Professional Documents
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Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the
three checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latters
account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as
conspirator.
Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that a
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To be held
guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal
plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner
performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently,
the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that
she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference
cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough
to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in
the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose
Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accusedappellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No.
152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding
accused-appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted
rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim.
Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a
minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the
ultimate penalty of death.
Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we
find no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accusedappellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to
commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt
acts but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code
states: (a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the
other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional. As explained by
an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have the
same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two.
In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent
in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which
took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private
complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter
intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private
complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of
the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private
complainants) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accusedappellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to
kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered
private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These
dastardly acts of accused-appellant constitute the first or some subsequent
step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made. Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are
indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape
against the person of private complainant.
Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City,
against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and
correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper
circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the
24th day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of
Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines
Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the abovenamed accused who are the news correspondent and the managing editor,
respectively, of the local weekly newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with
Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the
crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review
under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was
charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about
November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public
officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State
College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable
for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their
functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public
officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the
payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said
school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellants coaccused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court,
persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellants part.
Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its
reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal
intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not
automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because
disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act.
Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she
paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of
terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil
service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public
purpose payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in
the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages
enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources. Settled is the
rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution
and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of
evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The
Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save
the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal
intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of
innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no
basis to affirm appellants conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no
particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers
of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of
technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have
been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the
Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34
secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of
the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary
differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school
teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the
third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court.
Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance. Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the second
mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when:
(a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a
public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person
in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to
observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any
arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance,
are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on
appeal.
Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was
awakened by his wife Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting
invectives at her husband, viz: You ought to be killed, you devil. So Romeo
stood up and peeped to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody,
he proceeded towards the road.
Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with
bolo which was more that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he
recognized him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970s and
whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place.
Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body,
including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting
invectives at him. Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to
sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11 wounds.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioners plea of
self-defense and convicted him of frustrated homicide.
Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence, the confluence of the three essential requisites for complete selfdefense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
means used by the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful
to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the
petitioner thereby submitted having deliberately caused the victims injuries.
The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing all
the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the
petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this case,
the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victims wounds belie the petitioners
claim that the said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each
other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner
could not have been caused by bolo.
Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he
had injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked
the victim to defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.
Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the
petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was
her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During
trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that
he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from
his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him
guilty of bigamy.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?
Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, proved the
existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of
Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime
of Kidnapping. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of
demanding ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual
payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of
the purpose of demanding ransom. In this case, the records are replete with
instances when the kidnappers demanded ransom from the victim. At the
mountain hideout where Alexander was first taken, he was made a letter to
his wife asking her to pay ransom of twelve million. Also Mayangkang himself
wrote more letters to his family threatened the family to kill Alexander if the
ransom was not paid.
Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the
Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods
received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated
whenever the entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale of
goods, or (2) return the goods covered by the trust receipts if the good are
not sold. The mere failure to account or return gives rise to the crime which is
malum prohibitum. There is no requirement to prove intent to defraud.
The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts
and as part of the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to
demand from ARMAGRI payment or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI
failed tom pay or return the goods despite repeated demands by the Bank.
It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law,
that the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is
evidence of conversion or misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by
the entrustee to account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa.
The Trust Receipts Law punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the
handling of money or goods to prejudice the public order. The mere failure to
deliver proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold constitutes a criminal
offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor, but also to the public
interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for neither money nor the
goods were turned over the Bank.
PARRICIDE; ELEMENTS
kicked Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the
ground. Even as Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat
her up, punching her on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the
house of Felia Horilla but Armando ran after her and herded her back to their
house. Leah fell again to the ground and lost her consciousness. The trial
court convicted Armando of parricide.
Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by
Leah that caused her death were the consequence of the appellants
deliberate and intentional acts.
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
thus: Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a
person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
the accused. The prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to
death. The key element in parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate.
Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant
Benjamin Hilet, the common law husband of her mother not to go to school
and watch the house. At about 10 AM, while her mother was out selling fish,
Richelle saw appellant sharpening his bolo. Moments later, appellant dragged
her towards the room and raped her. She kept the afternoon of March 17,
1999. Richelle finally confided to her mother. The latter asked their neighbor
to report the incident to the police. The trial court convicted the appellant
guilty of two counts of statutory rape.
Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie
Sanchez and this Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy.
Thereafter Belleza Lozada arrived. They planned to wait Rosita Sy as she
would normally leave her drugstore between 10:30 and 11 PM. They have
also planned to kill Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed, Diaz
excused himself on the pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed
himself and the plan was not implemented that night because of the delay.
They have agreed to pursue it the next day. Diaz deliberately stayed away
from their meeting place the next day. The following day, he learned over the
radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in a remote area.
Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to
constitute a penalty of death.
Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo
lurid or personal property belonging to another person by means of violence
against or intimidation of person or using force upon thing constitutes
robbery, and the complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when by
reason or on the occasion of robbery, someone is killed. All these elements
have satisfactorily been shown by the prosecution.
First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probablenot necessarily immediate
and actualgrave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of
them were girls and named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and
kept custody of their fpur children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living
together as husband and wife.
Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering
firewood with the appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava
tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost
consciousness. She had her clothes when she woke up. She had a terrible
headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle
portion of her right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it,
otherwise he would kill her.
The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her
sister and eventually her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of
the crime rape and sentenced him to death.
Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held
guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that: 1) there had been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused;
20 the accused achieves the act through force or intimidation upon the victim
because the latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Carnal
knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct
evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape had been committed and
that the accused is the perpetrator thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused
for rape may be based solely on the victims testimony if such testimony
meets the test of credibility. Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable
in rape cases is not indispensable to warrant a conviction of the accused for
the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman states that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did take
place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with extreme
caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot
be assailed simply because her admission that it took the appellant only short
time to insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry
of his penis into the labia of the pudendum, even if only for a short while, is
enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the
brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the victims vagina is of
no particular importance.