Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Indonesia, long thought of as a basket case, has emerged as one of the key players in the
Asia-Pacific. Its democracy, while young and still consolidating, has proved to be remarkably
resilient. While other countries are undergoing painful recessions, thanks to the global financial
crisis, Indonesia is experiencing sustained economic growth. It has emerged as a key regional
player on the diplomatic stage, forging strong bilateral relationships with its neighbours and
joining the influential G20 group of major economies.
The archipelagic nation is also strategically significant. Straddling the Indian and Pacific
oceans, it abuts the busy Malacca Straitthrough which half of the worlds commercial tonnage
sailsand the contested South China Sea. Any serious assessment of Southeast Asias security
outlook must now include Indonesia.
Indonesias overriding security concern is the rise of China. Like most of its neighbours,
Indonesia sees both opportunities and threats in this emerging giant. Indonesia, which is rich
in natural resources and in desperate need of foreign investment to update its inadequate
infrastructure, knows that its economic development is tied to Chinas growth. But while Indonesia
wants to piggyback on Chinas economic ascent, it does not want China to dominate the
region politically.
Instead, Indonesia would prefer to preserve the status quo. Its colonial history has made
it wary of being dominated by great powers. However, it believes that the existing US-led
security order is the best way to ensure China does not become the predominant security actor
in the region. As long as America provides an implicit security guarantee, Indonesia believes
that a rising China is not a threat. Jakarta knows that the best way to balance Chinas economic
and strategic rise is for America to continue to play a central role in the region.
Managing relations between these two great powers is something of a balancing act. Jakarta
does not want to choose sides between the United States and China. It wants to continue
pursuing a fruitful economic relationship with China, while cultivating America as its most
important strategic partner. Eschewing one power over the other would force it to forgo either
its security needs or its economic development. To this end, Indonesia has recommitted to
regional multilateral forums, both to lock the United States into the region and to encourage
Chinas cooperation.
Indonesia is no longer a basket case but a middle power of geographic, economic and
strategic significance: a nation that important players in the region can ill afford to ignore.
Jessica Brown is a Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies. She holds
a Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) in Political Science from the University of Melbourne and has
completed a Master of International Studies at the University of Sydney.
The author would like to thank Dr John Lee, Daljit Singh, and one anonymous reviewer for
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors remain her own.
www.cis.org.au
90
Strait of
Malacca
Andaman Sea
Indian Ocean
INDONESIA
100
OTHER COUNTRIES
100
VIETNAM
110
South
China Sea
Brunei
MALAYSIA
110
Jakarta
SINGAPORE
MALAYSIA
THAILAND
10
10
90
120
PHILIPPINES
120
130
Philippine
Sea
Timor-Leste
130
North
Pacific
Ocean
140
10
10
PAPUA0
NEW
GUINEA
AUSTRALIA140
Introduction
When US President Barack Obama jetted into Jakarta in November 2010, he made
headlines around the world. Yet the international press barely noticed another state
visit, just days before. While Obama offered soaring rhetoric, Wu Bangguo, head of
Chinas National Peoples Congress, provided the Indonesians with something more
concrete: US$6.6 billion in infrastructure investments. It was, according to the
New York Times, a not-so-subtle challenge to Mr. Obama: Show your Indonesian
hosts the money.1
Over the past decade, Indonesia has transformed itself from an authoritarian
state to a democracy. As one of the few Asian states to survive the global financial
crisis relatively unscathed, it is also emerging as a regional economic power.
Indonesias rise is peaceful: it has resumed its de facto leadership of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (and is acting as chair of the body in 2011);
has joined the G20; and is building solid relationships with neighbours such as
India and Australia. Indonesia is cementing its middle power status. As the flourish
of interest shown by Washington and Beijing demonstrates, big powers are taking
notice of Indonesias increasing strategic significance.
At the same time as Indonesias fortunes are changing, the geopolitical
dynamics of the region are shifting as well. Despite assiduously building trade and
investment links throughout the region, China is increasingly asserting itself in
Southeast Asia. In March 2010, Beijing hinted it would elevate the hotly contested
South China Sea to the level of core interest, putting it on a par with Taiwan
and Tibet (although the Chinese government has not officially confirmed this).
