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Title: From Geometry to Phenomenology
Article Type: Original Research
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Keywords: Husserl, geometry, eidetic intuition, group theory, foundations of geometry
Corresponding Author: Dr. Mirja Helena Hartimo, PhD
Corresponding Author's Institution: Tufts University
First Author: Mirja Helena Hartimo, PhD
Order of Authors: Mirja Helena Hartimo, PhD
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Abstract: ABSTRACT. Richard Tieszen (2005) has argued that the group-theoretical approach to
modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserl's view of eidetic intuition. In support of
Tieszen's claim, the present article discusses Husserl's approach to geometry in 1886-1902. Husserl's first
detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under transformations takes place in his notes on
Hilbert's Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie that Hilbert wrote during the winter 1901-02.
Husserl's interest in the Memoir is a continuation of his long-standing concern about analytic geometry and
in particular Riemann and Helmholtz's approach to geometry. Husserl favored a nonmetrical approach to
geometry; thus the topological nature of Hilbert's Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of
phenomenology is to describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of
eidetic intuition.

abstract
Click here to download abstract: From Geometry Abstract.doc

From Geometry to Phenomenology

ABSTRACT. Richard Tieszen (2005) has argued that the group-theoretical approach to
modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserls view of eidetic intuition. In
support of Tieszens claim, the present article discusses Husserls approach to geometry in 18861902. Husserls first detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under
transformations takes place in his notes on Hilberts Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie
that Hilbert wrote during the winter 1901-02. Husserls interest in the Memoir is a continuation of
his long-standing concern about analytic geometry and in particular Riemann and Helmholtzs
approach to geometry. Husserl favored a nonmetrical approach to geometry; thus the topological
nature of Hilberts Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of phenomenology is to
describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of eidetic intuition.

* Manuscript
Click here to download Manuscript: Synthese From geometry to phenomenology.doc

1
From Geometry to Phenomenology
1. Introduction
In Hilberts famous Paris list of problems, the fifth challenge was to formulate
Lies concept of a continuous group of transformations without the assumption of the
differentiability of the functions defining the group. To solve the problem Hilbert wrote a
short memoir on the foundations of geometry ber die Grundlagen der Geometrie
during the winter 1901/02, and published as an appendix of the English translation of the
Foundations of Geometry in 1902, and separately, in more detail, in Mathematische
Annalen in 1903. In the memoir Hilbert partially solves the fifth problem using group
theory, Cantors set theory and the notion of Jordan curve. (To distinguish the Memoir
from Hilberts 1899 Grundlagen der Geometrie, I will call the 1903 published paper
Memoir and the 1899 foundations Festschrift.) Husserl took detailed notes on the
Memoir which were published in Husserliana XXI. The objective of this paper is to
explain Husserls interest in Hilberts Memoir. It will be argued that Husserls interest is
a continuation of his long-standing concern about analytic geometry and in particular
Riemann and Helmholtzs approach to geometry. In his notes Husserl also displays
understanding of group theoretical notions for the first time. Thus it may have motivated
Husserl in his subsequent work on eidetic intuition.

2. Two routes towards intrinsic geometry

Already in 1679 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz criticized Descartess analytic
geometry for not being properly geometrical and direct (Dorier 1995, 234). Similarly, in
the 19th century analytic geometry came under heavy criticism. The idea of analyzing

