I.

Introduction

For decades, Irans uranium enrichment activities, which are also a geopolitical issue,
have garnered much controversy. Due to the secrecy of Irans nuclear programs and
its history of deception, Irans ambitions are unclear and views towards this issue are
mixed.
Iran argues that it produces low level enriched uranium for nuclear fuel use and denies
that it is developing nuclear weapons (Akbar, 2007, para. 3). Iranian diplomat and
current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammad Javad Zarif Khonsari also declared
that Irans ideals and objectives are peaceful in nature (2014). Other countries,
especially the US, are however more hostile and distrusting towards Irans nuclear
ambitions and speculate that Iran is seeking the ability to build a nuclear bomb.
II.

Irans Goals

Economical Growth
Iran insists that the primary goal of its uranium enrichment programs is to acquire
peaceful nuclear energy and some argue that that might be true (CSIS, n.d.). Although
Iran has large oil and gas reserves, it lacks adequate refining capacity and is forced to
rely on imported gasoline. The ability to produce nuclear energy domestically would
diversify its economy away from oil, establish energy independence, and reduce its
susceptibility to fluctuations in oil prices (CSIS, n.d.). These would help enhance its
economical growth.
Independence
The preservation of Irans independence is one of Irans national ideals
(Mohammad, 2014, para. 2).
Irans will of independence can be dated back to the 18th and 19th centuries, when the
Islamic society was in opposition with the West. Irans quest for independence can be
seen from its decisions since the Islamic Revolution: to be a third voice critical of the
two superpowers, not participating in the Cold War, and to be both anti-US
imperialism and anti-communist (Arash, 2014, p. 2). This continued strong will for
independence might be a critical reason for the developing of a nuclear program.
In addition, Irans nuclear weapons program might have been part of a broader
attempt to develop self-reliance in arms and technology in the 1980s. During its war
with Iraq, which possessed chemical weapons and a nuclear weapons program, it
struggled to acquire arms and this may have resulted in the birth of its nuclear
program (The Iran Primer, n.d.).
Balance of Power
There are some other countries in the region that already possess nuclear bombs. Iran
is now surrounded by nuclear states such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the
Fifth American fleet (Akbar, 2007, para. 7). Iran could be developing nuclear
weapons due to the fact that five of the worlds nine nuclear powers are nearby or on
its borders (The Iran Primer, n.d.) and it wants a balance of power.

If Iran also goes nuclear, the balance of power in the region in the Greater Middle
East and especially in the Persian Gulf area would change in favor of Iran
(Mohammad & Yasser, 2010, p. 135).
Regional Primacy
Since the Persian Empire ruled much of the ancient world, Iran has been an on-again
off-again regional power, and it has been more politically and culturally sophisticated
than most of the Middle East for thousands of years (Totten, 2015, para. 7).
Currently, beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature
(Mohammad, 2014, para. 2). Other countries are apprehensive towards this goal.
Some speculate that Irans ultimate goal is regional hegemony and its nuclear
weapons program is merely a means to that end (Totten, 2015, para. 1).
III.

Obstacles Facing Iran

With several countries distrusting Irans intentions and nuclear ambitions, Iran faces
many obstacles with its uranium enrichment programs.
The United States in particular has been in conflict with Iran for decades. It views
Irans nuclear ambitions with extreme hostility. The U.S. State department considers
Iran the worlds most active state sponsor of terrorism (Bruno, 2011, para. 1). When
Irans secret nuclear program came to light in 2003, the United States had even gone
so far as to announce the possibility of a military strike to forcefully end Irans
nuclear program (Mohammad & Yasser, 2010, p. 122).
Although the United States has not taken any drastic measures so far, in 2007 it
finally got agreement from other major powers to impose multilateral sanctions on
Iran after years of unilateral sanctions (Akbar, 2007, para. 1).
The international community also remains suspicious of Irans intentions and has
continued to impose a growing list of sanctions against Iran to compel Iran to engage
in talks seriously (Bruno, 2011, para. 1). The United States, along with the EU and its
P5+1 partners (China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, plus Germany) are currently in
talks with Iran to address its nuclear program issues (U.S. Relations, 2015, para. 2).
There is little possibility that the United States and the international community would
accept a nuclear Iran, which would make developing nuclear programs harder for
Iran. Accepting a nuclear Iran would imply that the US should also accept the
development of nuclear programs in other countries (Mohammad & Yasser, 2010, p.
136). This would discredit US stand against nuclear weapons greatly. The P5+1 also
wants to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon or at least prevent it from being
able to get one quickly (Iranian Nuclear Deal, 2015, para. 4). Although the P5+1
negotiators have compromised over allowing Iran to continue its uranium enrichment
program, they have sought strict limits on its program, the redesign of a plutoniumproducing heavy water reactor that is being constructed, and a highly-intrusive
inspection regime in order to prevent cheating (Iranian Nuclear Deal, 2015, para. 6).
Their ultimate aim is to extend Irans breakout capability, which is the time needed
to produce sufficient fissile material to build a nuclear weapon (Iranian Nuclear
Deal, 2015, para. 6).

IV.

Ways for Iran to Achieve its Goals

Despite the many obstacles, there are still a number of ways for Iran to continue
developing its nuclear program and achieving its goals of economical growth,
independence, and gaining of power.
Firstly, Iran can continue to develop its nuclear program at a pace slow enough to
avoid any backlash. Iran has always been cautious to step instead of leap forward. It
advances its program incrementally and not provocatively. This way, even as Irans
nuclear program inches forward, the international community would still routinely
accede to its new gains (Takeyh, 2015, para. 6).
Currently, there has been a breakthrough interim agreement and an extensive
framework in regards to Irans nuclear deal with P5+1. This deal would enable Iran to
gain relief from sanctions that have increased in severity and are having a
tremendously negative effect on Irans resource-dependent economy (Iranian
Nuclear Deal, 2015, para. 5). However, this is in exchange of Irans agreement to
reduce its installed enrichment centrifuges and for Irans second enrichment facility to
cease enrichment (Iranian Nuclear Deal, 2015, para. 6). With this much scrutiny and
more intensive inspection regimes, it would be highly impossible for Iran to develop
any nuclear program in secrecy like it did before.
However, accordingly to what is publicly known about the current talks, Iran is
expected to retain its enrichment capability (Parsi, 2015, para. 11). This still leaves
Iran with a sizeable enrichment capacity and none of its facilities will be shuttered as
was once discussed (Takeyh, 2015, para. 3). In addition, there is a sunset clause that
upon expiration in 10 years would lift all essential restriction on Irans enrichment
infrastructure (Takeyh, 2015, para. 3). Once that happens, Irans nuclear program will
be treated no differently than those of Japan or Sweden (Parsi, 2015, para. 11). This
means that Iran would be in a position to manufacture atomic bombs on short order. In
the absence of a deal, Iran may take measures to advance its nuclear program
cautiously and at a pace that would not invoke any military reaction (Takeyh, 2015,
para. 6).
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