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Table of Contents

1.Introduction
2.Evolution of Tribunal system in India
3.

Administrative Tribunals Act,

1985
4.Types of administrative tribunals
5.Role of central administrative tribunal
6.Features of Tribunals in India
7.Judicial interpretation
8.Advantages and disadvantages of
administrative tribunals
9.Tribunals and Natural Justice
10.

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION
Welfarenatureofgovernmentistheevolutionarygoalofprobablyeverykindof
governmentthesedaysinthiscontemporaryworld.Therehasbeenaphenomenal
increaseinthefunctionsofthegovernment,whichhaslentenormouspowersto
theexecutiveandalsoledtoincreaseinthelegislativeoutput.Thishasledtomore
litigation, restrictions on the freedom of the individuals and constant frictions
betweenthemandtheauthority.Thedevelopmentofwelfarismledtoanincrease
in governmental functions and the executive saw in this a need to perform a
number of quasi legislative and quasi judicial functions, thus blurring the

traditionalpositionsofthevariouswingsofthegovernmentunderthedoctrineof
separationofpowers,underwhichthepowersofthegovernmentweredivided
betweenthelegislature,executiveandthejudiciarywhichweretobeentrusted
withthepowerofmakinglaw,executingitandinterpretingthelawrespectively.
Butnowthesewelfarestateschangedradicallyandinvolveitselfinthehostingof
widesocioeconomicactivities;forexample:providinghealthservices,education,
industrialregulationandotheralliedwelfaremeasures.Nowwherethereisthese
kindofactivities;disputesarecertainandobvious.Theissueswhicharosefrom
disputesonsuchmattersraisednotonlylegalmattersbutalsomatterswhichaffect
thesociety at large. Theconstitutionandfunction of ourcourt system isvery
traditional as well as inefficient. The inherent procedural limitations made it
difficultforthecourtstodisposethesecasespromptlythus leadingtoahuge
backlogofcasesinalllevelsofthejudiciary.Courtsthereforebecamedeluged
withlitigationsarisingdirectlyandincidentallyfromsuchincreasedgovernmental
interventions.Itwasalsofeltinmanyquartersthatthemembersofthejudiciary
were neither adequately trained nor equipped to deal with the complex socio
economicandtechnicalmattersathand.
Thusitwasfeltspecialisedadjudicatorybodiessuchastribunalsneededtobe
createdtoresolvesuchdisputesfairlyandeffectively.
TribunalsareaJudgmentseat;acourtofjustice;boardorcommitteeappointedto
adjudicateonclaimsofaparticularkind.1
ATribunal,inthegeneralsenseoftheword,isanypersonorinstitutionwiththe
authoritytojudge,adjudicateordetermineclaims.Intheearliertimes,thewords
TribunalandCourtswereinterchangeable.Forthepurposeofadjudication,a
TribunalcoulddeterminematterslikeaCourt.Subsequently,usageoftheword
Tribunalwasgivenadifferentconnotation.TheCourtshadbeenconstitutedby
virtueofpromulgationofCivilLawandTheyweresubjectedtoprocedurallaws

Thakker, C.K., Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company : Lucknow, 1996, p.226.

andotherstatutes,withtheaidofwhich,theCourtscouldcometoconclusionsfor
renderingJusticebetweentheparties.
ThewordTribunalfounditsconnectivitytothewordTribunewhichfoundits
rootsinthewordTRIHBYoonnameofaperson,whowasanofficialin
ancientRome.Inthefirstinstance,theTribunalwasunderstoodasunder;
TribunalisaspecialCourtconvenedbythegovernmenttoenquireintospecific
matterandthatitisnotrequiredtofollowtheprinciplesofLawofEvidencebut
wasrequiredtofollowonlyprinciplesofNaturalJusticeinstead.
The Tribunals were formed as fact finding authority rendering suggestive
conclusionsbasedupon naturaljustice.With passageoftime,theGovernment
created Tribunals with jurisdiction and authority almost parallel to Courts,
whereveritsuitedthem.
Theessenceofthemeaningofthewordtribunalwhichcanbeculledoutfromthe
various Supreme Court authorities is that they are adjudicatory bodies (except
ordinarycourtsoflaw)constitutedbytheStateandinvestedwithjudicialand
quasijudicial functions as distinguished from administrative or executive
functions.
AdministrativetribunalshaveemergednotonlyinIndiabutalsoinmanyother
countries with the objective of providing a new type of justice public good
orientedjustice.Thesetribunalsmannedbytechnicalexperts,withflexibilityin
operations,informalityinprocedureshavegainedimportanceintheadjudication
process.
AccordingtoServai,thedevelopmentofadministrativelawinawelfarestatehas
made administrative tribunals a necessity'. Administrative tribunals are
authoritiesoutsidetheordinarycourtsystem,whichinterpretandapplythelaws
whenactsofpublicadministrationarequestionedinformalsuitsbythecourtsor
byotherestablishedmethods.Theyarenotacourtnoraretheyanexecutivebody.
3

Rathertheyareamixtureofboth.Theyarejudicialinthesensethatthetribunals
havetodecidefactsandapplythemimpartially,withoutconsideringexecutive
policy. Theyare administrative becausethe reasons for preferring them to the
ordinarycourtsoflawareadministrativereasons.TheSupremeCourtinJaswant
SugarMillsv.LakshmiChand2laiddownthefollowingcharacteristicsorteststo
determinewhetheranauthorityisatribunalornot:
1.Powerofadjudicationmustbederivedfromastatuteorstatutoryrule.
2.Itmustpossessthetrappingsofacourtandtherebybevestedwiththepowerto
summonwitnesses,administeroath,compelproductionofevidence,etc.
3.Tribunalsarenotboundbystrictrulesofevidence.
4.Theyaretoexercisetheirfunctionsobjectivelyandjudiciallyandtoapplythe
lawandresolvedisputesindependentlyofexecutivepolicy.
5.Tribunalsaresupposedtobeindependentandimmunefromanyadministrative
interferenceinthedischargeoftheirjudicialfunctions.

