary education, adjusting the number of teaching
hours in the Khmer and French languages, and providing textbooks and
teaching materials in Khmer. Importantly, while the reforms involved revising syllabi to take account of Cambodias independence, they did not
address the heavy bias in the curriculum against rural Cambodian needs,
nor did they address the relevance of the curriculum to the countrys
economic and social circumstances. In fact, the system continued to train
students to be red tape artists.
The implementation of the reforms proved difcult. Notwithstanding the burden of educational expenditure stemming from the program
of rapid expansion, the Cambodianization reforms placed further strain
on the education budget. Resources remaining from the French pro-
41
tectorate were increasingly obsolete, while the ministrys capacity to purchase new resources, even with French and American assistance, was beyond its nancial means. Further compounding the problem was the
ministrys capacity to produce new textbooks, with complications resulting from poor quality paper, imperfect and costly printing methods, and
difculties in printing the Cambodian script.31
Although the effectiveness of Cambodianization was undermined by
educational expansion, the expansion did serve to benet the task of
building a Cambodian national consciousness. For the rst time in Cambodian history, the state assumed a genuine presence in the localized
world of the countrys rural villages through the erection of schools and,
in turn, the appointment of state representatives: teachers. Textbooks
served to promote, in the words of Hobsbawm, a suitable historical
past. 32 Secular time replaced the traditional calendar, serving as a secondary conduit of modernization, while national symbols were actively promoted.
In precolonial times, the wat had served as a cultural, religious, and
educational focal point of the village. Among the peasantry, the French
had done very little to alter this scenario. As in precolonial times, the wat
continued to serve as a spiritual link between the king, and therefore
the state, and the mass of the population. Physically, the link had been
practically nonexistent, reinforcing the localized sociocultural milieu.
With the wave of educational expansion ushered in by the modus vivendi
of 1946, the dynamics of this traditional context irrevocably altered. In
many villages, for the rst time, the presence of the state was obvious.
While the wat remained the religious and cultural center of the village,
the school became an alternative repository of knowledge, with its
teachers alternative authority gures in village life.
Cambodias modern school teachers were to benet from the status
accorded to monks, who traditionally imparted knowledge in the education process. The teachers, known in Khmer as kru, a derivative of the
Sanskrit guru, adopted an authoritarian approach, similar to that of
their monastic predecessors. While continuing to serve an important
role in the transmission of moral values, teachers no longer drew their
authority from the institutions of religion. Rather, Cambodias secular
teachers were invested with the authority of the state and were in a powerful position to impart the new values of the modern nation.33
A central element in establishing these values was the promotion of
a certain version of Cambodian history. For students of postindependence Cambodia, Cambodianization resulted in the promotion of a
42
suitable historical past, which acclaimed Sihanouk as the father of

Cambodian nationalism and emphasized heavily his Royal Crusade for
Independence. Former students recall learning about all of the dates of
the Royal Crusade but could not recall ever examining the role of the
Democrat Party, the Nagara Vatta newspaper, or the Issarak movement
in directing the country toward independence. For secondary school
students, Sihanouks own La monarchie cambodgienne et la croisade pour
lindpendence became a required history text. The themes of slavery, patronage and clientship, central to pre-independent Cambodian society,
were glossed over in favor of an appreciation of the glories of Angkor.34
The suitable historical past led to an understanding of the present, the
modern institutions created by Sihanouk in light of his crusade, the
Sangkum and Buddhist socialism. Students would learn how these institutions, embodying the future in the glories of the past, were embracing
modernization and, as Sihanouk claimed in 1962, a level of democratization . . . never attained by any other country. 35
Sihanouks suitable historical past, and the modern values that
stemmed from it, were reinforced through the hidden school curriculum.36 Time, previously measured with the passing of the seasons, yearly
ooding from the Tonl Sap, the rise and fall of the sun, and the celebration of important village and religious festivals, became associated
with a modern secular chronology and a regular, state-oriented routine.
Like the productive economic labor units the government hoped they
would become, students attended school according to a routine that involved set working days followed by a brief period of rest. The tenets of
nation were promoted through important historical dates, which were
emphasized by their celebration as public holidays. On other occasions,
classes would be suspended while students prepared for or participated
in events of national importance. Extending beyond the world of traditional village life, these national events often served to highlight independent Cambodias place in the global political sphere.
French Returnees
A Cambodian student, studying in France in 1952, wrote an article in
a Khmer student magazine, Khmer Niset, entitled Monarchy or Democracy? In the article, the author criticized the Cambodian monarchy:
The king is absolute. He attempts to destroy the peoples interest when
the people are in a position of weakness. . . . The absolute king uses nice
words, but his heart remains wicked. 37 The articles criticisms were in
conict with many of the key elements of statehood promoted through
43
the education system. It was many years later that scholars revealed that
the author of the article was in fact Saloth Sar (Pol Pot). In terms of education, the revelation would be quite unremarkable, except that only a
few years after writing these criticisms, Saloth Sar would return to Cambodia and embark on a teaching career, his antimonarchic tendencies
still intact.
Saloth Sar was not the only Cambodian radical to return from France
and enter the teaching profession.38 Many others, who would later become important ofcials in the Communist movement, also drifted into
the teaching ranks after returning from France. Saloth Sars then close
friend, Ieng Sary, became a teacher at the Lyce Sisowath and, later, at
the private school, Kambuboth Collge. He was joined at the Lyce
Sisowath by their wives, the sisters Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith.
Son Sen, later the director of the Ecole Normale, also taught at the
Lyce Sisowath, while Chau Seng, Uch Ven, and Ros Chet Thor would
all join the Ecole Normales teaching faculty.39
These students, later teachers, impeded the Cambodianization program through their opposition to the cultural system on which it was
based. As teachers in Prince Sihanouks Cambodia, their freedom of
speech was limited. Consequently, they were not able to criticize the
prince directly nor the institutions he patronized. As Communists, their
political leanings were rarely, if ever, revealed, and denitely never
within the walls of a classroom. Instead, they conveyed their message by
highlighting government corruption and inequality and, through their
actions, presented to their students an alternative model of behavior. As
more students came in contact with Cambodias growing band of radical teachers, their inuence was to increasingly permeate the education
system.
1958 1963: Chau Seng, A National

Attempt at Cambodianization
Between 1955 and 1958, no less than nine ministries had been formed
and then dissolved under the umbrella of a Sangkum government. Corruption, incompetence, and unresolved rivalries stemming from preSangkum politics were at the core of many of the problems. The instability worked to feed the power of the prince. An irreconcilable feud
between Prime Minister Sim Var and members of the National Assembly
eventually led to its dissolution and, in turn, to the elections of 1958. Eager to provide Cambodia with a more competent, and possibly more
44
subservient Assembly, Sihanouk individually selected and endorsed

each of the Sangkum candidates. Only ve members of the 1955 Assembly were reelected.40
The election was important in terms of education in that it brought
Chau Seng into public life. Upon his return to Cambodia from France,
Seng had undertaken an independent study of Cambodias public
school curriculum.41 After being elected to the Assembly, he was appointed under-secretary, and later secretary of state for education, and
many of the recommendations of his study became education policies.
The thrust of Chau Sengs reform was a more concerted attempt at
Cambodianization. Questioning the relevance to the Cambodian population of an education system imported from France, Sengs recommendations were aimed at meeting the needs of modern Cambodia.
Embracing the popular notion that education was a social investment,
Seng believed that unless progress in education takes place in conformity with a plan adapted to local conditions, economic expansion may
be compromised in the long run. 42
Sengs reforms, concentrated on primary education, were based
on the removal of subjects dealing with France, on the addition of
Cambodia-related subjects, on further relegation of French language
studies, and on devoting more time to science and technology.43 In effect, the policy reforms merely expanded those proposed by UNESCO
in 1952. They substituted Khmer content into a French model without
addressing Cambodias development needs, centered, in the rst instance, on increasing agricultural productivity. The reforms also failed
to address the terminal nature of the education system. While few students remained at school after receiving a primary education, the system continued to orient itself in favor of the education of those who
proceeded beyond primary studies. Chau Seng was the rst to admit
that the new curricula were far from perfect, but they did represent an
advance on the old, which were merely reproductions of those in
French schools. 44
The effect of the reforms was a more intense wave of educational expansion, spawned by Prince Sihanouks condence in Chau Seng and
his optimistic belief in the capacity of education to bring about desirable
social and economic change. By 1962, there were 667,310 students enrolled in some form of education in Cambodia, compared with 432,649
in 1958.45
Chau Sengs reforms were a failure. First, they were undermined by
Prince Sihanouks unabated obsession with the continued expansion of
educational facilities. This obsession undermined potential improve-
45
ments in educational quality and the achievement of fundamental

changes in the structure of the education system. Second, they failed to
address the colonial heritage of the system. Students continued to study
in the hope of gaining employment in the civil service. Education continued to be regarded as the path to upward social mobility. These perceptions of social mobility, generally unattained, fueled dissatisfaction
and dissension among students. Finally, the reforms failed to prevent
the entrenchment within the education system of the radical egalitarian
political culture rst espoused by the returnees from France in the early
days following independence. Expansion, declining quality, perceptions
of social mobility, and the emergence of educational radicalismall
symptomatic of an educational crisis were to prove the dominant
themes of educational policy and practice until Sihanouks deposition
in 1970.
Descent into Chaos

From the moment Sihanouk formed the Sangkum, political life in Cambodia became a carefully managed theatrical production, with the
prince as its director. Politicians and those fortunate enough to enjoy
feted positions in public life became the actors. Foreign journalists were
the critics; only those who reviewed the performance favorably had
their visas renewed. Negative reporting, whether from foreigners or
from any of the very few domestic commentators within the country, was
not tolerated. If one listened to Sihanouk, whose speeches invariably
dominated foreign understanding of the island of peace, there was
nothing to criticize. Perceptions of strife in Cambodia, the prince would
assert, were products of the imagination of those with ulterior motives
and were certainly not the truth.
In 1963, the environment began to change. The stage became bigger,
extending beyond Cambodias shores, and was more difcult for the
prince to manage. The troupe of actors became more aware, even venturing to question the princes directions, while backstage sat a growing
band of extras, some wanting to take their place on the stage and others
wanting a say in how the production was managed.
These extras were Cambodias young, the generation most affected
by the nations drive for compulsory education. Sihanouks rhetoric had
led them to believe that their modern education entitled them to take
their place on the stage of participation, deriving the benets from education they had seen accrue to those who had preceded them. Their
perceptions, unfortunately, were misguided. The rapid expansion of
46
education, a feature of Cambodias educational policies since independence, was not the product of meticulous planning. Instead, it had been
pursued at the whim of the prince, whose desire to reinforce his legitimacy through the distribution of largesse, had seen the platform of educational policy formulation and implementation subverted and convoluted. Not only could the nation ill-afford to continue maintaining
the necessary human and physical resources the unchecked expansion
of the system required, but the national economy was unable to absorb
its graduates, who continued to demand posts in the civil service.
When they could not act on Sihanouks stage, many of the extras
searched for an alternative venue or, at least privately, started work on
an alternative script. It is to their story we now turn.
1963 1966: Economic Stagnation

By January 1963, although it was not lost, Sihanouks development boat
had obviously begun to stray from its bearings. In the third year of a veyear economic plan,46 anticipated returns on investment in infrastructure and education had been considerably less than anticipated. Poor
results in the industrialization program and a burgeoning budget decit
were two major problems. In response to the difculties being encountered, the prince declared that a considerable slowdown in the pace of
infrastructure investment was necessary.47
The new nance minister, following the elections of 1962, was Long
Boret. He stated in a press conference that Cambodia had experienced
a 30 percent increase in working expenditure, one of the principal
causes being the heavy maintenance burden of schools. 48 While the
nance minister expressed support for Sihanouks proposal for a slowdown in investment, government records indicate that expenditure on
national education increased in real terms, and proportionately, from
14.8 percent of the national budget in 1962 to 20 percent in 1963.49 The
ofcial Sangkum reaction to the economic problems was to align more
closely with China in the adoption of an agriculture rst policy. In
terms of education, the alignment represented an opportunity to address problems with the school system. As shall be seen, the opportunity
would never be realized and the prevailing crisis never addressed.
Erasing the Americans

On November 19, 1963, in the midst of the budgetary crisis, Sihanouk decided to erase the Americans from Cambodia. By cutting
47
off all military and economic assistance, the princes decision worked to
compound already considerable problems. The country was to contend
with a substantial decrease in its annual revenues, having accepted U.S.
$278 million in economic assistance between 1954 and 1963. An economic aid program accounted for U.S.$88 million, 14 percent of it devoted to educational development.50
The cancellation of U.S. assistance by Sihanouk represented the culmination of a deterioration in U.S.-Cambodian relations that had been
brewing for a number of years. The repeated American attempts to encourage Sihanouk to enlist Cambodia in the anti-Communist Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO); two coup attempts in 1958, allegedly sponsored by the CIA; the presence of antagonistic and U.S.supported regimes in South Vietnam and Thailand; and the lack of
diplomatic courtesy Sihanouk believed he was being shown by Americas
ambassadors in Cambodia contributed to perceptions of distrust.51
Sihanouks greatest contention with U.S. assistance in Cambodia was
the culture of dependency it was breeding among the nations elite. One
historian noted that in Sihanouks mind, wealthy people in Phnom
Penh had become dependent on the luxury products imported under
the U.S.-sponsored commodity import program. The announcement
of the cessation of U.S. assistance was accompanied by a series of economic measures that Sihanouk believed would address the countrys
deteriorating economic prospects. These socialization measures included the nationalization of Cambodias import-export trade, private
banks, and distilleries and a curb on the importation of luxury goods.52
A CIA intelligence memorandum correctly noted that the measures
alienated elements of the military, bureaucracy, and Chinese-dominated
commercial community.53
Cambodia ofcially remained true to the Buddhist socialist ideology
and maintained its policy of neutrality. To be sure, Sihanouk could justify his renouncement of U.S. aid on the grounds that the Americans
were refusing to respect that neutrality.54 The reality was that the prince
was accelerating Cambodias move toward the left. The shift had begun
in the aftermath of the failed coup attempts of 1958 and, notwithstanding a series of oppressive crackdowns on the leftist political opposition at
home, had continued steadily ever since. Sihanouk increasingly drifted
toward a reliance on the nations young, usually foreign educated, leftists, who drew praise . . . for their patriotism and integrity. 55
Surrounding the education system, there exists evidence of a move
toward the left stemming from as early as 1960, when Sihanouk, in a
48
symbolic gesture, elected to send three of his sons to continue their

studies in China. In 1961, Chinese educators were sent to Cambodia to
provide technical education, and a technical school was established with
Chinese aid.56 Sometime later, at the prestigious U.S.-funded Kompong
Kantuot Teacher Training Center, the shift was even more conspicuous,
when Son Sen, a known leftist, was appointed as director of studies.57
The moves, while embracing elements of the agenda of the international left, were certainly directed as a rm rejection of the West, and
particularly the United States.
Education: Reform, Expansion, and Quality

In December 1963, with the aftershocks of the cancellation of U.S.
assistance still reverberating through Phnom Penh, the prince presided
over a conference on education. The keynote of the conference, reecting the new pro-China agenda, was to stress the necessity of an emphasis on practical activities within the curriculum. While glossing over
many of the qualitative problems confronting education, the conference recognized that current educational policies, and the huge investment outlaid on their implementation, were not delivering the economic returns anticipated by the government.58 There were discussions
about moving away from a purely academic curriculum in secondary
schools, while a plan was established to introduce diversied practical
training into the primary school curriculum.59
A further concern highlighted at the conference was the chronic
shortage of teaching personnel. Earlier in the year, at an International
Conference on Public Education, Cambodias representative had highlighted the extent of the problem. The ministry had estimated that in
order to educate all eligible school-aged children at a ratio of 1 teacher
per 35 students, the country would need to employ 18,667 new teachers.
Considering that only 12,886 were currently employed and that marginally more than 8,000 of these had been trained in the ten years since
independence, the task appeared an impossible one.60
To address the teacher shortage problem, ofcials consciously attacked educational quality. The ministry introduced half-day classes, expressing the hope that these could be phased out within ve years. In
the meantime, the government proposed to pursue accelerated training programs at the Phnom Penh Teacher Training Center (formerly
the Ecole Normale) and the Kompong Kantuot Teacher Training Center.
With U.S. aid rescinded, the well-advanced plans for a second rural
teacher training center, related to that at Kompong Kantuot, had to be
49
abandoned.61 Cambodias educational policy-makers were not alone in

adopting these approaches. In order to meet public demand for access
to both primary and secondary education, policy-makers throughout
Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the developing world, were making
similar choices.
The policy-makers were placed in something of a quandary. On the
one hand, they had to be seen to be visibly supporting Sihanouk, whose
educational agenda seemed concerned more with form than substance.
Although the prince occasionally expressed concern with educational
nance and quality, his overwhelming interest was the rapid expansion
of educational facilities. On the other hand, policy-makers were forced
to consider the ner details of the education system: how it was to be
nanced, how and where teachers were to be trained, and what would
be taught. The outline of the educational crisis in Cambodia had been
clearly drawn: Sihanouks agenda, concentrated on providing education
in order to reinforce the legitimacy of his leadership and the institutions that supported it, was in direct conict with educational needs and
the international agenda promoted in Cambodia by UNESCO. Again,
the circumstances were not unique to Cambodia. The governments
of the worlds newly independent states were pursuing the provision of
education in order to legitimize the authority of their regimes and to reinforce their attempts at nation building. While it may have been desirable in terms of the provision of quality education to restrict access to
education or to reorient the education systems goals and objectives,
such moves would have proved, as these governments were all too
aware, politically disastrous.
Classrooms began to suffer under the burden created by the scal
strain. As was the case elsewhere, it was costing the Cambodian government more and more money to provide education of an ever-declining
quality.62 Teachers were inadequately prepared for the task required of
them, while the resources available to them were not sufcient to meet
either their own needs or those of their students. The ongoing attempts
at providing a curriculum relevant to Cambodian social and economic
needs were continually overwhelmed by the day-to-day requirements of
a system in dire need of both massive reform and a signicant injection
of funds.
Despite the scal situation and the declining quality of education,
the system continued to expand. Following the earlier establishment of
the Royal University, the year 1964/1965 saw the beginning of rapid
expansion at the tertiary level.63 The decision to expand into tertiary
50
education was not a product of detailed planning. Nor was it a decision

of the education ministry to act on the advice of an international agency.
Instead, like so many other signicant turns in Cambodias educational
history, the decision was the brainchild of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. It
disregarded UNESCOs advice in favor of sustainable educational expansion. It also contradicted the nations current ve-year plan, which
advised that expansion be stabilized in the interests of maintaining educational quality.64
Charles Meyer, a French adviser to Sihanouk, in his embittered
memoirs, explains the princes quest for expansion. Meyer asserts that
Sihanouks decision to expand the provision of tertiary education
stemmed from a visit to Indonesia in 1964, when he toured a university
campus. The prince exhibited little concern with how the new institutions were to be nanced, staffed, and resourced. The new universities
were aimed, according to Sihanouk, at ensuring that students could obtain almost all higher education within Cambodia. This was particularly
important to the prince, who had long been concerned at the politically
unsettling inuence of study overseas, especially in France, where many
young Cambodians had been inuenced by Communism.65 In spite of
his assertions, there is little doubt that foremost in Sihanouks mind
when he decided to expand tertiary education was Cambodias international prestige, his desire to see his country admired throughout the
world, and his uncontested legitimacy as the builder of modern Cambodia. By 1966, 7,360 students were enrolled at Cambodias tertiary educational institutions.
1966 1970: Political Awakening

The Cambodia over which Prince Sihanouk presided in 1966 was very
different from the Cambodia that he inherited from the French thirteen
years before. For a start, state-sponsored public infrastructure dotted
the countryside. Internal communications had also improved, melting
the localized srok Khmaer into the geographical space of modern Cambodia. The prince, praised for his role in orchestrating the improvements, appeared to be increasingly losing interest in domestic politics
and was beginning to turn his attention to a new passion, lm-making.66
The conict in neighboring Vietnam was having considerable economic
and diplomatic effects on Cambodian society.67 Meanwhile, graduates of
the education system were increasing in number and facing the prospect
of being unable to nd employment. At the same time, demand for ac-
51
cess to all levels of the education system continued unabated. Further to

this, students were increasingly willing to question the many monologues of the prince.
Although Cambodias education policies, especially since 1963, had
sought to emphasize practical activities in the curriculum, the reality,
as practiced in the nations classrooms, was somewhat different. A lack of
ministerial strength and continuity, Sihanouks interference, bureaucratic factionalism, and chronic nancial difculties worked to impose
signicant impediments on the application of policies that would deliver to Cambodias population a more relevant system of education.
The problems of educational quality were obvious at every level of
the system. A former primary school teacher and principal at a school in
Kampot province, in the southwest of Cambodia, recalled that the process of regionalizing education to meet local needs was one of eliminating from the curriculum those areas of study for which materials
could not be found. Teaching materials and resources had to be found
by the teachers themselves; all that they were provided with was an overcrowded classroom and a blackboard. Problems with materials, and with
teaching aspects of the syllabus, were reported to district school inspectors, although very little action was taken to rectify the problems.
Rather, the inspectors merely approved the elimination of content for
which materials were often unavailable.68
A former Phnom Penh secondary school teacher recalled being directed to teach more practical content in her science class. The syllabus to be used by the teacher in the science course had not been
modied to meet the new demands, while the school did not have the
resources that would enable the teacher to undertake the task required.
The teacher recalled attempting to introduce practical experiments in
her class. When it was realized that the school did not have the basic
equipment to conduct these experiments, her task was reduced to illustrating on a blackboard how the experiments would have appeared if,
indeed, they could have been conducted. While the nature of classroom
instruction had changed, it was no more practical than it had been before the shift in the emphasis of the curriculum.69
In tertiary education, problems of quality and mismanagement became even more pronounced. A former lecturer and later a dean at the
University of Fine Arts, while generally positive in his recollections of
the university, recalled that facilities for lecturers were inadequate.70 In
discussing the University of Takeo-Kampot, Charles Meyer illustrates
Sihanouks role in creating the problems. A product of the princes
52
inexplicable drive for tertiary expansion, Meyer notes how the university boasted a Faculty of Oceanography, despite being over fty kilometers from the sea. There was also a Faculty of Electrical Engineering and
one of medicine, complete with a hospital, but no doctors.71 There is no
denying that Cambodia had a very real demand for oceanography and
medicine graduates. What is problematic is that the decision to create
these faculties failed to adopt a measured or reasoned approach to planning. To do so may have led to the creation of an oceanography faculty
with access to water and a training hospital with doctors to attend to its
patients.
Education: Social Mobility

A consequence of rapid educational expansion was the perception
that modern school education would lead to well-paid employment. To
even the poorest peasants, education was regarded as a means to escape
from a life in agriculture. It was the entry visa into the more lucrative
modern employment sector, centered in Phnom Penh, and on the civil
service. To what extent were these beliefs and perceptions a product of
policies and practices in education?
Educational policy-makers, at every juncture in the nations educational development, had stressed the need for the system to orient itself to Cambodias rural population and rural economy. Following
Sihanouks desire for expansion, their attempts at reorientation were
continually doomed to failure. The result was that a poorly equipped
and resourced education system continued, in practice, to reect the
system put in place by the French to train colonial civil servants.72
Despite ofcial policies that advocated rural reorientation, the government continued to promote the system as a reection of its colonial
heritage. In many respects, it believed it had no alternative, fearing that
to do otherwise would have undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of the
nations students and in the eyes of the families of those students. The
expansion of an outdated education system, with the governments legitimacy and ideal of the state at its core, was not unique to Cambodia.
What was unique, however, was the backdrop to the education system: a
political culture so rmly entrenched in and reverent to the practices of
the past. It was the deep divide between the ruling regimes reliance on
this traditional political culture, and an ofcial state ideology that advocated modernization, that was to account for the uniqueness and the
severity of the Cambodian educational crisis of the 1950s and 1960s.
53
Further educational reforms were introduced after 1965 to address

what had become very conspicuous problems. Sadly, they were a case of
too little too late. In the minds of Cambodias students, education was
the vehicle for social advancement and not for a return to the agricultural world of the past. Despite the introduction of new, more practical
subjects in schools and tertiary faculties, students continued to study the
liberal arts and humanities subjects they perceived would lead to their
employment in the modern sector. It is a perception borne out in enrollment patterns. In 1968, a combined total of 1,213 students were enrolled in the technical faculties at the Royal Technical University and
at the University of Kompong Cham. In that same year, 1,903 students
enrolled in arts and humanities faculties: 904 in the Faculty of Arts and
466 in the Faculty of Law at the Royal University and 533 students at the
University of Fine Arts.73
The fact that students had so soundly rejected the governments shift
toward vocational and practical education was due in large part to two
factors. First, despite rhetoric that emphasized practical education in
primary school, students were introduced to a classical, liberal curriculum. Legislation passed by the National Assembly in 1967 continued to
reinforce this trend. Manual work, the cornerstone of the new, Chinesestyle focus on meeting Cambodian needs, encompassed only one hour
(out of thirty) per week in the elementary primary education course and
two hours in the complementary course. In the same hour, teachers
were also required to provide lessons in music, drama, and chanting. Despite an ofcial commitment to addressing Cambodias needs, French
language study remained the most time-consuming subject in the complementary course, comprising between six and seven hours per week.74
The second factor in accounting for the students rejection of vocational and technical education was a fundamental contradiction between Sihanouks state ideology, Buddhist socialism, and his actions as a
national leader. According to his ideology, the prince was aiming to set
Cambodia on the path to development and modernity. The education
system, either rightly or wrongly, was widely regarded as the tool
through which these aims could be realized. Through the promotion of
Buddhist socialism, students regarded schooling as an opportunity to
acquire virtues of modernity: modern behavior, modern attitudes, and
modern thoughts. In turn, they then believed they were entitled to participate as informed citizens in Cambodias so-called socialist democracy. Two obvious by-products were their beliefs that they were entitled
54
to participate in the countrys modern employment sector and to be

heard on its political stage.75
It was at this point that the contradiction in Sihanouks state ideology
became evident. The prince stated in 1968 that there were now about
1,060,000 students who had nished their studies and applied for employment with the administration, claiming that each year 10,000 students graduated from the education system and sought employment in
the civil service. While Sihanouk had continually emphasized the creation of a modern nation, with students naturally believing they were
entitled to a modern role within that nation, the reality, nally conceded by the prince, was that the nations modern sector was too small
to absorb the graduates of the modern education system. Further, Sihanouk conceded, the problem could not be solved because of a six
hundred million riel budget decit.76 In many respects, the problem was
of the princes own doing. It was the policies he had implemented in his
bid to train up an elite that had contributed to student perceptions of
their right to employment in the modern sector.77 It was Sihanouks education policies that had advocated rapid expansion of the outdated,
French-style education system, and, although he had occasionally halfheartedly called for reform of the educational curriculum, it was his policy of expansion that had drained the system so chronically of resources
that any attempts at serious policy reform had inevitably failed. For graduates of the system, the problem of unemployment became a source of
great anger, as Michael Leifer noted in 1963:
The source of opposition to the government in 1962 was the growing
number of young educated members, particularly those with foreign
training. . . . The general problem remains of removing the disparity
between the new educated class seeking prestige appointments and the
number of openings available. . . . Some young men remain voluntarily unemployed rather than take a job which they consider beneath
their dignity.78
Magnifying the gulf between Sihanouks rhetoric and his actions as a

national leader was the manner in which he allowed unemployed education graduates to express their anger. Sihanouk claimed that the government was unable to solve the unemployment problem because of the
budgetary situation. Through their observations of both the corruption
pervading Cambodia and the cronyism surrounding the prince, students had many reasons to believe otherwise.79 Despite this, and despite
a state ideology that offered a role in political life to those who had be-
55
come modern, Sihanouk continued to maintain and defend the status

quo. His rule remained unquestioned, and opposition to it was regarded as an act of lse-majest. It is a point illustrated in the quiet protestations, in July 1965, of a student from Kambuboth Collge. After writing an anonymous letter to a newspaper about a scandal involving the
director of the National Bank, the student was identied and paraded
before a national audience:
Sihanouk berated him for his impudence and asked him if he wanted
to be Prime Minister. The student replied courageously that he wanted
Cambodia to make progress. Sihanouk threatened him with a jail sentence of ve to twenty years and sent him home.80
In introducing her examination of the relationship between Communism and nationalism in Cambodia, Katharya Um provides an essential insight into the dilemma posed by Sihanouks contradiction:
While institutional resiliency and exibility are among the key ingredients to successful development, the problem often comes from lite intransigence, which prevents the development of those institutions to
absorb and channel the social forces that have been mobilized by the
process of social and economic modernization.81
What happened in Cambodia when the institutions that needed to absorb and channel the social forces created by the development of modern education were found to be both inadequate and in contradiction
with a traditional political culture that failed to neither recognize nor
comprehend the needs and aspirations of the ruled? What were the effects of students and graduates not being absorbed into the political and
economic systems in the manner in which their schooling, and Sihanouks ideology, had led them to perceive they were entitled? What
were the consequences of the unemployment problem? In turning to
these questions, we return to those radical teachers who took their place
in the education system in the early years after independence.
Education: Political Detonator

As the 1960s unfolded in Cambodia, the nations already extensive
domestic problems were magnied by both Maos Cultural Revolution
in China and the escalation of the conict in Vietnam. In a fated twist
of the colonial legacy, Cambodias citizens were painted to resemble le
drapeau tricolore. The Reds were Cambodias Communists, believed by
Sihanouk to be servants of either the Viet Minh or the Thai Patriotic
56
Front. The Blues were the Cambodian right, lackeys of the imperialist
United States and staunch opponents of Sihanouks 1963 socialization
measures. The prince, and the remainder of the Cambodian population
were White middle-of-the-roaders: patriotic, neutral citizens.82
The colors were a physical embodiment of Sihanouks neutrality balancing act. His 1963 decision to erase the Americans had been followed by the cessation of all diplomatic ties with the United States in
May 1965.83 Fearing the impact of the United States in the region, the
prince increasingly turned to the Communist world in his bid to safeguard Cambodia. In turning to the left, Sihanouk placed both the Reds
and the Blues in a quandary. The Blues became isolated, marginalized
through their opposition to Sihanouks state-centered, socialist leaning
economic agenda, while the Reds, at least on the surface, had been upstaged, their socialist thunder stolen by Samdech Upayuvareach.
The political left and right began to direct their criticisms at the
Sangkum. Reacting to claims that he was an autocrat and a dictator, Sihanouk refused to endorse candidates for the 1966 National Assembly
elections. The poll, dominated by large-scale vote-buying and electoral
thuggery, resulted in a sound victory for Cambodias political right wing.
The newly elected Assembly, who owed nothing to Sihanouk and little
to anyone else, 84 soon became embroiled in factional battles, some
stemming from the pre-Sangkum era. The result was a spill of factionalism, instability, and turbulence that could not be contained by the
Sangkum and that eventually was to affect the very roots of Cambodian
society, the education system included.
Political Protests
Political rallies, protests, and assemblies, often dominated by students, were a continuing theme of the 1960s. They could easily be used
as evidence of the growing political conscience of Cambodias student
body and the physical manifestation of student grievances during the
period. Unfortunately, to do so only tells a partial fragment of the truth.
In essence, it fails to account for the hierarchical culture that underpinned Cambodias social and political systems. To examine political rallies in Cambodia does, however, provide a clear window through which
we can begin to examine the extent to which alternative notions of nationalism were able to inltrate the education system.
By 1963, it was evident that education was not creating the good citizens the government had intended to make. The rst signicant act
57
of political deance by students came at Siem Reap, in northern Cambodia, in February 1963. It started simply when a local policeman began
harassing students about riding their bicycles on certain paths at night.
After a schoolboy was found beaten to death, the students accused the
police of brutality and murder. When local authorities defended the
ofcer at the center of the controversy, student meetings were called to
organize protest demonstrations. These nally resulted in the sacking
of the local police headquarters, the removal and desecration of Prince
Sihanouks portraits from all public buildings, and the brandishing of
placards reading The Sangkum is rotten, The Sangkum is unjust,
and Down with the Sangkum. 85
The result of the protests was the death of at least two students and
the beginning of a political witch hunt. It culminated in Sihanouk
publishing the names of thirty-four Communist subversives, including
the two former school teachers, Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary. Was the protest a sign of the political mindset of the student population? One historian has implied that the protest was an indication that discussion
groups conducted after school hours by Communist teachers had begun to bear fruit.86 In so doing, he highlights a central characteristic of
student protests in Cambodia: while the students had overwhelming
grounds for grievance, the imperative for action generally emanated
from someone of more status in the social hierarchy than those who actually participated.
Students protested against the Sangkum, Sihanouk, and later Lon Nol
both during and after school hours. Opposed to these pro-left demonstrations were protests and rallies organized to counter the Reds (and
Blues).87 Many of the students were divided in their political allegiances.
The majority, however, were reacting to the imperatives of their teachers
or the imperatives of education ministry ofcials.
In March 1967, with Sihanouk increasingly a spectator of the domestic and regional turmoil into which his country was becoming embroiled, an antigovernment rebellion broke out at Samlaut, in Battambang province in northwestern Cambodia. By the end of the year, it had
spread throughout many provinces of the country. The uprising sprang
from local grievances: the buying up of land by Cambodians repatriated
from Vietnam, rural indebtedness, and the government policy of buying rice at highly deated prices. Many students and teachers were leading or lending support to cells of so-called rebels in the initial outbreaks.88 David Chandler has argued that leftist teachers and students
58
from Battambang city undoubtedly encouraged people to blame their

troubles on feudalism, Lon Nol, and the United States and probably
helped them prepare their banners. 89
The history of Cambodias Communist movement provided by Pol
Pot (Saloth Sar) ten years after the rebellion suggests that the students
who participated in it were not members of the Communist movement.
Pol Pot, down-playing the role of the Communist party, stated:
this [peasant uprising] was set off by the people through their own
movement. The party central committee had not yet decided on a general armed insurrection throughout the country.90
The protests did not all favor the cause of the radical left. At the
height of the rebellion, the government called on citizens to demonstrate their allegiance to the Sangkum. A teacher from Sangker district,
in Battambang province, recalled being sent to Samlaut district to assemble his students on the riverbank to deny the rebels access to water.91
The teacher, like his students, was not acting from his conscience but
was following the orders of those with more authority than himself.
As the conict raged on, government news reports proudly boasted
of the number of people who expressed their loyalty to their country by
staging demonstrations against the Khmer Reds. 92 A spokesperson for
senior secondary and tertiary students in the capital, Thou Thonn, expressed his profound indignation at the barbaric criminal acts perpetrated by the rebels,93 while the Ministry of Education ofcially pledged
its allegiance to the prince.94 A series of anti-Khmer Red and antiKhmer Blue demonstrations in the provinces of Kompong Speu and
Kratie were allegedly well attended by young men and women and
students. 95 Participation in these events, like that in militant groups
formed in Battambang, was not voluntary. A former Phnom Penh secondary school teacher described teachers and students as scapegoats
and pawns in the political struggle, placed under pressure by the education ministry. The teacher recalled how ofcials would order the cessation of classes to allow time for students to prepare placards to protest
against the Khmer Reds.96
The political turmoil drew a panicked response from the education
ministry. In the rst place, at the insistence of Sihanouk, it was announced that secondary school instruction would be Khmerized, as
had instruction in primary schools in 1958, with French relegated to the
status of a second language. While a commission was established to over-
59
see the reorientation of the language of instruction, the plan was very
much a pipedream.97 The reality was that it was totally beyond the means
of the administration, requiring the redevelopment of almost all resources and textbooks used in secondary education. The shift away from
France was designed to counter the inuence of French-inspired Communism. A second element of the reform was intended to counter the
inuence of Communism in private schools, which had ourished under Sihanouks encouragement. Concerned at the popularity of Maos
Cultural Revolution among the students at these schools, measures were
introduced to make them more accountable to the Ministry of Education.98 It would seem that the hastily installed measures were overwhelmed by the weight of the political crisis. In 1968, Sihanouk continued to lament the private school problem. The French-administered
Lyce Descartes was especially problematic, criticized by the prince for
acting like a state within the state. 99
Sihanouk made many references to Cambodias so-called Reds. In
doing so, he was addressing those people he believed were Communists.
He announced in May 1968, for example, that he had instructed provincial governors and the Ministry of Education to give him a list of Red
leaders in secondary schools. Unfortunately, Sihanouk was often incorrect when he labeled a Communist. It was a difculty compounded by
the united front soft policy adopted by the Communist movement.
Members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) of which
there were few before 1970 hid their revolutionary afliations and ambitions not only to protect themselves from the wrath of Sihanouk but in
response to the partys preference for an underground struggle.100 If the
Red teachers were not all Communists, who were they? How, and why,
did they attract support from among the student population?
Contending Nationalisms
In the face of the countrys economic malaise and the unemployment problem stemming from it, Cambodias students were unable to
nd within the political system Sihanouk controlled the institutions
needed to bring about social and economic reform. It was in this atmosphere that many became receptive to ideas of change and the prospect
of a more personally favorable alternative. As he so often did, Sihanouk
blamed the turn of events on foreign inuences, such as the Vietnamese conict, American imperialism, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In doing so, he failed to recognize the bitter divide created by
60
the education system he had engineered.101 It was not so much Communism that had ignited Cambodias students into action. Rather, it was
a massive failure in educational policies and practices.
The idea of a change in the social order to most Cambodians was an
abstract, arguably unthinkable, concept. Traditionally, the notion of a
padeawat (revolution), the replacement of one ruling stratum by another, held little sway with the Cambodian populace. Serge Thion, a
French sociologist and former school teacher in Cambodia, has argued
that the idea of a revolution in Cambodia emerged because of the
French school system and the international Communist movement.
The French school syllabus exposed students to the French revolution
of 1789 and to the replacement of an ancien rgime with a universal bourgeoisie, representative of the whole population. Meanwhile, Khmer students who studied in France, many of whom became teachers on their
return to Cambodia, were exposed to the Communist movement. Favorable to ideals of egalitarianism and opposed to the traditional feudal
dominance of the monarchy at home, they saw Communism emerge as
the most viable vehicle through which they could achieve a padeawat
and, therefore, dispense with a social system that genuected before a
rigid hierarchy.102
Were the students who came under the inuence of these teachers
supporters of a revolution? Were they Communists? There is no doubt
that some were. How many we shall never know, although it would
be reasonable to assume they were a numerically small and politically
isolated group. Their numbers were centered in Cambodias radical
strongholds, the private Kambuboth and Chamroan Vichea Collges,
and at the Lyce Sisowath, where Ieng Sary and the sisters Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith, all Communists, were teachers.
What of the remainder of those students who appeared to be supporting the Communist cause? To many teachers and their students,
Communism did not imply a revolution. For many, to be a Communist
was to stand as a model of high morality, of nationalism, a bastion of incorruptibility, and a proponent of equal opportunity. Many liked the
theory because it promoted equality between rich and poor and the
elimination of corruption. Teachers, some Communists, others merely
impressed by these more general values, were able to exert a profound
inuence in the development of the worldview of a body of students
who saw inequality, corruption, and unequal access to the institutions of
modernity denying them access to the life they believed their education
had entitled them.
61
Describing Pol Pots appeal as a teacher in the 1950s, his biographer

points out how he drew on the reservoir of reverence Cambodians have
always had for their teacher. 103 From a parents perspective, as this popular adage indicates, the teacher was the source of all authority:
I give to you my whole child. Teach him everything you know. You set
the rules. Whatever you do is up to you. I need only the skin and
bones.104
It was this reservoir of reverence that the government hoped to draw on

in reinforcing among students its modern state ideology. The teachers
were the representatives of the state and were therefore the conduits of
state ideals. It was Cambodias teachers who were to promote a modern
curriculum, one that led students to believe that by succeeding in their
studies, they were entitled to employment, participation, and a prosperous modern future.
In practice, the outcome was very different. As discussed earlier, a
number of teachers entered the profession to provide a front for their
subversive revolutionary activities. Many others entered the teaching
profession after being unable to gain employment elsewhere in the more
lucrative branches of the civil service.105 What emerged was a body of
many teachers with alternative agendas and motivations and an often indifferent, sometimes hostile, attitude toward the state. Among those who
were not Reds, many were Pink, not members of the Communist movement but certainly not White, patriotic citizens of neutral Cambodia.
It was these teachers who often presented their students with a more
personally favorable alternative. Their whispers of equality remained
true to the students beliefs that they were entitled to participate and to
be heard. The appealing alternative was rarely presented through formal instruction, although this did happen. A teacher at the Lyce Sihanouk, in Kompong Cham province, for example, was known to have
presented the theory of Communism to his senior students, usually
when discussing civic responsibility and nationalism. Students would
then be asked to discuss the pros and cons of a particular issue. It was
claimed that those students whose reaction was a positive or favorable
one were tacitly invited to join after-school discussion groups.106
Often, the personally favorable alternative perceived by students was
manifested in the behavior of their teachers, who were seen as a welcome contrast to the moral decadence and institutionalized corruption
so rampant in Phnom Penh. Many Red teachers were remembered for
their simple lifestyle and their genuine commitment to the social and
62
economic betterment of Cambodia. Khieu Samphan, although better

remembered as a politician and newspaper editor, was also a teacher
who shunned luxury, lived in a simple dwelling with his aging mother,
and was often seen riding a bicycle around the capital city. Unremarkable though this may seem, it drew the attention of many of Cambodias
students, who witnessed rst-hand the incredible divide between rich
and poor in Cambodia. A former student, describing this divide, recalled riding his bicycle through a very poor shanty town en route to
the Sangkum II Lyce in Phnom Penh, passing as he did so the opulent
surrounds of the Royal Palace.107 To many of their students, it was Red
teachers who seemed to be the only people above them in Cambodias
social hierarchy who visibly exhibited some concern with the plight of
the poor. The prosperity promised to them by Sihanouks state ideology
had been denied.
Education and Development: An Evaluation

The educational policies and practices of the Sihanouk era were an
overwhelming failure. In the seventeen years following Cambodias independence, there was prolic expansion of a Westernized formal education system. In 1969, the year before the country was thrust into the
throws of a protracted civil war, 1,160,456 students were enrolled in
some form of formal education throughout Cambodias schools, colleges, and universities. This compares with only 432,649 students in
1956. Although expanding access to education at a rate far in excess of
many of its counterparts in the developing world, Cambodia was not
alone in its quest for educational development. Throughout the newly
independent nations of Asia and Africa, education was pursued with the
promises of rapid development and economic modernization. The
promised riches were not forthcoming, resulting in dissatisfaction, dissent, and protest. In many instances, the very people in whom the government had invested the funds and resources for education became its
greatest and, ironically, most articulate critics. Despite the supercial
link between the two, educational expansion was not the underlying
cause of the crisis in Cambodian education. Rather, the crisis was a function of the tensions between tradition and modernity manifested in Sihanouks attempts to construct a modern Cambodian nation-state.
The global imperatives of modernity, reected in Cambodias ofcially stated struggle against underdevelopment and in its educational
policies, were subverted in their interaction with Cambodias local so-
63
ciopolitical milieu. It was here that the weight of the past continued to
dominate power relations and political behaviors. The construction of
the nation-state was a function of this enmeshment of tradition and
modernity. In accounting for the crisis in education, and its role in the
construction of the modern Cambodian nation-state, a number of issues
emerge. The rst is the appropriateness of the policies pursued in education; the second is the forces that were at work in developing and implementing those policies. A third issue, derivative of the rst two, was
the compatibility between education and Sihanouks Buddhist socialist
state ideology.
A rst criticism of the appropriateness of education policies was the
fact they were rooted in historical circumstances far removed from the
realities of Cambodia. Modern educational development in Cambodia
was paralleled by the disintegration of the traditional education system
directed by the monastic order for over six centuries. The process of disintegration, as Chapter 1 demonstrated, was initiated by the French,
whose haphazard agenda provided Cambodia with notions of Westernization and modernization. The French model, designed to train a
small indigenous administrative elite, was used by Sihanouks administration as the model for educational expansion.
A second criticism was that the policies were not economically affordable. Rapid educational expansion led to an exponential growth
rate in enrollment, as students graduating from one level of education
sought enrollment at the next, while demand for the lower institutions
continued unabated. In order to meet the demand, the costs of maintaining the education system also proved to be exponential. The result
of the expansion, in practice, was a rapid deterioration in educational
quality. Schools were poorly constructed, teachers hastily trained, too
many students were crammed into classrooms, and teaching facilities
and materials were inadequate.
A nal criticism of the appropriateness of education policies was
that the system was totally incompatible with the productive economic
capacity of the country. Graduates of the modern education system
rmly believed in their right to participate in the countrys modern employment sector. Although Cambodia was an agrarian nation, education was regarded as the means to escape the often very difcult life of
a rice cultivator. An education dominated by schooling in the liberal
arts bore no relevance in a nation where over 80 percent of the population was engaged in some form of agriculture. Students perceptions
of their future, created by the very nature of the education system, were
64
incompatible with the social and economic capacity of the country to

absorb their aspirations.
In accepting that policies in education were inappropriate, we need
to understand the nature of the policy formulation process. Rather than
following modern methods of government and administration, policies in Sihanouks Cambodia were subverted by local sociopolitical imperatives both above and within the education system. The subversion,
linked to the construction of the nation-state, accounts for the second
dimension of the crisis in education. Educational policies developed in
Cambodia by the countrys Ministry of Education bear a striking resemblance to those developed elsewhere in the developing world during the
period. At most turns, there exists evidence of action taken on advice
from international organizations, particularly UNESCO, in developing,
formulating, and reforming educational policies in accordance with the
global imperatives of development. It was on the advice of UNESCO
that the Cambodian Ministry of Education implemented its rst program of Cambodianization, and it was with its assistance that attempts to
implement Chau Sengs Cambodianization reforms were undertaken in
1958. It was UNESCO that continually advised educational administrators to temper the rate of infrastructure expansion, and it was international inuence that advised in favor of a rural reorientation of the
school system. Why then, in light of the inuence these organizations
wielded at the time, were their recommendations only rarely, if ever, realized in educational practice?
The answer is in the subversion of the educational policy framework
by forces acting above and within the education system. Above the system was the indomitable presence of Prince Sihanouk, whose impact on
policy development was immeasurable. One critic has argued that until the closing months of his rule, the Princes wishes determined the
fundamental policies that were followed. . . . Sihanouk was responsible. 108 Responsible he may have been; but knowledgeable about the
probable effects of educational policies, the prince was not. His inuence and interference was concentrated on his desires for personal legitimacy, national adoration, and international prestige. Its legacies
were many of the elements of the educational crisis. While Sihanouk
supported curriculum reform, and occasionally demonstrated some
concern with nancing education, his enthusiasm rarely extended beyond a desire to see rapid educational expansion at all levels. It was a desire that severely undermined the capacity of ofcials at the education
65
ministry to implement the policy reforms the system needed to ground

it in the social and economic needs of the country.
Coupled with Sihanouks subversion of policies from above were efforts to undermine the system from within. This subversion, most notable in the inuence of radical teachers, centered on the concept of
good citizenship and highlighted the gulf between the promises and the
realities of Sihanouks development agenda. It is this gulf, centered on
the relationship between educational policy and state ideology, that
constitutes the third dimension of the educational crisis. Buddhist socialism linked Cambodia to the goals of development and modernization dominating the agendas of governments throughout the developing world. In one respect, the education system was aligned to these
global imperatives. Students, and their families, believed their training
would entitle them to economic participation in the new modern
Cambodia. In another respect, education policies were promoting
among students a belief in their right to political participation. In this
regard, Sihanouk preferred to ignore the so-called democratic aspects
of the ideology he had formulated, and instead, insisted on the maintenance of the status quo. The prince became what Samuel Huntington
would describe as a modernizing monarch, the prisoner of the institution that makes his modernization possible. 109 Sihanouk was a
prisoner in that he was presented with basically two choices. The rst
was to continue to venerate traditional political behaviors and, in doing
so, marginalize those members of the population entitled to participate
in the modern life he was allegedly attempting to bring to Cambodia.
His second choice was to appease these members of the community by
relinquishing some degree of his power.
Sihanouk chose the former, attempting to construct the modern
Cambodian nation-state while maintaining a rm grasp on the traditional monarchical institutions that would enhance his power and,
therefore, thwart the access of others to share that power. It was these
actions, within a political and social system whose core was the precolonial notions of helplessness, human imperfection, and hierarchy, that
accounts for the unique circumstances and outcomes of the Cambodian educational crisis of the period. The economic incompatibility
that existed between the policies adopted in education and the realities
of Cambodias social environment, in conjunction with this dogged refusal to facilitate change, worked to marginalize Cambodias educated
population.
66
Whether Sihanouk was aware of the simmering problems over which

he presided is secondary to the fact that he provided no impetus for
change or reform. On March 18, 1970, while the prince was in France
receiving medical treatment, Lon Nol, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, and
the right wing dominated Cambodian National Assembly, deposed Sihanouk. Within days, the infuriated prince had aligned himself with his
former enemies, the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmers, or Communists), to
form the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). Over the next
ve years, Cambodia was at war with herself, a sideshow to the conict
in neighboring Vietnam. It is to this period, with the education system
essentially crumbling from within, that we now turn.
Lon Nol
and the
Republic
The Declining
State
Neil Davis recollections of the bombing of the Ecole Wat Phnom, a

private primary school in the center of Phnom Penh, in the nal weeks
of the life of the Khmer Republic, serve as a poignant metaphor for the
ve years that followed the Sihanouk era and preceded the Democratic
Kampuchea holocaust in Cambodia: 1
The rocket had gone straight into a classroom with children aged six to
nine years. There were fourteen or fteen dead, thirty or forty seriously
wounded and it was like a scene from Dantes Inferno. Bloodied children wounded and screaming in terror were trying to get out of the
school. There were several hundred more children in other parts of
the school who were also desperately trying to get out of the place, and
calling for their parents. Some of the wounded children were being
carried out by policemen and soldiers and some of their teachers and
civilians. It was the most horrifying sight I remember from the Cambodian war.2
In the aftermath, government reports condemned the attack, while the