With the Peoples Liberation Army Navy rapidly expanding in size and capability,
Southeast Asian governments (including Indonesias) worry that China may soon
be able to dominate the region. Indonesias three chief security concernsthe
Malacca Straits, the South China Sea, and the Indian Oceanare all areas where
China wants to increase its presence. However, Jakartas main security priority is
keeping China out. This contradiction means that Indonesian strategists are closely
watching Chinas rise.
This report will examine Indonesias strategic outlook through the lens of
these changing security dynamics. The first section looks at Indonesias increasing
strategic significance and its growing importance as an emerging economy and a
consolidating democracy.
The second section focuses on Indonesias foreign policy outlook and its
preoccupation with a rising China. In the words of veteran Southeast Asia watcher
Amitav Acharya, Jakartas dealings with Beijing will be defined by a mixture of
competition and collaboration.2 The two countries may be significant trading
partners, but many in Jakarta worry about Chinas ambitions in the region.
To assuage its worries, Indonesia is carefully building close relationships with its
neighbours and with the powerful United States. While Indonesia does not want
to have to choose sides between China and America, it is aware that the existing
US-led security order is the best way to maintain regional peace and security, and
to balance Chinas rising influence. A close strategic relationship with America
means Indonesia will have a powerful friend by its side if Chinas rise turns out not
to be peaceful.
At the same
time as
Indonesias
fortunes are
changing, the
geopolitical
dynamics of
the region are
shifting as well.
some of the busiest and strategically most important sea lanes in the world.3
The Malacca Strait, a narrow waterway separating Indonesia from Malaysia and
Singapore, is one of the two main chokepoints for energy transport in the world.
More than 50,000 vessels travel through it every year. In 2006, 15 million barrels
of oil per day were transported through the strait, the bulk being Middle-Eastern
oil travelling to China and Japan.4 Eighty percent of Chinas oil imports pass
through the waterway.5 Distinguished US correspondent Robert Kaplan notes:
As sea power grows in importance, the crowded hub around Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia will form the maritime heart of Asia.6
Recent political
reform and
economic growth
has made
Indonesia a
regional
power in its
own right.
The waters surrounding Indonesia are also militarily significant. The Malacca
Strait is the fastest way to move naval vessels between the Indian and Pacific
oceans.7 The strait leads to the hotly disputed South China Sea, which lies to
the north of Indonesia and borders all the littoral Southeast Asian states, as well as
China and Taiwan. The Natuna Islands, in Indonesias Riau province, lie in the
southwest corner of the South China Sea. The sea is rich in oil and gas, and carries
more than half of the worlds super-tanker traffic. China, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore and Indonesia all
claim parts of the South China Sea or its islands; at times, there have been brief
clashes in defence of these claims. By virtue of its location, any power that wants
to control the South China Seaand by extension control maritime Southeast
Asiacannot ignore Indonesia.
A consolidating democracy and a growing economy
Recent political reform and economic growth has made Indonesia a regional
power in its own right. With a population of nearly 250 million people, Indonesia
is the worlds fourth most populous country.8 Moreover, it is rated by Freedom
House as the only politically free state in Southeast Asia.9 Since the fall of the
authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, highly centralised political power in Jakarta
has been substantially devolved to the regions. Controls on political parties,
civil society, and the media have been relaxed or lifted altogether; ongoing
conflicts in East Timor and Aceh have been neutralised, with East Timor granted
independence and Aceh effective autonomy. The re-election of President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, universally known as SBY, to a second term in mid-2009
reflects Indonesias growing political stability.
