HOW DO YOU PROVE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS?

THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS ARE:

(1) THE ACCUSED IS IN POSSESSION OF AN ITEM OR OBJECT WHICH
IS IDENTIFIED TO BE A PROHIBITED DRUG;
(2) SUCH POSSESSION IS NOT AUTHORIZED BY LAW; AND
(3) THE ACCUSED FREELY AND CONSCIOUSLY POSSESSED THE SAID
DRUG.[1][40]
Ruled the Supreme Court in the above-stated case:
As regards the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec.
11, Art. II of RA 9165 against accused-appellant Aure, We also find that the
elements of the offense have been established by the evidence of the
prosecution.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.[2][40]
In the instant case, a brown bag was found inside the car of accusedappellant Aure. It yielded a plastic sachet of shabu weighing 86.23 grams
wrapped in red wrapping paper, small plastic sachets, and an improvised
plastic tooter. Considering that during the sale to Bilason, it was from the
same bag that accused-appellant Austriaco took the sachet of shabu, per
order of accused-appellant Aure, the owner-possessor of said bag and its
contents is no other than accused-appellant Aure, who has not shown any
proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them or any evidence to
rebut his animus possidendi of the shabu found in his car during the buy-bust
operation.
Defense of denial is inherently weak
The sachet containing the dangerous drug was positively identified by
MADAC operative Bilason during the trial as the very sachet with white
crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by accused-appellants. Thus,
accused-appellants denial is self-serving and has little weight in law. A bare
denial is an inherently weak defense,[3][41] and has been invariably viewed by
this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted but difficult to prove,
and is a common standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of RA 9165.[4][42]
Time and again, We have held that denials unsubstantiated by convincing
evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt particularly where
the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of guilt.[5][43]

In the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely
impute such crime against the accused-appellants, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty stands.[6][44] Especially here, where an
astute analysis of MADAC operative Bilasons testimony does not indicate
any inconsistency, contradiction, or fabrication.

For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be
proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires

merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.[9] Settled is the rule that
as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his
offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the
former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.
buy-and-bust operation - an undercover operation by narcotics detectives
to catch unsuspecting drug dealers
undercover operation - an operation involving secret work within a
community or institution

Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs

(The provisions of Article 190 to 194 have been repealed. First there was R.A.
6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Law of l972 as amended by R.A. 7659.
This law has in turn been replaced by R.A. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Some salient provisions are
summarized hereunder).
A. Change in the classification of dangerous substances. The old
classification between Prohibited and Regulated Drugs have been replaced
by classifying dangerous substances into (i) Dangerous Drugs (DD) and (ii)
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals (CP/EC)

DD and CP/EC are not defined but refer to those substances which are
enumerated in the list of schedules prepared and adopted by International
Conventions.
B. Factors Affecting Criminal Liability:
1.The kind of dangerous substance involved: the penalty is higher if
what are involved are DD.
2. The Act performed by the accused such as:
a. Importation
b. Sale, trading, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation.
(Note: The quantity of the substance involved is immaterial)
c. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort Being an employee or visitor of a den,
dive or resort
d. Manufacture of a DD or CP/EC or drug paraphernalia
e. Illegal chemical diversion
f. Possession of a DD
(i). The possession of different substances give rise to separate charges of
possession even if the drugs were seized in the same place and occasion
( PP. vs. Empleo, 503 SCRA 464; PP. vs. Tira 430 SCRA 134) . Thus one may
be charged for possession of Marijuana separate from possession of shabu
(methamphetamine hydrocloride)
(ii). One may be charged for sale of shabu and a separate charge of
possession of another gram of shabu which was not the subject of the sale
(iii). One charged for sale or delivery may be convicted of possession if the
sale or possession was not proven
(iv). In this charge of possession, the quantity of the substance determines
the penalty to be imposed
(v). Possession may be actual or constructive. Actual possession is when
the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion or
control of the accused or when he has a right to exercise dominion or control
over the place where it is found ( PP vs. Tira,430 SCRA 134)
Thus a person may be convicted for possession of drugs found inside his
bedroom even if at the time of the seizure, he was physically absent there
from ( PP vs. Torres, Sept. 12, 2006)

f. Possession of DD or drug paraphernalia during parties, social gatherings or

meetings or in the proximity of at least two persons ( these are new
provisions)
d. Use of DD provided the accused is not charged for possession
e. Cultivation or culture of plants classified as DD or sources thereof. This
need not be in a plantation. One plant of marijuana in a flower pot is included
f. Offenses by physicians and drug stores: (i) failure to maintain and keep
records of transactions of any DD or CP/EC (ii) Unnecessary prescription (iii)
Unlawful prescription
g. Two new acts are included:
(i). Acting as a Financier: a person who pays for, raises, or supplies money
for, or underwrites any of the illegal activities involving dangerous
substances
(ii). Acting as a Protector or coddler: a person who knowingly and willfully
consents to the unlawful acts provided for in the law and who uses his
influence, power or position in shielding, harboring, screening or facilitating
the escape of any person whom he knows or has grounds to believe has
violated the provisions of this Act in order to prevent the arrest, prosecution
and conviction of the violator
j. Attempt or conspiracy. Note that the law does not include possession as
being the subject of an attempt or conspiracy ( Is this omission intentional or
by oversight? )
3. The Quantity of the dangerous substance if the act of that of
possession
4. The presence of special aggravating circumstances.
a). These vary according to the act of the accused. Thus in the act of
importing: that the accused is a diplomat or a financier. In cases of sale,
delivery, administration or transporting: that it took place within a radius of
100 meters form a school; the use of a minor or a mentally incapacitated
person; or that the victim is a minor or a mentally incapacitate person; or
that the DD is the proximate cause of the death; or that the suspect is a
financier
b). The application of these circumstances is doubtful considering that the
penalties provided for by the Act do not follow the nomenclature and scheme
of the penalties under the Revised Penal Code and they do not have periods
C. New Acts punished: The law seeks to address certain abuses by law

enforcers as well as causes of unsuccessful prosecution or dismissal of drug

cases filed in court.
1.Creation of a new qualifying aggravating circumstance applicable to
offenses under the Revised Penal Code consisting of a POSITIVE FINDING
FOR THE USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS. This must be corroborated by a
confirmatory drug test
a). Under the old law what constituted an aggravating circumstance was that
the accused committed a crime while under the influence of drug. Under
the new law, the accused need not be high on drugs during the time of
committing of a crime so long as the test showed he is a user of drugs
b). The application of the new qualifying aggravating circumstance poses a
problem to felonies which do not have qualified forms such as parricide,
threats, physical injuries, robbery. ( In such a case it is suggested the
circumstance must be appreciated as a special aggravating to give meaning
to the intent of the congress to punish more severely the users who commits
crimes)
2. Defining and Penalizing the offense of Planting of Evidence i..e planting
of any dangerous substances in the person, house, effects, or in the
immediate vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose of implicating,
incriminating or imputing the commission of any violation of this Act
a). If what is planted is not a dangerous substances the crime is that of
Incriminating an Innocent Person/Incriminatory Machination under the
Revised Penal Code.
b). The penalty is death
3. Penalizing any public officer who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to
account for the DD/CP/EC, paraphernalia, proceeds or properties obtained
form unlawful acts. ( Note: Consider this as Malversation or Infidelity of
Dangerous Drugs, Drug paraphernalia and Drug Proceeds)
4. Penalizes the following acts of law enforcers:
a). Failure or refusal after due notice, to appear as witnesses for the
prosecution
b). Failure of the immediate superior to exert reasonable efforts to present
the witness in court
c). Failure of the immediate superior to notify the court of the transfer or reassignment of a witness during the pendency of the case to another
territorial jurisdiction. Note that the transfer of re-assignment to the

witnesses to another territorial jurisdiction must only be for compelling

reason and provided the court was notified 24 hours in advance.
5. Defines and Penalizes the act of Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of
Drug Cases i.e. the prosecution causes the unsuccessful prosecution or the
dismissal through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect or unreasonable delay.
There must first be an Order of dismissal or Judgment of acquittal, based on
the fault of the prosecution.
6. In case of conviction:
a). the convict suffers the accessory penalty of disqualification to exercise
civil rights and political rights and that rights are suspended during the
pendency of an appeal from such a conviction.
b). After conviction by the RTC: there shall be hearing for the confiscation
and forfeiture of unexplained wealth of the accused. In case the article
declared forfeited is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned not later than five
days from the order of confiscation or forfeiture
7. Prohibition against plea bargaining and disqualification from probation for
those convicted of drug trafficking
8. Provides as a ground for removal from office of an elective official; that of
having benefited from the proceeds of drug trafficking or receipt of any
financial or material contribution or donation from persons found guilty of
drug trafficking.
D. Provisions Against Act affecting the Integrity of the evidence or their
possible appropriation by agents:
1. Conduct of a Physical Inventory and Photographing of the Evidence
a.

Immediately upon the arrest, seizure or confiscation

b. In the presence of (i) the accused or person form whom the articles were
taken or his representative (ii) a representative form the DOJ (iii)
representative from the Media and (iv) an elected official. These persons
must also sign the written inventory
2. Submission of the article within 24 hours to the Crime Laboratory for
Quantitative ( how many kilos or grams) and qualitative ( what kind of
substance was involved) examination
3. Requirement that the results of the crime laboratory examination must be
under oath

4. Upon the filing of the Information in Court:

a. Conduct of an ocular inspection or examination of the evidence by the
court within 72 hours. This may be in the place were the evidence are kept if
the same cannot be presented in court, or the evidence are actually brought
and presented in court.
b. Destruction of the articles within 24 hours following the inspection but
representative samples are taken and preserved
5. Destruction of the representative samples after conviction, forfeiture and
confiscation of other proceeds of the crime and
E. Provisions intended to benefit the drug dependent- the following are
applicable only if the charge is for the use of DD/CP/EC :
1. Community service in lieu of imprisonment
2. Exemption from Criminal Liability for first time offenders who underwent
treatment and rehabilitation in a Drug Rehabilitation Center under the
supervision of the Dangerous Drugs Board and were discharged thereafter
3. Suspension of sentence of a Minor First Offender
a). A minor is one who is over 15 at the time of the commission of the
offense but below 18 at the time of sentencing
b). The suspension is discretionary upon the court. Contra the Family Court
Law ( RA 8369) which provides that the suspension is mandatory)
c). The minor is placed under the supervision of the Dangerous Drugs Board
and is for a period ranging from 6 to 18 months
d). Upon favorable recommendation by the Board the court shall discharge
the accused and dismiss all the proceedings
e). All records shall be expunged and the minor shall not be criminal liable
for perjury for concealment or misrepresentation of refusal to acknowledge
or recite any fact concerning his case.
F. Provisions to expedite drug cases:
1. The Preliminary Investigation shall be terminated within 30 days from
filing and the Information hall be filed within 24 hours from the termination of
the investigation

2. Trial shall be terminated not later than 60 days from ate of filing of the
Information
3. The decisions shall be rendered within 15 days from submission for
decision
G. Miscellaneous Provisions:
1. Requirement of a Mandatory Drug Test in the following:
a). Application and renewal of drivers license
b). Application for firearms license or permit to carry
c). Annually for Officers and members of the AFP, PNP and other law
enforcement agencies
d). For all persons charged before the Prosecutors Office for an offenses
punishable by imprisonment of not less than 6 years and one day
e). For all candidates for public office whether appointive or elective, national
or local
2. Requirement of a Random Drug test
a). For high school and college students with parental consent and subject to
the rules and regulations of the student handbook
b). For officer and employees of public and private offices subject to the
companys work rules and regulations
3. Strengthening and Professionalization of the Fight against Drug Menace:
a). Creating of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency ( PDEA) as the
implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board
b). the NARCOTICS group fo the other law enforcement agencies are
abolished
c. Establishment of a PDEA ACADEMY which shall be responsible for rte
recruitment and training of PDEA agents and personnel and whose graduates
shall comprise the operating units of the PDEA
H. Principles:
1. Drug cases are where the principles of Instigation and Entrapment are

most often applied

2. Buy-bust operations are recognized as one of the most effective means of
arresting criminals in flagranti. Where the arrest is due to a buy-bust the
presentation of the buy-money is not essential, and as a general rule, the
identification and presentation of the civilian informer is considered
privileged
3. If the accused is a CICL and the penalty is Life Imprisonment, said penalty
shall be understood to be Reclusion Perpetua thereby the minor is still
entitled to all the beneficial effects arising from his minority, such as the
reduction of the penalty by degrees
EOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. SAMROD PENDATUN y KASAN,
RICHARD NUEZ y SANITA, CANAPI AMBALGAN y BAGUNDONG alias PIA, NOEL
LANTIKAN y PEREGRINA, JOVEN CASEM y MENKO alias SARIP, SARAH
PENDATUN y PANDIAN and TARHATA TATA SALMORE y WATAMA alias THATA,
appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On appeal is the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro,
Laguna, Branch 311 finding appellants Samrod Pendatun y Kasan, Richard
Nuez y Sanita, Canapi Ambalgan y Bagundong alias Pia, Noel Lantikan y
Peregrina, Joven Casem y Menko alias Sarip, Sarah Pendatun y Pandian and
Tarhata Salmore y Watama alias Tata, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of selling 982.1 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, sentencing them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 and costs.
Appellants were charged with violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to
Section 21 (b), Article IV of RA 6425, as amended, in an Information which
reads:2
That on or about May 25, 1999, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without license or legal authority, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, pass and distribute to PNP member/poseur
buyer methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) a regulated drug weighing
982.1 grams contained in a self-sealing transparent plastic bag which was
placed in an orange plastic bag with mark Emporia Department Store, in
exchange for six (6) pieces of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) Bills marked
money separately placed on top of several pieces of bond paper used as
boodle money.
Contrary to law.

On May 25, 1999 at around 9:00 in the morning, a confidential agent went to
the office of Police Senior Inspector Romualdo Iglesia, Chief of the Service
Support Office of the PNP Narcotics Group at Camp Crame, Quezon City, to
relay an information about a group of Muslim drug traffickers operating in
Metro Manila and nearby provinces. It was determined that the drug deal
would take place in San Pedro, Laguna at around 4:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon of that day. Police Senior Officer Iglesia then designated the team
that would conduct the buy-bust operation. PO2 Wilfredo de Leon, as the
assigned poseur-buyer, was given P3,000.00 placed on top of a stack of
boodle money. At around 2:30 in the afternoon, the arresting team,
composed of 12 to 15 police officers on board five cars, proceeded to the
target area. When they arrived at the Petron Gasoline Station along South
Expressway, PO2 De Leon, together with the confidential agent, alighted
from the car to await the arrival of the suspects. After five minutes, a white
taxi with three unidentified passengers arrived. When they met, the
confidential agent introduced PO2 De Leon to the three persons, later
identified as appellants Canapi Ambalgan alias Pia, Samrod Pendatun, and
Richard Nuez, as the prospective buyer of shabu. After an exchange of
pleasantries, the three drug dealers demanded to see the money. PO2 De
Leon, insisted however, that they first show him the stuff. Appellants Pia,
Samrod, and Richard left but returned later with appellants Tarhata Tata
Salmore, Sarah Pendatun, Joven Casem and Noel Lantikan. Joven Casem
handed the plastic bag he was carrying to Tata who passed it on to the
poseur-buyer. After examining the contents of the plastic bag, PO2 De Leon
gave the pre-arranged signal. He then took out his gun and introduced
himself as a narcotics agent, while the other police officers rushed to the
scene to arrest the seven suspects.
Police Inspector Ma. Luisa David, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, examined the specimen substance and found that the same was
methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
On the other hand, appellant Tarhata Salmore testified that among the seven
appellants, only Sarah Pendatun was familiar to her. She narrated that on
May 25, 1999 she was accompanied by Sarah to Taguig where they met with
appellants Richard Nunez, Joven Casem, and Canapi Ambalgan. Since the
group was planning to go to Laguna, Tarhata volunteered to go with them so
she can visit her uncle, a sidewalk vendor, whom she has not seen since
December 1998. They boarded a taxi with Richard taking the front seat while
she, Sarah, Joven and Canapi on the back seat. Tarhata placed the plastic
bag containing a kilo of mangoes which she bought for her uncle on the floor
between her legs. Upon reaching the McDonalds Restaurant along South
Expressway, Richard instructed the taxi driver to stop, after which all of them
alighted from the taxi; that somebody asked her to carry a plastic bag but
could not recall who it was; and that she placed the bag on a monobloc chair
outside the restaurant. Moments later, she entered the restaurant with
appellants Noel Lantican and Samrod Pendatun when they met the rest of

the group. Then her male companions went out of the restaurant, leaving her
and Sarah inside.Samrod motioned for her to pick up the plastic bag on the
monobloc chair, so she went outside and followed Samrod.
Tarhata and Samrod went towards the back of the restaurant, where she
noticed a woman and an old man, together with Noel Lantikan, standing
beside a red car. When she went near the vehicle, Noel Lantikan shoved her
inside. The three individuals then boarded the car, followed a little later by
Samrod Pendatun. The unidentified woman ordered her to hand over the
plastic bag. At this juncture, several men appeared and pulled the four of
them out of the vehicle. Their captors dragged them towards a flesh-colored
van and they were brought to Camp Crame.
Appellants Richard Nuez and Noel Lantikan narrated a substantially similar
version of the incident. Specifically, Richard Nuez testified that on May 25,
1999 at around 10:00 in the morning, his childhood friend from Laguna,
appellant Noel Lantikan, came to visit him at his house in Fairview, Quezon
City. Appellant Lantikan invited him to go to his house in Los Baos, Laguna to
visit their friends. On their way to Laguna, the jeepney they were riding
stopped at a Petron gasoline station along the South Expressway to gas up.
They asked permission from the driver to use the comfort room which was
located behind McDonalds Restaurant. While inside the rest room, they were
suddenly pushed down the floor and manhandled by two armed men. They
were then dragged outside towards a vehicle which brought them to Camp
Crame.
Appellant Samrod Pendatun testified that on May 25, 1999, he was on board
a bus on his way to Calamba, Laguna to see his uncle. Before he could reach
his destination, however, the bus he was riding developed engine trouble
near the McDonalds Restaurant, which was located along the South
Expressway. While the bus was being fixed, he went inside the restaurant to
call his wife who arrived in a taxi at around 4:00 in the afternoon. Not long
after, three men collared and forcibly brought them to a waiting car.
Appellant Canapi Ambalgan testified that on May 25, 1999, he had just
finished his lunch in a restaurant in Quiapo when Joven Casem, a friend from
his hometown, came to see him. Casem asked if he could accompany him to
Laguna to visit a relative. On their way to Laguna aboard a taxi, they asked
the driver to stop by the McDonalds restaurant because they wanted to take
a snack. Before they could finish their snack, however, several men collared
the two of them and shoved their faces on the table. Appellant Canapi was
led towards a vehicle where he was forced to lie down. Later, he found
himself at Camp Crame. Appellant claimed that he was tortured to admit the
possession of the plastic bag containing the prohibited drugs. He insisted
that, except for Joven Casem, he had not met any of his co-accused before.
In denying the charges, appellant Joven Casem recounted that he went to
Manila to look for his sister who got lost after being abandoned by her
recruiter. In the morning of May 25, 1999, he and his uncle went to the