Communists, who had ringed the city, continued to reign bombs on the
besieged capital.3 Essentially, the period was one of despondency, rivalry, factionalism, corruption, and eventually, for those who supported
the Khmer Republic, one of defeat.
At the time the Ecole Wat Phnom was bombed, the Cambodian state
could be dened almost in terms of the city limits of Phnom Penh.
Government-controlled territory had been steadily shrinking since
March 1970, when Prince Sihanouk was deposed by the National
67
68
Lon Nol and the Republic
Assembly and he aligned himself with his sworn enemies in the Communist movement. The increased insurgent control of Cambodia was
but one dominant theme of the period. A second was the nations failed
experiment in democracy and republicanism, spawned in the aftermath
of Sihanouks deposition, when the institutions of the Cambodian
monarchy were steadfastly dismantled. A third theme was the emergence of a new battleeld. Like the U. S. soldiers who ooded into Vietnam, aiming to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese peasantry,
both the government and the self-declared liberation forces in Cambodia strove to win the hearts and minds of the nations students. This
battle, fought with propaganda and through protests, was to provide
education and the education system with a leverage and importance
that in a climate of war it certainly would not otherwise have enjoyed.
Despite its importance, at least in terms of rhetoric, an educational crisis in Cambodia remained a fundamental theme of the period.
The educational crisis in Cambodia between March 1970 and April
1975 was a function of the material and human destruction generated
by a nation at war. The civil conict, however, was not the sole precipitating cause of the crisis. Rather, the crisis was the product of the battle
between the forebears of the countrys contending nationalisms. Each
was attempting to assume absolute state power, and each was hoping to
reconstruct the nation-state. The story that emerges is one about the
attempts by two ideologically opposed yet remarkably similar regimes, to
construct separate nation-states within the same geographical space.
Supported by the West, Lon Nols Republican regime embraced, at least
through its rhetoric and promises for participatory democracy, the imperatives of global modernity. Educational policies were, in turn, formulated and adopted to reect this orientation. The alternative regime,
that associated with Cambodias Communists, also embraced educational reform in its attempt to reshape Cambodia. Like the Republicans,
it promised equity, access, relevance, and qualitative improvements. In
the end, despite their rhetoric, neither regime delivered educational reform. The educational policies of the despondent Republic collapsed
under the weight of the past: by the delusions of grandeur of Lon Nol,
who conceived of himself as a predestined chief of state, or modern
God-King; by corruption within, as those in positions of inuence saw
in their roles no accountability to the people; and by the inuence of
Sihanouk among Cambodias peasantry, who remained true to the traditional reverence accorded the monarchy. Similarly, the aspiring Communist regime, riding to power on the coat-tails of Sihanouks popular-
The Declining State
69
ity in the countryside, intentionally subverted their educational agenda,

associating Cambodias Westernized formal education system with
imperialism. For these potential leaders of Cambodia, the version of
modernity promoted in their rhetoric was enmeshed with traditional
conceptions of power and leadership, where the needs and aspirations
of the ruled were born no consideration in the political behaviors of the
rulers. Both regimes promised change for the better, yet both relied on
the traditional social hierarchy in their half-hearted attempts to deliver
that change.
Studying the educational crisis under the banner of the Khmer Republic is a task fraught with the considerable difculties stemming from
a nation at war. The period was one of substantial human devastation and
material destruction, with Cambodian Republicans, Cambodian Communists, Vietnamese Communists, their South Vietnamese enemies, and
the United States all inicting extensive damage on the rural Cambodian
countryside. It was also a period of inated rhetoric, as the protagonists
battled for the loyalties of the population. Education policies were announced that could never be achieved, while counterpolicies and criticisms were launched that were only ever intended to inict damage in
the propaganda war. Finally, it was a period of division: between supporters of Communism and republicanism; between supporters of the
political left and those of the political right; between inhabitants of
the city and those of the country; between the rich and the poor; between
the beneciaries of corruption and its victims; and between those Cambodians whose conception of nationalism constituted the notion of social equality and those whose conception supported the status quo.
A Nation Divides: Looking Back

The division of the Cambodian nation is a phenomenon easily traced to
the emergence of contending Cambodian nationalisms in the aftermath
of independence, the camouage of factionalism caused by the formation of the Sangkum, and the political autocracy of Sihanouk. The division was accelerated in the aftermath of the 1966 elections, when a gathering largely hostile to Sihanouk and his policies took its place in the
National Assembly. Between these elections, and the fateful events of
March 1970, a train of events was to occur that would see those Cambodians opposed to the countrys social hierarchy in direct armed conict
with the forebears of the hierarchical social order. It is ironic that
Norodom Sihanouk, as the former king, was in alliance with those op-
70
posing the hierarchy over which he had presided. It is also ironic that
the Communists drew legitimacy from a gure whose popularity was a
product of that which they were ghting to eliminate. The conict between the two sides spawned the emergence of two Cambodias during
the period, each pursuing their own vision of the state, their own perspective on development, and their own educational agenda.
When, throughout 1967, the Samlaut Rebellion escalated with the
support of the radical left to embrace other regions of Cambodia, Sihanouk called on Lon Nol, who the left despised, to resign as Cambodias prime minister. The prince formed an Exceptional Government,
cracked down severely on the domestic left, and began secret negotiations with North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF, Vietcong) on the use of Cambodian territories.4 To
appease the right, and primarily to counterbalance the Vietnamese
presence, the prince gradually drifted toward a resumption of relations
with the United States. The result, beginning in March 1969, after Richard Nixon had assumed the presidency of the United States and was pursuing his policy of Vietnamization, was the systematic bombing of the
Cambodian border region by U.S. B-52s.5 By the middle of 1969, if it was
not already, Cambodias destiny was out of its own hands. In the meantime, sections of the population had become disenfranchised and disgruntled. Many rural dwellers saw their livelihoods destroyed by U.S.
bombs, while those in urban areas were angered at Sihanouks nancial
ineptitude and apathy and his unwillingness to deal with the Vietnamese
who, in order to avoid U.S. bombardment, were encroaching further
into Cambodian territory.
In July 1969, when a National Congress proposed the formation of a
government of National Salvation, Lon Nol again assumed the prime
ministership. Importantly, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, a critic and a
cousin of Sihanouk, was appointed deputy prime minister. When Lon
Nol left Cambodia for medical treatment in France on October 30,
1969, Sirik Matak became Cambodias acting prime minister. He took
no time accelerating the speed of economic reform, overturning much
of the Sangkums socialization program of the previous six years. At a
National Congress in December, Sihanouk vainly strove to reassert his
authority by attempting to undermine his cousins economic reforms.
The move failed, resulting only in the resignations of the cabinets four
pro-Sihanouk members. The left-wing Australian journalist, Wilfred
Burchett, a long-time observer of Cambodia with connections to the
prince, described Sirik Mataks actions as a carefully staged mini-
The Declining State
71
coup. 6 The division between the political right, comprising the countrys commercial elite, and those in support of maintaining the political
and economic status quo, centered around supporters of the monarchy,
became a chasm.
What transpired over the next three months continues to prompt
considerable debate among analysts of Cambodian politics and history.
The central areas of contention are the extent to which Lon Nol was
a party to the coup maneuvers being staged in Phnom Penh while Sihanouk was overseas and the extent of the role played by the United
States in orchestrating Sihanouks fall from grace.7 Whatever the case, a
number of events have been etched on the historical record. On March
8, in Svay Rieng, with the assistance of students acting under imperatives
from the education ministry, demonstrations broke out against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodian territory. On March 11, possibly with
Sihanouks approval, the Phnom Penh embassies of North Vietnam and
the South Vietnamese NLF were sacked by demonstrators. The following day, in response to the growing political unrest, the government
ridiculously demanded the withdrawal of all North Vietnamese and
NLF troops from the country within seventy-two hours. On Monday,
March 16, with the demand not met, 30,000 youths met outside the
National Assembly in Phnom Penh to protest about the Vietnamese
presence. A National Assembly meeting discussing smuggling allegations surrounding Sihanouks brother-in-law, Oum Mannorine, was adjourned to hear the resolutions of the student protesters. After the Assembly adjourned for the day, Queen Kossomak, at Sihanouks urging,
summoned Lon Nol and Sirik Matak to the Royal Palace. There she
urged them to end the demonstrations and to return to the policies of
Sihanouk. They didnt. On March 18, at a meeting of the National Assembly to discuss the Vietnamese situation, condence was withdrawn
from Sihanouk.8 The Cambodian public was informed in a communiqu issued by the president of the Assembly, Cheng Heng, at 1:00 p.m.:
In view of the political crisis created in recent days by the Chief of State,
Prince Sihanouk, and in conformity with the Constitution of Cambodia, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom during a
plenary session held on 18th March 1970 at 1pm have unanimously
agreed to withdraw condence in Prince Sihanouk.9
Without the fanfare that had accompanied major acts in Cambodias

political history since independence, its most colorful player was effectively removed from the political scene. In the following days, the
72
government moved to reinforce its position. The National Assembly

voted, on March 19, that in light of the Vietnamese situation, the nation was in danger and declared a state of emergency. Stage-managed
protests, held in favor of the decision to depose Sihanouk, were organized in Phnom Penh. On March 20, the Sangkum youth movement announced that it would recognize and support the ouster of the prince,
while a meeting of the Cambodian Students Association and Youth
Committee agreed to an education ministry proposal that March 23 and
24 be declared public holidays so that students could return to their
families and explain the Assemblys decision.10
The extent to which students actually understood or, more importantly, failed to understand what they were required to explain, adds
substance to the argument that student action generally owed from the
imperatives of a person or body of higher standing in the social hierarchy. The late Ngor Haing Seng was a student at Phnom Penhs medical
faculty when the North Vietnamese and NLF embassies were sacked.
Writing about the incident many years later, he recalled that the rioters, for all their deep feelings, had been manipulated by hidden organizers like puppets on strings. 11 Another former student, May Someth,
recalled being organized to march in protest:
At nine oclock we were called down to the school yard and told we
were going on a march to the independence monument. We were
given banners telling the Vietcong to get out of the country. . . . We
shouted anti-Vietcong slogans as we went. We were all very excited. It
was the rst such event in our lives.12
At no stage were the majority of students participating of their own volition in the events to which they were a party. Their participation
reected the view of a high-ranking ofcer of the time, Ros Chantrabot,
who wrote that the protests were the work of some sorcerers apprentice, and the . . . crowd were nothing but sheep. 13
In Peking, on the return leg of his overseas journey, it took the prince
very little time to react to his deposition. On March 21, the same day as
Cheng Heng was being sworn in as Cambodias new head of state, Sihanouk declared that his removal from ofce was illegal. To neutralize
any possible impact of the former monarch, the Assembly later voted to
ban Sihanouk and his entourage from entering the country. The prince,
meanwhile, announced his intention to form a government of national
unity. In coalition with the Khmer Rouge, and with the military assistance of Cambodias traditional enemy, the Vietnamese, Sihanouk be-
The Declining State
73
gan his campaign to win back his country. Many of the nations youth
heeded his call to arms, as did many rural peasants, and joined Samdech
Euv in the forest.14 Others remained in Cambodias major cities, relieved that the specter of Sihanouks corrupt regime had been nally
eliminated. T. D. Allman, in the Far Eastern Economic Review, perceptively
summed up the state of the nation when he wrote:
For the rst time since independence in 1953, Cambodians were killing
Cambodians, travel through the countryside was restricted and sometimes dangerous, and the Phnom Penh governments hold on the rural
population was in doubt.15
With the nation, and particularly its youth divided, the battle for the
hearts and minds of the student population had begun.
1970: Planning the Future, Revising the Past

In the days, weeks, and months following the coup, the government
struggled to maintain stability, to achieve international recognition in
the face of the considerable publicity being generated by Sihanouk, and
to quell the upsurge of unrest in the countryside. In order to maintain
support, and in accordance with the wishes of Lon Nol, who was a devout Buddhist, they continued to pursue their attacks on the Vietnamese (and Cambodias growing band of insurgents), referring to
them collectively as nonbelievers, or thmil. As waves of young Cambodians enlisted to ght in the holy war, reports of massacres of the many
Vietnamese civilians living in the country made international media
headlines.16
With the war as a backdrop, it is difcult to discern the forces at work
in shaping the Cambodian state over the ve years of the republic. It is
possible, however, to identify a number of threads that serve to provide
an understanding of the ideology guiding Lon Nols attempt to reconstruct the Cambodian nation-state. The rst was Lon Nols perceptions
of Cambodia and himself in religious terms. The marshall saw himself as a predestined Buddhist chief of state, leading his people in a religious war. 17 Buddhism, Lon Nol conceived, was the force that bound
all Cambodians.18 A second thread was Lon Nols ramshackle neoKhmerism. 19 Like Sihanouks Buddhist socialism, this ideology drew on
the glorious past of the Khmer nation and was based around Lon Nols
belief that he could reunite the Khmer people living in Thailand and
Vietnam, particularly the region of South Vietnam known to Khmers as
74
Kampuchea Krom. A third thread was the promotion of democracy,

through the institutions of a Khmer Republic. In drawing on Buddhism,
on past glories as the basis of a new Khmer nationalism, and on democracy, Lon Nol was promulgating an ideology similar to that of the
prince.
The differences between Lon Nol and his predecessor, including the
establishment of republicanism, were more pronounced. Both leaders
urged Cambodians to participate in a struggle. Where Sihanouk had
promoted the struggle against underdevelopment, Lon Nols struggle
was against the thmil, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, whose incursions had sought to undermine the stability of the nation. Another difference stemmed from the leaders application of Cambodias neutrality. Sihanouk had long advocated for Cambodia a policy of extreme
neutrality, although on balance, he leaned considerably to the left
throughout his years of tenure. Lon Nol, on the other hand, while advocating Cambodian neutrality, was denitive in his opposition to Communism and considered the United States as Cambodias number one
friend and ally. 20
A nal difference could be found in the relative strength of personality of the two leaders. Sihanouk was a member of the royal family, he
was charismatic, often amboyant, energetic, and entirely condent in
his capacity to lead Cambodia. Lon Nol was the antithesis of this prole:
he was a quiet, unassuming character whose political successes had been
few and whose primary role had been executing orders, not formulating them. In terms of policies in education, Lon Nols tendencies and
state ideology were to result in two signicant differences in his attempts
at state formation. The rst, stemming from neo-Khmerism, was a shift
in what constituted a good citizen, with loyalty to the Cambodian monarchy no longer a desirable trait. Second, the direct involvement of the
national leader in the formulation of educational policies diminished.
For the rst time since independence, the Ministry of Education would
be able to assume almost full responsibility for the development of educational policies.
Education: Interpretations of the Past

In order to reconstruct the Cambodian state, the new regime sought
to denigrate its predecessor. One of its earliest educational priorities
was to interpret the past, discrediting the achievements acclaimed by Sihanouk as examples of the national progress made by the Sangkum. A
new periodical, New Cambodge, distributed its rst issue in May 1970.
The Declining State
75
Among many articles proclaiming alleged Cambodian successes on the

battleelds in the war against the unbelievers were other articles that
sought to discredit the former regime. Phouk Chhay, the founder of the
General Association of Khmer Students, who would ironically later rally
to Sihanouks National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) organization, wrote an article of sweeping economic and social criticisms of the
former regime. Noting that the time of personal rule, based on absolutism, individualism, favoritism, and terror is thus overthrown, Chhay
turned to education when highlighting the burden of Sihanouks development aspirations on Cambodias peasants. Referring to Sihanouk as
an excellent demagogue, he claimed that while the prince would invite his children to accept heavy burdens in order to build schools,
the people who contributed to the construction were too poor to afford
the exorbitant school admission fees. The poor peasants, he concluded, had no chance at all of sending their children to high school. 21
Another article, in the second issue of New Cambodge, highlighted the
development of education under the Sangkum. While it can be conceded that the article was written for an explicit political purpose far removed from the realms of educational policy, it was both perceptive and
incisive in its criticisms. The article predictably leveled its criticisms at
Norodom Sihanouk, arguing the prince was seized with a desire to convince foreigners at any cost that in the realm of education Cambodia was
a progressive country. In regard to higher education, the article noted
Sihanouks opposition . . . to any preliminary studies that had serious
results, while in secondary education, the article noted the unsuitability of many sites selected for educational infrastructure development.
These were often enforced [by Sihanouk] against the explicit and considered advice of the people concerned. A second criticism centered
on Sihanouks lack of concern with the specic details of educational
policy. The article argues, quite rightly, that neither the cost of construction, nor the plans, . . . nor the availability of the necessary teaching materials mattered to him. A nal criticism highlighted Sihanouks
tendency to act out of compulsion, citing the princes inclination,
whilst touring a province, as a reward, he said, for the welcome he received, to decide suddenly to transform a junior high school into a senior high school without taking other factors into consideration. In
summing up, the article argued that Sihanouk introduced uneasiness,
improvisation and disorganization into a eld which should by denition be controlled by a sensible and practical organization. 22 The decks
were being cleared by the ships new crew.
76
Education: A New Direction?

In the halls of the educational bureaucracy, the many silent critics of Sihanouks policy interference greeted his removal from ofce with a
sense of relief. Like their compatriots in elite circles elsewhere in the nation, they were optimistic about the prospects for Cambodias future development. Throughout 1970, as the domestic political climate became
clearer, the ministry began to feel its wings, unrestrained for the rst
time since independence. Without Sihanouk, it was nally provided
with the opportunity to adopt a measured and rational approach to the
process of formulating educational policy. Its rst actions, in line with
the national move toward ideals of republicanism and democracy, were
largely symbolic. An immediate priority was to eradicate the symbols of
the past. Apart from the removal of Sihanouks portrait from ofcial
buildings, including classrooms, the use of the word Royal was removed
as a prex on the names of government buildings, while schools named
after Sihanouk, other members of the royal family, and institutions of
the former regime were promptly renamed. Other symbolic gestures
were aligned with the governments anti-Vietnamese, Buddhist nationalism. The Ministry of Education organized, for example, religious ceremonies in memory of high school and university students killed as a result of the aggressive invasion of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese.
The ceremonies, a reection of Lon Nols nationalist thinking, stressed
the commitment of the nations students to the ideals of independence, democracy, and social justice. 23 While these notions also formed
the cornerstone of Sihanouks state ideology, the new administration
stressed how the former head of state had ignored such ideals in favor
of nepotism, political crackdowns in response to legitimate opposition,
and ignorance of the nations intellectuals. For Sihanouk, the ideology
was nothing more than rhetoric. The reality was that the functioning of
the Cambodian state had been based on a precolonial political culture
predicated on notions of hierarchy, inequality, and exploitation.
In accordance with Lon Nols neo-Khmerism, the notion of Cambodianization again became a fundamental concern for policy-makers.
Neo-Khmer Cambodianization was inextricably tied to the political considerations of the post-Sihanouk era. Many of the educational bureaucrats entrusted with Cambodianization during the Sangkum period
shouldered the responsibility for implementing this new policy. It is not
surprising then that neo-Khmer Cambodianization bore a remarkable
resemblance to the Buddhist-socialist Cambodianization of the Sang-
The Declining State
77
kum. The policy comprised three pivotal elements: rst, a civic education tied to the economic and political needs of the new regime; second,
the use of Khmer as the language of instruction; and nally, in a move
enacted to address the nations political situation, the mobilization of
students to participate in direct actions against the national enemy.
A newly formed Committee of Intellectuals took responsibility for the
program of civic education. In sharp contrast to priorities for civic education under the Sangkum, the committees proposals did not include
the monarchy as a symbol of national unity. In every other respect, however, it is difcult to see how the program was different from its predecessor. The committee proposed that political and economic education
be included in the formal school curriculum, while courses in history,
geography, and civics be reoriented to embrace the new goals.
Employing Khmer as the language of instruction embraced a policy
initiative of 1967, when ofcials had begun instituting instruction in
Khmer in secondary schools. Progress in implementing the new language policy had been slow, however, and had achieved very little success by 1970. With the change in government and the renewed government emphasis on Cambodianization, the program to replace French
instruction with lessons in Khmer was pursued with renewed vigor.
Committees were established within the faculties of schools and in
school districts to Khmerize educational materials. The journal, Revue de
lInstituteur Khmer, which had a monthly circulation of 14,000, also published certain school texts in Khmer.24
The mobilization of students was orchestrated in response to the nations political situation, involving students directly in the national campaign to remove the Vietnamese from their occupation of large tracts of
Cambodian territory. The ministry used its Commissariat Gnrale la
Jeunesse to recruit student volunteers for service in Cambodias military,
the Forces Armes Nationales Khmres (FANK), or to work on refugee aid
projects. While there is little doubt that some students were conscripted
into the armed forces, the claim by the Sihanouk factions radio that Lon
Nol had closed down universities so as to force students to join the army
was totally without foundation.25 One historian has argued that in response to Lon Nols appeal for 10,000 volunteers to join the army,
70,000 enlisted. Many were schoolboys and students. 26 William Shawcross wrote that they could be seen setting out from the city . . . wearing shower clogs or sandals . . . as they headed for the war. 27 The majority of students were mobilized for public information campaigns,
while youth battalions were formed within schools to protect them
78
against possible onslaught by the North Vietnamese or Vietcong. The

government then drew on the support of the battalions and student
groups in their campaign to demonstrate the level of popular support
they enjoyed or to promote political goals such as the formation of a
republic.28
Formal Curriculum: Reecting the Past?

Although many ofcial documents from the period disappeared in
the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge victory and the subsequent social
and political turmoil in Cambodia, the remaining evidence clearly indicates that Cambodias future development agenda represented a return
to the past, albeit without the diluting inuence of Sihanouk. The policy goals in education were reected in the nations second ve-year
plan, which had been developed in 1967 for implementation at the beginning of 1968. The aims of educational policy centered on tempering
the rate of the quantitative expansion of educational infrastructure and
focusing on improvements in educational quality. In broad terms, the
aim of educational policy was to address the symptoms of the crisis that
had been evident in Cambodian education since before independence.
The basis of the governments policy was outlined by Minister of
Education Chhan Sokhum at a press conference in December 1970.
Sokhum noted to those present that the previous administration had
tended to focus on secondary and tertiary education, to the neglect of
primary school studies, showing interest in the blossom at the expense
of the tree. 29 His discussion addressed the very purpose of education.
Was primary education to serve as a terminal course of study or was it
to serve as a gateway to secondary studies? These questions were central
to the crisis of the 1960s. While generally ignored under Sihanouks
rule, they were not unique to Cambodias educational circumstances,
having been a focus of attention throughout the developing world during the period. Their roots in Cambodia could be traced to international concerns about the role of education in development and particularly to questions in relation to manpower planning.
Human capital theory contributed directly to a wave of international
interest in manpower planning throughout the 1960s. Manpower planning, in turn, became a primary instrument in social and economic
planning, especially for the nations of the developing world. Its basic
premise was that educations role in development was to create a suitably
skilled and qualied workforce.30 Cambodias second ve-year plan had
adopted many of the tenets of manpower planning, drawing on the
guidelines of the Asian Model of education developed at UNESCOs
The Declining State
79
Bangkok conference in 1965. The Asian Model expanded on the recommendations of two earlier conferences at Karachi and Tokyo, addressing the relationship between manpower needs and the expansion
of secondary and university education.31 Again, the concern was with
the balance of priorities among primary, secondary, and higher education and with the nature of the courses within each stage. The assumptions of the Asian Model, which were concerned with educational
quality as much as quantity, became an educational priority for the administration of the new regime.
The policies eventually adopted recognized that the manpower
needs of the Cambodian economy did not require an abundance of secondary and tertiary graduates. For his part, the minister announced that
an attempt would be made to regionalize primary education, so as to
halt the undesirable drift of rural dwellers to the city.32 The policy involved an emphasis on maritime shing, rubber cultivation, rice growing, and freshwater shing, depending on the characteristics of particular regions of the country. Adopting a similar approach to earlier
attempts at developing a relevant school curriculum, however, the policy continued to implant an essentially Western educational model on
the needs of the rural population. In addressing rural needs, and in
accepting the advice of international agencies, never did Cambodias
educational policy-makers (or the international advisers) address the
structure or French heritage of the education system. It was this structure that implied that the vast majority of students would proceed beyond primary school studies.
As with the Sihanouk regime it had succeeded, an attempt by the new
regime to address the colonial heritage of the education system would
have proved untenable. It would have undermined the fundamental reasons most students were pursuing an education: to become a civil servant
and to escape the prospect of toiling for long hours in the rice paddies.
The Lon Nol regimes legitimacy in the eyes of the people was considered to be of more importance and a higher priority for the administration than introducing and implementing the education systems most
sorely needed measure of reform. As with the Sihanouk period, the educational crisis in Cambodia during the Lon Nol era, at least in terms of
ofcial policies, could be traced to the regimes quest for legitimacy and
its desire to construct a nation-state around that legitimacy.
Education: Policy in Practice?

To what extent were the policies of an education ministry free from
the inuence of Sihanouk realized in practice? Adam Curle, writing
80
about Nigeria, noted that civil war is the absolute antithesis of national
development. 33 Like Nigeria, the fundamental problem facing the education system in Cambodia was the nations civil conict. Not only was
education undermined by the material destruction being wrought by
the conict; it was also the victim of other factors: nancial constraints,
the severe dislocation of the population, and, nally, the continued impact of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The princes continued inuence
on the social fabric of Cambodia, backed by centuries of tradition, increasingly resulted in large tracts of Cambodian territory falling under
the administration of the Cambodian rebels in the so-called liberated
zones.
Increased insurgent control of government territory saw the closure,
abandonment, or destruction of the majority of Cambodias schools
throughout 1970. While ofcial policies in education called for the retention of pupils in rural areas and were intended to prevent a drift of
poorly qualied youths into the cities, the realities of the civil conict
were dictating otherwise. In masses, refugees ed strife-torn areas. The
increasing numbers of dislocated rural dwellers posed an educational
dilemma, for by the start of the 1970/1971 academic school year, almost
40 percent of students attending primary schools in Phnom Penh were
refugees.34 Double, and in some cases triple, shifts were established
within schools to cater to the eligible students.35 Certain elements of the
curriculum had to be eliminated to cater for the demand, while kindergarten classes ceased functioning.36
The problems caused by the civil conict on Cambodias educational
enrollments and infrastructure were not the only impediments to the
implementation of educational policies. The Khmerization of instruction was disrupted as committee members employed to translate educational curricula and materials were forced to ee the conict.37 Many
looked for refuge in the city, while others secured passage to France,
from where they attempted to continue their work, although without
any substantial degree of success.38 Teaching materials were scarce and
frequently inadequate, while the impoverished and malnourished state
of many children, having ed from the country and often squatting on
the outskirts and riversides of the city, was not conducive to effective
learning.39 The conict provided the educational crisis with a second dimension, exacerbating the already considerable problems in educational provision and practice.
While education, and the fabric of society in general, was deteriorating in those areas of Cambodia controlled by the Khmer Republic, a
greater force was gaining momentum in the countryside.
The Declining State
81
1970: Norodom Sihanouk and the Other Cambodia

At the time of his deposition, Sihanouks rule had been unpopular in
Phnom Penh and in other major cities where the nations modern sectors were located. It was here that the intellectuals, merchants, bankers,
and civil servants were gathered, drawn together in their disdain for the
repressive nature of Sihanouk and the cohort of cronies who presided
over the kingdom. While the princes ouster was greeted with a sense of
relief, opportunity, and optimism among city dwellers, in large tracts of
the Cambodian countryside, the overthrow of the former monarch was
perceived to have been an overturning of the natural order and was met
with a sense of outrage.
Cambodias peasants, whose lives had continued to revolve around a
cycle of patronage and clientship rmly rooted to loyalty to the Cambodian monarchy, in the main never recognized the legitimacy of the new
Phnom Penh regime. Many continued their devotion to Sihanouk, or at
least to the institution of the monarchy. For these people, there was no
choice to be made in deciding between Lon Nol and the now exiled
prince. Sihanouk was royalty, and Cambodia was therefore his to rule.
While Lon Nols new regime was embraced in Cambodias urban centers, rural support for the prince had manifested itself within days of his
deposition in an uprising of peasants in Kompong Cham. Reacting to Sihanouks call to arms, they demanded both his immediate return and
the dissolution of the National Assembly.40
Sihanouks call to arms was voiced in light of the formation of FUNK,
an alliance between the prince and the Cambodian Communist movement, who would ght alongside the Vietnamese Communists in an attempt to seize state power in Cambodia.41 The alliance was to provide a
focus for those disenchanted with the Lon Nol regime, facilitating the
control of large sections of the country by the Communist movement
and resulting in an inated belief in their own legitimacy on the part of
a number of members of the movement. The impact of these effects is
central to understanding not only the remainder of the life of the
Khmer Republic but also the revolutionary nature of Cambodian society, development, and education over the next twenty years.
Liberated Cambodia
The magnitude of the initial defeats inicted on Lon Nols army provides startling evidence of the degree to which the Phnom Penh regime
had become blinkered to the reality of the republics prospects. In the
rst month of the civil war, with FUNK relying on the strength and
82
numbers of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), the Republican army

had lost control of almost all of the provinces of Svay Rieng, Rattanakiri,
and Mondolkiri, and over a half of Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, Kandal,
Takeo, and Kampot.42 As the year continued, the FUNK-NVA forces
continued to liberate Cambodian villages, districts, and provinces.
The Republicans, experiencing heavy losses, withdrew further toward
Phnom Penh and Cambodias second largest city, Battambang, where
their ofcers and generals concentrated on enriching themselves with
the fruits of American assistance.
What was life like and who was in control of these liberated zones
of Cambodia? Where was Sihanouk, and the monarchy from which he
drew his legitimacy, located in the hierarchy of the FUNK organization?
The Cambodian Communist movement, despite the inated rhetoric of
its leaders throughout the Democratic Kampuchea period, attracted
very little support in rural Cambodia between 1963, when the former
school teachers Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary ed Phnom Penh for the relative security and obscurity of the countryside, and the 1970 coup. At the
start of 1970, their number totaled no more than 4,000 ghters
throughout Cambodia, less than half of whom were armed.43 The coup
against Sihanouk, and the formation of FUNK, provided the Communists with the opportunity to gather support among the peasantry. The
Khmer Rouge soldiers often declined to reveal their Communist identity, preferring to conceal themselves behind a veil of support for Sihanouks Front.44 It was as the gurehead of the organization that
Sihanouk outlined the FUNK political program and the development
policies it was to pursue in liberated Cambodia.45
In presenting the FUNK program, Sihanouk retraced a path already
well worn by himself, Lon Nol, colonial and precolonial Cambodian
leaders, by drawing on and calling for a return to the glorious pages
and noble traditions of Cambodian history. The program, making no
mention of the Communist movement, summarized FUNKs plans to
build a democratic and prosperous Cambodia. In parallel with the political and ideological agenda of Lon Nol, FUNK made guarantees of
freedom of expression, demonstration, association, and movement,
maintained Buddhism as the state religion, respected the practice of
other religions, and guaranteed economic freedom. Also in parallel
with the Lon Nol agenda, corruption, smuggling, proteering, and inhuman exploitation were ofcially condemned, while development
continued to constitute a fundamental concern and ultimate priority of
the regime.
The Declining State
83
In respect to education, policies also reected those of the past. The

FUNK agenda, under the direction of Chan Youran, had shifted very
little from the recommendations put to Cambodia by UNESCO in 1952.
Priority was accorded to the Khmerization of the curriculum, while
other aspects of the program were also tied rmly to past policies:
Adapt the educational program to the different regions of the
country.
Encourage an experimental and scientic emphasis in the
curriculum.
Promote research and scholarship in Cambodian national history.
Ensure free education (including a system of scholarships for the
needy).
Support an extensive civil, political and cultural education among
the nations youth.
The FUNK agenda, as with that of Lon Nol, was directed at securing the
loyalty of the nations students. The thrust of the propaganda campaign
of both sides was the reconstruction of the nation-state, promising an alternative to past practices, ironically, within the context of an emphasis
on past glories.46
As in areas of the country controlled by the republic, civil war undermined development, and therefore education, in the so-called liberated zones of Cambodia. Throughout 1970, with the conict already
widespread, three factors were particularly important in relation to the
delivery of education. The rst was the immediate priority of the FUNK
organization to remove and eliminate the Lon Nol government. The
second factor was the degree of control enjoyed by the liberation forces
in the areas they occupied. On the one hand, FUNK often controlled
territory intermittently and was unable to secure a system of administration within villages that would be periodically assaulted or overtaken
by Republican forces. On the other hand, the front did not have a
sufcient number of indoctrinated cadres to implement its political program. Aware of its own logistic limitations, it is obvious that FUNK was
not genuinely committed to education. Its educational program, even
more so than that of the republic, was nothing more than a key in the
battle for the loyalty of the nations intellectuals, who constituted the
largest politically active group in Cambodian society.47
The third factor affecting education in liberated Cambodia, although not evident to outsiders during the early phases of the conict,
was the internal dynamics of FUNK. The secret agenda of Cambodias
84
Communists, who gained increasing ascendancy within the front, did

not include Sihanouk nor the institutions he patronized. Rather, it involved revolution, an overturning of the Cambodian social order, and a
precursor to the years of Democratic Kampuchea.
19711975: The Republic on Its Knees

Lon Nols assumption of power in Phnom Penh was greeted with optimism among the administrative and commercial elite in the capital and
other major provincial centers. His neo-Khmerism struck a chord with
those members of Cambodian society who considered their prospects
constrained under the autocratic, monarchical rule of Sihanouk. The
pronouncement of the Khmer Republic on October 9, 1970, while serving as a metaphor for the new Cambodia, ironically heralded the beginning of the regimes dismal demise. Shortly after the pronouncement, Lon Nol suffered a debilitating stroke. It not only diminished his
capacity to effectively lead the nation but was also seen among the
people as a bad omen.48 As military defeats of the Republican army became more frequent, corruption steadily worsened, and political factionalism and inghting more destabilizing, public condence quickly
drifted away from Lon Nol and the small group of sycophants, most noticeably his brother Lon Non, who were actively supporting, promoting,
and agging his credentials. Although it seemed from as early as late1970 that the days of the new regime were numbered, the Khmer Republic would struggle on for almost four more years, supported nancially and militarily by the United States in a war they always seemed
destined to lose.
Liberated Cambodia: The CPK Assumes Control

A dening feature of liberated Cambodia during the period was the
assumption of control of liberated zones by the Khmer Communist
movement. Fueled by a dramatic increase in their numbera function
of Sihanouks popularity and the anger generated by U. S. bombardment of the countrysideand a subsequent decreased reliance on the
Vietnamese,49 the Communists began to implement their revolutionary
agenda throughout sections of Cambodia from as early as 1972.50 Then
began their implementation of a program driven by an ideology in stark
contrast to that of FUNK. Anti-Sihanoukism and increased communalization were two themes of the ideology.51 A third theme, in parallel
The Declining State
85
with the regime the Communists were in conict with, was a distinctive
anti-Vietnamese sentiment. While politically astute enough to maintain
the emphasis on Sihanouk as a gurehead for the front organization,
throughout the course of the conict, and especially after 1973, the
Communists intensied their emphasis on each of the themes, destroying the old society and preparing Cambodia for an independent revolution, not connected with that occurring in neighboring Vietnam.52
Why were the Communists so virulent in their opposition to the institutions of the monarchy upon which Cambodian society was based?
Essentially, their opposition stemmed from their rejection of the Khmer
social hierarchy and could be traced to the egalitarian political culture
spawned among a number of the French returnees in the aftermath of
independence. It is ironic to observe, however, that their radical conception of modernity contrasted sharply with their behavior in attempting to bring about its realization. While the Communist core of FUNK
had rejected the Cambodian social hierarchy, they relied on its premise
of absolute power and its contempt for the needs and aspirations of the
ruled in implementing their program. As with Sihanouk, and as with the
regime of Lon Nol, with whom they were ghting, the Communists had
effectively enmeshed their aspirations for modernity with the weight of
Cambodian tradition.
FUNK, the CPK, and Education

What of education in these post-Sihanoukist liberated zones? Clearly,
the FUNK program, as announced by Sihanouk in the aftermath of the
coup, held little sway with the Communists. They were merely using the
organization as a front to pursue their own revolutionary end. The nature of education in the liberated zones was a function of the fractured
character of Communist control. There was considerable regional variation in policies and practices, depending on the beliefs of those in
charge and the degree to which they adhered to the extreme views of
the party Center.
The fractured nature of the party was demonstrated in the confession
of Hu Nim at the Tuol Sleng interrogation center in 1977. Reecting on
the prerevolutionary period, he recalled:
A-Soeun was appointed Deputy Secretary of Region 22 by brother
Phim. At that time in Region 22 secondary schools were opened, and a
number of textbooks were published which were no different from
those of the old society.53
86
While his testimony is enlightening in highlighting the problems being

faced by educators in the liberated zones at the timefor example, inappropriate teaching resourcesits greatest benet is in accentuating
regional variations in Communist applications of the ideology of the
party Center. Region 22, in the Eastern Zone of Cambodia, remained in
close afliation with the Vietnamese throughout the civil conict and
was, in many respects, distant from the party Center. It was this distance
that arguably facilitated an attempt at the continuation of the formal educational setting. Upon learning of the schools, the party Center quickly
moved to quash them, despite their congruence with the ofcial FUNK
agenda, regarding the system as a vestige of the old society. Other
schools in the region had been closed since 1971 and were used by the
Khmer Rouge as stables and storage centers or as prisons.54
Other evidence supports this notion of regional variation. A U. S.
State Department assessment noted that in Kampot, in the southwest,
where the party Center was particularly strong, the National Democratic Revolution had resulted in destruction of most of the schools
built prior to 1970.55 In Kratie, in the Northeast, on the other hand, Tiv
Ol, as the head of the zone, reopened the school after the Communists
assumed control of the area.56
While the party Center of the Communist movement eliminated vestiges of the old society, and therefore those institutions that would have
supported FUNKs educational program, they did establish schools and
a form of education more in keeping with their revolutionary ideology.
These schools, exclusively for party cadres, boasted a curriculum dealing with revolutionary discipline, social classes in Cambodian society,
revolutionary hate, and collectivism.57 Graduates of the schools assumed important educative roles in promoting the revolution in liberated villages by attempting to raise, or establish, the class-consciousness
of the peasantry.
The One-Man Republic

As the Communists increased their hold over Cambodia, Lon Nols republic continued its rapid decline. The end seemed near by the beginning of 1973, before the massive U. S. bombardment prolonged the life
of the regime.58 Three themes dominated the last years of the republic,
described by one historian as violent and melancholy. 59 The rst was
the political factionalism disabling the war effort in Phnom Penh. The
The Declining State
87
second, pumping the rst, was the ood of U. S. assistance pouring into
the coffers of the republic. The nal theme was the fracture between the
republics rulers and those they ruled, with Phnom Penhs decisionmakers demonstrating a total ignorance of the plight of the nations
poor. The education system, caught up in this atmosphere of decline,
was to become the vanguard of criticism of the regime.
The political factionalism in Phnom Penh was dominated by Lon
Nols brother, Lon Non, who had sought to destabilize the two major political parties formed after the declaration of the republic. While supporters of a rejuvenated Democrat Party followed In Tam, and those of
the Republican Party, Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak, Lon Non supported
neither organization and, instead, concentrated his energies on promoting the leadership of his brother, who preferred not to participate
in the party process. Remaining above party politics, Lon Nol became an
autocratic leader in the mold of his predecessor. Two years after the
coup that was meant to herald an end to autocratic rule, he dismissed
Cheng Heng as chief of state and assumed the position. He later proclaimed a constitution, modeled on that of France and South Vietnam,
that augmented his already considerable powers. A presidential election
was called where, to Lon Nols chagrin, several rivals presented themselves, and two of themIn Tam and Keo Anrefused to withdraw.
The results of the election were corrupted and fraudulent, as were those
for the National Assembly held in September, in which the new SocioRepublican Party, established by Lon Non to support his brother, won
all of the 126 seats.60 Traditional political practices and behaviors, and
traditional conceptions of power and leadership, had been intricately
fused with the institutions of modernity adopted in the name of the
republic.
The presidential and Assembly elections reinforced the proAmerican agenda of Lon Nol, resulting in a continuance of the ow of
American military assistance. The nations politicians, and many in the
higher echelons of the military, exhibited very little concern with the
administration of the country, preferring instead to concentrate on enriching themselves. The practice of enlisting phantom soldiers continued, while members of the government found it protable to trade
with the enemy. The U. S. administration, aware of the widespread corruption, encouraged Lon Nol to initiate changes, although the Marshall
demonstrated little impetus to do so. He preferred to ensconce himself
in a world of mystics and fortune-tellers.61
88
While they were preoccupied with enriching themselves, members

of the elite became totally ignorant of the plight of the country and the
reality that surrounded Phnom Penh. It was an ignorance manifested
in the plight of the Cambodian poor. As highly ranked military ofcers speculated on Phnom Penh real estate, buying up villas and driving
luxury cars, the number of refugees escaping the conict and squatting
in the city increased markedly. Starvation, malnutrition, and disease
manifested themselves among the masses eking out a miserable existence in Phnom Penhs parks, the riverbanks, and the shell of the incomplete Cambodianna Hotel.
By 1973, the government had all but ceased functioning. The United
Nations Development Programs (UNDP) resident coordinator in Cambodia became, in many respects, a de facto prime minister, holding
weekly meetings with representatives of the specialized UN agencies,
who had assumed virtual responsibility for the countrys day-to-day administration. The Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO) representative, for example, had assumed the responsibilities of the minister
of agriculture, while the representative from the World Health Organization (WHO) had taken on the role of the minister of health. Although
there were a few notable exceptions, government ofcials had lost interest in national development priorities, leaving education to drift with
the tide of countrywide despair. Sensing the lack of concern with the future, the director-general of UNESCO, hoping that the conict would
end quickly (with a Khmer Rouge victory), began to examine postwar
possibilities.
Believing that the return to peace would provide an opportunity
for attracting a substantial amount of external development assistance,
UNESCO and the International Labor Organization (ILO) sent a mission to Cambodia to identify development issues and priorities in
education and training. Arriving in Phnom Penh in February 1973, the
UNESCO/ILO consultants were accommodated at the Hotel le Phnom,
where they circulated among war correspondents, CIA agents, and corrupt army generals having cocktail parties with their beautiful young
mistresses. The consultants task, hampered by the fact they could only
travel freely in Phnom Penh and Battambang (Cambodias second city),
was to suggest how the objectives of the education system could be
aligned with the nations socioeconomic and cultural conditions. Certainly, their observations and the nature of their recommendations were
pertinent to the educational evolution of Cambodia, and particularly
The Declining State
89
the nations prewar educational problems. There is little point, however,

in dwelling on the nal report of the mission, which had understandably
failed to predict how the Khmer Rouge would behave after its victory. In
one respect, we can reect on the mission as yet another instance of opportunity lost. If we step back from its ner educational details, we can
dwell on the mission as an illustration of the surrealism that had gripped
those pockets of the Cambodian countryside that remained under Republican control.62 While the government attempted to convey a sense
of normalcy often through press briengs conducted by the unfortunately named Major Am Rongthe UNESCO/ILO consultants were
witnesses to the stark reality of decay evident at almost every turn: from
the curfew to the sandbags surrounding major government ofces and
hotels, and from the homeless to the senior military ofcials joining
their soldiers on the front lines during the day before retiring to the bars
of Phnom Penh in the evening.
Political and social life in the Khmer Republic eventually became
more pathetic than that of the kingdom it had succeeded, with Lon Nol
a fading shadow of the leader he had replaced. Increased corruption,
factionalism, autocracy, and, among the people, poverty and desperation resulted in a marked drift of support away from Lon Nol and his regime. Leading this drift were students, disgruntled that the optimism
ushered in by Sihanouks dismissal had not materialized.
The Voice of the Students

The disruption to education caused by the outbreak of civil unrest in
1970 did not improve during the remaining years of Lon Nols republic.
While there exist stories of valiant efforts to maintain the provision of
education in areas controlled by the government, including Phnom
Penh, the story, like that of the republic itself, was largely one of decline.63 The problems manifested in 1970 only intensied during the
following years. Educational policy, which had been based largely on the
second Five-Year Plan, was disrupted by its abandonment in light of
both the war and its neglect by the government.64 Educational practice
reected the fractured policy framework. The Khmerization of instruction was at rst slowed before being almost totally abandoned as the
conict drew to its inevitable conclusion. The quality of instruction continued to deteriorate as materials and resources were exhausted and as
teachers were dislocated by the conict. A further problem, emerging
later in the conict, was the closure of schools in light of security risks 65
90
and the industrial action of teachers, who went on strike in response to

the decreased purchasing power of their salaries.66 The crisis in Cambodian education had taken on a chaotic dimension inconceivable in earlier, more peaceful times.
The teachers were not alone in expressing their anger with Lon Nols
regime. The student movement, which had been a vocal supporter
of the overthrow of Sihanouk and a strong advocate of the decision to
declare a republic, also lent its support to protests against the regime.
Beginning with the protests sparked by Keo Ans sacking as the dean of
the law faculty, the students continually rose in anger against the perceived injustices and corruption of the government.67 While the government enacted laws designed to thwart their momentum, the students
continued their protests until the last days of the republic, serving to
highlight the bitter divide between the rhetoric of the national leaders
who ousted Sihanouk and the reality of the regime over which they
presided.68 The culmination of their protests came in June 1974, in
an atmosphere of confusion surrounding a protest at the Lyce 18
Mars, when the Minister of Education Keo Sangkim and the former
minister Thach Chia were assassinated.69 While the assassin or assassins
were never found, the incident and the severe crackdowns that followed it demonstrated clearly the divide between the students and the
government.
It was a divide continually reinforced by FUNK propaganda. Students
in Phnom Penh were generally unaware of the revolution being carried
out under Communist sponsorship in the countryside. Ngor Haing
Seng recalled that much information circulating in Phnom Penh was either government propaganda or it was rumor.70 Phnom Penhs students
believed that Sihanouk still guided the movement, and given his continued broadcasts over FUNK radio, they had few reasons to believe
otherwise. FUNK boasted of prominent defections from the Lon Nol regime and broadcast appeals to the nations youth to join the struggle to
overthrow Lon Nol.71 Continually reinforcing its commitment to equality, the front was admired by many in Phnom Penh. Kun Thon Thanarak, the secretary-general of the Khmer Students Association, in an
interview with Donald Kirk, noted:
If we make a comparison between this side and the other side, we see
this side [the Khmer Rouge] has a lot of discipline and no corruption,
and this side [the Phnom Penh government] has a lot of corruption.
This side is worse.72
The Declining State
91
Many students and teachers rejected the Phnom Penh regime, eeing
to the liberation forces in the countryside, following a path established
by the former school teachers, Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary, in 1963.
Awaiting the Reds: The Death of the Khmer Republic

The ultimate collapse of the Khmer Republic began on New Years Day,
1975, when the Khmer Rouge launched their nal offensive against
Phnom Penh.73 Those schools that had remained opened were closed in
the aftermath of the bombing of the Ecole Wat Phnom, as the Communist noose around the city was tightened. Access to Phnom Penh via the
Mekong river was closed with the placement of oating mines, while the
U.S.-sponsored airlift of rice into the city became insufcient to feed
the estimated two million refugees who then lived there. Lon Nol, along
with many of those either rich enough or fortunate enough to secure
passage, ed the country. When last-minute diplomatic efforts failed, it
was simply a matter of watching and waiting.
The debilitating effects of Cambodias civil war overshadowed both
public policy and civil society between March 1970 and April 1975. Addressing the educational crisis without taking substantial account of the
effects of the conict on Cambodias educational system is, therefore, an
undertaking of considerable unfairness. It is clear, however, that it was
not only the civil war that augmented the educational crisis that had
emerged during the Sihanouk era. During Lon Nols regime, the educational crisis was exacerbated by the failure to address the education
systems colonial heritage. On the side of the Communists, who drew
their legitimacy from the deposed Prince Sihanouk, the crisis was intentionally pursued, a derivative of the alternative regimes contempt
for institutions they associated with imperialism and with the West.
In Lon Nols republic, the crisis in education was a function of the
new regimes reluctance to address the historical legacies of the education system created under French patronage almost a century before.
The beleaguered Khmer Republic inherited from its predecessor an education system that was designed to train administrative assistants for
the colonial regime and was therefore incompatible with the needs of
an essentially agrarian nation. Stemming from this historical legacy, the
system was nancially unaffordable and was incompatible with the economic needs of the newly independent Cambodia. The deposition of
Norodom Sihanouk, who had slavishly pursued this educational model
with little regard for either its costs or consequences, provided the Cam-
92
bodian administration with the opportunity to reorient the education

system in favor of a more appropriate model. Its failure to adequately
undertake this task accounts for the fundamental educational policy
failure of the Lon Nol regime.
Underpinning the failure was the contradiction between Lon Nols
commitment to modernity, as reected in educational policies, and his
reversion to the traditional cultural practices and ideals of his predecessor. Like Sihanouk, Lon Nols belief in his right to rule was paramount. Questioning that right was not tolerated. Neo-Khmerism was
predicated on a belief in the fundamental superiority of the Khmer
race. Stemming from this belief, it promised development and equality
among Khmers and it implied a correction of the wrongs of the past: an
end to nepotism, corruption, and autocracy. Education policies were
enacted to reect this new equality, with a reorientation of the notion of
Cambodianization and the provision of civics and political education in
keeping with the new agenda. Unfortunately, for those swept up in the
optimism of the new ideals, the political and social realities were somewhat different. In the same mold as Sihanouk, but without his capacity,
Lon Nol perceived of himself as the savior and invigorator of Khmer civilization. Connected with this perception was his belief in his right to
rule and his subsequent refusal, like Sihanouks, to share responsibility
with others. Nepotism and corruption, shaded by the umbrella of traditional power relations, ourished under the weak Lon Nol leadership,
serving to marginalize a section of the population that provided overwhelming support in his ascension of power.
In rural Cambodia, increasingly under the control of the Communist
inspired FUNK organization, the educational crisis was even more profound. For the residents of liberated Cambodia, the effects of the civil
war on education were also chronic: teachers had ed their posts and
classrooms had been destroyed, while students were often unable to
leave the relative security of their homes to attend school. More enduring than the effect of the war, however, was the subversion of the education system from within FUNK. Despite its educational policies, formal education was intentionally undermined and dismantled by those
in control of the Cambodian Communist movement, whose conception
of the Cambodian nation-state was centered on dispensing with the institutions of modernity associated with the colonial and postindependence periods.
As Cambodias civil conict magnied in its intensity, and Lon Nols
regime reached new heights in its capacity for corruption, many of those
The Declining State
93
who originally supported Lon Nol drifted back to Sihanouk, or to the