While Indonesia is still very much a developing economyalmost half of
its population lives on less than $US2 a day in PPP termsits economic future
looks bright.10 Indonesia was one of the few economies that continued to grow
throughout the global recession, experiencing GDP growth of more than 6%
in the second quarter of 2010.11 Investment bank Morgan Stanley predicts that
Indonesias economy, already ranked 18th largest in the world,12 will continue to
grow at a similar rate in 2011.13 The Economist touts it as a potential member of
the fast-growing BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economies,14 and the
Financial Standard argues that Indonesiawhich accounts for 13% of global coal
exports and is a major producer of palm oilwill get picked up by the rising tide of
a booming China and India.15
Indonesia is actively seeking a bigger presence on the world stage, and is
increasingly acting like a middle power.16 Yudhoyono has reinvigorated Indonesias
role as the unofficial leader of ASEAN, and is building a bigger international
profile as a member of the increasingly powerful G20 group of large and
emerging economies. Indonesians are becoming more confident about their place
in the world. In the 2006 Lowy Institute Poll, 88% of Indonesian respondents
indicated it would be best for the future of Indonesia if we take an active part in
world affairs.17
Indonesias relationships with the major powers in the region have improved,
too. As well as moving closer to ASEAN, Yudhoyono has improved cooperation
with large neighbours such as India and Australia, and more importantly, great
powers America and China. Taken together, these trends suggest that Indonesia
will become a more important part of the regional security fabric.
However, some significant problems could still derail Indonesias progress.
Its democracy is still new, and institutions such as the courts, police and parliament
remain weak. Democratic reversals in neighbouring Thailand and the Philippines
are a reminder that political stability is tenuous in Southeast Asia. Respected
Indonesia watcher Rizal Sukma notes that Indonesias democracy, while becoming
more consolidated, remains a work in progress.18 The resignation in 2010 of
reform-minded Finance Minister Sri Mulyani was widely interpreted as a sign
of President Yudhoyonos weakness in the face of powerful Suharto-era cronies,
many of whom are now in Parliament and oppose political and economic reform
to protect their vested interests.19 The President is coming under increasing
criticism both within Indonesia and abroad, thanks to the sluggish change under
his leadership.20 Corruption is more widespread now than it was under Suharto,
and is seriously impeding the functioning of the state and business investment
in Indonesia.21 Poverty remains endemic. The 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings were
a reminder of the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks. Instances of religious
violence have increased.22 Any of these domestic problems could undermine
Indonesias political and economic progress.
Some
significant
problems could
still derail
Indonesias
progress.
Indonesias
relationship
with China
has historically
been unstable.
were killed in an aborted coup. In the bloody aftermath, one surviving general,
Suharto, seized power and replaced Sukarno as president in 1967. Suharto
suspected the coup had been orchestrated by the Indonesian Communist Party
(the PKI), backed by China. In the violent reprisals that followed, hundreds of
thousands of PKI members and suspected communist sympathisers were killed.
Suharto unilaterally cut diplomatic relations with China.
This episode, along with Suhartos own deeply held hostility to communism,
shaped Indonesias relationship with China for the next two and a half decades.
The authoritarian Suharto justified his strong military rule as a response to the
threat posed by communist China. Despite repeated requests from China to
re-establish ties, the two countries did not have a formal relationship until 1990.
Even after relations were restored, Suharto remained wary of China.27 His suspicion
that China would interfere in Indonesias domestic affairs persevered until his
resignation in 1998. While other ASEAN states developed closer bilateral
relationships with China during the 1990s, Indonesia favoured dealing with
Beijing through multilateral forums.28
Bilateral ties improved substantially in the post-Suharto period, although
coming from a very low base. Jakarta is a lot less wary of Beijing than it used to
be.29 President Wahid, who came to power in late 1999, explicitly forged closer ties
with China, India and other Asian states to counter the influence of Western
countries in Indonesia, believing the United States and Australia had forced
Indonesia to grant independence to East Timor.30 President Megawati Sukarnoputri,
Wahids successor, focused on improving economic ties with China.31 In 2005,
President Yudhoyono signed a strategic partnership with China. Juwono Sudarsono,
former Indonesian defence minister and professor of international relations at the
University of Indonesia, sums up the Indonesian view that lingering suspicion of
China is still present but this is offset by admiration for Chinas successes.32
Rizal Sukma argues that this thawing in relations must be seen in two separate
contexts: bilateral and regional.
Within the bilateral context, Indonesia has become increasingly comfortable
dealing with China, a manifestation of which is evident in the expansion of
cooperation between the two countries since 1998 and especially since 2004.
