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Antiship Missiles:
An Effectiveness and
Utility Comparison
ABSTRACT The paper reviews the
Introduction
ver the last twenty years, maritime forces around the world have
deployed a wide variety of antiship missiles (ASMs). These missiles
have periodically incorporated new technologies in order to maintain an effectiveness advantage over evolving defensive systems.
Interest is growing in the application of new propulsion technologies for efficient
supersonic ASMs in the 1990s and beyond. It is therefore appropriate and
timely to evaluate the overall effectiveness and utility payoff for supersonic
ASM speed.
With the exception of several Soviet missiles and dual purpose surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) such as Standard SM-1/2, current ASMs fly subsonic trajectories which enable maximum standoff range w i t h size and weight constraints
and give adequate time for guidance processing to maximize target acquisition.
Studies of advanced antiship missiles employing either subsonic or supersonic
flight profiles have been performed by missile manufacturers, to examine the
relative merit of these two flight regimes for the antiship mission. This paper
will compare the effectiveness of subsonic and supersonic antiship missiles and
present a rationale for selection between the two.
Requirements
Before designing a missile to perform a mission, requirements for that mission
are organized in a systems engineering flowdown matrix. An example of such a
flowdown is shown in Figure 1. Here, the requirements in each performance
area are related to some top-level effectiveness criterion:
Effectiveness Criterion-The overall performance goal for the ASM system.
For example, we might specify that the ASM must be able to achieve a 0.5
probability of disabling the surface-to-surface missile capability (SSM kill) on
a given target moving at 30 knots with a single shot from 60 nm range.
Loadout-This is a requirement for how many ASMs must be carried on
which launch platforms and be compatible with which launch equipment. The
loadout requirements set a number of constraints on missile design, such as
maximum length, diameter, and weight.
Availability-This defines the percentage of time that the ASM system will
be ready to launch when needed. It is another family of constraints that may
be driven by factors such as depot maintenance schedule, logistics, storage/
pre-launch reliability, ease of repair, and response time during combat.
Launch Platform Survivability-Survival of the launch platfonin is essential
and will set the ASM standoff range requirement.
In-Flight Reliability (Pr)-The probability that the ASM will function properly
after launch.
Target Acquisition (Pacq)-The probability that the ASM will acquire the
intended target.
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL
January 1997
57
Anti-Ship Missile
Effectiveness Criteria.
j.lllllilllj..II.I)Yl
El
Survivabilit
+Example: Hit 30
F I G U R E 1.
=
=
=
=
ClWS
=
=
=
=
EMCON
IR
LID
mr
OTH
Pacq
Ph
Pk
Pkss
Pr
Ps
sr
SSM
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
STOT
I*m
=
=
RCS
RF
SAM
SFC
58
=
=
=
Angle of attack
Area of uncertainty
Missile presented area
Antiship missiles (used to describe own-forces)
Close-in weapons system
Emission control
Infrared
Lift-to-drag ratio
milliradian
Over-the-horizon
Probability of target acquisition by ASM
Probability of an ASM impacting the target
Probability of kill (ASM killing ship or SAM killing
ASM)
Single shot probability of kill
Missile in-flight reliability
Probability of survival (vs hard kill defenses)
Radar cross section
Radio frequency
Surface-to-air missile (system)
Specific fuel consumption
Steradian (a measure of solid angle)
Surface-to-surface missile (used to denote a threat
ASM)
Simultaneous time on target
micron
Effectiveness
Pr x Pacq x Ps x Ph x Pk
N A V A L ENGINEERS J O U R N A L
2.3(0.5)(1322/3)(LOG10(1.13))
=
R
F I G U R E 2.
Having arrived at a range requirement of 185 km for surface launch, we can proceed to compare the performance
ill use the classic Breguet equation
of several ASMs. We w
(Corning, 1970 and many others) to calculate the maximum range of our candidate ASMs:
~.~(L/D)(V/C)(LOG~O(W~/W~))
2.5
V
1.5 lbilblhr
2.3(0.5)(1322/3)(LOG10(1.3))
58 nm (107 km)
January 1997
Design
Subsonic
Supersonic #1
Supersonic #2
Normalized Weight
1.0
1.37
2.2
Normalized Cost
1.0
1.27
1.82
rolled off the assembly line. At the same time, the 2,000th
subsonic missile is rolled off a competing assembly lie.
By using a learning curve methodology, we can estimate
the cost and schedule tradeoffs to expect.
In aerospace applications, manufacturing improvement
curves (Gibson, 1981 and many others) are often used to
determine expected recurring costs over a production run.
The average cost of a production run of X missiles is given
bY
cost
(Z)(X)-
Target Acquisition
An autonomous ASM must be able to fly out to the expected target location and find the target w i t h an area
of uncertainty (AOU) around the aimpoint. The size of the
AOU is determined by three primary factors: (1) random
motion of the target during ASM flyout; (2)ASM navigational errors incurred during flyout; (3) targeting errors,
including target motion between time of measurement and
time of launch (time late).