Communists, whose standards of discipline and anticorruption provided
a stark contrast to those of the Republicans and their allies. Alternatively,
many ed liberated Cambodia, unable to adjust to the dismantling of
their local worlds caused by the Communists communalization agenda.
Others supported neither side in the conict. They merely waited, hoping that the conict would soon end so they could return to a semblance
of normalcy at school, at work, or on their farms. On April 17, 1975, their
hopes were partially realized, for the conict had in fact ended. A return
to normalcy, however, was a dream many would have to harbor for the
rest of their lives.
Pol Pot
and the
Khmer
Rouge
Building
and
Defending
Cambodia
By April 1975, most of Phnom Penhs students had not attended classes
for more than a month. When they saw the soldiers of the Khmer Rouge
nally enter the city, many of these students, and their parents, were relieved. The ghting had stopped and they could nally return to school.
A former student of the Lyce Yukanthor remembered his father, who
was a teacher, expressing the hope that the new Khmer Rouge government would eliminate the corruption that had ourished in schools
during the ve years of Lon Nols Khmer Republic. When the Khmer
Rouge soldiers nally reached the front of Kong Saos modest Phnom
Penh villa, they told Saos father that his family would have to leave immediately and go to the countryside for a few days. My father trusted
them, Kong recalled, because some of his friends had joined the Communists. The family left hours later with a small suitcase full of clothes,
a sack of rice, and two chickens. We werent worried because we could
come back in three days. Sao came back ve years later. His parents
never came back.1
The Communist troops, as they marched victoriously into Phnom
Penh on April 17, 1975, did not return the smiles of the capitals war
weary population, relieved that the specter of ghting, grenade attacks,
and curfews would be nally lifted from their heads. Instead, they
addressed the people assembled to welcome them without the deferential terms of reference that had characterized social relations in Cambodia since precolonial times, and they ordered the immediate evacuation of the city. Angkar (the organization, not to be confused with
Angkor), everyone was assured, was in control of everything. Rather
94
Building and Defending Cambodia
95
than a return to the normalcy of the lives they had enjoyed prior to the
war, it quickly became clear that the seizure of state power by the new
regime would be accompanied by a whirlwind of momentous social
change.2
The regime that seized control of state power in Cambodia in April
1975 was known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The leaders of DK
were members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), referring
to themselves collectively as Angkar Leou (the High Organization) or
Angkar Padeawat (the Revolutionary Organization). Their agenda was
simple: replace perceived impediments to national autonomy, coined in
terms of self-reliance, with revolutionary energy and incentives. Impediments to national autonomy included Cambodian individualism, family ties, Buddhism, urban life, money, ownership of property, and the
monarchy, which, ironically, as members of FUNK (National United
Front of Kampuchea), the Communists had allegedly been ghting to
restore.3
The four years of DK were an era of almost incomprehensible social
change, where aspects of Khmer cultural and economic life, which had
developed over centuries, were totally ruptured. Traditional patterns of
social relations were broken down, the nations market-based economy
was ruthlessly dismantled, while state-sanctioned violence and terror
reached heights inconceivable in previous times.4 Yet in spite of the
massive changes, it is often forgotten that the era was resplendent with
continuities that could be easily traced to Lon Nol and, before him,
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. DKs leaders, like Sihanouk and Lon Nol,
stressed the superiority of the Khmer race and sought to return Cambodia to the glories of its illustrious past. Like their predecessors, they
aimed to draw on and exploit the age-old rivalry between Cambodians
and their neighbors to the east, the Yuon (Vietnamese). Finally, like Lon
Nol and Sihanouk, they could conceive only of their righteousness as
rulers. Their legitimacy was beyond question, and challenges to their
authority were testament to high treason. DKs leaders, with a ferocity
and brutality inconceivable during the Sihanouk and Lon Nol periods,
assumed and superseded beyond all measures the fundamental characteristic of the leaders of the regimes they had succeeded: a blissful and
willing ignorance of the peoples needs. It is these factors that account
for the stunning ferocity of the DK revolution and the equally stunning
suddenness of its demise.
What intellectual forces were driving the CPK in its bid to transform
Cambodia? What was the ideology of Angkar? Was it a derivative of Communist models adopted elsewhere? How did it permeate DK? These key
96
Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge
questions are central to an understanding of the relationship between

the formation of the state and policies and practices in education in
Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. The CPKs assumption of state power
signaled the rise in Cambodia of a political culture committed to equality. Spawned among nationalists at Cambodias colonial twilight, this
egalitarian culture was actively promoted among many of the Khmer
students who had studied in France and drifted into the Communist
movement on their return to Cambodia.
A commitment to equality starkly opposed that which had sustained
Lon Nol and Norodom Sihanouk, who both enjoyed absolute power.
Both presided over social and political systems in which people knew
their places. In turn, both saw their development and educational aspirations descend into chaos. How did egalitarianism affect aspirations for
education? What was the educational agenda of Angkar Padeawat? Was
education pursued in order to assert the legitimacy of the new regime,
as Sihanouk and Lon Nol had done and as the new Communist government would do in neighboring Vietnam? Or was education merely
another impediment to national autonomy?
Responding to these questions is fraught with difculties. Interpretations of DK, and the policies pursued within the country, have continued to shift signicantly over the past twenty years. Throughout the DK
period, views were polarized. On one side, initial reports and analysis by
anti-Communist Western scholars, such as John Barron and Anthony
Paul in their Peace with Horror, attempted to paint the events transpiring
in Cambodia as a nationwide cataclysm.5 Michael Vickery called this the
Standard Total View (STV) of the Cambodian revolution.6 Alternatively,
writers whose attitudes toward the revolution were sympathetic sought
to discredit these reports.7 With the regimes self-imposed exile from
the international community, it was difcult for either side to rmly establish its case.
In the aftermath of DKs defeat, extreme anti-Communist analysts focused their criticisms on the Vietnamese-backed successor to the Khmer
Rouge, further clouding understanding of what actually transpired
between April 1975 and December 1978. Vickerys 1984 study of the DK
years attempted to analyze the alleged excesses of the Khmer Rouge. He
argued:
I am convinced that all the worst atrocities which have been reported
occurred at some place at some time, but not as the STV would have it,
everywhere all the time.8
97
Vickery then estimated that approximately 741,000 people died in

excess of normal and due to the special conditions of DK. 9 While his
study successfully undermined elements of the so-called STV, highlighting the regional and temporal variations characteristic of the period,
more recent research has shown that Vickery signicantly underestimated the extremities of DK.10 While the death of Saloth Sar (Pol Pot)
in April 1998 virtually ensures that we will never fully comprehend the
motivations and actions that guided this most tragic period of Cambodian history, there is still much we can add to the historical record in
attempting to understand the extremities alluded to here.11
DKs educational agenda, we shall see, correlated with its radical attempt to reconstruct the Cambodian nation-state. Conceiving of a Cambodian state that was completely self-sufcient, without dependence on
the West, and that rmly rejected capitalism, DKs leaders attempted to
destroy the old society. Education became a victim of the motivation toward destruction. The crisis was a function of the regimes sweeping onslaught against vestiges of the past, the fervent ideological dogma inherent among its leaders, an unrealistic quest for immediate self-sufciency,
and unparalleled contempt for its perceived beneciaries.
Angkar: The Roots of the Organization

The leadership of DK was not revealed to the Cambodian population,
nor to the rest of the world, until September 1977, when the CPK rst
admitted its existence. Prior to this, the world remained confused about
the shadowy gures that called themselves Angkar. Pol Pot and Saloth
Sar, for example, were often presented as separate identities by the
Western media.12 With this in mind, it is interesting to recall that the
roots of the organization that seized control of Cambodia in 1975, and
then attempted to sacrice individualism and the cult of personality
surrounding national leaders in favor of collectivism and anonymity,
centered around a small group of closely associated and often intermarried personalities and individuals. The rise of Angkar Leou was the
story of the rise of these individuals within the Cambodian Communist
movement. In order to understand the dynamics of Angkar, and therefore the dynamics of DK, it is necessary to examine the roots of the organization and the rise to power of the faction led by and synonymous
with Pol Pot. It is a story of how one group capitalized on opportunities,
often at times when the Communist movement had seemed to have
reached its lowest ebb.
98
Communism in Cambodia was born among the ethnic Vietnamese

community and among supporters of the Thai-based Khmer Issarak
Committee. Both were aligned with Ho Chi Minhs Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). When the independence struggle against the
French gained momentum in the aftermath of the Second World War,
membership in Cambodias splintered and edgling revolutionary
movement increased steadily in rural areas. The urban base of the movement, apart from recruits among the Vietnamese community, remained
largely without support. It has been suggested elsewhere that the
revolutionary movement in Phnom Penh was so negligible, even by
1954, that it was open to a relatively easy take over by a small outside
group. 13
Between the return of the French in 1945 and the Geneva conference of 1954, the revolutionary movement in rural Cambodia, driving
for independence, had assumed a steady ascendancy. In early 1951, at
its second conference, the ICP resolved to dissolve itself in favor of the
formation of separate national Communist movements in Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Laos. By late 1951, the Cambodian party, the Khmer
Peoples Revolutionary Party (KPRP), had 1,000 Khmer members.14
The movements ascendancy was halted in the aftermath of the
Geneva conference. The conference resolved that Cambodias resistance forces, the United Issarak Front (UIF), within which the KPRP was
integrated, should not be granted a regroupment zone, unlike the similar movements in Vietnam and Laos. Leading KPRP cadres were given
two alternatives. The rst was to participate in the national elections
scheduled for 1955, while the second was to secretly withdraw to North
Vietnam with the retreating Viet Minh forces. Many adopted the latter,
which dealt a devastating blow to the movement.15 It was a blow compounded in 1959, when Sieu Heng, the KPRP Central Committee member responsible for rural Cambodia, openly defected to the government. After gathering intelligence for a number of years, Hengs
eventual defection fanned a re that would decimate Cambodias revolutionary momentum.16
Into the revolutionary power vacuum drifted a new group. Saloth Sar
was among the rst members of this assemblage, the Cambodians privileged enough to have studied in France. Based in a rural area, he joined
the local revolutionary movement in 1953. After the Geneva accords
were signed, Saloth Sar returned to Phnom Penh. With fellow students
who had returned from France, especially after the return of Ieng Sary
99
in 1956, the Saloth Sar faction soon began its opportune domination of
the Phnom Penh committee of the KPRP.17
Sieu Hengs defection to the government provided the returned students with a further opportunity to extend their inuence. As an internal copy of the partys history would later note, the debilitation of the
rural activities of the party saw the urban committee assume control of
the national movement. At the second general assembly in 1960, it was
decided to form a Marxist-Leninist party, assuming the title, the Workers Party of Kampuchea (WPK).18 Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary assumed positions on the new Central Committee, with the future Pol Pot becoming a member of the politburo.
The second major opportunity for the returned students came when
Tou Samouth, the secretary-general of the party, disappeared, allegedly
kidnapped and killed by the Sihanouk regime. With Samouths disappearance, and many cadres still in North Vietnam, the Cambodian party
was devoid of its leading veterans, providing an avenue for the former
students to seize control of the movement. This was achieved at the
third general assembly of the party in February 1963, when Saloth Sar
became the WPKs secretary-general, Ieng Sary and Vorn Vet assumed
positions in the politburo, and Son Sen was admitted to the Central
Committee. Within a few months after the assembly, Pol Pot and Ieng
Sary had taken to the jungle, where the Communist party began its
preparations for a peasant revolution.19
The Pol Pot group was based initially in the northeast of Cambodia,
where it recruited a band of loyal young followers among Cambodias
ethnic minorities. The group extended its inuence to the Northern
Zone in the early 1970s and, by 1975, to the Southwest. A second faction
of the party, largely made up of veterans of the revolutionary movement,
was centered in the Eastern Zone. It extended its inuence, especially
before the Communist victory in 1975, into Kandal province, regions of
the southwest, and Battambang in the northwest. The Pol Pot group, in
control of the Central Committee of the CPK, had sought to eliminate
members of this faction as early as 1971, when party veterans returning
from Hanoi to participate in the liberation struggle were purged.20
With the benet of hindsight, we are able to look back on the period
as one of shifting power. In essence, the ascendancy of the Pol Pot group
within the Communist movement signaled the transfer of power from
a faction of the movement constituted largely of party veterans, whose
allegiance to the Vietnamese Communists was substantial, to a new
100
faction, whose experiences of the local Communist movement were

minimal and whose grounding was instead in the intellectual environment of postwar Europe.21 It is through examining the forces inuencing the ascendancy of the Pol Pot group that we are able to begin to ascertain a DK state ideology.
CPKs Revolutionary Ideology

When an article critical of the Cambodian monarchy appeared in the
Cambodian student magazine in France, Khmer Niset, in 1952, there was
little evidence to conclude that its author, Saloth Sar, would one day
seek to radically transform Cambodian society.22 In a similar manner, it
is difcult to conclude that the embrace of Communism by a small
group of Cambodian students in France would one day result in one of
the worlds bloodiest revolutions under one of its most tyrannical regimes. Cambodian students in France were not immediately drawn to
Marxism. The Cambodian student representative body in France, the
Association des Etudiants Khmers (AEK), formed in Paris in 1946, originally represented nationalist interests aligned to the Democrat Party at
home. The association was radical in that it advocated Cambodian independence from France, and it was more nationalist than overtly political or ideological in nature. In 1950, with the arrival of Ieng Sary in
France, dissension emerged within the Association and several factions
were formed. Vann Molyvann, later the Sangkums longest serving minister of education, Hang Tun Hak, and Tan Kim Huon, later the rector
of the University of Agronomy under the Khmer Republic, were among
the moderate faction. On the right were Mau Say, Long Pet, Douc Rasy,
Douc Phana, Sam Sary, and Prom Tos. Members of the leftist grouping,
who formed a Marxist study cell, included Ieng Sary, Saloth Sar,
Thiounn Mumm, Khieu Samphan, Keng Vannsak, Sin Khem Ko, Hou
Yuon, and Phuong Ton. By 1951, the Marxist group had assumed control of the AEK, with Hou Yuon appointed as its president.23
The motivation for the adoption of Marxism by these emergent radicals is difcult to determine. In her examination of the origins of the
Vietnamese revolution, Hue-Tam Ho Tai provides an illuminating starting point. She poignantly argues that revolution came to seem the only
possible solution to many young Vietnamese students, who saw an existential predicament that bound their personal concerns to those of the
nation in a tight and seeming natural unity. These students, argues Tai,
saw a symmetry between the national struggle for independence from
101
colonial rule and their own efforts to emancipate themselves from the
oppressiveness of native social institutions and the dead-weight of tradition. 24 Like their Vietnamese associates, Cambodias elite students were
caught between two worlds. One was the hierarchical social world of
Cambodia, with the monarchy presiding at its apex. The other was the
new world presented by their surroundings in a foreign country. Distanced from the ties of monarch, sangha (the monkhood), and family,
they were easily able to associate the emancipation of Cambodia from
the French with their own emancipation from this traditional social
world. Marxism, with its promise of equality, provided the avenue for
emancipation.
Despite occasional differences in opinion between the left-wing faction of the AEK and the Parti Communiste Franaise (PCF), the Stalinist orientation of the PCF no doubt affected the ideological alignment
of the future CPK leaders.25 Such Stalinist ideas as rapid collectivization
and the elimination of class enemies were reected in the policies later
adopted by DK.26 Karl Jackson, whose examination of the intellectual
origins of the Khmer Rouge points clearly to a relationship between the
experiences of the Pol Pot group in France and the ideological orientation of DK, notes other inuences, including Samir Amin, a major reference for Khieu Samphans doctoral dissertation, which is often simplistically argued to have been a blueprint for DKs economic policy
platform.27
The intellectual environment of France did not, however, provide
the future DK leaders with their only frame of ideological reference. In
1950, Saloth Sar spent a month in the former Yugoslavia constructing
housing in a mobile youth group at the University of Zagrebthis at a
time of intense hostility between Stalin and Tito.28 Sar, who later recalled the trip with great fondness, no doubt reported to his Cambodian
colleagues how impressed he was with the Yugoslavian ideals of agricultural collectivization, self-reliance, and mass mobilization for public
works, all of which would later be reected in DK.29
In his rst interview in over twenty years, in October 1997, Saloth Sar
denied the inuence of foreign ideas. Instead, he claimed, his political
awakening came when he saw the actual situation in Cambodia. 30
While there is little doubt that he was inuenced by the situation in
Cambodia, there is also no doubt that Pol Pots experiences in France
and Yugoslavia, and later his afnity with Maos China, colored how he
perceived the Cambodian situation. Along with other former overseas
students of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Saloth Sar, on his return to
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Cambodia, quickly aligned himself with the indigenous Communist

movement. After assuming positions of inuence within the party, the
French returnees sought to inuence the ideological direction of the local Communists. In particular, they attempted to shift away from a reliance on and subservience to the Vietnamese party. Evidence of the
shift is explicit. First, from as early as 1971, party veterans returning to
Cambodia from Hanoi were treated with suspicion, and often open hostility, by their Khmer colleagues. A second source of evidence is the antiVietnamese demonstrations organized by the CPK in late 1972, after
three of the four North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions ghting in
Cambodia had withdrawn to Vietnam. A third source is the account of
the former primary school inspector, Ith Sarin, who observed during his
stay in liberated Cambodia that there is also distrust of North Vietnamese unstated intentions. Hou Yuon, Sarin recalled, was adamant
that the CPK has foreseen all in preparing for danger from the
VC/NVA, asserting that the Cambodians were absolutely not under
the guidance of the Vietnamese Communist Party. 31 A nal, retrospective source of evidence in relation to the movement away from the Vietnamese is the Livre Noir, published by the government of DK in September 1978 in order to justify its conict with its former Vietnamese
allies. The Black Paper continually attempted to characterize the Vietnamese Communists tactics throughout the 1970 1975 period as expansionist and recalled the partys heroic struggle to maintain independence. Pol Pot, the paper noted, refused to become a client of the
Vietnamese.32
While the Khmer Rouge leadership sought to distance itself from its
Vietnamese neighbors, it grew ever closer to China, embracing the
Maoist notion of complete self-reliance. Arriving at a Cambodian revolutionary base upon his return from France in 1953, for example, Saloth
Sar is alleged to have said that everything should be done on the basis
of self-reliance, independence, and mastery. The Khmers should do
everything on their own. 33 The historical record clearly indicates that
the Khmers did not do everything on their own: they secured the support of the peasantry only through an alliance with Sihanouk and
through U.S. bombardment of the Cambodian countryside, won the
1970 1975 war against Lon Nol only with the considerable military support of the Vietnamese Communists, and administered DK with substantial Chinese aid and technical assistance.34 Despite this overwhelming evidence, the leaders of Angkar would later proudly boast that the
Khmer revolution was without precedent and that Cambodia was
103
building socialism without a model. 35 The notion of self-reliance,

however half-hearted its application, would prove to be a fundamental
harbinger of change for the education system and would lie at the core
of an educational crisis, which, because of its devastating nature, severity, and effects, was incomparable to that experienced under both Sihanouk and Lon Nol.
1975 1976: Gaining Total Control

The evacuation of Phnom Penh in April 1975 provides ample evidence
that, at the moment of its greatest triumph, Cambodias Communist
movement was not united. Controversy and conicting stories abound
about when the decision to evacuate the city was reached, whether the
evacuation was to be permanent, and which enemies of the revolution
should be dispensed with in the evacuation process.36 Communists from
the East, who entered Phnom Penh from the Southeast and controlled
territory east of Norodom Boulevard, were acting on orders often in
conict with those being acted upon by troops from the Northern Zone,
where Pol Pot had been located, and from the Southwest, led by Mok,
and later described as Pol Pot-ism par excellence. 37 The Southwest became the focal point for Pol Pots party Center.
While it has been argued that the evacuation of the cities was ordered
as a solution to a looming food crisis, to prevent a possible epidemic of
disease, or to forestall and negate any possible resistance, the Centers
overwhelming rationale for ordering the evacuation was that it suited its
ideological agenda. Cities were representations of capital, Western ideas
and Western thinking, Western institutions, the exploitation of the
poor, decadence, and corruption. In a society where there was to be absolute equality, there remained little room for highly populated urban
centers. Cambodia, according to Angkar, was to become self-reliant and
self-sufcient. Agriculture, particularly rice production, was to become
the basis for economic reconstruction and development.38 For the revolution to proceed and for Cambodia to survive, wrote one analyst,
everyone had to be put to work. 39
Plans for Education

What of education in this new egalitarian and agrarian society? Given
the forced closure of schools by the CPK center between 1970 and 1975,
it was probably nave of Kong Sao and his father, and many others, to believe that the Communist victory would see them return to school as
104
normal. It was very clear that the education system, as it had operated
under Lon Nol and Sihanouk, would cease to function. Although it
could be argued that the closure of schools in areas under the control
or inuence of the Center between 1970 and 1975 was a contingency in
a climate of war and social unrest, both Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot, in
1977 and 1978, respectively, would put such views to rest. Samphan
rhetorically asked whether children of the old regime knew anything
about the true natural sciences? They did not, he asserted, arguing that
everything was done according to foreign books and foreign standards, that education in the old regime was useless and failed to
serve the needs of the people or help in building the nation.40 Pol Pot
would later reinforce Samphans assertions, stating that there are no
schools, faculties or universities in the traditional sense . . . because we
wish to do away with all vestiges of the past. 41 It is a glaring irony that
both men, especially Samphan, were the beneciaries of that which they
sought to comprehensively discredit.
Samphans criticisms, however, were central to many of the problems
that had beset the education system since independence, residing at the
core of the crisis in Cambodian education. At one level, his rhetoric
pointed to the relevance of the system to its end users. At another, he
identied the lack of relevance with the systems adoption of foreign
models, echoing the words of the American scholar, Hans Blaise, whose
study of the education system, referred to in Chapter 2, had been undertaken more than ten years earlier. Blaise had quite accurately observed that Cambodias teachers used approaches and methods which
were copied from schools in France and which were intended to impart
knowledge necessary for administrative assistants to French colonial
civil servants. 42
Samphans conclusion made it clear that DK had rejected the former
education system in both structure and content. Given its rejection of an
educational model that had contributed signicantly to the crisis in
Cambodian education, how did the Center perceive the future of education? As is so often the case in attempting to unravel the complexity
that was DK, the evidence in regard to the regimes approach to education is ambiguous. It emerges from four sources: a conference in Phnom
Penh on May 20, 1975, a document circulated by the Center in September 1975, the 1976 Constitution of DK and, nally, the 1976 FourYear Plan.
The Phnom Penh conference, held in the almost deserted capital less
than ve weeks after the nal capitulation of the republic, was attended
105
by all of the new regimes civilian and military ofcials and represented
the Centers rst major attempt to run its political writ throughout
Cambodia. Ben Kiernans interviews with three of the participants at
the meeting and two subordinates whose superiors (now dead) were
also at the meeting allow us to shed some light on the events that transpired. In relation to education, the conference is important in terms of
what was not said. Two of the participants remembered no mention of
school closures at the conference, while twoa participant and a subordinaterecalled that closing schools was one of the items on the
agenda. No mention of schools or education was made by Sin Song, the
second subordinate.43 Whose version of events is correct is secondary
to the fact that unlike the regimes preceding them, the leaders of DK
were not about to accord signicance to school education. Sihanouks
Sangkum had devoted over 20 percent of its budget to the education system, while Lon Nol made particular mention of students and the importance of school education in his rst months in government. The
leaders of DK were not to imitate their predecessors. Education was
clearly no longer a priority of the state.
A document circulated by the Center in September 1975 afrmed
ofcial ambivalence. The internal document noted that since the war
we have been very busy. Neither children nor youth have received much
education. While the document then proceeded to note that in some
places schooling has started gradually, it suggested that when people
arrange to study at twelve noon, this part-time education gives quite
good results. Further, the document then proposed that the state
must organize to have exercise books and pencils for schools and that
later on expert teachers would be needed, but they would have to educate themselves among the peoples movement rst. 44 The documents references to the future of education were tokenistic. As former
school teachers, the leaders of DK could not have been anything but
fully aware that providing education during a lunch break to people often working fourteen hours a day in harsh and trying conditions would
have provided little benet. Likewise, it is difcult to concede that they
were not aware that experts were unable to create themselves among
the people.
As 1975 drew to a close, the Center felt in enough control of Cambodia to establish a CPK government. Sihanouk had been effectively
eliminated, the economic class of almost all citizens reduced to that of
peasants, and the monastic order dismantled.45 With the conclusion of
a major center-administered political course in December 1975, the
106
CPK project went into full swing. 46 On January 5, 1976, Cambodias

new constitution was proclaimed, ofcially giving the new state the title
Democratic Kampuchea. The new constitution further indicated that
nothing would be done by the new regime in relation to education.
While the September statement had noted the presence of education
and had half-heartedly hinted at a possible future direction, the new
constitution offered nothing.47 Shortly after it was promulgated, an eminent historian described the document as a manifesto that made no
mention . . . of home, family, inheritance, health, education, or rights before the law [emphasis added]. 48
Obviously buoyed by their assumption of almost complete control of
the movement, the Standing Committee of the CPK, the Center, began
the process of attempting to build socialism in all elds in Cambodia.
Between July 21 and August 2, 1976, the Center met to formulate and
consider a proposed Four-Year Plan. Two documents have emerged
from the process, which, for the rst time since they had seized power,
outline CPK plans for the education system. The rst is the typescript of
a preliminary explanation given by the CPK secretary, Pol Pot, to
members of the Center between August 21 and 23, 1976. The second
document is The Partys Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields,
19771980.
Pol Pots plan for the education system comprised three central ideological elements. The rst was that education, specically literacy, to
learn letters and numbers, was essential only in order to learn technology. The second, following from the rst, was that technology could
not be learned without practice. The third was that learning could only
occur swiftly by cultivating good political consciousness at the expense
of culture in order to demonstrate that the line of the party is correct. 49 These elements reected the ideological orientation of Angkar:
an emphasis on mastery and self-reliance, an emphasis on physical
labor, and the elimination of culturethat is, the old societyin favor of following a desirable revolutionary line.
Unfortunately, the plan that followed Pol Pots preliminary explanation offered little that could be subjected to detailed analysis. Again, it
serves to highlight Angkars outright rejection of the formal educational
setting. Formal education, according to the plan, was to consist of three
years of primary education in general subjects, three years of general secondary education, three years of technical secondary education, and tertiary education in technical subjects, also for three years.
A second section deals with daily education methods, which adopt,
107
although this is never conceded, the Chinese model of incorporating

half study and half work for material production. 50
The plan makes almost no mention of the educational curriculum,
other than to list the general subjects for study. These subjects were
reading and writing, arithmetic, national geography, natural science,
physics, and base chemistry, the history of the revolutionary struggle of
the people and, nally, the partys politics, consciousness, and organization.51 Taken in isolation, the contents of the curricula, with the obvious
exception of the last two subjects, had the potential to address many of
the elements of the educational crisis of the 1960s and early 1970s.
There was a denitive movement away from the humanities subjects that
occupied the endeavors of many of Cambodias prerevolutionary students, and there was the desire to link the education system with the
economic capacity of the country. On the other hand, there were no
details, and there was no concern with the quality of education, the adequacy of educational infrastructure, educational nance, or the training of a national body of teachers. In essence, there was ofcial contempt for educational development.
The Four-Year Plan was a product of the Center, written without consultation with the rank and le of the CPK and without the input of
those party veterans who had survived the regimes early purges. As a result of opposition to sections of the plan from within the party, in tandem with the possibility of an attempted coup dtat, a conict over the
Partys founding date, and the death of Mao Zedong in China, the announcement of the Four-Year Plan was canceled, the announcement of
the existence of the CPK (to Cambodia and to the world) was postponed
for another year, and the number and ferocity of purges rapidly intensied within the party. The Center perceived itself as being surrounded by enemies, both within the country and externally. Increasingly looking inward, and outwardly xenophobic, the CPK, unbeknown
to itself, was plotting its self-destruction. The remaining years of the regime would see that self-destruction manifest itself in the lives, and the
misery, of almost every Cambodian.52
Education: Temporal and Regional Variation

When two veteran Cambodian revolutionaries, Nay Sarann and Keo
Meas, were arrested by the CPK center in September 1976, the DK revolution turned a corner. For the remainder of the brief life of the regime, Angkar Leou would be obsessed with extinguishing its internal
108
enemies. Sarann and Meas would nish their revolutionary careers at

the former southern Phnom Penh lyce, Chau Ponhea Yat, turned by
the CPK into S-21, or Tuol Sleng, DKs most infamous security and interrogation center. Here, the partys enemies were ruthlessly eliminated
in a way reeducation could never achieve. The two were not alone. Hu
Nim, DKs minister of information, would be interned and tortured at
S-21, as would Koy Thoun, the former school teacher and CPK secretary
of the North and Chau Seng, the former secretary of state for education.
They were joined by almost the entire CPK administration in the Eastern Zone and, throughout 1977 and 1978, over 15,000 others. All were
perceived to be enemies of the revolution, people who had strayed from
the line of the Center.53
The elimination of the partys internal enemies was not the only
variation that distinguished this period from that which it had succeeded. There was the so-called second migration, in which new
people (neak phnoe or neak thmei),those from urban areas and those
whose backgrounds the new regime regarded as suspiciouswho had
evacuated Phnom Penh to the East and Southwest, were forcibly transferred to the North and Northwest.54 There was also an escalation in
hostilities between DK and its former Communist ally in neighboring
Vietnam. For the population, the effects of these changes were devastating. While the second migration, and the exhaustive work practices and
decreased rations that accompanied it, resulted in mass starvation and
disease in many districts, the conict with Vietnam further intensied
the Centers quest to root out and eliminate so-called enemies. A nal
signicant change, in effect driving the other changes, was the assumption of power throughout the North, the Northwest, and the East by
Moks Center-aligned Southwest.
These major changes are the pivotal points in the story of a revolution becoming increasingly bloody and self-destructive. They account,
to an extent, for the negligence in the establishment or development of
education throughout the early phases of the revolution. The Center
was preoccupied with more pressing priorities: asserting total control
within the CPK and asserting total control over the population, many of
whom they still considered class enemies. The complexity of understanding Cambodias revolution, and therefore understanding the nature of revolutionary education, is exacerbated not only by these temporal variations but also the very signicant regional variations that
prevailed throughout the country. These regional variations depended
on several factors: the nature of and differences between regional, dis-
109
trict, subdistrict, and even village leaders, the regional leaderships relationship with the Center, the prerevolutionary conditions in the region,
the regions agricultural fertility and potential, the population of the region, and the ethnic composition of the population in particular areas.55
In 1975 Angkar had divided Cambodia into zones (phumipheak)
based on the military divisions of the 1970 1975 war. There were seven
zones, in addition to an autonomous zone at Kompong Som, and a special zone (505) in Kratie. With a long CPK history, the Northeast, Southwest, and East, at least before 1977, enjoyed the most favorable conditions in DK. Conditions were at their worst in the North and Northwest,
where most of the former residents of Phnom Penh, the new people,
were eventually resettled.56
Education was a function of the complex social and political environment in which it existed. A Ministry of Education existed in DK. Like
other DK ministries, it would have achieved nothing, with its skeleton
staff required to combine their bureaucratic duties with labor in the
elds. Little is known of the ministrys activities other than the production of several texts that were intended to guide teachers.57 Few ministerial documents have ever come to light, while educational statistics
were certainly never compiled.58 Despite these overwhelming deciencies, it is a myth to suggest that DK abolished all schools. Certainly, the
educational infrastructure of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes was
cast aside. So too were the educational agendas, teaching corps, and
curricula of prerevolutionary times. What emerged, at certain times in
certain places throughout DK, in a quite primitive and pathetic form,
was an alternative education system.
Piecing together the puzzle that was education in DK is particularly
difcult. Without a base of documentary evidence, we are forced to rely
on the accounts and recollections of the regimes survivors, whose
denitions of what constitutes education vary widely. Do we categorize
the Mondolkomar (childrens barracks), for example, as institutions of
education? We know that primary-school-aged children were generally
taken, on a more or less permanent basis, to these centers, where they
were housed, fed, and indoctrinated with DK ideology. With their often
horrendous memories of the period as a backdrop, many DK survivors
quite understandably refuse to concede that these centers were educational institutions, despite the fact that children taken to them were often taught basic literacy and numeracy. Whatever our denitions and
categorizations, there is little doubt that DKs education system was
characterized by massive qualitative deciencies and by a curriculum
110
haphazardly attuned to DKs revolutionary agenda. The crisis in education, having undergone a revolutionary metamorphosis, and while completely overshadowing the crises of the past, could again be linked and
attributed to the ruling regimes attempt to reconstruct the nation-state.
In national terms there was no education system, wrote David
Chandler of the DK period.59 It is a view mirrored and often exaggerated elsewhere.60 A national system of education did exist, however, although in certain parts of the country, no education was provided at any
stage of the DK period. Schooling was provided in every zone of DK and
in almost every region. Throughout the country though, were villages,
subdistricts, and districts where there was no education at all. There is
no single reason why education was provided in particular areas at particular times and why it was not provided in other areas. What is clear is
that the provision of education decreased throughout the life of the regime and markedly so after the second migration of 1976. These tendencies are born out in the discussion of the Southwest, Northwest, and
Eastern Zones that follows.
Sum, a new person from Phnom Penh, lived at the birthplace of
Mok, Tram Kak. This was one of DKs few model districts, in the Southwest, the CPK Centers stronghold. Sum recalled that parents could only
see their children every couple of months, as the children were formed
into separate work groups and were given lessons one or two hours per
day. Kem Hong Hav, a former medic, lived at Prey Krabas, to the east
of Tram Kak, between June and November 1975. Hong recalled that
schooling continued for all children under eleven, although the teachers were ignorant. Similarly, Hap, a base person from nearby Kong
Pisei recalled that there were schools in some of the villages, where children were mostly taught to work. A former student of the school of
pedagogy, Van, lived in the Chouk district, in the Elephant Mountains
to the east of Tram Kak. He noted that schools existed in the district,
with teachers who were poor peasants with minimal education. All children were supposed to acquire basic literacy along with work education, although Van asserts that the literacy was neglected and the children were still illiterate in 1979.61
At the same time, at Bati, to the north of Prey Krabas, Ngor Haing
Seng related that education did not gure in the plans of local ofcials.
Recalling a meeting at the sala (hall) next to the historic Tonl Bati
temple, Haing Seng remembered the speech of a CPK spokesperson.
Under our new system, we dont need to send our young people to
school, the spokesman told those present. The farm is our school. The
land is our paper. The plough is our pen. We will write by ploughing. 62
111
Although it contrasts with the stories of Sum, Kem Hong Hav, Hap,
and Vam, there is no reason to question the accuracy of Haing Sengs
account. Moeung, from Tonl Bati, was a thirty-three-year-old base
person in 1975. No schooling was provided in her village after the rst
migration in 1975, she asserted. Only later, when the new people left,
could the children of the base people go to school. . . . It was hardly a
school, though. They learned nothing. At nearby Khnar, Sau, a twentyseven-year-old base person in 1975, recalled a little schooling in
1975. The children did nothing. They only learned how to collect
dung. 63
The Northwest Zone comprised the greatest proportion of new
people in the country. With a comparatively large population, it was one
of DKs worst zones in terms of food shortages. In spite of the hardship
endured by the zones population, education was provided in some areas. A new person, sent to damban 3 in the Northwest, allegedly the best
of the seven regions in the zone, told Michael Vickery she had been
employed to teach small children. Another from damban 3, a teenage girl, believed most teachers in her district were real school teachers who had joined the revolution before 1975. Mun Savorn was also
evacuated to damban 3, from Pailin, where her family had been on holiday in April 1975 to escape the conict in the city. Savorns recollections
differ from the other accounts. Moving between a number of villages in
the region between 1975 and 1979, she was adamant that she had encountered no schools at all.64
Former residents of damban 4, to the east of damban 3, admitted to
Vickery that there had been centers for indoctrination of primary
school-age children. He notes, however, these people refused to qualify the centers as schools and claimed that the children learned nothing. In damban 5, to the north, Ben Kiernan recorded Ang Ngeck
Keangs recollection of schooling in 1977 under the supervision of a
young woman from the southwest. The children, separated from their
parents, were taught revolutionary songs and a little of the Khmer alphabet.65 Ngecks experience was an isolated one. With the arrival of
new people from other parts of the country after 1976, the provision
of education in the zone declined markedly. It was a decline mirrored
throughout the country.66
An education system also functioned throughout sections of the
Eastern Zone. Thun, a new person, lived in Prek Pou village of Srey
Santhor subdistrict between April 1975 and December 1976. There
were schools, she noted, and the teachers were well-educated, like
many in that region. 67 Drawing on the accounts of survivors, Vickery
112
argued that the East was one place where central policy seems to have
been applied. There, or at least in the best-run districts, children of
primary school age attended classes in the mornings and performed
productive work in the afternoons. The teachers, according to Vickery,
were all from the base population, and there were DK textbooks for
the guidance of the teachers in reading, arithmetic, and geography.68
Ung Bunheang was a new person who, after being evacuated from
Phnom Penh in 1975, settled at Andong, in the Maesor Prachan subdistrict of Pearaing district in damban 22. The village was only ten kilometers from Prek Pou village, where Thun had settled. Bunheangs account
is enlightening. It corroborates the assertion that in sections of the east,
school and productive work were combined. In doing so, it illuminates
the quality of education in this region of DK and provides a valuable insight into the curricula at these schools.
The children in Andong would attend school in the morning, in the
buffalo stables, while the buffaloes had been taken to graze. In the afternoon they worked, building small dykes, tending paddies or vegetable gardens, watching over the cattle grazing, or carrying dung to the
elds.69 The experiences of children in nearby Prek Kamphleung,
where Ek Seng lived, were the same, although the school there was a
thatched sala built for that purpose.70 Elsewhere throughout the country, educational infrastructure was remarkably similar, with schooling
provided in former houses, village halls, occasionally former schools or,
as Lam Larn recalled, outdoors with mother earth for a oor and an
old tree for a roof. 71
While the adequacy of the classroom facilities undermined the
quality of education, the nature of the teaching corps further exacerbated problems. The teaching staff, according to both Bunheang and
Seng, whose accounts of Andong and Prek Kamphleung differ to that of
Thun in Prek Pou, was drawn from the old people, despite the fact that
they had no formal teaching qualications. Educational materials were
also inadequate. While the DK Ministry of Education produced a number of school texts, their presence in village schools was obviously very
isolated. Both Bunheang and Seng assert that children had no pencils
or books and were required to make chalk from clay, while Bunheang
recalls students having to write on waste paper from used cement bags.
The conditions at the so-called schools were hardly conducive to effective learning. In addition to working in a buffalo stable, in a thatched
sala, or under trees, under the supervision of teachers with no credentials, the students were required to make their own primitive learn-
113
ing instruments. While the leaders of Angkar could claim that the students were self-reliant, the masters of their education, and not dependent on foreign models, materials, or textbooks, the cost to the Cambodian population, in terms of educational quality, was immeasurable.
The consistency of educational conditions throughout the country
indicates that a central educational policy was at work in DK. The
schools were almost always located within a similar structure, almost all
catered to children of approximately primary school age, almost all
adopted a study-work routine and used identical self-made materials
and, nally, almost all taught similar curricula: rudimentary literacy,
numeracy, revolutionary songs, and, through slogans, revolutionary
morality.72 Elements of the school structure and curricula can be found
in the Four-Year Plan. Specic curriculum documents, however, if they
existed, have not come to light. By examining the content of the curriculum, as it was practiced in schools, the relationship between the DK
education system and the state-making efforts of the leaders of Angkar
Padeawat becomes clear.
At Andong, the children were taught in four grades. They learned
to read and write, though painfully slowly, recalled Bunheang. Apart
from some elementary arithmetic, most of the time was taken up by
learning revolutionary songs, how to love Angkar, and in being indoctrinated into socialist morality. The children were told again and again
of the need to work hard, to protect the revolution by reporting on their
parents and relatives, of the glories of Kampuchean socialism, and the
danger posed by Vietnam. Phnom Penh radio, monitored overseas,
had broadcast a similar description of the curriculum in 1976. Children follow a cultural and literary program, the broadcaster announced. They learn to love the country, to hate the Americans and to
love the workers and peasants. Summing up, he referred to the children of the cooperatives as revolutionary artists. 73
The curricula comprised two central elements. The rst was literacy
and numeracy, which as the Four-Year Plan noted, were essential in order to learn technology. The second element, like the civic education
sponsored under Sihanouk and Lon Nol, was the development of Cambodian nationalism tied closely to Angkars revolutionary egalitarian ideology. DKs literacy and numeracy training was an overwhelming failure.
Although Pol Pot was to boast proudly that Angkar had eradicated illiteracy in Cambodia, the reality was far removed from the image he and
those sympathetic to his cause had attempted to portray. With no texts,
inadequate writing materials and school infrastructure, unqualied and
114
often illiterate teachers, and students who were all too often overworked
and malnourished, the result of education, in many cases, was negative
development by children.74
In those areas where school texts were available, the students were
exposed to a view of the world which reected the ideology of Angkar.
In a DK geography text, it was written that rice is the base crop and the
capital for building and defending the country. The semantics of the
text are similar to a geography text of the Sihanouk era, which also
stressed the importance of rice to Cambodia. The difference between
the two was in the choice of language, with the DK text stressing that rice
was essential for building and defending the country. Building Cambodia reected Angkars emphasis on self-reliance, while defending the
country reected the xenophobic nationalism at the heart of Cambodian distrust and hostility towards the Vietnamese.75 The phrase was to
become one of many used widely throughout Cambodia between 1975
and January 1979.
School texts were not widely used in spreading the DK world view.
Prerevolutionary Cambodian society had depended on the didactic
chbab poems for reinforcing social order and social regulations. In 1975,
with all people declared equal, the chbab (Khmer didactic poems) became obsolete. They were replaced by revolutionary songs imparting
the new social ideology and moral order. One such song referred to the
loving kindness of Angkar. 76 Personifying Angkar, the song portrayed
the organization as a father, overturning the traditional social order that
stressed the importance of the family. A second song, Children of the
New Kampuchea, again suggested the personication of Angkar as a
replacement for the family:
We, the children have the good fortune to live the rest of our
time in precious harmony under the affectionate care of the
Kampuchean revolution, immense, most clear and shining.
We, the children of the revolution make the supreme revolution
to strive to increase our ability to battle, and make the stand
of the revolution perfect.77
The song, typical of others taught to children in DK schools, reected

the keynotes of Angkars ideology, emphasizing battles and struggles
and deemphasizing the past and the primacy of family life. Far removed
from the conception of social hierarchy portrayed in Khmer chbab, the
songs embodied the egalitarian moral order imposed by Angkar. 78
115
19771978: Self-Annihilation and Appeasement

By mid-1977, the frenzied self-annihilation of Angkar was beginning to
reach its peak. Two events then dominated the nal eighteen months of
DK. The rst was the conict with Vietnam. It is ironic that DKs nemesis to the east, which it had shunned for so long, would bring about the
unrestrained self-destruction of the CPK by the Pol Pot faction. The second, a reaction to the conict with Vietnam, was a relative opening up
of Kampuchea to the world from which it had been closeted since April
1975. Both events were to affect education. The conict with Vietnam
and subsequent self-destruction of Angkar resulted in the closure of
most village schools that had not already been closed. Paradoxically,
when DK opened up to the world, a new rhetoric emerged within
Angkar, with several pronouncements regarding education.79 The pronouncements were nothing more than a half-hearted, poorly staged attempt by the leadership to convince the world that the regime was not
as brutal and repressive as it was being increasingly painted by refugees
eeing to both Vietnam and Thailand.
In September 1977, Pol Pot nally announced the existence of the
CPK, shortly before traveling to China. The trip, no doubt, was taken to
shore up Chinese support for the rapidly escalating conict with the
Vietnamese. In May 1976, Vietnamese and Cambodian ofcials had sat
down together to discuss the issue of the two countries shared border,
resolving very little.80 With the assumption of almost absolute power
within the CPK by the Pol Pot faction, the border situation deteriorated
rapidly. In January 1977, Cambodia sent troops to occupy tracts of disputed territory in Vietnamese-held areas. The result, by the middle of
1977, was the outbreak of open hostilities. The Vietnamese, not U.S.inspired imperialism, became Cambodias number one enemy.81
Vietnamese forays into Cambodia were greeted by the Center with a
massive purge of the Eastern Zone. The zones close proximity with Vietnam resulted in its cadres being labeled traitors, or people with Khmer
bodies but Vietnamese minds (khluon Khmae khou khbal Yuon). Some of
DKs schools, established in 1975 and 1976, had run for only a few
months, with the priorities of the local leadership concentrated elsewhere, such as building dams and dykes or growing rice. With the escalation of the Vietnamese conict, village schools elsewhere were closed.
Concentrating on ushing out its internal enemies and defending the
country against the external threat from Vietnam the regime could no
116
longer afford to devote precious resources to the cause of education.