Within the East Asian context, however, Indonesias attitudes and policy are
still shaped by a degree of the feeling of uncertainty regarding the long-term
implications of the rise of China for the regional order.33
The bilateral context
subject of violent attacks in the 1998 riots that followed the Asian Financial
Crisis. President Wahid in particular saw the value in dismantling discriminatory
policies and restoring the confidence of overseas Chinese business networks to
return to Indonesia.38 Now, a quarter of Indonesian universities teach Mandarin;
Indonesian companies seeking to do business with China are increasingly looking
for Indonesian-Mandarin speaking recruits. Indonesians seem much more accepting
of China, with 59% saying they trust China to act responsibly in the world.39
In part, this is the result of Chinas diplomatic efforts over the past decade, with
Beijing being quick to offer aid after both the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and
the 2004 tsunami.40
Despite the increasingly close economic relationship, there are limits to bilateral
cooperation. Jakarta largely sees Chinese investment in Indonesia, especially in
resources and infrastructure, as more of an economic benefit than a security
threat. However, this may change as China becomes more powerful. As Abraham
Denmark notes:
There is concern among policy elites throughout the region that Chinese
economic influence will make Indonesia more vulnerable to political pressure
from Beijing.41
Large sections of the Indonesian population are also concerned about the
impact of trade with China on domestic industries, especially the textile industry.
While the Yudhoyono government was keen to get behind an ASEAN-China
Free Trade Agreement, many Indonesians remain fearful it will result in jobs
being lost to Chinese firms.42
The regional context
Strategic
cooperation
between
Indonesia and
China has not
progressed the
same way as
the economic
relationship.
If there are still some lingering concerns in Indonesia about the bilateral
relationship with China, there is outright anxiety about Chinas strategic role in
the region. Sukma sums up Indonesias fears:
The concern with China relates first and foremost to the question of how
China is going to use its new stature and influence in achieving its national
interests and objectives in the region. Indonesia, like any other ASEAN member
states [sic], would not want to see China seeking to dominate the region ...43
Jakartas wariness means that strategic cooperation between Indonesia and
Chinawhile improved since the days of Suhartohas not progressed the same
way as the economic relationship. The 2005 strategic partnership on security
issues has not translated into action.44 Indonesia has signalled its keenness to
sell non-weapon military supplies to the huge Chinese army, promising to buy
Chinese weapons in return.45 But in all likelihood, Indonesia just wants to cash in
on the economic opportunity rather than build closer strategic or military links
with China.
Chinas strategic role
This possibility of
Chinese security
dominance drives
Indonesias
security worries.
security priorities.47 Jakarta believes that keeping these waters free from external
domination is the key to preserving its own security and sovereignty. If a foreign
power were to gain a foothold in any of these waterways, it could be in a position
to deny access to commercial and naval shipping.
Unfortunately, other regional powers also consider these three areas as
strategically important. Beijing has affirmed both its strategic interest in the Malacca
Strait and its readiness to use naval force to ensure safe passage of its ships if
other powers were to deny it access.48 And while China spent many years playing
down its long-standing territorial claims against Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam
and Taiwan, in March 2010 it indicated it would elevate the South China Sea to
the level of core interest, putting it on a par with Taiwan and Tibet.49 Although
China may have since backed away from this statement, the situation is deeply
worrying for Indonesia.
In 1993, China quietly made a territorial claim over the waters surrounding
Indonesias Natuna Islands. While the Indonesian government (under Suharto)
did not formally respond to the claim, fearing that to do so would legitimise it,50
Chinese maps of its South China Sea claims now include an area north of the
Natuna Islands that falls within Indonesias Exclusive Economic Zone. China has
never acted on its claim, but it evades questions regarding Indonesias sovereignty
over the Natunas. The dispute bubbled over in 2009 when Indonesia detained
75 Chinese fishermen operating in the area.51
The Natuna Islands are both strategically and economically important for
Indonesia. Located between peninsular Malaysia and Borneo, the islands provide
a geographical gateway between the South China Sea to the north and the Java Sea
and the Malacca Strait to the south. Whoever controls the islands commands
access to these sea lanes, as well as Indonesias main islands of Java and Sumatra.
Lying under the sea bed surrounding the Natunas is one of Indonesias largest
liquefied natural gas reserves. These largely unexploited reserves may hold up to
a quarter of Indonesias recoverable gas supply.52 Jakarta is worried that China
might see the Natunas as quite a prize.
