Electoral Reform and Political Outcomes

Sunil Bastian
01/06/2015
Sri Lanka is once again talking of electoral reform. After experimenting with two types
of electoral systems first-past-the-post (FPP) and proportional representation (PR),
there is now talk of some kind of a mixed model. Just as at the time of the search for
devolution models, the discussion seems to be ahistorical, without an analysis of our
past experience and devoid of any idea of political outcomes that we want to achieve.
The purpose of this is to raise some issues relevant for this discussion.

Electoral systems in the world

The world is full of many electoral systems. Each arises in a particular historical
context, and is shaped by political forces and a set of ideas dominant at that time.
They help to transform preferences of voters to political agency, structure the party
system, determine the composition of the legislature, and determine the stability of the
regime in power. Since electoral systems always operate in a particular society in a
particular historical context, the characteristics of these societies have an influence on
these political outcomes. Therefore learning from history is important.
There are also no ideal electoral systems. Often when the discussion of electoral

systems gets reduced to one of representation, it ends up in an arithmetic exercise

devoid of political analysis. Electoral systems are produced by a particular
configuration of political power and results in political outcomes, and they have to be
analysed within such a framework. Finally, there are many things in a political system
that cannot be resolved merely by designing electoral systems. Therefore there are
limits to what can be achieved through electoral reform.
When Sri Lanka was granted universal franchise the only electoral system under
consideration was FPP, which was what prevailed in the land of our colonial master
Britain. The issue that dominated was whether Sri Lanka should have communal or
territorial electorates. Those days being communal was a bad thing. One was
expected to transcend these backward communal feelings and build a national identity.
Territorial electorates were supposed to contribute to this. Well, we now know how
wrong that idea was. There were many features in the territorial-based FPP system
that undermined the possibility of a peaceful plural society.
In order to safeguard the rights of minorities, the Sri Lankan elite decided on what was
called balanced representation in parliament. Balanced representation was expected
to minimise the influence of the Sinhalese, who would form the majority in the party.
The political elite of the Sinhalese and Tamils agreed to this. But one group that did not
take part in this discussion was representatives of the plantation community.
Immediately after independence the bulk of this population was disenfranchised and
lost their vote. This not only undermined the idea of balanced representation, but also
made sure that capital in the plantations had a working class without basic rights that
could be exploited. Subsequent developments resulted in the Sinhala domination of
the parliament.
The FPP electoral system of Sri Lanka showed a high degree of variation in the
number of registered voters per MP. If we take the 1970 and 1977 elections, for
example, the last to be held under FPP, voters per member ranged from 16,461 to
70,236 in 1970, and 19,925 to 64,190 in 1977. Due to this factor, sparsely-populated
less urbanised rural areas had an undue advantage from the electoral system. It was a
conscious decision of delimitation commissions to ensure greater representation of
rural areas. The argument was that such a system weighted towards rural areas would
ensure more attention being paid to development problems in these areas. This
actually did happen, but created its own problems for the peaceful existence of a plural
society in areas such as land settlement. In addition, who in rural areas actually
benefited from this focus on rural areas in development depended on many other
factors such as caste, class and political power.
Perhaps the worst political outcome of the FPP system was what the electoral studies
literature calls manufactured majorities for the ruling parties. This is when the winning
party gets a much higher proportion of seats compared to the proportion of votes it has
secured. For example, in 1970 the ruling SLFP/Left coalition, with only 42.2 per cent of
the total vote, enjoyed 76.8 per cent of the seats in parliament. In 1977 the picture was
reversed, with the UNP benefiting even more from the system. In 1977 the UNP, with
only 44.4 per cent of the total vote, enjoyed 83.3 per cent of seats.