The decision does not seem to have been a direction from the Center.
Instead, it was in all likelihood a pragmatic reaction by local leaders to
the Centers demands for unattainable rice harvests and human resources. Local leaders throughout the country, their own heads on the
block, perceived the need to put all hands on deck.
Pol Pots trip to China and North Korea signaled a partial opening up
of DK. A reason for his trip was to display the human face of DK and
to counter charges emerging in Thailand and the West of human rights
violations, terror and starvation in Cambodia. 82 On Pol Pots return to
Cambodia, foreign delegations were permitted to enter the country.
One was a television and news reporting team from the former Yugoslavia, who were able to meet with Yun Yat, the DK minister charged
with education and culture. Her description of the education system accords with that which had been functioning throughout the country in
the period prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Vietnam. Noting that
school teachers had only the diploma of a revolutionary, Yun Yat told
the team that school and work were combined. While the rhetoric of the
minister demonstrated a concern with the new education system, the reality was that very few functioning schools of any kind remained in DK.
The attempt by Angkar to display a human face included an effort
to make cosmetic improvements in peoples standards of living. 83 In
April, the party celebrated the third anniversary of the liberation of
Phnom Penh, while in September, the anniversary of the party was also
celebrated. On both occasions, for the rst time since April 1975,
people were excused from work. Education, a critical platform of social
policy, was suddenly embraced enthusiastically by the regime. At the
Fourth Party Congress in Phnom Penh, in September 1978, Pol Pot unveiled a plan for a revolutionary technical education system. He shared
the stage with Thiounn Mumm, the French-educated revolutionary
then in charge of technical education. Elizabeth Becker has argued that
Mumm put an intellectual gloss on the program, which she added,
was little more than establishing a basic trade school in the capital. 84
David Chandler referred to the school as a faculty of a technological
university. Fifteen intellectuals, whose status would previously have invited persecution and probable death, were brought into the city and selected to work under Mumm.85
As part of displaying a human face, a few schools appeared in a few
selected cooperatives. With their eyes on Vietnam, the regime could not
yet afford a serious attempt at mass education. Whether the sudden em-
117
brace of education was designed to impress foreigners or to ingratiate

the regime with the populace it had been terrorizing for over three years
shall never be known. In all probability, the opening of selected schools
throughout the country and the technical school in Phnom Penh, signaled an attempt by the regime to implement the educational program
outlined in its Four-Year Plan. Evidence has emerged that DKs leaders
became worried about having few suitably qualied engineers and technicians to implement their planned industrialization program. There is
also evidence of attempts to begin training primary school teachers,
with the mattresses already found for a residential training course to
take place in Phnom Penh! While the prospects for the success of the
these educational initiatives remain an unwritten chapter, a former
Khmer Rouge ofcial intimately associated with DKs educational plans
believes, in hindsight, they would have been a disaster. 86
On December 25, 1978, only three months after the Party Congress,
the Vietnamese launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia. They were
supported by the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea
(UFNS), defectors from the DK regime who had taken sanctuary along
and inside the Vietnamese border. By January 1, 1979, gunre could be
heard in Phnom Penh.87 On the afternoon of January 6, 1979, Norodom
Sihanouk, who had been retired as head of state in 1976 and was under
house arrest in the Royal Palace, took the last ight out of Phnom Penh.
As he did so, he agreed to Pol Pots request to put DKs case to the
United Nations. With almost two million Cambodians left in its wake,
DK nally collapsed on January 7, 1979.
Evaluating Education in DK
The DK regime was provided with a great opportunity to address the
crisis in Cambodian education. In many respects, the notions of selfreliance and self-mastery, which underpinned the rhetoric of Angkar
Padeawats leaders and the state ideology of DK, were compatible with
the changes necessary in order to address the symptoms of the crisis that
had characterized the 1960s and 1970s. Self-reliance, for instance, represented a justication for eliminating the education systems blinded
replication of the French school education system. Evaluating and assessing the regimes failure to capitalize on the opportunity provided to
it not only necessitates criticism of the policies pursued and the practices that ensued in education during the turbulent years of DK but condemnation of the extremity and savagery of the leaders of a regime,
118
whose pursuit of a social and political ideal debased, devalued, and

eventually disregarded those people who were supposedly to benet
from its commitment to equality. Essentially, the failure to reorient and
reform the education system was, as this chapter has made clear, a function of the regimes attempt to achieve its own Great Leap Forward,
swiftly and brutally reconstructing the Cambodian nation-state.
The rst phase of DKs educational agenda was to dismantle and
eliminate the French-imbued education system of the old society. It was
a task achieved rapidly and effectively. The second phase of the agenda
was concerned with the reconstruction of the nation-state, aiming to ingrain in students a desire and capacity to build and defend the country.
It is the regimes failure to realize this aim that accounts for the nature
and the severity of the educational crisis in Cambodia between 1975 and
1978. The failure can be attributed to three factors. First, in the shortterm, the highest echelon of Angkar effectively desired and pursued a
failure in education. Second, educational quality was so decient that it
undermined the process of learning. Finally, the ideology of Pol Pots
CPK Center, which would eventually become the state ideology of DK,
was incompatible with the cultural fabric of Cambodian society. It was
not only illegitimate in the eyes of the Cambodian peasants in the countryside but in the eyes of many who were supportive of the revolutionary cause.
The educational agenda of DKs leaders was entirely hostile to the development of education. The initial underlying objective of the DK economic and social agenda was to pursue self-reliance at the cost of social
development. The regime intended to build a solid agricultural base
and to eliminate Cambodias reliance and dependence on foreign capital. The education system, a siphon for substantial government revenues and foreign aid since being rapidly expanded in the aftermath of
independence, became a victim of the self-reliance agenda. Forced to
develop with resources that could be locally manufactured and with
teachers whose only qualication was the diploma of a revolutionary,
the system was doomed to abject failure. How serious the regime was
about developing the education system after securing an agricultural
base shall never be known, as DK collapsed before later phases of the
economic and social development agenda were implemented.
The quality of education received by children in DK was mediocre in
every respect. Teachers, almost exclusively old people from rural areas, were either poorly trained or not trained at all. Students, meanwhile, were forced to learn in makeshift shelters, in stables, or under
119
trees. School buildings, condemned as vestiges of the old society, were

abandoned and left to decay or were used as ammunitions factories, silos, or prisons. Where they were fortunate enough to be able to attend
school, children had to contend with a lack of the most basic educational materials, often in an environment characterized by dislocation
from their families, severe overwork, and chronic undernourishment.
That these conditions prevailed throughout the country is directly attributable to the Utopian ideals that underpinned the policies pursued
by the individuals that constituted Angkar.
A nal issue in accounting for the failure of education in Cambodia
was that the educational policies pursued by the DK regime were a direct manifestation of an ideology that enjoyed no political or social legitimacy in Cambodia. The CPK assumed state power on account of the
anger generated throughout the countryside by U.S. bombardment, the
military support provided by the army of North Vietnam, and the coattails of Norodom Sihanouks popularity among the peasantry. It drew
support from among the countrys small, urban-based intellectual population, who were impressed with its ideals of social equality. At no stage
was there a widespread revelation to the population to the effect that the
CPK did not support the deposed Prince Sihanouk or the institution of
the monarchy. Intellectuals, meanwhile, were never given notice of the
extent of the Communists revolutionary social agenda or that they too
would eventually become its victims.
The lack of legitimacy also extended within the CPK itself. Pol Pots
Center, from the moment its members began to maneuver into positions of power in the late 1950s, never enjoyed total support within the
movement. As time passed, and its enemies accrued, the Center sought
to eliminate those whose views were divergent with its own. In splintering Cambodias revolutionary movement between those sharing their
views of an extreme racist nationalism and those supporting fraternity
within the international socialist movement, and especially with the
Vietnamese, the Pol Pot group created the framework for the postDK era. With the DK regime defeated in January 1979, the Vietnamese
installed in power in Cambodia a regime whose leadership was tied
rmly to those factions of the CPK that had opposed or been powerless
to halt the ascendancy of Pol Pot. The Peoples Republic of Kampuchea
was born.
The PRK
and the
SOC
The State
in
Transition
In 1973, the commander of the Khmer Rouges 126th Regiment, based

in the Eastern Zone, advanced across the Mekong river in pursuit of Lon
Nols Republican army. His troops attempted to climb Phnom (Mount)
Chisor, in Takeo province, in search of a traditional malarial cure,
whereupon twelve of them were arrested, taken away, and killed. They
were not arrested by Republican soldiers nor by the Republics South
Vietnamese allies who frequented the East. The commanders troops
were arrested by their fellow Communists, troops of the Southwest, under the notorious command of the Center-aligned Mok.1
More than ve years later, with Cambodia having been controlled by
the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime for over three years, the same
commander again crossed the Mekong with his troops. On this occasion, as the appointed leader of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea (UFNS), and backed by the military might of the
Vietnamese army, his advance was not thwarted by Mok, nor by the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) Center, with whom he was aligned.
Pol Pot (Saloth Sar), and the entourage of leaders collectively known as
Angkar, quickly ed in the face of imminent defeat. Phnom Penh, practically deserted for almost four years, was captured. The Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), under the leadership of Heng Samrin, the
former commander of the 126th Regiment, was formed.2
The story of the fate of the PRK and its successor, the State of Cambodia (SOC), is one of geopolitics. With the support of the Vietnamese,
the leaders of the PRK sought to reconstruct the devastated nation-state
120
The State in Transition
121
of Kampuchea, as the country was then known. Vietnamese patronage

and occupation brought with it international condemnation. As a result,
an international development assistance embargo was imposed on Vietnam and Cambodia, supported by the United States, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Chinese and approved by
the United Nations. The denial of Western assistance to Cambodia as it
attempted to recover from the traumas of the Pol Pot time emerges as
a dominant theme of the period.
The absence of the West and the socialist orientation of the PRK,
bringing with it the support of the international socialist bloc led by
the pro-Vietnamese, anti-Chinese Soviet Union (USSR), represents a
second dominant theme. In 1989, the European Communist bloc began
to collapse and, with it, the substantial foreign assistance enjoyed by
both Vietnam and Kampuchea. The Vietnamese, unable and unwilling
to continue to support the Kampuchean economy, honored a longstanding commitment to fully withdraw from the country. In order to
prevent economic collapse and to promote development, the Vietnamese adopted an economic liberalization program, doi moi, similar to
Mikhail Gorbachevs perastroika in the USSR. Kampuchea soon followed
suit, with a new constitution, new economic ideals, and a new name, the
State of Cambodia. The gradual embrace of a market-driven economy
in Cambodia at the expense of socialism is a third theme of the period.
These themes are reected in education. What was the DK legacy in
education? How did the inuence of Vietnamese occupation and patronage impact on education and development in Cambodia? What was
the effect of the international embargo on the rehabilitation of the
Cambodian education system? How did Cambodias place on the Cold
War chess board impact on this rehabilitation? In what ways did the sociopolitical circumstances that emerged in Cambodia as a result of the
DK legacy, Vietnamese patronage, and Western isolation contribute to
an educational crisis in the country during the period? Responding to
these questions is the fundamental concern of this chapter.
The PRK: Fraternity with the Vietnamese

The PRK was spawned from the same seed as Pol Pots DK. Both regimes
trace their roots to the evolution of revolutionary politics in Cambodia,
to the struggle for Cambodian independence in the aftermath of World
War II, and to notions of egalitarianism that emerged in contrast to
Cambodias established hierarchical political culture. The difference
122
The PRK and the SOC
between the two regimes can be examined by unraveling the nature of

their relations with the Vietnamese and examining their commitment to
revolutionary self-reliance. In order to understand the nature of Heng
Samrins PRK, an understanding of these roots and the divergent paths
of Cambodias two post-independence Communist regimes, is essential.
An examination of the controversy surrounding the founding date of
Cambodias revolutionary movement represents a key to understanding
these divergent paths. While the CPK was an underground movement
throughout the 1960s and remained so until Pol Pots announcement of
its existence in 1977, the question of the founding date was a source of
considerable internal consternation. It was almost certainly a precipitating factor in the execution of one of the partys founding veterans, Keo
Meas, in 1976. In essence, there are two accounts of the founding date
of the party: one maintains that the party was born in 1951, while the
second argues that the party was not founded until 1960.3
The 1951 founding date was that adopted by Keo Meas, who had been
a revolutionary since before independence. Meas maintained that Cambodias revolutionary party was launched in 1951, when the division of
the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) into three separate organizations saw the formation of the Khmer Peoples Revolutionary Party
(KPRP). When the Geneva conference of 1954 failed to grant a regroupment zone to Cambodias revolutionary movement, Meas was one
of the few revolutionaries who elected to remain in Cambodia rather
than travel to Hanoi. Through the KPRPs legitimate political branch,
the Citizens Group (Krom Pracheachon), he participated without success in the 1955 elections. A combination of factors saw the fortunes of
the KPRP wane throughout the 1950s. First, they were successfully
hunted, intimidated, and often assassinated by Sihanouks police. Second, the loss of many leading cadres to Vietnam saw the depletion of the
partys membership and its most experienced political activists. Finally,
the defection to the government in 1959 of Sieu Heng, the KPRP Central
Committee member responsible for rural Cambodia, heightened both
the effects of Sihanouks police hunt and the loss of cadres to Vietnam.
By 1960, in order to survive, the party needed a change of direction.
The change was provided when twenty-one KPRP delegates met in secret at Phnom Penh railway station on September 28 30, 1960. As a
result of this congress the KPRP changed its name to the Workers Party
of Kampuchea (WPK). The WPK used the meeting to elect a Central
Committee, with Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary assuming politburo positions
alongside KPRP veterans Keo Meas and Nuon Chea. As we saw in Chap-
123
ter 4, in the years that followed, especially after Tou Samouths disappearance in 1962, Saloth Sar and fellow revolutionary returnees from
France assumed increasing control of the movement.
It was the Pol Pot faction of the Communist party (renamed the CPK
in 1966) that promoted the 1960 founding date. A party spokesman, arguably Pol Pot, explaining the shift in a special issue of the partys ofcial
journal, Tung Padeawat (Revolutionary Flags), referred to the 1960 date
as a new numeration. It was necessary, the spokesman explained, because we must arrange the history of the party into something clean and
perfect, in line with our policies of independence and self-mastery. 4
The timing of the explanation corresponded with the assumption of
almost complete control of the revolutionary movement by Pol Pots
party Center. It also corresponded with the beginning of a marked deterioration in Vietnamese-Cambodian relations. Changing the founding date of the CPK was conceived with the Centers radical agenda as its
motivation. The Pol Pot groups conception of a clean and perfect revolutionary history involved removing references to the partys fraternity
with the Vietnamese and the wider socialist bloc. This was a fraternity
that had been openly acknowledged throughout the KPRP years.
The controversy over the CPKs founding date provides conrmation
that the legitimacy of Pol Pots DK, especially after 1976, was not universally recognized within Cambodian revolutionary circles. The regime
lacked legitimacy in the eyes of a number of groups. The rst group
comprised those Cambodian revolutionaries who had elected to remain
in Hanoi throughout the 1970 1975 period. While a number returned
to Cambodia during the civil war, where they were often killed by the
Center, many others remained in the North Vietnamese capital, from
where they continued their revolutionary alliance with Vietnam. A second group comprised those Cambodian revolutionaries in Cambodia
who had split with the Pol Pot group before the revolutionary victory in
April 1975. Most notable among this group was Sae Phouthong, a veteran revolutionary from Koh Kong, whose small force continued to
ght Pol Pots Center between 1975 and 1978.5 The nal group comprised those DK cadres, especially from the Eastern Zone (bordering
Vietnam), who ed Cambodia for Vietnam between 1975 and 1978. Included among this group were Heng Samrin, Chea Sim, and Hun Sen,
all prominent PRK, and later SOC, personalities.
It is from this body of revolutionaries that the UFNS was formed. The
background of the group accounts for the nature of the state ideology it
attempted to promulgate upon its sudden seizure of power in Phnom
124
The PRK and the SOC
Penh in January 1979. The ideology bore a number of central themes.

The rst was an attempt to paint the DK period as an apparition,
where the revolutionary momentum in Cambodia had been usurped by
what the new rulers universally referred to as the regime of the Pol PotIeng Sary clique, who were clients of the expansionist Chinese. The
second theme, stemming from the rst, was that the PRK was the only
true socialist regime in Cambodia. Associated with this was the promotion of the PRKs position within the international socialist community.6
A nal theme evident in the ideological orientation of the new regime was a pragmatic acceptance of the damage done to the peoples
attitude toward socialism by the Pol Pot regime. In this regard, the UFNS
attempted to portray itself as a regime that would be far more palatable
to the Cambodian people than was its predecessor. On January 1, 1979,
six days before it was installed in power, the UFNS annulled the categorization of Cambodians into new people and old people, promised
that Cambodians would have sufcient food, ensured freedom of movement and religion, and, importantly, undertook to eradicate illiteracy
and to rebuild primary schools.7
The ideological orientation of the regime, as with the apparatuses of
the state through which the ideology would be promoted, was stitched
together very quickly. The UFNS congress at Memut, in Kompong
Cham province, to re-launch the authentic Communist party was interrupted on its third day by the capture of Phnom Penh. No one, it
seems, least of all the Vietnamese, expected the Pol Pot regime to capitulate so quickly and so easily.8
The very swift emplacement in power of the successor to the DK regime, at least initially, had two signicant effects. The rst was that the
UFNS was heavily reliant on its Vietnamese allies. Prior to its victory, the
new regime had announced a number of important policies, including
foreign policy, clearly indicating that signicant Vietnamese support,
advice, and resources were being employed in the salvation effort. Kampuchean fraternity with the Vietnamese and with the Soviet-led international socialist bloc, was swiftly reinforced after the UFNS victory
with treaties of friendship and understanding signed between Vietnam
and Kampuchea. This fraternity was to include educational cooperation, as the Treaty of Friendship signed between the two socialist neighbors in March 1979 reected.9 The second effect of the swift emplacement of the new regime was the reliance of the leadership on many
people from nonrevolutionary backgrounds. One observer commented
125
that the cadre force of the new regime was then still less than skeletal,
while another noted its embarrassingly low quality. 10
To describe the task ahead of the new regime as daunting was an understatement. Eva Mysliweic, a long-time resident of Cambodia during
the PRK period, described the state of the nation in 1979. She noted
that the country had no currency, no markets, no nancial institutions
and virtually no industry. In addition, there was no system of public
transport, no postal system, no telephones, very little electricity, and
virtually no clean water, sanitation, or education.11 Apart from these
pervasive deciencies, other factors also heightened the difculty of the
reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. First, thousands of people, dislocated from their homes and separated from their families by the Pol
Pot regime, were moving erratically around the countryside. Second, especially in the northwest of the country, ghting continued with the
scattered remnants of DK. The ghting would continue on a considerable scale until at least July 1979. Third, there was the fear of an impending famine in Cambodia. In the initial months after the new regime assumed power, there were few fears of a massive food shortage, as
people were still able to harvest the 1978/1979 rice crop. However, with
many people continuing their migrations across the country throughout 1979, and with many of the nations draft animals dead, an inadequate rice crop was planted for the 1979/1980 harvest.12
A fourth factor was the number of people electing to ee to the ThaiCambodian border. Taking advantage of the freedom of movement being offered by the new regime, many people ed in fear of the possibility of a famine. Others ed hoping to establish contact with relatives
living abroad, while a third group ed to engage in the illicit, yet comparatively lucrative, cross-border trade. While only 5,000 Cambodians
had taken refuge in Thailand in the three months following the overthrow of Pol Pot, approximately 300,000 ed in the last three months
of 1979.13
The nal factor exacerbating the difculty in reestablishing a sense
of normalcy to Cambodian life was the question of international assistance. Commentators remain unresolved in their dispute over who
should accept the greatest proportion of blame for the very conspicuous
delay in the provision of humanitarian assistance to Cambodia following
the defeat of DK. Regardless of whether the delay was the result of a tactical ploy by the Vietnamese, the ineptitude of the international relief
agencies, or the conditions for aid imposed by the new regime in Phnom
126
The PRK and the SOC
Penh, it can be attributed to consternation over the question of whether

the Vietnamese had liberated or invaded Cambodia. The initial delay in
the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the PRK, and the aid embargo
that was to follow it, both impacted on the PRK regimes capacity to rehabilitate Cambodia and the devastated Cambodian people.14
1979 1980: Rebuilding an Education System

In announcing and celebrating the beginning of the 1979/1980 school
year on September 24, 1979, PRK President Heng Samrin focused his attention on the horrors and destruction of the DK period. Having
passed four years of the barbaric genocidal regime of the Pol Pot-Ieng
Sary clique, Heng commented, our infrastructure in the domain of
education and of teaching is completely shattered. The nations professors, teaching personnel, and students, the president pointed out,
had been tortured, massacred horribly. Heng Samrins address highlighted the critical issue facing the new regime as it attempted to rehabilitate the education system that was the legacy of Pol Pot and the
Khmer Rouge.15 This legacy of destruction, turmoil, and trauma was but
one of two central educational themes of the regimes rise from the
ashes of the educational crisis imposed by the Khmer Rouge. The second was the pervasive inuence of the Vietnamese, and particularly the
so-called Vietnamese experts, in the reconstruction effort.
The legacy of DK was immeasurable. On one count, the human cost
was severe. DK policies targeted those with a higher education, particularly teachers, those who could read, sometimes those who wore glasses,
or even those whose hands were soft and were therefore unaccustomed
to physical labor. It was claimed by the PRK regime in 1984 that 75 percent of teachers, 96 percent of higher education students, and 67 percent of primary and secondary school-aged pupils were murdered by
the Khmer Rouge.16 In terms of the direct legacy of DK, the gures are
somewhat exaggerated. They do reect, however, the cumulative human cost to education of DK, the civil war that preceded the Khmer
Rouge holocaust, and the number of former educators and students
who later ed to Thailand. This latter gure, one analyst has suggested,
may have been in the thousands.17
While the human resources of the education system were severely
depleted in 1979, so too was educational infrastructure. It is completely
false, as some have suggested, that the Khmer Rouge destroyed all
127
schools. While it has been politically expedient for extreme antiCommunists, education ofcials of the PRK, and those, especially foreign advisers, with little background in Cambodian history to make such
claims, they are simply not true.18 Henri Locard, a teacher of higher education in Cambodia before the Khmer Rouge period and again in
more recent years, correctly argues that the Khmer Rouge destroyed
none of [the] educational buildings. Instead, Locard accurately points
out, the DK regime were using former educational buildings for other
purposes, such as for prisons and stables or as an ammunitions factory,
as was the case with the Royal University of Agriculture.19 Asserting that
the Khmer Rouge did not destroy all schools is not to say that the PRK
did not confront incredible destruction in 1979. Educational infrastructure had been widely destroyed during the ve years of civil war
that preceded the 1975 revolution. Those buildings that survived the
civil war were then put to other uses or were often completely abandoned during the DK period, leaving them in a state of neglect and
sometimes chronic disrepair by 1979.
In the same way that the DK regime did not willfully destroy all educational infrastructure, it is also the case that it did not systematically
destroy educational materials, especially books. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), created by the UN to oversee Cambodias
1993 elections, mistakenly assessed, for example, that all educational
books, equipment and facilities had been destroyed. Henri Locard
again presents a more accurate account, arguing not many books in
Khmer Rouge days disappeared either: they were just abandoned to rot
where they happened to be. These were troubled times, however, and
there was destruction. Refugees of the 1970 1975 civil war, forced to ee
the countryside for the city, used school books when they could not nd
wood to start a re. Many often illiterate soldiers of the Khmer Rouge
army rolled their cigarettes with the paper they had ripped from textbooks they could not read. The youngest daughter of a wealthy Phnom
Penh family, considering herself lucky to have survived the Pol Pot time,
recalled her horror, shame, and disgust at having to use her brothers
hidden economics books when going to the toilet. A former educational
ofcial of the PRK admitted that in 1979 he pilfered all the paper he
could nd so his wife could wrap the produce she was selling at the market. On a more considerable scale, it is alleged that surviving print media
from the 1960s was taken from the National Library in 1979 and pulped
to supply the new regime with a sorely needed supply of paper.20
128
The PRK and the SOC
Whether the depletion of Cambodias educational human resources

and its infrastructure were products of the civil war, Khmer Rouge neglect and destruction, or the ensuing chaos in 1979, the new regime was
faced with a profound legacy of social upheaval as it attempted to rehabilitate the education system. In this respect, in Cambodia in 1979, there
was a severe crisis in education. There was no educational administration in place, no curricula, no adequate learning materials, and few
qualied teaching personnel. As shall be seen, it was a crisis heightened
by the PRK regimes efforts to swiftly legitimize its authority and the new
socialist state in which it was based.
As Chan Ven took his place at a desk in a dimly lit room in a run-down
building in Phnom Penh in 1979, the enormity of the task before him
must have weighed heavily on his mind. The new minister of education
was not a revolutionary. Nor was he an administrator. In fact, Vens only
previous educational involvement had been as a high school physics
teacher. With the human and physical destruction wrought by the previous decade as a backdrop, the former teacher was charged with collaborating with a team of Vietnamese advisers to plan the rehabilitation
of the Cambodian education system. Ven and his few equally unqualied Cambodian colleagues were largely without ideas and without
a sense of direction.21 Their only aims were to place as many students in
schools as quickly as possible and, in so doing, build Kampuchea into a
nation of new Socialist workmen. 22 Responses to questions of educational quality and access, including the concern over the recruitment
and training of teachers, whom would attend school, and of what would
be taught, were clearly beyond the capacity of the new Cambodian Ministry of Education.
Into the vacuum of expertise stepped Cambodias Vietnamese liberators with an army of technical and political advisers. There is little consensus on how many advisers the Vietnamese sent to Cambodia after the
so-called liberation. Estimates vary considerably, from as few as 2,000 to
as many as 12,000.23 Whatever the number, which was unquestionably
much higher in the period immediately after the liberation, there is no
doubt that the inuence and control of the Vietnamese over the PRK,
especially before the mid-1980s, was pervasive.24 It was not, however, the
basis for the planned ethnocide suggested by one Western commentator.25 Instead, it can be thought of as an orchestrated Vietnamese project concerned not only with Vietnamese political and economic goals
but with providing humanitarian assistance to a neighbor.
129
1979: Drawing the Chaos Together

Suon Serey, a student at the Lyce Sisowath before 1975, had spent the
DK period in a village in Kandal province. Within a month of the Vietnamese liberation of her village in 1979, Serey had established a
school and was teaching a class of young children. There were eighty
students, she recalled, in a classroom that was an old disused building.
I had no pedagogical training and I had no teaching materials. I just
taught the students Khmer from my memory. The children, Serey
added, used clay as a pen and wrote on boards. 26
Serey was not alone. In May 1979, a Vietnamese observer in Phnom
Penh witnessed a primary school established in a former DK administrative building. The children were sitting seven to eight to a desk, with
only one book and a stub of pencil, practicing reading out loud in chorus. Kim Din, the secretary of the management committee of Kompong
Cham province, also noted that a number of schools run by the people
have been opened with alphabet [literacy] classes and some elementary
classes. The classes, Din observed, do not follow a systematic program.
The teaching staff . . . have some degree of instruction but no teaching
experience. 27
The rst schools to function in Cambodia after DK were neither organized nor sanctioned by the PRK administration. Instead, they sprang
from the initiatives of dedicated individuals like Serey. By April 1979, the
PRKs leaders had turned their attention toward the recommencement
of an ofcially sanctioned school year. It was a task they approached with
great haste and without due consideration of the obstacles they faced.
The structure and orientation of the education system implemented in
Cambodia during the PRK (and SOC) period reected this haste.
The task of reestablishing a national education system aligned with
the promises and assurances made by the regime in the UFNS platform.
It was begun with signicant Vietnamese support at both the provincial
and national levels.28 Throughout April and May 1979, the few functional Khmer education ofcials, in tandem with their respective Vietnamese advisers, began a concerted campaign to set up a national body
of ofcials and teachers.29 The Vietnamese managed the effort, recalled
one former ofcial, because we did not know where we should start. We
were lost. The ofcials originally focused on recruiting former teachers
and ofcials who had survived the DK period. Later, they turned to the
wider community in order to recruit enough teachers to ll the nations
130
The PRK and the SOC
classrooms. Teachers were virtually picked up from city streets and village pathways. 30 An ofcial proclamation circulated throughout the
country on July 30, 1979, announced the new educational program of
the PRK.31 It had been developed in less than two months.
The system inaugurated by Heng Samrin in September 1979 was a
function of the haste with which it was created: a combination of diametrically opposed revolutionary Vietnamese and French educational
ideals and ill-conceived contingencies in the face of signicant obstacles. The new educational structures put in place by the administration were a hybrid, reecting both Vietnamese educational practices
and the French-oriented prewar background of many of those Cambodians entrusted with the systems rehabilitation.
Vietnamese advisers imposed on a Cambodian ministry lacking both
ideas and expertise a system of education that bore a striking resemblance to that functioning in Vietnam. The primary school course,
which had been divided into two three-year cycles prior to 1975, was
condensed into four grades. Secondary school involved a further six
years of study, broken into two three-year cycles. The ten-year structure,
and the ascending numbering system adopted to denote school grades,
were identical to those of Vietnam. A second feature of the system,
which was the same as that of Vietnams, was its decentralized management. Provincial education committees, rather than the powerful central ministry of prerevolutionary times, were vested with a high degree
of responsibility for decision-making.32
The changes were not de-Khmerization. Nor were they ethnocide. 33 Rather, they were a removal of French inuence from the structure of the Cambodian education system. In respect of both structure
and management, they were also changes that accorded with the prevailing post-DK conditions in Cambodia. The country was without the
infrastructure, facilities, and personnel necessary to reintroduce a thirteen-year system of education. Similarly, a decentralized management
structure was entirely appropriate for a country in which there was not
the staff to manage a powerful central ministry and in which the national system of communications lay in ruins.
While the structure and management mechanisms of the system were
almost entirely Vietnamese, the school curriculum was more complex.
On one side, it reected Vietnamese socialist and revolutionary educational ideals. On the other, it was a product of the memories of prerevolutionary teachers. The socialist goals were expressly stated in the
regimes ofcial decrees and in its English and French language propa-
131
ganda. The Decree on the Establishment of the Cabinet of the Minister of Education stated, for example, that the Ministry of Education was
an organization to protect and build the Peoples Republic of Cambodia [sic] into a socialist country. 34 A later report, published after the
transition to the SOC, noted that a new and progressive education system had been created that would serve to defend and rmly build the
country on the way to socialism. 35
The socialist inuence in the development of the educational curricula was most clearly manifested in the history syllabus, in the emphasis on practicality, and in the introduction of political morality as a
subject for study. The remaining curriculum areas, in both primary and
secondary education, reected the subject matter of the prerevolutionary education system. The similarities, in terms of the structure of the
primary education syllabi, are illustrated in Table 1. Moral education
had replaced the ethics and civics education of the Sihanouk era, bringing with it a socialist conception of what constituted a good citizen.
Study of the French language had been eliminated, while a renewed
emphasis had been placed on the practical and physical activities that
reformers of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol periods had called for but
had never been able to achieve. Despite the changes, the curriculum
Table 1. Primary Education Syllabus by Subject,
Pre-1970 and Post-1979.
Pre-1970 Primary Education
Post-1979 Primary Education
Ethics
Civics
Khmer Language
French Language
Arithmetic
History
Geography
Science and Hygiene
Manual Work
Moral Education
Khmer Language
Arithmetic
History
Geography
Manual Work
Practical Knowledge
Drawing
Arts/Dancing/Singing
Physical Education
Source: C. Bilodeau 1954, p. 54; and H. Rieff 1980, Annex XI.
132
The PRK and the SOC
remained a classical academic one. In respect of both the time devoted

to them and the traditional esteem with which they were held, humanities subjects continued to be emphasized by teachers, whose capacity to
implement a detailed curriculum was, at best, negligible. Success, as had
been the case in the past, was measured by passing academic examinations and paid scant regard to the students capacity to demonstrate
prociency in the practical skills they had allegedly acquired.
Dimensions of the Crisis

By the end of 1979, UNICEF and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) had successfully negotiated an agreement with the
Phnom Penh regime for the provision of humanitarian assistance.36 A
UNICEF consultant was sent to the country in February 1980, providing
the rst illuminating insight into the educational crisis that had developed in Cambodia in the DK period. The crisis assumed three critical
dimensions. The rst was a crisis of quality, where deciencies in human
resources and physical infrastructure continued to debilitate educational provision. The second was a crisis of orientation, with an obvious
conict and contradiction between the goals and structure of the system
on the one hand and its continued reection of a French educational
curriculum on the other. The nal dimension was a crisis of timing. In
its attempt to legitimize its authority and legitimize socialism, the new
regime, with the support and encouragement of its Vietnamese advisers,
had attempted to do too much too quickly.
The crisis of quality was staggering. In the rst instance, there was
a chronic shortage of qualied educational personnel. While the ministry was without adequately trained or experienced cadres, the shortage of qualied staff was even more pronounced in the nations schools.
A former students recollection that there were many students in every
class is certainly corroborated by statistical evidence.37 By November
1979, when 716,553 students had ofcially enrolled in primary schools
throughout Cambodia, the nation had only 13,619 teachers, at a ratio
of 1 teacher for every 53 students. Only 4,000 of the teachers had formal qualications.38 In addition to their lack of qualications, teachers
had other concerns. I was not a good teacher at that time, said Mon
Pon. Every day I would think about my parents who had died, and
think about my wife, who I could not nd. Troubled by the effects of
the previous four years, with concerns about the whereabouts of family
members, poor physical health, psychological trauma, and poor memory and concentration, the teaching corps was certainly ineffective.39
133
Problems with staff were heightened by problems of infrastructure

and materials. Systematic national data relating to the state of Cambodias educational infrastructure in 1979 was never compiled. Anecdotal
evidence, however, clearly demonstrates the extent of the dilapidation
and decay. At a school in Phnom Penh, for example, UNICEFs consultant observed that a grade one class takes place under a tree but needs
to be closed as soon as the rainy season starts. A school in Svay Teap district of Svay Rieng province was an ex-hospital and surrounded by
mines and graveyards of soldiers [where] children sit on [the] oor
[and there are] no windows! At a school in Prey Veng province, there
was a lack of textbooks . . . and insufcient furniture. In each class,
there were only eight pens per fty students. At a Teacher Training Center in Phnom Penh, the capacity of the school was affected by a lack of
chairs and tables, while at the Teacher Training Center in Prey Veng
there was no furniture. The lack of materials was coupled with a shortage of school texts.40 A Center for Program Writing and Textbooks,
staffed by seventy-seven Cambodians and several Vietnamese advisers,
was one of the rst units to be functioning within the ministry. By February 1980, the center had produced thirty-nine texts for use in primary
school, several for secondary school, and a single text for use in adult literacy education courses. Owing to a lack of materials and problems with
distribution, however, few of the texts had been printed or distributed
to the provinces.41
A nal dimension of the crisis of quality was the learning capacity of
the nations students. Many were suffering from either malnutrition or
diseases, especially malaria, that they had contracted during the previous years. Others continued to move about the country looking for missing relatives they had lost under the Khmer Rouge. Coupled with these
concerns, many students lacked basic shelter and clothing. UNICEFs
consultant observed, for example, that some children at a school in Svay
Rieng were attending school completely naked. 42
The crisis of orientation stemmed from the conict between the systems goals and structure on the one hand and its European-oriented
academic curriculum on the other. The regimes primary goal for the
education system was to create a socialist society in Cambodia. Ensconced within the broad goal of creating a socialist political economy
through education were more acute considerations of Khmerization,
ruralization, and cultural identity, all of which were expressly stated
by the Ministry of Education.43
The leaders of the PRK, in concert with their Vietnamese advisers,
134
The PRK and the SOC
rmly believed that the education system would serve to build or construct and also legitimize the post-DK socialist state in Cambodia. Quite
simply, the educational curriculum did not reect the goals underlying
this belief. UNICEFs consultant observed in 1980 that with the exception of manual work and practical activities, the curriculum was rather
classical in nature. He also noted the problem of reecting educational
policies such as Khmerization, ruralization, and cultural identity within
appropriate educational structures, content and media. This problem,
commented the consultant, was gradually being considered by educational authorities. 44
If only he were correct. Questions of educational structures, content,
and media had already been hastily considered and resolved by the administration. A former ofcial, intimately connected with the early reconstruction of the system, remembered that the process began with two
tasks. First, we needed to recruit people from everywhere and second,
we needed a structure. The Vietnamese experts provided the structure.
Cambodian ofcials did the curriculum, he remembered, but only
with the approval of the Vietnamese experts. 45
The only resource available to the Cambodians charged with curriculum development was their prerevolutionary educational experiences. The process was not as simple as the ministerial ofcial described.
A former ofcial at the program writing and textbook center remembered much turmoil in the center after its inception. The center was
the largest department in the ministry, he recalled, with many ofcers
[who] worked for the Lon Nol government and were from the Sangkum
period. There were few revolutionaries at the center, he said. As such,
many people did not agree with the new history. Others did not like
Marxism or Lenin. There was much disagreement, with several ofcers
leaving and eeing to Thailand.46
The conict over ideals was eventually won by neither the revolutionary nor the prerevolutionary faction of the center. Led by the Vietnamese, who one former textbook author remembered as the big
bosses of the center, the revolutionary history syllabus, revolutionary
morality syllabus, and the emphasis on practical activities, were all
quickly ratied as policy.47 In all other curriculum areas, and in the pedagogical methods adopted, it was prerevolutionary educational ideas
that prevailed.
While the ministry, with difculty, could manage the goals of Khmerization and promoting Khmer cultural identity, both ruralization and
the creation of the new socialist man represented a problem. A former
135
ministerial ofcial vividly recalled: when we saw the word ruralization

in the policy, we just put one hand over our eyes and read the next
word. Ofcials were aware of the policy, he remembers, but didnt
know how to implement it. Creating the new socialist man was the
same. Many people did not understand it and many people did not
trust it. 48
In addition to the problems of quality, the crisis was a product of the
regimes failure to consider a more relevant, rurally oriented school curriculum. To be fair, the country was without resources and was being ignored by the international community, which may have been able to
provide alternative ideas. As such, the educational leaders of the PRK
had few choices but to draw on their past experiences in reconstructing
the education system. It was, however, their embrace of substantial elements of the classical former French-oriented education system that
was to prove the greatest impediment to improving the relevance and
the quality of education. Two issues are particularly signicant. First, the
French model as it had existed under Prince Sihanouk and then Lon
Nol carried with it in the eyes of the people considerable baggage. Primarily, it was encumbered by a perception that graduates of the education system would be able to assume posts in the civil service. Employment in rural production, in the eyes of those who were educated, was
inevitably devalued. Second, the French-imbued system would prove to
be a difcult model through which the government could build socialism by their stated aim of linking study to practice, school to productive labor, school to society. 49
The crisis of timing resulted from the new regimes steadfast and
speedy attempts to legitimize its authority. Cambodia in 1979 and 1980
was a tormented and traumatized country, without adequate food, with
infrastructure in ruins, with the family unit signicantly undermined,
and with a government that was continuing its struggle to wrest control
of outlying areas still under virtual Khmer Rouge control. Despite the
torment and the trauma, the rehabilitation of the national education
system was pursued by the new regime with unbridled vigor and unbridled Vietnamese encouragement and support. The vexing question
then becomes why was educational rehabilitation pursued with such
vigor, given that other social policy sectors, including the national
health system, were in a state equally as dire as education?
Essentially, education was seen as the primary tool for state-building
and establishing legitimacy. The rehabilitation of education, while it
had humanitarian motives, was a massive exercise in hegemony, an
136
The PRK and the SOC
attempt to rapidly diffuse among the masses the regimes socialist worldview. With the damage done to the socialist cause by the DK period, it
was a task of paramount importance if the regime was to be perceived as
legitimate in the eyes of the people.
1981 1985: Internal Legitimacy, External Rejection

In September 1979, the Heng Samrin regime was denied the Cambodian seat at the UN. Instead, the right to represent the Cambodian
people was granted to the government of DK, despite universal horror
at the tragedy it had inicted over the previous four years. The decision
was not born out of a desire to represent the needs of the country.
Rather, it was the result of several regional and international geopolitical imperatives. The ASEAN states had wanted to punish the Vietnamese for their December 1978 invasion; China was hoping to bleed
Vietnamese resources by promoting a continuation of the Cambodian
conict; the United States was concerned about an increasing Soviet
presence in Southeast Asia; while Vietnam was reluctant to negotiate
while ever they considered the Chinese were attempting to secure
greater inuence in the region.
On the Cambodian stage, the geopolitical drama was played out in
two ways. First, the United States, China, and the ASEAN states, especially Thailand, nanced, supported, and sponsored the Cambodian resistance forces: the Khmer Rouge; FUNCINPEC, a royalist resistance
movement led by the indefatigable Norodom Sihanouk; and a republican resistance movement, the KPNLF, led by the former Sangkum-era
prime minister, Son Sann.50 Second, the international community punished both Cambodia and Vietnam by denying them development assistance. The drama reached its peak in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in June
1982, when the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF came together in a shotgun alliance to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The aim of the alliance was to liberate
Cambodia from Vietnamese occupation. The CGDK would hold the
Cambodian seat at the UN General Assembly for the remainder of the
decade.51
In Phnom Penh, meanwhile, the PRK regime continued the task of
rehabilitating social, economic, and political life in Cambodia. By 1981,
the regime considered its legitimacy and control strong enough to promulgate a national constitution, hold national elections, and announce
the formation of a Communist government under the control of the
137
Khmer Peoples Revolutionary Party (KPRP). The story of education

following the initial crisis of 1979 1980 was one of consolidation in the
face of the considerable difculties imposed by the international embargo and the less signicant impediment engendered by the resistance
forces. It was also the story of the PRK regimes continued attempts to
create good socialist citizens in Cambodia.
Education: Quantity, Quality, and Good Citizens

The PRKs initial educational problems persisted through 1981. In a
follow-up to his report of February 1980, UNICEFs consultant returned
to Cambodia in October 1981. He remarked that the progress made in
education, if measured in quantitative terms, has been exceptional. 52
The crisis of quality was, however, no less severe than it had been twenty
months before. The concerns raised by the balancing act between improving educational quality and expanding educational services were to
remain a critical theme for the next several years. A second theme was
the revival, with Vietnamese and Soviet support, of the higher education
system, and the continued development of a national system of adult literacy education. Central to these themes was the regimes attempts to
build a socialist state through the development of education.
The growth of the education system during the rst two years of the
PRK, although not surprising, was more accelerated than at any other
time since independence in 1953 (see Table 2). Given the state of the
nation in January 1979, the statistics were a credit to the dedicated administrators who sought to rebuild the Cambodian education system.
The impressive picture is signicantly distorted, however. As was the
case in Cambodia and its developing world counterparts throughout the
1950s and 1960s, the educational expansion pursued by the PRK regime
was achieved at the crucial expense of educational quality.
Following visits to schools in Phnom Penh and Kandal and Kompong
Speu provinces, the UNICEF consultants observations of educational
quality in 1981 mirrored those of his rst visit. At the Lyce Phnom
Daun Penh (formerly the Lyce Sisowath), Cambodias premier educational institution, there were no textbooks available to students and
there was a lack of basic pedagogical materials. Throughout Phnom
Penh, there was a lack of classrooms, textbooks, and workshop and laboratory facilities and an insufcient supply of basic stationery materials.
The situation in the provinces of Kandal and Kompong Speu was no
better, with a lack of classrooms and teaching materials, especially textbooks, representing the most critical problems. Overwhelmed by the
138
The PRK and the SOC
Table 2. Quantitative Growth in Education,

by Level, 1979 1980 to 1980 1981.
School Year
1979 1980
School Year
1980 1981
Growth
Rate (%)
Primary (Grades 1 4)
Schools
Classes
Pupils
Staff
5,290
17,761
947,317
21,605
4,334
27,217
1,328,053
30,316
18
53
40
40
Colleges (Grades 57)

Schools
Classes
Pupils
Staff
14
101
5,104
206
62
394
17,331
671
343
290
240
226
1
7
301
20
2
15
555
28
100
100
84
40
Level of Education
Lyce (Grades 8 10)

Schools
Classes
Pupils
Staff
Source: H. Reiff (1981), Annex V, p. 10.
number of students enrolling in both primary and secondary schools,

the regime was unable to divert resources to the training and retraining
of school teachers, leaving the caliber of classroom instruction at a deplorably low standard.53
The crisis of quality was aggravated as the administration turned its
attention toward the development of higher education and adult literacy education. Both were promoted with the signicant support and
assistance of Vietnamese advisers and staff. In the case of higher education, Soviet support was also inuential. As with primary and secondary
education, the haste with which the new regime attempted to develop
higher and adult education was a function of its desire to create a new
socialist society.
The rehabilitation of higher education began in early 1979, when
plans were set in motion for the reopening of the Faculty of Medicine.
This was eventually celebrated on December 12, 1979. In July 1980, the
Teachers Training College was opened, followed by the Institute of
Languages and Tuok Thla Professional Training Center in February
139
1981, the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Higher Technical Institute in September 1981, the Economics Institute in September 1984, and the
Chamcar Daung Agricultural Institute in January 1985. The new regime
was particularly concerned with the rehabilitation of higher education,
as it was regarded as a solution to the countrys chronic shortage of technicians and leaders in economics, politics and culture. 54 Its primary
importance, however, was in the promotion of socialism. A KPRP Central Committee decision noted the the main objective of higher and
technical education is to provide good political training and good technical training. Good political training, it went on, should be concerned with serving and protecting the nation leading to the socialist
way and following the objectives of socialism. 55
Without the capacity to administer higher education, the PRK relied
almost exclusively on Vietnamese and Soviet support. In so doing, the
policy of the Khmerization of tertiary education, although addressed
by the administration, was practically abandoned. By the mid-1980s,
Vietnamese and Russian were the dominant languages of instruction in
those tertiary faculties where there was no adequately trained or qualied Khmer staff.56
The PRKs adult literacy program was adopted by the Peoples Revolutionary Council on June 19, 1980, which was declared the National
Day of Struggle against Illiteracy. The broad objective of the program,
the liquidation of illiteration, was a laudable one. While the regimes
claim that 1,025,794 people had been left illiterate by Cambodias former regimes, especially the genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary rgime, cannot be veried, there is little doubt that the legacy of civil war and destruction since 1970 had left a signicant literacy problem among
Cambodias young adult population. Even more so than the development of primary, secondary, and higher education, the regimes adult
literacy program was an explicit exercise in diffusing socialism. Arguing
that the literacy plan was necessary and urgent in the struggle against
enemies (who were not specied), the regime associated participation
in the program with patriotism and love of the fatherland. 57
If Paul Quinn-Judges observations of an adult literacy class in Kompong Cham province in June 1980 are any indication, we can reasonably
question how much was actually learned at these schools. The class observed by Quinn-Judge was held in a school building, its musty smell a
legacy of its use as a grain store during the Khmer Rouge period. The
classroom had no electricity, its fty students relying for light on small
oil lamps made out of ink bottles.58 Koy Nong, an English teacher in
140
The PRK and the SOC
Phnom Penh and a former instructor in the literacy program in his

native Kratie province during 1984 and 1985, corroborated these observations. The program was poor, he said, concluding that the conditions were very bad and students did not learn very [much] in the
classes. 59
UNICEFs consultant to Cambodia reported in 1981 that government priorities in the education sector are gradually shifting from quantitative expansion to qualitative improvements. 60 Except in relation to
attempts to improve the quality of teachers, there is very little evidence
to support this claim. Contrary to its educational priorities, the regimes
political priorities were given precedence. These political priorities relied explicitly on the expansion of educational provision. A former
ofcial, who played a signicant role in the policy development process
throughout the 1980s, believed that in its attempt to achieve universal
school enrollment, the ministry neglected questions of educational
quality. Quality was a long-term project, he asserted. At that time, we
were concerned only with enrollment. Importantly, the Vietnamese
were too. Providing a socialist education for everyone was a government number one priority. 61
The former ofcial was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to account for
the motivation behind the regimes emphasis on the quantitative expansion of the education system. It is abundantly clear, however, that legitimizing its socialist state was at its core. In its statement of educational
goals and needs for 1980/1981, the ministry demonstrated an awareness
of the crisis of quality, noting that maintaining quality in education was
a serious problem. 62 Despite an awareness of the problem, and despite
a policy emphasis on improvements in educational quality, it continued
to base the project of building a new socialist society on the rapid expansion of educational provision. The project, as the years that followed
were to unquestionably demonstrate, was a failure.
1985 1988: The Winds of Change

The Kampuchean problem continued to represent a most important
foreign policy issue in Southeast Asia during the 1980s. The CGDK, led
by Prince Sihanouk, dominated by the Khmer Rouge, and funded by the
United States, ASEAN, and China, continued to represent Cambodia
at the UN and continued its attempts to disrupt the Vietnamese-backed
socialist government in Phnom Penh. With Mikhail Gorbachevs ascendancy in the USSR throughout the 1980s, Soviet support for the Vietnamese regime, and therefore Cambodia, began to wane. As pressure
141
mounted for a reconciliation between Vietnam and ASEAN, the winds

of regional change increasingly affected the Cambodian climate. Although still occasionally a theme in the rhetoric of the PRK regime, by
1989 socialism was all but a faded memory on the Cambodian political
and economic landscape. The education system again became a victim
of shifting state priorities and a renewed Cambodian state ideology.
The reorientation of the Cambodian state was evident as early as
1985. The rst signs of the shift had come before the KPRPs Fifth Party
Congress. After the surprise death of Prime Minister Chan Si in December 1984, Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge ofcer and the foreign minister of the PRK, was elected as his replacement. The election was signicant in that it reinforced a shift away from the partys Hanoi veterans
in favor of younger KPRP members, former DK ofcials, and those who
were without revolutionary backgrounds. While the partys allegiance to
the Vietnamese had not and would not diminish, the shift signaled an
increasing condence by the Cambodian Communist movement in its
capacity to independently govern Cambodia. It was a condence embodied by the nonrevolutionary PRK Minister of Education Pen Navuth,
who had told a French visitor to Cambodia in 1983 that we can fend for
ourselves. 63
The most signicant shift in the orientation of the PRK came at the
KPRPs Fifth Party Congress in October 1985. The president of the party,
Heng Samrin, announced in his political report that, for the rst time
since 1979, in order to mitigate the weaknesses of the state sector, the
party would recognize private enterprise as a legitimate sector of the
economy. In effect, the move merely legitimized what had been the status quo since 1979, with acute observers recognizing that a private sector had been operating in Cambodia since the overthrow of the DK regime.64 The announcement represented the rst ofcial recognition
that the task of building socialism in Cambodia was not achieving the
success anticipated by the government or its Vietnamese patrons. It was
a failure caused by a lack of competent cadres, a lack of cadres who believed in the system, and a lack of cooperation from the Cambodian
peasantry.65 In short, the goal of building socialism lacked legitimacy.
Despite what seemed a recognition that the building of a socialist state
was failing, the PRKs rhetoric, although cautious, was nonetheless deant. Heng Samrin, in his speech at the Fifth Party Congress, called for
making every effort to complete economic restoration, reorganize production, and build socialist education and culture. He also emphasized
that the state must gradually build a national economy with socialist
norms. Samrins report conceded the existence of several problems in
142
The PRK and the SOC
building socialism, including a thin and weak organizational system

that was incomplete at district and especially at grass-roots level. 66 A
sympathetic observer of the PRK argued that the report indicated a
clear implicit recognition that the weaknesses of the party derive from
general apathy to socialist goals among the mass of the population. 67
Following the lead of Samrin, there was both deance and caution in
relation to education. In a report to a conference of Ministers of Education of Socialist Countries in November 1985, Pen Navuth declared
that the essential objective of education was to form new and good
hard-working citizens with a baggage of culture, of technical awareness,
of a capacity for work, of good health and of a revolutionary morality
ready to serve the Kampuchean revolution. This self-assurance was
tempered, however, in noting that the apprehension of the population
and distrust of Cambodias Vietnamese neighbors were both problems
our schools were compelled to face. 68
The education system, as it had through other periods of social transition in Cambodias history, was left to struggle with the prospect of
adjustment in a vacuum of irrelevance. While the state ideology of the
PRK, both in economic and political terms, continued to promote Cambodias alignment with the Soviet-led socialist bloc and continued to
reject capitalism, the movement toward a more capitalist economic orientation had gathered substantial momentum. The crisis in education
crisis had taken another turn, again a product of the ruling regimes efforts to build a Cambodian state.
The contradiction between explicit socialist rhetoric and an unsocialist economic orientation saw the education system perceived as
increasingly irrelevant by its users. Chea Saron, a former student of the
Lyce Phnom Daun Penh, recalled learning about socialist economic
theory, about socialist solidarity, and about Marxism and Leninism
during his senior high school years. Saron, who believed that socialism
could not work in Cambodia, recalled his lack of interest, and that of
his peers, in classes that examined or discussed the socialist cause. We
studied [these subjects] because we had no choice. Nobody was interested in socialism, Saron asserted, but it was a necessity for students who
aspired to higher education. I remember writing in my exam: The
Mekong river will dry up and the mountains will be crushed before solidarity between the Kampucheans and Vietnamese disappears. But I
did not believe it. 69
The contradiction was also evident in relation to the study of foreign
languages. Ofcially, the study of English and French was illegal in the
PRK. Both were rejected by the regime as vestiges of imperialism. Stu-
143
dents were encouraged to study Vietnamese, Russian, German, and

Spanish, while opportunities for higher education abroad were provided in the Soviet Union, Vietnam, East Germany, and Cuba.70 Despite
the orientation toward these languages of the socialist world, students
continued to prize a knowledge of both English and French, and a ourishing private industry emerged in Phnom Penh and other provincial
centers catering to the increasing demand for languages the ruling regime was unwilling, and to be fair, unable to provide.71
The students perception of irrelevance was not the education systems only problem. While the extraordinary school enrollment expansion of the rst years of the decade had appeared to stabilize and
marked improvements had been achieved, the crisis of quality continued to concern education policy-makers. The supply of school textbooks, supplies of basic stationery materials, and educational infrastructure all remained inadequate.72 Contributing to the crisis of quality
was Cambodias continued international isolation, with the government
still denied sorely needed development assistance.
The major obstacle to improving educational quality in Cambodia remained the nations teaching corps, who were very poorly trained and
poorly remunerated. Provincial teacher training facilities, where future
primary school teachers were trained, were staffed by teachers whose
credentials should have often failed to gain them employment as the
teachers they were charged with training. Secondary teacher trainers
were recycled teachers without the training, experience, or knowledge
necessary to prepare future educators. In higher education, lecturers
were generally either Vietnamese or Russian nationals who were poorly
understood by their students, or were Cambodians who had been promoted from senior secondary school teaching, and who were without either a background in research or experience in the delivery of tertiary
education. Lacking experience, poorly trained, and led by a ministry
that was lacking the credentials to adequately administer the system, the
national teaching corps was ill-prepared to cope with the clouds of
change whose rains were about to ood the Cambodian countryside.
1989 1991: Abandoning the Past