Indonesia is similarly anxious about Chinas interest in the strategically significant
Andaman and Nicobar Islands on its Western tip. The islands, which form a barrier
between the Malacca Strait on one side and the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal
on the other, belong to India but lie only 200 kilometres off Indonesias Sumatra
province. Both Indonesia and India wish to keep the islands safe for shipping
Indonesia's maritime security priorities
Andaman and
Nicobar Islands
Malacca Strait
INDONESIA
OTHER COUNTRIES
Natuna Islands
and free from external domination.53 Jakarta is keen to build its relationship with
New Delhi, hoping that close cooperation with India will prevent China from
expanding its naval operations into the Indian Ocean and threatening Indonesian
naval interests from the west. For its part, India has been carefully building a
system of bilateral security relationships with Southeast Asia, including Indonesia,
with the same aim in mind.54
Indonesias most sensitive security issue is the Malacca Strait. Jakarta is
unequivocal in barring any foreign power from gaining a foothold in the strait.
Indonesia, along with its close neighbours, is responsible for securing the strait
and ensuring the safe passage of more than half the worlds commercial maritime
traffic through it. In 2007, then Indonesian defence minister Juwono Sudarsono
asked Japan, China and South Korea for technical assistance to help secure the
strait.55 However, Indonesia is loath to accept more than technical help. So far,
it has rebuffed advances from America, India, Australia, Japan, and China to help
secure the waterway.56
Indonesia does not want to give any of these statesespecially Chinathe
impression that it (along with its neighbours) cant manage the strait. Despite
severe funding constraints, Indonesia is working assiduously to professionalise
its navy and improve its capacity, particularly through the purchase of submarines.57
Since 2004, it has joined with Malaysia and Singapore to coordinate security
patrols in the areaa previously unprecedented level of security cooperation.
While there is no doubt that Indonesia, along with its neighbours, sees piracy and
the potential for terrorism in the strait as a serious security threat, these patrols also
send a clear message to China that, should it be looking for an excuse to flex its
muscles, the Southeast Asian nations are in control.
Indonesias sensitivity about outside powers gaining too much of a foothold in
the strait was made clear when, in 2004, incorrect reports suggested that America
would begin sending patrol boats to the area. Indonesia (along with Malaysia)
reacted quickly and angrily,58 claiming that not only would such a move attract
the attention of Islamic extremists keen to target US vessels, but that it would also
infringe on their sovereignty.59 Likewise, Jakarta has also refused New Delhis offer
to use its Andaman and Nicobar command post as a base from which to operate
patrols of the Malacca Straits.60 With sovereignty such a sensitive issue, it seems unlikely
that Indonesia would ever allow foreign patrols in its territorial waterseven by
a trusted partner like the United States.61
With
sovereignty
such a sensitive
issue, it seems
unlikely that
Indonesia
would ever
allow foreign
patrols in its
territorial
waters.
A desire for
self-reliance and
non-alignment
remains at
the heart of
Indonesias
foreign policy.
Papuan civilians in October 2010), it was not long before the two states resumed
contact. While the Soviet threat had passed, a new threat in the form of global
terrorism had emerged. In 2002, in the aftermath of the Bali bombing, America
began providing counter-terrorism assistance to Indonesia.64 Formal security ties
were restored in 2005. America resumed arms sales, as well as military training
programs and bilateral military exercises.65 It has helped Indonesia install a series
of radar systems to enhance security in the Malacca and Makassar straits. In 2009,
they co-hosted the Garuda Shield multilateral military exercises.66 In 2010,
the Indonesian armys notorious Special Forces unit Kopassus struck a training deal
with the US military.