The target motion contribution to AOU can be modeled
by assuming a target moving away from the aimpoint in a
January 1997
NAVAL E N G I N E E R S J O U R N A L
Pt
=
=
18
16
14-
R = (A/B)**0.25
where A = (Pt)(Gt)(Gr)(Lt)(Lr)(A**2)
0
and
B
(7.94E - 8)(S/N)(Br)(NF
1)
January 1997
20
40
MI
MI
100
120
Target Range - Km
140
160
180
200
61
24
cross Ran-
Coverage Seeker B
CmssRange
Search Allnude
*-185
Km Range
Requirement
4 2 -
20
40
60
80
Range
F I G U R E 5.
- Km
1,000 mz Target
Survivability
Accuracy
Time Delays
Dead Zone =
SAM velocity =
=
=
Figure 7 illustrates some observations which can immediately be made. The radar horizon against an ASM
flying at an altitude of 5 meters is 26.7 km. This is the
ships first detection opportunity even if the ASM was
launched at the example standoff range requirement of 185
km. If the ASM flies a high altitude trajectory, as our
ramjet-powered supersonic missile must do to achieve the
standoff range, then first detection could take place soon
after launch at ranges exceeding 160 km. Our hypothetical
SAM could achieve four shoot-look-shoot opportunities
against a Mach 2 ASM on this trajectory prior to the ASM
reaching the SAM dead zone.
While the probability of kill (Pk) of each SAM intercept
is complicated to estimate, even a small Pk, when compounded by multiple intercepts, lowers the overall ASM
probability of survival significantly Figure 8 shows the
compounding effect of multiple intercepts. Flying faster,
say Mach 3, will reduce but not eliminate intercept opportunitie s.
January 1997
NAVAL E N G I N E E R S J O U R N A L
I
SAM Min. Range
Subsonic
:
I
Track
Delay
(Limited by
EW Handover
Delay or ASM
RCS)
Target Ship
Handover
Delay
(Limited by :
Horizon or ASM
RCS)
I !
Downrange
EW
Detect
Track
Track
Delay
Early
Warning
Radar
ASM
Handover
Delay
(Limited by
Horizon or ASM
EW Handover
Delay or ASM
RCS)
Target Ship
F I G U R E 6.
RCS)
I
Downrange
RF Guided SAMs
January 1997
1.o
0.6
1
0.6
.E
a'
0.4
.-a3
0.2
I
0.0 0
4
6
Number of SAM Intercepts
I
10
10,000
2
Q
5 1,000
E
1
Q
=?
.
I
-
100
Subsonic Low
,--""Altitude
Trajectory
10
~.
-,-**
20
40
60
80
100
FIGURE
Z Detection Scenario-RF
120
- Km
140
160
180
200
Guided SAMs
January 1997
60 degrees
5 meters (1 sigma)
10 degrees
20 meters
Infrared (IR) guided SAMs are deployed on small combatants and are much shorter range than radar guided
SAMs. They typically employ electro optical fuzes which
function at low altitude. The small detection range of an
optical fuze is acceptable on an IR guided SAM because
of inherently higher terminal accuracy than RF guided
SAMs. An IR SAM system is cued by a long range sensor
on the defending ship, and is physically pointed toward the
incoming ASM to attempt seeker lock-on. The SAM is
launched when the received signal from the target becomes large enough. The IR guided SAM has a dead zone,
but it is much smaller than for RF guided SAMs.
The survivability of subsonic and supersonic ASMs
against IR guided SAMs is driven by Merences in ASM
signature. Figure 13 shows the variation of IR radiant
Time
Delays
-10
-20
E
rn
u)
;E? -30
cn
-40
-50
F I G U R E 9.
2
3
4
ASM Speed (Mach Number)
January 1997
65
-10
+ Horizon
Limits
Mach 2.6
-20
Mach 1.5
U
J
'E1l
-30
cn
0
U
-40
-50
Miss Distance
Distribution
Range Cufofl
Sea Surface
66
January 1997
NAVAL E N G I N E E R S J O U R N A L
1.o
2z
10,000
0.8
.-U5
.-F
u.
o!
0.6
9?
BB
6
C
.-
1,000
0.4
100
10
m
.U
0.2
LL
0.0
0
10
15
ASM Cruise Altitude
20
- meters
25
30
0.1
I
30
120
150
60
90
Vehicle Aspect Angle deg
180
F I G U R E 13.