Muslim mosque in Quiapo to look for her. By chance, he met appellant

Canapi Ambalgan, an old friend. Canapi invited him to go to Laguna. Along
the way, however, they were arrested and detained at Camp Crame. He
revealed that, like the other appellants, he was also maltreated by the
arresting officers.
For her part, appellant Sarah Pendatun narrated that in the morning of May
25, 1999, she was inside her house in Taguig, Maharlika Village. Her
husband, appellant Samrod Pendatun, had just left to go to the recruitment
agency in Manila. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, she received a call from
her husband telling her to proceed to the McDonalds Restaurant at the South
Expressway. She arrived there at around 3:00 p.m., and had a snack. It was
then that three men pulled her husband and brought him outside. Thereafter,
the men returned and ordered her to board a vehicle.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and rendered a decision finding the seven appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling 982.1 grams of shabu, a
regulated drug, the dispositive portion of which reads:3
IN VIEW THEREOF, the prosecution assisted by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Melchorito M.E. Lomarda has duly established the guilt of all
accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of a Violation of Section 15,
Article III of RA 6425, as amended, for having sold, in conspiracy with one
another, 982.1 grams of shabu, a regulated drug, to a poseur-buyer without
any authority of law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing each of the accused
Samrod Pendatun y Kasan, Richard Nunez y Sanita, Canapi Ambalgan y
Bagundong @ Pia, Noel Lantikan y Peregrina, Joven Casem y Menko @ Sarip,
Sarah Pendatun y Pandian and Tarhata Salmore y Watama @ Tata to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and to pay
the costs of suit.
The Officer-In-Charge of this court is hereby directed to turn over the
evidence consisting of a plastic bag containing 982.1 grams of shabu to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for its proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal based on the following grounds:4
I.
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED
COLLECTIVELY AND INDIVIDUALLY DEMONSTRATE THE EXISTENCE OF A
COMMON DESIGN TOWARDS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE SAME
UNLAWFUL PURPOSE, THUS CONSPIRACY IS NOT EVIDENT;
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ADMISSION MADE BY
ACCUSED T. SALMORE SUBSTANTIATED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GUILT

OF ALL ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

III.
THE SHABU SEIZED WAS INSIDE A CLOSED PACKAGE AND IS NOT IN PLAIN
VIEW, THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT;
IV.
THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED WERE VIOLATED, SPECIFICALLY, THE DEFENSE OF
NUEZ AND LANTIKAN THAT THEY WERE AT THE WRONG PLACE AT THE
WRONG TIME; THE PENDATUNS SPOUSES ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE
MANHANDLED; AND AMBALGAN AND CASEMS CLAIM THAT THEY WERE
SIMILARLY MALTREATED FOR NO APPARENT REASON.
To buttress their stance, appellants contend that the trial court erred in
finding that their presence at McDonalds was and of itself, a conspiracy. They
claim that the incredible admission made by Tarhata Salmore betrays
material contradictions with the narration of PO2 De Leon resulting in the
failure by the prosecution to meet the required quantum of proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt to convict them of the crime charged.
Appellants further claim that the shabu allegedly seized by the authorities
was placed inside a closed package and was not in plain view. Hence, it could
not be seized without a warrant. Furthermore, they protested the alleged
illegal tactics employed by the arresting officers to extract confessions from
them which violated their constitutional rights.
Appellants contentions are bereft of merit. The trial court was correct in
giving full weight and credence to the prosecutions evidence.The testimonies
on how the buy-bust operation was conducted exposed in clear and distinct
terms the intention of the malefactors to engage in the illegal sale of shabu.
As recounted by prosecution witness De Leon, and corroborated by the other
prosecution witnesses, the Narcotics group acted on the information by the
confidential agent that a group of Muslim drug traffickers operating in Metro
Manila was about to conduct an illegal drugs deal. At the designated place,
the confidential agent introduced the poseur-buyer as a prospective buyer of
shabu to appellants Pia, Samrod and Richard.The three demanded to see the
money in exchange for the shabu in their possession. The three left for a
while but returned later with Tata, Sara, Jovi and Noel. It was appellant Jovi
who handed the plastic bag to Tata who in turn gave it to PO2 De Leon.
The presence of the seven accused at the locus criminis was confirmed by
Tarhata Tata Salmore who also testified that on the date of the incident, she
and the other appellants Sarah Pendatun, Richard Nunez, Joven Casem, and
Canapi Ambalgan decided to go to Laguna. Along the way, the taxi stopped
by the McDonalds Restaurant along the South Expressway. There, they met
Noel Lantican and Samrod Pendatun inside the McDonalds Restaurant. It was
Samrod who asked appellant Salmore to pick up the plastic bag she was
made to carry. She also identified Noel Lantikan as the one who, together

with a woman and an old man, shoved her inside the red car before the
arresting officers swooped down upon the group and brought them to Camp
Crame.
The presence of the seven appellants at the scene of the crime was not only
established but the participation of each of the appellant in the aborted drug
deal was clearly described and proved by the prosecution witnesses.
Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of
illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug.5 These essential ingredients were duly
proved in the case at bar. Appellants sold and delivered the shabu to the
police officer posing as buyer. It was seized and identified as a prohibited
drug and subsequently presented in evidence. Appellants were fully aware
that they were selling and delivering a prohibited substance. They were all
present when the plastic bag containing the prohibited substance was
handed over to the poseur-buyer. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes
prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict
an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi. In this respect, appellants
defense of denial withers in the face of the positive identification by PO2 De
Leon who enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his job.
The trial court accorded full credit to the testimony of PO2 De Leon as
substantiated by the other arresting officers and at the same time, dismissed
the self-serving and uncorroborated testimonies of the Appellants. We find no
reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial
courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal.6 Moreover, the defense failed to prove any ill motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses to impute a serious crime that would put in
jeopardy the life and liberty of innocent persons.
Appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a
conspiracy among the seven accused, as it did not show a common plan or
design among them. We find otherwise. There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. As a rule, conspiracy must be proved as
convincingly and indubitably as the crime itself. It is not necessary, however,
that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit
the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused which
show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted action and a
community of interest among the accused.7
We find that conspiracy exists in this case. While there is no showing of

direct evidence that appellants agreed to commit the crime, their acts and
the attendant circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime
disclose a common design that would make all of them co-principals in the
crime committed. As the records would show, appellants Pia, Samrod and
Richard conducted the preliminaries to the transaction when they tried to
ascertain the identity of the supposed buyer and made inquiries on the
availability of the drug money. Satisfied, they then brought to the scene
appellants Tata, Sara, Jovi and Noel who delivered the prohibited substance.
This indubitably demonstrates a concerted effort on the part of the
appellants in perpetrating the illegal sale. We can deduce from their
collective conduct a common design, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. Needless to state, when conspiracy is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators.8
Neither can we sustain appellants erroneous invocation of the plain view
doctrine. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.9 It finds no application
where the appellants, as in this case, are caught in the act of committing a
crime. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of the
buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but are even dutybound to arrest them even without a warrant.
In the instant case, there is reasonable suspicion that the package in the
possession of the culprit contains the prohibited item, which the arresting
officer came across, not inadvertently, but on purpose. It bears noting that
the package containing the illegal substance was seized only after it was
examined and voluntarily placed by one of the appellants in the possession
of the arresting officer posing as buyer.
Appellants decry the alleged maltreatment and abuse they experienced in
the hands of the arresting officers. While we do not condone and in fact
condemn the penchant by some members of the police force in resorting to
extra-constitutional means to extract, for which reason evidence so obtained
are deemed inadmissible, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the conviction
of herein appellants rests, not on any evidence so obtained, but on the
strength of the prosecution evidence showing their guilt beyond any iota of
doubt.
The penalty prescribed under Section 15 of Article III, in relation to Section
20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA
7659, for unauthorized sale of 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
In the case at bar, as the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death consists of
two indivisible penalties, appellants were correctly meted the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances

in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. 10 As to the
fine, considering that the amount of shabu sold was 982.1 grams, we find the
amount of P500,000.00 as reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, finding Samrod Pendatun y Kasan,
Richard Nuez y Sanita, Canapi Ambalgan y Bagundong a.k.a. Pia, Noel
Lantikan y Peregrina, Joven Casem y Menko a.k.a. Sarip, Sarah Pendatun y
Pandian and Tarhata Salmore y Watama a.k.a. Tata guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 15, Article III of RA No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
fine of P500,000.00 and costs, is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 70569 January 7, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL MADARANG y SANTOS, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Roman C. Vilialon IV for accused-appellant.
FERNAN, J.:
Michael Madarang y Santos appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, convicting him in Criminal Case No.
567-BG of a violation of Section 4, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425
[Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675]
and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. 1
Madarang, together with Cirilo Juan y Polas, was charged in an information
dated January 26, 1983, as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1982 at Sitio Gabor,
Barangay Bilis, Municipality of Burgos, Province of La Union,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and without any justifiable cause and
not being authorized by law, sell Eight Hundred [800] grams of
dried Marijuana leaves with flowering tops, a prohibited drug, to
Pfc. Roberto C. Viloria, a member of the Integrated National
Police, a Government agent who pretended as buyer.
Contrary to Sec. 4, Art. 11 of R.A. 6425 as amended by P.D. 1675.
2

Juan, who evaded arrest, has not been tried and is still at large.
Madarang was convicted.

Only

The lower court based its finding of guilt on the prosecution's evidence. Thus:
In the early morning of July 12, 1982, Integrated National Police Sergeants
Alejandro Basallo and Roberto Viloria of the San Fernando Police Station in La
Union were tipped by a civilian informer [identity undisclosed] that certain
drug pushers would be selling about four kilos of dried marijuana leaves
valued at P2,800 in Barangay Bilis Burgos, La Union. Acting on that
information and with the permission of his station commander, Basallo
formed a combined Integrated National Police [INPI/Naval Intelligence Bureau
[NIB] team composed of himself and Viloria and Eduardo Pascua and Douglas
Abalos of the NIB of Poro Point, La Union. Adopting a strategy to entrap the
drug dealers, it was agreed that Viloria would pose as the buyer, Basallo as
the driver and Abalos and Pascua as passengers. 4
Said officers, clad in civilian clothes, and the informer proceeded to Barangay
Bilis, about two kilometers away, on board a borrowed passenger jeepney.
This was actually their second attempt to apprehend the suspected drug
dealers. Earlier, on June 9, acting on the same information, they waited in
Sitio Gabor for the drug pushers, but the intended sale failed to materialize
as the latter did not appear. 5
The combined team arrived in Sitio Gabor, in Barangay Bilis at past ten in the
morning. After parking the jeepney along the Naguilian Highway, the civilian
informer left while the rest waited by the j jeepney. 6
At around 2:25 in the afternoon, the civilian informer returned and informed
the group that the marijuana dealers were in a house situated about two
hundred meters from where they were waiting. They backed up the jeepney,
stopping a few meters from the house indicated. Several minutes later, two
men came down from the mountainside and approached the jeepney. They
were the accused Cirilo Juan and Michael Madarang. Juan was holding a
plastic bag. 7
The civilian informer introduced the two to Sgt. Viloria, who was then seated
inside the jeepney, as the buyer. Thereupon, Madarang and Juan boarded the
vehicle and sat opposite him. Villoria asked the two the price of their
marijuana. Madarang promptly replied that it was P600 a kilo and showed
one stalk as sample. Viloria inspected the rest of the marijuana leaves
wrapped in manila paper inside the plastic bag. He tried to bargain for a
lower price but Madarang insisted on the original price of P600. Viloria
relented and accepted the offer ["Sige ngarud"]. He took out his wallet from
his back pocket, but instead of paying, he showed Juan and Madarang his
police Identification card and Identified himself as a police officer. This
caught Madarang and Juan by surprise, who could not make any move. The
other members of the team, then standing at the side of the jeepney,
boarded the vehicle, arrested the drug peddlers and confiscated from Juan
the plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves with flowering tops. 8
The peace officers then proceeded to the Burgos Police station and had the
apprehension of Madarang and Juan recorded in the police blotter. 9

Thereafter, they brought Madarang and Juan and the confiscated marijuana
to the police station in San Fernando, La Union, where they were
investigated, detained and subsequently released. 10
Meanwhile, a miscroscopic test and thin layer chromatography conducted on
the confiscated marijuana leaves with flowering tops [about 800 grams] at
the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory unit in Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, where they were delivered by Sgt. Basallo for
examination, positively confirmed that the same were really marijuana. 11
After a prima facie finding by the provincial fiscal that the offense
complained of had been committed by the accused, Juan and Madarang were
ordered re-arrested. 12 Madarang voluntarily surrendered and upon
arraignment pleaded not guilty. 13 Trial ensued and eventually the judgment
of conviction under review was promulgated.
During the trial the defense adduced the following evidence:
Michael Madarang, 18 [born on March 19, 1964], single, and a vocational
student taking practical electricity, testified that at noontime of July 12, 1982
[Monday] he was sleeping alone in his house located along the Naguilian
Highway because he was sick with influenza. 14 At around one o'clock in the
afternoon, Cirilo Juan came to his house and asked him to accompany the
former to meet certain persons. Since he knew Juan since childhood and was
quite close to him, Madarang agreed to accompany Juan though he felt weak.
They walked in the direction of Siping, a road leading to the Naguilian
Highway. Madarang noticed that Juan was holding something wrapped in
cellophane. He asked Juan what the object was but the latter did not answer
him directly. Juan appeared excited and in a hurry. 15
Madarang and Juan stopped at the house of Trifon Gallardo where Juan was
immediately met by Felix Biwang, who was with two men standing in the
yard. Juan talked with the two strangers, after which they [Juan and the two
strangers] boarded a jeepney parked about 50 meters down the road.
Madarang remained where he was until Juan waved at him to join them
inside the jeepney. 16
There were other men inside. Madarang sat beside Juan who was then
holding the cellophane bag. Madarang heard Viloria requesting Juan to open
the bag. Madarang peered inside but he did not know what the contents
were. After Viloria inspected the contents, he suddenly drew his gun and
Identified himself and the other men as police officers. He placed them under
arrest. Because of shock and fear, Madarang remained speechless and made
no protest. 17
They were then brought to the Burgos municipal building and afterwards to
San Fernando where they were detained for twenty-two days. It was only
during his detention that Madarang found out that he was arrested for illegal
possession of marijuana. He was very angry with Juan for getting him
involved. Upon his release, he went to his brother's house at Tabok, Kalinga,

Apayao, to avoid Juan. He stayed there for about five months. However, upon
learning that he was going to be arrested because of a case filed against
him, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on March 4, 1983 prior to
the service of a warrant of arrest upon him. 18
In this appeal, Madarang contends that the trial court erred in discrediting
the eyewitness testimony of Felix Biwang and in finding him guilty of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. Madarang disavows knowledge of
the contents of the plastic bag and denies involvement with Juan in the sale
of marijuana.
The issue is credibility.
Felix Biwang, a forty-two-year-old farmer from Barangay Bilis Burgos,
testified that in the morning of July 12, 1982, he was in the house of Trifon
Gallardo, his father-in-law, having a drink with neighbor Virgilio Sabado. Two
men, whom he did not know, came looking for Cirilo Juan. 19
Juan arrived at 10 o'clock on board a Marcitas bus. He conversed with the
two men for a few minutes. Biwang heard them ask Juan "where is it?"
["Ayanna ngay?"]. Then they separated and Juan left the two men in the
yard. 20
At about 1:00 p.m Juan reappeared holding a bag. He was followed by
Madarang. Juan rejoined the two men and they boarded the jeepney parked
nearby while Madarang stayed near the house. After ten minutes, Madarang
joined them. Although Biwang was about 100 to 120 meters away, he could
see them because he was standing near the stairs, facing the jeepney. He
could not, however, hear their conversation. Then he saw Juan and Madarang
being handcuffed and the vehicle moving towards the municipal building. 21
When first queried about his relationship with Madarang, Biwang stated that
that was the first time he had seen Madarang. He however changed his
testimony and admitted that Madarang and Juan were his neighbors in
Burgos. He volunteered to testify in court because he was requested by
Madarang's mother to whom he had related what transpired in the early
afternoon of July 12th, two months after said incident. 22
The lower court correctly rejected the testimony of Biwang. By and large, it
was replete with incredulities and vacillations. If at all, it only served to
emphasize the fact that Madarang was with Juan at the time of the incident
and that they were together inside the jeepney when the sale of narcotics
was effected to a poseur-buyer. Biwang might have seen what had taken
place, but his account is insufficient to disprove Madarang's complicity. By
his own admission, he was too far to hear what was being said by the
persons inside the jeepney. His version therefore cannot prevail over that of
the police officers who were actually present in the vehicle when Madarang,
in conspiracy with Juan, negotiated the sale of the marijuana leaves for P600
a kilo.
Viloria, who posed as the buyer, and Basallo clearly and positively Identified

Madarang as the seller of the marijuana. The latter's defense that he only
accompanied Juan and that he was completely unaware that the plastic bag
actually contained illegal drugs cannot overcome the positive and
unequivocal statements of the two peace officers that it was none other than
Madarang who personally fixed the price of the marijuana leaves of P600 a
kilo and who stood firm against Viloria's attempts at haggling.
We have carefully examined the records and find no sufficient reason to
depart from the trial court's appraisal of the evidence of the prosecution and
the defense. We are constrained to give credence to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses, more so when they are law enforcers
who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary. 23
There was an attempt by Madarang to discredit the police officers who
arrested him. He accused them of extorting money from his mother in
exchange for dropping the charge against him. He added that since his poor
mother could only afford a small amount, they decided to frame him up.
Thus, he claims that his inclusion as a co-conspirator was prompted by
"ulterior motives." Madarang's mother, who executed an affidavit attesting to
the foregoing was not however, asked, by the defense counsel to testify in
court to elaborate on the matter and to be cross-examined by the
prosecution. 24
For someone as desperate as Madarang who was caught red-handed
peddling illicit drugs, such an imputation of wrong doing, so easily fabricated,
can be expected. In the case of People v. Adriano, 133 SCRA 132, the factual
background of which is similar to the case at bar, We ruled that:
It is a clear case of res ipsa loquitur. His imputation to the police
of attempted extortion and maltreatment do not weaken the fact
that he was caught red-handed in possession of contraband. The
presumption that the police performed their duties regularly was
not overthrown
Moreover, one thing sticks out like a sore thumb throughout this case. We
refer to the unusually submissive stance displayed by Madarang after the
entrapment. As correctly observed by the trial court, if Madarang were
indeed innocent of the crime imputed to him as he now vehemently insists,
why did he not make a vigorous protest at the time he was placed under
arrest inside the jeepney, or while enroute to Burgos and up to the time he
was brought to the police station in San Fernando, La Union, where he was
put in jail? His lame explanation that he was surprised and shocked by the
sudden turn of events is wholly unsatisfactory because an unwarranted
arrest would naturally elicit an indignant protest from an innocent man.
Moreover, he meekly signed, after reading, a waiver, for his safekeeping for
seven days without inquiring from the authorities why he was being
detained. And finally when he confronted Juan with the latter's non-disclosure
of the real contents of the plastic bag, he allegedly felt angry but he kept it

to himself despite the grave nature of the charge against him.