EVOLUTION OF TRIBUNAL SYSTEM IN INDIA


In India, administrative adjudication increased after independence and several
welfarelawswerepromulgatedwhichvestedthepowerondecidingvariousissues
in the hands of the administration. The modern Indian Republic was born a
WelfareStateandthustheburdenonthegovernmenttoprovideahostofwelfare
servicestothepeoplewasimmense.Thesequasijudicialpowersacquiredbythe
administrationledtoahugenumberofcaseswithrespecttothemannerinwhich
theseadministrativebodiesarrivedattheirdecisions.TheCourtsheldthatthese
bodiesmustmaintainproceduralsafeguardswhilearrivingattheirdecisionsand
observeprinciplesofnaturaljusticetheiropinionsweresubstantiatedbythe14th
LawCommissionReport.Inordertoavoidcloggingthejudicialmachinerywith
cases which would have arisen by the operation of these new socioeconomic
legislations, a number of tribunals were established by the government. The
2

AIR 1963 SC 677 at 687

tribunals were established with the object of providing a speedy, cheap and
decentralised determination of disputes arising out of the various welfare
legislations.Anotherimportantreasonforthenewdevelopmentisthatlawcourts,
onaccountoftheirelaborateprocedures,legalisticfrontsandattitudescanhardly
render justice to the parties concerned, in technical cases. Ordinary judges,
broughtupinthetraditionsoflawandjurisprudence,arenotcapableenoughto
understandtechnicalproblems,whichcropupinthewakeofmodemcomplex
economicandsocialprocesses.
InIndiasuchtribunalsweresetupimmediatelyafterindependence.Infact,the
mostimportantadjudicatoryfunctioniscarriedoutbystatutorytribunalscreated
bythelegislaturetoadjudicateuponcertaindisputesarisingfromadministrative
decisionsortodetermineissuesjudicially.
The Railway Rates Tribunal, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Labour
Tribunals, the Companies Tribunal, various Compensation Tribunals, Revenue
CourtsofvariousStates,etc.,canbecitedasexamplesofsuchtribunals. 3
RegardingtheproblemofbackloganddelayeddisposalofcasetheGovernment
setupthe AdministrativeReformsCommissionin1967.Itwastoexaminethe
problem,suggestssolutionsandalsotorecommendthesuitableareasinwhich
tribunalscouldbesetup,accordingtothiscommissionThereasonsforthegrowth
ofadministrativetribunalsareasfollows:
1) Inadequacy of the traditional judiciary to effectively decide administration
relatedmattersespeciallywhenitcametotechnicalities.
2)Thetraditionaljudiciarywasseentobeslow,costlyandexcessivelyprocedural.
TheCommissionalsorecommendedtheestablishmentofindependenttribunalsin
thefollowingareas:
a)Servicemattersanddisputeofemployeesunderthestate

Supra n.1 at p.66

b)OrdersofassessmentonadjudicationunderCustoms,CentralExcise,SalesTax
andordersundertheMotorvehiclesAct.
PeriodofemergencyplayedacrucialroleintheevolutionoftribunalsinIndia.
Therewereclearsignalsthattheexecutivedidnotwantthejudiciarytointerfere
with their developmental plans and other such decisions. Such as removing
disputesregardingelectionstotheofficeofPresident,PrimeMinisterandSpeaker
oftheLokSabhabeyondjudicialscrutiny.Hencein1976theissuewasdiscussed
attheConferenceofChiefSecretariesandfromamongstallthesediscussionsand
the reports of the various bodies stated above, Parliament enacted the

42ndConstitution (Amendment) Act, 1976 inserting Articles 323A4 and 323B


5

whichprovidedfortheestablishmentofadministrativeandothertribunalstodeal

withthemattersspecificallyprovidedfor.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Constitutional
Amendment bill by which Article 323A was sought to be inserted in the
Constitutionstatesthefollowingwords:
4

323A. Administrative tribunals Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial

by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and


conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India
or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the
Government.
(2) A law made under clause (1) may
(a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for the Union and a separate
administrative tribunal for each Stat or for two or more States;
(b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority
which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals;
(c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be
followed by the said tribunals;
(d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in clause (1);
(e) provide for the transfer to each other administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any court
or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the
jurisdiction of such tribunal if the cause of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had
arisen after such establishment;
(f) repeal or amend any order made by the President under clause (3) of article 371D;
(g) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees)
as Parliament may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases
by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals;
(3) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of
this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.
5

323B. Tribunals for other matters (1) The appropriate Legislature may, by law, provide for the

adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or
any of the matters specified in clause (2) with respect to which such Legislature has power to
make laws.
(2) The matters referred to in clause (1) are the following, namely(a) levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax;

"ToreducethemountingarrearsinHighCourtsandtosecurethespeedydisposal
of service matters .... it is considered expedient to provide for administrative
tribunalsfordealingwithsuchmatterswhilepreservingthejurisdictionofthe
SupremeCourtinregardtosuchmattersmderAiticleI36oftheConstitution."
Themaindistinctionthatcanbemadeoutbetweenarticle323Aand323Bisthat
while 323A allows for the Parliament to by law provide for administrative
(b) foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers;
(c) industrial and labour disputes;
(d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in article 31A or of
any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or by way of ceiling
on agricultural land or in any other way;
(e) ceiling on urban property;
(f) elections to either House of Parliament or the House or either House of the Legislature of a
State, but excluding the matters referred to in article 329 and article 329A;
(g) production, procurement, supply and distribution of foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oils)
and such other goods as the President may, by public notification, declare to be essential goods for the
purpose of this article and control of prices of such goods;
(h) rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues including the rights, title and interest of landlords
and tenants;
(i) offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in sub clauses (a) to (h) and fees in
respect of any of those matters;
(j) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in sub clauses (a) to (i);
(3) A law made under clause (1) may
(a) provide for the establishment of a hierarchy of tribunals;
(b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority
which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals;
(c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be
followed by the said tribunals;
(d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
article 136 with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said
tribunals;
(e) provide for the transfer to each such tribunal of any cases pending before any court or any other
authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the
jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had
arisen after such establishment;
(f) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees)
as the appropriate Legislature may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy

tribunalstoadjudicatedisputes,323Ballowsfortheanyappropriatelegislature,
tobylawcreateanadministrativetribunalfortheadjudicationofdisputes.