2
geometrical figures by means of calculation was considered external and transitory
(Dorier 1995, 254). The same charge was brought against the projective geometers in
Gttingen in the 1870s and 1880s. The objection was that numerical coordinates
incorporate Euclidean distance, and hence using the coordinates is viciously circular
(Tappenden 1995, 324-325; Klein 1979, 141).
These charges motivated von Staudt and others to search for a purely qualitative
projective basis for analytic geometry Klein, in particular, emphasized the need for a
solution (Johnson 1979, 127). The development culminated in Hilberts Festschrift, the
first edition of which was published in 1899. In it Hilbert sought to develop plane
geometry independently of the Archimedean axiom (given any two line segments, either
may be exceeded by an entire multiple of the other), which brings an arithmetical element
into geometry. In his work, Hilbert developed a segment calculus independent of the
Archimedean axiom, thus giving elementary foundations to analytic geometry (Bernays
1967, 497-498).
The search for intrinsic methods and the development of pure geometry took
also place in the attempts to legitimize the use of complex numbers by giving them a
geometrical representation. A great deal of work was carried out in this field in the early
19th century, most notably by Carl Friedrich Gauss in 1831 and Augustin-Louis Cauchy
in 1849 (Dorier 1995, 234). Later Frege, among others, held that geometric
interpretations of the complex numbers introduce foreign elements into analysis
(Tappenden 2006, 124). For the present purposes a particularly important work is
Hermann Grassmanns (1809-1877) Theory of Extension (1844). In this at first relatively
unknown work, Grassmann attempted to give an abstract foundation of the theory of

3
space as a pure mathematical science, freed from any spatial intuition. Independently of
Gauss, Grassmann treated complex numbers in a manner similar to Gausss. Grassmanns
Theory of Extension is a coordinate-free geometrical calculus, a theory of n-dimensional
vector spaces (Torretti 1978, 109).

3. Husserl and the externality of the analytic tradition

In the 1890s Husserls worry was that space could not be properly analyzed by
means of analytic geometry. According to Husserl, the usage of analytic methods brought
artificial and unjustified constraints to the representation of space. Likewise, in his
Habilitationsschrift from (1887) Husserl had already questioned Helmholtzs view that
the analytic methods advantageously allow the geometrical results to be obtained by
calculation without needing intuition in proofs. Husserl claimed that obviously even the
analytic method presupposes certain facts of intuition in assuming the general hypotheses
according to which every geometrical form can be algebraically defined by means of an
equation, and according to which, then from every algebraic relation a geometrical
relation can be derived. Husserl continues: For does not the well-known, fundamental
expedient of analytic geometry, which first makes possible the transposition just
mentioned namely, the univocally characterizing statement of any spatial point by
means of the vectorial numbers of its distances for three fixed co-ordinate axes rest
upon the peculiar properties of our representation of space?(Husserl 1970, 293-294.
English translation Husserl 2003, 309-310.). The analytic geometers who claimed to
avoid the customary facts of intuition for conceptual necessities relied on Cartesian or

4
skewed coordinates and hence seemed to take some facts of intuition as conceptual
necessities. Hence, Husserl writes that

It is obvious that, so long as the relation of arithmetic to geometry is not completely cleared up,
no attempt to answer questions of principle in geometry by numerical analysis offers us a sure
guarantee that we are not being led in a circle - as, in my opinion, actually occurs with the
Riemann-Helmholtz theory.(Husserl 1970, 294. English translation Husserl 2003, 309-310.)

Husserl expresses similar criticisms in his lectures of 1890-91, when, as requested by

his students, Husserl discussed raumlogischen questions and especially the RiemannHelmholtz theory of space (Husserl 1983, 250). In the lectures Husserl had first discussed
the disputed questions in geometry related to general arithmetic and analysis. The
published part starts with an overview of the development of Euclidean geometry, the
problem of parallels, and the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry. Husserl gives a
detailed exposition of Gausss theory of curvature. Then Husserl goes on to criticize
Riemanns manifolds, claiming that Riemanns theory of curvature cannot be taken as an
adequate generalization of Gausss theory. In the end, Husserl raises objections especially
towards Riemanns approach following Minding, Kronecker, and Beez (Husserl 1983,
337-342). For the present purposes Husserls more philosophical objections towards the
whole approach is most interesting. Hussel first repeats the claim from the
Habilitationsschrift that to think that the general theory of curvature could clarify the
logical foundations of geometry amounts to reasoning in a circle: Ich behaupte: Die
ganze Tendenz der philosophisch-mathematischen Untersuchungen, welche in Gauss,
Riemann und Helmholtz ihre hervorragendsten Vertreter besitzt, beruht auf einem
vollstndigen Zirkel, Husserl claims (Husserl 1983, 344). To him Gauss already

5
presupposes three dimensional space in his definition of a line-element (Husserl 1983,
344). Hence Gausss work is already, according to Husserl, viciously circular.