All considered, we hold that Madarang committed an act in direct violation of
Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, which provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand
to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
That the marijuana leaves may have belonged to Juan is of no moment.
Ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of the crime
under consideration. The mere act of selling or even acting as broker in a
sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the crime under
Section 4. When Madarang negotiated the sale without authority of Juan's
marijuana leaves to Viloria who posed as a buyer, he took a direct and active
part in the crime. His guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDEN DEL CASTILLO, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Eden del Castillo appeals from the decision dated June 27, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU54778, finding her guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; and
imposing on her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
She was indicted under an Information dated August 2, 2000 which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of July 2000, at about 10:30 A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then
and there have in her possession and control or use the following:
A- Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance
weighing 294.86 grams;
B- Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance
weighing 12.33 grams;
C- Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance
weighing 4.75 grams

locally known as shabu, containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a

regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon her arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Leopoldo Bauzon,
PO3 Alfredo Petallar, P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas and PO2 Brazilio Borinaga. Their
testimonies proved the following facts:
On July 21, 2000, a search warrant was issued by Judge Isaias Dicdican of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, authorizing the search and seizure
of shabu and its paraphernalias in the house of appellant located in M.
Borgonia Street, Hayco, Mabolo, Cebu City. At about 10:30 in the morning of
July 31, 2000, a team composed of Police Chief/Insp. Pablo Gacayan Labra II,
Bauzon, Petallar and Borinaga, PO2 Ricardo Baclayon, Jr. and PO1 Jeric Cuyos
Toring, went to the subject house to implement the search warrant. The
police officers accompanied by three barangay tanods, namely: Wilfredo
Wasawas, Mansueto Toong and Leonico Sagosa, entered the house, saw
appellant and served the warrant on her. At that time, appellant was with her
grandmother Elena Rivaral Garcia, the registered owner of the house, and
Servando del Castillo, appellants brother, in the living room. The police
officers pressed them by telling them not to move and they were asked to
just sit down while the search was on-going.
The raiding team divided themselves into two searching groups. The first
group composed of Bauzon, Toring and one barangay tanod searched the
upper portion of the house and found three large plastic packs of white
crystalline substance. The second group, composed of Baclayon and
Borinaga, searched the ground floor and found eight medium heat-sealed
plastic packs of white crystalline substance and fifty-three heat-sealed plastic
packets of white crystalline substance; two disposable lighters, one pair of
scissors, one tooter, one puller and an improvised hacksaw. Servando
voluntarily surrendered five small packs of white crystalline substance.
Appellant was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights, specifically,
the right to counsel to which she replied that she has a lawyer who will
represent her. Petallar then prepared an inventory of the seized articles and
appellant was made to sign the same. PO3 Bauzon and PO3 Petallar
explained that the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000 although the
raid was conducted on July 31 because their office had earlier prepared the
blank form. A copy of the inventory was given to a tanod and thereafter
appellant and Servando were brought to the police station while the items
seized were brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for examination.
P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas, chemist of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office,
who conducted the laboratory test on these substances confirmed that the
specimens submitted for testing were positive for the presence of

methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu.

The defense presented the following witnesses: Elena R. Garcia, Jaime
Garcia and appellant herself who testified to establish the following facts:
The house subject of the search on July 31, 2000 was owned by Elena,
appellants grandmother, and her late husband, Jose Garcia, as evidenced by
a copy of Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name of Jose Garcia; that only
Brent Lepiten, Elenas grandson, was living in the house while appellant was
living with her parents in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City, a
distance of about five kilometers from Elenas place. On July 31, 2000, Elena,
who was in the upper portion of the house with her son, Jaime, who
happened to sleep in her house the night before because he had a drinking
spree with some friends, went downstairs because of the thudding sound
from their door. Appellant, who was in the house to visit her grandmother,
was having breakfast when the door was opened. Several men entered the
house and instructed them to sit down. Two of these men carrying an
envelope went upstairs and woke up Jaime Garcia. Jaime then went
downstairs and these two men without the envelope followed two minutes
later. Appellant and the other occupants were told to wait for the arrival of
the tanods. Then, the same two men who earlier went upstairs went up
again with a tanod and when they came down, they had with them an
envelope, the contents of which were spread on the table and were listed
down. Appellant was then asked to sign a paper where a listing of the
contents of the envelope was made but she requested to contact her lawyer
which was denied. She was forced to sign otherwise she would be
handcuffed. The list of the inventory was neither read to her nor did they
leave a copy for her or to any of the occupants. Appellant declared that the
search warrant was served on her but she never read it nor was it read to
her.
On June 27, 2001, the trial court rendered its assailed decision finding
appellant guilty as charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Eden del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The seized or confiscated items are declared
forfeited in favor of the government and the same shall be disposed of in the
manner allowed by law.
In convicting appellant, the trial court ratiocinated:
After a careful analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence on
record, the Court is of the well considered view and so holds that the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the accused had indeed, with
deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, in her possession and
control or use on or about July 31, 2000 at about 10:30 A.M. the following:
A - Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance
weighing 294.86 grams;

B - Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance
weighing 12.33 grams;
C - Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance
weighing 4.75 grams
locally known as shabu, containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription. The
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), by virtue of a Search
Warrant issued against Eden Garcia del Castillo by Judge Isaias Dicdican and
implemented on July 31, 2000 resulted in the acquisition of said items. The
items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for analysis and the result
is positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, or locally
known as shabu. No less than the accused signed the Receipt for Confiscated
Articles signifying that the Raiding Team of the Philippine National Police had
actually seized and confiscated certain items or articles from the herein
accused. The prosecution then was able to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use
any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject
to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of
Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any
of the following quantities:
...
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylampetamine hydrochloride; . . .
Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS JUDGMENT A CLEAR
AND DISTINCT FINDINGS OF FACTS (WHICH) PROVED THAT ACCUSED DID
NOT OWN THE HOUSE WHICH WAS SEARCHED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT THE
ARTICLES SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT WERE NOT TURNED
OVER TO THE ISSUING COURT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.

III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAIDING TEAM FAILED
TO ISSUE A DETAILED RECEIPT OF SEIZED ARTICLES AND TO GIVE A COPY
THEREOF TO THE LAWFUL OCCUPANT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT BY THE RAIDING TEAM
ORDERING ACCUSED TO SIGN THE INVENTORY AFTER THE ARREST WITHOUT
THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS VIOLATIVE OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAID WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE PRIVACY OF ELENA R. GARCIA, AS OWNER OF THE HOUSE
BEING SEARCHED, AND NOT THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED EDEN DEL CASTILLO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in
lieu of appellees brief praying that the decision under consideration be
reversed and set aside and that the appellant be acquitted.
We agree with the OSG. The appeal is meritorious.
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use
any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject
to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the
following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the
person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c)
the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
In People vs. Tira, we explained the concept of possession of regulated
drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place

where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a
showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such
fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and
any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence of the presence of
the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the
drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act,
the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugs is in the
house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within
such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
Prosecution witnesses failed to establish that the house where the shabu and
other shabu paraphernalias were found belongs to appellant. On the other
hand, defense evidence clearly showed that the subject house belongs to
appellants grandmother, Elena Garcia, who testified in direct examination as
follows:
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q You stated in your personal circumstances that you are a resident of
Mabolo, Cebu City. Do you own a house?
A

Yes, I owned a house.

With whom are you living therewith?

My grandson.

What is the name of your grandson living with you at that house?

Brent Lepiten.

Q You stated that you owned a house in Mabolo, Cebu City which was the
subject of the search. Do you have any evidence to show that you owned
that house?
A

Yes, I have.

Q Showing to you this machine copy which is Tax Declaration No. 01-30651
in the name of Jose Garcia. Is this the tax declaration evidencing your
ownership and possession of your house?
A

Yes, that is the one.

How are you related to Jose Garcia?

My husband.

Where is he now?

He is already dead.

ATTY. RIVERAL:
We request Your Honor that the machine copy of the tax declaration be

marked as our Exhibit 1.

COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q The house which you mentioned belongs to you, how many storeys are
there?
A

Two storeys.

ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q

You mean the ground floor and the upper portion?

Yes, sir.

Where do you usually take your rest in the evening?

In the upper portion.

Do you know accused Eden del Castillo?

Yes, she is one of my grandchildren.

Where is she living?

San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City.

Is accused Eden del Castillo still single?

She is still single.

With whom is she living with before the arrest?

Together with her auntie Edna Aballe.

How about her parents?

A
Sometime(s) when they traveled at Badian only Eden is in the house
together with her auntie but they stayed in their house.
Q On July 31, 2000 in that evening who was sleeping at the upper portion
of your house?
A

Myself and my grandson.

You are mentioning of Jaime, who is this Jaime?

FISCAL LABORTE:
The witness was only asked who slept at the upper portion and she answered
myself and my grandson.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q

You mentioned one Jaime Garcia, why was he there?

A
This Jaime was able to sleep in the house at that time considering that
his wife was abroad.
...

ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q

That Jaime Garcia you said where did he take his rest that night?

At our house.

In what portion thereof?

At the upper portion.

The evidence of the prosecution failed to establish by competent evidence

that appellant is the owner or at least shared the ownership of the house
where the shabu was found. PO3 Petallar testified that based on their own
casing operation, appellant frequented the subject house to eat meals; that
they were not sure that the house was owned by appellant but only believed
that she had belongings therein since she frequented the same. PO2
Borinaga testified it was a public knowledge that appellant was living in the
subject house since she was a child. Thus, there is no competent evidence
that appellant had control and dominion over the place where the shabu was
found. The claim of appellant that she has her residence in San Vicente
Village, Wireless, Mandaue City and that she was only a visitor in the house
that belongs to her grandmother at the time of the search was not rebutted
by convincing evidence.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, however,
there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants
control or possession.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove appellants possession of the shabu
at the time of her arrest. It bears stressing that at the time the raiding team
conducted the search, appellant and the other occupants were asked to stay
in the living room. PO3 Petallar did not find any drugs on appellants body
nor was there anything unusual or suspicious noted in her person.
Notably, the policemen testified that they found the shabu in the upper
portion of the house, however, it was not shown at all in whose room it was
found. In fact, the defense evidence showed that at the time the two
policemen went upstairs, Jaime Garcia, appellants uncle, was asleep and
was awakened by the policemen who asked him to go down. This was
corroborated by PO2 Borinaga who testified on cross-examination that while
he was downstairs, there was a person upstairs who came down. Moreover, it
was appellants grandmother and the latters grandson, Brent, who were
staying in the upper portion of the house. Also, the shabu found at the
ground floor of the house does not conclusively establish that it belongs to
appellant since it was not found together with the other things of appellant.
To reiterate, she was not the only person who had access to the entire
house. In fact, it was also shown by the prosecution that a certain Servando,
appellants brother, voluntarily surrendered five small plastic packs of white
crystalline substance. We find that the prosecution failed to prove
convincingly that the seized shabu belonged to appellant.

Moreover, the manner in which the search was conducted on the subject
house failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly
Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two
witnesses No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
Clearly, the search of the house must be done in the presence of the lawful
occupants and it is only in the absence of the former that two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality may be called upon
to witness the search. While appellant and the other occupants of the house
were present during the search, they were not allowed to actually witness
the search of the premises. They were in the words of the policemen
pressed, i.e., they were asked to stay put in the sala where they were
seated while the simultaneous search was on-going in the upper and lower
portions of the house. They should be the ones that should have
accompanied the policemen while the search was being done and not
substituted by the barangay tanods in their stead. We held in People vs. Go:
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically
admitted that the search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the
recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the
presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who
was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground
floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are
prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the
premises, violates both the spirit and the letter of the law:
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was
planted is strengthened by the manner in which the search was conducted
by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala
together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito
na. Apparently, the search of the accused-appellants house was conducted
in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically
provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is
mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised
Penal Code.
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of
Investigation, et al., a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can
roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the
only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a search

conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the
house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the
search at the second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and
explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the
search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126
provides that the search should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the absence of either
of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the
search of appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his
son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were without
discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the
law.
...
The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is
essentially no different from that in People v. Del Rosario where this Court
observed:
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small
canister was actually seized or confiscated at the residence of the accusedappellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the
subsequent and much delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into
the residence of the accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying
down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room
while they searched the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two
persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the
policeman had already entered accused-appellants residence (PP. 22-23, tsn,
December 11, 1991), and therefore, the policemen had more ample time to
plant the shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved (Section 14[2], Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances
of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with
his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil 463 [1946]; People vs.
Constante, 12 SCRA 653[1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516[1986]). The
facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is
innocent.
We also find that the raiding team failed to comply with the procedures on
search and seizures provided under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property
under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful
occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were
made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality,

leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.

SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the court. The
officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
Clearly, the detailed receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful
occupant. In this case, however, PO3 Petallar admitted that the inventory
receipt was given to the barangay tanod despite the presence of the
appellant and her grandmother which is a violation of the rule.
Likewise, the police officers failed to deliver the seized items to the court
which issued the search warrant. It was commanded in the search warrant
that the seized articles be brought to the court which issued it to be dealt
with as the law directs. Under the rule, the seized property must be
delivered by the officer to the judge who issued the warrant. It must be
accompanied with a true inventory thereof duly verified. The police officers
all testified that the confiscated shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Faced with the same circumstance, we held in
People vs. Gesmundo:
On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court, the trial
court held that it takes judicial notice of the usual practice of the San Pablo
City police force of retaining possession of confiscated specimens suspected
of being marijuana by immediately forwarding them to the NBI or to an NBI
accredited physician for preliminary examination and/or laboratory
examination before filing a case with the city prosecutors office. The mere
tolerance by the trial court of such a practice does not make it right. Clearly,
such practice violates the mandatory requirements of the law and defeats
the very purpose for which they were enacted. Speculations as to the
probability of tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided.
The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy, et al vs. Mariano Almeda , et al.
(70 Phil 141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody
of the allegedly confiscated specimens. While in said decision, this court
recognized the fact that the objects seized were retained by the agents of
the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over to the Justice of the Peace
of Sagay, yet the Court also held that it was for the reason that the custody
of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention
having been approved by the latter. Thus, approval by the court which
issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property
seized by the police officers; and only then will their custody be considered
custody of the court. Absent such approval, the police officers have no
authority to retain possession of the marijuana and more so, to deliver the
property to another agency, like the NBI.
Moreover, the inventory receipt was not certified under oath by any of the
members of the raiding team as required by the rule but was signed only by
appellant and her brother.

The trial court erred in relying on the receipt of confiscated articles to

establish that the raiding team had actually seized the listed items therein.
First, it is highly irregular that the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000
when the actual raid was conducted on July 31, 2000. We find the
explanation unacceptable given that the receipt was already prepared earlier
than the search. Such discrepancy affects the integrity of the inventory
receipt. Second, appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of
counsel. It was established that at the time she signed the receipt, she was
already under custodial investigation. The testimony of PO3 Petallar is
revealing:
Q When you saw the articles seized you were of the impression that they
were illegal?
A

Yes, sir.

Q Because of that impression you held Eden del Castillo in custody of the
law?
A

Yes, sir.

You handcuffed Eden del Castillo immediately?

No, we do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo.

Q Although you do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo, the accused
but virtually she was already held in custody of the law?
A

We effected the arrest.

So you begun listing down the articles which is supposedly seized?

A
Upon the delivery of the seized articles from the searching parties I
began listing.
Q

You listed the articles in that prepared form, correct?

Yes, sir.

Q In your joint affidavit, you stated in paragraph 7 That we informed her

Constitutional Right provided under the 1987 Phil. Constitution?
A

Yes, sir.

Q You informed her of her right under the Constitution because you wanted
her to claim ownership of the seized articles?
A

We just informed her about her constitutional right.

Q So that after informing her of her constitutional right she signed this
receipt or inventory of seized articles, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q So you asked her by interrogation or question whether or not you will

concur to the entries listed in this inventory?
A

Yes, sir.

Q You also asked her that the search was conducted in a very orderly
manner?
A

Yes, sir.

You also asked her that nothing was destroyed or lost inside the house?

Yes, sir.

Q That you also asked her that the members of the raiding team did not in
any manner subjected (sic) them to unreasonable treatment?
A

Yes, sir.

And that they were not exposed to embarrassment?

Yes, sir.

Q Since you shoot (sic) several questions and informing her of the
constitution(al) right(s) under the 1987 Constitution did you tell her that you
have the right to be assisted by counsel?
A

I told her that.

...
COURT:
Q After you had told the accused that she is entitled to have counsel now
what did the accused say, if any?
A

She told me that she would get a lawyer.

ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q

In effect, did she get a lawyer?

Not immediately.

...
Q

Thereafter was she able to get a lawyer?

A
When we arrived at the camp her sister told us that she had already
hired a lawyer.
Q

In effect, did that lawyer appear in the camp?

I never saw.

Q So accused would (sic) sign (sic) that instrument without the assistance
of counsel?
A

Yes, sir.