In 1987, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen met for the rst time
with Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The prince had spent the previous
eight years oscillating between his demand for the Vietnamese to fully
withdraw from Cambodia and his frequent disagreements with his
CGDK coalition partners, the Khmer Rouge, and Son Sans KPNLF.
144
The PRK and the SOC
The dialogue between Hun Sen and his predecessor did not come about
in isolation. As with many signicant developments in the melody that is
Cambodias postwar history, the score was orchestrated by larger powers.
Moves toward an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations saw Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge decrease and resulted in a diminished Soviet
concern with the Vietnamese. These factors, combined with ASEAN
pressure for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean
problem and Vietnamese tiredness of their role in Cambodia, resulted
in a crescendo that was to climax with the historic meeting between the
two rivals. Little was achieved in either the rst or subsequent meetings
between Sihanouk and Hun Sen. However, the ongoing dialogue, considered a rst step in bringing about a peaceful solution to the Cambodian conict, had been established.73
By 1989, the political and economic landscape of the PRK had shifted
considerably. International leaders and the international media focused
their attention almost exclusively on the various initiatives proffered in
order to bring an end to the Cambodian conict. Meanwhile, in Phnom
Penh, signicant domestic changes, related to those in the international
arena, were taking place. First, the PRK regime became increasingly less
reliant, both politically and militarily, on Vietnam. Second, with the
shifting priorities of the Soviet Union, its economic assistance to the Indochinese states was decreasing. Finally, in light of these two factors, the
KPRP, through a program of economic liberalization, effectively sought
to reconstruct the Cambodian state. These factors constitute the underlying motifs of the remaining years of Communist party rule in Cambodia. A central theme was the gulf between the ideology of Cambodias
ruling KPRP on the one hand and its reoriented state ideology on the
other. A second theme of the period was Cambodias continued international isolation. The isolation had been heightened by the drying up
of Eastern bloc assistance since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A nal
theme was the nations political limbo, as the peace process frequently
uctuated back and forth between unbridled hope, when settlement
seemed near, and bitter disappointment, when it appeared increasingly
unlikely.
These themes are taken up in considering the crisis in education.
With Cambodias leaders attempting to promulgate an alternative and
radically different state ideology from that which they had pursued
over the previous ten years, the education system struggled to contend
with its purpose in the new society. The nal three years of KPRP rule
in Cambodia were characterized by the widening divide between the
145
partys socialist aims and objectives for the education system, and the
reality of a state that was increasingly embracing capitalist ideals.
Socialism Abandoned
In April 1989, during an extraordinary session of the PRK National
Assembly, members adopted a raft of amendments to the constitution.
The reforms, which enjoyed popular support, included reinstating
Buddhism as the state religion and abolishing the death penalty. More
cosmetic changes were made to improve the image of the regime overseas. These included changing the name of the country to the State of
Cambodia (SOC), amending the national ag, and changing sections
of the national anthem. The most signicant and the most popular
amendments were those pertaining to economic life in Cambodia. A
mixed economy sector, providing an avenue for joint ventures between the state and private enterprise, and the right to own, use, bequeath and inherit land were both introduced. The changes not only
undermined the socialist orientation of the regime but also placed
Cambodia rmly on the path to capitalism. The constitutional amendments were followed in September 1989 by the complete withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and therefore a further assertion of
Cambodian independence.
Despite the changes, at the end of 1989 the mood in Cambodia descended from high expectation to be a somber one. The breakdown of
peace talks in Paris had been a signicant setback for those hoping to
end the ongoing conict. The economy meanwhile, showed few signs of
beneting from the governments program of economic liberalization.
Without the nancial backing of the Eastern bloc, the SOC was left with
few alternatives other than to pursue its current course. This it did over
the following years, becoming increasingly capitalist in its economic orientation and increasingly accessible to the Western world. The education system became caught between the past and the present.
Sitting in the nations generally dilapidated classrooms, Cambodias
students witnessed a confused pattern of change and continuity in light
of the transition to the SOC. The promotion of symbols of the state, used
by the regime to project a particular view of the world, typied this confusion. In many schools a new ag took its place aloft the pole that was
generally located at the center of the school grounds. Other schools continued to use the ag of the PRK. Inside many classrooms, above the
blackboard, there continued to hang pictures of Heng Samrin, the president of the KPRP, Stalin, and occasionally the founder of the Vietnamese
146
The PRK and the SOC
Communist movement, Ho Chi Minh. In other classrooms, Ho Chi Minh

and Stalin were removed with the departure of the Vietnamese. A former
student captured the confusion: We stood at the morning assembly and
faced the ag of [the] Peoples Republic and we sang the anthem of the
State [of] Cambodia. It was a silly time. 74
Students who sat for their nal-year political education matriculation
examinations in 1990 were presented with a set of values reminiscent of
those of the SOCs PRK predecessor, which certainly were not in congruence with the new orientation of the state.75 The examination text
provides salient evidence that the core values of the educational curriculum of the SOC continued to reect the status quo of the PRK era,
promoting the virtues of Marxism-Leninism and the view that education
should turn students and pupils into new [socialist] workers. 76 The examination text asserted that the party strictly follows scientic MarxismLeninism, clearly contradicting the emphasis on private property rights
that characterized the 1989 constitutional amendments. Contradictions
between state ideology and the inherent values of the curriculum are
manifested in reference to the role of the front, the defense and
construction of the country, labor, and the state of the Cambodian
revolution.77
While the curriculum failed to keep abreast of the signicant social
changes in Cambodia in 1989, the organizational structure of the ministry appeared to be shifting with the sands of the new tide. The 1991
State Plan, for instance, reected the reorientation of the state promulgated by the National Assembly in 1989, addressing both the private sector and international assistance. The State Plan called on the education
ministry to strongly stimulate in opening more private kindergartens
and gradually reduce the state sector. The directive was coupled with
another in relation to higher education that called on the ministry to
open the door to have relation [sic] with international institutions in
order to get assistance for the development of education. 78 The plan,
in contradiction to values promoted in the school curriculum, advocated a break with past practices, signaling a more capitalist planning
structure and a move toward the capitalist nations of the Western world.
In combination with a Council of Ministers decision of 1989 that repealed the ban on the learning of French and English, the State Plan
bore little resemblance or similarity to the socialist ideology of the ruling KPRP, to the ideals they had promoted over the past decade, or to
the examination paper completed by prospective higher education students only months before.
147
The nal report of Cambodias National Conference on Education

for All represents the last signicant education statement of the State of
Cambodia. It also represents Cambodian educations debut before an
international audience, ending almost thirteen years of international
isolation. The conference was held less than a month after the SOC and
its three resistance rivals had agreed, in principle, to a comprehensive
UN-sponsored political settlement of the Cambodian crisis. It was also
held less than two months before the ofcial signing of the Paris Peace
Agreements in October 1991 and before the formal abandonment of
Communism by the KPRP, which was renamed the Cambodian Peoples
Party (CPP).79 It is within the context of these momentous events that
the report must be considered.
Those students who had been accepted into Cambodian higher education institutions for the 1990/1991 academic year had done so partially on account of their capacity to demonstrate an understanding of
the Marxist-Leninist orientation of the KPRP in their political education
examination. By the beginning of the 1991/1992 school year, however,
all references to the socialist orientation of the Cambodian state had
been abandoned. In their speeches before the Education for All conference, both the minister of education, Yus Son, and the prime minister, Hun Sen, addressed the policies adopted by the PRK government in
order to rebuild the education system after the DK period. The most
discernible feature of both speeches is what the two leaders failed to address. Marxism and Leninism, arguably the cornerstone of the rebuilding effort, were not mentioned. Gone too, were references to creating
a new socialist man and to constructing and defending the fatherland.
Instead, Hun Sen addressed the need to lighten the governments burden, together with the assistance of international organizations, and to
permit the opening of private schools. There is a recognition of the
need to make urgent reform of the curriculum of general education at
all levels, to improve teacher competencies, and to strengthen educational quality and the management capacity of the ministry.80
The Crisis in Education: Evaluating the PRK /SOC

The PRK did not create a crisis in education. It inherited one. When it
was installed by the Vietnamese as the government of Cambodia, the
PRK was confronted with an educational chaos that is arguably unparalleled in modern history. This chaos, the legacy of both a civil war and
the DK period, is a fundamental factor in considering the educational
148
The PRK and the SOC
crisis of the period. A second factor, heightening the chaos, was Cambodias international isolation, resulting in the country being denied
desperately needed development assistance. Though they cannot be
blamed for creating an educational crisis, the leaders of the PRK, and
later the SOC, were guilty of sustaining one. The post-DK regimes attempt to reconstruct the nation-state through unchecked educational
expansion spawned the crises of quality, orientation, and timing, which
were hallmarks of the period.
In this respect, the crisis in education was a predominately Cambodian project (with Vietnamese inuence and compliance), whose central cause, as with the periods of the past, was the PRK /SOC regimes
approach to legitimizing and constructing a nation-state that reected
its ideological orientation and agenda. As with the regime of Prince
Sihanouk in the 1960s, the number one educational priority of the PRK
regime upon being installed into power in Phnom Penh in 1979 was
rapid educational expansion. Despite a paucity of resources and materials, dilapidated infrastructure, and a virtually nonexistent teaching
corps, and despite continued ghting in the countryside, the regime
embarked on an inauguration frenzy, reopening primary, secondary,
higher, and adult education within its rst twelve months of governance. Over subsequent years, without these initial qualitative problems
being rectied, the regime continued to boast of increased educational
enrollments. The overwhelming concern of the Cambodian administration in pursuing this program of rapid expansion was to diffuse its socialist ideology among the entire population. The leaders of the PRK, in
concert with their Vietnamese advisers, sought to build socialism in
Cambodia by creating new socialist men through education. With educational expansion given priority over qualitative progress or improvement, the seed for the growth of a sustained crisis in education had been
sowed.
A second factor in the relationship between the regimes attempts at
state formation and the crisis in education was the ideological orientation underlying the KPRPs state-building project. With the nightmares
of DK as an enduring backdrop, the Cambodian people were largely unwilling to embrace the socialist ideals of their leaders. The educational
agenda of the regime was, therefore, undermined by a general lack of
interest by students in learning about Marxism-Leninism, socialist theory, or socialist economic principles. Further, it was undermined by a
lack of specialized knowledge and enthusiasm among many of those
charged with promoting the socialist worldview. The result of the edu-
149
cation ministrys incapacity to adequately enshrine socialist principles in

school curricula was an educational setting that continued to resemble,
in many respects, the allegedly reactionary pre-DK system it was supposed to replace.
The nal dimension of the crisis in education was the failure of education to keep abreast of and adjust to the reorientation of the Cambodian state. The leaders of the PRK were not encumbered by the legacy
of the state structures and ideology of the DK regime, with the former
nonexistent and the latter universally deplored by the Cambodian
people. They were, however, forced to contend with both the political
and the French-imbued educational culture of the regimes that preceded the rule of Pol Pot. In this regard, in order to effectively diffuse its
view of the world, the KPRP was required to effect a shift in Cambodias
educational culture, emphasizing the relationship between study and
work and deemphasizing the liberal-academic mind-set that had fueled
aspirations of social mobility among students during the Sihanouk and
Lon Nol regimes. Largely reliant on the remaining bureaucrats of the
regimes they were intending to supplant, the PRK failed to achieve this
crucial cultural shift.
The failure to replace the cultural values of the previous regimes with
a socialist alternative was exacerbated when the regime attempted to reorient the underlying ideology of the Cambodian state in 1989. At this
time not only did the regime require a further shift in educational
thought but it was obliged to reform the educational curriculum it had
been promoting over the previous ten years and to reorient both the nature of classroom instruction and school texts that had supported that
curriculum. It was within this climate of social change and adjustment,
with education struggling to contend with its purpose, that the peace
agreements, which were intended to bring about a political settlement
to the Cambodian conict, were signed. The agreements provided the
political watershed that saw the arrival, en masse, of the international
community into Cambodia. The Cambodian state, development, and
the education system, carrying with them the baggage of past practices
and tradition, were to turn another sharp corner.
Ranariddh
and
Hun Sen
From
Uneasy
Alliance
to Coup
On July 5, 1997, Cambodias second prime minister, Hun Sen, appeared
on national television dressed in military fatigues. With none of his
usual amboyance, he calmly read a statement in which he accused his
counterpart, First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh, and other ofcials from Prince Ranariddhs National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)
party, of illegal acts that were dangerous to the nation. Hours later,
bullets began to y as troops aligned with Hun Sens Cambodian
Peoples Party (CPP) attempted to forcibly disarm those troops and security personnel aligned to FUNCINPEC. Within two days, Hun Sen was
in control of Phnom Penh; his coup had been successful.1
On July 10, the second prime minister was again before the cameras,
explaining that the coup wasnt really a coup, and that he was merely acting to prevent anarchy. To astute observers, Hun Sens coup came as no
surprise, merely nalizing the deterioration in relations between the
two major parties that had formed Cambodias coalition government
following UN-sponsored elections in 1993. The days and weeks that followed the coup were as much a farce as they were a tragedy. Ranariddh,
in France at the time he was ousted, was threatened with arrest if he attempted to return to Cambodia. In order to maintain a semblance of
normalcy and the illusion of a FUNCINPEC-CPP coalition, Hun Sen
rounded up those members of FUNCINPEC who had not ed the country and announced that Foreign Minister Ung Huot, a former minister
of education, would assume the position of rst prime minister. Human
150
From Uneasy Alliance to Coup
151
rights groups and sympathetic nongovernment organizations (NGO),

meanwhile, sheltered those who were afraid for their lives. Their fears
were not without good reason; at least forty FUNCINPEC ofcials, including General Chao Samboth and Secretary of State for the Interior
Ho Sok had been executed.
Apart from providing a striking testament to the failures of the UNs
expensive Cambodian operation, the coup also quite explicitly demonstrated the absolute power enjoyed by Hun Sen over the institutions of
the Cambodian state. It is a power that reinforced the sense of dj vu
that permeated Cambodian social and political life after the country
again became a kingdom in 1993. For many long-time observers, Hun
Sens apparent paranoia, his continuous and all-pervading presence in
the media, monumental speeches, uncanny ability to nd scapegoats for
his countrys ills, and capacity to eliminate his political opponents, were
an acute reminder of years when Sihanouk was the undisputed captain
of the Cambodian boat.
Continuities aside, there also existed fundamental differences between the Cambodia that entered the 1990s and that of the immediate
postindependence years. A rst distinction between the periods was in
the legacy of the past they inherited. While their predecessors inherited
from the French a negligibly developed political and economic infrastructure, Cambodias leaders following UN intervention were forced to
contend with an infrastructure whose fabric had been repeatedly reconstituted and often destroyed since 1970 and whose status, in terms of
key development indicators, had plummeted in comparison to its counterparts in the developing world.2 A second distinction was that the Cold
War had ended, and therefore Cambodias political allegiances, and the
ideological orientation associated with those allegiances, were no longer
a consideration. A nal distinction, related to the second, was that Cambodia was faced with a world in which globalization, especially in terms
of economic integration, was a fundamental concern and in which national development wasand continues to bealmost universally regarded as a celebration of capitalism.
Within the context of this climate of political instability, continuities
and discontinuities, and globalization, the central concern of this chapter is the extent to which those charged with the development of Cambodian education learned from past policies and practices. The key
question is if the mistakes of the previous forty years were repeated. The
evidence, sadly, shows overwhelmingly that the optimism generated
by the unparalleled international intervention in Cambodia was un-
152
Ranariddh and the Hun Sen
founded, pointing to an educational crisis that overshadows, with the

obvious exception of the Khmer Rouge period, those of the past. The
basis for Cambodian and international optimism, and the manner in
which that optimism unraveledshifting from a sense of hope to one
of despairis the focus of this chapter, which capitalizes on a range of
sources more comprehensive than was available for the periods discussed in previous chapters.
A rst theme to characterize the postelection period was the confused nature of state-making that followed the UNs intervention. On
one count, state-making was, until only hours before the coup of July
1997, characterized by the tension between the nations copremiers and
their respective political parties. Each regarded the post-UN political
period as one of transition, hoping to wrest total control of the state apparatuses. With this in mind, each was attempting to secure the legitimacy of his leadership and his party while attempting to discredit the
credentials of their opponents. Essentially, before Hun Sens military
subjugation of Ranariddhs party (FUNCINPEC), two states were being
made within the same apparatuses. On a second count, state-making
continued to demonstrate an irreconcilable fusion and enmeshment
of modern institutions with traditional behaviors. Cambodias ofcial
embrace of modern political institutions and a modern, developmentoriented state ideology were sharply at odds with a rmly reasserted and
entrenched traditional political culture. It was within this environment,
where national leadership was almost exclusively equated with securing
and maintaining power, that the education system functioned.
A second theme, a reection of the past, was that of form over substance and politics over policy. An ofcial concern of the Cambodian
government, and the source for great optimism in the aftermath of the
UN-sponsored elections, was the improvement of the quality and relevance of education. In a similar vein to Cambodian regimes of the past,
however, there is ample evidence demonstrating that the goals, objectives, and policies of the Ministry of Education were often abandoned in
the name of the immediate political priorities of those with higher authority than the policy-makers. The result was an obvious failure to improve the quality and relevance of education.
A nal theme was the governments lack of commitment to its agreements with the international donor community. These agreements, arising from the internationally-sponsored peace settlement in Cambodia,
were designed with Cambodias capacity to participate in the global
community as a key concern. A willingness on the part of the coalition
153
government to cast aside these agreements, often for reasons of immediate political expediency, has not only served to damage short-term educational prospects but has had an alarming effect on the governments
capacity to continue to secure large amounts of development assistance
in the medium to long term.
Free and Fair Elections: A Platform for Change?

The political climate in Cambodia following the 1993 elections was a
function of the conditions it had succeeded: Angkorean power, rule by
a monarch, colonialism, civil war, genocide, Vietnamese occupation,
and the Cold War. Primarily, the climate was a product of the failings of
the Paris Peace Agreements of October 1991,3 the signing of which led
to the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC), the 1993 elections, and, in turn, the coalition administration led by Ranariddh and Hun Sen. In order to understand the
nature of the post-1993 political climate, an understanding of the agreements and the period of UN intervention that they heralded is essential.
The agreements, signed by Cambodias four warring factions in
October 1991,4 were the culmination of negotiations that had been ongoing since 1988. They could be traced to a plan that called for the establishment of an international control mechanism that would temporarily rule Cambodia while preparations were made for elections to
be conducted.5 The purpose of the period of temporary international
rule, which the agreements eventually enshrined, was to create a neutral
political environment that would facilitate the conduct of free and fair
elections in Cambodia. Following these, a Constituent Assembly could
be elected, a government formed, and a new constitution, following a
system of liberal democracy, promulgated.6 Several elements of the
agreements and their implementation are worthy of consideration.
A rst notable element, in terms of the agreements implementation,
was the slow deployment that characterized the UN operation. Reecting on the UNs tardiness, one analyst noted that although the transitional period began at the time the Paris Agreement was signed, in
Cambodia there was no sign of UNTAC. 7 UNTACs predecessor, the
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)itself an afterthought hampered by poor and inadequate planning, slow deployment, and a limited mandatewas nally merged with UNTAC in midMarch 1992, more than ve months after the agreements had been
signed. It was not until September 1992, however, that UNTAC was fully
154
operational. For Cambodias factions, the delay resulted in increased

violations of a very fragile cease-re agreement. While waiting for the
UN to shift the arena of confrontation from the battleeld to the ballot
box, the factions had attempted, according to the Far Eastern Economic
Reviews Cambodia specialist, Nate Thayer, to ll Cambodias power vacuum in the only way they know howby resuming their struggle for
control of the exhausted country. 8
A second element of the agreements worthy of consideration was the
fact that Cambodias warring factions had few options but to agree to
them. With a shattered state, no money, few remaining foreign supporters, and with the permanent ve members of the UNs Security Council
nally committed to a resolution of what had been the Kampuchean
problem, the Khmer leaders came to the negotiating table with few realizable options. While it must be noted that the factions had signicant
input in the wording and complexion of the Paris Peace Agreements,
one commentator quite accurately suggested that the factions were unlikely candidates for national reconciliation with no common agenda
for Cambodia. 9 The outcome of both the continued power struggle
and the ctitious reconciliation that underpinned the peace agreements was a lack of condence in the UN operation (especially by the
Khmer Rouge) and a marked deterioration in the level of mutual understanding between the agreements signatories, especially between
the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the Khmer Rouge. In the end, although it was invested with extraordinary power in order to fulll its
mandate, UNTAC was unable to achieve its initial goal of cantoning, demobilizing, and disarming 70 percent of the military forces of the four
factions and was therefore unable to create a neutral political environment suitable for the conduct of the elections.
A third noteworthy element of the 1991 agreements was their provision for a separation of authority between the UN body (UNTAC),
the existing SOC, and the Supreme National Council (SNC), a body
presided over by Norodom Sihanouk, whose role was to delegate to
UNTAC all powers necessary to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive agreement. 10 In theory, UNTACs mandate provided for
existing administrative structures to be placed under the direct control or supervision of UNTAC in order to ensure strict neutrality. 11
The reality, however, was that what UNTAC seemed to control, it usually did not. Instead, the rmly entrenched SOC simply administered
around UNTAC, 12 with one observer commenting that UNTAC staff
often faced . . . labyrinthine local administrations backed by all of the
resources (police included) of the party-state. 13
155
A nal noteworthy element of the Paris Peace Agreements was the

Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.
This nal component of the agreements facilitated Cambodias return
to the fold of development assistance from the Western world, particularly from multilateral and international nancial institutions and from
bilateral assistance arrangements. The declaration called for the advancement of the Cambodian people and economic aid to benet all
areas of Cambodia. 14 While it also stated that no attempt should be
made to impose a development strategy from any outside source, Cambodia had little choice but to accept the imperatives of international
donors. With virtually nothingmoney, infrastructure, means of communication, or adequately skilled human resourcesthe atmosphere
of cooperative needs assessment envisioned by the declaration was more
akin to a beggar, empty bowl in hand, seeking assistance from a wealthy
benefactor.
Education: The Transitional Period

The tardiness of UNTACs planning and deployment, the fragility of the
reconciliation between the warring factions, the confusion over who
had power, and the declaration on Cambodian reconstruction all affected the policy-making process in education. How did these preelectoral administrative arrangements impact on education? In response to
this key question, ve themes emerge. The rst was the SOCs continued
control, although with cosmetic concessions, of the education system. In
order to create a neutral political environment, the civil administration
component of UNTAC (CIVADMIN) was charged with exercising full
control over ve key ministries: national security, defense, foreign affairs, consular affairs, and nance. It also had the authority to intervene
(control) in other areas of public administration, including education, should it be deemed necessary in order to establish and maintain
a neutral political environment.15 In essence, UNTACs objectives and
mandate provided for minimal intervention in the education sector,
which would continue to function under existing administrative structures. As a result, there were very few educational changes during the
UNTAC period. With the exception of an education committee comprising representatives from each of the four factions, the SOC effectively maintained its complete control over education.16 One analyst has
alleged that a nancial controller from CIVADMINs nancial services
division was seconded to the education ministry, as occurred with all
other ministries. A former UNTAC nancial controller, however, was
156
adamant that there were no nancial controllers in ministries, with the

exception of those involved with producing and controlling revenue:
nance, treasury, and customs.17 In attempting to realize its objective of
creating a neutral political environment, UNTAC assumed no responsibility for Cambodian education. The direction and management of the
education system remained in the hands of those entrusted with its development during the previous decade.
A second educational theme of the transitional period was the increased presence and prole of NGOs in the education sector. While
the governments of the Western world had shunned Cambodia through
the 1980s, NGO assistance had been provided since 1979, when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began to provide humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Democratic Kampuchea (DK).
The NGO presence steadily increased throughout the 1980s, although
it was continually limited in its capacity to assist by several factors, including the continuing conict, the ideological orientation of the PRK
administration, and the international aid embargo ratied by the UN.18
With the political and economic liberalization evident in Cambodia following Hun Sens historic 1987 meeting with Norodom Sihanouk, NGO
activities proliferated, especially in the provision of training and technical assistance. The imminent signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in
1991 saw a further increase in NGO involvement, with several organizations undertaking feasibility and needs assessment studies in order to
plan their future involvement in the education sector.
These studies are useful in providing a window to the third theme of
the period: the parlous state of the education system. A study for CONCERN in 1991 identied a raft of educational problems: inadequate
training and remuneration for teachers, an inappropriate curriculum,
rare and unevenly distributed teaching aids and materials, dilapidated
schools, a high drop-out rate, elitist preschool and secondary school
sectors, and a socio economic environment that often constrained parents from sending their children to school.19 The central educational
problems highlighted in the report, poor educational quality and an irrelevant curriculum, were reiterated in a study of Siem Reap province
the following year. Redd Barnas Siem Reap study identied three key
areas of concern in relation to education: the low attendance of students
at school, the problem of low achievement by students, and the difculty
of reintegrating into schools former refugees from the nearby ThaiCambodian border. The study also expressed concerns in relation to the
qualications of teachers, the state of the provincial Teacher Training
157
College, and the fact that the centralized educational curriculum failed
to account for regional differences between provinces.20 Both reports,
with conclusions that were supported in other studies of the period,
provided salient proof that the crisis conditions prevalent in the PRK /
SOC years were still very much in evidence during the transitional period.21 Given that little time had passed, that there were few policy
changes in education during the period, and that the system continued
to be controlled by the overseers of the crisis in the 1980s, the continuation was entirely comprehensible.
The fourth theme, a product of the transitional nature of the period,
was that educational development was taking place, although very
slowly, without an articulated direction of its future function, structure,
or importance. The introduction to the United Nations Childrens
Funds (UNICEF) 1993 Education Plan noted, for example, that as a result of the transitional process, decisions regarding curricula, content
of new textbooks, a credentialing policy for new teachers, and other
decisions must wait. 22 While UNICEFs education plan, which was
intended to address national educational concerns, proposed that
UNICEF wait for the outcome of the elections before implementing education projects, many NGOs adopted an alternative approach. These
NGOs, working in partnership with local educational authorities, who
enjoyed signicant independence from the central ministry, actively
implemented educational rehabilitation and reconstruction projects
throughout the country. Although the projects often had positive shortterm effects, in the long term, they further complicated the problem
of establishing a national direction for educational policy. These were
problems conceded throughout 1994, when a concerted effort was
made to develop a national framework.23
A nal theme of the transitional period preceding the elections, a
long-term response to the lack of direction alluded to earlier, was the
assistance and impact of international multilateral actors in shaping the
future direction of the education system. While NGOs had been involved with Cambodia since 1979, it was not until the signing of the
Paris Peace Agreements in October 1991 that the bilateral and international nancial and multilateral organizations established a recognizable presence.24 The Asian Development Banks (ADB) Economic Report on Cambodia opened the oodgates in December 1991. Over the
next six months, the torrent included the United Nations Development
Programs (UNDP) Comprehensive Paper on Cambodia, the UN secretarygenerals Consolidated Appeal for Cambodias Immediate Needs and National
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Rehabilitation, and the combined UNDP, World Bank, International

Monetary Fund (IMF), and ADB report, Cambodia, Socio-Economic Situation and Immediate Needs. 25 Although their immediate impact on education was negligible, the documents were particularly important in reinforcing the principles for rehabilitation and reconstruction forwarded
in the Paris agreements, steering education and development in Cambodia toward increasingly global trends.
The Voice of the People

On Sunday, May 23, 1993, the people of Cambodia began pouring into
polling booths throughout the country. By the time the polls closed on
Friday, May 28, 4,242,454 of Cambodias registered voters had turned
out to cast their ballots in the national elections.26 Summing up the
mood of the historic occasion, William Shawcross wrote:
When thunder broke over Phnom Penh early on the morning of Sunday, 23 May [1993], many people awoke fearing that it was a Khmer
Rouge barrage. It was not. That morning hundreds of thousands of
people arrived at Ballot stations in the rain.27
The elections, however, had not proceeded as smoothly as the UN

would have liked, with the buildup characterized by increasing violence,
intimidation, and a refusal by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea
(PDK, the Khmer Rouge) to adhere to the agreements it had signed in
Paris in 1991.28 Despite the problems, the elections were declared free
and fair by the UN secretary-generals special representative, Yasushi
Akashi, who announced before the SNC that they were a stinging rebuke to the men of violence and to those who tried to prevent [the Cambodian people] from exercising their inalienable rights. 29
As the elections utilized a system of proportional representation,
there was always the expectation they would deliver to Cambodia a coalition government. It was also the expectation that Hun Sens CPP would
emerge as the dominant partner in any governing coalition. Against
these expectations, however, the elections resulted in a narrow victory to
Norodom Ranariddhs FUNCINPEC party.30 Unaccustomed and unwilling to accept defeat, Hun Sens CPP, the former Communist Party, refused to acknowledge the voice of the people. Declaring the election result invalid, and with the key elements of state apparatus still in its
control, the CPP left FUNCINPEC with few alternatives other than a
coalition based on power-sharing. The result, after much negotiation,
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was the formation of a coalition government constituted of the CPP,

FUNCINPEC, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), and a
fourth party, Moulinaka. Ranariddh was appointed rst prime minister
and the defeated Hun Sen assumed the role of second prime minister.
Further negotiations resulted in Prince Sihanouk agreeing to resume the
throne he had given up in 1955. Cambodia again became a kingdom.31
The Kingdom of Cambodia: A Modern State?

The preamble to the constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia provides
a penetrating testimony to one of the unstated aims of the UN intervention in Cambodia: the generation of a framework and motivation for
the creation of a modern Cambodian state.
Accustomed to having been an outstanding civilization, a prosperous,
large, ourishing and glorious nation . . . having declined grievously
during the past two decades . . . having awakened and resolutely rallied
to unite for the consolidation of national unity . . . and the ne Angkor
civilization, and the restoration of Cambodia into an Island of Peace
based on a multi-party liberal democratic rgime. . . .32
The constitution eventually adopted provided for a bureaucracy, a legislature, a judiciary, a separation of powers doctrine, and a head of state
whose ofcial role extended no further than ceremony. Despite these
institutions of modern statehood underpinning the constitution, a
functioning modern state has not emerged in Cambodia. Ironically, it is
the two central themes of the constitutions preamble that provide a key
to understanding why.
The rst is Cambodias focus on the greatness of the Angkorean era,
when the country constituted one of the most powerful in Southeast
Asia. One historian has argued that one of the tragedies of Cambodian
history is the weight of its past and the effect of that weight on politicians and ordinary people. Among Cambodias leaders, he argues, the
past has produced a folie de grandeur, with the nations postindependence
rulers either allowing themselves to be compared with the rulers of
Angkor or using Angkorean greatness as a frame of reference for Cambodias future. Associated with these Angkorean parallels have been inherited notions of power and leadership, perceived in terms of hierarchy and ranking, deference and command, hegemony and servitude, 33
far removed from the pluralism envisioned by the UN.
The preambles second theme is its recognition of the conict of the
160
past, and its claim that Cambodians have resolutely rallied . . . for the
consolidation of national unity. Supercially, through signing the Paris
Peace Agreements, the leaders of Cambodias four factions did agree to
promote national unity. Beyond the surface, however, national unity did
not gure in their respective agendas. The four Cambodian political
factions each represented remnants of Cambodias ruling regimes since
independence: FUNCINPEC, a royalist remnant of the Sihanouk era;
the BLDP, a republican remnant of the Lon Nol era; the PDK, a remnant of the Pol Pot era; and the CPP, a remnant of the PRK /SOC period. While their roles in the negotiations that eventually led to the Paris
Peace Agreements were substantial, never once did there emerge
among them a unied vision of Cambodia. In a tragic resurgence of
neoauthoritarianism, each faction, regardless of the peoples aspirations, refused to acknowledge the credentials of its opponents. In turn,
each regarded the state as nothing more than a collection of institutions
whose purpose was to protect and promote the power and entrenched
position of those invested with that power.
The UN had a rm idea of the outcome it envisioned for the Cambodian state after UNTAC had departed. In this regard, the agreements
had bound Cambodias factions to principles on which the new constitution would be drafted. These included the inviolability of the constitution and a declaration of fundamental rights, which was, the agreements noted, required in light of Cambodias tragic recent history.
Also to be included was a declaration that Cambodia was a sovereign,
independent and neutral state, and a statement that Cambodia will
follow democracy, on the basis of pluralism, with a provision for periodic elections and universal and equal suffrage.34 Failing to account for
the traditional political culture and conceptions of power as just described, the UNs encouragement did not succeed in motivating Cambodias political leaders in favor of the formation of a modern state. The
political environment that emerged in the country in the aftermath of
the electoral process continued to reect the traditional political culture that has characterized the Cambodian nation-state since precolonial times, although with a fusion of imported, poorly understood, and
supercially embraced Western democratic ideals.
Within this context, Cambodias post-UNTAC polity emerged. While
UNTAC forced on Cambodia a constitution that embraced democratic
ideals and was able to educate Cambodias population about the essential elements of democracy and about the principles underlying the
electoral process, it was not able to change the countrys traditional
161
leadership culture. The result: politics as usual is the game being

played by all the parties that have gained power. 35 The July 1997 coup
was the nal chapter in that game, one in which political expressions
not in concordance with those who hold power are not tolerated.
The Kingdom: The Question of Ideology

The government formed by the coalition agreement between
FUNCINPEC, the CPP, the BLDP, and Moulinaka, was one of manifest
tensions. In representing a hybrid of the regimes of Cambodias past,
the government was a melting pot of ideologically opposed elements
that brought together the hierarchical and egalitarian ideological
worldviews that had fought over control of the Cambodian nation-state
since independence. In practice, despite the ofcial commitment to a
pluralist, liberal democracy by all of Cambodias political factions, the
egalitarian element of Cambodias political cultureif it ever truly
existedwas dead. The CPP, who inherited the egalitarian tradition,
ofcially revoked its revolutionary past, declaring in 1992 that it would
continue the line of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum such as . . . Sihanouk pioneered it. 36 While the CPP still harbored a signicant Communist
old guard, there was little evidence of egalitarianism in the behavior
of the CPPs most powerful and most visible public gure, Hun Sen,
nor in the behavior of the partys senior ministers and ofcials, many
of whom accumulated sizable personal fortunes following the elections. Similarly, a commitment to pluralism was difcult to detect in
FUNCINPEC, which continued to be administered like a royal court. In
political practice, it was Cambodias traditional hierarchical political
culture, implicitly revoked in policy and stated ideology by all of the
countrys regimes since independence, that exclusively dictated the nature of political behavior among the countrys post-UNTAC rulers.
With the political tensions between the coalitions two major parties
as a backdrop, it is very difcult to identify the state ideology of the kingdom. Despite the tensions, in contradiction to the hierarchical culture
that has sustained political behavior in Cambodia and in parallel with
the institutionalized aspirations of the UNs intervention in the country,
it was a commitment to development that underpinned the conception
of the state subscribed to, at least ofcially, by the countrys coalition
partners. This commitment to development is, therefore, the most readily identiable and universal element of the contemporary Kingdom of
Cambodias state ideology.
162
The ofcial commitment to development did not emerge in isolation. In parallel with its role in promoting the emergence of a modern
state in Cambodia, the international community played a substantial
role in imposing on Cambodias government an ideology in harmony
with the imperatives of the New World Order (NWO) that emerged in
the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. As with the imposition on the
country of the institutions of the modern state, the imposition of an ideology on Cambodia was both willingly embraced and poorly understood
by the leaders of a regime eager to be credited with undertaking the
rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country and, in doing so, enhancing their personal legitimacy among those over whom they exercised power.
Commitment to Development
The developmentalism of the so-called NWO traces its immediate
roots to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the
Warsaw Pact. Characterized by the neoclassical economic imperatives
on which the restructuring of First World states was undertaken in response to the global economic crisis of the late 1970s, the NWO symbolizes a global conquest by the free market paradigm in which competitiveness in the global economy is the ultimate criterion of public
policy. 37 The shift in global politics and economics ushered in by the
end of the Cold War affected perceptions of development in the countries of the Third World. In stark contrast to perspectives on development between the 1950s and the 1970s, the post-Cold War period has
seen increased skepticism in regard to the capacity of the state to serve
as an engineer of both social change and economic growth, and an increased belief in the supremacy of the free market. Further, the period
has been characterized by a perception of the reduced sovereignty and
legitimacy of the state, such that its role becomes one of adjusting national economies to deal with the dynamics of an unregulated global
economy.38 The post-Cold War periods emphasis on the supremacy of
capitalism has seen, cloaked in the gown of neoclassical economic theory, the reassertion of the basic tenets of the modernization theory of
the 1950s and 1960s.
Developmentalism in Cambodia embodies the aim of the rejuvenated modernization model to integrate into the global capitalist economy the nations and, therefore, the markets of the developing world.39
Central to the NWO modernization models diffusion into ideology and
enactment into development policy in Third World states are the Struc-
163
tural Adjustment Programs (SAP) promoted and imposed on developing countries by international nancial institutions, most notably
the World Bank and the IMF. It has been argued, for example, that the
World Bank disburses loans conditional on adherence to marketoriented reform through a policy of leverage, whereby conditions are
attached to loans that are designed to impinge quickly and directly on
governments scal policies and developmental priorities. 40 In Cambodia, the imposition of a SAP, and an economically oriented and marketcentered conception of development, was easily facilitated by the
UN-sponsored international intervention. It was this conception of development that provided the framework for an internationally coordinated program for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the
country.
Cambodias rst steps on the path toward modernization, and therefore reintegration into the global capitalist economy, were taken in June
1992, when Japan hosted the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia (MCRRC). The principal accomplishment of the conference was the establishment of the International
Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), a consultative body and international mechanism whose members comprised
countries and organizations contributing to Cambodias development.
It was the formation of ICORC, with the assent of the leaders of Cambodias factions, that initiated the process of placing Cambodias future
development orientation in the hands of foreign governments and
multilateral organizations.
The declaration of MCRRC was quite explicit in illuminating the
roles of ICORC:
Provide a forum for the exchange of views and information with the
Cambodian authorities (clause 1).
Enable the government of Cambodia to put its views before the
contributors (clause 2).
Enable the contributors to consult with and advise the Cambodian
authorities on development requirements (clause 2).
Provide for the coordination of assistance to Cambodia to develop
an economic and social planning and aid-management capacity
(clause 3).
To welcome as observers at ICORC meetings NGOs nominated by
the NGO Coordination Committee for Cambodia (clause 7).41
Although the conference did not explicitly state that the role of ICORC
was to impose an international agenda on Cambodia, the roles dened
164
by the conference did establish a power relationship in which imposition became an unstated assumption. While the framework allowed the
Cambodian government to put its views before the international contributors, it was the international contributors who were to advise the
Cambodian authorities and who were to provide for the coordination
of assistance. Given that the money and expertise were to ow in only
one direction, there was never the expectation or serious belief that
Cambodias views would shift or alter the nature of the advice of international contributors.
The Tokyo conference also provided an indication of the nature of
the advice that was to emanate from ICORC. The concluding declaration of the conference made explicit the issues for the development of
Cambodias economy in the future:
International nancial institutions [World Bank, IMF, and ADB]
stressed the importance of market-based reforms in Cambodia to increasing output in major sectors of the economy. . . .
There remain fundamental institutional and policy-related constraints
to further economic progress. . . .
We stress our resolve . . . to extend appropriate assistance . . . to Cambodia . . . that ensure[s] and strengthen[s] Cambodias own capacity to
sustain its development. . . .
We are hopeful that . . . Cambodia can expand and diversify its external trade and investment relationships, so that it will be integrated into
the dynamic economic development of the Asia-Pacic region and of
the world.42
The commitment to modernization ushered in by the conference

was consolidated in October 1993, only a month after the formation of
the coalition government. Cambodias arrears to the IMF, accrued during the 1970s, were paid by grants from bilateral donors, paving the way
for an IMF loan only days later. The loan, embracing the key recommendations of the 1992 MCRRC, required, as did IMF structural adjustment agreements elsewhere, the Cambodian government to implement
tight scal and monetary policies.
The National Plan to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia (NPRD),
presented by the government to the second ICORC meeting in Tokyo,
in March 1994, provides striking evidence of the extent to which the
developmentalism of the NWO had been adopted as an ideology of the
state in Cambodia.43 Based on the principle that the government is a
165
manager of development and a partner of the private sector, the

NPRD dened Cambodias short-term (eighteen months) and mediumterm (three years) rehabilitation and development strategies. Clearly
reecting the agenda of the international community summarized in
the MCCRC declaration cited earlier, the strategy embraced six mutually-reinforcing and interdependent elds of operation:
Create a legal and institutional environment conducive to fostering
the emergence of a strong private sector.
Achieve the stabilization and structural adjustment of the economy
through macroeconomic controls.
Develop the human resources base . . . with a view to strengthening
. . . the private sector.
Rehabilitate and build up physical infrastructure and public facilities
. . . in order to support investment.
Open the country to international trade and private foreign investment in order to integrate into the regional and world economies.
Achieve rural development and the sustainable management of natural resources and the environment.44
The underlying themes of the elds of operation were market-based

economic reform, a powerful private sector, overcoming institutional
restraints, capacity building, and economic diversication and regionalization. In short, they are the themes of the economically oriented modernization model of the NWO. Formulated by foreign experts, they were
enthusiastically rubber stamped by the co-prime ministers and constituted, at least in terms of policy, the central tenets of the state ideology
of the postelection Kingdom of Cambodia.45
It is human capital theory, rst articulated in the 1950s, that linked
education to the governments development priorities. As human resource development, education in the post-Cold War world is associated with enhanced efciency and rationality in decision-making. It
is, in turn, perceived to be a determinant of competitive advantage in
the market. The education policy measures associated with the human
capital theory of the NWO have been established according to the
rules and norms of the World Bank. 46 These norms, based on notions
of increased efciency in the use of resources, qualitative renewal, and
improved sectoral management, were evident in the education policy
program formulated by foreign advisers in Cambodia. They were willingly and enthusiastically embraced by the Cambodian government,
which proudly boasted as fundamental development priorities the
166
sustainable development of human resources and sustainable economic growth. 47
Establishing the Framework

The NPRD was the culmination of early attempts to establish a framework for development in Cambodia following the formation of the kingdom and therefore the conclusion of UNTACs mandate. While the
UNTAC forces had all but left the country by the end of 1993, the international presence remained substantial and was focused primarily on
the tasks of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Over the next two years,
the commitment to development became a concerted international
and domestic project, with considerable energy and nances expended
in ensuring its success. The process was orchestrated by international
actors, particularly the World Bank, whose annual reports to ICORC
achieved unparalleled inuence.48
The educational project associated with the commitment, steadily
gaining momentum since the 1991 Education For All conference, went
into full swing when the Rebuilding Quality Education and Training in
Cambodia Program was ratied at the National Education Seminar in
January 1994.49 The program formed the cornerstone of policy-making
in education over the next two years, providing a comprehensive policy
framework to deal with the crisis in Cambodian education. At the seminar, the recently installed minister of education, Ung Huot, outlined the
regimes educational priorities:
Universalizing nine years of basic general education.
Modernizing and improving the quality of the education system.
Linking training development with the requirements of both employers and workers.50
Responding to the educational imperatives included in the kingdoms constitution, these priorities reected the regimes commitment
to development.51 In doing so, they made a positive contribution to
addressing the educational crisis that had beset the country for over
three decades. In one respect, they engaged the qualitative concerns
that all previous Cambodian regimes had failed to address. Second, the
priorities addressed the question of the relevance of the system to its
beneciaries, the nations students and the nations social well-being.
The remainder of 1994 was concerned with generating a framework
through which the program could be implemented. The Education Sec-
167
tor Review conducted by the Asian Development Bank was particularly

inuential.52 The reviews medium-term development strategy, the Indicative Policy and Strategic Directions 1994 2000, reected the policy advice given to the Cambodian government over the previous forty
years. The strategy included increasing the hours of instruction to accord with international norms, reducing the number of underqualied
teachers, Khmerizing instruction (in higher education), emphasizing
improvements in educational quality, and simplifying the curriculum to
foster greater relevance. Coupled with these measures were others that
reected the market-oriented ideological tone of the developmentalism
of the NWO. The Education Sector Review recommended a performancebased scale of salary incrementation, downsizing the education service
through redeployment, departure, and retraining schemes, commercialization of selected education support services, merit-driven matriculation examinations, privatization of schooling in selected urban areas,
the introduction of student charges in higher education, business sponsorship of higher education faculties, and the introduction of shortterm contracts for future staff employed by the ministry.53 An education
plan, stemming from the ADBs review, was adopted by the government
in December 1994. Presenting the plan to international donors, the government committed itself to increasing its budget share allocated to education to 15 percent by the year 2000 (from its present level of approximately 7 to 8 percent).54
Despite reservations about the capacity of the government to implement the reforms, the international community remained, in 1994,
condent about the prospects for the successful rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia. With the cooperation of the Cambodian government, the development-oriented state ideology that was imposed on
the country was intended to assure Cambodias emergence into the
global economic market. The education system, as it had in Cambodias
development programs of the past, was considered essential to realizing
that goal. The minister of education, Ung Huot, articulated this expectation at the National Forum on Foreign Aid to Education:
One of the countrys major objectives is to turn out a new generation
of youth who will [be] fully employable and capable of making a contribution to the defense and construction of the nation. . . .55
Good citizens, the minister implied, would be those Cambodians capable

of assuming the qualities of modernity necessary to take their place on
the stage of global economic interdependence. In articulating his
168
expectation, Ung Huots rhetoric revealed the extent to which the government had embraced the educational imperatives associated with the
developmentalism of the NWO:
To reach this objective, we deem it necessary to carry out our immediate tasks: the renement and the reform of the whole system of education and the reorganization of the whole managerial structure with a
view to improving the effectiveness of the system.56
Toward Despair
The emergence in Cambodia of a pluralist democracy, the marketoriented reform and reconstruction of the countrys shattered economy, and the creation of an environment conducive to securing foreign
investment and trade, all underlying the development ideology embraced by the government, were dependent on the establishment of the
rule of law.57 Contrary to the widespread sense of hope that accompanied the 1993 elections, political developments in Cambodia following
the departure of UNTAC were characterized by a very conspicuous failure to establish anything that even closely resembled the rule of law.58 It
was a failure that stemmed from the strength and endurance of Cambodias traditional political culture.
The rst underlying cause of the failure was the development of dual
power structures following the formation of the coalition government
in 1993. As reconciliation between the major parties was, at best, cosmetic, there was never any attempt to create a depoliticized state apparatus. Instead, authority, roles, and responsibilities in the new administration were split between the coalition parties. The result, observed
David Ashley, was the creation of two separate and competing party
states operating within every ministry, province, military command and
police commissariat. 59 As the coalition had been formed on a consensus principle, whereby both parties were to agree to the decisions
of the royal government, the gradual development of a two-party state
saw communications between the coalition partners grind to a halt,
leaving crucial administrative decisions and institutional reforms dormant. In short, the executive and legislative decisions that may have facilitated the rule of law were never undertaken.
A second cause of the failure to establish the rule of law, tied to the
rst, was the increasing rivalry between the two major coalition parties
169
and especially that between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. As the development of a two-party state gathered momentum, traditional power structures overwhelmed those of an emergent modern state. Both prime
ministers attempted to establish vast networks of clients and bases of
power within the bureaucracy, business community, media, military,
and police. In doing so, they were often quick to cast aside considerations of policy, economic reform, the unity of their parties, and morality. The expulsion from FUNCINPEC and the National Assembly of
Sam Rainsy (the high-prole former minister for nance), the rape of
Cambodias natural resources, the governments unwillingness to deal
with drug trafcking, and the pitiful scurry to enlist defectors from the
decrepit and self-destructive Khmer Rouge were all tragically linked to
the incapacity of Cambodias leaders to put policy over politics and
nation over self.60
In 1994, one astute analyst described the process of decision-making
in the coalition administration as one of scorn. He cited the scorn of
a political class that goes on increasing the number of highly paid
ofcials with no thought for the poverty of the vast majority of the population. Adding to the assertion, he summed up the character of the
Cambodian political environment, referring to scorn in terms of ability and merit among those exercising power and scorn toward the
Cambodian voters whose electoral voice was ignored.61 To this list could
be added the scorn of the Cambodian government toward the international community, whose massive investment in Cambodia was
treated with contempt, and the scorn of the government toward its
own state ideology.
What of education in this environment? At the heart of human resources development, and therefore at the core of the countrys development project, the education system was the source of considerable
government attention and optimism in planning its quest to rehabilitate
and reconstruct Cambodia. To what extent was the awed coalition government able to deal with the educational crisis inherited from previous
Cambodian regimes in attempting to realize the optimism associated
with its investment in education? In light of the explosive political environment, how effective were the detailed plans and policy directions
formulated by the governments foreign advisers, at the behest of the
international community, in addressing long-standing problems in
education?
Sadly, Cambodias enduring and pervasive educational crisis re-
170
mained a function of the attempts of the countrys rulers to construct

the nation-state. In the process of construction, as in the past, traditional conceptions of power, hierarchy, and leadership enmeshed with
institutions of modernity and the governments ofcially sanctioned
commitment to development. In respect to the crisis in education, state
formation saw a subversion of the Westernized models of planning associated with modern educational development, and enthusiastically
embraced in the rhetoric of the government. A nostalgia for times
passed, traditional patterns of authority, and traditional understanding
of the nation-state all played their part in creating a tension between the
weight of history and the demands of modernity that underscored postUNTAC Cambodia.
Fading Optimism
While in hindsight its optimism may have been misguided, the international community, in 1995, still remained hopeful that Cambodia would
continue its tenuous progress toward development. In March 1995, the
Cambodian government again met with international donors in Paris to
reect on the developments of 1994 and to set priorities and targets for
the period 1995/1996. First Prime Minister Ranariddh described the
outcome of the meeting as a great success for Cambodia and its
people. On the surface, his enthusiasm was rightly founded. Despite
confusion about the specic amounts of aid pledged to Cambodia during the meeting, it was clear that the governments request for U.S.$295
million had been exceeded.62
At a supercial level, the World Banks report reected the governments optimism. It noted, for example, that the Government is to be
commended for its achievements in 1994 and for the realistic approach
it takes in addressing the daunting work that remains to be done. 63 Beyond the surface though, the World Bank report was replete with the
concerns of international donors. In relation to restructuring the economy, for example, the banks report noted that strong efforts in the
area of tax reform are needed, concluding that the Government must
keep in mind that the current high level of external budget support is
not sustainable. Other economic concerns raised by the bank included
the governments overrun in defense spending and its failure to include
revenues from logging in the national budget.64 At one level, the concerns could be attributed to the effect of the tragedies of the past and a
171
failure on the part of the Cambodian administration to fully understand

the nature of accountable administration. A more realistic assessment is
that those areas of concern raised by the bank paralleled the attempts
by the governments leaders to reinforce their respective bases of power.
It was certainly the case in relation to the banks concerns in regard to
spending on education.
In March 1994, the government had introduced a salary supplement
of 20,000 riels (then U.S.$8) per month for teachers. In one respect, this
prime pdagogique accorded with the governments stated aim of improving the performance and morale of the teaching force. 65 It was the
ADBs Education Sector Review, however, that put the salary supplement
in perspective:
What has the government or public got in return?very little. There
is little sign of improved staff performance. MOEYS [Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport] staff have retained their second and third
jobs. . . . The prime pdagogique could have been used to inuence policyas an incentive for working longer hours or improving staff performance. . . . The prime pdagogique of 1994 . . . a chance missed.66
The World Banks ICORC report was similarly critical: this pay rise
has clearly not been linked to increases in teacher performance nor to
necessary plans to restructure and downsize the education service. 67 As
with the governments failure to properly collect tax and the Ministry of
Defenses control of logging, which were attributable to an attempt by
FUNCINPEC to secure the loyalty of those who were granted tax exemptions and by the CPP to secure the loyalty of the military, respectively, the prime pdagogique was a blatant attempt by FUNCINPEC to secure legitimacy among the staff of a FUNCINPEC-headed ministry.68
The three examples highlight the themes that dominated educational
development in post-UNTAC Cambodia. The ascendancy of political
expedience over policy, quantity over quality, and contempt for technical advice and the processes and outcomes of planning emerge as the
underlying themes of the period of lost opportunity that was evident
from at least 1995; and it was arguably inevitable from the day in 1993
when two belligerent factions, with no shared aspirations, agreed to
share power in order to bring peace to Cambodia. Absolute power, its
manifestation and its maintenance, as in the past, were the hallmark of
politics and policy in Cambodia and were the desired outcome of statemaking. The coalition governments ofcial commitment to develop-
172
ment was the tool and the funds provided by the international community were the conduit. As consistently happened in the past, education
was the victim.
The crisis in Cambodian education following the 1993 elections was
an inherent function of Cambodian politics. In essence, while rhetoric
often indicated otherwise, the development of a nancially and qualitatively sustainable education system in Cambodia remained a secondary
priority of Cambodias administration. Before Hun Sens military takeover of the government in July 1997, the primary priority of the two
prime ministers, and their associated political parties, was power. As a
result, policies in education existed at the whim of the two national leaders, whose concern with legitimizing, reinforcing, and sustaining political power saw policies and commitments ignored, delayed, or altered in
the name of short-term political expedience. The lack of genuine commitment to education, and the governments willingness to ignore, delay, or alter policies and commitments is apparent in relation to questions of educational nance, planning, and quality, which will be
discussed next. Failures on each of these counts resulted in a reassertion
of the underlying causes of the crises of the past: unsustainable expansion and declining quality leading to educational graduates whose credentials were both incompatible and irrelevant in respect to the nations
socioeconomic development requirements. In essence, the disparity between the education system and the economic, political, and cultural
environments that it was intended to serve remained as evident in the
early-1990s as it did throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
Educational Finance: The Question of Commitment