From the present-day standpoint Husserls criticism appears silly: he does not seem to
understand Gausss empirical and dynamic approach at all. However, similar criticism
has been expressed by D. M. Johnson in 1979 from the point of view of the development
of topology. According to Johnson, [o]n a very profound level there is a serious problem
related to Riemanns entire approach. Ultimately he links his basic topological objects
with numbers and coordinate systems. In other words, a Riemannian manifold is always
reducible to a number-manifold. Consequently, when trying to construct a
framework for nonmetrical analysis situs, he nonetheless seems to fall back on concepts
of measurement and ordinary analytic geometry. In this way he appears to complete a
logical circle(1979, 126). The ultimate solution to this problem requires the concept of a
topological mapping (ibid., 127). Thus Husserls criticism could be understood to express
a worry that fueled the subsequent development of topology. Husserl wanted the analysis
situs to be entirely nonmetrical.

Husserls final point is that [t]he truth is that the concept of surface is not
mathematically but only logically definable, and that mathematics cannot do anything but
presuppose this concept, and with help of its determinations declare mathematical
characteristics, through which one can express the position of a point in such surface
manifold. Not the concept of surface manifold, but the position of a point in a surface
manifold is to be mathematically defined.(Husserl 1983, 345-346) Husserl also

6
complains that in Riemannian geometry, Euclidean geometry is just an arbitrary case of
geometry in general (Husserl 1983, 347). Hence, Husserl thinks that only mathematical,
not philosophical, value can be attributed to Riemanns theory (Husserl 1983, 347).
Bertrand Russell has formulated the issue more poetically as follows: For mathematics,
where quantity reigns supreme, Riemanns conception has proved itself abundantly
fruitful; for philosophy, on the contrary, where quantity appears rather as a cloak to
conceal the qualities it abstracts from, the conception seems to me more productive of
error and confusion than of sound doctrine.(Russell 1897, 69)

Later, the Norwegian mathematician Sophus Lie followed in the steps of Riemann
and Helmholtz in solving Helmholtzs problem of space purely mathematically by use of
transformation groups (Torretti 1978, 154, 172.). No detailed notes on Lies work can be
found in Husserls published writings. This is not surprising because Husserl writes in a
letter to Natorp that he engaged in an intense investigation in geometry, arithmetic, and
the theories of manifolds in the years from 1888-1893 (Husserl 1983, 396), while Lie
published his first papers on the foundations of geometry in 1890, but the third volume of
his Theory of Transformation Groups, in which Lie gave the most expanded solution to
Helmholtzs problem of space, appeared in 1893 (Torretti 1978, 154). Curiously,
however, Husserl mentions Lies transformation groups in Prolegomena as an example of
a theory of theories. However, Husserls list of potentially fruitful theories is long and
contradictory. Besides Lies transformation groups, Husserl explicitly mentions Cantors,
Grassmanns, and Hamiltons approaches as well as Riemannian-Helmholtzian theory
(Husserl 1975, 252).

In an 1892 letter to Brentano, Husserl claims that he has changed his view about
Riemann-Helmholtz view. However, though he now thinks that the Riemann-Helmholtz
theory has a valuable core, he himself has followed a much deeper and unvergleichlich
ebener und leichter way in his investigations (Husserl 1994b, 11). Around 1893 Husserl
drafted an outline for how one should proceed in solving the problem of space. Husserls
to-do list is the following:
-the origin and content of the geometrically basic concepts have to be studied
-the origin and content of the axioms, and thereby are also clarified
-the origin and content of the geometrical space. (Husserl 1983, 286)