While PO3 Petallar testified that appellant was read her constitutional right, it
was not clearly shown that she was informed of her right not to sign the
receipt and that it can be used as an evidence against her. If appellant was
indeed informed of her constitutional right, it is unusual for her to sign the
receipt acknowledging ownership of the seized items without the assistance
of counsel considering that she wanted to get a lawyer. In People vs. Go, we

found the inventory receipt signed by appellant inadmissible for being

violative of her custodial right to remain silent, thus:
After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to
appellant for his signature without any showing that appellant was informed
of his right not to sign such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither
was he warned that the same could be used as evidence against him. Faced
with similar circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo stated:
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accusedappellant that marijuana was found in her possession but said admission
embodied in a document entitled PAGPAPATUNAY previously prepared by
the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for
having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense. The records show that the
accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document;
neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the
fact that the document may be used as evidence against her.
In People vs. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing
suspects to sign receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their
possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain
silent, viz:
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional
right to be silent and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be
used against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement unless it
is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to
this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small
plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing
a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the
dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign
these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the
commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to
sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who
confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is
a violation of the constitutional right of the appellant to remain silent
whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without
informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for
being violative of appellants custodial right to remain silent; it is also an
indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team
conducted the search of appellants residence.
Assuming arguendo that appellant did waive her right to counsel, such
waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. To insure that a waiver is

voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution requires that for the right to
counsel to be waived, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of
the counsel of the accused. There is no such written waiver in this case,
much less was any waiver made in the presence of the counsel since there
was no counsel at the time appellant signed the receipt. Clearly, appellant
affixed her signature in the inventory receipt without the assistance of
counsel which is a violation of her right under the Constitution.
In all criminal cases, it is appellants constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus in
People vs. Del Norte, we said:
We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the duty to
protect appellant where the evidence presented shows insufficient factual
nexus of her participation in the commission of the offense charged. In
People vs. Laxa, we held:
The governments drive against illegal drugs deserves everybodys support.
But it cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of
constitutional rights. It is precisely when the governments purposes are
beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As
Justice Brandeis warned long ago, the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning without
understanding.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE on
the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant Eden
del Castillo. She is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her and
her immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless she is
lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to forthwith implement
this decision and to inform this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
The shabu and other shabu paraphernalias seized during the search are
forfeited in favor of the State.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
HUANG ZHEN HUA and JOGY LEE, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Metro Manila, Branch 259, convicting the appellants of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The Case for the Prosecution

Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime

(PARAC) under the Department of Interior and Local Government received
word from their confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao,2 and
appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug
trafficking. The policemen also learned that appellant Lee was handling the
payments and accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking
activities of Lao and Chan.3 PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other police
operatives conducted surveillance operations and were able to verify that
Lao and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They once
spotted Chan, Lao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in
Bocobo Street, Ermita, Manila, late in the evening. On another occasion, the
policemen saw Chan, Lao, and the appellants, at the Celicious Restaurant
along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at about 8:30 p.m. They were
spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.4
The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at Room Nos.
1245 and 1247, Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and in
a two-storey condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa,
Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila.5
On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search
Warrant No. 96-801 for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal
possession of firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-802, for
violation of Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from
Judge William M. Bayhon, Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila.6 Senior Police
Inspector Lucio Margallo supervised the enforcement of Search Warrant No.
96-801 at the Cityland Condominium at about 11:00 p.m. on October 29,
1996. With him were PO3 Anciro, Jr., PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3 Roger Ferias
and seven other policemen of the PARAC, who were all in uniform, as well as
a Cantonese interpreter by the name of Chuang. While no persons were
found inside, the policemen found two kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia for its production,
and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit
cards.7
Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan
would be delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the
corner of Dasmarias and Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen rushed to
the area on board their vehicles. It was 2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The
policemen saw Chan and Lao on board the latters Honda Civic car. As the
two men alighted, one of the men approached them and introduced himself,
but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between the
members of the raiding team and the two suspects. Chan and Lao were shot
to death during the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each
containing one kilo of shabu, in Laos car.
The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to
enforce Search Warrant No. 96-802. When the policemen arrived at the
place, they coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security

in the building.8 The men found that the Condominium Unit No. 19 was
leased to Lao under the name Henry Kao Tsung. The policemen, Pangan and
two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa proceeded to the condominium
unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one responded.
Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door.9 Appellant Lee peeped through the
window beside the front door.10 The men introduced themselves as
policemen,11 but the appellant could not understand them as she could not
speak English.12 The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with
appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their uniforms to her to show
that they were policemen. The appellant then opened the door and allowed
the policemen, Pangan and the security guards into the condominium unit.13
The policemen brought appellant Lee to the second floor where there were
three bedrooms a masters bedroom and two other rooms. When asked
where she and Lao slept, appellant Lee pointed to the masters bedroom.14
Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched the masters
bedroom, while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom where
appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping.15 Ferias awakened appellant Zhen Hua and
identified himself as a policeman. Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised.16
Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the masters bedroom about six feet
high. He stood on a chair, opened the cabinet and found two transparent
plastic bags each containing one kilo of shabu,17 a feeding bottle, a plastic
canister18 and assorted paraphernalia.19 Inside the drawer of the beds
headboard, Anciro, Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank
passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation, credit cards, passports
and identification cards of Lao and Lee.20 Anciro, Jr. asked appellant Lee who
was the owner of the crystalline substance, but the latter did not respond
because she did not know English.21 Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for instructions
on what to do with the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep
the same for future reference,22 and as evidence against any other suspect
for illegal drug transactions.23 Anciro, Jr., Pangan and Margallo later showed
the seized articles to the other members of the team.24
Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were
bringing her to the PARAC headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told
and took some clothes from the cabinet in the masters bedroom where
Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu.25
The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The
following articles were found and confiscated by the policemen in the
condominium unit:
a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) Kilo
each of white crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an
undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu;
c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined

amount of suspected Shabu .

d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised
Tooters used for sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning
Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;26
Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box. 27 The
appellants were then brought to the PARAC headquarters where they were
detained. Pangan signed a Certification28 that the search conducted by the
policemen had been orderly and peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the
transparent plastic bags and their contents, the transparent baby feeding
bottle and the plastic cannister and their contents. On October 26, 1996, he
and Ferias29 brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
laboratory examination30 along with the letter-request31 thereon.
On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cario signed Chemistry
Report No. D-1243-96 which contained his findings on the laboratory
examination of the items which were marked as Exhibits "A" to "A-4," viz:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. "A" One (1) "must de Cartier Paris" carton containing the
following:
Exh. "A-1" One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing
1,000.40 grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. "A-2" One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing
998.10 grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. "A-3" One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle
with pink cover containing 18.52 grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. "A-4" One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover
containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline substance.
NOTE: The above-stated specimen were allegedly taken from the
residence of the above-named subjects. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens,
Exhs. "A-1" through "A-4" gave POSITIVE result to the test for
Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx32
The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest.33 Pangan and the two
security guards signed a certification stating that nothing was destroyed in
the condominium unit and that the search was orderly and peaceful. 34 The
policemen also accomplished an inventory of the articles seized during the
search.35
The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as

amended, in an Information filed in the RTC of Paraaque, Metro Manila, the

accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use
any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have, in their possession and under their control and custody, the
following to wit:
A. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing
1,000.40 grams of white crystalline substance;
B. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.1
grams of white crystalline substance;
C. One (1) transparent plastic "Babyflo Nurser" feeding bottle
with pink cover containing 18.52 grams of white crystalline
substance;
D. One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover
containing 3.28 grams of white crystalline substance
which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.36
Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29,
1992, and pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The Case for the Appellants
Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of
Kwantong, China, a college graduate who could not speak nor understand
English. She was once employed in a real estate firm. One of her coemployees was Huang Zhen Hua.37 She met Henry Lao in China sometime in
1995,38 and he brought her to Belgium that same year. Lao also helped her
procure a Belguim passport, for he explained that if she only had a Chinese
passport, it would be difficult to secure visas from countries she wanted to go
to and visit; whereas many countries did not require a Belgian passport
holder to secure visas before allowing entry therein. In the process, he and
Lao fell in love and became lovers.
Upon Laos invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the
first time in April 1996. Lao met her at the airport, and she was, thereafter,
brought to a hotel in Manila where she stayed for less than a month.39 She
returned to the Philippines a second time and was again billeted in a hotel in
Manila. All her expenses were shouldered by Lao, who was engaged in the
garlic business.40 As far as she knew, Lao was not engaged in any other

business.41 In June 1996, she invited her friend, appellant Huang Zhen Hua to
visit the Philippines to enjoy the tourist spots.42 They were then in China.
In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines
on a tourist visa. She was fetched by Lao, and she was brought to his
condominium unit at No. 19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio,
Paraaque. She had been residing there since then. She and Lao used to go
to the shopping malls43 and she even saw Chan once when he cleaned his
Nissan car in Laos garage.
On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and
was met by Lao at the airport. He tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but
Lee told him that he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen Hua was
brought to the Villa where he had been staying since then. The appellants
had made plans to visit Cebu.
At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the
masters bedroom at the condominium unit. She had closed all the windows
because she had turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen Hua was sleeping
in the other bedroom in the second floor beside the masters bedroom. Laos
Honda Civic car and Chans Nissan car were in the garage beside the
condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard someone knocking on the
bedroom door. When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into the
bedroom and at the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr.
was not among the men. Lee did not hear the policemen knock at the main
door before they entered.44 The policemen were accompanied by Chuang, a
Cantonese interpreter, who told her that the policemen were going to search
the house.45 Appellant Lee saw a policeman holding two papers, but no
search warrant was shown to her.46 She was so frightened.
The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the
masters bedroom. Appellant Lee went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua
and when she returned to the masters bedroom, she saw shabu on the
bed.47 The policemen took her ring, watch and the P600,000 owned by Lao
which had earlier been placed in the cabinet, her papers and documents, and
those of Laos as well. She had never seen any shabu in the room before the
incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua were brought to the PARAC
headquarters where they were detained. Chuang, the cantonese interpreter,
informed her that shabu had been found in the condominium unit and that
the policemen were demanding P5,000,000 for her release. She was also told
that if she did not pay the amount, she would be charged with drug
trafficking, and that the leader of the group who arrested her would be
promoted. However, she told Chuang that she had no money. Since she could
not pay the amount, she was boarded on a PARAC owner-type jeep and
returned to the condominium unit where the policemen took all the
household appliances, such as the television, compact discs, washing
machine, including laundry detergent. Only the sofa and the bed were not
taken. About ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the services of

counsel.
Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to
the condominium unit but that no one responded. He shouted, "Sir Henry,"
referring to Lao, but there was no response from inside the condominium.
After about three (3) to five (5) minutes, a policeman kicked the door open
and they entered the house. They went to the second floor and saw the
appellants sleeping.
Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the
policemen. He learned that shabu had been found and taken from the
condominium unit only when he saw someone holding up the substance on
television during the daily news program TV Patrol.48
Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony
of appellant Lee that upon her invitation, he arrived in the Philippines on a
tourist visa on October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see Anciro, Jr. in
the condominium unit when policemen arrived and searched the house. He
testified that aside from the PARAC policemen, he was also investigated by
policemen from Taiwan.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both
appellants of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Jogy Lee and
Huang Zhen Hua GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec.
16, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, and considering the
absence of any aggravating circumstances, this Court hereby
sentences both accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The properties seized in
accordance with the search warrants issued relative to this case are
hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the Clerk of
Court of this Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board, the drugs and paraphernalia subject hereof for proper
disposition.
The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the Mittimus for the
immediate transfer of both accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua
from the Paraaque City Jail to the Bureau of Correccions (sic) in
Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.49
The Present Appeal
On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:
First. The evidence for the prosecution, as a whole, is so far as selfcontradictory, inherently improbable and palpably false to be accepted
as a faithful reflection of the true facts of the case;
Second. Appellant Huang Zhen Huas conviction was based merely on
the trial courts conclusion that he "is not an epitome of first class

tourist and that he appeared nonchalant throughout the proceedings;"

Third. In convicting said appellant, the court below completely
disregarded the glaring facts and admissions of the prosecutions
principal witnesses that no regulated drug was ever found in his
possession;
Fourth. The trial court, likewise, ignored the fact that the appellants
arrest was illegal and in violation of his constitutional and basic rights
against arrest without probable cause as determined by a Judge and
that his arraignment did not constitute a waiver of such right;
Fifth. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the presumption of
regularity of performance of the police officers who took part in the
search had been overcome by prosecution's own evidence, thereby
wrongly giving such presumption substance over and above the
constitutional presumption of innocence of the appellant.50
For her part, appellant Lee contends that:
1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE
ROOMS IN THE TOWNHOUSE RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY
PLANTED BY PARAC OPERATIVES;
1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY
IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT
DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE ROOM TO BE
SEARCHED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER TO ASSIST AND GUIDE
JOGY LEE, WHO NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, DURING THE SEARCH AND EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE
UPON THE GROUND THAT HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.51
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant
Zhen Hua should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that
the conviction of appellant Lee should be affirmed.
The Courts Ruling
We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang
Zhen Hua and Jogy Lee sequentially.
On Appellant Zhen Hua
The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove appellant Zhen Huas guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged, thus:
Huang Zhen Hua denies having anything to do with the bags of "shabu"
found in the townhouse unit of Henry Lau. He claims that he arrived in the
Philippines as a tourist on October 22, 1996, upon the invitation of Jogy Lee.
Allegedly, at the time of his arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely

four days. He claims that he was just temporarily billeted as a guest at the
townhouse where Jogy Lee was staying. And that he had no control
whatsoever over said townhouse. He puts emphasis on the fact that the
search of his room turned out to be "negative" and that the raiding team
failed to seize or confiscate any prohibited or regulated drug in his person or
possession. He, therefore, prays for his acquittal.
The People submits that Huang Zhen Hua is entitled to acquittal. The
prosecutions evidence fails to meet the quantum of evidence required to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence; thus, regardless of
the supposed weakness of his defense, and his innocence may be doubted,
he is nonetheless entitled to an acquittal (Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98
SCRA 335 (1980), cited in People v. Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15,
2000). The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every
individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused must
rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence
for the prosecution.
In the instant case, as pointed out by appellant Huang Zhen Hua, the trial
court erred when it did not give much weight to the admission made by the
prosecution witnesses that no regulated drug was found in his person. No
regulated drug was also found inside his room or in his other belongings such
as suitcases, etc. Thus, he had no actual or constructive possession of the
confiscated "shabu."
Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the
country for barely four (4) days at the time when he was arrested. The
prosecution was unable to show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua
committed acts which showed that he was in cahoots with the drug
syndicate Henry Lau and Peter Chan. It was not even shown that he was
together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. As for Huang Zhen
Hua, therefore, there is no direct evidence of any culpability. Nor is there any
circumstantial evidence from which any culpability may be inferred. 52
We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People vs.
Tira,53 ruminated and expostulated on the juridical concept of "possession"
under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and the
evidence necessary to prove the said crime, thus:
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs
are the following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated
drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidende)
the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists
when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the

accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exits when the

drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has
the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused
cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion
over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession,
and a showing of non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the
accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn
therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place
under his control and dominion and the character of the drug. Since
knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs
in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act,
the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in
the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or
within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.54
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time,
had actual or constructive possession of the regulated drug found in the
masters bedroom where appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the appellant
had accessed the said room at any given time; or that he had knowledge of
the existence of shabu in appellant Lees bedroom. Appellant Zhen Hua had
arrived in the Philippines upon the invitation of appellant Lee only on October
22, 1996 or barely four (4) days before the arrival of the policemen and the
search conducted in the condominium unit leased by Henry Lao. He was a
mere visitor of appellant Lee. There is no evidence that appellant Zhen Hua
was aware of the alleged illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry
Lao, Peter Chan and appellant Lee. The policemen did not find any regulated
drug in the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping when they made
their search.
The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove conspiracy between him, appellant
Lee and Chan or Lao.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and
decide to commit it.55 Conspiracy cannot be presumed.56 Conspiracy must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the conspiracy. 57
Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of
the accused, before, during and after the commission of the crime charged
indicative of a common design.58
The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant
Zhen Hua from China, and before the search conducted in Laos
condominium unit, appellant Zhen Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and
appellant Lee. Having dinner or lunch at a restaurant does not constitute

sufficient proof that he had conspired with them or with any of them to
possess the subject-regulated drug. Mere association with the principals by
direct participation or mere knowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not
suffice.59 Anciro, Jr. even admitted that during his surveillance, he could have
mistaken appellant Zhen Hua for another group of Chinese persons who were
also being watched.60 Appellant Zhen Hua should, thus, be acquitted.
On Appellant Lee
Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance
and implementation of Search Warrant No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the
policemen who implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show
to her the said warrant, inform her of their authority and explain their
presence in the condominium unit; (b) the policemen gained entry into the
condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and (c) articles and
personal effects owned by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by the
policemen, although not specified in the search warrant.
The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the
occasion of the search of the condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up
because the policemen planted the regulated drug on her bed even before
they searched the bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua to
find out if he was already awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she
noticed shabu on her bed. She avers that the sole testimony of Anciro, Jr.,
that he found the regulated drug in the masters bedroom, is incredible
because he was not with the policemen who barged into the bedroom. She
notes that even Pangan, the caretaker of the Villa, testified that he did not
see any illegal drug confiscated by the policemen.
According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime
charged, considering that Lao and Chan were the suspects identified in the
search warrants, not her. She avers that she had no knowledge of the alleged
illegal drug transactions of her lover Lao. She contends that there was no
probable cause for her arrest as her mere presence in the condominium unit
does not render her liable for the shabu found in the masters bedroom of
the condominium unit leased by Lao. She further avers that the testimonies
of the witnesses for the prosecution are inconsistent; hence, barren of
probative weight. The appellant also asserts that she was deprived of her
right to due process when the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese
interpreter to assist her.
The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have
performed their duties. Based on the testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee
was shown the search warrant, through the window, and the policemen
identified themselves through their uniforms. The security guards of the
condominium also explained the search warrant to the appellant. Although
she was, at first, reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later voluntarily
opened the door and allowed them entry into the unit. There was no

evidence of forcible entry into the unit and no breakage of any door. The OSG
further avers that the appellant had been in the country for quite sometime
already and could not have gotten around without understanding English. In
fact, the OSG argues that when Anciro, Jr. told the appellant to get some of
her clothes since she would be brought to the police headquarters in Quezon
City, she did as she was told and took her clothes from the cabinet where the
shabu were found by the policemen.
The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the
subdivision who was a witness for appellant Lee, even testified that the
search was orderly. The OSG contends that there was probable cause for the
appellants arrest because an informant had tipped off the arresting officers
that the appellant was a member of a syndicate dealing with illegal drugs,
and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. The appellant was not a
victim of frame-up because she was present when the policemen searched
the masters bedroom where she was sleeping and where she kept her
clothes, and witnessed the discovery of the regulated drugs and
paraphernalia.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional
proscription against unreasonable search and seizure applies to Filipino
citizens, as well as to aliens temporarily residing in the country. The rule
against unreasonable search and seizure forbids every search that is
unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or known to be offenders, as
well as the innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the
guarantee of the other fundamental rights of the citizens.61 All owes the duty
for its effective enforcement lest there shall be an impairment of the right for
the purpose for which it was adopted.62
Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice
of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to
execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding
him when unlawfully detained therein.
The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her
their authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house to execute the search
warrant if, after such notice and demand, such officers are refused entry to
the place of directed search. This is known as the "knock and announce"
principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law. The method of entry of
an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such notice are as
important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search
and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable.63 In Gouled v. The United
States,64 it was held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a
reasonable search. A search would violate the Constitution if the entry were

illegal, whether accomplished by force, by illegal threat or mere show of

force.
The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275
providing that "if a person takes the beasts of another and causes them to
be driven into a castle or fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for
the deliverance of the beasts, and if the person did not cause the beasts to
be delivered incontinent, the king shall cause the said castle or fortress to be
beaten down without recovery." Common law courts appended an important
qualification:
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming,
and to make request to open doors , for the law without a default in
the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house (which is for
the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and
inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for
perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it
is to be presumed that he would obey it65
Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking
open doors if the possession be not quietly delivered.66 The principle was
woven quickly into the fabric of early American law and in the Fourth
Amendment in the United States Federal Constitution. It is an element of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment as held in Wilson v.
Arkansas.67
Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their
presence, identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who
rightfully have possession of the premises to be searched, and show to them
the search warrant to be implemented by them and explain to them said
warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them. The
requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the
substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of
words is required. It is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers,
their authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It
must be emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the
protection of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his property but
also the safety and well-being of the officers serving and implementing the
search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and
whose property is to be searched is notified of the search warrant and
apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may consider
the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression on
his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the process, may
cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for
which he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility
that the police serving and implementing the search warrant may be
misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to other material
affirmations. Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame or

embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced intrusion.69 Indeed, a lawful

entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would
violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show
of force or obtained by stealth, or coercion.70
Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party
whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon
demand, to open it; (b) when such person in the premises already knew of
the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons; (c) when the
officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life
or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of
someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the
door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that
an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have
no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence.71
However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times,
without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment,
the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion
into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was without prior
announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry.72 Indeed, there is no formula for
the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own
facts and circumstances.73 In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed
entry and the existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only
with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry.74 In
Richards v. Wisconsin,75 it was held that:
[1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence,
under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or
that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standardas
opposed to a probable-cause requirementstrikes the appropriate
balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in
the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interest
affected by no-knock entries.76
As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida,77 what constitutes breaking
includes the lifting of a latch, turning a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp,
removing a prop to or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house,
even a closed screen door.78 However, entry obtained through the use of
deception, accomplished without force is not a "breaking" requiring officers
to first announce their authority and purpose because the reasons behind
the rule are satisfied there was no real likelihood of violence, no
unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no damage to the residence of the
accused.79