Distinction between Court and Tribunal


Anadministrativetribunalissimilartoacourtincertainaspects.Bothofthemare
constituted by the state, are invested with the judicial powers and have a
permanent existence. Thus, they are adjudicating bodies. They deal with and
finallydecidedisputesbetweenpartiesthataffectrightsofsubjects.Asobserved
bytheSupremeCourtinAssociatedCementCompaniesLimitedv.P.N.Sharma,
thebasicandthefundamentalfeaturewhichiscommontoboththecourtsand
thetribunalsisthattheydischargejudicialfunctionsandexercisejudicialpowers
whichinherentlyvestinasovereignstate.
Butatthesametime,itmustnotbeforgottenthatanadministrativetribunalisnot
court. The line of distinction between court and the tribunal in some cases is
indeed fine though real. All courts are tribunals but the converse need not
necessarilybetrue.6
Tribunalpossessessomeofthetrappingsofacourt,butnotall,andtherefore,both
mustbedistinguished:
Acourtoflawisthepartofthe traditionaljudicialsystem.Wherejudicial
powersarederivedfromthestateandthebodydealswithKingsjusticeitis
calledacourt.Ontheotherhand,anadministrativetribunalisanagencycreated
bythestatuteandinvestedwithjudicialpowers.Primarilyandessentially,itisthe
partandparceloftheexecutivebranchofthestate,exercisingexecutiveaswellas

disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals.
(4) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of
this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.
6

TAKWANI, supra note 6, at 241.

judicialfunctions.AsLordGreenesaid,administrativetribunalsperformhybrid
functions.
Whereordinarycivilcourtshavejudicialpowertryallsuitsofacivilnature,
excepting those whose cognizance is either expressly on impliedly barred,
tribunalshavepowertrycasesinspecialmattersstatutorilyconferred.
Themerelackofgeneraljurisdictiontotryallcasesofcivilnaturedoesnot
necessarilyleadtoaninferencethattheforumisatribunalandnotacourt.Acourt
canalsobeconstitutedwithlimitedjurisdiction.
Judgesofordinarycourtsoflawareindependentoftheexecutiveinrespectof
thetenure,termsandconditionsofservice,etc.Ontheotherhand,membersof
administrativetribunalsentirelyinthehandsofthegovernmentinrespectofthose
matters.
Acourtoflawisgenerallypresidedoverbyanofficertrainedinlaw,butthe
presidentoramemberofatribunalmaynotbetrainedaswellinlaw.
Inacourtoflaw,ajudgemustbeanimpartialarbiterandhecannotdecidea
matterinwhichheisinterested.Ontheotherhand,anadministrativetribunalmay
bepartytothedisputetobedecidedbyit.
Court of law is bound by all the rules of evidence and procedure but an
administrative tribunal is not bound by those rules unless the relevant statute
imposessuchanobligation.
Acourtmustdecideallthequestionsobjectivelyonthebasisoftheevidence
andmaterialsproducedbeforeit,butanadministrativeTribunalmaydecidethe
questionstakingintoaccountthedepartmentalpolicyonexpediencyandinthat
sensethedecisionmaybesubjectiveratherthanobjective.Therealdistinctionis
thatthecourtshaveanairofdetachment.
Whileprecedents,principlesofthisresjudicataandestoppel,bindacourtof
lawanadministrativetribunalisnotstrictlyboundbythem.
Acourtoflawcandecidetheviresoflegislation,whileanadministrative
tribunalcannotdoso.

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985


10

InpursuanceofArt323AParliamenthaspassedtheAdministrativeTribunals
Act,1985coveringallmattersfallingwithintheclause(1)ofArticle323A.This
Actauthorisescentralgovernmenttoestablishadministrativetribunalsforcentral
servicesandontheapplicationofStatesevenforStatesservicesaswellasfor
localbodiesandotherauthoritiesincludingpubliccorporation.Fromthedateof
establishmentoftribunalsallcourtsexcepttheSupremeCourtunderArt136lose
theirjurisdictionwithrespecttothematterfallingwithinthejurisdictionofthe
tribunals.
AtribunalshallconsistofChairmanandsuchnumberofViceChairmenandother
membersasappropriateGovernmentmaydeemfit.Theyareappointedbythe
PresidentinthecaseofCentraltribunalsandbythePresidentinconsultationwith
theGovernorsorGovernorsincaseofStateorjointTribunals.Thequalifications
regardingthatarelaiddownintheAct.
TheenactmentoftheAdministrativeTribunalsAct1985openedanewchapterin
the sphere of administering justice to the aggrieved Government servants in
servicematters.
Itwasexpectedthatajudiciousmixofjudicialmembersandthosewithgrassroot
experience would best serve this purpose. The Administrative Tribunals are
distinguishable from the ordinary courts with regard to their jurisdiction and
procedure.Theexercisejurisdictiononlyinrelationtotheservicemattersofthe
litigantscoveredbytheAct.Theyarealsofreefromtheshacklesofmanyofthe
technicalitiesoftheordinarycourts.
Theprocedural simplicity oftheActcanbeappreciatedfromthefactthatthe
aggrievedpersoncanalsoappearbeforeitpersonally.TheGovernmentcanalso
present its case through its Departmental officers or legal practitioners. Thus
becametheAdministrativeTribunalsaneffectiveandrealsubstitutefortheHigh
Courts.
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Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT)


TheenactmentofAdministrativeTribunalsActin1985openedanewchapterin
administeringjusticetotheaggrievedgovernmentservants.Itowesitsoriginto
Article323AoftheConstitutionwhichempowerstheCentralGovernmenttoset
up by an Act of Parliament, the Administrative Tribunals for adjudication of
disputesandcomplainswith respectiverecruitmentandconditionsofserviceof
personsappointedtothepublicservicesandpostsinconnectionwiththeUnion
andtheStates.
TheTribunalsenjoythepowersoftheHighCourtinrespectofservicemattersof
theemployeescoveredbytheAct.Theyarenotboundbythetechnicalitiesofthe
CodeofCivilProcedure,buthavetoabidebythePrinciplesofNaturalJustice.
Theyaredistinguishedfromtheordinarycourtswithregardtotheirjurisdiction
andprocedures.Thismakesthemfreefromtheshacklesoftheordinarycourtsand
enablesthemtoprovidespeedyandinexpensivejustice.
TheprovisionsoftheAdministrativeTribunalsAct,1985donot,however,apply
to members of paramilitary forces, armed forces of the Union, officers or
employeesoftheSupremeCourt,ortopersonsappointedtotheSecretariatStaff
of either House of Parliament or the Secretariat staff of'State union Territory
Legislatures.
TheActprovidesfortheestablishmentofCentralAdministrativeTribunaland
StateAdministrativeTribunals.TheCATwasestablishedin1985.TheTribunal
consistsofaChairman,ViceChairmanandMembers.TheseMembersaredrawn
fromthejudicialaswellastheadministrativestreams.Theappealagainstthe
decisionsoftheCATlieswiththeSupremeCourtofIndia.