This list suggests that Husserl favored a synthetic approach to geometry. However,
Husserl did not want to compromise the method of calculation either and accordingly
favored Hermann Grassmanns approach. Here, Husserls criticism of Ernst Schrders
Vorlesungen is analogous to his criticism of analytic geometry. Husserl complains about
the externality of calculations that were used in place of genuine deductions (Husserl
1983, 8; 1994a, 56) as well as of the arbitrariness of Schrders stipulative definitions
that did not capture the natural processes of thought(Husserl 1983, 33; 1994a, 81). In
general Husserl does not object to calculations as such, but only that they were not
founded on genuine thought. This attitude is demonstrated in his remarks on geometry as
well. For a long time Husserl thought that Grassmanns Ausdehnungslehre provided the
approach that combined the logical analysis of our space intuition and the analytic
methods purely, without presupposing Cartesian coordinates. In 1897, Husserl still
thought that the only satisfactory general framework for Euclidean manifolds could be

8
found in Grassmanns Ausdehnungslehre of 1862 (In a letter to Natorp in March 29,
1897. Husserl 1994c, 60-61).
However, by the turn of the century Husserl is in approximate agreement with
Hilbert, who views the axiomatics as the way of proper analysis of our perception of
space. In 1901 Husserl gave two lectures to a Gttingen mathematical society. Husserls
view of Definitheit in his Double Lectures has been discussed in detail in Authors
(forthcoming) paper, so I will not digress now except to mention that in his lectures
Husserl shares Hilberts view of completeness or definiteness of an axiom system as
categoricity. Thus Husserls development in the 1890s takes him from the justification of
imaginaries through Grassmannian approach to axiomatics. Contrary to Hilbert, who was
influenced by projective geometry, Husserl followed the route via justification of the
complex numbers. In Husserls writings the search for intrinsic methods is clearly
combined with the desire to justify the usage of complex numbers. Accordingly Husserl
explains in the Formal and Transcendental Logic that his initial motivation to study
definite systems came from questions such as: Under what conditions can one operate
freely, in a formally defined deductive system with concepts that, according to the
definition of the system, are imaginary?(Husserl 1974, 101. English translation 1969,
97). Likewise in the foreword to the Philosophie der Arithmetik, Husserl held that in the
second volume he is going to discuss a new philosophical theory of Euclidean geometry
based on Gausss work Anzeige der Theoria residuorum biquandraticorum,
Commentatio secunda from 1831. (Husserl 1970, 8). Husserl was inspired by Gausss
treatment of complex numbers in his 1831 work and for the same reasons Husserl seems
to have been interested in Grassmanns Ausdehnungslehre (Husserl 1983, 396-397) .

Thus Husserls statement in the Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929)

summarizes his and Hilberts development:
Throughout the present exposition I have used the expression complete system of axioms,
which was not mine originally but derives from Hilbert. Without being guided by the
philosophico-logical considerations that determined my studies, Hilbert arrived at his concept of
completeness (naturally quite independently of my still-unpublished investigations); he attempts,
in particular, to complete a system of axioms by adding a separate axiom of
completeness.(Husserl 1974; 1969, 31)

4. Husserls notes on the Memoir

The two directions, one through projective geometry and another via Grassmann
thus both culminate in the notion of completeness as captured by Hilberts completeness
axiom that was added to the French translation of the Grundlagen (1900), and then to its
second edition. Both directions were guided by similar criticisms of analytic geometry.
But in contrast to the Festschrift, Hilberts Memoir is a contribution to the HelmholtzLie problem of space. Hilberts approach is group theoretical and it uses the notion of
Jordan curve as well as Cantors set theory. In the words of Weyl, Hilbert in the Memoir
does get rid of [Lies assumptions of differentiability] as far as Helmholtzs problem in
the plane is concerned. The proof is difficult and laborious; naturally continuity is now
the foundation, and not the keystone of the building as it had been in his Grundlagen
book(Weyl 1968, 156). In his notes, Husserl lists Hilberts axioms, briefly describes the
main idea of the proof, and then makes some remarks about the theorems. The first axiom
is the definition of a plane, the second the definition of a motion, the third states that the
motions form a group. The fourth is a definition of a rotation, and the fifth one states that

