After the Revolution1

The documentary After the Revolution, presented at the One World Romania Documentary
Film Festival reveals the first six months after the 1989 Revolution in Bucharest. The period
is extremely tense as the National Salvation Front, which, despite the fact that at first it
declared that it will not become a political party and run in the elections, it quickly forgets its
statements and embarks on an extremely populist electoral campaign; it is also to blame for
the counteractions against the historical parties and the first miners riot in January 1990.
Furthermore, the documentary shows the large amount of irregularities in the elections of
May 20, 1990, signaled by international observers. It is interesting how, even with such a
huge popular support, the NSF felt the need to rig the elections.
The first six months after the Revolution were extremely important, as in that period the basis
for democratic consolidation was supposed to be built. Sadly, the one country in the 1989
wave of exiting non-democratic regimes that had a bloody revolution, managed to put at its
helm (former) communist cadres. Naturally, democracy was compromised since the very
beginning. But who is to blame for this? One simple answer would be the population. As
the documentary clearly shows, Iliescu, Roman and the NSF enjoyed an overwhelming
support from the population, while the historic parties were pushed aside. The National
Peasants Partys headquarters were boycotted by the pro-NSF demonstrators, the historical
parties leaders Ion Raiu and Radu Cmpeanu were regarded as fossils who fled to the
West and did not suffer together with the Romanians during the Ceausescu era, and after the
fall of the regime they returned to Romania, as opportunists in their desire to take over the
country. The University Square became the location of passionate, even aggressive debates
between the Fronts supporters and NLP and NPP supporters. Some of the people were aware
of the fact that a multi-party system was a trait of democratic systems, while others did not
care that instating a single party was a trait of the same dictatorship for which they had fought
against. Moreover, they did not seem to be aware of what meant to be a political prisoner.
Iliescus electoral campaign was filled with populist discourse that appealed to the masses; the
fact that the NSF was formed of former second-ranking communist officials, collaborators,
informants or Securitate officers did not carry much weight. The population was easily
manipulated, with the expertise of former communist propagandists. At the time of the
elections, serious irregularities took place; however, the elections were validated and Iliescu
1 Dup Revoluie, in the direction of Laureniu Calciu, Romania, 2010, 83
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was elected president with an overwhelmingly majority of the votes. Iliescus regime did not
conduct investigations concerning the Securitate and lustration was out of the picture. The
people has chosen.
However, assigning blame is easy. Searching for the true cause is not. It is my opinion that not
the people per se are responsible for Iliescus victory (plus the electoral fraud, which was not
necessary anyway), but a series of factors that led to the election of neo-communists just six
months after the former regime collapsed. While I am reluctant to describe this as a necessary
outcome of history, in order to avoid the historicist dimension of the revolutionary socialist
ideology itself, I will adhere to Ken Jowitts pessimist theory of path-dependency the
inheritance from the communist era (the Leninist legacy, how Jowitt calls it 2) is bound to
shape politically and economically the former communist states in Eastern Europe.
While his theory is criticized for generalizing, this paper discusses only the case of Romania
and not from a comparative perspective; the uniqueness of the Romanian communism regime
and the following transition do respect Jowitts theory. What is more, Jowitt is aware of and
takes into account national differences. Some may argue that it is not enough to take into
account the communist legacy and one has to go further back in time. It is my opinion that
this is not necessary, as the four decades of communism were more than enough to shape the
peoples behavior and thinking patterns; many of the Romanians knew nothing else but the
communist regime, while those who lived in the Interwar period were too old and too few to
matter. As for those who deny the importance of the communist legacy altogether, it should be
underlined that starting with a clean slate is impossible, as the NSF was a refurbished
Communist Party, fact which set limits on the establishing of democratic institutions,
principles and values. Innovation was not possible; it was only the case of reshaping and
remodeling the former institutions under a democratic faade a Perestroika, disguised as a
Revolution, to a certain extent. Moreover, the Glasnost was out of the question.
The communist legacy in the case of Romania was obvious in 1990 and sadly its implications
are visible even nowadays. However, I will resume to presenting the situation from 1990.
Firstly, after forty-two years3 of communist rule, people did not know how to think freely;
they were just under the impression that they did. In fact, their political ideas were the result
of propaganda, conducted after all the rigorous standards of the communist practice. In
2 See Ken JOWITT, New World Disorder The Leninist Extinction, University of California Press,
Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1992
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support of this argument is the fact that the spokesman of the NSF was a chief propagandist
under the Ceausescu regime. The manipulation techniques of former communists, used on a
population that was trained to be manipulated, plus the fact that the NSF quickly took hold of
the means of communication resulted into an efficient way of winning supporters; the populist
discourse, the discrediting of the opposition, slogans, people holding flowers and the picture
of Iliescu all of these resemble the former regime rather than a new, democratic path.
Secondly, the opposition mainly the historic parties was ill-regarded and associated with
the extreme-right formations of the Interwar period the Iron Guard and the Legionnaires.
The NPP and the NLP had supporters of their own, but they were overwhelmed by the proFront population. Being democratic means being both anti-fascist and anti-communist.
However, while people were obviously anti-fascist (anti-fascism is also part of the socialist
discourse) and some of them did not want the communists back, the majority of the supporters
of the Front did not associate Iliescu and his comrades with the former regime; it is amazing
how easily people forget the faces of the former cadres.
Thirdly, fear, distrust, naivety, misinformation, dissimulation are all part of the communist
legacy and as a result the prospects for a true civil society are slim, as people are used to not
trusting neither each other, nor the state institutions, rumors gain more power than facts and
confusion is omnipresent. The Front confiscated the Revolution through these means and
won almost all of the Romanian population on their side. What is more, the communist
experience taught people how to think primarily in terms of their self-interests and not make a
priority out of the greater good. This is valid for both the citizens and the politicians. For
example, some people were under the suspicion of being bribed to demonstrate (for 200 lei or
brandy and cigarettes), Dan Iosif switched sides and became a supporter of the Front after
risking his life during the Revolution and Iliescu refused to exclude the Communist Partys
members from participating in the elections.
To conclude, post communist societies do not know how to be democratic, how to
depersonalize public offices, how to avoid the one-party hegemonic system that resembles the
one-party totalitarian/authoritarian system and institutionalize political compromise. Just a
few voices are useless if they are covered by the shouts of the majority Iliescu te votm, te
3 It seems that the persons who appeared in the documentary considered ground zero for the
communist regime the year 1948, the year when the Securitate emerged, and not the year 1945, when
Petru Groza came to power
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votm cu neamul/ Ca s moar de necaz Raiu i Cmpeanu 4. On the one hand, the historical
parties stood no chance as they were outlawed by the communists and the people could only
associate the right-wing parties the Legionnaires, while on the other hand, the NSF comprised
experienced politicians who knew what to do in order to win the masses on their side. This
was bound to happen, as four million Communist Party members do not disappear overnight.
They were Ceauescus true legacy, along with their socialist education, indoctrination and
practices.

4 Iliescu, we will vote for you, we will all vote for you/ In order for Ra iu and Cmpeanu to die of
bitterness
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