As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before

breaking open any door cannot be distilled into a constitutional stopwatch.
Each case has to be decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an
examination of all the circumstances.80 The proper trigger point in
determining, under the "knock and announce" rule, whether the police
waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is
when those inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to
execute a warrant.81
In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium
unit. Appellant Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police officers were
accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his
companions were police officers and had a search warrant for the premises,
and also explained to her that the officers were going to search the
condominium unit.82 The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of
the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their
purpose. Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some
clothes with her as she was to be brought to the police headquarters.
Without such request being interpreted to the appellant, the latter did as she
was directed and took some clothes from the cabinet atop the headboard.83
The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer
door before entering the condominium unit, and after a while, the appellant
opened the door and allowed the policemen and Pangan to enter. Anciro, Jr.
testified, thus:
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards
who helped you or assisted you in implementing said search warrants
at Grand Villa Subdivision?
A The OIC of the Home Owners Association, Antonio Pangan, and the
OIC of the Security Agency and two (2) other security guards.
Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr.
Witness?
A I can hardly recall their names.
Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers
and the OIC of the Home Owners Association, what did you do next?
A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key
and also knock and introduce ourselves, knock on the said
condominium.
Q Did they do that, the request?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand
Villa?
A Yes, Sir.

Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to

implement said search warrants, what happened next, if any? What did
you do after that?
A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody
there because the Home Owners Association doesnt have any key for
the door. We asked them to knock also because they are the ones who
have access with the tenants.
Q And after knocking, what happened next?
A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By
that time, we thought they were still asleep.
Q And then after that what did you do, if any?
A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another
security guard to try to knock on the kitchen which is on the back door.
Q And then after that?
A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic)
the window of the kitchen and asked who we are in a sign language.
Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window I
withdraw. Were you able to have a good look on that female person
who showed herself thru the window?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?
A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.84
The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain
entry into the condominium unit. She could have asked the court for an
ocular inspection to show the door which was allegedly broken into by the
policemen, or at least adduce in evidence pictures showing the said
breakage. The appellant failed to do so. The testimony of the appellant is
even belied by Pangan, who was a witness for the appellant, who certified,
along with three other security guards, that nothing was destroyed and that
the search was conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner.85
We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked
the outer door to gain entry into the condominium unit, which testimony is
seemingly in derogation of his certification. However, Pangan admitted that
the policemen did so only after knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5)
minutes and after he had called Lao in a loud voice and received no response
from the appellants:
Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being
required according to your security guards?
A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as
police operatives.

Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police authorities?

A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19,
that is what they told me.
Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct
the search?
A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I
dont know what time was that.
Q When they conducted the search, were you there?
A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is
not present.
Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of
that unit occupied by Henry Kau Chung?
A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they
pushed the door and the door was opened.
Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened it?
A Kaya naman po ginawa yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker,
wala naman pong masamang mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po
ang namamahala.
Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time
that the police operatives forcibly break open the door, how many
minutes had elapsed?
A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, "Mr. Henry,
pakibuksan nyo ang pinto, would you mind to open the door, kasi
merong mga police officers na gustong ma-search itong unit mo. Then,
when nobody was answering, they forcibly opened the door.
Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that
unit at that time?
A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion
whom I do not know.
Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door,
there was no one who responded, is that correct?
A Pardon, Sir?
Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no
one who responded to your knocking at the door?
A Nobody was answering, Sir.
Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door forcibly?
A Yes, Sir.86

COURT:
From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed
before the police officer broke open the door?
A Matagal din po.
Q For how long?
A Maybe for about three to five minutes.
Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the door?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Continue.87
The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her
contention that Anciro, Jr. placed the shabu on her bed before he continued
his search in the bedroom, and that she was a victim of frame-up by the
policemen. She relied on her testimony and those of Pangan and Ferias that
they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and take custody of the shabu in the
cabinet.
The appellants defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and
standard line of defense in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Law. While such defense cannot and should not always be considered
as contrived, nonetheless, it is generally rejected for it can easily be
concocted but is difficult to prove. Police officers are, after all, presumed to
have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions, in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are
motivated by ill-will.88
It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr.
discover and take custody of the shabu subject of this case. However, as
explained by Pangan, he remained in the ground floor of the condominium
unit while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant
Lee and her lover Lao, and Ferias proceeded to the room occupied by
appellant Zhen Hua where he conducted his search. Thus, Pangan testified:
Q When the masters bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then,
according to you, sleeping, did you accompany the PARAC members?
A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.
Q What about the members of the security force?
A They were outside, Sir.
Q During the search made on the masters bedroom?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by
Huang Zhen Hua, were you present then?

A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.

Q How about the other guards?
A They were also outside.89
For his part, Ferias declared:
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua
was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as
police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?
A He was surprised.90

Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?

A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua
was then sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as
police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?
A He was surprised.91
Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the
second floor of the condominium unit, he did not see them bring in anything:
Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the
unit, you did not see them bringing anything with them, they were all
empty-handed?
A I did not see, Sir.92
No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the
security guards of the subdivision, who accompanied the policemen in
implementing the search warrants, certified that, what was found inside the
condominium unit and confiscated by the policemen were two plastic bags
which contained white crystalline powder substances suspected to be
shabu.93

The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the
policemen were there. She claimed that the policemen placed the plastic bag
on the bed before they started the search and that she noticed the shabu
only after he returned from the room of appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was
already awake is hard to believe.
First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the
appellants bed, in her full view, for which the latter could be prosecuted for
planting evidence and, if convicted, sentenced to death under Section 19 of
Rep. Act 7659:
SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known
as the Dangerous Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and
Officers and Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces,
Planting of Evidence. The maximum penalties provided for
[in] Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and
Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed,
if those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government
officials, employees or officers, including members of police
agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found
guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7,
8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as
evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as
therein provided.
Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of
evidence by the policemen; if she had done so, for sure, the said counsel
would have prepared her affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court
for the suppression of the things/articles seized by the policemen.
Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence
before or after she was charged of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended.
Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or
policemen who allegedly planted the evidence.
The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr.
and Ferias, the articles and substances found and confiscated from the
condominium unit of Lao and appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at the
Cityland condominium unit of Lao and Chan were itemized as follows:
a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) kilo
each of white crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu, a regulated drug;
b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing

undetermined quantity of suspected Shabu;

c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Canister also containing undetermined amount
of suspected Shabu
d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised
Tooters used for sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning
Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;

a. TWO (2) Kettles/Pots containing more or less 1 kilos of Raw Shabu

or Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;
b. Two (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing more or less Two (2)
Kilos of Shabu;
c. Three (3) Plastic Basins, small, medium, large, used for containers of
finished/cooked Shabu;
c. Several pieces of Plastic Strainers used for draining out liquids from
finished Shabu;
e. One (1) Plastic Container with liquid chemical of undetermined
element;
f. Several pieces of Spoons and ladles with traces of raw Shabu used in
stirring mixtures
g. One (1) Electric Cooking Stove w/one coil burner;
h. One (1) Unit Card Making Machine;
i. One (1) Unit Card Stamping Machine;
j. Several pieces of Credit Cards and Telephone Cards;94
Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline
powder which were found and confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the
company of Ferias, delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination, per the request of Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman,
the chief of the PARAC.
We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in
the search warrants. However, such fact did not proscribe the policemen
from arresting her and charging her of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended. There was, in fine, probable cause for her warrantless arrest
independent of that found by Judge William Bayhon when he issued the
search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the condominium units
at Atlantic Drive and Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the
premises being searched when the facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are
sufficient to themselves warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that
an offense has been or is being committed.95 It has been held that:

Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present
at the time the officers entered the apartment to arrest her husband,
was nevertheless present at the time of her arrest. Upon their entry
and announcement of their identity, the officers were met not only by
George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who was emerging from the kitchen.
Officer Berman immediately walked to the doorway from which she
emerged and, without entering, observed the brick-shaped package of
marijuana in plain view. Even assuming that her presence in a small
room with the contraband in a prominent position on the kitchen sink
would not alone establish a reasonable ground for the officers belief
that she was in joint possession with her husband, that fact was
accompanied by the officers information that Ker had been using his
apartment as a base of operations for his narcotics activities.
Therefore, we cannot say that at the time of her arrest there were no
sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as well as her
husband, were committing the offense of possession of marijuana in
the presence of the officers.96
In Draper v. United States,97 it was held that informations from a reliable
informant, corroborated by the police officers observations as to the
accuracy of the description of the accused, and of his presence at a
particular place, is sufficient to establish probable cause. In this case, the
police officers received reliable information and verified, after surveillance,
that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the
payments and proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao.
Indeed, the policemen found that the appellant occupied the bedroom and
slept in the same bed used by Lao. The appellant took her clothes from the
same cabinet where the subject shabu and paraphernalia were found by
Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same condominium unit with
Lao since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996. Along with
Lao, the appellant thus had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as
well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts
and circumstances are sufficient on which to base a reasonable belief that
the appellant had joint possession of the regulated drugs found in the
bedroom along with Lao, her live-in partner, in line with our ruling in People
v. Tira.98 For the purpose of prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Law, possession can be constructive and need not be exclusive, but may be
joint.99
Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to
the appellant and Lao which were not described in the search warrants.
However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not
render the seizure of the articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does
it render inadmissible in evidence such articles which were described in the
warrant and seized pursuant thereto. Moreover, it bears stressing that
Anciro, Jr. saw the unlisted articles when he and the other policemen

implemented the search warrants. Such articles were in plain view of Anciro,
Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the
said articles because of their close connection to the crime charged. As held
in Coolidge, Jr. v. New Hampshire:100
An example of the applicability of the plain view doctrine is the
situation in which the police have a warrant to search a given area for
specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some
other article of incriminating character.
Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of
such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also
legitimate. Thus, the police may inadvertently come across evidence
while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And an object that comes
into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited
in scope under existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally,
the plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 101
It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents
and papers seen by the policemen have an intimate nexus with the crime
charged or, at the very least, incriminating. The passport of the appellant
would show when and how often she had been in and out of the country. Her
credit cards and bank book would indicate how much money she had
amassed while in the country and how she acquired or earned the same. The
pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are relevant to show
her relationship to Lao and Chan.102
Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed
to provide an interpreter when she testified. The records show that a
Cantonese interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The
Rules of Court does not require the trial court to provide the appellant with
an interpreter throughout the trial. An interpreter is required only if the
witness on the stand testifies in a language other than in English or is a deafmute. The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at her own
expense.
Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt of her guilt of the crime charged. She and Lao, her
lover, had joint possession of the shabu which the policemen found and
confiscated from her bedroom.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen
Hua is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City,
convicting him of the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
said appellant is ACQUITTED of said charge. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby directed to release the said appellant from detention
unless he is detained for another cause or charge, and to submit to the

Court, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a report of his compliance with
the directive of the Court.
The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10,
1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, convicting her of
violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
RUBY DIMACUHA y EBREO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Ruby E. Dimacuha seeks
her acquittal by a reversal of the October 22, 1999 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20720 which affirmed her earlier conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila, Branch 273, for
violations of Sections 152 and 163 of Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-112-D-MK and 95-63-D-MK, respectively. Dimacuhas
motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied by the CA in its June
19, 2000 resolution.4
Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK of the court of origin traces its formal
beginning from an Information charging petitioner of the crime of violation of
Sec. 16 (Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs), Art. III of RA No. 6425, as
amended. A companion case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK,
for violation of Sec. 15 (Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs), Art. III of the same law,
was later lodged in the same branch of the court.
The two separate Informations filed against the petitioner respectively read
as follows:
Crim. Case No. 95-63-D-MK
(For Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs)
That on or about the 10th day of August 1995, in the Municipality of
Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, direct custody and control 10.78 and 1.15 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, in violation of the abovecited law, as amended.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 96-112-D-MK
(For Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and

Distribution of Regulated Drugs)

That on or about the 10th day of August, 1995, in the Municipality of
Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver 1.15 gram
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug to another person, in
violation of the above-cited law, as amended.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on separate dates, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea
of "Not Guilty" in both cases. Thereafter, by agreement of the parties, the
two cases were tried jointly.
To buttress its case against the petitioner, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Police Inspector Julita T. De Villa, SPO2 Melanio Valeroso and
SPO2 Vicente Ostan.
The People's version of the incident, as summarized by the CA in the decision
now on appeal, is as follows:
The prosecution's evidence tend to show that at around 9:30 a.m. on 10
August 1995, SPO2 Melanio Valeroso (SPO2 Valeroso, for brevity), Senior
Inspector Ely Pintang, SPO2 Ostan, and Edilberto Ogto were at the office of
the Intelligence Unit of the Marikina Police Station, Metro Manila. While there,
an informant or confidential informer or asset named Benito Marcelo arrived.
He relayed to the policemen about a sale of illegal drugs to be done between
11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon of the same day along the corner to J.M. Basa and
Kapwa Streets, Calumpang, Marikina, Metro Manila. He likewise described the
seller as "more or less 5'4" in height, has a long hair and she will be using a
(sky blue colored) car (Toyota Corolla with Plate No. PPZ-254) in delivering
the shabu." At once, Senior Inspector Ely Pintang formulated a plan to
conduct the operation of arresting the suspected seller. A team composed of
SPO2 Valeroso, SPO2 Vicente Ostan, Bello Borgueta, Jose Castelo, Jr., and
Felipe Evangelista was formed. Then, the team dispatched to the said place.
At about 11:00 a.m. of that day, SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Vicente Ostan
(SPO2 Ostan, for brevity) positioned themselves along J.M. Basa Street, while
the other members were at Kapwa Street, Calumpang, Marikina. SPO2
Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan were fronting a house which was more or less 5 to
7 meters away from where they were. The house allegedly owned by a
certain alias Rudy Kalawang was where the sale of the illegal drugs was to
take place. SPO2 Valeroso saw Benito Marcelo, the confidential informer,
walking to and from that house.
More or less thirty minutes later, two vehicles (a colored blue Toyota car with
plate number PPZ-254 and a semi-stainless jeep with plate number DJK-840)
parked near the said house. In the car, there were the occupants (a female
driver, a female companion, and a male companion) while in the jeep there
were two (a male driver and a male companion). Moments later, the female

driver of the car, which matched the description of the seller given by Benito
Marcelo, alighted. She approached the driver of the other vehicle. After a few
minutes of transaction, the jeep left. Thereafter, the female driver and her
female companion went to the gate of the house while their male companion
stayed at the car. At the said gate, Benito Marcelo, the confidential informer,
met the female driver and her female companion. The female driver took out
from her shoulder bag "one small plastic bag x x x" and gave it to Benito
Marcelo. Immediately, SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan approached the
female driver, her female companion and Benito Marcelo. Aside from the
small plastic bag that was handed to Benito Marcelo, SPO2 Valeroso also
recovered "suspected shabu inside the shoulder bag" of the female driver
"inserted inside the cover of a check booklet." Then, they were brought to
the headquarters. The female driver was Ruby Dimacuja; her female
companion was Juvy Carpio and their male companion was Michael Mallari.
SPO2 Valeroso then marked the two transparent plastic bags recovered from
Ruby Dimacuja by affixing his initials, placing the date and writing Ruby
Dimacuja's name. A joint affidavit was executed.
Complying with the letter request dated 10 August 1995 of the Chief of the
Investigation Unit of the Marikina Police Station, Forensic Chemist Julita T. De
Villa came up with the following:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. "A" -- One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag with 10.78
grams of white crystalline substance.
Exh. "B" -- One (1) transparent plastic bag containing 1.15 grams of
white crystalline substance allegedly delivered by R. Dimacuja.
xxxxxxxxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave
POSITIVE result to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride a regulated
drugs."
For its part, the defense offered in evidence the testimonies of the petitioner
herself and her witnesses, namely, Rodolfo Enutallo and Jose Antonio Boo.
The CA decision likewise summarizes the defense' account of the incident, to
wit:
On the other hand, the defense's evidence tend to show that at around 10:00
a.m. on 10 October [should be August] 1995, Ruby Dimacuja (Ms. Dimacuja,
for brevity) received a message in her beeper. It came from a certain Egay
telling Ms. Dimacuja that Juvy Carpio and Michael Mallari were in the house
of a certain Rodolfo Caluang whose correct name is Rodolfo Enutallio (Mang
Rudy) in Basa St., corner Kapwa St., Calumpang, Marikina, Metro Manila.

Immediately, Ms. Dimacuja proceeded there alone.