In May 1994, the Cambodian minister of nance and minister for rehabilitation and development signed a preliminary IMF Structural Adjustment Agreement in which it was agreed that the government would increase the budget for education.69 In December 1994, Ranariddh and
Hun Sen signaled the governments adherence to this direction by promoting the intention to increase the budgetary share for education
from around 9 percent in 1994 to at least 15 percent by the year 2000. 70
Keeping in mind the IMF agreement, the crises of the past, and the
funding necessary to nance the governments development program,
the commitment was not only highly desirable but absolutely necessary.
By 1995, the World Bank had expressed concern with Cambodias
commitment to this fundamental educational measure. The banks 1995
173
ICORC report, for example, noted that budgetary shortfalls constrain

improvements to the education system, and the low quality and lack of
relevance of education lead to . . . inadequate achievement. 71 The
banks concerns were mirrored by the NGO community and by the governments own advisers.72 The government remained deant, reiterating in the 1996 socioeconomic development plan its commitment to allocate a minimum of 15 percent of the total budget to education. 73
In December 1996, the minister in charge of rehabilitation and development, Keat Chhon, nally conceded the governments nancing
failure:
The national budget for the education sector as a whole over the past
four years has remained at less than 10% of [budget expenditure].
Given these gures, the goal of reaching from 12% to 15% of the budget in the year 2000 will not be achieved [emphasis added].74
Chhons concession was formally realized less than two weeks later
when the National Assembly ratied the governments 1997 budget. The
budget papers, contrary to the misleading reports in the press, revealed
that the education systems share of the total national budget would fall
to 8.11 percent in 1997, down from 11.83 percent in 1996.75
Why was the government unable to achieve this key educational and
nancial goal? Following the budget, an obviously exasperated Keat
Chhon made the reasons immediately apparent. In short, the administration had failed to channel all state revenues into the national budget.
Whether through corrupt taxation and customs ofcials, the diversion
of forestry revenues, or extrabudgetary expenditure by the leaders of
the two major political factions, the bottom line of the budgets revenue
column had consistently been lower than it should have been.76
While government revenues no doubt affected the paltry amount of
money allocated to education, it is even more disturbing to examine
how those funds raised were actually spent. Although budget allocations
rose in most ministries, the education, environment, nance, and national defense ministries all received reduced disbursements. Given the
governments commitment to human resources development through
education, the problems of environmental degradation, and the difculty in collecting revenue, the reductions to the education, environment, and nance ministries appear quite inexplicable, if not irrational.
The reduction in the national defense budget, on the other hand, was a
laudable measure, given that the seemingly paralyzed Khmer Rouge
were of no threat to the government. The reduction was countered,
174
however, by a 32 percent rise in the budget for the Ministry of the Interior, the stronghold of the CPP.77
The national budget provided salient proof of the governments
neglect of education. Other goals, such as the CPPs bid to shore up its
control over the state through the Ministry of the Interior, had been
given priority. The nancial neglect of education, for overt political
ends, was even more conspicuous in relation to how money was spent on
education. What emerged was a situation in which over 80 percent of
total recurrent expenditure on education was devoted to salaries and
operating expenses. The majority was absorbed by three central ministerial departments. Given that central departments catered to only
3 percent of students (in higher education) and that the funding for the
education of the majority of the nations students was disbursed by
provincial authorities, the budget raised the serious question of education for whom? The emphasis of recurrent educational expenditure on
salary payments to a select few within the central departments of the
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MOEYS) demonstrated the
governments lack of concern for those most affected by education.
There was an obvious careless attitude toward the provision of school
and classroom materials, the provision of funds for the ongoing maintenance of school infrastructure, and the continued professional development of the nations poorly trained teaching corps.
Stemming from this lack of concern was the systems culture of corruption. Notwithstanding corrupt practices that existed at the higher
echelons of the ministry, widespread institutionalized corruption was
endemic at two levels within the education system. At one level, informal fees were charged by poorly paid teachers throughout the country.
By charging students for attendance at extracurricular classes, where
they were taught the subject matter essential for effective participation
in examinations; by providing only a certain number of free hours of tuition per day; or by conducting after-school tutorials within school facilities, where the essential subject matter in the syllabus is covered, this
informal fees corruption existed right through the education system.78
The second level of corruption, while not as pervasive as the rst, involved corruption in relation to matriculation examinations. The transition of students from secondary to tertiary education in Cambodia was
marked by three examinations. The examination period each year was
characterized by an elaborate management, supervision, marking, and
security scheme that made it essential for the administration to provide salary supplementation to selected ministerial employees, but in-
175
evitably there was a proliferation of corrupt practices, as examination

papers and responses were sold by those charged with protecting their
impartial distribution and supervision.79
The corruption was a product of the very poor salary received by
Cambodias teachers and education ofcials. Even when an educators
salary was paid, it was frequently late in arriving and often did not equal
the total entitlement. The effects of the corruption, in respect to the crisis in education, were direct. Students without the means to provide
their teachers with additional remuneration were denied access to a
comprehensive education and were subsequently denied the equity
guaranteed them in Cambodias much lauded constitution.80 Teachers,
on the other hand, quite rightly continued to consider that their professional capacity and status in the community were in decline. These effects were directly attributable to government policies that denied funding to the education sector in the name of either more attractive
political propositions elsewhere or in order not to offend those sections
of the electorate on whom their legitimacy and their patronage were
based. Contributing in no small measure to the problems was the approach to planning taken by both the Ministry of Education and those
who directed the ministry.
Educational Planning: The Question of Expedience

In their foreword to an education policy document, Cambodias coprime ministers asserted that the governments education plan demonstrated its determination to address the human resources development needs of the country in a systematic yet dynamic fashion. 81 How
effective was the government in adopting this systematic planning approach? Was the commitment to this process, encouraged by international donors, genuine on the part of the Cambodian administration?
These questions can be answered by focusing on just one aspect of reform: the governments commitment to the rationalization of the public
service. This crucial element in the nations development plans is a core
issue in the developmentalism of the NWO. It was also considered by major multilateral donors to be a critical plank in the governments attempts to liberalize the economy. The governments 1994 agreement
with the IMF included a commitment that it would reduce the size of the
bloated civil service by 20 percent by 1997. In February 1995, the government began moves toward this rationalization when it conducted a
headcount to remove ghosts from the various ministerial payrolls
176
and to identify those civil servants in dereliction of their duties by engaging in employment elsewhere.82 The rationalization agreement reected the governments commitment to development, and in turn, its
commitment to market-based economic reform through both publicsector efciency gains and strengthening the private sector.
In terms of education, the agreement recognized that graduates of
Cambodian universities would no longer be guaranteed automatic recruitment into the civil service, an arrangement that was ratied with
the passing of legislation by the National Assembly in 1994.83 By the end
of that year, the government had decided, with reference to dubious statistical projections, that with an expected increase in educational enrollments, they could not afford to reduce the educational corps. Instead, it was announced that efciency gains would be achieved by
transferring to school-based positions many of those ofce administrators who were also qualied teachers.84 In essence, the policy of the government, embraced at both the level of the Ministry of Education and
by the Council of Ministers, implied that few teachers would need to be
recruited in the immediate future, as the need for qualied staff could
be achieved through internal rationalization.
The policy changes effectively transformed the nature of the Royal
University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), which had served, quite haphazardly, as an upper secondary school teacher training institution since
1979.85 The 1995 graduating class of the RUPP were awarded Bachelor
of Arts or Bachelor of Science degrees and, according to the 1994 agreement and its associated legislation, were to seek their own employment
in the private-sector-oriented free market. It was a situation immediately rejected by the students, whose historical appreciation of tertiary
education had convinced them they were entitled to employment in the
civil service. At the 1995 RUPP graduation ceremony, the speaker representing the 1,460 graduands expressed the students concerns:
In previous years, because of the needs of the country, everyone received a degree in education. While this is a valuable degree, the overall needs in Cambodia have changed. However, we feel somewhat concerned as this is the rst time that we graduates must nd jobs for
ourselves, so we ask you, Your Highness [referring to Prince Ranariddh], to think of us as you work to develop and expand the economy in Cambodia.86
The concerns of the students were not lost on the rst prime minister,
who had earlier addressed the ceremony:
177
Besides, . . . all the new graduates want to be ofcers of other status [sic]
in government position, even if the salary is lower than many private
companies.87
In the aftermath of the graduation ceremony, both prime ministers,

in a move designed to generate immediate political goodwill, guaranteed the university graduates employment with the government. Drawing on the governments emphasis on human resources development, it
was decided that the students should be employed as teachers by the
Ministry of Education. Fully aware that the ministry did not need to employ further staff, the Minister of Education proposed several compromise solutions. They were immediately rejected by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen.88
In late 1995, in contradiction to Cambodias agreement with the IMF
and in deance of its own legislation and the clearly articulated policies
of the Ministry of Education, which had been approved by the Council
of Ministers, the minister of education received a direction from the
prime ministers that the 1,460 RUPP graduates would spend a year at
the Faculty of Pedagogy, where they would be trained as teachers of upper secondary school. An adviser to the minister recalled he had no discretion in this matter, nally capitulating to force majeure. 89
The governments employment of the university graduates, in contravention of both its own policies and its agreements with international
donors, represents a stark example of both the underlying nature of the
educational policy-making process in Cambodia and its eventual outcomes. First, it can be seen that policy-making existed at the same two
levels it did in the 1960s. The rst level was that of the Ministry of Education, where policies were developed that were in accordance with the
imperatives of international agreements and were harmonious with
Cambodias stated development objectives. The second level of educational policy-making was that of the national leaders, whose politically
motivated interference in the policy-making process often contradicted
the very objectives of the governments overall development agenda,
subverting the processes of policy formulation and implementation.
The underlying nature of this policy-making process was not a new
phenomenon in Cambodian politics. Rather, it was a clear manifestation
of the hierarchical political culture that provided the behavioral model
for the leaders of all of Cambodias postindependence political regimes.
The model, whereby the deeds and actions of the leader are generally
perceived as being beyond reproach, has created a state controlled
178
totally and absolutely by that leader. In the context of the recruitment

as teachers of the 1995 graduates of the University of Phnom Penh, this
state-making project by the national leaders impacted directly on the
crisis in education.
First, the new graduates of the Faculty of Pedagogy perpetuated the
problem of inadequately trained teachers in schools. While Hun Sen directed the minister to provide positions for the graduates at the Faculty
of Pedagogy, he failed to address the capacity of the faculty to cater to
the educational needs of such a large class. The Faculty of Pedagogy was
without the necessary staff, facilities, textbooks, and equipment to provide for the students and did not have a curriculum in place that could
cater to their needs or prepare for them for teaching in the nations upper secondary school classrooms.
Second, the unnecessary recruitment of the teachers placed further
strain on the education budget. The problem of devoting an exorbitantly disproportionate amount of the budget to the payment of salaries
was heightened, further eroding the capacity of the ministry to provide
adequate materials to students, adequate resources for teachers, and the
necessary maintenance of educational infrastructure and facilities. Issues such as the Khmerization of instruction, the development of second language education in primary and secondary schools, and ongoing curriculum development and reform were all neglected, further
affecting the ministrys ability to align the national education system
with the countrys development objectives.
The problem caused by employing the graduates in government was
not one that could be alleviated in the short term. In 1996, the government indicated that it would continue to employ university graduates as
teachers. Minister of Education Tol Lah asserted that steps would be
taken to recruit students for the civil service as soon as they graduated
from high school or university. In relation to university graduates, the
minister noted:
We can guarantee these students [university graduates] they will not
have any problems getting jobs with the government. They will become
teachers or lecturers at the university.90
The purpose of employment guarantees, a Council of Ministers paper asserts, is to ensure political and social stability. If there is no stability, it is not possible for the government to be succeeded [sic]. 91
While it may be concerned with the stability of the government, and
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therefore the entrenched positions of power held by the governments

leaders, the policy failed to consider Cambodias development agenda,
its agreement with an increasingly frustrated IMF,92 and, importantly, its
capacity to avert a crisis in education. The pattern of failing to honor
agreements and disregarding technical advice in order to enhance the
state-building project of the national leaders was again conspicuous in
relation to the questions of educational quality and quantitative expansion. It is to these questions we now turn.
Educational Quality: The Question of Quantity

The quantitative expansion of educational provision was a goal embodied in Cambodias constitution. Article 68 states both that the state shall
provide free primary and secondary education to all citizens in public
schools and that citizens shall receive education for at least nine
years. 93 In order to achieve the guarantees provided for in the constitution, the governments educational policies embraced as a mediumterm objective to expand primary education by one year providing a
school system of twelve years based on a 6 3 3 model (primary,
lower, and upper secondary, respectively).
By any reasonable measure of educational quality, the education system of Cambodia in the aftermath of the UN-sponsored elections was in
a parlous state and had certainly not improved since the 1991 Paris
Peace Agreements. There remained an abundance of unqualied
teachers, the absence of a national curriculum framework, inadequate
book supplies, and high student repetition and drop-out rates.94 An
Australian education adviser, reecting on the developments in education since the signing of the Paris agreements, substantiated these observations. He recalled:
The curriculum was basic in the extreme. Math consisted of a one
page list of topics per class, each topic to be completed in a week. . . .
The schools were bare. Hardly a book or a poster to be seen and
other equipment no more than a dream. Teachers . . . were usually two
months behind in salary, often missed out completely, and rarely got
their full entitlement.
Ministry ofces were no better. No funds were available for paper,
pens, water supply, electricity or fuel. . . .95
180
Keeping an eye on educational quality, the ADB addressed the governments objective of achieving nine years of basic education through
a 6 3 3 structure:
The mission proposes a gradual approach to introducing six years of
primary schooling, starting a grade six class around the year 2000. Any
acceleration of the process . . . would leave insufcient time to nalize
new curriculum frameworks, textbooks and staff development programs. . . . The key objective of ensuring that quantitative gains do not sacrice
quality improvements would be in jeopardy [emphasis added].96
In 1996, the government proudly boasted that Cambodia would have

in place a six-year primary education system, marking this progression
as the rst in a list of major achievements in education.97 It was an
announcement, reecting government initiatives, that expressly contradicted the technical advice provided by international donors. Why
was the ADBs sound advice rejected? Certainly, the qualitative problems
that preceded the decision had not been addressed. Likewise, secondary education had not been rationalized or reorganized in order to
cope with the reforms in primary education. While the government
guaranteed six years of primary education from the beginning of the
1996 1997 academic year, it failed to consider the demand for further
infrastructure; the nalization of curriculum, textbooks, and materials
and the number and adequacy of available teachers. In essence, the decision had been made to pursue a politically attractive program of educational provision in favor of addressing long-standing educational concerns, of which the government was quite aware.
The pursuit of form over substance was a principal feature of the
education system pursued in Cambodia during the Sangkum period of
Sihanouk. For the then-prince, educational expansion represented a
key to legitimizing his Buddhist socialist state and reinforcing his indispensability as the nations leader. In the political climate of post-UNTAC
Cambodia, the pursuit of form over substance was a result of the attempts by the two major factions of the ruling regime to secure greater
legitimacy among the people. It was a trend reected in Hun Sens belief that the CPP is a superpower when it comes to school construction
and in his prolic program of school inaugurations.98 During a visit to
the former Khmer Rouge stronghold of Samlaut, for example, he
promised to build ten new schools in the district.99 The second prime
ministers announcement was made without the involvement of the
Ministry of Education and without a needs assessment study. Instead, it
181
was a spontaneous response to a plea by the new governor of the district,

Hem Sophal, to assist in developing Samlaut. Aside from questions of
extrabudgetary expense and with a disregard for the planning process,
the prime ministers announcement was made without any consideration of educational quality. Who would teach at these schools? Where
would they be located? What materials would be available? To where
would the students graduate upon completion of their studies? These
key questions were never addressed.
The politically motivated educational expansion pursued by the government, and particularly the CPP, since the elections of 1993, undoubtedly fueled the crisis in Cambodian education. On one count, the
nancial capacity of the ministry to effect necessary changes, especially
when considered in the light of the governments poor record of budgetary commitment to education, was signicantly diminished. Forced
to contend with the immediate demands stemming from quantitative
expansion, especially in relation to infrastructure and the recruitment,
training, and deployment of teachers, the ministry was nancially and
logistically unable and incapable of diverting the necessary resources to
those existing areas of the system in dire need of improvement. On a
second count, the orientation toward quantitative expansion reduced
the planning options of the Ministry of Education in relation to the realization of qualitative improvements. The state of the quality of the education system provided testament to the severity of this problem and
testied to the magnitude of the task facing the governmentboth the
ministry and the national leadersif improvements in educational
quality were to become a serious policy concern.
Education: Learning from the Past?

To what extent did those charged with the development of education in
post-UNTAC Cambodia succeed in orchestrating successful reforms? At
one level, the detailed and intricate educational policies formulated following the international communitys renewed involvement with Cambodia indicated that the mistakes and problems of the past had guided
educational policy formulation. The educational policies prepared in
Cambodia following the 1993 elections represented a laudable program
of reform that offered possible solutions to several of the countrys
rmly entrenched educational problems. Although criticized on many
fronts, especially in respect to its negative effects on the countries of
the developing world, a NWO-oriented development program, eagerly
182
embraced by the government, underscored Cambodias education policy framework. Primarily, the program of educational reform was concerned with qualitative revitalization, demonstrating both an awareness
of long-standing problems with Cambodias teaching corps, educational
materials, and curriculum and an understanding that efforts to rectify
these problems could only be facilitated with access to scarce resources.
In addition, the program demonstrated a concern with questions of equity, addressing the needs of female students, students from ethnic minorities and, importantly, students from rural Cambodia. Given that the
policy program appeared to address Cambodias educational problems,
why was it not fully realized in practice? Why was the crisis in Cambodian
education augmented following the 1993 elections?
The answer lies in understanding the totality of the policy formulation and implementation arena. In simple terms, the educational policy
formulation process is not restricted to a single arena, where educational decisions are made in accordance with the Westernized planning
process synonymous with notions of modernity. The planning processes
congruent with NWO-oriented development, and therefore with ideas
about global modernity, were continually subverted by conditions tied
rmly to Cambodias local sociopolitical milieu. It is quite evident that
educational policies in post-UNTAC Cambodia were subjected to the
whims of the nations political leaders. Educational policies developed
by the Ministry of Education, in consultation with international advisers
and in congruence with international practice, were implemented only
where they did not conict with the immediate political imperatives of
those in control of the apparatuses of the state. The cases of the prime
pdagogique, the commitment to a 15 percent budgetary allocation to education, the public service agreement with the IMF, and the implementation of a 6 3 3 school structure all highlight the capacity of Cambodias national leaders to subvert planning processes, dispensing with
or overturning stated and ofcial educational policies and replacing
them with cosmetic contingencies and reforms designed to augment
their power.
In this respect, formal education, rather than the key to realizing the
governments stated commitment to human resources development,
was a tool utilized, and often abused, in the interests of building a Cambodian nation-state geared to the entrenched positions of those in
power. In the context of the coalition government formed following the
United Nations-sponsored elections, it was a situation exacerbated by a
183
divided coalition government whose prime ministers (Hun Sen in particular) used the education system in their attempts to outdo each other.
The NWO-oriented framework that dominated educational policies
in Cambodia may have eventually failed. The simple reality, though, is
that it was never given a chance to succeed. While critics may have
balked at its overtly Western and modernist tone, the policy framework
offered, at the very least, a costed, coherent, and arguably relevant sense
of direction. The rejection of this framework, in favor of an ad hoc policy framework based solely on political criteria, was a manifestation of
the conditions that sustained the educational crisis in Cambodia over an
extended period. While the quality of education at all levels of the system remained deplorably low throughout the country, the government,
in light of directions from its leaders, failed to provide the system with
the funds necessary to effect sustainable improvement. Further, it continued to force on the Ministry of Education policy directions that undermined the capacity of educational ofcials, and their advisers, to
work toward the realization of the systems stated goals and, therefore,
the alignment of the education system with the countrys development
agenda.
Underlying the continued convolution and subversion of educational policies was an enmeshment of tradition with modernity. Supported by the presence of those state institutions commonly associated
with modernity, Cambodias commitment to development was enacted
with an eye to securing the countrys position in the global community.
Central to the commitment were the key tenets of the NWO: the preeminence of pluralism and democracy, a small and noninterventionist
state apparatus, and the dominance of the free market. Enmeshed with
these institutions of modernity were Cambodias hierarchical political
traditions, in which democracy represents a hindrance to those exercising power and in which all authority rests with those who control the obtrusive and intrusive apparatuses of the state. These traditions, in sharp
contrast to those underlying the Westernized development ideology
embraced by the government, were at the core of the construction of
the Cambodian nation-state, which informed the countrys process of
educational policy formulation and implementation and which eventually accounted for the nature of Cambodias educational crisis.
Conclusion
At twilight, the modern world
recedes from Angkor Wat as
the last stragglers leave with
memories of sunset over the
western entrances. Reclaimed
by the twelfth century again, the
temple slowly disappears from
view during the encroaching
darkness. . . . Silence descends,
and in the soundless night, time
seems to stand still.
E. Mannika, Angkor Wat:
Time, Space, and Kingship
Like Angkor Wat, where the traditional and modern worlds are enmeshed by the rise and the fall of the sun, the modern Cambodian nation-state embodies both tradition and modernity. Shrouded by the
dark cloak of twilight, the temples disappearance from the horizon is
followed at dawn by the slow ascent of the sun from behind its central
towers, where it again joins the modern world. The Cambodian nationstate, with Angkor Wat at its core, oscillates between these two worlds, attempting to reconcile the demands of each. The education system, central to state-making, is caught in the middle of the reconciliation
process.
It is tempting to conclude that the crisis in Cambodian education
began with the consecration of a unified Khmer state, under King
Jayavarman II, in the ninth century. Just how Jayavarman ruled the
Khmer polity we do not know. In fact, we know very little about him
or about the lands and people he ruled. We do know, courtesy of an
eleventh-century inscription, that in the year 802 he participated in a
ritual whereby he became a chakravartin (universal monarch) and where
the cult of the devaraja (God-King) was celebrated. In the same way
that Cambodian villagers would pay homage to local neak ta (ancestor
spirits), Jayavarmans Angkorean successors would honor his spirit at
184
Conclusion
185
Roluos, where he eventually settled. While the ideas of a universal monarch or a God-King have never been fully explained, they have provided
the cultural core for the Cambodian beliefs about power, hierarchy, and
leadership that are at the core of the educational crisis.
Focusing on the legacy of Jayavarman II provides us with a poignant
image of a timeless society. But history is not so simple. When the
French arrived in Cambodia in the nineteenth century, much of the
countrys early history was unknown to the local population. No one had
bothered to decipher the eleventh-century Sdok Kak Thom inscription.
No one even knew the names of the kings who had reigned over Angkor.
In fact, kingship was in decline and had been so for several centuries.
It was French scholars and archaeologists who told Cambodia of its former greatness. The French deciphered the many inscriptions scattered
throughout the country, listed the great Angkorean kings and their
many victories on the battlefields, and described the massive irrigation
works that had once sustained a mighty kingdom. In doing so, as David
Chandler suggests, the French bequeathed to the Khmer the unmanageable notion that their ancestors had been for a time the most powerful and most gifted people of mainland Southeast Asia. 1 The French
drew on this former greatness in boosting the prestige of the monarchy,
thereby fusing Cambodias long forgotten past with the modernizing
mission civilisatrice.
It might be appropriate then, that we exonerate Jayavarman II and
attribute the educational crisis to the failings of French colonialism. The
case is a compelling one. France provided Cambodias contemporary
leaders with not only aspirations to reclaim the grandeur of the past but
also a path to the future. It was the French who turned Phnom Penh into
a capital city. They introduced electricity, constructed public buildings, turned canals into drains, established a post and telecommunications system, and linked the capital to other parts of the country
through an elaborate system of highways and a railway line. Importantly,
it was the French who undermined the traditional system of temple education, replacing it with a modern counterpart, and introduced ideas
about social change and social mobility that were almost as unmanageable as those about former greatness. The capital city, public works, and
modern education system were all evidence of the mission civilisatrice.
This path to the future hardly extended beyond Cambodias capital.
In the countryside, where the majority of the population lived, the
French did very little. While they were intent on ridding Cambodia of its
traditional education system, the development of a modern counterpart
186
Conclusion
was pursued only to the extent that it was not a drain on colonial resources. The legacy of French colonialism on Cambodia and Cambodian education was the creation of a social contradiction. With one
hand, through the development of Phnom Penh and the promise of
secular education, the French offered Cambodia modernity. With the
other hand, they took it away. While Phnom Penh was developed, much
of the remainder of the country was ignored. Instead, through aligning
themselves with the prestige of the monarchy, the French reinforced the
countrys hierarchical social order and its associated concepts of power,
authority, and patronage. Their half-hearted attempt to provide education, which offered the prospect of upward social mobility, was never
fully realized. The fundamental contradiction between a social environment that offered modernity yet celebrated tradition, and an education
system that promised change but was never fully implemented, sowed
the seeds of educational disparity.
On the basis of the evidence presented here, however, the educational crisis was not a French construction. While it was the French who
introduced modern education to Cambodia, they were never particularly serious about it. It is appropriate that we condemn them for their
ambivalence and their inertia. But it is not appropriate that we condemn
them for Cambodias long-standing educational problems. Rather, as
we have seen, the crisis has been almost a distinctly Cambodian outcome. In particular, it is an outcome that stems from Cambodias leaders, whose attempts to promote their visions of modernity within a
framework of absolute power have had disastrous and sometimes tragic
consequences.
State-making has been a priority of the leaders of each of Cambodias
ruling regimes since independence. Each has sought to reshape local
worlds by promoting radically different ideas about what constitutes a
good Cambodian citizen. Prince Norodom Sihanouk intended to
mold Cambodians into good Buddhist socialists, committed to the
monarchy and to the struggle against underdevelopment. His successor,
Lon Nol, sought to transform the people into neo-Khmer Republicans, while Pol Pot endeavored to destroy their individuality in favor of
collectivization. Burdened by the legacies of the Khmer Rouge, Heng
Samrin and Hun Sen, through the 1980s, attempted to rescue the Communist cause in Cambodia. They believed that Cambodians, like their
new-found allies in neighboring Vietnam, could become new Socialist
workmen. Finally, Cambodias contemporary leaders have consigned
Conclusion
187
themselves to transforming the people into pluralist democrats, committed to securing Cambodias place on the global stage and, importantly, in the regional and global economies. Central to each of these attempts at state-making, with their alternative visions of development and
modernity, have been the traditional political behaviors that evolved in
precolonial times and that were later reinforced by the French. It is as
a result of this traditional political culture that state-making in Cambodia, since independence, has been associated with asserting and reinforcing the power and legitimacy of national political leaders.
The education system has been caught in the middle of these statemaking aspirations: one hand is used to promote development, change,
and modernity, yet the other is used to sustain the key tenets of the precolonial polity. These contradictory expectations for education have
produced the educational crisis, a disparity between education and
Cambodias economic, political, and cultural environments.
The economic disparity in many respects is a product of the colonial
heritage of the education system. All of Cambodias postindependence
regimes have acknowledged the importance of agricultural development to the economy. None, however, has used education to address
this sector and its needs. Periods of educational expansion in Cambodia
have been characterized by the proliferation of the Westernized education system the country inherited from the French. Originally intended
to socialize selected members of the elite into the colonial civil service,
the system has remained inappropriate in an environment where few
students progress beyond primary school and where there exist few employment opportunities in the nonagricultural modern sector associated with the civil service. The rapid expansion of this Western educational model has not been pursued in accordance with expert advice or
even with ministerial policies. Both have almost universally argued that
education should address rural needs and that modernist educational
expansion should be tempered. The rapid expansion of Westernized
education in Cambodia has been a function of the weight of the past: a
desire by Cambodian leaders to secure legitimacy among the populace
and an unwillingness by those charged with developing educational
policies to contradict the wishes of those with more power (national
leaders, for example) in the traditional hierarchy.
The political dimension of the disparity between Cambodian education and the countrys social environment also stems from the enmeshment of tradition and modernity. In one respect, the education system
188
Conclusion
has stood as a cornerstone of modernity in Cambodia. It has promoted

among students the acquisition of values aligned with the development
aspirations of different regimes; it has been perceived to represent a key
to social mobility; and it has been congruent with social change. The values, perceptions, behaviors, and implications analogous with this institution of modernity have often been eschewed, however, in the wider
political environment. The political actions and decisions of Cambodias leadersNorodom Sihanouk, Lon Nol, Pol Pot, Heng Samrin,
Hun Sen, and Norodom Ranariddhprovide testament to their reliance on the values of the traditional polity and to the sharp contrast
between this polity and the values they have attempted to promote, often through education, as the basis of state ideology.
Finally, the cultural dimension of educational disparity in Cambodia
has served to inform the economic and political disparity. With the stark
exception of the Democratic Kampuchea period, the evidence indicates
that the crisis in Cambodian education has often not been the product
of poorly directed or misguided education policies. In the 1950s and
1960s, Cambodias educational leaders and bureaucrats were presented
with an abundance of advice from international agencies, particularly
UNESCO, on the reform of education. Although the passage of time has
revealed flaws in this advice, it was considered praiseworthy during the
period when it was given. In Cambodias case, the advice was eagerly embraced by those entrusted with educational development. Similarly, during the early 1970s, Cambodia was given advice by UNESCO pertaining
to educational reform. During both periods, although international advice had been officially embraced in educational policies, it was never
implemented. It is a situation that continues to resonate in contemporary Cambodia. Central to this failure to implement educational policies
are the traditional cultural values that have characterized attempts to
implement social and economic policies in Cambodia.
It is these cultural values that have subverted many of the assumptions that underlie the Westernized development ideologies often
embraced by Cambodias leaders. Policies and practices in Cambodian
education do not reflect those at the core of global development paradigms. Instead, they reflect the contest between the tenets of these
global paradigms and those of the traditional polity. The educational
crisis is a product of the contest, a result of the failure to absorb the competing demands of those, influenced by both tradition and modernity,
seeking to construct the nation-state.
Conclusion
189
Beyond the 1997 Coup

If we look beyond Hun Sens coup of July 1997, we find few reasons to be
optimistic. Despite the second prime ministers effortswith the compliance of Ung Huotto convey a sense of normalcy following his elimination of Ranariddh, the international community wasted little time in
condemning his actions. In addition to imposing on the country another bout of diplomatic isolation, which included denying Cambodia
membership of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), international organizations and donors punished Cambodia where it hurt
most: financially. Several donors imposed a blanket suspension on all
assistance, while others imposed a development assistance embargo similar to that of the 1980s, providing only humanitarian aid to those perceived to be most in need. The donor pullout in education was particularly conspicuous, with programs funded by the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) and the European Union (EU)
practically grinding to a halt.
Although it tried to present a brave face, Hun Sens regime was certainly bruised by the international communitys financial punishment.
Prior to the coup, in December 1996, Keat Chhon (minister of the economy and finance) had declared that 1997 would be the moment of
truth for Cambodia. The 1997 budget is fragile, he had asserted when
explaining its economic framework and fundamental contents. Warning
that both expenditure and revenue, which was highly dependent on international donors, would need to be tightly controlled, Chhon pointed
out the possible consequences of a budgetary blow-out: Cambodia
would again plunge into the inflationary spiral and monetary wildness. 2 The coup and its aftermath found Cambodia miserably wanting
in terms of its moment of truth: expenditure on defense and security
exploded, while essential tourism revenues were devastated, sending the
country down the well-worn path of monetary wildness Chhon had
earlier warned against.
Coupled with the financial effects of the coup was the political climate it produced. Hun Sen busied himself with cementing his rule and
condemning Ranariddh as a criminal. The prince, meanwhile, traveled
through Europe and North America urging governments to continue to
punish Hun Sen and his regime. In Cambodias north, in areas close to
the Thai border, the remnants of the armed forces loyal to Ranariddh
clashed with those loyal to the CPP. When a protracted 1980s-style
190
Conclusion
conflict again seemed likely, sinking into oblivion the more than $2 billion spent by the United Nations since 1991, the international community again shuttled between the protagonists, seeking to find common
ground in order to reach a settlement acceptable to the major political
factions. This they eventually did, and national elections scheduled for
1998 were conducted. While international observers declared the elections sufficiently fair, the losersthis time Ranariddhs FUNCINPEC
and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP)refused to accept what many considered was Hun Sens inevitable victory. In November 1998, further international encouragement and cajoling resulted in an agreement to form
another CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition (the SRP electing to remain in
opposition).3
Some things have changed: this time around the CPP is the dominant
coalition partner; there is only one prime minister (Hun Sen); and the
international community, while promising to help, is much more wary
about writing checks to the Cambodian government than it was following the 1993 elections. But other things remain very much the same. Importantly, the country is again governed under a coalition arrangement,
where both coalition factions remain suspicious of and often openly
hostile toward each other. In education, Hun Sen continues to fly
around the country in a helicopter funded by a businessman widely suspected of drug-trafficking, descending on villages to inaugurate schools.
As with those who led Cambodia before him, he remains unconcerned
about the finer details of educational quality and relevance. Bare-walled
classrooms, devoid of books, continue to crumble, while teachers, who
went on an indefinite strike in January 1999, remain reliant on the proceeds of petty corruption to boost their pitiful salaries.4
Looking to the future, it is difficult to perceive of any genuine commitment in the Cambodian governments embrace of development
policies. In October 1997, King Sihanouk lamented that in a blossoming Asia . . . we are the only oasis of war, insecurity, self-destruction,
poverty, social injustice, arch-corruption, lawlessness, national division,
totalitarianism, drug trafficking and AIDS. 5 His words were a sad indictment and, unfortunately, continue to ring true. While millions of
Cambodians continue to live without adequate food and shelter, others
are still busy enriching themselves by selling the countrys natural resources to the highest bidder. Parliamentary process remains irrelevant,
high profile criminals act with impunity, basic human rights are largely
ignored, and policies and commitments seem to be often worth no
Conclusion
191
more than the paper they are written on. In essence, the aspirations of
the long-suffering Cambodian people continue to be ignored in favor of
the aspirations of its leaders. Angkor Wat, meanwhile, sits aloft flagpoles
throughout the country, while Jayavarman II and his Angkorean successors look down from the heavens. Cambodias future, I am reminded,
remains a prisoner of its past.
Notes
List of Abbreviations
AER
AKP
AS
BBC SWB
BCAS
BEFEO
BP
BUROEA
CD
CER
CSQ
CT
FA
FBIS
FEER
HE
IC
II
JAS
JCA
JSEAS
JSS
LM
LS
MAS
NC
NWCR
American Economic Review

Agence Khmre de Presse
Asian Survey
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
Bulletin de lEcole Franaise dExtrme-Orient
Bangkok Post
Bulletin of the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Asia
The Cambodia Daily
Comparative Education Review
Cultural Survival Quarterly
Cambodia Times
France-Asie
Foreign Broadcast Information Service
Far Eastern Economic Review
History of Education
Indochina Chronicle
Indochina Issues
Journal of Asian Studies
Journal of Contemporary Asia
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
Journal of the Siam Society
Le Monde
Le Sangkum
Modern Asian Studies
New Cambodge
Naval War College Review
193
194
NYT
PA
PPP
RC
SEAA
SEAC
SEAQ
VC
WT
Notes to Pages 110

New York Times
Pacific Affairs
Phnom Penh Post
Ralits Cambodgiennes
Southeast Asian Affairs
Southeast Asia Chronicle
Southeast Asia Quarterly
Vietnam Courier
The World Today
Introduction
1. Detailed discussion of Angkor Wat is provided in E. Mannikka, Angkor
Wat: Time, Space and Kingship. See also G. Cds, Angkor: An Introduction.
2. C. Neher and R. Marlay, Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The
Winds of Change, p. 19.
3. David Chandler eloquently noted that Cambodia is the only country in
the world to display a ruin on its national flag. D. Chandler, Reflections on
Cambodian History, CSQ 14 (1990), p. 18.
4. For the most recent scholarly articulation of the themes of tragedy, see
D. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History Revisited, in Facing the Cambodian Past: Selected Essays, 19711994, pp. 310 325.
5. For the first detailed scholarly examination of the idea of an educational
crisis, see P. Coombs, The World Crisis in Education: A Systems Analysis. Coombs
reiterated the essential themes of the crisis almost two decades later in
P. Coombs, The World Crisis in Education: The View from the Eighties.
6. S. Thion, Explaining Cambodia: A Review Essay, p. 1.
7. D. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution
since 1945, p. 1.
8. H. Hockett, The Critical Method in Historical Research and Writing, p. 68.
9. This book, as with any contemporary work on Cambodia, is particularly
indebted to the work of David Chandler, Ben Kiernan, Milton Osborne, and
Michael Vickery.
Chapter 1: The Traditional Setting

1. I. Mabbett and D. Chandler, The Khmers, pp. 79.
2. Ibid., pp. 61 65; see also I. Mabbett, The Indianization of Southeast
Asia, JSEAS 8 (1977), pp. 114. Also R. Choudhary, Some Aspects of the Social and
Economic History of Ancient India and Cambodia; G. Cds, The Indianized States of
Southeast Asia, 3rd ed.; and M. Vickery, Society, Economy, and Politics in Pre-Angkor
Cambodia.
3. For a discussion of the notion of caste, or varnas, in the Cambodian context, see I. Mabbett, Varnas in Angkor and the Indian Caste System, JAS 36
(1977), pp. 429 442.
4. D. Chandler, Cambodia Before the French: Politics in a Tributary Kingdom, 1794 1848. Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan (1974), pp. 3738. Jan
Ovesen and his colleagues note that the term loosely structured is quite simplistic. They argue that Khmer society is certainly structured . . . but the struc-
Notes to Pages 10 16
195
tures are cultural and ideological rather than immediately social organizational. See J. Ovesen, I. Trankell, and J. jendal, When Every Household is an Island: Social Organization and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia, p. 86.
5. Chandler, Cambodia Before the French, p. 41. On the self-preservation
motive of Cambodias kings, see introductory paragraphs in M. Osborne, Kingmaking in Cambodia: From Sisowath to Sihanouk, JSEAS 4 (1973), p. 169 and
pp. 169 170, note 3.
6. Chandler, Cambodia before the French, pp. 44 47.
7. S. Bit, The Warrior Heritage: A Psychological Perspective on the Cambodian
Trauma, p. 20.
8. S. Somboon, Buddhism, Political Authority and Legitimacy in Thailand
and Cambodia, in Buddhist Trends in Southeast Asia, pp. 105106.
9. Martin Stuart-Fox discusses this notion in his analysis of Theravada Buddhism in Laos. Stuart-Fox argues that through its monopoly over education,
the sangha ensured the propagation of an acceptable belief-system which effectively maintained existing social distinctions. See M. Stuart-Fox, Marxism
and Theravada Buddhism: The Legitimation of Political Authority in Laos,
PA 58 (1985), p. 432.
10. Chou Ta-Kuan, Notes on the Customs of Cambodia, 2nd ed., pp. 1112.
11. L. Manipoud, La rnovation des coles de pagodes au Cambodge. Authors
translation.
12. Sorn S., Lvolution de la socit cambodgienne entre les deux guerres
mondiales (1919 1939) (these pour le doctorat, Universit Paris VII, 1995),
p. 181. Authors translation.
13. C. Keyes, The Proposed World of the School: Thai Villagers Entry into
a Bureaucratic State System, in Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia, p. 93.
14. Bit, The Warrior Heritage, p. 100.
15. D. Chandler, Normative Poems (chbab) and Precolonial Cambodian Society, JSEAS 15 (1984), p. 272. Chandler refers to the social system as one of
lop-sided friendships.
16. S. Pou and P. Jenner, Cpap Rajaneti. BEFEO 65 (1978), p. 387. English
translation cited in Chandler, Normative Poems, p. 274.
17. S. Pou and P. Jenner, Cpap Kun Cau. BEFEO 64 (1977), p. 191.
18. P. Jenner and S. Pou, Cpap Kram. BEFEO 66 (1979), p. 139. English
translation by Chandler, Normative Poems, p. 275.
19. For details of the distinctness of the Khmer version of the Ramayana
story, see S. Singaravelu, The Rama Story in Kampuchean Tradition. Seksa
Khmer 5 (1984), pp. 24 28. Also S. Pou. The Indigenization of the Ramayana
in Cambodia, Asian Folklore Studies 51 (1992), pp. 89 103; and S. Pou, Some
Proper Names in the Khmer Ramakerti, The Southeast Asian Review 5 (1980),
pp. 19 29.
20. See D. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 2nd ed., p. 91. A more detailed
summary of the plot of the story is found in F. Bizot, Ramaker: Lamour symbolique
de Ram et Seta, pp. 42 124.
21. J. Jacob, Reamker (Ramakerti): The Cambodian version of the Ramayana,
p. 8.
22. Bit, The Warrior Heritage, p. 17.
196
23. M. Carrison, Cambodian Folk Stories from the Gatiloke, p. 12. In the late
nineteenth century, Cambodias colonial government commissioned a monk,
Oknya Sotann Preychea, to compile a volume of Gatiloke stories. His tenvolume compilation contained 112 stories, representing the first and last known
written collection of Gatiloke stories written in the Cambodian language. This
ten-volume compilation formed the basis of Muriel Carrisons rendering of the
stories in English, used as the textual basis for the present study.
24. In discussing Cambodian folk tales, the eminent Cambodian linguist,
Judith Jacob, refers to a navet in the narration of the tales, which, she argues,
leads to no surprises in the story, since all the steps of the story are revealed to
us as they happen. J. Jacob, The Short Stories of Cambodian Popular Tradition, in Cambodian Linguistics, Literature and History, p. 254.
25. Carrison, Cambodian Folk Stories, pp. 52 57.
26. Ibid., pp. 1516.
27. Cited in K. Fisher-Nguyen, Khmer Proverbs: Images and Rules, in
Cambodian Culture since 1975: Homeland and Exile, p. 99.
28. Ibid., p. 97.
29. Khin Sok, Le Cambodge entre le Siam et le Vietnam, de 1775 1880.
30. M. Osborne, The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia: Rule and
Response, 1859 1905, p. 34.
31. For an acute summary of the writings of a number of these explorers, see
D. Meyers, ed., The French in Indo-China: With a Narrative of Garniers Explorations
in Cochin-China, Annam and Tonquin. See also a reprint of the first English language translation of French explorations in Indochina in L. de Carne, Travels
on the Mekong: Cambodia, Laos and Yunnan The Political and Trade Report of the
Mekong Exploration Commission ( June 1866 June 1868).
32. R. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890 1914,
p. 16.
33. D. Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century, p. 306.
34. S. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, 1870 1925, p. 419.
35. Chandler, A History, p. 142.
36. Ibid., pp. 144 145.
37. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, pp. 421 433, 451.
38. Betts, Assimilation and Association, p. 106.
39. Roberts, The History of French Colonial Policy, pp. 457 458.
40. A more detailed discussion of the 1916 Affair can be found in M. Osborne, Peasant Politics in Cambodia: The 1916 Affair, MAS 12 (1978),
pp. 217243. See also J. Tully, Cambodia under the Tricolour: King Sisowath and the
Mission Civilisatrice, 1904 1927, pp. 187211.
41. On the assassination of rsident Bardez, see D. Chandler, The Assassination of Rsident Bardez (1925): A Premonition of Revolt in Colonial Cambodia, JSS 70 (1982), pp. 35 49; and Sorn, Lvolution de la socit cambodgienne, pp. 333 339.
42. Chandler, A History, pp. 156 158.
43. R. Morizon, Monographie du Cambodge, p. 178.
44. Osborne, The French Presence, p. 54.
197
45. A. Forest, Le Cambodge et la colonisation Franaise: Histoire dune colonisations sans heurts, 18971920, pp. 154 156. Forest notes the divergence between
the education provided for Cambodians and that provided for Vietnamese and
Chinese nationals in Cambodia.
46. Indochine Franaise Section des Services dIntrt Social, La pntration
scolaire en pays Cambodgien et Laotien, Indochine Franaise, p. 8.
47. On Sarrauts reforms, see C. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, in Compulsory Education in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, p. 18; also Tully,
Cambodia under the Tricolour, pp. 244 246. Gail Kelly argued that the system was
not planned as a replica of French schools or a diluted version but rather as a
distinct system that would be appropriate not merely to the colonized but to the
Vietnamese who were colonized. See G. Kelly, Colonial Schools in Vietnam:
Policy and Practice, in Education and Colonialism, p. 102.
48. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, p. 20.
49. Ibid.
50. Sorn, Lvolution de la socit cambodgienne, p. 181.
51. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, p. 21. See also Indochine Franaise Section des Services dIntrt Social, La pntration scolaire,
pp. 9 10.
52. The annual training cost per student at modernized pagoda schools was
only one-quarter that of the secular schools. See Ministre du Plan, Annuaire
statistique rtrospective du Cambodge, 1958 1960, p. 19.
53. J. Montllor, Foreign Service Despatch from the American Embassy
Phnom Penh to U.S. Department of State, School Enrollment Increases in
Cambodia, Air Pouch 851H.43/3-653, March 6, 1953, pp. 2 3.
54. Le Khmer (May 18, 1936), p. 1. Cited in B. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to
Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930 1975, p. 18.
55. In 1939, there were no Cambodian students enrolled at the only university in Indochina at Hanoi. See United Kingdom Naval Intelligence Division,
Indo-China, p. 158. Vu Duc Bang discusses the evolution of higher education in
French Indochina, noting its elitist orientation. See Vu Duc Bang, Higher Education in former French Indo-china: A Success Story for a Fortunate Few,
Compare 23 (1993), pp. 63 70.
56. See, for example, Osborne, The French Presence, pp. 156 174.
57. The proposed romanization of the Khmer script, based on a transliteration by George Cds, did not take place until 1943, when it was announced by
Cambodias new French rsident, Georges Gautier. See Chandler, A History,
pp. 169 170.
58. On the education of Vietnams minorities, see G. Hickey, Sons of the
Mountains: Ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Highlands to 1954, pp. 331334.
59. The Collge Norodom Sihanouk is interesting in terms of its school roll.
Students included Hu Nim, Hou Yuon, Khieu Samphan, and Saloth Sar, later
to gain notoriety under his nom de guerre, Pol Pot. See D. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, pp. 18 19. Renamed the Lyce Kompong
Cham in 1970, Amnesty International alleges that the school was used as a
political torture center by the Vietnamese throughout the 1980s. See Amnesty
International, Kampuchea: Political Imprisonment and Torture, p. 88.
198
60. Norodom Sihanouk was not the logical choice for the Cambodian
throne. The French furthered their control over the Cambodian monarch by
manipulating succession to the throne. As they had done in the case of King
Sisowath, the French passed over traditional succession procedures and chose
Norodom Sihanouk, the great-grandson of King Norodom. As Sihanouk was an
offspring of both the Norodom and Sisowath branches of Cambodian royalty,
the French were able to justify their selection on the grounds that it would heal
a rift between the two. A more logical explanation is that Sihanouk was thought
to be more malleable and submissive, especially in light of the problems that
World War II was causing the French. See R. Smith, King Norodom Sihanouk
of Cambodia, Asian Survey 7 (1967), pp. 354 355. Details of Sihanouks genealogy can be found in J. Corfield, The Royal Family of Cambodia, 2nd ed., p. 111.
61. David Chandler cites the change in the format of Cambodias Royal
Chronicles as further evidence of the manner in which World War II forced
changes in the French approach to Cambodian kingship. See D. Chandler,
Cambodian Palace Chronicles: Kingship and Historiography at the End of the
Colonial Era, in Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia, p. 207.
62. For a discussion of the impact of the Japanese occupation elsewhere, the
Indonesian experience is worthy of consideration. It is widely believed that
the Japanese occupation was regarded as a significant turning point in the development of Indonesian nationalism. See J. Legge, Indonesia, pp. 137140. A
second thesis, which is somewhat more controversial, and seemingly a less
plausible argument in the Cambodian case, was that Japanese misrule and neglect inspired nationalist movements in the region. See S. Sato, War, Nationalism
and Peasants: Java under Japanese Occupation, 1942 1945.
63. For a discussion, see D. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution since 1945, pp. 14 15. See also D. Chandler, The Kingdom of Kampuchea, MarchOctober 1945: Japanese Sponsored Independence
in Cambodia in WW2, JSEAS 17 (1986), pp. 80 93.
64. The Buddhist Institute was established in Phnom Penh by the French
scholar Suzanne Karpels in 1930 in order to diminish the influence of Thai
Buddhism on the Cambodian monastic order. The early Cambodian nationalist, Son Ngoc Thanh, served as a librarian and later as deputy director at the
institute.
65. On the significant and very laudable French contribution to the study
and reinvigoration of Cambodian heritage, see Tully, Cambodia under the Tricolour, pp. 221225.
66. Slogan cited in F. Keesing, Education and Pacific Countries, p. 95.
67. O. Quinlen, Education Reform in Cambodia (Master of Science thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1992), p. 8.
68. Kiernan, How Pol Pot, p. xiii.
69. On the pesantren of Java, see S. Jones, The Javanese Pesantren: Between
Elite and Peasantry, in Reshaping Local Worlds, p. 21.
70. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, pp. 16 18.
71. This shift was led by a member of the Paris circle, Keng Vannsak. Kiernan, How Pol Pot, pp. 122 123, 131.
Notes to Pages 3135
199
Chapter 2: Sihanouk and the Sangkum