Hillary Clinton included Indonesia in her first official overseas trip in early 2009,
and the two states agreed to sign a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement
including defence, trade and environmental cooperation later that year. This was
subsequently signed by presidents Obama and Yudhoyono in November 2010.67
The partnership includedamong a number of clauses on closer security, economic
and cultural cooperationa pledge to become partners in maintaining regional
and international peace and security in Southeast Asia and beyond.68 Indonesian
international relations experts agree that the strategic partnership will do much to
bring Indonesia and United States closer.69
Limits to cooperation
United States will likely remain the most important player in Southeast Asian
security for the foreseeable future. Jakarta welcomed Hillary Clintons offer in
April 2010 to mediate in the South China Sea disputes, believing that having a
powerful friend would give the smaller Southeast Asian states more bargaining power.77
Proudly non-aligned
A powerful realist urge to balance against dominant outside powers has long
been at the heart of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Despite Suhartos
anti-communist sentiments, Indonesia has always been a committed member of
the Non-Aligned Movement. The formation of ASEAN in 1967 by Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Thailand (with memories of colonialism fresh
in their minds) was an effort to stop either of the two Cold War superpowers from
gaining too much influence in the region. ASEANs now infamous policy of
non-interference in the internal affairs of member states has long been derided as
the main source of the groups impotence and inertia. But the policy stems from
this urge to resist domination by any regional or outside power.
Having been so keen to avoid this fate during the Cold War, Jakarta certainly
does not want to risk it again. Indonesia does not want to become a subservient
ally to the United States or be used in a power play against China. Some experts in
Jakarta fear that America is only interested in getting close to Indonesia on suspicion
of Chinese intentions in the South China Sea.78 Nor does Indonesia want China
to define its relations with ASEAN states in terms of its competition with other
major powers.79
A balancing act
Jakarta
believes that
maintaining
relationships
with both the
United States
and China is
the best way
to ensure
regional peace
and stability.
Multilateral institutions
Indonesia sees its leadership of ASEAN in 2011 as a way to engage both China
and the United States in the region. As Abdul Khalik says in the Jakarta Post,
Indonesia will not allow the region to fall into a Cold War-like environment
of mutual suspicion and hostility while striving to maintain an absence of
a preponderant power.86 China is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the
regions only formal multilateral security dialogue, and the East Asia Summit,
Indonesia is
far more likely
to accept the
United States
as a benign
hegemon than it
is to accept China
in such a role.
an annual leadership dialogue hosted by ASEAN. By bringing China into the tent,
Indonesia hopes it will be more inclined to adhere to ASEANs rules and negotiate
disputes with the region as a whole rather than picking off the relatively powerless
Southeast Asian states one by one.87
Indonesia was also one of the more vocal proponents of the United States
joining the East Asian Summit, which it did in July 2010. Most analysts interpreted
this as an attempt to moderate Chinas growing influence and balance its
disproportionate size.88 As the Jakarta Post summarised, Now that the US has
been admitted into the East Asia Summit, Washington and Jakarta [can] collaborate
on building a new regional architecture that guarantees peace and prosperity for
all countries in the region.89 In 2007, Australia, India and New Zealand joined
the summit following lobbying from Jakarta.90
Indonesia has long regarded itself as the de facto leader of the ASEAN, but its
interest waned as it became caught up in domestic turmoil at the end of the 1990s.
Now, despite some suggestions that Indonesia is outgrowing ASEAN,91 Jakarta
wants to claim its historical place at the centre of the group.92 However, ASEANs
track record in managing security disputes is patchy at best. Moreover, some of its
members such as Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia have become increasingly close to
China. Indonesia is concerned that ASEAN alone cannot effectively manage regional
security in the future,93 and is simultaneously pursuing bilateral relationships with
regional powers (as well as the United States) to hedge against this possibility.
Conclusion
Indonesia, like the United States and China, is ultimately driven by realist
calculations. Its foreign policy outlook will be increasingly dominated by strategies
to balance Chinas rising influence in the region. Jakarta is extremely wary of
potential Chinese naval expansion into Southeast Asia, especially in the South
China Sea, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the Malacca Strait, which
it views as its corealmost existentialsecurity concerns. For now, China
provides far greater economic opportunities than security threats. Even if strategic
competition between America and China were to emerge, Indonesia would put off
choosing sides for as long as possible. But, fundamentally, Jakarta does not trust
Beijing. It will hedge its bets by pursuing cooperative relationships with both the
United States and China.
Indonesias interests are largely aligned with Americas. Neither country would
like to see China increase its military power in Southeast Asia. However, Indonesia
will maintain a staunchly independent outlook: its relationship with America will
be a marriage of convenience rather than an enduring alliance. Despite Indonesias
ongoing antipathy towards what it perceives as meddling from any major power,
Indonesia is far more likely to accept the United States as a benign hegemon than
it is to accept China in such a role. The Pentagons renewed relationship with the
Indonesian militarydespite ongoing problems exemplified in the latest human
rights scandalshows that Washington is aware of this, too.