Establishment of Central Administrative


Tribunal

12

The Central Administrative Tribunal has been established for adjudication of


disputeswithrespecttorecruitmentandconditionsofserviceofpersonsappointed
topublicservicesandpostsinconnectionwiththeaffairsoftheUnionorother
localauthoritieswithintheterritoryofIndiaorunderthecontrolofGovernmentof
Indiaandformattersconnectedtherewithorincidentalthereto.
ThisActauthorizescentralgovernmenttoestablishadministrativetribunalsfor
centralservicesandontheapplicationofStatesevenforStatesservicesaswellas
forlocalbodiesandotherauthoritiesincludingpubliccorporation.Fromthedate
ofestablishmentoftribunalsallcourtsexcepttheSupremeCourtunderArt136
losetheirjurisdictionwithrespecttothematterfallingwithinthejurisdictionof
thetribunals.
TheTribunalfollowstheprinciplesofnaturaljusticeindecidingcasesandthe
procedure,prescribedbyEvidenceActorCPCdoesnotapply.TheTribunalis
alsoaspecializedorganization,whichdealswithonlyservicemattersinrespectof
theCentralGovernmentemployeesandotheremployeeswhohavebeennotified.
TheoriginalApplicationsinthePrincipalBencharegenerallydisposedofinfour
to six months, thus justifying the aim of the Legislature in setting up the
Administrative Tribunals to provide a speedy, relatively inexpensive and
efficaciousremedytotheemployeeswhofeelaggrieved.
TheCentralAdministrativeTribunalisempoweredtoprescribeitsownrulesof
practicefordischargingitsfunctionssubjecttotheAdministrativeTribunalsAct,
1985andRulesmadethereunder.Forthispurpose,theCentralAdministrative
TribunalRulesofPractice,1993havebeennotified.Similarly,forthepurpose
oflayingdownacommonprocedureforallBenchesoftheTribunal,theCentral
AdministrativeTribunal(Procedure)Rules,1987 havebeen notified. Under
Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the Tribunal has been

13

conferredthepowertoexercisethesamejurisdictionandauthorityinrespectof
contemptofitselfasaHighCourt.
TheemployeesoftheCentralAdministrativeTribunalarerequiredtodischarge
their duties under the general superintendence of the Chairman. Salaries and
allowancesandconditionsofserviceoftheofficersandotheremployeesofthe
TribunalarespecifiedbytheCentralGovernment.
The qualifications for appointment as Judicial Member are laid down in sub
section (3) of Section 6 of the Act. It lays down that a person shall not be
qualifiedforappointmentasaJudicialMemberunlessheis,orhasbeen,oris
qualifiedtobe,ajudgeofaHighCourt;orhasbeenamemberoftheIndianlegal
serviceandhasheldapostofGradeIofthatserviceforatleastthreeyears.
FortheappointmentofanAdministrativeMember,itisnecessarythathehasfor
atleastfortwoyearsheldthepostofanAdditionalSecretarytotheGovernment
ofIndia,oranyotherpostundertheCentralorStateGovernment,carryingascale
ofpaywhichisnotlessthanthatofanAdditionalSecretarytotheGovernmentof
India;orhas,foratleastthreeyears,heldthepostofaJointSecretarytothe
GovernmentofIndia,oranyotherpostundertheCentralorStateGovernment,
carrying a pay scale which is not less than that of a Joint Secretary to the
Government of India. In addition, he must have adequate administrative
experience.
TheappointmentofChairman,ViceChairmanandeveryothermemberofCATis
tobemadebythePresidentofIndiainconsultationwiththeChiefJusticeofIndia
andtheGovernoroftheconcernedState.
BesidestheestablishmentofCentralandStateadministrativetribunals,theAct
makesprovisionfortheestablishmentofjointadministrativetribunalfortwoor
moreStatesontherequestofsuchStates."Subsection(5)ofSection4inserted
bytheAdministrativeTribunals(Amendment)Act,1986providesthattheCentral
GovernmentmaydesignatealloranyofthemembersofBenchorBenchesofthe

14

StateadministrativetribunalasmemberoftheBenchorBenchesofCATandvice
versa.
Section 15 confers similar jurisdiction on State administrative tribunal. The
languageofSection14(1)iswideenoughtocoverallservicemattersconcerning
thepersonscoveredundertheActwheretheallegationistheviolationofArticle
311oranyserviceruleframedunderArticle309oftheConstitution,including
Articles14and16.Therefore,evenincasesofinfringementoffundamentalrights
ofthecivilservants,theforumwillbethetribunal.Thus,thetribunalhasauthority
todecidetheconstitutionalityofanystatute,rule,regulationornotification. 7For
this purpose, the tribunal can exercise all jurisdiction, power and authority
exercisable by all courts, including the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under
Article226oftheConstitution.
Ordinarily, the tribunalshall not admit an application unless the applicant has
exhaustedtheremedyavailableundertheservicerulesasgivenunder Sec.20.
Sec.21providesforaperiodoflimitationofoneyearisalsoprovidedformaking
anapplicationfromthedateonwhichthefinalorderwasmadebythegovernment
againstthecivilservant.UnderSec.17thetribunalhaspowertopunishforits
owncontempt.AsperSec.23,anapplicantcanevensendanapplicationthrough
postandcanpleadthecasewithorwithoutanadvocate.8
TheActprovidesforaninformalandnontechnicaltrialprocedure.Thetribunal
isnotboundbythetechnicalrulesofCivilProcedureCode,1908(CPC),butis
onlyrequiredtoactinconformitywiththerulesofnaturaljustice.However,the
tribunalshallhavethepowersofacivilcourtundertheCPCinrespectofmatters
specifiedintheAct,asgivenunderSec.22.

Thedecisionofthetribunalshallbebymajority,butifthemembersareequally
dividedthemattermaybereferredtotheChairman.Becausethetribunalexercises
7

J.B. Chopra V. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC422 : AIR 1987 SC 357.