1. D. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 2nd ed., p. 200; also Sydney Morning
Herald (May 4, 1994), p. 20; The Australian (May 14, 1994), p. 6.
2. W. Leslie Garnett, Cambodia, Educational Horizons (Summer 1957),
pp. 146, 147.
3. Memo, Charles Mann to the Vice President, August 9, 1966, C. O. 40, confidential files, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Box 7, LBJ Library. See also
M. Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness, p. 78.
4. On these events, D. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics,
War and Revolution since 1945, pp. 61 65. On Geneva, see J. Davidson, Indochina: Signposts in the Storm, chapter 10. The result of the conference was the
partitioning of Vietnam into north and south. A second outcome was the granting of regroupment zones to the Communist forces of Vietnam and Laos but
not to those of Cambodia.
5. M. McDonald, Angkor and the Khmers, p. 147; and Osborne, Sihanouk,
p. 92.
6. AKP, March 15, 1955, p. c/1. Cited in Southeast Asia: Documents of Political
Development and Change, p. 489.
7. Prince Sihanouk often metaphorically conceived of himself as the captain
of the Cambodian boat. See, for example, BBC SWB, FE/2461/B/24.
8. BBC SWB, FE/2313/B/16.
9. Michael Leifer contends that the effectiveness of the Sangkum was determined, to a large extent, by the institutional apparatuses of the Cambodian political system. He asserts that Sihanouk failed to effectively institutionalize the
political system so that it would be able to sustain his departure without clear
prospect of disintegration. Milton Osborne extends Leifers argument by affirming that while the formation of the Sangkum was a brilliant answer to a
short-term problem, the organization was so broad in composition that the old
political rivalries it had been designed to eliminate reappeared once the unifying election campaign [1955] had ended. See M. Leifer, The Failure of Political Institutionalization in Cambodia, MAS 2 (1968), p. 138; and M. Osborne,
Politics and Power in Cambodia: The Sihanouk Years, pp. 55, 59.
10. Ministre de lInformation, Considerations, sur le socialisme Khmer (Phnom
Penh, 1960), pp. 2, 5. Norodom Sihanouk, Our Buddhist Socialism, Kambuja
(December 1965), p. 18. See also Sihanouks inaugural address to the 6th Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists held in Phnom Penh, November
14 22, 1961, in FA 18 (1962), p. 28. On the economic rationale of the ideology,
see P. Preschez, Essai sur la dmocratie au Cambodge, pp. 117122.
11. Norodom Sihanouk, Our Buddhist Socialism, p. 15; and Norodom
Sihanouk, Souvenirs doux et amers (Paris: Hachette, 1981), p. 262. On Buddhist
socialism and development planning, see Ministre de lInformation, Considerations, pp. 13 14.
12. For a more detailed discussion, see A. Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development, pp. 48 49.
13. Norodom Sihanouk, Souvenirs, p. 262.
200
14. J. Eilenberg, New Directions in Cambodian Education, Comparative Education Review 5 (1961), p. 188.
15. T. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, AER 51 (1961), pp. 117.
16. Cambodia had been a member of UNESCO since July 1951. UNESCO,
A Chronology of UNESCO, 1945 1987: Facts and Events in UNESCOs History with
References to Documentary Sources in the UNESCO Archives and Supplementary Information in the Annexes 121, p. 51.
17. Cited in C. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, in Compulsory Education in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, p. 28.
18. On Nhiek Tioulong, see LS (March 1966), p. 20. See also the obituary
written on his death in 1996 in PPP ( June 14 27), 1996, p. 20.
19. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, pp. 28, 56. Jean Imbert argues that expansion was one of two educational aims of the Cambodian
administration during this period. The other aim, according to Imbert, was the
creation of a system of higher education in Cambodia, manifested with the establishment of the Institut National dEtudes Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques, the Ecole Royale de Mdicine, and the Ecole dAgriculture. See J. Imbert, Histoire des institutions Khmres, p. 170.
20. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, p. 58.
21. See M. Tabellini, From Fundamental Education to Community Development: The Story of a Project Carried out in Cambodia, UNESCO Chronicle 8
(1962), p. 285. On the teacher shortage, see International Bureau of Education,
Cambodia: From the Reply Sent by the Ministry of National Education, International Conference on Public Education XXVI Session 260, p. 20.
22. Bilodeau, Compulsory Education in Cambodia, pp. 30, 49, 62.
23. On the Issaraks, see B. Kiernan, How Pol Pot came to Power: A History of
Communism in Kampuchea, 1930 1975, pp. 125134. On the elections, see
Chandler, The Tragedy, pp. 81 84.
24. H. Blaise, The Strategy and Process of Institution Building: A Case
Study in Cambodia (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1964), p. 107.
25. J. Lacouture, Cambodge, pp. 33 52.
26. Sihanouk Unopposed is the title of a chapter of David Chandlers
history of the period after the Second World War. See Chandler, The Tragedy,
chapter 3.
27. On the plan, see Ministre de lIntrieur, Cambodge, p. 214. Source for
statistics cited: Ministre du Plan, Annuaire statistique du Cambodge, 1963 1964,
pp. 16, 19. Of the eighteen establishments noted for the 1957/1958 school year,
only four offered a full secondary education (lyce). See Departement de lEducation Nationale, Rapport annuel, anne scolaire de 1957/58, pp. 79.
28. Ministre du Plan, Annuaire statistique rtrospective du Cambodge, 1937
1957, p. 15.
29. Cited in D. Steinberg, Cambodia: Its People, its Society, its Culture, p. 271;
and Blaise, The Strategy and Process of Institution Building, p. 128.
30. See U.S. Embassy Phnom Penh Foreign Service Despatch 851H.00/122954, December 29, 1954. The United States Operations Mission in Phnom
Penh was aware of the potential credentialism problem as early as 1954. In a re-
201
port of December 11, 1954, it was noted that while there is no present problem
in placing educated young people, the current emphasis on purely academic
education could lead eventually to over-production of white collar professionals. The report states that the U.S. Embassy will continue to exert its influence
toward the prevention of a repetition in Cambodia of the tragedies which have
resulted from this tendency [students moving away from rural life] in other
colonial and ex-colonial countries.
31. International Bureau of Education, Cambodia: From the Reply Sent by
the Ministry of National Education, International Conference on Public Education
XXII: Primary School Textbooks 204, p. 88.
32. Hobsbawm, cited in C. Keyes, State Schools in Rural Communities: Reflections on Rural Education and Cultural Change in Southeast Asia, in Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia, p. 10.
33. Authors interview with Om Prasit, Sydney (Australia), July 1996. On respect for authority figures in education, the recollections of Cambodian
refugees in the United States, as related to Usha Welaratna, provide an illuminating starting point. See selected accounts in U. Welaratna, Beyond the Killing
Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America.
34. Om Prasit recalled that students were taught nothing at all . . . because
Sihanouk did not want us to know it. Interview with Om Prasit. See also
Norodom Sihanouk, La Monarchie cambodgienne et la croisade royale pour lindpendance.
35. Sihanouk cited in Chandler, The Tragedy, p. 118.
36. On the idea of a hidden curriculum, see J. Watt, Ideology, Objectivity and
Education, pp. 163 166.
37. Saloth Sar, Monarchy or Democracy? Copy of text cited in Khmer
Rouges! Materiaux pour lhistoire du communisme au Cambodge, eds. S. Thion and
B Kiernan, p. 357.
38. Saloth Sar taught at the private college Chamroan Vichea (Progressive
Study). On his teaching career, see D. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political
Biography of Pol Pot, pp. 5155.
39. See Kiernan, How Pol Pot, p. 176.
40. Chandler, The Tragedy, pp. 94 98.
41. Chau Sengs study was published as Programme de lenseignement secondaire
Khmer.
42. Kambuja ( June 1965), p. 67.
43. Secondary education, according to the ministry in 1960, was still aimed
at giving Khmer youth a humanist training. See International Bureau of Education, Cambodia, Preparation of General Secondary School Curricula: XXIII International Conference on Public Education, 216, p. 134.
44. Kambuja ( June 1965), pp. 68 71.
45. Ministre du Plan, Annuaire statistique, 1963 1964, p. 91.
46. BBC SWB, FE/ W44/B/33. The plan, entitled Norodom Sihanouk Five
Year Plan, called for eight billion riels of state investment during the five years,
40 percent initially to come from foreign aid.
47. FEER ( January 31, 1963), p. 195.
202
48. Ibid.
49. Ministre de lInformation, Luvre du Sangkum Reastr Niyum: Prsente au
XV e Congres National, p. 104.
50. FEER (December 5, 1963), p. 510. Also Ministre de lIntrieur, Cambodge, p. 235.
51. For details, see Chandler, The Tragedy, pp. 86, 99 107. On lack of American respect, see Osborne, Sihanouk, p. 103.
52. Chandler, The Tragedy, p. 131.
53. CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Current Intelligence Memorandum,
Subject: Sihanouks intentions, OCI No. 3519/63, December 19, 1963.
54. As early as March 1961, Sihanouk had stated that the United States has
from the beginning searched for means to bend our neutrality, and even to
overthrow our rgime, which the Khmer people have charged with applying the
neutral policy. Sihanouk, cited in R. Smith, Cambodias Foreign Policy, p. 137.
55. Chandler, Brother Number One, p. 60. See also Kiernan, How Pol Pot,
p. 181.
56. BBC SWB, FE/ W66/A/8; BBC SWB, FE/ W92/A/13; BBC SWB, FE/
W98/A/13. On Chinas aid to Cambodia, see A. Marsot, Chinas Aid to Cambodia, PA 43 (1969), pp. 189 198.
57. Kiernan, How Pol Pot, pp. 176 177.
58. Secretary General of the Cambodian Commission for UNESCO, Directorate of Education Services, Cambodia, BUROEA 3 (1968); Secretariat of the
Cambodian National Commission for UNESCO, The Development of Education in Cambodia since 1955, BUROEA 1 (1966), pp. 9 14.
59. Ministre de lEducation National et Beaux-Arts, Office National de
Planification de lEducation, Le Royaume du Cambodge vu par les Planificateurs de
lEducation. On primary education reforms, see J. Griffon, Rapport de mission au
Cambodge, octobre-decembre 1964, pp. 20 24.
60. International Bureau of Education, Report from Cambodia: From the
Reply Sent by the Ministry of National Education, Shortage of Primary Teachers:
International Conference on Public Education XXVI Session 256, pp. 20 21.
61. International Bureau of Education, Cambodia: From the Reply Sent
by the Ministry of Education, International Conference on Public Education XXVI
Session 260, p. 109; Secretariat of the Cambodian National Commission for
UNESCO, The Development of Education in Cambodia since 1955, p. 13. See
also C. Meyer, Derriere le sourire khmer, p. 266.
62. On problems being encountered elsewhere in Southeast Asia, see Le
Thanh Khoi, Problmes generaux de leducation et du dveloppement en
Asie, in Education et dveloppement dans le Sud-Est de lAsie: Colloque tenu a Bruxelles les 19, 20 et 21 avril 1966, pp. 732.
63. New institutions, opened over the next four years, included the Royal
Technical University, the Royal University of Fine Arts, Royal University of Kompong Cham, Takeo-Kampot Royal University, Royal University of Agronomic
Science, and the Royal University of Battambang. On the development of these
institutions, see H. Hayden, ed., Higher Education and Development in Southeast
Asia, Volume 2: Country Profiles, pp. 197204.
203
64. J. Griffon, Rapport de mission. On the educational aspect of the plan, see
UNESCO, Cambodia, BUROEA 3 (1968), p. 49.
65. Meyer, Derriere, pp. 162 165; and M. Leifer, Cambodia: The Politics of
Accommodation, AS 4 (1964), p. 676.
66. Sihanouks film, Apsara, was the first of nine films written, produced,
and directed by Sihanouk between 1966 and 1969. Bereft of reality, the films depicted Sihanouks vision of an ideal Cambodia, with absolutely no expense
spared in their production. See Osborne, Sihanouk, pp. 179 183.
67. See Chandler, The Tragedy, p. 145. For an acute summary of the economic situation in Cambodia at this time, see D. Kirk, Cambodias Economic
Crisis, AS 11 (1971), pp. 239 245.
68. Interview with Om Prasit.
69. Authors interview with Tea Hour Yith, Sydney (Australia), February
1994. Her recollections were mirrored by those of an education adviser sent to
Cambodia by the U.S. International Cooperation Administration in the early
1960s. Robert Bullington recalled that although the curriculum calls for much
direct observation and the use of . . . objects and some equipment, it is likely
that most instruction is by word of mouth. See R. Bullington, Science Education in Cambodia, Science Education 48 (1964), p. 297.
70. Written responses to questions from Kao Nhek-Kiang, Canada, August
1996.
71. Meyer, Derriere, p. 164.
72. The authoritative treatise on the Cambodian economy of the 1960s by
Remy Prudhomme clearly demonstrates this point: primary, secondary and
tertiary education do not prepare for much more than a career in the civil service. The agronomists, technicians, accountants, engineers, economists, and
entrepreneurs who play an important role in economic development are too
few in Cambodia. See R. Prudhomme, Leconomie du Cambodge, pp. 5556. Authors translation.
73. Ministre de lEducation, Rglement scolaire des coles primaires publiques
Cambodgiennes, pp. 29 31, 34 35.
74. Ibid., p. 16.
75. See LM ( July 9, 1968), p. 2.
76. BBC SWB, FE/2790/B/24.
77. While Sihanouk continued to urge students to return to the soil, he
also continued to boast about the quantitative progress made in the development of education. See, for example, his speech at the Lyce Santepheap in
Kompong Speu, AKP ( July 26, 1967), p. 1.
78. M. Leifer, Cambodia: Its Search for Neutrality, AS 3 (1963), p. 56.
79. On corruption in Cambodia, see Osborne, Sihanouk, pp. 159 161; and
M. Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society, pp. 66 68.
81. K. Um, Brotherhood of the Pure: Nationalism and Communism in
Cambodia (Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1991), p. 8.
82. BBC SWB, FE/2792/A3/2.; BBC SWB, FE/2784/A3/1; BBC SWB,
FE/2806/A3/1; BBC SWB, FE/2478/A3/2; BBC SWB, FE/2313/B/17. See
204
Sihanouks explanation of his coloring of Cambodia in a series of interviews

conducted in July and August 1979 in P. Schier and M. Schier-Oum, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia: Interviews and Talks with Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
p. 7.
83. On the break with America, see J. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up! A History of
the Cambodian Government 1970 1975, pp. 36 37. For an American reaction, see
Memo, Arthur McCafferty to the President, May 3, 1966, Cambodia Memos Vol.
III, Box 236, NSF, LBJ Library; also Memo, McGeorge Bundy to the President,
May 3, 1965, Cambodia Memos Vol. III, Box 236, NSF, LBJ Library.
84. BBC SWB, FE/2313/B/16; on the elections, see Corfield, Khmers Stand
Up!, pp. 39 40. See also Chandler, The Tragedy, p. 154.
85. L. Summers, Translators Introduction, in Cambodias Economy and Industrial Development, p. 17.
86. Chandler, Brother Number One, p. 66.
87. See BBC SWB, FE/2715/A3/11 and BBC SWB, FE/2716/A3/12.
88. On the Samlaut Rebellion, see B. Kiernan, The Samlaut Rebellion and its
Aftermath, 19671970: The Origins of Cambodias Liberation Movement. See also
B. Kiernan, The Samlaut Rebellion, in Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,
1942 1980, pp. 166 205. On a visit to Pailin (in southern Battambang) in 1966,
Milton Osborne observed the presence of an increasing number of educated
people who could not find jobs working as coolies in gem mines. See
M. Osborne, Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy, pp. 39 41.
90. Pol Pot, cited in ibid., p. 166.
91. Authors interview with Men Bunroeun, Adelaide (Australia), March
1994.
92. BBC SWB, FE/2715/A3/11.
93. AKP (April 10, 1967), p. 9.
94. AKP (April 24, 1967), p. 9.
95. BBC SWB, FE/2716/A3/12.
96. Interview with Tea Hour Yith.
97. LM ( July 9, 1968), p. 2.
98. BBC SWB, FE/2480/A3/7 and FEER ( July 13, 1967), p. 115.
99. BBC SWB, FE/2792/A3/2.
100. It should be noted that many teachers who fled to the forest, allegedly
because they were Reds, were on a mission of self-preservation. Cambodias
volatile domestic political climate led to the coloring of many people merely
suspected of being enemies of the state or, more tragically, enemies of those
with more status or influence than themselves. Many fled in fear of Sihanouk,
while others ran, afraid of the brutal and repressive head-hunting campaign being conducted by the army of Lon Nol. See interview with Tea Hour Yith, who
recalled that a friend had to run away . . . go away, far away. See also M. Caldwell and Lek Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, pp. 156 157, who argue
that teachers fled to avoid possible or certain persecution in Phnom Penh. On
Sihanouks demand for a list, see BBC SWB, FE/2784/A3/2. On the soft policy
of the Communists, see T. Carney, The Unexpected Victory, in Cambodia,
1975 1978: Rendezvous with Death, pp. 1719.
205
101. On blaming others, see BBC SWB, FE/2571/A3/1, in which the prince
blamed problems on events in China.
102. S. Thion, The Cambodian Idea of Revolution, in Watching Cambodia:
Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle, pp. 80, 82 85.
104. For a discussion of this adage, see interview with Tea Hour Yith; interview with Hem Sophearak, Sydney (Australia), February 1994; and authors interview with Ek Seng, Sydney (Australia), January 1996.
105. Although teaching was a lowly rated civil service vocation for many education graduates, the extent of the unemployment problem resulted in school
graduates clamoring for the available places at teacher training institutions. In
1967, for example, 12,000 candidates applied for 1,600 teacher training openings. LM ( July 9, 1968), p. 2.
106. Interview with Hem Sophearak.
107. Authors interview with Nuon Vuthy, Sydney (Australia), February 1994.
108. Osborne, Sihanouk, p. 269.
109. S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 168.
Chapter 3: Lon Nol and the Republic

1. Davis provided details of the incident in an article written at the time. See
FEER (February 21, 1975), p. 13. See also BBC SWB, FE/4826/A3/4.
2. T. Bowden, One Crowded Hour: Neil Davis, Combat Cameraman, 1934 1985,
pp. 312 313.
3. See BBC SWB, FE/4828/A3/2.
4. Sihanouks negotiations were aimed at ensuring the territorial integrity of
Cambodia.
5. Vietnamization, in line with President Nixons promise to remove U.S.
troops from Vietnam, involved handing the conduct of the war over to the
South Vietnamese. The bombing was the brainchild of General Creighton
Abrams, who wanted to strike at Vietnamese frontier bases to ensure no come
back after the Americans began their withdrawal from Vietnam. The bombing
campaign, code-named Menu, was to concentrate on eliminating the mobile
Communist military headquarters (known as COSVN), located in Cambodia.
The first of 3,695 B-52 raids flown over the Cambodian sanctuaries took place
in a veil of secrecy on March 18, 1969. On the bombing, see A. Isaacs, Without
Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia, pp. 194 195.
6. W. Burchett, The Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos, p. 47.
7. See J. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government,
1970 1975, p. 53; D. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War
and Revolution since 1945, pp. 192 199; M. Leifer, Peace and War in Cambodia, SEAQ (Winter 1971), p. 59.
8. On the Svay Rieng demonstrations, see LM ( June 3, 1970), p. 1. On the
embassy sackings, see BBC SWB, FE/3328-3331/A3; BP (March 13, 1970), p. 1;
FEER (March 19, 1970), p. 4. On the demand for the Vietnamese withdrawal,
see BBC SWB, FE/3330/A3/1; FEER (March 26, 1970), p. 4. On Oum Mannorine, see BBC SWB, FE/3331/A3/4 5. On Kossomaks order, see FEER (April 9,
1970), p. 20. On the withdrawal of confidence, see BBC SWB, FE/3334/A3/
206
Notes to Pages 7178
3-5. The coup has been discussed in detail elsewhere. See, for example, Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!; W. Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, chapter 8; F. Sille, Die roten Khmer, pp. 71 83; M Leifer, Peace
and War in Cambodia, SEAQ (1971), p. 59; also, M. Leifer, Political Upheaval
in Cambodia, WT 26 (1970), p. 185.
9. BBC SWB, FE/3333/A3/7.
10. On the state of emergency, see BBC SWB, FE/3334/A3/3. On the
protests, see BBC SWB, FE/3334/A3/6. On the youth movement, see BBC SWB,
FE/3336/A3/9. On the public holiday, see RC, December 18, 1970, p. 14.
11. H. S. Ngor and R. Warner, Surviving the Killing Fields: The Cambodian
Odyssey of Haing S. Ngor, pp. 39 40.
12. S. May, Cambodian Witness: The Autobiography of Someth May, p. 93.
13. See Ros Chantrabot, La rpublique khmre et lAsie du sud-est aprs
sin croulement (These pour le doctorat, Ecole des Hautes tudes en Sciences
Sociales, 1978), p. 97.
14. BBC SWB, FE/3338/A3/12.
15. FEER (April 9, 1970), p. 5.
16. NYT, April 13, 1970, p. 1.
18. On Lon Nols philosophy in regard to Buddhism and his penchant for
the occult and mysticism, see E. Becker, When the War was Over: The Voices of Cambodias Revolution and its People, pp. 135136.
19. B. Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930 1975, p. 348. See also, Lon Nol, Neo-Khmrisme, p. 3.
20. Emory Swank, the U.S. Ambassador in Cambodia between 1970 and
1973, recalled in 1983 that Lon Nols faith in us was child-like, unquestioning.
See E. Swank, The Land in Between: Cambodia Ten Years Later, II 36 (April
1983), p. 2.
21. Phouk Chhay, The Social and Economic Heritage of the Old Rgime,
NC 1 (May 1970), pp. 50 52.
22. Phuong Ton, The National Education under the Old Rgime, NC 2
( June 1970), pp. 38 39.
23. See Conference de presse, Documents sur laggression Vietcong et NordVietnamenne contre le Cambodge, pp. 70 71.
24. Authors interview with Tea Hour Yith, Sydney (Australia), February
1994. On the circulation of the Revue, see D. Whitaker, ed., Area Handbook for the
Khmer Republic, p. 114.
25. BBC SWB, FE/3343/A3/7.
26. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, p. 92.
27. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 131.
28. See, for example, NC 3 ( July 1970), pp. 33 35. Teachers were also involved in the military activities. An Australian teacher working in Cambodia at
the time recalled teachers turning up to class in military uniforms, sometimes
wearing pistols. The same teacher recalled one student arriving at school in a
French paramilitary uniform. G. Coyne, personal communication, December
1996.
207
29. RC (December 18, 1970), p. 14.

30. M. Bray, Economics of Education, in International Comparative Education: Practices, Issues and Prospects, p. 254.
31. UNESCO, Education in the Khmer Republic, BUROEA 6 (1972),
pp. 89 and 92 93. Also UNESCO, Modle de dveloppement de lducation: Perspectives pour lAsie, 1965 1980 (Paris, 1967).
32. RC (December 18, 1970), p. 14.
33. A. Curle, Educational Problems of Developing Societies: With Case Studies of
Ghana, Pakistan and Nigeria, p. 86.
34. Whitaker, Area Handbook, p. 113.
35. Ibid. See also authors interview with Suon Serey, Phnom Penh, January
1997.
36. Authors interview with Mun Savorn, Sydney (Australia), July 1996.
37. Throughout 1970 and 1971, before the effects of the civil conflict almost
totally enveloped Cambodian society, significant progress had been made in
Khmerizing school texts and curricula. See Ministre de lEducation Nationale et de la Culture, Rapport sur le mouvement ducatif en 1970 1971: Prsente
la 33e session de la Confrence Internationale de lEducation, Genve, septembre 1971.
38. M. Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society, p. 74.
39. On reports of malnutrition, see Isaacs, Without Honor, p. 223.
40. See BBC SWB, FE/3340/A3/6. On the Kompong Cham uprising, see
B. Kiernan, The 1970 Peasant Uprising in Kampuchea, JCA 9 (1979).
41. Thomas Englebert and Christopher Goscha accurately point out that
Vietnamese motives in Cambodia were concentrated on maintaining their sanctuaries in Cambodia and, in particular, maintaining their control of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. See T. Englebert and C. Goscha, Falling Out of Touch: A Study on Vietnamese Communist Policy towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement,
1930 1975, pp. 9196. Gareth Porter has argued that the Vietnamese believed
they had a major role to play in fostering a revolution in Cambodia and therefore considered their alliance with Sihanouk, who had significant local support,
more important than that with the Cambodian communists. See G. Porter,
Vietnamese Communist Policy towards Kampuchea, 1930 1970, in Revolution
and its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, p. 83.
42. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, p. 99.
43. The figure of 4,000 is that cited by Saloth Sar in his 1977 speech commemorating the founding of the CPK. Saloth Sar, Discours prononc par le Camarade Pol Pot, Secrtaire du Comit Central du Parti Communiste du Kampuchea, traduction non officielle (Paris, 1977), pp. 38ff. Others have provided lower
estimates. David Chandler cites U.S. intelligence, who estimated that at the time
of the coup, the Communists had less than 3,000 men and women under arms.
See D. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, p. 91. See also
G. Hildebrand and G. Porter, Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution, p. 66.
44. K. Frieson, Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, in Genocide
and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, pp. 3536.
45. On Sihanouk as a figurehead, see D. Chandler, A History of Cambodia,
208
2nd ed., p. 91. For a commentary on the program, see L. Summers, The Cambodian Liberation Forces: Political and Economic Doctrine, IC 17 (1972),
pp. 1 6.
46. BBC SWB, FE/3372/A3/510.
47. On FUNK attempts to secure the loyalty of the nations intellectuals,
see Chan Yourans appeal to Cambodias youth, and Son Sens appeal, one week
later, to Cambodias intellectuals, which highlighted the disrespect of the Lon
Nol regime for education: How can we remain indifferent . . . when our
schools, libraries and research institutes are being turned into barracks for the
aggressor troops? he asked. A third appeal was broadcast by Sihanouk in August 1970, urging Cambodias intellectuals to switch their allegiance to FUNK.
See BBC SWB, FE/3379/A3/6 8; BBC SWB, FE/3393/A3/6; BBC SWB, FE/
3461/A3/4 5. Ironically, the Khmer Republic was to accuse its opposition of
similar acts. Long Boret asserted that the occupiers are attacking our . . .
schools. See Long Boret, The Struggle for Survival or the Violent [sic] of Neutrality,
p. 6.
48. See Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, p. 110, citing an interview with Jacques
Nepot.
49. In an interview in 1990, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen recalled
that the Americans had been dropping bombs on Memut, my birthplace. Being a Khmer and the offspring of the Angkorean age, I had no choice but to join
the popular movement to fight against external aggression. Chou Meng Tarr,
A Talk with Prime Minister Hun Sen, CSQ 40 (1990), p. 6.
50. K. Quinn, Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970 1974, NWCR (Spring 1976), pp. 3 31. See
also S. Thion, Within the Khmer Rouge, in Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle, pp. 119.
51. Ith Sarin, Nine Months with the Maquis, in Communist Party Power in
Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion, pp. 38 41. Milton Osborne argued that Sihanouk was used by the Cambodian Communists to ensure their international legitimacy and that the prince was well aware, by 1973, that he did
not figure in the long-term plans of the Communists. See M. Osborne,
Norodom Sihanouk: A Leader of the Left? in Communism in Indochina,
pp. 239 241.
52. On the anti-Vietnamese sentiment, see Kiernan, How Pol Pot, pp. 357
362. On the intensification of the Communists revolutionary zeal, see Quinn,
Political Change in Wartime, pp. 1117 and Frieson, Revolution and Rural
Response, pp. 42 43.
53. Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim, Tuol Sleng
prison, MayJune 1977 (trans. by C. Boua), in Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976 1977, p. 263. On Tuol
Sleng, a former high school, see B. Kiernan, C. Boua, and A. Barnett, Bureaucracy of Death, New Statesman (2 May 1979), pp. 669 676. See also
W. Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience,
pp. 39 44; and D. Hawk, The Photographic Record, in Cambodia, 1975 1978:
Rendezvous with Death, pp. 209 215.
54. Authors interview with Ek Seng, Sydney (Australia), June 1996. A resi-
209
dent of damban 22, Prey Veng province, the informant recalled that the Sney Pul
high school was converted into a prison facility.
55. Kenneth Quinn, cited in Kiernan, How Pol Pot, p. 335. Quinns report,
The Khmer Krahom program to create a Communist society in southern
Cambodia, was a U.S. Department of State Airgram (February 20, 1974) and
should not be confused with the journal article cited in note 50 (although both
are based on the same data).
56. On the school, see C. Meyer, Derrire le sourire Khmer, p. 389. On Tiv Ols
fate, see Chandler, The Tragedy, p. 291.
57. See Ith, Nine Months with the Maquis, p. 40.
58. On the bombing, see B. Kiernan, The American Bombardment of
Kampuchea, Vietnam Generation (Winter 1989), pp. 4 41.
59. Chandler, A History, p. 206.
60. See Chandler, The Tragedy, pp. 221222. See also Corfield, Khmers Stand
Up!, pp. 142 151. See also P. Poole, Cambodia: Will Vietnam Truce Halt Drift
to Civil War? AS 13 (1973), pp. 76 82.
61. For details of the corruption within the armed forces, see Becker, When
the War was Over, p. 33; Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, pp. 124 125. For personal
accounts, see May, Cambodian Witness, pp. 96 97; and H. Locard and Mung
Sonn, Prisonnier de lAngkar, pp. 54 58. On U.S. encouragement for changes,
see FEER (October 7, 1972), p. 20. On Lon Nol and fortune-tellers, see FEER
(March 25, 1972), pp. 5 6.
62. The final report of the consultancy: B. Duvieusart and R. Ughetto, Projet de restructuration du systme dducation, 13 fvrier20 avril 1973 (Paris:
UNESCO, 1973), no. 298/RMO.RD/EP. Apart from noting the obvious damage being caused by the ongoing conflict, the consultants also noted that the
system bore little relationship to Cambodias economic and social development
needs (pp. 26 31). The discussion of the social and political context surrounding the mission is based on B. Duvieusart, personal communication, January 29, 1999.
63. Justin Corfield notes that in areas of Kompong Speu, where Col.
Norodom Chantaraingsey led the thirteenth Infantry Battalion, schools were
established under Chantaraingseys sponsorship and with funds raised from the
sale of his Phnom Penh real estate and the proceeds of illicit gambling in the
capital. See Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, p. 125.
64. Tan Kim Huon, Role of the Universities in Development Planning: The Khmer
Republic Case, p. 8.
65. See, for example, BBC SWB, FE/4505/A3/6, and BBC SWB, FE/4543/
A3/3.
66. On the strikes, see Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, pp. 178 180. See also
FEER (February 4, 1974), pp. 20 21. Michael Snitowsky of the FEER argued that
the momentum of the teachers strike was sapped when the government announced the closure of schools in light of rocket attacks. See FEER (February 4,
1974), pp. 20 21.
67. On Keo Ans sacking, and the protests that followed it, see Corfield,
Khmers Stand Up!, pp. 126 129, 138, and 140 141. See also FEER (March 18,
1972), pp. 5 6.
210
68. See BBC SWB, FE/3973/B/2; BBC SWB, FE/4581/B/1.

69. On the assassination, see Corfield, Khmers Stand Up!, pp. 199 202.
See also FEER (10 June 1974), pp. 1718; RC ( June 8, 1974), p. 10; and RC
( July 13, 1974), pp. 2526. On the government reaction, see BBC SWB, FE/
4618/A3/1.
70. Ngor Haing Seng and R. Warner, Surviving the Killing Fields, p. 71.
71. BBC SWB, FE/3638/A3/12; BBC SWB, FE/4871/A3/13; BBC SWB,
FE/3656/A3/6. See also Declaration of Patriotic Intellectuals, Issued on September 30, 1971, in the Liberated Zone, in Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War,
pp. 418 433.
72. D. Kirk, Cambodia in 1974: Governments on Trial, AS 15 (1975), p. 58.
73. On the final days, see Chandler, The Tragedy, pp. 233 235; Corfield,
Khmers Stand Up!, pp. 217233.
Chapter 4: Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge

1. Authors interview with Kong Sao, Phnom Penh, December 1996.
2. April 17, 1975, is arguably the most written about day in Cambodian history. Written from the perspectives of Westerners and Cambodians from all
walks of life, the accounts are surprisingly uniform in their presentation of the
evacuation. See, for example, J. Criddle and T. Mam, To Destroy You is No Loss: The
Odyssey of a Cambodian Family, chapter 1; May S., Cambodian Witness: The Autobiography of Someth May, chapter 11; Ngor H. S. and R. Warner, Surviving the Killing
Fields: The Cambodian Odyssey of Haing S. Ngor, chapter 6; Pin Y., Stay Alive, My Son,
chapter 1; F. Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero, chapter 1; I. Simon-Barouh and
Yi T., Le Cambodge des Khmer Rouges: Chronique de la vie quotidienne, pp. 13 22. For
a report written at the time, see New York Times (17 April 1975), pp. 1, 18. The
Communist takeover is also depicted in the 1984 movie, The Killing Fields.
3. See D. Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 2nd ed., p. 209.
since 1945, p. 240, refers to the changes as discontinuities.
5. J. Barron and A. Paul, Peace with Horror: The Untold Story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia. The text was first printed in the United States as Murder of a
Gentle Land. On the responses of the Western media to the Cambodian revolution, see J. Metzl, Western Responses to Human Rights Abuses in Cambodia,
1975 1980.
6. M. Vickery, Cambodia, 1975 1982, pp. 36 ff.
7. See, for example, D. Boggett, Democratic Kampuchea and Human
Rights: Correcting the Record, Ampo 11 (1979), pp. 13 18.
8. Vickery, Cambodia, p. 50.
9. Ibid., p. 187.
10. More recent estimates by the U.S.-funded Cambodia Genocide Project
have raised the possibility that the death toll for the period may be significantly
more than the 741,000 estimated by Vickery and 1.5 million estimated by other
authors. See Reuters News (19 February 1996); see also the article by the director
of the Cambodia Genocide Program, Ben Kiernan, in which he estimates 1.7 million deaths: BP ( January 31, 1999).
11. Of course, Pol Pots death does not mean that attempts to further
Notes to Pages 97101
211
understand DK are doomed to failure. Other notable DK personalities, including Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Nuon Chea, now reside in the former
Khmer Rouge stronghold of Pailin and are arguably more accessible than they
have been at any time since 1975.
12. See, for example, FEER (29 October 1976), pp. 22 23 and FEER (21 October 1977), p. 23.
13. B. Kiernan, Origins of Khmer Communism, Southeast Asian Review
(1981), p. 167.
14. Ibid., p. 169.
15. Ibid., p. 175. KPRP cadres to retreat to North Vietnam included Son
Ngoc Minh, Sieu Heng, Mey Pho, Nuon Chea, So Phim, Ney Sarann, Keo Moni,
Leav Keo Moni, Sos Man, Hong Chhun, Nhem Sun, Chan Samay and Pen
Sovan. Sieu Heng, Nuon Chea, So Phim, and Ney Sarann all returned from
Hanoi after a few months. KPRP members to engage in political struggle in
Cambodia, within the Citizens Group (Krom Pracheachon), included Keo
Meas and Non Suon.
16. Ibid., p. 175. See also D. Chandler, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, p. 59.
17. Kiernan, Origins, p. 176.
18. The internal copy of the partys history, compiled by the Eastern Region
military political service, was captured in 1973. See Summary of Annotated
Party History, in Cambodia, 1975 1978: Rendezvous with Death, pp. 251268.
19. On Tou Samouth, see Kiernan, Origins, p. 177, and Chandler, The
Tragedy, p. 120.
20. On the control of the different factions, see B. Kiernan, Pol Pot and the
Kampuchean Communist Movement, in Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea,
1942 1980, pp. 228 229. On the purge of party veterans, see K. Quinn, Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970 1974, NWCR (1976), p. 11.
21. Ben Kiernans pioneering study of Cambodian Communism referred to
this transfer as a changing of the vanguard; see B. Kiernan, How Pol Pot came to
Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930 1975, chapter 3.
22. Saloth Sar, Monarchy or Democracy? in Khmer Rouges! Materiaux pour
lhistroire du communisme au Cambodge, pp. 357371.
23. M. Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society, pp. 9798.
24. Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution,
p. 4.
25. Khieu Samphan, in an interview in 1980, pointed clearly to his time in
Paris as the origins of his becoming a revolutionary and a Communist. See
C. Pilz, Khieu Samphan: Giving up on Socialism, Asia Record (October 1980).
26. K. Jackson, Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge, in Cambodia,
1975 1978, p. 248.
27. Khieu Samphan, Leconomie du Cambodge et ses problems dindustrialisation (Ph.D. thesis, University of Paris, 1959). For arguments in favor of
Samphans thesis as a blueprint, see C. Twining, The Economy, in Cambodia,
1975 1978, pp. 109 150, and W. Willmott, Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party, PA 54 (1981), pp. 212 225.
212
28. On Saloth Sars visit to Yugoslavia, see Chandler, Brother Number One,
pp. 30 31.
29. Saloth Sar recalled the trip with affection to a delegation of Yugoslav
journalists who visited Kampuchea in 1978; see Pol Pots Interview with Yugoslav Journalists, JCA 8 (1978), pp. 413, 421.
30. FEER, October 30, 1997.
31. On the hostility toward returnees from Vietnam, see Quinn, Political
Change, p. 11. On the anti-Vietnamese protests, see Chandler, The Tragedy,
p. 226. See also Ith Sarin, Nine Months with the Maquis, in Communist Party
Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion, p. 39.
32. Dmocratique Kampucha, Livre noir, faits et preuves des actes daggression
et dannexation du Viet-Nam contre le Kampucha, pp. 48 49. See also S. Thion,
The Ingratitude of the Crocodiles: The 1978 Cambodian Black Paper, in
Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle, pp. 95118.
33. Kiernan, How Pol Pot, p. 123, citing an interview with Chea Soth. For a
discussion of the CPKs perception of the independent nature of its party, see
K. Frieson, The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea, PA 61 (1988),
pp. 407 408.
34. On the extent of Chinese aid and assistance, see Kiernan, The Pol Pot
Rgime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, pp. 125131.
35. Ieng Sary: The Khmer revolution has no precedent. What we are trying
to do has never been done before in history. See FBIS (May 4, 1977). Also Pol
Pots now infamous speech before an assembled group of Yugoslav journalists
in 1978: We are building socialism without a model. We do not wish to copy
anyone. See S. Stanic, KampucheaSocialism without a Model, Socialist
Thought and Practice 18 (1978), p. 67.
36. B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, chapter 2. Kiernan notes the opposition
of the prominent revolutionary intellectual Hou Yuon to the evacuation plan
(pp. 32 33), the conflicting stories over whether the order was permanent or
temporary (pp. 34 35), and the different treatment by Khmer Rouge soldiers
of the population on the different arterial routes out of the city.
37. Vickery, Cambodia, p. 86. On the control of different areas by the troops
from different zones, see Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, chapter 2; Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 69 72; and Pin Yathay, Stay Alive, My Son, chapter 1.
38. FEER (October 29, 1976), p. 23.
40. FBIS (April 18, 1977).
41. Stanic, Kampuchea, p. 67.
42. H. Blaise, The Process and Strategy of Institution Building: A Case
Study in Cambodia (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh), p. 107.
43. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, pp. 5557.
44. Examine the control and implement the political line to save the economy and prepare to build the country, Document No. 3, September 19, 1975.
Cited in Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, p. 98.
45. Sihanouk made his return to Phnom Penh on September 9, 1975, at the
invitation of Cambodias revolutionary leaders. In early October, the prince returned to Beijing, then traveled to France before returning to Cambodia in
213
December 1975. By April 1976, he had resigned as the Democratic Kampuchea

head of state and spent the remaining years of the regime under virtual house
arrest in Phnom Penhs Royal Palace. On these events, see N. Chanda, Brother
Enemy, the War after the War: A History of Indochina since the Fall of Saigon, pp. 42
45, 103 107. Sihanouk also discusses his return in J. Gerrand (producer, director, writer), The Last God-King: The Lives and Times of Norodom Sihanouk, J. Gerrand and SBS Independent (1996). On Sihanouks resignation, see FEER
(April 30, 1976), p. 37.
46. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, p. 101.
47. FBIS ( January 6, 1976). For an English translation of the Democratic
Kampuchea constitution, see R. Jennar, The Cambodian Constitutions, 1953
1993, pp. 81 88.
48. D. Chandler, The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of Revolutionary Change, PA 49 (1976), p. 513.
49. Preliminary Explanation Before Reading the Plan, by the Party Secretary, trans. in Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976 1977, pp. 120 163.
50. The Partys Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in all Fields, 19771980,
trans. in Pol Pot Plans the Future, pp. 37119. On the Chinese model, see Maos
perspective on the work-study principle in Comrade Mao Tse-Tung on Educational Work, Part I, Chinese Education 2 (1969), pp. 40 41.
51. The Partys Four Year Plan, p. 114.
52. On the attempted coup dtat, see Chandler, Brother Number One, p. 129;
Chandler, The Tragedy, p. 270; and Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, pp. 337348. On
the conflict over the founding date of the CPK, see D. Chandler, Revising the
Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When was the Birthday of the Party? PA 36
(1983), pp. 288 300. On Maos death, see Chanda, Brother Enemy, pp. 74 80.
On purges, see Chandler, Brother Number One, pp. 128 129. On enemies, see
Report of Activities of the Party Center according to the General Political Tasks
of 1976, trans. in Pol Pot Plans the Future, pp. 189 190.
53. On Toul Sleng, see B. Kiernan, C. Boua, and A. Barnett, Bureaucracy of
Death, New Statesman, (2 May 1979), pp. 669 676. Hu Nims Toul Sleng confession is translated in Planning the Past: The Forced Confessions of Hu Nim,
Toul Sleng Prison, MayJune 1977 (trans. by Chantou Boua), in Pol Pot Plans
the Future, pp. 227318. Tuol Sleng (S-21), while the most famous, or infamous,
of Democratic Kampucheas security centers, was not the sole center, nor was it
the largest. For a discussion of Democratic Kampuchea security centers, see PPP
(1124 August 1995), pp. 1719.
54. For a discussion of the division of the Cambodian population into new
and base or old people, see S. Heder, Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance,
p. 5; and T. Carney, The Organization of Power, in Cambodia, 1975 1978,
pp. 82 84. On the second migration, and its effect on individuals, see Kiernan,
The Pol Pot Rgime, pp. 217230; and Vickery, Cambodia, chapter 3.
55. On the fate of Cambodias ethnic minorities, see Kiernan, The Pol Pot
Rgime, chapter 7.
56. For an overview of conditions in the different regions, see Chandler, The
Tragedy, pp. 265272. More detailed analysis and discussion can be found in
214
Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, pp. 159 250; and Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 82 138.
Ben Kiernan also highlights the variations within a particular zone in Wild
Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants: Kampucheas Eastern Zone under
Pol Pot, in Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, pp. 136 211.
57. See, for example, Ministry of Education, Seipao Rien: Uksaa, Tnak Ti Bpee
[Study Book: Writing, Second Class], which is glowing in its praise for the efforts
of the children of the revolution. Authors translation.
58. Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley perceptively noted that Government
ministers were expected to fulfil their duties on a part-time basis and they devoted most of their energies to work in the ricefields, and no bureaucracy was
established to implement policy. G. Evans and K. Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War:
Indochina since the Fall of Saigon, p. 105. A firsthand account of a ministry at work
can be found in L. Picq, Beyond the Horizon: Five years with the Khmer Rouge, chapters 2 10. Picq, a French woman married to a Democratic Kampuchea official,
worked in Ieng Sarys Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Phnom Penh throughout
the period. David Chandler noted the scarcity of documentation, which reflects official policy, is compounded by the rgimes contempt for paperwork
and research, and its much publicized preference for practice at the expense of
theory. D. Chandler, A Revolution in Full Spate: Communist Party Policy in
Democratic Kampuchea, December 1976, in Facing the Cambodian Past: Selected
Essays, 19711994, p. 256.
60. D. Ayres, The Khmer Rouge and Education: Beyond the Discourse of
Destruction, History of Education 28 (1999), pp. 216 225. See, for example,
UNICEF, Cambodia: The Situation of Women and Children, which states that between 1975 and 1979 there was deliberate destruction of all educational books,
equipment and facilities.
61. On Sum and Kem Hong Hav, see Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, pp. 182,
188; on Van, see Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 9596.
62. H. S. Ngor and R. Warner, Surviving the Killing Fields: The Cambodian
Odyssey of Haing S. Ngor, p. 139.
63. Authors interview with Moeung, group interview, Takeo Province, December 1996; authors interview with Sao, group interview, Takeo Province,
December 1996.
64. On the Northwest Zone, see B. Kiernan, Rural Reorganization in Democratic Kampuchea: The Northwest Zone, 19751977, in Indochina: Social and
Cultural Change, pp. 3578; on accounts of teacher and teenage girl, see
Vickery, Cambodia, p. 171; see also authors interview with Mun Savorn, Sydney
(Australia), July 1996.
65. Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 171172; Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime, p. 289.
66. On the decline after the second migration, see D. Ayres, Tradition and
Modernity Enmeshed: The Educational Crisis in Cambodia, 1953 1997,
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Sydney, 1997), Appendix 3.
67. B. Kiernan, The Eastern Zone Massacres: A Report on Social Conditions and
Human Rights Violations in the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea under the Rule
of Pol Pots (Khmer Rouge) Communist Party of Kampuchea, p. 56.
68. Vickery, Cambodia, p. 172.
215
69. M. Stuart-Fox and B. Ung, The Murderous Revolution: Life and Death in Pol
Pots Kampuchea, p. 66.
70. Authors interviews with Ek Seng, Sydney (Australia), JanuarySeptember 1996.
71. Written replies to questions from Lam Larn (United States), August
1996.
72. On the consistency, see Ayres, Tradition and Modernity Enmeshed,
Appendix 3.
73. Stuart-Fox and Ung, The Murderous Revolution, p. 66. Phnom Penh radio
cited in F. Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero, p. 142. See also FEER (18 July 1975),
p. 30.
74. See, for example, Vickery, Cambodia, pp. 171172.
75. Translation cited in J. Marston, Metaphors of the Khmer Rouge, in
Cambodian Culture Since 1975: Homeland and Exile, p. 113. For the original text,
see Ministry of Education, Phuomisah Kampuchea Pracheaneathipdei [Geography
of Democratic Kampuchea]. For text of the Sihanouk era, see Tan Kim Huon,
Gographie du Cambodge et de lAsie des moussons, p. 73. On building and defending the country, see The Current Political Tasks of Democratic Kampuchea,
in Ieng Sarys Rgime: The Diary of the Khmer Rouge Foreign Ministry, Document 1.
76. Translation cited in Marston, Metaphors, p. 110.
77. Ibid., pp. 110 111, who cites Chamrieng Padaewat on pp. 33 34, a publication of the Committee of Patriots of Democratic Kampuchea in France.
78. For other DK songs, see B. Kiernan and C. Boua, Six Revolutionary
Songs, in Peasants and Politics, pp. 326 328. The songs were coupled with a
plethora of revolutionary slogans. On these slogans, and the themes they encapsulated, see H. Locard, Le <<petit livre rouge>> de Pol Pot, ou les paroles de lAngkar:
Entendues dans le Cambodge des Khmer Rouge du 17 avril 1975 au 7 janvier 1979.
79. See, for example, BBC SWB, FE/5959/B/3.
80. See J. Pouvatchy, Cambodian-Vietnamese Relations, AS 26 (1986),
p. 447; and S. Heder, The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict, in The Third
Indochina Conflict, pp. 3132.
81. On Pol Pots visit to China, see FBIS (September 29, 1977), and Chandler, Brother Number One, pp. 142 144. On the build up to the CambodiaVietnam conflict, see Evans and Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War, pp. 115118.
Norodom Sihanouk recalled Khieu Samphan declaring in 1978: the number
one enemy is not U.S. imperialism, but Vietnam, ready to swallow up Cambodia. Norodom Sihanouk, Chroniques de guerre et despoir, p. 56.
83. Ibid., p. 152.
84. E. Becker, When the War Was Over: The Voices of Cambodias Revolution and
its People, p. 329.
86. Personal communication from a former high-ranking Democratic Kampuchea official, March 8, 1999.
87. Norodom Sihanouk notes that Pol Pots cannonfire had shaken the
windows in my prison home. See his vituperative War and Hope: The Case for
Cambodia, p. 100.
216
Chapter 5: The PRK and the SOC