10
the system of rotations is closed. Hilbert also defines the true circle and the true line,
which are isomorphic to the number circle and number line respectively. The assertion
that Hilbert proves is the following: A plane geometry in which Axioms I-III are
satisfied is either the Euclidean plane geometry or the Bolyai-Lobachevskian
geometry.(Hilbert 1990, 155). In other words Hilbert manages to show that by means of
his first three axioms one can characterize either the group of Euclidean motions or the
group of Bolyai-Lobachevski motions, i.e., that the three axioms alone characterize
Bolyais absolute geometry of plane (cf. Torretti 1978, 187). Thus Hilbert gives a
solution to the Helmholtz-Lie problem of space.
The editors of the Husserliana date Husserls notes to around the turn of the
century (wohl um 1900). Hilbert first presented the introductory part of the Memoir in a
meeting of Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gttingen on November 8, 1901 (Hilbert,
2004, 8, 639). This paper was added to the English translation of the Festschrift of 1902
as a summary of the forthcoming Memoir. According to the editors of (Hilbert 2004), the
paper lacks the detailed working-out of the proofs of the latter part of the Memoir. The
finished paper, published in the Mathematische Annalen, has been signed on May 10,
1902, and it appeared in the Mathematische Annalen, Volume 56 (3) in 1903.
Husserl moved to Gttingen in the fall of 1901; he started lecturing at the end of
October 1901 (Schuhmann 1977, 67); attended Hilberts lecture Abgeschlossenheit von
Axiomensystemen in the Mathematical Society on November 5 (Schuhmann 1977, 68);
and he gave the Doppelvortrag in Gttingens mathematical society in November 26, and
December 10, 1901 (Schumann & Schumann 2001, 97). In his notes, Husserl summarizes
the Memoir without giving a detailed working out of the proofs. Husserl makes

11
references to Hilberts saying something: Mit dem Raum habe ich mich nicht befasst,
sagt Hilbert(Husserl 1983, 413), hence we can assume that Husserls notes are based on
Hilberts oral explanation of the Memoir, either in a presentation or privately. Husserl
might have attended Hilberts lecture on November 8, 1901, or the two might have
discussed the matter privately as well: at some point Hilbert had also shown Husserl
Freges letter of December 27, 1899 in which Frege claims that the consistency follows
from the truth of the axioms and not the other way around. Husserls remark to this is that
Frege does not understand the sense of Hilberts axiomatic grounding of
geometry(Husserl 1970, 448, English translation Husserl 2003, 469).
There are some differences between the published Memoir and Husserls notes.
For example, in his notes on Hilberts memoir Husserl first distinguishes between two
directions in geometry: one is the development from Euclid to Gauss, Lobatchefsky, and
others, the direction in which the points, lines, etc, are equally justified, and where one
studies relationships between them seeking for the simplest possible system with which
to capture all of geometry (Husserl 1983, 412). This is the approach of the Festschrift.
The other direction is the analytic tradition of Riemann, Helmholtz, and Lie.
According to the notes Lies approach was the first mathematically rigorous formulation.
But, his approach is complicated and nongeometrical (Husserl 1983, 412). In his Paris
problems, as well as in the Memoir, Hilbert similarly claimed that Lies solution is
rather forced and complicated(Browder 1976, 13). The problem is the artificial
assumption of the differentiability of the functions defining the group.
Instead of distinguishing between the two approaches Hilberts Memoir starts
directly with a discussion of Lies approach. However, in the end of the Memoir, there