MASSEY, supra note 28, at 604.

15

thejurisdictionoftheHighCourt,itcanissuewrits,butgenerallytribunalsdonot
issuewrits.Orderpassedbythetribunalshallbefinalandshallnotbecalledin
questioninanycourtincludingHighCourt,excepttheSupremeCourtbywayof
special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution, because an
administrativetribunalsetupundertheActisasubstituteofandsupplementalto
theHighCourtinservicematters.
Asanecessaryconsequencetothis,thetribunalsarenotunderthewritjurisdiction
oftheHighCourtandarenotboundbytheirdecisions;nomattertheymayhavea
persuasivevalue.ThetribunalhasinheritedthejurisdictionoftheHighCourtin
service matter, therefore, in exercise of its power of judicial review, it cannot
interferewiththepenaltyimposedbythedisciplinaryauthorityonthegroundthat
itisdisproportionatetotheprovedmisconduct,ifthefindingsastomisconductare
supportedbylegalevidence.9
TheActdoesnotprovideforanyappealorreviewoftheorderofthetribunal
exceptthatapersonaggrievedmayfileaspecialleavepetitionbeforetheSupreme
Court.However,afterthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinL.ChandraKumar
v.UnionofIndia10,servicetribunalshavebeenbroughtunderthejurisdictionof
HighCourtsandtheirdecisionnowshallbeappealablebeforetheHighCourts
also.
Under Section 15, an administrative tribunal has power to interfere with the
findingsofaninferiortribunal;however,suchpowerislimitedtocaseswhere
inferiortribunalhasallowedinadmissibleevidence,orhaspreventedevidence,or
hasbaseditsconclusiononanerroneousviewoflaw,ortheconclusionreachedis
suchwhichnoreasonablemancandrawontheexistingmaterialonrecord. 11

Union of India v. Parma Nanda, (1989) 2 SCC177 : AIR 1989 SC 1185.

10

Supra note 26.

11

KendriyaVidyalayaSangthan v. Subhash Sharma, (2001) 10 SCC 517.

16

Customs and Excise Revenue Appellate Tribunal


(CERAT)
TheParliamentpassedtheCERATActin1986.TheTribunaladjudicatedisputes,
Complaintsoroffenceswithregardtocustomsandexciserevenue.Appealsfrom
the,ordersoftheCERATlieswiththeSupremeCourt.

Election Commission (EC)


TheElectionCommissionisatribunalforadjudicationofmatterspertainingtothe
allotmentofelectionsymbolstopartiesandsimilarotherproblems.Thedecision
ofthecommissioncanbechallengedintheSupremeCourt.

Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board


(FERAB)
TheBoardhasbeensetupundertheForeignExchangeRegulationAct,1973.A
person who is aggrieved by an order of adjudication for causing breach or
committingoffencesundertheActcanfileanappealbeforetheFERAB.

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal


ThistribunalhasbeenconstitutedundertheIncomeTaxAct,1961.TheTribunal
hasitsbenchesinvariouscitiesandappealscanbefiledbeforeitbyanaggrieved
personsagainsttheorderpassedbytheDeputyCommissionerorCommissioneror
ChiefCommissionerorDirectorofIncomeTax.Anappealagainsttheorder
oftheTribunalliestotheHighCourt.AnappealalsoliestotheSupremeCourtif
theHighCourtdeemsfit.

Railway Rates Tribunal


ThisTribunal was set up under the Indian Railways Act, 1989. It adjudicates
matterspertainingtothecomplaintsagainsttherailwayadministration.Thesemay
be related to the discriminatory or unreasonable rates, unfair charges or
17

preferentialtreatmentmetedoutbytherailway'administration.Theappealagainst
theorderoftheTribunallieswiththeSupremeCourt.

Industrial Tribunal
ThisTribunalhasbeensetupundertheIndustrialDisputesAct,1947.Itcanbe
constitutedby'boththeCentralaswellasStategovernments.TheTribunallooks
into the dispute between the employersand the workers in mattersrelating to
wages, the period and mode of payment, compensation and other allowances,
hours of work, gratuity, retrenchment and closure of the establishment. The
appealsagainstthedecisionoftheTribunalliewiththeSupremeCourt.

Procedure Involved
(i)ATribunalisnotbarredbytheprovisionsoftheEvidenceAct. 12 Inorderto
discoverthetruth,theTribunalmayresorttotheinquisitionalprocedure,provided
noprincipleofnaturaljusticeisviolated.
(ii)Tribunalsshallbeguidedsolelybytheprinciplesofnaturaljusticeunfettered
byanythingintheCPCandshallhavethepowertoregulateitsownprocedure.
(iii)ApleaofviolationofstatutoryprovisioncanbetakenbeforetheTribunal
thoughnottakeninthepetition.
(iv)Itiscompetenttoexecuteitsownorder,thoughtheA.TActhasnospecific
provisioninthisbehalf.

3. Disciplinary matters

12

G Mohanti v. UOI ATR (1987) 1 CAT 229

18

TheTribunaliscompetenttogointothefactsandsetasidetheorderpassedbya
disciplinaryauthority
Wheretheconclusionarrivedatisarbitraryorperverse.
Ontheotherhand,theTribunalwillnotinterfere
i.withthefindingoffactsoftheenquiryofficerswheretherewassomeevidence
beforehimonthebasisofwhichhecouldreasonablycometotheconclusionthat
thechargesagainstthepetitionerwereproved.
ii.withanorderofrejection,bytheTribunal,ofanapplicationforreinstatement
onthegroundsofinordinateandunexplaineddelay.
iii.Therehasbeensomedifferenceofopinionamongstthetribunalsastohowfar,
if at all, they may interfere with the punishment awarded by a disciplinary
authority.
Likewise,AdministrativeTribunalscanperformotherfunctionsofPunishment,
Compulsoryretirement,Interlocutorymattersetc.