Upon reaching the two-storey house of Mang Rudy, Ms. Dimacuja went at the
second floor. On her way up, she saw Benito Marcelo whom she had known
since June 1995 talking with Mang Rudy at the first floor. At the second floor,
she saw Juvy Carpio and Michael Mallari. Ms. Dimacuja asked Juvy Carpio
about the latter's indebtedness of P24,000.00 to her. As Ms. Dimacuja was
collecting the said amount, two men in civilian clothes appeared at the
second floor and were looking for Michael Mallari. Upon seeing them, Mallari
asked them what the problem was. The two men responded, they wanted to
see his belt bag. A scuffle for the belt bag ensued. While that was happening,
Ms. Dimacuja continued talking with Juvy Carpio about the debt. Moments
later, the three men went down, still grappling for the possession of the said
bag. Sensing that what was happening among the men was just a scheme of
Juvy Carpio to avoid paying the debt, Ms. Dimacuja followed them at the first
floor. There, the two men who barged in at the second floor asked Ms.
Dimacuja to go with them at the Marikina Police Station to explain her
presence in the house. Hesitantly, Ms. Dimacuja acceded. Using her car, they
(Ms. Dimacuja, Juvy Carpio, Michael Mallari, and three other men, as there
were six of them) rode together. In the car, Ms. Dimacuja noticed the
presence of Valeroso, a friend of her mother, who arrived after the scuffling
incident.
At the police station, Ms. Dimacuja's shoulder bag was inspected. Found
inside were the "telephone book, perfume, check book and cash money (of)
less than P2,000.00." She was told that the contents were to be used as
"part of the evidence." She disclaimed carrying the drugs. Thereupon, she
was detained for two days and two nights, the contents of her bag remain
unreturned and her car was not released from police custody until after one
month.
After due assessment of the evidence presented, the trial court gave full
faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and upheld
the presumption applied in cases involving violation of Dangerous Drug Acts
of regularity in the performance of duty by public officers conducting antinarcotics operations when the police officers have no motive in testifying
falsely against an accused. It found that the evidence for the prosecution
convincingly established petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
accordingly sentenced her thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.) In Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK - the Court finds accused Ruby
Dimacuja y Ebreo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
considering that the quantity of the shabu is only 10.78 and 1.15
grams, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in consonance with People
vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 572-573, and People vs. Martinez, 235 SCRA 183,

the accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS

of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the costs;
2.) In Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK - the Court finds accused Ruby
Dimacuja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and considering that
the quantity of the shabu is only 1.15 gram, and there being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in consonance with People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 572573, and People vs. Martinez, 235 SCRA 183, the accused is sentenced
to suffer imprisonment from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The confiscated shabu are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
government and shall be disposed of in accordance with law.1awphi1.net
SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the trial courts judgment of conviction, petitioner
went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 20720.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed
Decision5 dated October 22, 1999, affirmed that of the trial court:
Premises considered, the prosecution has proved appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 15 (Sale,
Delivery, etc.,) and 16 (Possession), Article III, R.A. 6425, as
amended. The penalties were properly meted by the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision being in conformity with the law
and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioner is now with this Court via the present
recourse thereunder raising the following issues:
1. Whether the CA, in holding that petitioner did not approach
SPO2 Melanio Valeroso to profess her innocence, committed a
reversible error by affirming in toto the questioned decision of
the court a quo;
2. Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it
affirmed the conviction of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 96112-D-MK for violation of Section 15 (Sale, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Etc.), Art. III, of R.A. 6425, as amended,
when it was the investigating prosecutor's view that there was
not even any probable cause to hold petitioner liable therefor
without the testimony of the professed police asset;
3. Whether the non-presentation of one Benito Marcelo, the
professed police asset, was a denial of petitioner's right to

confront her accuser;

4. Whether the warrantless arrest of petitioner was justified
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court;
5. Whether the alleged pieces of prohibited stuff presented in
Criminal Case No. 95-63-D-MK for violation of Section 16
(Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs), Article III of R.A. 6425,
allegedly obtained as an incident to a warrantless arrest, are
admissible in evidence;
6. Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it failed
to adopt and apply the equipoise rule in the instant cases.
These issues raised can actually be trimmed down to only two: the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies; and,
the validity of the arrest and search conducted on the person and
belongings of the petitioner without a warrant.
It is settled that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident
by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover,
in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious
crime against the petitioner, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over petitioners selfserving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.6
Here, we found nothing in the record to justify why we should
depart from the above rule as far as the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses SPO2 Melanio Valeroso and SPO2 Vicente Ostan are
concerned. As correctly noted by the trial court, there is no
evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police officers
who conducted the entrapment operation in this case.
The prosecutions evidence established that an honest-to-goodness
entrapment operation which has repeatedly been accepted to be a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law was
conducted on August 10, 1995 against Dimacuha by the team
composed of SPO2 Melanio Valeroso, SPO2 Vicente Ostan, Bello
Borgueta, Jose Castelo, Jr. and Felipe Evangelista. SPO2 Valeroso
and SPO2 Ostan positively testified that from a distance of more or
less 5 to 7 meters, they saw petitioner took out from her brown
shoulder bag one (1) small plastic sachet, suspected to be "shabu,"
and handed the same to their police informant, Benito Marcelo.
Immediately thereafter, the two police officers approached the
petitioner, the latter's lady companion and Marcelo. SPO2 Valeroso
confiscated the said small plastic sachet, containing a white

crystalline substance from Marcelo. A subsequent search on the

petitioner's shoulder bag yielded another small plastic sachet, also
suspected to contain shabu, which was inserted inside the cover of
petitioner's checkbook. After laboratory examination, the white
crystalline substance contained in the small plastic sachets was
found positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly
known as shabu, a regulated drug.
Petitioner now questions the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies by giving stress over the nonpresentation in court of Benito Marcelo, the professed police asset.
She argues that the non-presentation of Marcelo was a denial of her
constitutional right to meet and confront her accuser.
The right of the petitioner to confront the witnesses against her is
not affected by the failure of the prosecution to present the
informant. The matter of presentation of witnesses is not for
accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to
the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The
prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as
witnesses. Moreover, in illegal drugs cases, the presentation of an
informant is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a
successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely
corroborative and cumulative. Informants are usually not presented
in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve
their invaluable service to the police. It is well-settled that except
when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and
there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting
officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that
only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed
with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness accounts.7
Here, SPO2 Valeroso and SPO2 Ostan directly testified regarding the
entrapment operation, as they witnessed the whole transaction of
petitioner's handing over the 1.15 grams of shabu to their asset,
and, immediately thereafter, seized from her another 10.78 grams
of shabu which was placed inside her shoulder bag. The nonpresentation, therefore, of the informant would not create a hiatus
in the prosecutions evidence since his testimony would merely have
been corroborative. The physical evidence on record, which is
Chemistry Report No. D-578-95, also corroborates the collective
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.8 Upon laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance found in appellants
possession was positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

As stated earlier, the testimony of the police officers carried with it

the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function.
Absent any persuasive evidence showing why these officers would
falsely testify against the petitioner, the logical conclusion is that no
improper motive exists, and that their testimonies are worthy of full
faith and credit.9
Finally, petitioner contends that the arrest and the search
conducted incidental to her arrest were illegal as the surrounding
circumstances of the arrest were not within the purview of the
allowable warrantless arrests under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court.
The Constitution enshrines in the Bill of Rights the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose.10 To give full protection to it, the Bill of Rights also
ordains the exclusionary principle that any evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.11
In People v. Chua Ho San,12 we pointed out that the interdiction
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute and that
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in the following instances: (1) search
of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain view; (3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search); and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognizes permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3)
arrest of escaped prisoners.
Here, the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto while in the act
of delivering 1.15 grams and in actual possession of another 10.78
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) as a result of an
entrapment operation conducted by the police on the basis of
information received from Benito Marcelo regarding petitioner's
illegal drug trade. Petitioner's arrest, therefore, was lawful and the
subsequent seizure of a bag of shabu inserted inside the cover of
her checkbook was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule
that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime. The seized regulated drug is, therefore,
admissible in evidence, being the fruit of the crime.
Petitioner next argues that no entrapment (buy-bust) operation

ever took place as no payment was made. This is of no moment. In

the crime of distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of any
consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the
prohibited drug to others is in itself a punishable offense.13 In
Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK, petitioner was charged under
Section 15, Article III of RA No. 6425 for the distribution of
regulated drugs. The law defines the word "deliver" as a persons
act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or
otherwise, and by any manner with or without consideration. 14
At the trial court, petitioner invoked the defense of alibi. She
claimed that Juvy Carpio and Michael Mallari were already at Mang
Rudys residence when she arrived, and while talking with Carpio,
two men in civilian clothes appeared and asked for Michael Mallari.
When Mallari identified himself, the two men asked for his belt bag.
While the three men scuffled for the bag, she followed them and
later on was asked to go to the police station for some questioning.
The defense set up by the petitioner does not deserve any
consideration. She should have presented her friends, Juvy Carpio
and Michael Mallari, to collaborate her tale, but she did not, for
reasons known only to her. The consistent ruling of this Court is that
alibi is the weakest of all defenses and the easiest to concoct. So it
is that in drug cases, the Court views alibi with disfavor. For alibi to
prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was
physically impossible for him to be there. Here, no clear and
convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove her
defense of alibi. On the contrary, were she not at the house of Mang
Rudy at the time of the entrapment, she would not have been
arrested and her bag searched.
The Court has no doubt at all that the charge for delivery or
distribution of 1.15 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) in Criminal Case No. 96-112-D-MK, and possession of 10.78
grams in addition to the 1.15 grams of shabu in Criminal Case No.
95-63-D-MK, were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We found the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the
CA to be correct. Although the Congress later enacted an
amendatory law, R.A. No. 9165,15 which increased the penalty for
illegal possession of 10 grams or more but less than 50 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00),16 and for the sale/delivery
of dangerous drugs from life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) to ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) regardless of the quantity and purity

involved,17 the said law is not favorable to the petitioner, hence, it

cannot be given retroactive application in the instant case.
In People v. Tira,18 we held:
Under Section 16 [Possession or Used of Regulated Drugs], Article
III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case,
shabu, is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the
quantity of the regulated drug subject of the offense, the imposable
penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional
49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor
98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal
147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
The same ruling was applied in People v. Isnani 19 where the
petitioner therein was found guilty for the crime of illegal sale of
0.60 gram of shabu.
Petitioner in this case was caught in the act of delivering 1.15
grams of shabu plus the 10.78 grams found in her possession. Thus,
the proper penalty should be no more than prision correccional.
There being neither generic mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed in
its medium period which has a duration of 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months. And applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum period shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor, the duration of
which is 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Hence, petitioner was
correctly sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional in its medium
period, as maximum.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARILYN MIRANDA y RAMA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision,1 dated 30 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR H.C. No. 00395, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 37, in Criminal Case No. 1826, finding
appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.2

The Information dated 16 February 2004, charged appellant and her coaccused Imeldo Caoile3 as follows:
That on January 12, 2004, around 7:00 oclock in the evening in
Barangay Calitlitan, Municipality of Aritao, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, caught in flagrante elicto (sic), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to a law
enforcement agent who posed as a buyer of .25 gram
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug,
contained in four small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets to
the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.4
When arraigned on 5 March 2004, both appellant and Caoile pleaded not
guilty to the charge.5
The prosecutions version is based mainly on the testimony of PO1 Henry
Valenzuela (PO1 Valenzuela), a member of the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Operation Task Force assigned at the police station in Alfonso
Castaeda, Nueva Vizcaya. According to him, in the afternoon of 24 January
2004,6 he was at the Aritao police station together with Police Senior
Inspector Prudencio Dela Cruz (PSI Dela Cruz), PO3 Manolo Lapea (PO3
Lapea), SPO2 Rogelio Orero (SPO2 Orero), and PO1 Rodelia Vergara (PO1
Vergara) discussing the conduct of the "buy-bust" operation within the town
of Aritao. During the meeting, PSI Dela Cruz designated him as the poseur
buyer and gave him a P500.00 bill for use as buy-bust money.
From the Aritao police station, they proceeded to Barangay Bone for the
execution of the first buy-bust operation which was directed against a certain
Reynaldo Mazo (Mazo). Apparently, the operation was a success as they were
able to apprehend Mazo and to bring him to the police station. While being
interviewed by PSI Dela Cruz, Mazo allegedly revealed the identities of the
other people involved in the drug trade in the area. And so, their team
planned another buy-bust operation. This time, the subject of their operation
was herein appellant who lived in Barangay Calitlitan of the same town. Their
team arrived at appellants house at around seven oclock in the evening.
Upon their arrival, Mazo, who they brought along for the purpose of the buybust operation, introduced PO1 Valenzuela to appellant. Mazo told appellant
that PO1 Valenzuela needed to buy shabu. Appellant then sought the
permission of Caoile for the transaction. The latter allegedly agreed and so
appellant went inside a room. When she returned, she pulled heat-sealed
sachets from her pocket and handed them to Mazo who, in turn, gave
appellant the marked P500.00 bill.7 Mazo then turned over to PO1 Valenzuela
the items he got from appellant. Convinced that what appellant had given
them was shabu, PO1 Valenzuela gave the pre-arranged signal to his
companions who were then within the vicinity of appellants house. PO1
Vergara and Police Chief Zaidee Daculog (Police Chief Daculog), entered the

house and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Vergara proceeded to

frisk appellant and subjected her to a body search, but the procedure did not
produce any contraband. For his part, PO1 Valenzuela went up to Caoile to
prevent the latter from giving any aid to appellant. PO3 Lapea also helped
Police Chief Daculog in searching for more illegal drugs in the living room of
appellants house. Again, the search yielded nothing.
Appellant was then taken to the Aritao police station. It was there that PO1
Vergara put the markings on the four plastic sachets allegedly sold by
appellant. Another police officer, PO1 Magdalena Alicum (PO1 Alicum), took
over the preparation of the request for laboratory examination and transfer
of the confiscated items to the provincial office of the PNP crime laboratory.
When the prosecutor presented four marked plastic sachets, PO1 Valenzuela
identified them to be the ones they recovered from appellant in the course of
the buy-bust operation.
For its part, the defense presented Caoile, appellants boyfriend, as its first
witness. He testified that on 12 January 2004, he went to appellants house
and found her resting on the bed. After taking a brief rest, the two of them
went outside to buy meat at a nearby store. Upon their return, he
immediately went to the kitchen to prepare their food, while appellant sat on
the hammock. Thereafter, Mazo arrived together with another man whom he
identified as PO1 Valenzuela. According to him, Mazo was an acquaintance,
as the latters family was a customer of the store he used to work for. He
claimed that it was appellant who talked to Mazo and the unidentified man
while he remained in the kitchen and was unaware of what the conversation
was all about. All of a sudden, more men barged inside appellants house and
started searching the living room and the bedroom. PO1 Valenzuela then told
him that they had recovered shabu. Another police officer started frisking his
front pocket but he slapped the latters hand as he thought evidence might
be planted against him. His back pocket was likewise searched and again, he
slapped the police officers hand. He claimed that he opted to tear up his
back pocket and that he even offered to remove all his clothing to prove that
he did not have any illegal drugs in his possession.
The police then invited appellant to the municipal police headquarters and
he insisted on coming along to make sure that "nothing will happen" to her.
Instead of heading straight to the headquarters, they first passed by the
house of SPO2 Orero at Bone South where they were told to sit at the terrace
while the police officers took a rest. From there, they proceeded to the Aritao
police station.
Caoile added that he and appellant were not the only ones who were taken
to the police headquarters that night for according to him, two individuals,
Sarmiento and Valdez, were with them as well as Mazo himself.8
Appellant also testified in her defense and her testimony corroborated that of
Caoile. She claimed that she knew Mazo because he was one of the
customers at the videoke bar where she used to work. Contrary to the

statement of PO1 Valenzuela that Mazo negotiated the sale of shabu with her
on the evening of her arrest, appellant insisted that PO1 Valenzuela merely
asked her if she was aware of Mazos drug-related activities. After she denied
any knowledge of said activities, about five men wearing short pants barged
into her house and started conducting a search until one of them declared
that he had found shabu.
After the trial, the court a quo rendered its decision finding appellant guilty
as charged, while Caoile was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Marilyn Miranda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Republic Act No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby
imposes upon her the penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), and to pay the costs.
Considering the insufficiency of evidence, the court hereby acquits
Imeldo Caoili on reasonable doubt. He is hereby ordered released
unless he is being held for some other valid cause or causes.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride subject of this case is hereby
declared forfeited in favor of the government, to be destroyed in
accordance with the aforesaid law. The clerk of court is directed to
coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for this
purpose.9
In convicting appellant, the trial court declared that
The court believes, and so holds, that the specimen positively tested
for methamphetamine hydrochloride by forensic chemist Alfredo
Quintero was the same taken from the accused. Chemistry Report No.
D-003-2004 not only indicated the names of the suspects, Imeldo Caoili
and Marilyn Miranda but also the markings "RCV" written on the
specimen examined. These initials were written by PO1 Rodelia C.
Vergara in the presence of PO1 Valenzuela. The latter also testified that
the sachets were delivered to the crime laboratory and even identified
the receipts evidencing such delivery. More importantly, he identified
the sachets in court and the accused had the opportunity to crossexamine him on this point (Peo. v. Babac, 204 SCRA 968). Finally, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies
to this case, especially in the absence of any proof of any ulterior
motive for the public officers to testify against the accused. The court
therefore entertains no doubt that the sachets marked "RCV" were the
very ones given by the accused Miranda to Mazo and Valenzuela
during the buy-bust operation.10
On 19 October 2004, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal,11 which was granted
by the trial court in its Order,12 dated 22 October 2003, thereby elevating the
case to the Court of Appeals.