12
are some remarks that should have interested Husserl too, but are missing from Husserls
notes. Hilbert concludes the memoir by pointing out the characteristic difference
between it and the Festschrift. The difference is in the arrangement of the axioms. In the
Festschrift Hilbert listed them so that the axioms of continuity were listed last, so that the
question as to what extent geometry could be developed without them would arise in a
natural way. In the Memoir, on the contrary, continuity is required first among the
axioms by the definition of the plane and a motion so that here the most important task
has been rather to determine the least number of conditions from which to obtain by the
most extensive use of continuity the elementary figures of geometry (circle and line) and
their properties necessary for the construction of geometry.(Hilbert 1990, 189). It is
likely that Hilbert did not explain this remark in a conversation with Husserl for Husserl
would have mentioned it in his notes, but that it was added to the Memoir afterwards.
This addition may prompt one to speculate on Husserls possible influence on Hilbert. In
his Double Lectures Husserl criticized Hilberts treatment of completeness as an axiom,
saying that, to him, it should never be an axiom but a theorem (Husserl 1970, 102). This
suggests that Husserl and Hilbert might have discussed continuity and completeness and
Hilberts remark in the published Memoir might have been inspired by these discussions.

5. From geometry to phenomenology

Let us attempt to imagine what Husserl might have thought of Hilberts work.
Why was he so interested in Hilberts solution to the problem of space? At the time,
Husserl was mainly concerned with the epistemological foundation for the ideal form of a

13
scientific theory that to him was captured by a definite, or a complete system of axioms.
In his lectures 1901-02 Husserl explains the importance of it with the following words:

Logic reveals to us the essence of the objective reason. Man has reason in so far as he is a
theoretical being, thus, a being, that has the capability to think, to know, and build sciences and
respectively to discover scientific theories, which brings the different material domains to
systematic exposition. The reasonable and the reasoning of men can be found in the form of
science that also composes what the idea of reason originally constitutes. (Husserl 2001a, 305)1

By logic Husserl means the Euclidean form captured by Hilberts axiomatization in the
Festschrift, the ideal form, which Newton and Galilei used to express their theories. In
the Introduction to the Logical Investigations Husserl states as his desideratum: to bring
the ideas of logic, the logical concepts and laws, to epistemological clarity and
definiteness. Here phenomenological analysis must begin(Husserl 1984, 9; English
translation, Husserl 2001b, 168, italics in the original). Respectively, in the Logical
Investigations Husserl develops the notion of categorial intuition aiming to give
epistemological justification for Hilbertian axiomatics. Moreover, Husserl views
Hilbertian axiomatics as the culmination of development in the 19th century, which gives
it an unquestioned status as the form of the theories.
In his Memoir Hilbert gives alternative, group-theoretical foundations for
geometry. Thus he gives an alternative solution to Husserls earlier concern about
analytic geometry and Riemann and Helmholtzs approach to the problem of space. The
Memoirs non-metrical, topological nature must have been pleasing to Husserl. But
otherwise it must have or at least should have given a blow to Husserls faith in the

14
axiomatics as giving the form of reason. Hilberts Memoir suggests that the proper theory
form could take a group theoretical form instead of the form of the Festschrift. Shortly
afterwards Minkowskis work on special relativity was surely another source suggesting
the group theoretical form of the a priori. Given that Richard Tieszen (2005) has recently
shown, and quite plausibly so, that the group theoretical approach to modern geometry
can be seen as a realization of eidetic intuition, it is no wonder that Husserl soon started
to develop his view of eidetic intuition.

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In German original: Die Logik enthllt uns das Wesen der objektiven Vernunft. Vernnftig ist der
Mensch, sofern er ein theoretisches Wesen ist, also ein Wesen, das die Fhigkeit besitzt zu
denken, zu erkennen, und somit Wissenschaften zu bauen bzw. wissenschaftliche Theorien
entdecken, welche die verschiedenen Sachgebiete zur systematischen Darstellung bringen. Das

17

Vernnftige an der Vernungtttigkeit des Menschen liegt in der Form der Wissenschaft, die also
das ausmacht, was die Idee der Vernunft eigentlich konstituiert. (Husserl 2001a, 305).