Judicial interpretation
Asmentionedearlier,theAdministrativeTribunalsActwaspassedin1985under
article323Aandsection28ofthisActprovidedfortheexclusionofjurisdictionof
allcourtsexceptthatoftheSupremeCourtunderArticle136 13.Thisfuelleda
sudden spurt in the number of cases that challenged the validity of the said
legislationaswellasthatofthe42ndAmendmentthatintroducedArticles323A
and 323B in to the constitution. Some of the prominent case in this regard is
discussedbelow.
S.P.SampathKumarv.UnionofIndia14
13

Joshi, K. C., Legal Status of Tribunals, IBR, Vol. 25 (2), 1998

14

AIR 1987 SC 386

19

Thisisthefirstandperhapsthemostimportantcaseinthisperiodthatattracted
judicialscrutinyinthisarea.TheConstitutionBenchinSampathkumarwascalled
upon to decide on the main issue whether Section 28 of the Act was
unconstitutionalasitexcludesjudicialreview,whichwascontendedaspartofthe
basicstructureoftheconstitution. 15TheeSupremeCourtacceptedwithoutdoubt
thatjudicial;reviewispartofthebasicstructure.HowevertheCourtwentonto
observe that the creation of alternate institutional mechanisms which were as
effectiveastheHighCourtswouldnotbeviolativeofthebasicstructure.The
administrativeTribunalsundertheActwererecognizedaseffectivesubstitutesof
the High Courts. This proved to be a shot in the arm of the proponents of
tribunalisation.
Sambamurthyv.StateofAndhraPradesh16
It was held in this case that Article 371D (5) of the constitution, which was
insertedbytheConstitution(32ndAmendment)Act,1973,wasunconstitutional
and void. This provision had enabled the Government of Andhra Pradesh to
modifyornullifyanyorderoftheAdministrativetribunalofthatstate.Itwas
pointedoutthatsuchaprovisionwasviolativeofthebasicstructureasitmadethe
tribunalnotaseffectiveastheHighCourtwhenitcomestojudicialreview.Here
theCourtseemstobestrictlyadheringtothedirectiveinSampathKumarscase
thattheadministrativetribunalsshouldbeeffectivesubstitutestotheHighCourt.
J.N.Choprav.UnionofIndia17

15

During the pendency of the case, the Government gave an assurance to the Court that the Act would

be amended so that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 was not excluded. The Act
was consequently amended after the decision.
16

(1987) I SCC 386

17

(1987) I SCC 422.

20

ItwasheldthatsincetheAdministrativetribunalsaremeanttobesubstitutesof
HighCourts,theirpowerofjudicialreviewextendedtopowerastodecideonthe
constitutionalityofservicerules.
However, soon we see a reversal of trend leading to a lot of confusion. In
M.B.Majumdarv.UnionofIndia18 theSupremeCourtrefusedtoextendthe
serviceconditionsandotherbenefitsenjoyedbyordinaryHighCourtjudgestothe
membersoftheseTribunals.Threeyearslater,inR.K.Jainv.UnionofIndia19,
theSupremeCourtopinedthattheseTribunalscouldnotbeeffectivesubstitutesof
HighCourtsunderArticles226and227.
Wealsofindveryclearexpressionofdissatisfactionoftheapexcourtregarding
the functioning and effectiveness of Administrative Tribunals especially with
regardtotheirpowerofjudicialreview.
Sakinala Harinath v. State of Andhra Pradesh20

Inthiscase,theAndhraPradeshHighCourtdroppedabombshellbyexpressing
seriousdoubtsaboutthewisdomofthelearnedJudgesinSampathKumarscase.
TheFullBenchruledthattherulingintheabovecaseequatingAdministrative
TribunalstotheHighcourtswithrespecttotheirjurisdictionunderArticles226
and227wasinconsistentwiththeapex court"srulingincaseslike Kesavanda
Bharativ.StateofKerala21andIndiraGandhiv.RajNarain22.Itwaspointedout
thattheconstitutionalcourtscouldonlyexercisethepowerofjudicialreview.
Since the logic of alternative institutional mechanism propounded in Sampath
Kumarscasedoesnotfitintothisscheme,itisconstitutionallyimpermissible.As
aresultbothArticles323A(d)andsection28oftheActwerestruckdownas
unconstitutional.
18

(1990) 4 SCC 501

19

(1993) 4 SCC 119

20

1993 (2) An. W.R.484 (FB)

21

(1973) 4 SCC 225

22

AIR 1975 SC 2291

21

Theconfusioncreatedbytheseconflictingdecisionsusheredintheneedfortaking
asecondlookat S.P.SampathKumars case.Thisopportunityarrivedwhena
threejudgebenchoftheSupremeCourtinL.Chandrakumarv.UnionofIndia 23
decidedtoreferthemattertoalargerbench.Thiseventuallyledtothefamous
rulingoftheSevenJudgeBenchoftheSupremeCourtwhichisnowthelawofthe
land.

L.ChandrakumarsCase

Theimportantissuesconsideredbytheapexcourtwereasfollows:
1. WhetherArt.323A(2)(d)andArt.323B(3)(d)oftheconstitutionwhich

give the power to the Union and State Legislatures to exclude the
jurisdictionofallcourtsexceptthatoftheSupremeCourtunderArt.136,is
inaccordancewiththepowerofjudicialreviewembodiedinArt.32and
226.
2. Whether the power of High Courts to exercise the powers of
superintendenceoverthesubordinatejudiciaryunderArticles226and227
formpartofBasicStructure.
3. The competence of the aforesaid tribunals to determine the
constitutionalityofanylaw.
4. WhethertheaforesaidtribunalsareactingasaffectivesubstitutestoHigh
Courtsintermsofefficiency.
Itwasheldthatthepowerofjudicialreviewoverlegislativeandadministrative
actionis expresslyvestedwiththeHigh CourtsandtheSupremeCourtunder
Articles226and32respectively.Thecontentionthattheconstitutionalsafeguards
whichensuretheindependenceofthehigherjudiciary 24 isnotavailabletothe
lower judiciary and bodies such as Tribunals was upheld and the Apex Court
23

AIR 1995 SC 1151

24

In terms of qualifications, mode of appointment, tenure, mode of removal, etc.

22

consequentlyheldthatthelowerjudiciarywouldnotbeabletoserveaseffective
substitutestothehigherjudiciaryinmattersofconstitutionalinterpretationand
judicial review. Hence the power of judicial review is vested in the higher
judiciary and the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the
constitutionalvalidityoflegislativeandadministrativeactioncannotordinarilybe
ousted.Howeveritwasheldthatthesetribunalsandthelowerjudiciarycould
exercisetheroleofjudicialreviewassupplementtothesuperiorjudiciary.The
courtappliedtheprovisionsofArticle32(3)toupholdthesame.

ADVANTAGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


Administrativeadjudicationisadynamicsystemofadministration,whichserves,
more adequately than anyother method, the varied and complex needs of the
modemsociety.Themainadvantagesoftheadministrativetribunalsare:

1)Flexibility

2)AdequateJustice

3)LessExpensive

4)RelieftoCourts

DISADVANTAGES OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS


Even though administrative adjudication is essential and useful in modem day
administration,weshouldnotbeblindtothedefectsfromwhichitsuffersorthe
dangers it poses to a democratic polity. Some of the main drawbacks are
mentionedbelow.

(i)AdministrativeadjudicationisanegationofRuleofLaw.RuleofLawensures
equalitybeforelawforeverybodyandthesupremacyofordinarylawanddue
23

procedureoflaw overgovernmental arbitrariness.Butadministrative tribunals,


withtheirseparatelawsandproceduresoftenmadebythemselves,putsaserious
limitationuponthecelebratedprinciplesofRuleofLaw.

(ii)Administrativetribunalshaveinmostcases,nosetproceduresandsometimes
theyviolateeventheprinciplesofnaturaljustice.

(iii)Administrativetribunalsoftenholdsummarytrialsandtheydonotfollowany
precedents.Assuchitisnotpossibletopredictthecourseoffuturedecisions.

(iv)Thecivilandcriminalcourtshaveauniformpatternofadministeringjustice
andcenturiesofexperienceintheadministrationofcivilandcriminallawshave
borne testimony to the advantages of uniform procedure. A uniform code of
procedureinadministrativeadjudicationisnotthere.

(v) Administrative tribunals are manned by administrators and technical heads


whomaynothavethebackgroundoflawortrainingofjudicialwork.Someof
themmaynotpossesstheindependentoutlookofajudge.

STATUS AND WORKING OF TRIBUNALS IN INDIA


TribunalsareessentiallythosebodiesoftheExecutivebranchofthegovernment
who by virtue of some statutory provision have the power and duty to act
judiciallyindeterminingdisputeswhichcomebeforeit.Tribunalsasstatedearlier
aredistinctfromtheordinarycourtsofthelandandasperChandrakumarscase
theyarenotonparwiththeHighCourtsbutserveasupplementalfunctiontothe
HighCourts.Theyarethereforesubjecttothewritjurisdictionofthesuperior
judiciaryandtothepowerofjudicialreviewexercisablebythesuperiorjudiciary.
InmostofthetribunalsappealsfromtheirdecisionslieintheHighCourton
substantialquestionsoflaw.

24

There are different types of tribunals in India, ranging from single member
tribunalstomultimembertribunals.
Whileacceptingthefactthatsuchtribunalsmustworktowardsfurtheringsocial
justice, it has been held in J&K Iron and Steel Co. v. Mazdoor Union 25that
tribunalcannotactbeyondthescopeofthelaw.Itcandecidethedisputeonthe
basis of the pleadings and has no power to reach a conclusion without any
evidenceonrecord.Thetribunalisexpectedtoholdtheproceedingsinpublic,
followfairprocedureanddecidedisputesimpartiallyandindependently.

TRIBUNALS AND NATURAL JUSTICE


Administrativetribunalsmustactopenly,fairlyandimpartially.Theymustafford
areasonableopportunitytothepartiestorepresenttheircaseandadduceevidence.
Thus,inStateofU.P.v.Md.Nooh26wheretheprosecutorwasalsoanadjudcating
officerandalsoinDhakeshwariMills27wherethetribunaldidnotdisclosesome
evidencetotheassesseewhichwasreliedupon,thedecisionsweresetaside.
In UnionofIndiav.T.R.Verma 28 theSupremeCourtheldthefollowingtobe
partofnaturaljustice:
a)Partymustbeabletoadduceallevidencebeingreliedupon.
b)Evidencemustbetakeninthepresenceofbothparties.
c)Mustbegivenopportunitytocrossexamine.
d)Andnomaterialmustberelieduponwithoutgivingthepartyopportunityto
explaintheevidence.
Tribunals are free to evolve their own method of procedure as long as they
conformtotheprinciplesofnaturaljusticeasoutlinedabove.
25

AIR 1956 SC 231

26

AIR 1958 SC 86

27

AIR 1955 SC154

28

AIR 1957 SC 882 at 885

25

Tribunalsarealsoexpectedtogivereasoneddecisionssoastointroduceclarity,
reducearbitrarinessandreducethescopeoffrivolousappeals.Italsoprovidesthe
supervisoryauthoritytheopportunitytokeeptribunalswithinbounds.

Madrasbarassociationv.UOI(2014)
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another
Details :
In the petitions before the Supreme Court, the constitutional validity of the
National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 (the Act for short) was challenged. In T.C. No. 150
of 2006, additionally there was challenge to S. 46 of the Constitution (Fortysecond Amendment) Act, 1976 and Article 323B of the Constitution of India. It was
contended that S. 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, is ultra
vires the basic structure of the Constitution as it enables proliferation of Tribunal
system and makes serious inroads into the independence of the judiciary by
providing a parallel system of administration of justice, in which the executive has
retained extensive control over matters such as appointment, jurisdiction,
procedure, etc. It is contended that Article 323B violates the basic structure of the
Constitution as it completely takes away the jurisdiction of the High Courts and
vests it in the National Tax Tribunal, including trial of offences and adjudication of
pure questions of law, which have always been in the exclusive domain of the
judiciary.
On January 21, 2009, when arguments in C.A. No. 3067 of 2004 and C.A. No. 3717
of 2005, which related to the challenge to Parts IB and IC of the Companies Act,
1956 were in progress before the Constitution Bench, it was submitted that these
matters involved a similar issue and they could be tagged and disposed of in
terms of the decision in those appeals. Therefore the Constitution Bench directed
these cases to be listed with those appeals, even though there was no order of
reference in these matters.
C.A. No. 3067 of 2004 and C.A. No. 3717 of 2005 were subsequently heard at
length and were reserved for judgment. The matters which were tagged were also
reserved for judgment.
While disposing of C.A. No. 3067 of 2004 and C.A. No. 3717 of 2005, the Supreme
Court observed that insofar as the cases relating to the National Tax Tribunal were
concerned, the T.C. (Civil) No. 150 of 2006 involved the challenge to Article 323B
of the Constitution. The said Article enables appropriate Legislatures to provide by
law, for adjudication of trial by Tribunals of any disputes, complaints or offences
with respect to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) thereof. Sub-clause
(i) of the clause (2) of Article 323B enables such Tribunals to try offences against
laws with respect to any of the matters specified in clauses (a) to (h) of clause (2)
of the said Article.
One of the contentions urged in support of the challenge to Article 323B related to
the fact that the Tribunals do not follow the normal rules of evidence contained in
the Evidence Act. In criminal trials, an accused is presumed to be innocent till
proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and the Evidence Act plays an important
role, as appreciation of evidence and consequential finds of facts are crucial. The
trial would require experience and expertise in criminal law, which means that the
judge or the adjudicator to be legally trained. The Tribunals which follow their own
summary procedure, are not bound by the strict rules of evidence and the
members will not be legally trained. Therefore it may lead to convictions of
persons on evidence which is not sufficient in probative value or on the basis of