On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed

Decision affirming the appellants conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Nueva Vizcaya (Branch 37), dated October 9, 2004, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the appellant.13
The Court of Appeals reiterated the oft-cited rule that factual findings of the
trial court especially on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight
and respect because of the trial courts unequalled opportunity to observe
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. In this case, PO1 Valenzuelas
testimony with regard to the buy-bust operation was found to be convincing,
credible, and sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals also held that when a police officer, such as PO1
Valenzuela, was not moved by ill motive to testify falsely against an accused,
courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duty.
The Court of Appeals likewise brushed aside appellants argument that the
evidences chain of custody was not established for it was not shown that
what were allegedly sold to the poseur-buyer and taken from appellant were
the same ones actually forwarded to the crime laboratory. The Court of
Appeals held that
We note that while the marking of the sachets in this case was not
done by the arresting officers in strict compliance with Section 21,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002), there is no doubt that the plastic sachets of shabu with the
markings "RCV," referring to the initials of arresting officer PO1 Rodelio
C. Vergara (PO1 Vergara), contained the same specimens recovered
from the appellant. PO1 Valenzuela affirmed that this (sic) markings
were made by PO1 Vergara in his presence. He also specifically
narrated the incident from the time appellant turned over the plastic
sachets to him until the time they were marked by PO1 Vergara in his
presence and finally when the same was referred to the forensic
chemist for qualitative examination. As correctly noted by the trial
court, PO1 Valenzuela witnessed the delivery of the sachets of shabu to
the Crime Laboratory and even identified the receipts evidencing such
delivery. There is no question, therefore, that the identity of the
prohibited drug in this case was certainly safeguarded.14
Because of the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals, appellant now seeks
the review of her case by this Court. On 29 November 2006, we required the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. 15
On 23 January 2007, appellant filed her Manifestation stating that she was
adopting her Appellants Brief dated 21 June 2005 filed before the Court of
Appeals as her supplemental brief.16
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE
TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.17
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the
crime she was charged with. She points out that other than the testimony of
the alleged poseur-buyer, the prosecution failed to present any other
evidence that the alleged buy-bust transaction took place. Moreover, she
contends that the only subject of the police operation on that day was Mazo,
while the operation involving her arose only out of what Mazo had
supposedly told the police officers. To bolster her claim of innocence, she
also draws our attention to the fact that the warrantless search of her house
conducted by the police did not yield any incriminating evidence against her.
She also contends that while the alleged buy-bust operation transpired at
around seven oclock in the evening, the excerpt from the police blotter
showed that it was only at around nine oclock of the same night when the
alleged marked money used by the police was recorded therein. Appellant
also argues that the chain of custody of the four sachets of shabu
purportedly recovered from her was not established and that the prosecution
failed to prove that the plastic sachets forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination were indeed the ones she "sold" to PO1 Valenzuela. Thus,
appellant contends that the police failed to prove that the contraband items
were first weighed before they were turned over to the crime laboratory.
In its Supplemental Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters
that the chain of custody over the confiscated drug was duly established by
the prosecution. It argues that the issue of the faithful handling of the shabu
was never raised during the trial of this case and that appellant is belatedly
raising such issue on appeal. And even if said question would be considered,
the OSG opines that it should not affect the outcome of the case, for the
chain of custody was proven in that PO1 Valenzuela testified regarding the
conduct of the buy-bust, his transfer of the possession of the shabu to PO1
Vergara, the latters marking of the plastic sachets, and PO1 Alicums
preparation of the request for laboratory examination and the turnover of the
illegal drug to the crime laboratory.
The OSG also insists that the prosecution had discharged its burden of
proving appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the elements of the
crime she was charged with were established during the trial.
At the outset, we address the argument raised by the OSG that it is now too
late for appellant to raise the issue of chain of custody on appeal. Such
stance clearly overlooks one of the distinctions between a criminal case and
a civil case. To reiterate, an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case
for review. The reviewing tribunal can correct errors though unassigned in
the appeal, or even reverse the trial courts decision on grounds other than
those the parties raised as errors.18 Notwithstanding this, we still find no
cogent reason warranting the acquittal of appellant in this case.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are

employed for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their plan.19 It has become a familiar and much-resorted to
procedure to apprehend lawless elements and to put a dent on the
proliferation of criminal activities. In particular, its use has been proven
effective in putting an end to the illicit business of drug peddlers who are
susceptible to deal with anyone willing to purchase their goods even if the
prospective buyer is a total stranger. Unless there is a clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any
improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit.20
In this case, PO1 Valenzuelas recollection of the buy-bust operation is as
follows:
Q: You said that you planned another buy bust operation, when did you
plan this buy bust operation against this Marilyn Miranda?
A: Initially we planned this buy bust operation at the Aritao Police
Station, Sir.
Q: You said, initially, why initially you planned the buy bust operation at
the Aritao police station?
A: Before we conducted the buy bust operation, Sir, we passed by at
the area and we again rehearsed at another area, Sir, before we finally
conducted the buy bust operation at the house of Marilyn Miranda, Sir.
Q: Who actually conducted the buy bust operation?
A: I, Sir, PO1 Vergara, PO3 Lapea, the chief of police of Aritao and
others, Sir, whom I cannot remember their names.
Q: Around what time did you arrive at the house of Marilyn Miranda?
A: Around 7:00 oclock P.M., Sir.
Q: So, what happened upon the arrival at the house of Marilyn
Miranda?
A: Upon arrival, Reynaldo Mazo who was then my companion
introduced me to the suspect, Sir.
Q: So, what happened?
A: After he introduced me to the suspect, Mr. Mazo said that I need a
drug particulary shabu, Sir.
Q: Where did this introduction happened inside (sic) the house or
inside the house?
A: Inside the house, Sir.
Q: So, what was the reaction, if any, of the suspect that accused
Marilyn Miranda in this case when Mr. Mazo said you needed drug
particularly shabu?

A: I talked to Mr. Caoile, Sir.

Q: Who talked to Mr. Caoile, Mr. witness?
A: Marilyn Miranda, Sir.
Q: How far were you from them when they talked?
A: About 2 to 3 meters, Sir.
Q: What did they talk about, if you know?
A: Marilyn Miranda asked permission from Mr. Caoile, Sir.
Q: What was Marilyn Miranda asking permission about?
A: He asked permission to sell shabu from Mr. Caoile, Sir.
Q: So, what was the result of that talk?
A: Mr. Caoile permitted by saying, "ikkam a nu adda."21
Q: What happened next?
A: After that, Sir, Marilyn Miranda entered their room, Sir.
Q: How far was that room from the place that you were situated?
A: 3 to 4 meters, Sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: After that, Sir, Marilyn Miranda got something from [her] pocket and
gave it to Mr. Mazo, Sir.
Q: What was that something that Marilyn Miranda took from [her]
pocket?
A: A heat sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance,
Sir.
Q: After [that] what happened next?
A: Reynaldo Mazo in return gave the P500.00 which I gave him, Sir.
Q: After [that] what happened next?
A: Reynaldo Mazo gave the plastic heat sealed to me and when I notice
that it was a suspected shabu, I gave the pre-arranged signal to my
companions, Sir.
Q: Where were your companions when this transaction happened?
A: At the vicinity of the house of Marilyn Miranda, Sir.
Q: After you gave the pre-arranged signal, what happened next?
A: PO1 Vergara and the chief of police entered the house and identified
themselves as police officers, Sir.22
In our minds, PO1 Valenzuelas testimony was able to meet the requirement
we laid down in People v. Ong,23 in that, he was able to present a complete
picture detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial contact between

the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the
delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.24 His testimony revealed how
their team came to know about appellants drug trade; the manner of
negotiation for the purchase of shabu among appellant, Mazo, and himself;
the exchange of consideration between Mazo and appellant; and Mazos
handing over to him of the subject of the sale.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution succeeded in
establishing, with moral certainty, all the elements of the illegal sale of
shabu, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.25 The presence of these elements is sufficient to support appellants
finding of guilt and is not negated by the polices failure to find any other
contraband in her house.
We are neither persuaded by appellants contention that the buy-bust
operation was directed only at Mazo. While it is true that based on the
testimony of PO1 Valenzuela, the buy-bust team met at the Aritao police
station to coordinate their entrapment of Mazo, this fact should not in any
way affect the validity of the buy-bust operation conducted against her. To
reiterate, her name and involvement in the illegal sale of shabu only became
known to the police after Mazos arrest. Thus, it was only after Mazo revealed
her identity to the police that she became the target of another entrapment
operation and in her case, Mazo himself was used as an intermediary by the
buy-bust team.
Moreover, appellant failed to present any plausible reason or ill motive on
the part of the arresting officers to falsely impute to her such a serious and
unfounded charge.26 From her testimony, it can easily be discerned that she
did not know any one of the members of the buy-bust team who arrested
her. She even referred to them as Mazos "companions." This fact supports
the Court of Appeals holding that
Then too, the rule is settled that the testimony of a law enforcer carries
with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
functions. When a police officer has no motive for testifying falsely
against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duty. Here, no evidence
whatsoever was presented which would suggest any improper motive
on the part of PO1 Valenzuela. We must accord great respect to and
treat with finality the findings of the trial court on the matter of his
credibility.27
We likewise find no merit in appellants contention that the buy-bust
operation was tainted with irregularity by the belated recording of the buybust money in the records of the police. It is settled that the recording of
marked money used in a buy-bust operation is not one of the elements for
the prosecution of sale of illegal drugs. The recording or non-recording

thereof in an official record will not necessarily lead to an acquittal as long as

the sale of the prohibited drug is adequately proven.28
As to appellants insistence that the shabu confiscated from her was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution, the records will bear out that PO1
Valenzuela positively identified in court the four plastic sachets containing
shabu which they bought from her. While he did not put any markings on the
items, he witnessed his fellow member of the buy-bust team, PO1 Vergara,
put his initials "RCV" on the sachets. Obviously, the identity of the corpus
delicti has been duly preserved and established by the prosecution in this
case contrary to appellants protestation.29 Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The appellant in
this case bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that public officers
properly discharge their duties.30
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00395 dated 30 June 2006, finding appellant Marilyn
Miranda y Rama, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01255 dated 29 March 2006, affirming with modification the Decision of the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 99-172427
dated 14 May 2001, finding accused-appellants Edgardo G. Santiago, Vicente
G. Santiago, and Vladimir S. Amado guilty of illegal sale of shabu under
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and
imposing upon them the penalty of death.
Gathered from the records are the following facts:
Appellant Edgardo G. Santiago (Edgardo) is the elder brother of appellant
Vicente G. Santiago (Vicente) while appellant Vladimir S. Amado (Vladimir) is
the nephew of Edgardo and Vicente.
On 22 April 1999, an Information was filed with the RTC against appellants

for illegal sale of shabu under Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
The undersigned [Asst. City Prosecutor Yvonne G. Corpuz] accuses EDGARDO
SANTIAGO Y GATDULA, VICENTE SANTIAGO Y GATDULA and VLADIMIR
AMADO Y SANTIAGO of a violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to
Section 2 (e), (f), (m), (o) Article I, in relation to Section 21 (b) of Republic Act
6425 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683 and as further amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about April 8, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, not
having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute a
total of THREE HUNDRED TWELVE POINT TWO GRAMS (312.2 g) of white
crystalline substance known as Shabu containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When arraigned on 13 May 1999, the appellants, assisted by their respective
counsels de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the charge. Subsequently, trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Inspector Nolasco Cortez
(Inspector Cortez), Chief of Cavite Provincial Narcotics Office and Team
Leader of the 4th Regional Narcotics Office Special Operations Group, and his
subordinate, SPO1 Joseph Yatco (SPO1 Yatco). Their testimonies, woven
together, bear the following:
On 8 April 1999, at around 10:00 in the evening, an informant approached
Inspector Cortez at the latters Narcotics Office in Imus, Cavite, and reported
the drug trafficking activities of appellants in Binondo, Manila. Inspector
Cortez instructed the informant to contact the appellants and arrange a
transaction between him (Inspector Cortez) and the appellants for the
purchase of shabu. The informant called the appellants and told them that an
interested buyer wants to procure from them 300 grams of shabu for
P300,000.00. Appellants agreed to the transaction. Thereafter, Inspector
Cortez formed a team and planned a buy-bust operation. The team agreed
that Inspector Cortez would act as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Yatco, a
certain PO3 Wilfredo Luna (PO3 Luna), SPO1 Marcelino Male (SPO1 Male),
PO3 Rolando Paternal (PO3 Paternal), PO3 Ben Almojuela (PO3 Almojuela),
PO3 Albert Colaler (PO3 Colaler), PO2 Allan Lising (PO2 Lising) and PO1 Aldrin
Agravante (PO1 Agravante) would act as back-up during the buy-bust
operation. The team also prepared bundles of boodle money appearing to be

worth P300,000.00. The monies were marked with the signature of PO3
Paternal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 9 April 1999, at about 6:30 in the morning, the team went to the Manila
Western Police District Command (WPDC) and coordinated the planned
entrapment of appellants. Afterwards, the team proceeded to the residence
of the informant at P. Solano Street, Binondo, Manila, arriving thereat at
around 8:45 in the morning.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Inspector Cortez and the informant waited for appellants at the second floor
of the informants house while SPO1 Yatco and PO3 Luna positioned
themselves outside the house. The rest of the team members stayed within
the perimeter of the area. Later, Vladimir arrived and met the informant and
Inspector Cortez. The informant told Vladimir that Inspector Cortez was the
interested buyer of shabu he referred to in their previous conversation.
Vladimir asked Inspector Cortez to show him the money. Inspector Cortez
opened the briefcase he was holding and displayed the boodle money.
Vladimir then left the two.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After a few minutes, Vladimir returned, this time accompanied by Edgardo
and Vicente. Edgardo introduced himself as a barangay kagawad and told
Inspector Cortez, Walang problema sa hulihan dito. Sagot ka namin
dito.Vicente also uttered, Pare dito sa amin maganda ang klase ng aming
shabu. Puwede kang bumalik bukas ng hapon o sa kamakalawa para ka
makapag-purchase ng another 300 grams of shabu. Edgardo then brought
out three transparent plastic bags containing shabu while Vicente brought
out a digital weighing scale. The appellants assisted each other in weighing
the three plastics bags of shabu. Each of the plastic bags weighed 100
grams. Subsequently, Vladimir handed the three plastic bags of shabu to
Inspector Cortez, while the latter turned over the briefcase containing the
boodle money to the former. Inspector Cortez then wiped his face with a
handkerchief as pre-arranged signal to his back-up team. Thereupon, he
drew his service firearm, introduced himself as a narcotics agent, and
declared the arrest of appellants. Instead of yielding peacefully, appellants
ganged up on Inspector Cortez. Vladimir grappled with Inspector Cortez for
the possession of the latters service firearm while Edgardo and Vicente
pushed Inspector Cortez to the wall. At this juncture, SPO1 Yatco and PO3
Luna arrived and subdued the appellants. Thereafter, the rest of the back-up
team entered the informants house and assisted Inspector Cortez, SPO1
Yatco and PO3 Luna. The arresting officers then seized the three plastic bags
of shabu, the weighing scale, and the briefcase containing the boodle
money.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The three plastic bags of shabu recovered from appellants were submitted to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba, Laguna, for laboratory examination. PNP Forensic Chemist Lorna

Tria (PNP Forensic Chemist Tria) found the contents of the three plastic bags
to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Upon being
weighed, the three plastic bags were found to be containing 104 grams,
104.43 grams, and 103.77 grams of shabu, respectively, or a total of 312.2
grams.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The prosecution also presented documentary and object evidence to buttress
the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) PINAGSAMA-SAMANG
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY of Inspector Cortez, SPO1 Yatco and PO3 Luna dated
April 1999; (2) booking sheet and arrest report of appellants; (3) request for
physical/medical examination of appellants addressed to the 4th Regional
Narcotics Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna; (4) findings on the
physical examination of appellants; (5) request for laboratory examination of
the three plastic bags of shabu seized from the appellants addressed to the
Chief of the Forensic/Chemistry Section; (6) chemistry report signed by PNP
Forensic Chemist Tria finding the three plastics bags to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (7) the three plastic bags of
shabu examined by PNP Forensic Chemist Tria; (8) request for
physical/medical examination of Inspector Cortez; (9) the boodle money used
in the buy-bust operation and its photocopies; (10) coordination form
prepared by Inspector Cortez and received by a certain PO3 Baarde and PO3
Arasis; and (11) letter-referral for inquest proceedings of appellants signed
by SPO1 Male and addressed to the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Manila.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of the appellants and their
corroborating witnesses -- namely, Manuel Quinan (Quinan), Celerino
Rubiano (Rubiano), Benjamin Joven (Joven), and Guillermo Miguel Hermoso
(Hermoso) -- to refute the foregoing accusations. Their version of the incident
is as follows:
On 9 April 1999, at about 8:50 in the morning, Vladimir went to the house of
a certain Oscar Colobe (Oscar) at Del Pan, Binondo, Manila, to invite the
latters son named Boy, to play basketball with him. Upon entering the
second floor of the house, he saw therein Oscar, the latters wife, a certain
Rey, two men and a lady. Oscar was talking with Rey, the two men and the
lady. While waiting for Boy, he saw the two men pull out a gun while Rey ran
downstairs. One of the men ran after Rey while the other went to the terrace
of the same house and fired his gun. Stunned, he remained motionless.
Suddenly, one of the men held his arm and poked a gun at him while the
lady held his shoulders. He then shouted to his neighbors, Tulungan ninyo
ako, tawagin nyo ang Kuya Edgar.
Edgardo and Vicente were having a conversation with their neighbors
Quinan, Rubiano, Hermoso, and a certain Rolando Ramirez (Ramirez) and
Bayani Antiago (Antiago) in front of Edgardos house at Bagong Pag-asa, Del

Pan, Binondo, Manila, when an unidentified person approached Edgardo and

told him, Kuya, si Vladimir babarilin ng mama. Edgardo and Vicente
immediately proceeded to the house of Oscar and saw Vladimir wrestling
with a man, whom they identified as Inspector Cortez, for the possession of a
gun. Edgardo introduced himself as a barangay kagawad and told Inspector
Cortez not to make any trouble in their place and that they could peacefully
take Vladimir with them. At this point, several policemen arrived and, per
order of Inspector Cortez, handcuffed the appellants. Inspector Cortez and
his men then inflicted fist blows and poked their guns at appellants.
Thereafter, Inspector Cortez and his men brought the appellants to the 4th
Regional Narcotics Office, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna. During their
stay in the said office, appellants were beaten and threatened by Inspector
Cortez and his men. Subsequently, some neighbors of the appellants
approached the arresting officers and affirmed that the appellants were not
involved in the illegal sale of shabu in their
barangay.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In support of the testimonies of its witnesses, the defense adduced as its
object and documentary evidence the following: (1) pictures of the house
terrace of Oscar; (2) PINAGSANIB NA SALUNGAT NA SALAYSAY of Edgardo
and Vicente dated 19 April 1999; (3) manifestation paper signed by the
neighbors of appellants stating that Edgardo and Vicente are of good moral
character and had no participation in the alleged illegal sale of shabu during
the incident; (4) KONTRA-SALAYSAY of Vladimir dated 19 April 1999; (5)
SALAYSAY of Joven, Quinan, Rubiano, Hermoso, Ramirez and Antiago; and (6)
manifestation paper dated 15 April 1999 signed by the fellow barangay
kagawads of Edgardo attesting that the latter is of good moral character and
was active in fighting crimes in their place.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 14 May 2001, finding
appellants guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and imposing upon them the penalty
of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused, Edgardo Santiago, Vicente Santiago and Vladimir
Amado, are hereby convicted of the crime of Violation of Section 15, Article
III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A.
7659, involving 312.2 grams of shabu with the aggravating circumstance of
the offense having been committed by an organized/syndicated crime group,
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00 each, plus the costs.
The 312.2 grams of shabu is forfeited in favor of the government and is
ordered to be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, for proper
disposition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Aggrieved, appellants elevated the instant case directly to this Court for
review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, we remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. On 29 March 2006, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC
decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the May 14, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 99-172427, with respect to the
conviction of EDGARDO SANTIAGO Y GATDULA, VICENTE SANTIAGO Y
GATDULA and VLADIMIR AMADO Y SANTIAGO is AFFIRMED except as to the
penalty which shall be MODIFIED to reclusion perpetua. The Division Clerk
of Court is directed to CERTIFY and ELEVATE the entire records of this case
to the Supreme Court for proper review in accordance with Section 13 (a),
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004.
In their separate Briefs, appellants assign the following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURTS FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF SPO1 YATCO AND
INSPECTOR CORTEZ, THE ONLY WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION, WERE
LOGICAL, FORTHRIGHT AND PLAUSIBLE, ARE NOT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
AT ALL. ON THE CONTRARY, THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE REPLETE WITH MAJOR
INCONSISTENCIES, EXAGGERATIONS, CONCOCTIONS, AFTERTHOUGHTS, AND
FALSITIES NOT JUSTIFYING A CONVICTION WITH THE PENALTY OF DEATH;
II.
THE LOWER COURTS FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART
OF THE WITNESSES, ESPECIALLY POLICE OFFICER CORTEZ, IS TOTALLY
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. MOREOVER, THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE RULE THAT, REGARDLESS OF ILL-MOTIVE, IF THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ARE FLAWED, INCREDIBLE
AND FULL OF INCONSISTENCIES, THE SAME WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO
WARRANT CONVICTION;
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
IN THE PERFORMANCE OF A POLICE OFFICERS DUTY;
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING IN THIS CASE THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT CANNOT BE DISPENSED;
V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND
ALIBI IS NOT PERSUASIVE AND CREDIBLE. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN STATING
THAT THE VERSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IS NOT NATURAL IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND THAT THE SAME ARE MERELY
SELF-SERVING AND NEGATIVE TESTIMONIES;
VI.
THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPRECIATING AN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WAS NOT EVEN ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AND
WHICH WAS NOT PROVEN AT ALL.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment thereof. In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what
is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. In
the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish through testimonial,
documentary and object evidence the said elements.
Inspector Cortez, the poseur-buyer, testified that appellants sold to him
shabu during a legitimate buy-bust operation. His positive identification of
appellants and direct account of the transaction are clear, thus:
PROS. GURAY:
Q:cralawAfter you dropped by at the WPD where did you proceed?
A:cralawWe went directly to the residence of our informant wherein the
cralawpayoff would be made of.
THE COURT:
Q:cralawWhere is the residence of (interrupted)
A:cralawOn Solano Street, Del Pan, Binondo, Manila.
Q:cralawWhat time did you arrive at said place?
A:cralawAround 8:45 or 8:50.
Q:cralawIn the morning?
A:cralawYes, sir.