Endnotes
1 Norimitsu Onishi, Obama and China play rival suitors to Indonesia, The New York
Times (9 November 2010).
2 Amitav Acharya, Seeking Security in the Dragons Shadow: China and Southeast Asia in
the Emerging Asian Order (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, March
2003).
3 CIA World Factbook, Indonesia.
4 US Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints (January
2008).
36 Yoga Rusmana and Liza Lin, Indonesia Seeks Chinas Help in Doubling Foreign
Investment, Businessweek (18 April 2010).
37 Abidin Kusno, Chinese Indonesians: State Policy, Monoculture and Multiculture,
Review of thePacific Affairs79:4 (2006),705707.
38 Rizal Sukma, Indonesias Response to the Rise of China: Growing Comfort Amid
Uncertainties, as above.
39 Michelle Tsai, Indonesia Learns Chinese, Foreign Policy (20 May 2010).
40 Rizal Sukma, Indonesias Response to the Rise of China: Growing Comfort Amid
Uncertainties, as above.
41 Abraham Denmark, Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of US-Indonesia Relations, as
above.
42 Anwar Nasution, Another look into the China-ASEAN trade pact, Jakarta Post
(22 March 2010).
43 Rizal Sukma, Indonesias Response to the Rise of China: Growing Comfort amid
Uncertainties, as above.
44 Klas Marklund, Indonesia: Development Scenarios 20202030, as above.
45 Dicky Christanto, Indonesia, China set to boost military relations, The Jakarta Post
(22 May 2010).
46 Jing-dong Yuan, China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects, and Implications
for U.S. Interests (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006).
See also Jusuf Wanandi, The future of Indonesia-China relations after 60 years,
The Jakarta Post (1 October 2010).
47 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Malacca Strait tops RI defense agenda in
region, (9 June 2010).
48 Mokhzani Zubir and Mohd. Nizam Basiron, The Straits of Malacca: The Rise of
China, Americas Intentions and the Dilemma of the Littoral States, Maritime Studies
141 (Mar/Apr 2005), 2426.
49 See Professor Carlyle A. Thayer, Recent Developments in the South China Sea:
Implications for Regional Peace and Prosperity. Paper to 2nd International Workshop
on The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development,
co-organised by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers
Association (Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam: 1012 November 2010).
50 Douglas Johnson, Drawn into the Fray: Indonesias Natuna Islands Meet Chinas
Long Gaze South, Asian Affairs 24: 3 (June 1997).
51 Keith Loveard, The Thinker: Caution Over Natuna, Jakarta Globe (2 July 2009).
52 ASEAN Affairs, Indonesia: Exxon Mobils Natuna gas proposal rejected
(17 January 2009).
53 Pankaj K. Jha, India-Indonesia Strategic Partnership, www.scribd.com/doc/19229647/
IndiaIndonesia-Strategic-Partnership.
54 Ritu Sharma, Indian Navy seeks to strengthen standing in Indian Ocean Region,
India Strategic (March 2010).
55 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Indonesia wants help to secure waterway
(3 June 2007).
56 Reuters, Balancing Powers in the Malacca Strait, Global News Journal (7 March 2010).
57 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Indonesia wants help to secure waterway,
as above.
58 Lieutenant John F. Bradford, The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Naval War College Review 58: 3 (Summer 2005).
59 Ian Storey, Calming the Waters in Maritime Southeast Asia, East-West Center Asia
Pacific Bulletin 29 (18 February 2009).
60 Ramli H. Nik, ASEAN Maritime Security Perspectives: Enduring Parternships. In
William T. Tow and Chin Kin Wah (eds.), ASEAN India Australia: Towards Closer
Engagement in a New Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).
61 Klas Marklund, Indonesia: Development Scenarios 20202030, as above.
62 John B. Haseman and Eduardo Lachica, The U.S.-Indonesia Security Relationship:
The Next Steps, (Washington, D.C.: United States-Indonesia Society, 2009),
63 Abraham Denmark, Crafting a Strategic Vision: A New Era of US-Indonesia Relations,
as above.
64 As above.
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