One of the main arguments of the supporters of FPP is that these majorities produce
stable governments, and are therefore is preferable. Obviously everything depends on
what sort of political outcomes are produced by this so-called stability. In the case of
Sri Lanka, the huge majorities ended up in single-party-driven constitutional reforms,
and alienation of both ethnic and political majorities. I would argue much of the
negative influence of the political party machinery in the state structure began with
these huge majorities that the FPP system produced from the early seventies. The
power of political parties who gained these majorities began to influence every aspect
of state machinery. It gave rise to a patronage system, widespread political
appointees, and went to the humorous level of political lackeys ensuring the walls and
curtains of government buildings were decorated with the colour of the party in power.
In short the manufactured majorities of the FPP system have not been a positive
experience in Sri Lanka.
Another argument brought in favour of the FPP system is that due to the smaller size
of the electorate, there is a close relationship between the MP and the voters. Once
again this has to be placed in the context of Sri Lankan society in order to understand
what was the nature of this close relationship, and what were its outcomes. Right at
the beginning of our electoral system, in some instances this close relationship had a
feudal character. In more recent times it has become part of the patronage system.
This had led to a clientelist system that has undermined the interests of the voters in
general. Therefore one has to be cautious of these romantic notions of the close
relationship between the MP and the voter.
The origins of the PR system of elections had a lot to do with the liberalisation of the
economy. Long before liberalisation of economy in 1977, late president Jayawardene
saw the need for a strong presidency, and legislature elected through a system where
the political party machinery had a greater control over individual MPs. According to
his thinking these institutions were necessary to implement economic policy measures
that could be unpopular. He talked about this in 1966, in the key note speech to the
twenty-second annual sessions of the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of
Science.
Under PR, electoral districts became larger units and they coincided with
administrative districts. It did away with the spatial inequalities that were biased
against densely populated urbanised areas in the FPP system. Compared to the FPP
system of elections PR provides space for small parties to be elected, and therefore
undermines the domination of the two-party system. The original proposals of the UNP
wanted to avoid this possibility, and introduced a twelve and a half per cent cut-off
point before a political party could be considered for allocation of seats. There is also
the bonus seat conferred on the party that obtains the largest number of votes in an
electoral district. Invariably this would be one of the larger parties. This was another
measure introduced to ensure the dominance of larger parties.
Finally, the original PR proposals gave the parties a high degree of control over MPs
by ensuring that voting was for lists put forward by parties rather than for individual
candidates. The party machinery would decide the hierarchy within the list. The

number of seats that each party obtained would be distributed according to the
hierarchy in the list put forward by the party. Once the list had been finalised, the filling
of any vacancies that arose would be on the basis of the list and therefore the original
decisions of the party continued to be important. The list system also did away with the
possibility of members elected from one party crossing over to another.
Some of the key elements of this original proposal were changed. The twelve and a
half per cent cut-off point was reduced to five per cent. Obviously minority parties
opposed the high cut-off point. Individual MPs resented the excessive control of the
party machinery. While the list system of voting was maintained, it was supplemented
with a preference vote that allows the voter to chose a candidate as well. This added a
new level of electoral competition, competition between members of the same party,
in addition to competition between parties. A new national list of members was
introduced. All parties in the parliament got a new mechanism for bringing in unelected
members. Preventing cross overs has become a difficult objective to achieve.
The new electoral system has been in operation for six general elections. The most
significant impact of PR has been the disappearance of manufactured majorities in
parliament. As could be predicted, the reduced cut-off point of five per cent has
allowed smaller parties to enter into the parliament. This has been one of the most
important political outcomes of PR. It has led to a more inclusive parliament, and has
become important in giving a political voice especially to the Muslim and Indian Tamil
community. Given the past history of excessive Sinhala domination and how this has
led to polarisation of the country, this particular political outcome has been important
for long-term stability in the country. In addition PR allowed a framework to incorporate
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, a political party responsible for two insurgencies, into
democratic politics, Therefore PR has contributed to incorporating both ethnic and
political minorities into electoral politics. For a country that has seen so much violence
since the early seventies in the South as well as the North, this is no mean
achievement.
To end this note it is also important to recognise the limits of electoral reform. For
example, with the two major parties evenly balanced in parliament, the role of smaller
parties has become significant. We have seen many coalition governments. However
there is a wide range of interests on the basis of which political parties agree to
become a member of coalition. Some reasons relate to the political and community
interests they represent. In addition to this, personal ambition of individuals and the
need to maintain a patronage system play a big role. In the period of a liberal
economy, the ideological differences between political parties in the area of
development have disappeared. On the other hand using political power as a means
of accumulating resources has become prominent. These interests play a role in
decisions to go into coalition governments. But these are issues that cannot be tackled
through electoral reform. Electoral reform is not effective in such questions. We have
to get into discussions about political culture, nature of the political class, how to limit
the influence of political power in resource allocation, and so on.
To end this note, one final comment about political violence. In our discussions on

political violence, many have pointed out the system of preference votes as a reason
for political violence. But surely one can imagine a system of preference votes where
candidates go about canvassing peacefully for preference votes, without the
barbarism that we see in our society? The reason for this violence is not the electoral
system. In order to understand this violence we need to look at the violence that we
have witnessed in many aspects of our society in general, and in electoral politics in
particular. Blaming the electoral system for the violence is to close our eyes to these
fundamental problems in our society. Sri Lanka can be characterised as a country with
democratic institutions, but without democratic politics. Electoral reform is one small
component in progressing towards democratic politics.
Posted by Thavam