Q:cralawWhat happened after you arrived at the place of your confidential

cralawinformant?
A:cralawWe waited for the arrival of the suspect.
Q:cralawAnd did the suspect arrive?
A:cralawYes, sir.Minutes later a man went upstair and I was introduced by
cralawour informant to Alias Blady [Vladimir] as the one interested in
cralawbuying shabu.
cralawx x x x
PROS. GURAY
Q:cralawAnd after this Blady (sic) was introduced to you by your confidential
informant what happened?
A:cralawAfter I was introduced by our informant he asked for the money
cralawfor the purchase of shabu which we prepared and I showed to him
cralawthe contents of the brief case and the bundles of the boodle money.
Q:cralawAnd after the money in the brief case was shown to Blady (sic)
cralawwhat did you do?
A:cralawHe immediately left to fetch his other companions who will brought
(sic) the 300 grams earlier ordered by our informant.
Q:cralawDid he came (sic) back?
A:cralawWhen he returned he was accompanied by two male person who
identified themselves as a certain Edgar who claim to be a cralawbarangay
kagawad and even told me, Walang problema sa cralawhulihan dito.Sagot ka
namin dito.
cralawx x x x
Q:cralawSo, wait.This accused Blady (sic) that man whom you said was
cralawintroduced to asBlady (sic) who is this?
A:cralawHe was introduced to me.
Q:cralawIs he one of the accused in this case?
A:cralawYes, sir.

Q:cralawWill you point out to the Court this accused?

A:cralawThat man in the corner.
THE COURT:
cralawTumindig yung tinuro.Witness pointing to Accused (stop)
cralawpangalan?
A:cralawVladimir.
THE COURT:
cralawVladimir Amado.
Q:cralawSo he was the first one introduced to you by the informant?
A:cralawYes, sir.
Q:cralawAnd then after you show the boodle money inside your brief case
cralawhe left the house of the informant?
A:cralawYes, sir.
Q:cralawWhat did he tell you before he left?cralaw
A:cralawThat he is going to fetch his other two companions who will brought
(sic) the shabu.
Q:cralawSo how many minutes later did he return together with his
companion?
A:cralawMore or less five minutes.
Q:cralawHe returned together with two other companion?
A:cralawYes, sir.
Q:cralawYou were referring to the other two accused in this case?
A:cralawYes, your honor.
Q:cralawEdgar and Vicente Santiago?
A:cralawYes, your Honor.

Q:cralawThey were with Vladimir when he came back to the house?

A:cralawYes, your Honor.
cralawx x x x
PROS. GURAY:
Q:cralawIf these companions of Vladimir namely Edgar and Vic are in the
cralawcourt room will you be able to identify them?
A:cralawYes, sir.
Q:cralawWill you please look around and point to them if they are in the
cralawcourt room?
A:cralawEdgar was the one wearing a maroon shirt and sunglass while Vic
cralawwas wearing a blue t-shirt.
THE COURT:
cralawYung tinuro tumayo.Witness pointing to two men who answered
cralawby the name of (stop) what is your name?
ACCUSED SANTIAGO:
cralawVicente Santiago, sir.
ACCUSED EDGAR SANTIAGO:
cralawEdgar Santiago, sir.
THE COURT:
cralawVicente and Edgar Santiago.All right.
PROS. GURAY:
Q:cralawWhen this Blady, Edgar and Vic arrived what else happened?
A:cralawAlias Vic told me that Pare ditto sa amin maganda ang klase ng
cralawaming shabu.Puwede kang bumalik bukas ng hapon o sa
cralawkamakalawa para ka makapagpurchase ng another 300 grams ng
cralawshabu.
cralawx x x x

PROS. GURAY:
Q:cralawNow, on or in what part of the house of the confidential informant
cralawdid all these transaction happened?
A:cralawAt the terrace on the second floor of the informants residence.
Q:cralawNow, aside from you who else was at the terrace?
A:cralawMy confidential informant and the three suspects.
Q:cralawNow, after the three suspects were shown the money what
happened next?
A:cralawAlias Edgar brought out the three transparent plastic bags of shabu
cralawwhile Alias Vic brought out the digital weighing scale.
Q:cralawAnd what did you do?
A:cralawThe three help (sic) one another in weighing the suspected shabu
cralawplaced in a three separate plastic bags.
Q:cralawWhat was the participation of Vic while the weighing was being
cralawmade?
A:cralawHe was the one who brought the digital weighing scale.
Q:cralawWhat about Edgar?What did he tell you if any?
A:cralawHe was the one who brought the shabu and even told me that
cralawDito cralawwalang problema sa hulihan.Sagot ka namin dito.
PROS. GURAY:
Q:cralawAfter that what happened?
A:cralawAfter that they demanded the money.I handed to Alias Blady the
cralawbrief case where there are bundles of boodle
money.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SPO1 Yatco corroborated the aforesaid testimony of Inspector Cortez on
relevant points.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The foregoing testimonies are in harmony with the documentary and object
evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals

found the testimonies of Inspector Cortez and SPO1 Yatco to be logical,

forthright and plausible. Both courts also found no ill motive on their part to
testify against appellants.
The prosecution also submitted as its documentary and object evidence the
three plastic bags of shabu sold by appellants to Inspector Cortez during the
buy-bust operation, the Chemistry Report of PNP Forensic Chemist Tria
confirming that the three plastic bags sold by appellants to Inspector Cortez
contained 312.2 grams of shabu, and the boodle money used during the buybust operation.
The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their
conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that
they acted in union with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. It
is clear from the testimony of Inspector Cortez that appellants were of one
mind in selling shabu to Inspector Cortez as shown by their acts before,
during and after the transaction, to wit: (1) Vladimir asked Inspector Cortez
to show him the money; (2) Vladimir fetched Edgardo and Vicente; (3)
Edgardo brought out three plastic bags containing shabu; (4) Vicente brought
out a digital weighing scale; (5) appellants assisted each other in weighing
the three plastic bags of shabu; and(6) Vladimir received the money from
Inspector Cortez.Conspiracy having been established, appellants are liable as
co-principals regardless of their participation.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellants, however, allege in their first assigned error several
inconsistencies and falsities in the PINAGSAMA-SAMANG SINUMPAANG
SALAYSAY of Inspector Cortez, SPO1 Yatco and PO3 Luna and in the
respective court testimonies of Inspector Cortez and SPO1 Yatco regarding
the type of phone used by the informant in contacting appellants, the exact
address and description of the place where the alleged sale took place, the
precise number and position of the back-up team during the buy-bust, the
accurate description of appellants arrest, the kind of service firearm carried
by Inspector Cortez during the buy-bust, the number of shots fired by
Inspector Cortez during the arrest, and the correct description of the boodle
money.
For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as
basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or

innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has
nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the
acquittal of the accused.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The inconsistencies cited by appellants refer to trivial matters and are clearly
beyond the elements of illegal sale of shabu because they do not pertain to
the actual buy-bust itself - that crucial moment when appellants were caught
selling shabu. Besides, these inconsistencies even bolster the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Appellants, nonetheless, assert that the following are material
inconsistencies because they refer to the alleged actual sale of shabu: (a)
the PINAGSAMA-SAMANG SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY states that Vladimir left
the informants house after having seen the money and after five minutes
returned with Edgardo and Vicente, while SPO1 Yatco recounted to the court
that Vladimir never left the informants house and that Edgardo and Vicente
arrived minutes after Vladimir entered the house; (b) in the PINAGSAMASAMANG-SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY, Inspector Cortez averred that Edgardo
introduced himself as a barangay kagawad and told him not to worry about
being arrested because they were in charge of the place, while in his court
testimony, Inspector Cortez never told the court that Edgardo talked to him;
(c) in the PINAGSAMA-SAMANG SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY, Inspector Cortez
stated that Vicente merely asked him if he had with him the money for the
purchase of the shabu, while during the trial, Inspector Cortez claimed that
Vicente also told him, Pare dito sa amin, maganda ang klase ng shabu.
Puwede ka bumalik bukas ng hapon o sa makalawa para maka-purchase ng
another 300 grams ng shabu; (d) in the PINAGSAMA-SAMANG SINUMPAANG
SALAYSAY, Inspector Cortez narrated that after the weighing of the three
plastic bags of shabu, he immediately handed the briefcase containing
bundles of boodle money to Vladimir, while in his court testimony, Inspector
Cortez testified that he handed the briefcase to Vladimir after the latter
demanded the money; and (e) in the PINAGSAMA-SAMANG SINUMPAANG
SALAYSAY, Inspector Cortez asserted that he handed the briefcase to
Vladimir, while during the trial, Inspector Cortez testified that he turned over
the said briefcase to Edgardo.
Although it is true that the foregoing inconsistencies refer to the situations
during the buy-bust itself, these cannot destroy the positive and credible
testimony of Inspector Cortez that he handed over to Vladimir the briefcase
with boodle money in exchange for 312.2 grams of shabu. Further, we have
consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of
a witness in open court and his sworn statement are not fatal defects to
justify a reversal of judgment of conviction. Such discrepancies do not
necessarily discredit the witness since ex-parte affidavits are almost always
incomplete. Sworn statements taken ex-parte are generally considered to be

inferior to the testimony given in open court.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Appellants likewise posit that the prosecution witnesses testified that the
three plastic bags of shabu allegedly seized from appellants were brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on the day the appellants were
arrested on 9 April 1999. The Chemistry Report issued and signed by PNP
Forensic Chemist Tria, nevertheless, states that the said three plastic bags of
shabu were received by the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on 10
April 1999. Thus, it is doubtful whether the three plastic bags of shabu
allegedly seized from appellants were the same three plastic bags of shabu
examined by PNP Forensic Chemist Tria. Appellants also claim that the nonpresentation of the weighing scale allegedly seized from them is fatal to the
case of the prosecution.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It appears that the three plastic bags of shabu sold by appellants to
Inspector Cortez were the same specimen examined and found by PNP
Forensic Chemist Tria to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Inspector Cortez unequivocally testified that, after the three plastic bags of
shabu were brought to the Cavite Narcotics Office, these were subsequently
submitted by SPO1 Male to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Canlubang, Laguna
for examination. Moreover, the Chemistry Report of PNP Forensic Chemist
Tria specifically indicates that the specimen submitted were three heatsealed transparent plastic bags previously marked at the time of their
turnover for examination as Exhibit A-1 NVC 09 APRIL 99 through Exhibit A3 NVC 09 APRIL 99, each containing white crystalline substance. The same
report also clearly states that (1) the case involved was for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425; (2) the suspects were the appellants; and (3) the
requesting party was the Cavite Narcotics Office.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The non-presentation of the weighing scale is not vital for the conviction of
appellants for illegal sale of shabu. As aptly stated by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the Court of Appeals, a weighing scale is merely
an instrument for determining the quantity of shabu and has nothing to do
with the elements of illegal sale of shabu.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Anent the second issue, appellants impute ill motive to Inspector Cortez
based on the latters testimonies that (1) he was pushed to the wall and
against the barrister of the terrace by the appellants during the arrest; (2) he
received several blows from appellants; and (3) the timely arrival of my team
members prevented me from being killed by the accusedappellants.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no proof on records showing that Inspector Cortez had ill motive in
testifying against appellants. The prosecution witnesses and appellants did
not know each other prior to the buy-bust operation. Appellants themselves
admitted that they did not have any idea why the buy-bust team had

arrested and charged them with illegal sale of shabu. The observation of the
OSG on this point is worth noting, thus:
Appellants utterly failed to show ill motive on the part of Cortez. Having been
a police officer for more than twenty (20) years, Cortez is used to being
pushed to the wall and receiving blows. It is in his line of work to be
physically abused. It comes with the job. Police officers do not avenge every
minor scuffle that they get into.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Apropos the third issue, appellants argue that the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty should not be applied in favor of the
prosecution witnesses based on the following alleged irregularities: (1) the
buy-bust team led by Inspector Cortez were officers and members of the
Narcotics Office in Imus, Cavite, and as such, they exceeded their authority
and jurisdiction when they conducted the alleged buy-bust operation in
Binondo, Manila; (2) neither Inspector Cortez nor SPO1 Yatco testified that
they actually saw PO3 Paternal write his initials on the boodle money; (3) the
boodle money was not entered in the police blotter; and (4) Inspector Cortez
and SPO1 Yatco did not testify that they had informed appellants of their
constitutional rights as accused during their
arrest.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Inspector Cortez and SPO1 Yatco categorically testified that their team had
gone to the WPDC in Manila to coordinate first the buy-bust operation before
proceeding to Binondo, Manila, where the buy-bust took place. This
testimony was supported by a Coordination Form prepared by team member
PO2 Lising and received by a certain PO3 Baarde and PO3 Arasis of the
WPDC. Appellants also failed to state any specific law or regulation
mandating that only the Narcotics Office in Manila was authorized to conduct
a buy-bust operation within Manila. Further, it should be noted that the
informant was an asset of the Cavite Narcotics Office.
The failure of Inspector Cortez to testify specifically that he saw PO3 Paternal
write his initials on the boodle money as well as the doubt on whether the
boodle money was entered in the police blotter are not fatal to the cause of
the prosecution. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of
any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, much less is it required that
the boodle money be marked or entered in the police blotter. As earlier
discussed, the only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof
that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the shabu as evidence. Both were satisfactorily
proved in the instant case.
We have examined the transcript of stenographic notes of Inspector Cortez
and SPO1 Yatco and found that the prosecutor and defense counsels did not

specifically ask the two if they apprised appellants of their constitutional

rights as accused. Thus, Inspector Cortez and SPO1 Yatco cannot be faulted
for failing to mention this particular aspect in their testimony. At any rate,
what is clear is that Inspector Cortez, SPO1 Yatco and PO3 Luna categorically
stated in their PINAGSAMA-SAMANG SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY that appellants
were informed of their constitutional rights as accused during the buybust.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The testimonies of the police officers with respect to appellants participation
in the drug-related transaction, which was the subject of the buy-bust
operation, carried with it the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the testimonies of
police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their duties
regularly, absent any convincing proof to the
contrary.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Regarding the fourth issue, appellants contend that the testimony of the
informant is necessary because he witnessed the alleged buy-bust operation
and his testimony is the best evidence for the
prosecution.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of an informant who witnessed the
illegal sale of shabu is not essential for conviction and may be dispensed
with if the poseur-buyer testified on the same, because the informants
testimony would merely corroborate that of the poseurbuyer.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With regard to the fifth issue, appellants claim that their defenses consisting
of denials and alibis deserve more credence because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are full of inconsistencies.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The defenses of denials and alibi have been invariably viewed by us with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are
common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As heretofore discussed, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses do not warrant the reversal of appellants conviction in
light of the positive and candid account of Inspector Cortez that appellants
sold to him 312.2 grams of shabu in exchange for boodle money. The
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, as in the case of
Inspector Cortez, is sufficient to support a conviction.
It is a well-entrenched doctrine in criminal law that as between denials or
alibi and positive testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is accorded
greater evidentiary weight.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As regards the sixth issue, appellants asseverate that the RTC erred in
imposing the penalty of death and in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of organized/syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 15 of Article III in relation to Section 20 of Article IV of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides that
the penalties for selling 200 grams or more of shabu are reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Section 21 of Article IV thereof states that the
foregoing penalties shall also be applied in case of any attempt or
conspiracy to sell shabu.
Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of Republic
Act No. 7659, mandates that the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group. The same article defines an
organized/syndicated crime group as a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating, or mutually helping one another for the
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.
We agree with appellants contention, as affirmed by the OSG and the Court
of Appeals, that the RTC erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance
of organized/syndicated crime group and in imposing the maximum penalty
of death.
While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was
duly established, there was no proof that appellants were a group organized
for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence
of the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated group under Article
62 of the Revised Penal Code.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, this aggravating circumstance was not specifically alleged in the
information. Both law and jurisprudence require aggravating circumstances
to be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information;
otherwise, the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during
the trial.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
proper penalty imposable on each of the appellants is the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
The fine of P500,000.00 imposed by the RTC on each of the appellants is in
accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425.

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01255 dated 29 March 2006, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.