1. B. Kiernan, The Pol Pot Rgime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodian under the Khmer Rouge, 1975 1979, p. 65.
2. For details of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, see N. Chanda,
Brother Enemy, the War After the War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon,
chapters 8 10; G. Evans and K. Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War: Indochina Since
the Fall of Saigon, pp. 121126.
3. For a detailed discussion, see D. Chandler, Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When was the Birthday of the Party? in Facing the Cambodian
Past: Selected Essays, 19711994, pp. 215232. See also V. Frings, Allied and Equal:
The Kampuchean Peoples Revolutionary Partys Historiography and its Relations with
Vietnam, 1979 1991, pp. 5 6.
4. Cited in ibid., p. 217. See also S. Heder, Origins of the Conflict, SEAC 64
(1978), pp. 3 18.
5. M. Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society, pp. 25, 47.
6. References to the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique abounded in PRK propaganda. The label was used in all official documentation that referred to the DK
period and was also promoted by the regime in its dealings with foreigners. A
second tendency was to relate this clique to fascism and the barbarity of Adolf
Hitler, thus attempting to create a distance between DK and the socialist world.
See, for example, Ros Samays interview with the Vietnam courier, VC 15 (February 1979), pp. 6 8. The references to the Chinese were especially encouraged by Vietnam. A Vietnamese pamphlet in 1979 argued that The Pol PotIeng Sary butchers have completely sold their souls and bodies to Beijings
expansionism. See G. Lockhart, Strike in the South, Clear the North: The Problem of Kampuchea and the Roots of Vietnamese Strategy There, p. 1.
7. Kampucheas Eight Immediate Policies for Liberated Areas, VC 15 (February 1979), pp. 3 4.
8. B. Kiernan, Kampuchea 1979 1981: National Rehabilitation in the Eye
of an International Storm, SEAA (1982), p. 168.
9. A copy of the text of the treaty is in VC 15 (March 1979), p. 5. The first
Cambodian instructive visit to Vietnam, led by Pen Navuth, then responsible
for adult education in the PRK, was undertaken in 1979 (specific date not mentioned). On this visit, see Ministre de lEducation, Une visite instructive: Des
enseignants Kampuchans sinformant en Rpublique Socialiste du Viet Nam,
in Pour ressusciter lducation en Rpublique Populaire du Kampucha, pp. 79.
10. See Kiernan, Kampuchea 1979 1981, p. 168; and S. Heder, Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance, p. 9, note 1. Michael Leifer referred to the
regime as little more than a list of names on an information sheet, while a PRK
official told Kathleen Gough in 1980 that we enlisted anybody who could read
and write. . . . The problem is we have too many incompetent people in our
ministries. See M. Leifer, Kampuchea 1979: From Dry Season to Dry Season,
AS 20 (1980), p. 34; and K. Gough, Interviews in Kampuchea, BCAS 14 (1982),
p. 56.
11. E. Mysliweic, Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea,
p. 11.
217
12. On continued fighting, see FEER ( June 29, 1979), p. 23. On the famine,
see M. Hiebert and L. Hiebert, Famine in Kampuchea: Politics of a Tragedy,
II 4 (1979), pp. 12.
13. Kiernan, Kampuchea, 1979 1981, p. 175. See also J. Reynell, Political
Pawns: Refugees on the Thai-Kampuchean Border, pp. 3136.
14. For two perspectives on the apportion of blame over the delay in providing humanitarian assistance, see W. Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience, chapters 57; and B. Kiernan, Review Essay: William Shawcross, Declining Cambodia, BCAS 17 (1985), pp. 56 63.
15. Heng Samrin, Message la nation, in Pour ressusciter lducation, pp. 1,
6. Authors translation.
16. Ministry of Education, Education in the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea,
7.1.84, p. 1. Subsequent commentary has generally reaffirmed these estimates.
Grant Curtis 1989 study for the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), for example, estimated that as many as 80 percent of teachers and educational administrators died or fled the country. Eva Mysliweic forwarded a more conservative estimate of 7,000 of an original 20,000 remaining. See G. Curtis,
Cambodia: A Country Profile, p. 132; and Mysliweic, Punishing the Poor, p. 11.
17. M. Vickery, Cambodia, 1975 1982, p. 244.
18. D. Ayres, The Khmer Rouge and Education: Beyond the Discourse of
Destruction, History of Education 28 (1999), pp. 216 225.
19. H. Locard, Draft Report on Higher Education in Cambodia: Phnom
Penh-Canberra, JulyAugust 1995 (unpublished UNESCO paper, 1995), p. 11.
Michael Vickerys analysis accords with this view, noting of the DK period that
all infrastructure . . . and buildings had been allowed to deteriorate. See M.
Vickery, Cambodia (Kampuchea): History, Tragedy and Uncertain Future,
BCAS 21 (1989), p. 49.
20. UNTAC, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, p. 19; Locard,
Draft Report, p. 11. On refugees of the 1970 1975 war: authors interview
with Ngorn Som, Phnom Penh, January 1997. On books for toilet paper: authors interview with Sau Sina, Phnom Penh, December 1996. On books for
paper at market: authors interview with H, a former high-ranking textbook author, Phnom Penh, December 1996. On pulping 1960s print media, see J. Corfield, Khmers Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government, 1970 1975, Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, p. 58, note 15.
21. On Chan Ven: authors interview with E, a former high-ranking PRK
education ministry official, Phnom Penh, December 1996. See also National
United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea Founded, VC 15 ( January
1979), p. 9; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/5986/A3/2-3; and T. Clayton,
Education and Language in Education in Relation to External Intervention in Cambodia, 1620 1989 (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh 1995),
p. 252.
22. Ministry of Education, Education, 7.1.84, p. 4.
23. Clayton, Education and Language in Education, p. 243.
24. David Chandler, after noting the difficulty in determining the extent of
Vietnamese control over the PRK, described the country as a satellite of Vietnam. Nayan Chanda asserted that Ministries were set up, with Vietnamese
218
advisers running things behind the scenes, while Michael Haas concluded that
evidence of Cambodian independence from Vietnam was difficult to detect.
See D. Chandler, Cambodia in 1984: Historical Patterns Re-asserted, in Facing
the Cambodian Past: Selected Essays, 19711994, p. 286; Chanda, Brother Enemy,
p. 372; and M. Haas, Genocide by Proxy: Cambodian Pawn on a Superpower Chessboard, p. 48. Also authors interviews with I, a former primary school director,
and J, a former secondary school director, Phnom Penh, December 1996.
25. On claims of ethnocide, see M. Martin, Vietnamized Cambodia: A
Silent Ethnocide, II 7 (1986), p. 2. Martin argued that the Vietnamese were attempting to de-Khmerize Cambodia through a program designed to destroy
Cambodian cultural identity. In terms of the rehabilitation of the education system, she argued that Vietnamese experts had attempted to impose the Vietnamese model of education on Cambodia through the type of schools
opened, the curriculum adopted, the disciplines taught, and the treatment
of the countrys many orphans.
26. Authors interview with Suon Serey, Phnom Penh, January 1997.
27. Nguyen Hoang, Notes taken in Phnom Penh, VC 15 ( June 1979), p. 9;
and VC 15 (September 1979), p. 15.
28. Authors interview with A, a former high-ranking PRK education ministry official, Phnom Penh, December 1996. A recalled that there were two
Vietnamese advisers seconded to each of the ministrys seven departments and
an additional three advisers assigned to the minister. These figures accord with
those solicited by Thomas Clayton. See Clayton, Education and Language in
Education, pp. 243 244.
29. Authors interview with G, a former PRK official at the ministry personnel bureau, Phnom Penh, December 1996.
30. UNESCO, Inter-sectoral Basic Needs Assessment Mission to Cambodia p. 47.
31. Ministre de lEducation, Ralisations dans le domaine de lducation:
Exposition loccasion du 1er anniversaire de la grande victoire, 7/1/79. See also
H. Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance and Rehabilitation in Kampuchea: Consultant Report to UNICEF of a Mission Undertaken from 16 February to 1 March 1980,
p. 10.
32. Ibid., p. 12.
33. Marie Martin has charged that the changes represent evidence of deKhmerization and ethnocide. See Martin, Vietnamized Cambodia, pp. 3 4;
and M. Martin, Cambodia: A Shattered Society, p. 230.
34. Peoples Republic of Kampuchea, Peoples Revolutionary Council, Decree on the Establishment of the Cabinet of the Minister of Education. Unofficial translation in authors possession.
35. Ministry of Education, Education: State of Cambodia, p. 5.
36. UNICEF was one of few multilateral agencies to operate in Cambodia
throughout the 1980s because of its emergency relief mandate. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO),
and UNESCO, because of their development-oriented mandates (as opposed
to emergency relief ) were prevented from working in Cambodia by the UNsanctioned development aid embargo against the country. The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) was able to work in Cambodia between 1979
219
1982 but later had to limit its assistance because of the development embargo.
For a discussion, see Mysliweic, Punishing the Poor, pp. 72 76.
37. Authors interview with Ung Phanna, Siem Reap, December 1996.
38. Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance . . . 1980, Annex V.
39. Authors interview with Men Pon, Phnom Penh, January 1997. Men was
separated from his wife in 1976 and was not reunited with her until 1983, after
he had moved to Siem Reap, where he discovered that she was still alive. On
other effects, see Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance . . . 1980, p. 17.
40. Ibid., Annex IV.
41. Ibid., pp. 2527.
42. Ibid., p. 4.
43. See, for example, Ministre de lEducation, Evolution de lEducation
au Kampucha, in Pour ressusciter lducation, pp. 10 14.
44. Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance . . . 1980, pp. 16 18.
45. Authors interview with A.
46. Authors interview with F, a former official at the Center for Educational
Research and Textbook Development, Phnom Penh, December 1996.
47. Authors interview with H; also authors interview with F, a former official at the center, Phnom Penh, December 1996. Although a revolutionary history syllabus was ratified, it was not implemented until 1986. The delay could be
attributed to consternation over the question of what constituted an acceptable version of Cambodian history. A history text written by a Soviet historian
in 1985 was rejected by the Cambodian ministry because it was incorrect.
Texts distributed after this time were written by Cambodians. Details on the
delay are from authors interview with F. For a discussion of the Soviet text, see
J. Jordens, Scripting Cambodia: The PRK and its Rewriting of Cambodian National History (B.A. honors thesis, Monash University, 1991). See also Vickery,
Kampuchea, p. 157.
48. Authors interview with C, a former high-ranking ministerial official of
the PRK /SOC, Phnom Penh, December 1996.
49. Ministry of Education, Educational Ralisations, 19811985, p. 6.
50. On the resistance, see J. Corfield, A History of the Cambodian nonCommunist Resistance, 1975 1983.
51. For a detailed discussion, see J. Bekaert, The Khmer Coalition: Who
Wins, Who Loses? II 28 (1982); and Evans and Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War,
chapter 8. On the quite compelling case against granting the seat to the CGDK,
see also J. Leonard, Time to Unseat Pol Pot, II 36 (1983), pp. 4 5. See also R.
Amer, The United Nations and Kampuchea: The Issue of Representation and
its Implications, BCAS 22 (1990), pp. 52 60.
52. H. Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance in Kampuchea: Report of a Mission, 19 31 October 1981, p. v.
53. Ibid., pp. 19 36.
54. Ministry of Education, Education . . . 7.1.84, p. 15.
55. Decision #129 of the Central Committee of the Party about Problems of
Higher and Technical Education (30 April 1983), cited in Clayton, Education
and Language in Education, p. 336. The document, according to Clayton (personal communication, April 30, 1997), was written by the Vietnamese. In 1990,
220
the ministry claimed that the April 30 decision saw a decision on the revolution of higher and specialized education based on socialism, Ministry of Education, Education: State of Cambodia, p. 14.
56. The exception was the Faculty of Medicine, the first of Cambodias tertiary institutions opened after 1979, which used French as the language of
instruction.
57. Ibid., pp. 1112; Ministry of Education, Education . . . 7.1.84, p. 11; Ministry of Education, Some Aspects of the Literacy Movement and Complementary Education from the Great Victory of January 7 1979 to the end of 1987, p. 3.
58. P. Quinn-Judge, Chamcar Leou: A Gradual Recovery, SEAC 77 (February 1981), p. 26.
59. Authors interview with Koy Nong, Phnom Penh, January 1997.
60. Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance . . . 1981, p. v.
61. Authors interview with C.
62. Reiff, Educational Emergency Assistance . . . 1981, p. 40.
63. On Chan Sis death and Hun Sens appointment, see Vickery, Kampuchea, p. 47; M. Eiland, Cambodia in 1985: From stalemate to ambiguity, AS
26 (1986), p. 121. On the shift, see Vickery, Kampuchea, chapter 6. The shift
away from Hanoi veterans has been argued by a number of analysts to represent
a movement away from greater Cambodian independence. Michael Eiland
posits that Chan Sis death occurred in mysterious circumstances amid rumors
of his disenchantment with the Vietnamese occupation. See Eiland, Cambodia, p. 121. On Pen Navuth, VC 19 ( July 1983), p. 26.
64. On Hengs report, see Vickery, Kampuchea, p. 86. On the economy, see
M. Vickery, Notes on the Political Economy of the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea, JCA 20 (1990), p. 442.
65. The conclusions are drawn by Viviane Frings in her examination of agricultural collectivization in the PRK. See V. Frings, The Failure of Agricultural Collectivization in the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea, 1979 1989, pp. 54 66.
66. Vickery, Kampuchea, pp. 85 87.
67. Ibid., p. 88.
68. Pen Navuth, Rapport sur le rle de lcole dans la lutte idologique
contemporaine la 6e conference des ministres de lducation des pays socialistes, Rpubliques Populaire de Pologne, Varsovie (17 au 23 novembre 1985),
pp. 12. Authors translation.
69. Authors interview with Chea Saron, Phnom Penh, January 1997.
70. In 1985, 464 students were studying in the USSR, 111 in East Germany,
75 in Vietnam, 30 in Hungary, 26 in Czechoslovakia, 15 in Bulgaria, 11 in
Poland, and 5 each in Cuba, Laos, and Mongolia. See Ministre de lEducation,
Departement de Planification et de Finances, Bulletin de statistiques de lducation
ltat du Cambodge: Danne scolaire 1979 80 1989 90, p. 9.
71. On the illegality of learning French and English, authors interview with
D, a higher education official of the PRK /SOC, Phnom Penh, December 1996,
and authors interview with E. David Ablin noted that English and French study
were illegal from 1979 to 1988, excepting a few official efforts such as . . . in the
medical school. See D. Ablin, Foreign Language Policy in the Cambodian
Government: Questions of Sovereignty, Manpower Training and Development
221
Assistance (unpublished UNICEF consultants report, Phnom Penh, 1991),

p. 27. On the private industry, see Ablins report (p. 27), and authors interview
with Koy Nong.
72. Authors interview with Keo Soth, Phnom Penh, January 1997; authors
interview with Nou Si, Phnom Penh, January 1997; and authors interview with
Men Pon. Also Ministry of Education, Education: State of Cambodia, pp. 22 25.
73. On the buildup to and content of subsequent meetings between Hun
Sen and Norodom Sihanouk, see N. Chanda, Cambodia in 1987: Sihanouk on
Center Stage, AS 28 (1988), pp. 110 115. On the external factors influencing
the peace process, see D. Pike, The Cambodian Peace Process: Summer of
1989, AS 29 (1989), pp. 843 846. See also W. Duiker, Looking beyond Cambodia: China and Vietnam, II 88 (1989). On later meetings, the most significant being known as Jakarta Informal Meeting I ( JIM-I) and Jakarta Informal
Meeting II ( Jim-II), see K. Um, Cambodia in 1988: The Curved Road to Settlement, AS 29 (1989), pp. 73 78; and K. Um, Cambodia in 1989: Still Talking but no Settlement, AS 30 (1990), pp. 97100.
74. Authors interview with Long Visal, Phnom Penh, January 1997.
75. The primary education course had been extended by one year in 1985,
thus the matriculation examinations after eleven years of schooling and not the
ten of the immediate post-DK years.
76. On the text, see J. Jordens, A State of Cambodia Political Education Text: Exposition and Analysis; also authors interview with Sok Sarun, Phnom Penh, January 1997; authors interview with Sao Bunroeun, Phnom Penh, January 1997;
and authors interview with Li Ben, Phnom Penh, January 1997.
77. Jordens, Political Education Text, pp. 10 22.
78. Ministry of Education, State Plan: 1991, pp. 3 4. Unofficial translation
by Redd Barna in authors possession.
79. F. Brown, Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace, AS 32 (1992),
pp. 93 94; M. Vickery, The Cambodian Peoples Party: Where Has It Come
From, Where Is It Going? SEAA (1994), p. 110.
80. For Yus Sons speech, see State of Cambodia, National Conference on Education for All: Final Report, pp. 39 41; for Hun Sens speech, see pp. 42 47.
Chapter 6: Ranariddh and Hun Sen

1. On the coup, see the special edition of the PPP ( July 12 24), 1997. This
chapter is based on D. Ayres, From Hope to Despair: Education, Development and the
State in Cambodia since UNTAC.
2. A United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report in 1994 saw
Cambodia ranked 147 out of 173 countries on the UNDP-devised Human Development Index. In terms of Cambodias GNP, the country ranked 74th on a
list of 93 developing countries. See PPP (August 26 September 8, 1994), p. 1.
3. The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, in The United Nations and Cambodia, 19911995, A/46/608S/23177, pp. 132 148.
4. The four factions were the leaders of the incumbent State of Cambodia:
the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP); the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC); the
222
Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front (KPNLF); and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, Khmer Rouge).
5. The plan for an international control mechanism was the brainchild of
Stephen Solarz, a member of the U.S. Congress. It was later expanded by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. See J. Heininger, Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia, pp. 1516; and K. Berry, From Red to Blue:
Australias Initiative for Peace.
6. On the principles for the constitution set down in the agreements, see
The Agreements, pp. 145146.
7. S. Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodian War: From Battlefield to
Ballot-box, p. 178
8. FEER (February 27, 1992), p. 22.
9. D. Shoesmith, Cambodia: The Obstacles to Peace, pp. 4 5.
10. Letter dated 30 August 1990 from China, France, the USSR, the United
Kingdom, and the United States transmitting the Statement and Framework
Document Adopted by their Representatives at a Meeting in New York, 2728
August 1990, in The United Nations and Cambodia, A/45/472-S/21689, p. 90.
11. The Agreements, pp. 138 139.
12. M. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTACs Civil Mandate (Boulder:
International Peace Academy, 1995), p. 35.
13. W. Shawcross, Cambodias New Deal, p. 13.
14. The Agreements, p. 148.
15. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping, pp. 38, 40. The concept of full control, spelled
out by the secretary-general, was quite ambiguous, meaning that UNTAC
should control Cambodia, not govern it.
16. The education committee, without access to the management apparatuses of the education ministry, was only able to make recommendations in relation to educational policies. These recommendations, according to an observer, amounted to nothing more than sweeping statements about access and
quality, which had been the key tenets of the 1991 Education for All conference.
17. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping, p. 40; personal communication by e-mail from
former UNTAC financial controller, May 3, 1997.
18. J. Charny, NGOs and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia,
pp. 3 6.
19. O. Quinlen, Education [in] Cambodia in Practice (unpublished consultants report for CONCERN, July 1991), pp. 8 10.
20. V. Vorona, The Educational System of Siem Reap Province: Problems and
Prospects, pp. 6 16.
21. For other reports, see H. Blom and P. Nooijer, Higher Education and Vocational Training in Cambodia: Report of a NUFFIC Fact Finding Mission, pp. 28 29;
A. De Mello e Souza, Cambodia Book Sector Study: Specialist Report on the Economy,
Budget and Educational Finance; T. Read, Cambodia Book Sector Study: Specialist Report on the Education System, Authorship, Copyright and Publishing Industry.
22. United Nations Childrens Fund, UNICEF Education Plan 1993, p. 1.
23. EDUCAM, Education, in The Development Context of Cambodia: Sectoral
Position Papers, March 1994, p. 29.
24. The UNDP had undertaken a needs assessment study in August 1989.
223
While providing those with an interest in the rehabilitation of Cambodias infrastructure after 1991 with a point of reference, the 1989 report was otherwise
largely ignored. See UNDP, Report of the Kampuchea Needs Assessment Study.
25. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Economic Report on Cambodia; UNDP,
Comprehensive Paper on Cambodia. On the appeal, see First progress report of the
Secretary-General on UNTAC, in The United Nations and Cambodia, S/23870,
pp. 189 190; UNDP, World Bank, IMF and ADB, Cambodia, Socioeconomic Situation and Immediate Needs.
26. On the elections, see PPP ( June 6 12, 1993), pp. 1, 4 5, 16; FEER ( June
3, 1993), pp. 10 11; NYT ( June 3, 1993), p. A18. See also commentary in K. Um,
Cambodia in 1993: Year Zero Plus One, AS 34 (1994), pp. 74 76.
27. Shawcross, Cambodias New Deal, p. 20.
28. For examples of the increasing chaos in the buildup to the elections,
see Time (May 24, 1993), pp. 30 34; FEER (May 20, 1993), pp. 10 11; FEER
(May 27, 1993), pp. 1112. For an examination, see S. Heder, The Resumption
of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from
NADK Self-Demobilizers, in Propaganda, Politics and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping, pp. 73 113.
29. Y. Akashi, Letter dated 2 June 1993 from the Secretary-General transmitting statement by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Cambodia at the Supreme National Council meeting on 29 May 1993; endorses
the statement of the Special Representative that the conduct of the election was
free and fair, in The United Nations and Cambodia, S/25879, p. 310.
30. In the total popular vote, FUNCINPEC won 45 percent, the CPP 38 percent, and the BLDP 4 percent, with the remainder spread among the minor
parties. With a system of proportionality in relation to provinces, FUNCINPEC
won 58 seats in the Constituent Assembly, the CPP 51, the Buddhist Liberal
Democratic Party (BLDP) 10, and Moulinaka 1 seat.
31. On Sihanouks political maneuvering, see M. Vickery, Cambodia: A Political Survey, pp. 20 25. On becoming a kingdom, see Washington Post (September 22, 1993), p. A25, and PPP (September 24 October 7, 1993), pp. 12.
32. For an unofficial translation of the constitution, adopted from several
sources, see R. Jennar, The Cambodian Constitutions, 1953 1993; preamble on
p. 8.
33. D. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodia Revisited, in Facing the Cambodian Past: Selected Essays, 19711994, pp. 316 317.
34. The Agreements, pp. 145146.
35. D. Chandler, talk at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Cambodia, November 23, 1994; unofficial transcript in authors possession.
36. V. Frings, The Cambodian Peoples Party and Sihanouk, JCA 25
(1994), p. 358.
37. R. Cox, The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International
Organization, Cooperation and Conflict 29 (1994), p. 105.
38. E. Coxon, Politics and Modernization in Western Samoan Education
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Auckland, 1996), p. 105.
39. Joel Samoff, in reference to changes brought about by the economic and
political climate of the 1980s, argued that by the end of the 1980s moderniza-
224
tion was rejuvenated. See J. Samoff, ed., Coping with Crisis: Austerity, Adjustment
and Human Resources, p. 246.
40. P. Jones, World Bank Financing of Education: Lending, Learning and Development, p. 15.
41. Tokyo Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Issued at the Conclusion of the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia on 22 June 1992, in The United Nations
and Cambodia, pp. 197198.
42. Ibid., p. 197.
43. Royal Government, The National Program to Rehabilitate and Develop
Cambodia.
44. Royal Government, Implementing the National Program to Rehabilitate and
Develop Cambodia, pp. 2 5.
45. In discussing government policies, David Ashley noted, for example,
that economic reconstruction is its [the governments] principal, indeed perhaps its only policy aim. See PPP ( June 2 15, 1995), p. 6.
46. Ibid., p. 94.
47. Royal Government, Implementing the National Program, pp. 2 3.
48. World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Region, Country Department 1 (hereafter World Bank), Cambodia Rehabilitation Program: Implementation and Outlook;
World Bank, Cambodia: From Recovery to Sustained Development.
49. Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Rebuilding Quality Education
and Training in Cambodia.
50. Ung Huot, Education Policy Statement, in Rebuilding Quality Education
and Training in Cambodia, ed. Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, p. iii.
51. See Jennar, The Cambodian Constitutions, pp. 18 19.
52. ADB and Queensland Education Consortium (hereafter QEC), The
Royal Government of Cambodia Education Sector Review, Volume 1: Executive Summary; ADB and QEC, The Royal Government of Cambodia Education Sector Review,
Volume 2a: Education Sector Strategic Analysis; ADB and QEC, The Royal Government
of Cambodia Education Sector Review, Volume 2b: Education Statistical Digest; ADB
and QEC, The Royal Government of Cambodia Education Sector Review, Volume 3: Education Investment Framework and Program.
53. Medium Term Education Development: Indicative Policy and Strategic
Directions, 1994 2000, in ADB and QEC, Education Sector Review, Volume 3: Education Investment Framework and Program, pp. 6773.
54. Hun Sen, Opening Address, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
and Council for the Development of Cambodia, Investment Framework, Education
Sector: 1995 2000.
55. Ung Huot, Closing Speech, in Ministry of Education, Youth and
Sports, National Forum on Foreign Aid to Education, Youth and Sport, March 2123,
1994.
56. Ibid.
57. Establishing the rule of law was one of the stated goals of the Cambodian
government in the NPRD. See Royal Government, Implementing the National Program, p. ii.
225
58. See, for example, FEER ( January 27, 1994), p. 18; FEER (May 19, 1994),
pp. 16 19; Asiaweek (September 15, 1995), p. 40; Asiaweek (November 24, 1995),
pp. 38 44.
59. D. Ashley, The Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia: Causes and
Lessons, in Cambodia and the International Community: The Quest for Peace, Development and Democracy, eds. F. Brown and D. Timberman, p. 55.
60. For a discussion, see ibid., pp. 53 58.
61. R. Jennar. Cambodia: After the UNTAC mission, in Indochina Today:
Emerging Trends, p. 45.
62. PPP (March 24 April 6, 1995), p. 12.
63. World Bank, Cambodia Rehabilitation Program, p. ii.
64. Ibid., p. 19.
65. Policy and strategic framework, in MOEYS and Council for the Development of Cambodia, Investment Framework.
66. ADB and QEC, Education Sector Review, Volume 2a, p. 81.
67. World Bank, Cambodia Rehabilitation Program, p. 74.
68. The announcement of the prime pdagogique was made by FUNCINPEC
officials Norodom Ranariddh, the Minister for Education Ung Huot and the
Minister for Finance Sam Rainsy at a mass meeting of teachers in March 1994.
In an attempt to broaden its impact, and in contravention of the subdecree that
established the payment, the prime pdagogique was not only awarded to teachers
but to every employee of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports: clerical
staff, drivers, cooks, and maintenance staff.
69. On this agreement, see John McAndrew, Aid Diffusions and Illusions: Bilateral and Multilateral Emergency and Development Assistance to Cambodia, 1992
1995, pp. 39 40.
70. Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, Foreword, in MOEYS and Council for the Development of Cambodia, Investment Framework, Education Sector:
1995 2000 p. i.
71. World Bank, Cambodia Rehabilitation Program, p. 74.
72. Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, Towards Genuine Partnership,
NGO Strategies for Development in Cambodia, 1996 2000: Position Paper to Consultative Group, Tokyo, p. 10; and Cambodian Government Support for Education
Funding (unpublished paper, July 1996).
73. Royal Government, First Socioeconomic Development Plan, 1996 2000, p. 51.
74. Keat Chhon, Keynote Address, given at National Higher Education
Taskforce seminar, Phnom Penh, December 19 20, 1996, p. 3.
75. See, for example, the Cambodia Times article that erroneously claimed
that the governments expenditure on education had increased by 16 percent:
CT ( January 6 12, 1997), pp. 12. On the figures, see Ministry of the Economy
and Finance, Gestion 1997, Tableau du travail: Depenses du budget gnral de
ltat (Annexe 2).
76. Cambodge Nouveau 65 (fevrier 115, 1996), p. 1; CT ( January 6 12,
1997), p. 1; PPP (May 31June 13, 1996), pp. 1, 13; PPP (November 29
December 12, 1996), p. 13.
77. See Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Gestion 1997.
226
78. See, for example, PPP ( July 30 August 12, 1993), p. 3; PPP (September 23 October 6, 1994), p. 2. Also authors interviews with teachers and students at the following educational institutions in Phnom Penh: Bak Touk Secondary School, Beng Trabek Secondary School, Takhmau Secondary School,
Norodom Primary School, and Faculty of Medicine (December 1996 and January 1997).
79. On essential salary supplementation, authors interview with K,
Phnom Penh, December 1996. PPP ( June 1730, 1994), p. 8; PPP ( July 14 27,
1995), p. 20; CD ( June 11, 1996), p. 6; CD ( July 2, 1996), pp. 1, 6. The problem
is also prevalent in higher education, as indicated by the 1994 demonstrations
at the Faculty of Medicine. See PPP (September 23 October 6, 1994), p. 5.
80. PPP ( June 1730, 1994), p. 8; CT (October, 2127, 1996), p. 2. On the
lateness of the payment of wages, see CT ( January 27February 1, 1997), p. 1;
authors interviews with teachers and students at Bak Touk Secondary School,
Beng Trabek Secondary School, Takhmau Secondary School, Norodom Primary School, and the Faculty of Medicine; and PPP ( July 12 25, 1996), p. 17.
81. Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, Foreword, in Investment Framework,
p. i.
82. PPP (February 10 23, 1995), p. 7.
83. Royal Government, Implementing the National Program, p. 23.
84. Summary of Proceedings, in Compendium of Plan Documents Presented to
Donors: Round Table Meeting on Education Sector, Phnom Penh, 7/12/94, p. II.
85. On the RUPP, see H. Locard, Social Sciences at the University of
Phnom Penh (unpublished papers, 1993); G. Coyne, Education and Sociopolitical Transitions in Asia: The Case of Phnom Penh University, in Higher Education in Cambodia: Perspectives of an Australian Aid Project, pp. 23 40; and
L. Fergusson and G. le Masson, A Culture Under Siege: Post-colonial Higher
Education and Teacher Education in Cambodia from 1953 to 1979, History of
Education 26 (1997), pp. 91112.
86. Graduation Speech of Student Representative, in Ceremony to Award
Bachelor Degrees to the Twelfth Graduating Class, 7 October 1995.
87. Norodom Ranariddh, Speech of the First Prime Minister, in Ceremony
to Award Bachelor Degrees.
88. CT (December 31, 1995January 6, 1996).
89. Confusion over Employment Policy (unpublished paper, December
1995).
90. CT (September 9, 1996), p. 4.
91. Council of Ministers, Reduction of the Number of Civil Servants (unpublished paper, September 1996).
92. On the IMFs increasing frustration with Cambodia, see for example, CT
(November 25December 12, 1996), p. 1; and PPP (November 29 December
12, 1996), p. 13. See also the joint Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies for 1997 produced by the government in consultation with the IMF;
the text was printed in PPP (May 16 29, 1997), pp. 14 16.
93. Jennar, The Cambodian Constitutions, p. 19.
95. PPP (February 9 22, 1996), Supplement, p. 3.
227
97. Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, European Union Member States
Consultation: Ministerial Presentation.
98. PPP ( July 26 August 8, 1996), p. 4.
99. CT (December 16, 1996), p. 5.
Conclusion
since 1945, p. 6.
2. See Keat Chhon, Cambodia 1997, A Moment of Truth: The Finance Act
for 1997 in its Economic Framework and Fundamental Contents (Unpublished paper, December 1996).
3. For an analytical perspective, see also speech delivered by Tony Kevin
(former Australian Ambassador to Cambodia) at the Australian Institute of
International Affairs, Melbourne, November 16, 1998; transcript in authors
possession.
4. Cambodian teachers to strike for more pay, Reuters News ( January 24,
1998).
5. NYT (December 9, 1997), p. 13.
References
Books, Articles, Reports (Published and Unpublished), and Theses

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Amer, R. The United Nations and Kampuchea: The Issue of Representation and
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Interviews
Several interviewees, who very willingly shared with me their recollections of
the past, did not wish to be identied in the book. These interviewees, mostly
education ofcials of the former PRK regime who remain involved in educa-
References
247
tion, have been referred to using an alphabetical code. The interviewees cited
in the notes of the text are all referred to in this section. The list is not a comprehensive catalogue of all of those who contributed to this study. The recollections, opinions, arguments, and perspectives of many othersstudents,
teachers, expatriate consultants and advisers, and people on the street
while not cited in the text, played a signicant role in the construction of my
narrative.
Unnamed Informants
A. Education ofcial of the former PRK attached to the Cabinet of the Minister; current member of the National Assembly. Interviewed at Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
B. Secondary school principal and later planning ofcial of the PRK /SOC;
current high-ranking planning ofcial in the Ministry of Education. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
C. Secondary education ofcial and later high-ranking ministerial ofcial of
the PRK /SOC; current high-ranking ministerial ofcial in the Ministry of
Education. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
D. Higher education ofcial of the former PRK /SOC; current higher education ofcial. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
E. High-ranking ministerial ofcial of the former PRK; current member of the
National Assembly. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December
1996.
F. Ofcial at the Center for Education Research and Textbook Development
during the former PRK; current member of the National Assembly. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
G. Ofcial at the Ministry of Education Personnel Bureau during the former
PRK; current ministerial ofcial in another ministry. Interviewed at
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
H. Secondary school teacher and later textbook author at the Center for Education Research and Textbook Development during the former PRK. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
I. Director of three primary schools in Prey Veng province during the former
PRK. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
J. Director of Kompong Cham secondary school during the former PRK. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
K. Ofcial at the Ministry of Education. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, December 1996.
Named Informants
Asterisks indicate pseudonyms.
Chea Saron.* Former resident of damban 4 during the Democratic Kampuchea
period; secondary school student in the PRK period; and presently lecturer at a higher institution funded under a bilateral aid program. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Ek Seng.* Former resident of Prey Veng (until 1981). Various interviews at Sydney, Australia, JanuarySeptember 1996.
248
References
Hem Sophearak.* Former Sangkum period secondary school teacher, Lyce

Sihanouk. Interviewed at Sydney, Australia, February 1994.
Heng Pon.* Student at Beng Trabek secondary school, Phnom Penh. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Keo Soth.* Current primary school principal and former PRK primary school
teacher. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Kong Sao. Former Khmer Republic period secondary school student, Lyce 18
Mars. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, December 1996.
Koy Nong.* English teacher at a private school in Phnom Penh and former PRK
primary school and literacy education teacher. Interviewed at Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Li Ben.* Former student of the Economics Institute, SOC period. Interviewed
at Phnom Penh, January 1997.
Long Visal.* English teacher at private school in Phnom Penh and former
PRK /SOC secondary school student. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Men Bunroeun.* Former Sangkum period primary school teacher, Battambang. Interviewed at Adelaide, Australia, March 1994.
Men Pon.* Former PRK secondary school science teacher. Interviewed at
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Mun Savorn.* Former Khmer Republic period lyce student (Tuol Kork Lyce),
Phnom Penh. Interviewed at Sydney, Australia, July 1996.
Ngorn Som. Former resident of Svay Rieng who lived as a displaced person in
Phnom Penh 19711975. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January
1997.
Nou Si.* Current and PRK /SOC secondary school mathematics teacher. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January 1997.
Nuon Vuthy.* Former Sangkum period lyce student (Sangkum Reastr Niyum
II Lyce), Phnom Penh. Interviewed at Sydney, Australia, February 1994.
Om Prasit.* Former Sangkum period primary school teacher and principal,
Kampot province. Interviewed at Sydney, Australia, July 1996.
Sao Bunroeun. Former student of the Chamcar Daung Agricultural Institute,
PRK /SOC period. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, January 1997.
Sau Sina.* Resident of Phnom Penh evacuated to the southwest in 1975, before
returning to Phnom Penh in 1980. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, December
1996.
Sok Sarun. Former student of the Faculty of Medicine in the SOC period. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, January 1997.
Suon Serey.* Former student of the Lyce Sisowath (1969 1975), teacher in the
PRK period, and, since 1993, lecturer at a higher institution funded under
a bilateral aid program. Interviewed at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, January
1997.
Tea Hour Yith.* Former Sangkum period secondary school teacher, Phnom
Penh. Interviewed at Sydney, Australia, February 1994.
Ung Phanna. Former PRK secondary school student. Interviewed at Siem Reap,
Cambodia, December 1996.
References
249
Group Interviews
Bak Touk Secondary School, Phnom Penh Municipality, Cambodia. Selected
interviews with educational personnel and students, December 1996.
Beng Trabek Secondary School, Phnom Penh Municipality, Cambodia. Selected interviews with educational personnel and students, December
1996.
Faculty of Medicine, Phnom Penh Municipality, Cambodia. Selected interviews
with educational personnel and students, December 1996.
Norodom Primary School, Phnom Penh Municipality, Cambodia. Selected interviews with educational personnel, January 1997.
Phum Khnar, Takeo Province, Cambodia. Selected interviews in relation to education in Democratic Kampuchea, December 1996.
Phum Tonl Bati, Takeo Province, Cambodia. Selected interviews in relation to
education in Democratic Kampuchea, December 1996.
Takhmau Secondary School, Phnom Penh Municipality, Cambodia. Selected
interviews with educational personnel and students, January 1997.
Index
aid, 125126, 156 158, 162 168, 189;

Chinese, 48, 102; Soviet, 138 139;
Vietnamese, 102, 124, 128 130. See also
Asian Development Bank; International Monetary Fund; Scientic and
Cultural Organization; United Nations
Development Program; United Nations Educational; World Bank
Akashi, Yasushi, 159
Allman, T. D., 73
America. See United States
Angkorean period, 12, 12, 184 185
Angkor Wat, 12, 184
ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian
Nations
Asian Development Bank, 157158, 166
167, 171, 180
Association des Etudiants Khmers (AEK),
100 101
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), 121, 136, 140 141, 144, 189
Bardez, Felix, 22
Becker, Elizabeth, 116
BLDP. See Buddhist Liberal Democratic
Party
Buddhism, 11, 12 14, 18, 145; political
ideology and, 34 35, 53 54, 65, 73
74, 76
Buddhist Institute, 27, 198n. 64
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party

(BLDP), 159, 160
Buddhist socialism, 34 36, 47, 53 54, 65,
73
Burchett, Wilfred, 70
Cambodianization (Khmerization): during Khmer Republic era, 76 77, 80,
83, 89; during PRK /SOC era, 134
135, 139; during Sihanouk era, 32,
39 42, 43 45, 58 59
Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP), 150,
189; coalition with FUNCINPEC, 159
160, 161, 171, 174, 180 181; elections
and, 158, 190; formation of, 147, 158,
160, 161, 174, 190. See also Khmer
Peoples Revolutionary Party (KPRP)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 47, 88
CGDK. See Coalition Government of
Chamroan Vichea Collge, 60
Chan Si, 141, 220n. 63
Chan Ven, 128
Chan Youran, 83
Chao Samboth, 151
Chau Seng, 43 45, 108
chbab, 14 15
Chea Sim, 123
Cheng Heng, 71, 72, 87
Chhan Sokhum, 78
251
252
China, 46, 48, 136, 140; Cultural Revolution, 55, 59; Democratic Kampuchea
and, 101102, 107, 115
Chou Ta-Kuan, 12
CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency
civil war (1970 1975): end of, 67, 91, 93;
impact of, 80, 87 89; military offensives, 81 82; United States involvement, 86 87
Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea, 137, 141
colonial education. See education,
colonial
Colonial era (1863 1953): affair of 1916,
2122; Bardez incident, 22, 24; beginning of, 18, 19 20; development
of nationalism, 26; ideology underlying, 19 21; impact of, 22, 26, 27
30, 185188; naivet of French, 22;
tightening of control, 19, 20 21.
See also Japanese occupation; mission
civilisatrice
colonialism. See Colonial era
Communism in Cambodia: decline of,
141143, 145147; French inuence
on, 29, 50, 60, 100 101; origins of,
98 99; support for, 60 62, 90 91.
See also Communist Party of Kampuchea; Khmer Peoples Revolutionary
Party; Workers Party of Kampuchea
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK):
factionalism, 103, 120; history of, 84
85, 94 95, 97100, 121123; ideology
and political program, 85 86, 9596,
100 103, 115117; purges, 107108,
115, 123; Sihanouk and, 5558, 81,
84 85, 208n. 51. See also Communism
in Cambodia; Democratic Kampuchea;
Khmer Peoples Revolutionary Party
CONCERN, 156
corruption, 54, 60 61, 84, 87 88, 90, 190;
in education, 94, 174 175
CPK. See Communist Party of Kampuchea
CPP. See Cambodian Peoples Party
Crusade for Independence, 33, 42
Curle, Adam, 79
curriculum, 39 40, 42, 53, 107, 113 114,
130 133, 178, 179 180; irrelevant,
145146, 149; reform of, 38, 44 45,
48, 51, 77, 79, 83, 131, 134 135; traditional (precolonial), 1718
Index
Davis, Neil, 67
Democratic Kampuchea (DK): fall of,
115, 117; Four Year Plan, 105107;
legacy of, 125, 126 127, 132 133,
210n. 10, 217n. 16; legitimacy of, 119,
123; opposition to, 107; purges, 99,
107108, 115, 123; regional variation,
108 109; repudiation of history, 123;
social change, 9596; temporal variation, 107108; Vietnam and, 102,
115116. See also Communist Party of
Kampuchea; Pol Pot
Democrat Party, 29, 33, 87
development, 5; Cambodian commitment
to, 3132, 35, 53 54, 82, 155, 161
166, 182; human resource development and, 175176
DK. See Democratic Kampuchea
Douc Rasy, 100
Doumer, Paul, 21
Ecole dadministration cambodgienne,
29
Ecole Normale, 43, 48
Ecole Wat Phnom, 67
economic problems, 47, 54, 170, 173, 189,
203n. 72
education, colonial: Cambodian control
of, 29; contrast with Vietnam, 2526;
rst attempts, 23; French commitment
to, 30, 37; legacy of, 185186; mission
civilisatrice and, 25, 29; problems with,
24, 26; reformed temple schools, 24
25; Sarrauts reforms, 23, 197n. 47;
social mobility, 28
education, enrollments, 25, 36 37, 39,
44, 50, 62, 135, 138, 148, 200n. 19;
problems coping with, 40 41, 48 49
education, nancing of, 46, 63, 167, 172
175
education, quality of: problems with, 51
52, 63, 112 113, 118 119, 137138,
174; teachers and, 48 49, 112, 132
133, 143
education, planning of, 48 49, 78, 103
105, 106 107, 116 117, 130 131,
146, 166 168; failures in, 45 46, 83,
170, 175179, 182; Sihanouk and, 50.
See also Cambodianization; language
of instruction
education, politicization of, 56 59, 68 70
Index
education, precolonial, 12 14; contrast
with China, Java, and Vietnam, 28
education, primary, 25, 51, 78 79, 106,
129, 179 180
education, reform of, 23 24, 38, 40 41,
44 45, 58 59, 76 79, 118, 166 167,
175177, 180. See also Cambodianization; language of instruction
education, secondary, 25, 138, 179 180
education, tertiary, 49 50, 5152, 53, 143,
176 178, 202n. 63
educational crisis: causes of, 64 65, 91
93, 117119, 128, 148 149, 170, 172,
187188; contribution of war to, 69,
80, 83; emergence of, 3; political
dimensions of, 52; symptoms of, 3 4,
38 39, 44 45, 48 49, 5152, 112
113, 132 133, 156, 178
Eilenberg, Jeanette, 36
elections, 34, 43 44, 56, 69, 87, 153 155,
158 159, 189 190, 223n. 30
Ferreyrolles, 23
Four Year Plan, DK, 105107
FUNCINPEC. See National United Front
for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful
and Co-operative Cambodia
FUNK. See National United Front of
Kampuchea
Gatiloke, 16 17, 196nn. 23, 24
Geneva conference, 37, 38, 98
God-King, 10, 184 185
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 121
Government of National Salvation, 70
Hang Tun Hak, 100
Heng Samrin, 120, 123, 126, 141142
hidden curriculum, 42
higher education. See education, tertiary
Ho Sok, 151
Hou Yuon, 100, 102, 212n. 36
human capital theory, 3536, 78 79, 165
Hun Sen: character, 151; coup (1997),
150 151; early years, 208n. 49; Khmer
Rouge ofcer, 123; meeting with Sihanouk, 143 144; Prime Minister,
158 159, 177, 180 181, 190; PRK /
SOC experiences, 141, 147; rivalry
with Ranariddh, 168 169, 172
Huntington, Samuel, 65
253
ICORC. See International Committee on
the Reconstruction of Cambodia
ICP. See Indochinese Communist Party
ICRC. See International Committee of the
Red Cross
Ieng Sary: Communist activities, 57, 82,
99, 122; student, 29, 100; teacher, 43
ILO. See International Labor Organization
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Indianization, 9 10
Indochinese Communist Party, 98, 122
In Tam, 87
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. See World Bank
International Committee of the Red
Cross, 133, 156
International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, 163 164, 171
International Labor Organization, 88 89
International Monetary Fund, 159,
163 164, 172, 175
interpersonal relations, 14
Issaraks. See Khmer Issaraks
Ith Sarin, 102
Japanese occupation, 26 27
Jayavarman II, 184
Kambuboth College, 43, 55, 60
Kambuja, 9
Kaundinya, Prince, 9
Keat Chhon, 173, 189
Keng Vannsak, 100
Keo An, 87, 90
Keo Meas, 107, 122, 211n. 15
Keo Moni, 211n. 15
Keo Sangkim, 90
Khieu Ponnary, 43
Khieu Samphan, 62, 100, 101, 104, 211n.
11
Khieu Thirith, 43
Khmer Issaraks, 38, 98
Khmerization. See Cambodianization
Khmer Niset, 42
Khmer Peoples Revolutionary Party: early
years, 122 123; formation of, 98; PRK
and, 137, 141142, 144, 147. See also
Communist Party of Kampuchea
Khmer Republic: decline of, 86 88; fall
of, 67, 91; formation of, 84
254
Khmer Rouge. See Communism in Cambodia; Communist Party of Kampuchea; Democratic Kampuchea
Kingdom of Cambodia (1993 ), 152,
159 160, 161162; coalition government, 168; commitment to development, 162 163
kingship, 10 11, 65, 184 185; criticism
of, 42 43. See also social system
Kompong Cham uprising, 81
Kompong Kantuot Teacher Training Center, 48
Kossomak, Queen, 71
Koy Thoun, 108
Kun Thon Thanarak, 90
language of instruction, 25, 40, 58 59, 77
literacy, 13 14, 106, 113, 139 140
Long Boret, 46
Long Pet, 100
Lon Nol: character of, 73 74; coup
against Sihanouk, 71; ees Khmer
Republic, 91; Sihanouk era Prime
Minister, 5758, 70; stroke, 84;
United States and, 87 88. See also
neo-Khmerism
Lon Non, 84, 87
Lyce 18 Mars, 90
Lyce Descartes, 59
Lyce Norodom Sihanouk, 26, 61, 197n.
59
Lyce Sangkum II, 62
Lyce Sisowath, 25, 27, 29, 43
Manipoud, Louis, 12
manpower planning, 78 79
Mau Say, 100
May Someth, 72
Meyer, Charles, 50, 5152
Mey Pho, 211n. 15
mission civilisatrice, 6, 18 19, 21, 25, 26
27, 185. See also Colonial era
modernization, 162 164; commitment
to, 3, 36; theory of, 3, 3536; link to
education, 36
Mok, 103, 110, 120
Moulinaka, 159
Nagara Vatta, 27, 42
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia, 150, 160, 171;
Index
coalition with CPP, 150 151, 152,
158 159, 161, 190; resistance movement, 136
National United Front of Kampuchea:
CPK and, 83 85; formation of, 66, 81;
ideology and political program, 82
83, 85 86; military successes, 81 82
Nay Sarann, 107, 211n. 45
neo-Khmerism, 73, 76
New Cambodge, 74 75
New World Order, 162, 168, 182, 183
NGO. See non-government organizations
Ngor Haing Seng, 72, 90
Nhiek Tioulong, 37
Nixon, Richard, 70, 205n. 5
non-government organizations, 156 157
Norodom, King, 18, 20, 23
Norodom Chantaraingsey, 209n. 63
Norodom Ranariddh, Prince: coup
against, 150 151; Prime Minister,
158 159, 170; rivalry with Hun Sen,
168 169, 172
Norodom Sihanouk, King (and Prince):
abdication, 31; break with United
States, 46 47; Crusade for Independence, 29, 33 34; Democratic Kampuchea experiences, 105, 117, 212
213n. 45; development agenda, 34
35, 39; early years, 26 27, 198n. 60;
educational involvement, 40, 42, 44,
49 50, 64 65, 75; FUNK and, 72 73,
81 82, 85; meeting with Hun Sen,
143 144; opposition to, 45 46, 50
51, 54 55, 56 59; overthrow of, 66,
71; resistance leader, 136, 143 144;
since UNTAC, 154, 159, 190; Vietnam
and, 70. See also Sangkum Reastr
Niyum
Nuon Chea, 122, 211nn. 11, 15
Paris Peace Agreements, 147, 153 155,
158
Pen Sovan, 211n. 15
Peoples Republic of Kampuchea: aid embargo, 125126, 144; economic liberalization, 145; formation of, 120, 121
124; ideological orientation, 124; propaganda, 216n. 6; reliance on Vietnam, 124, 133 134, 217218n. 24;
State of Cambodia, 145
Phouk Chhay, 75
Phuong Ton, 100
Index
political culture, 34; effects of, 55, 161
162, 169, 178 179; egalitarian alternative, 29, 32 33, 85, 96, 161; inuence
on policy-making, 52, 162; origins in
Cambodia, 17
Pol Pot: early years, 29, 98 99, 101102;
education and, 104; FUNK and, 102;
identity of, 97; secrecy of, 97; student,
100; student in France, 42 43, 100;
teacher, 29, 43, 57, 58, 61, 115116,
123; rise of, 98 99; visits China, 115
116; visits Yugoslavia, 101. See also
Communist Party of Kampuchea;
PRK. See Peoples Republic of Kampuchea
Ramayana. See Reamker
Reamker, 1516
Redd Barna, 156 157
Ros Chantrabot, 72
Ros Chet Thor, 43
Royal University of Phnom Penh, 176 177
S-21. See Tuol Sleng
Sae Phouthong, 123
Saloth Sar. See Pol Pot
Samlaut rebellion, 5758, 70
Sam Rainsy, 169
Sam Sary, 100
Sangkum Reastr Niyum, 34, 43, 45, 199n.
9; opposition to, 57
Sarraut, Albert, 23, 197n. 47
Schultz, Theodore, 36
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization
Siem Reap demonstration, 57
Sieu Heng, 98 99, 211n. 15
Sihanouk. See Norodom Sihanouk
Sim Var, 43
Sin Khem Ko, 100
Sisowath Sirik Matak, Prince, 66, 70, 87
SNC. See Supreme National Council
social mobility, 36 37, 45, 52 54; origins
of concept, 28
social system, 194n. 4; hierarchical, 9 12,
13; literary traditions and, 13 14; opposition to, 85; precolonial education
and, 1718. See also kingship
Son Ngoc Minh, 211n. 45
Son Sen, 43, 99
So Phim, 211n. 15
Sos Man, 211n. 15
255
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, 47
State of Cambodia. See Peoples Republic
of Kampuchea
structural adjustment programs, 163, 164,
172
students: attracted to Communism, 60
62; in France, 29, 42 43, 100 101;
persecuted during DK, 126; protests
by, 54 55, 56 58, 71, 89 91; social
mobility and, 40, 52 54, 176; support
for 1970 coup, 72, 76 78
Supreme National Council, 154
Suramarit, Prince, 33
Suryavarman II, 1
Tan Kim Huon, 100
teachers: Communism and, 43, 59, 60
62; fear of Sihanouk, 204n. 100;
monks as, 13, 24; persecution during
DK, 126; problems encountered by,
49, 51, 89, 171; shortage of, 48, 129
130, 132; status and moral authority,
41, 61, 175; strikes, 89 90, 190, 209n.
66; training of, 48, 105, 117, 143,
177178
Thach Chia, 90
Thiounn Mumm, 100, 116
Thomson, Charles, 20
Tiv Ol, 86
Tol Lah, 178
Tou Samouth, 99
Tuol Sleng, 85, 108
Uch Ven, 43
UFNS. See United Front for the National
Salvation of Kampuchea
UNAMIC. See United Nations Advance
Mission in Cambodia
UNDP. See United Nations Development
Program
unemployment, 50, 54, 200 201n. 30,
204n. 88
UNESCO. See United Nations Education,
Scientic and Cultural Organization
Ung Bunheang, 112
Ung Huot, 150, 167168
UNICEF. See United Nations Childrens
Fund
United Front for the National Salvation of
Kampuchea, 117, 120, 123, 124
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia, 153
256
United Nations Childrens Fund,
132 133, 157, 218n. 36
United Nations Development Program,
88, 157, 218n. 36
United Nations Education, Scientic and
Cultural Organization, 3739, 64,
78 79, 88 89, 218n. 36
United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia, 153 155
United States, 46 47, 56, 70, 86, 202n. 54
UNTAC. See United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia
U.S. See United States
Vann Molyvann, 100
Vietnam: colonial experience, 2526;
Index
FUNK and, 82; PRK and, 121122,
124, 128, 133 134, 216n.9, 217218n.
24; protests against, 7173
Vorn Vet, 99
WHO. See World Health Organization
Workers Party of Kampuchea. See Communist Party of Kampuchea
World Bank, 170 171
World Health Organization, 88
Yun Yat, 116
Yus Son, 147
ABOUT
THE
AUTHOR
David M. Ayres is the Ewing Post-doctoral Fellow in

Education at the University of Sydney in Australia.
He became interested in Cambodia while an undergraduate, and subsequently wrote an honors thesis
and doctoral dissertation on the politics of educational policy in Cambodia. Dr. Ayres previous publications and undergraduate teaching at the University
of Sydney have combined his interest in Cambodian
history and politics with his background in international and development education.

Anatomy of A Crisis - Education, Development and The

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ANATOMY

University of Hawaii Press

2000 University of Hawaii Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

University of Hawaii Press

1 The Traditional Setting: State, Society, and Education

2 Sihanouk and the Sangkum: From Independence to Chaos

3 Lon Nol and the Republic: The Declining State

4 Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge: Building and Defending

5 The PRK and the SOC: The State in Transition

6 Ranariddh and Hun Sen: From Uneasy Alliance to Coup

My nal word of thanks is to the many Cambodians in Australia and

Asian Development Bank

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Front Uni National du Kampuchea (National United

Abbreviations and Acronyms

United Issarak Front

At the heart of precolonial Cambodia, and at the heart of the countrys

research is to interpret past events by the traces they have left, 8 it

The Traditional Setting

system, such as that in India, did not gain momentum in Cambodia. A

State, Society, and Education before Independence

The Traditional Setting

sought to become more powerful while having absolutely no obligation

State, Society, and Education before Independence

dhism, informed them about Cambodian oral and literary traditions,

The Traditional Setting

State, Society, and Education before Independence

But wanders into the forest instead

The Traditional Setting

State, Society, and Education before Independence

The Traditional Setting

Enter the French

State, Society, and Education before Independence

in comparison to the neighboring Vietnamese colonies, the French

French Colonial Ideology

The Traditional Setting

State, Society, and Education before Independence

extended to the masses in the countryside. Elsewhere in Indochina, the

The Traditional Setting

delegations ceased.40 The second event, in 1925, was the assassination of

State, Society, and Education before Independence

French Educational Reforms

The Traditional Setting

an education similar to that of their French counterparts.47 While critics

State, Society, and Education before Independence

The Traditional Setting

State, Society, and Education before Independence

Cambodias traditional political order. A primary feature of the French

Evaluating the French

The Traditional Setting

when we begin to pay attention to those the French seemed to ignore,

State, Society, and Education before Independence

The mission civilisatrice was applied to the Cambodian peasantry to

The Traditional Setting

opponents of the political, and therefore hierarchical status quo, were

When King Norodom Sihanouk abdicated the Cambodian throne to

Sihanouk and the Sangkum

Over time, the optimism subsided. Goodwill was replaced by unattained

From Independence to Chaos

emerge during the period, promoting ideals of egalitarianism, drew

The Prince, the Organization, and the Ideology

Sihanouk and the Sangkum