26

inadmissible evidence. It was submitted that it would thus be a retrograde step for
separation of executive from the judiciary.
The Supreme Court observed that the appeals on issues on law are traditionally
heard by the Courts. Article 323B enables the Constitution of Tribunals which will
be hearing appeals on pure questions of law which is the function of the Courts. In
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 it had considered the validity
of only clause (3)(d) of Article 323B, but did not consider the validity of other
provisions of Article 323B.
The Supreme Court noted that the appeals relating to constitutional validity of the
National Company Law Tribunal under the Companies Act, 1956 did not involve
the consideration of Article 323B. The constitutional issues raised in T.C. (Civil) No.
150 of 2006 were not touched as the power to establish company Tribunals was
not traceable to Article 323B but to several entries of Lists I and III of the Seventh
Schedule and consequently there was a challenge to this article.
The Supreme Court observed that the basis of attack in regard to Parts IB and IC
of the Companies Act and the provisions of the NTT Act were completely different.
The challenge to Parts IB and IC of the Companies Act, 1956 sought to derive
support from Article 323B by contending that Article 323B was a bar for
constitution of any Tribunal in respect of matters not enumerated therein. On the
other hand the challenge to the NTT Act was based on the challenge to Article
323B itself.
The Supreme Court therefore was of the view that these petitions relating to the
validity of the NTT Act and the challenge to Article 323B raised issues which did
not arise in the two civil appeals. Therefore these cases could not be disposed of
in terms of the decision in the civil appeals, but were required to be heard
separately. The Supreme Court accordingly directed that these matters be
delinked and listed separately for hearing.

In the NTT case, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that
though constitutional conventions didn't debar Parliament from vesting judicial
powers in tribunals, it should have the trappings of a court. Otherwise, the court said,
it would be in violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. The court struck
down the constitutionality of the NTT Act, on the grounds that the tribunal didn't have
the salient characteristics of courts, which it sought to replace. The apex court said
tribunals couldn't decide "questions of law", adding these could only be decided by
constitutional courts. The petitioner in the NTT case and the NCLT case are same the Madras Bar Association. And, the sections struck down by the apex court in the
NTT case were similar to those in the case of the NCLT and the NCLAT, under the
Companies Act, 2013, said Lalit Kumar, partner in law firm J Sagar Associates.
"Since sections five, six, seven, eight and 13 were challenged and found
unconstitutional in the NTT case, this could have a strong bearing on the pending
petition against NCLT and NCLAT," he added Corporate lawyers say the Supreme
Court (in the Union of India vs the Madras Bar Association) held the constitutional
validity of the NCLT and the NCLAT, in an order in May 2010. It had suggested

27

modifications in the constitution of these tribunals. Also, it didn't strike down the
important sections or provisions applicable to setting up and functioning of the NCLT
and the NCLAT.
Many important tribunals were, at some point, a matter of dispute before the Supreme
Court.These include, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the Administrative Tribunal,
consumer courts, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) The bone of contention in all these
disputes was whether Parliament was constitutionally empowered to abrogate or
divest the core judicial appellate functions traditionally vested with the courts (high
courts and the Supreme Court) In all these cases, the issue was whether such judicial
functions given to a tribunal did away with the basic structure enshrined in the
Constitution. The cases were on the issues of separation of powers, the rule of law
and judicial review
KEY CASES
Union of India vs Delhi High Court Bar Association (2002)
(The case questioned the constitutional validity of the Debt Recovery Tribunal)
State of Karnataka vs Vishwabharathi House Building Cooperative Society &
Ors (2003) (The primary question was the constitutional validity of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986)
S P Sampath Vs Union of India (1987) (Challenged the constitutional validity of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985)
Union of India Vs Madras Bar Association (2010) (Questioned the constitutional
validity of the NCLT and the NCLAT (national company law appellate tribunal)) final
2014

CONCLUSION
Inviewoftheincreasingroleofadministrationincitizens'life,theadministrative
tribunals are expected to play an important role in the redressal of citizens'
grievances.
28

Theyprovidegreaterflexibilityinadministeringjusticeandproviderelieftothe
courts.Butatthesametimetheysufferfromsomelimitations
However,withcertainsafeguardsitispossibletorectifysomeoftheselimitations.
The administrative tribunals should have people with legal training and
experience.Acodeofjudicialproceduresshouldbedevisedandenforcedfortheir
functioning.
Inpracticethereareanumberoftribunalsfunctioninginthecountry.Veryfewof
them,however,havebeenabletoinspireconfidenceinthepublic.Thetribunals
haveshownasingularlackofcompetenceandobjectivityindeterminingdisputes.
Anotherreasonfortheirfailureistheconstitutionofthetribunalsandthemethod
ofappointmentofthepersonnel.
Tribunalsaresupposedtoprovidespecialisedadjudicatoryservicesbutthetypeof
people appointed lack the requisite expertise and are on the tribunals merely
becauseofpoliticalpressureandexecutiveinterference.
Another important measure which needs to betaken aresteps to maintainthe
independence of the members of these tribunals from political or executive
interference.
Thustheoverallpictureregardingtribunalisationofjusticeinthecountryisfar
fromsatisfactory.AfreshlookatthesystemoftribunalsinIndiaisrequiredsoas
to ensure speedy justice and quick disposal of disputes arising out of
administrativedisputeswhichareessentialforthedevelopmentofthenation.

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