=
5 rn
We can relate these signatures to survivability by computing the seeker lock-on range. This is given by solving
for R in
J = (H)(S/N)(R2)/(T)and T = e-aR
where J is the contrast signature in wattsisr, H is the
seeker sensitivity in wattsicm', SAV is the signal-to-noise
ratio required for lock-on, R is the range in meters, T is
the atmospheric transmission (a non-dimensional fraction), and a is the extinction coefficient. The contrast signature is obtained by subtracting the background radiance
from the target signal received at the seeker. Calculating
this background can be very complex as it involves time of
dax sun position relative to target and sensor, sensor liieof-sight (e.g. target against sky or sea background), sea
state, cloud cover, and a host of other factors. For our
example here, we will use data from Wolf and Zissis (1985)
for daylight and ocean background (sea-skimmer ASMs
will be seen against ocean background). By multiplying
the background radiance area by the presented area of the
ASM (say 26 cm in diameter and 457 cm long at 5 degrees
AOA), we obtain a background radiance of about 0.5
wattslsr.
We can now define the other parameters in the lock-on
equation above:
10 a = -0.000345 m-l
January 1997
500 meters
2 seconds
4 seconds
0.01
Ballistic dispersion
Open-fire range
Minimum range
2 milliradians (one
sigma)
2500 meters
140 meters
=
=
We also define a generic ASM which is 36 cm in diameter and 457 cm long. The subsonic ASM cruises at 5
degrees AOA while a Mach 2 ASM cruises at 1 degree
AOA. Assuming the ASM is flying directly at the gun
system, the subsonic variant will have a presented area
(Ap) of 0.23 square meters while the supersonic variant
will have Ap of 0.13 square meters. Thus, if the two
variants are identical in size as we have assumed here,
then the supersonic missile has an immediate advantage
of having only sixty percent of the subsonic Ap simply due
to AOA (however, as we saw in our earlier discussion, for
the same standoff range, the supersonic variant is inevitably larger).
Figure 15 shows the result of a simplistic gun analysis
using the Carlton function. The Mach 0.8 missile would
be expected to receive one hit by 800 meters range-to-go
and eight hits into minimum range. The Mach 2 missile
would receive one hit by 250 meters and two hits into
minimum range. The supersonic missile has better performance because its speed limits the number of projectiles encountered.
Maneuvers might be used to attempt to further decrease the number of hits. A maneuver potentially decreases the pointing accuracy of the gun by changing the
ASM position too rapidly for the gun fire-control computer
to predict ahead. An aerodynamic maneuver, however, will
increase the AOA and Ap and actually decrease survivability in cases where the maneuver is not heavily degrading
the gun pointing error. The figure shows, for example, the
effect of a Mach 2, 10 g maneuver on expected hits assuming the mean pointing error is unaffected. The result
is more than double the number of expected hits. The
maneuver must degrade the pointing error to above 3
milliradians just to recover the loss in survivability due to
increased Ap. Whether this is possible or not depends on
the sophistication of the gun fire-control algorithms and
the timing of the maneuver.
The number of hits does not necessarily translate directly into survivability. Figure 16 shows the probability of
gun kill (Pk) against our Mach 0.8 and Mach 2 generic
ASMs assuming that one hit is a kill. The Pk against the
subsonic missile reaches a high level at longer range than
for the supersonic missile, but both are stiU killed. The
one shot kill criterion may be more applicable to the supersonic missile than the subsonic for several reasons. First,
the higher speed results in a higher projectile impact velocity, which ensures penetration of even armored warhead cases and coupling of more energy into the target. A
1000 meter/sec projectile, for example, impacts the Mach
2 vehicle with 78% more energy than the Mach 0.8 vehicle. Also, the Mach 2 air loads are six times as high as at
Mach 0.8, resulting in greater vulnerability to projectileinduced aerodynamic damage.
The figure shows that a Mach 0.8 vehicle which could
survive four hits would be equal in survivability with a
Mach 2 vehicle which is vulnerable to a single hit. It should
be remembered that ASM mission success is achieved by
delivering an intact ordnance section to the target, regardless of what damage might have been taken by the
rest of the missile in the process.
No matter how capable a defensive gun system may be,
existing and projected types can only engage one target
at a time. A Mach 0.8 ASM traverses the engagement
zone postulated here in 9 seconds, the Mach 2 ASM in
3.6 seconds. The gun will need a substantial fraction of
7 -
1.0,
z 4
I3
-\
1
0
0
1000
2 m
Range-to-Go meters
3000
Range-lo-Go -meters
of Gun Hits
F I G U R E 15.
January 1997
69
VIA
NAVAL E N G I N E E R S J O U R N A L
Generic Anti-Ship
Missile (ASM)
Time
Time
Time
TO
T1
T2
\,
Chaff Cloud
YSM
January 1997
1 .o
0.8
0.6
.
-g
a
0.4
0.2
0.0
5000
10000
I5000
20000
25000
71
Effectiveness Factor
ASM Tvpe
-.
Subsonic Supersonic
Availability
In-Flight Reliability
Probability of Acquisition
30 Knot Targets
High Speed Targets (>40kn)
Probability of Survival
RF SAMs
RF SAMs W/Advanced Fuze
IR SAMs
Point Defense Guns
1++1
1++1
+
-
1+1
1+1
+
Probability of Hit
Clear Environment
ECM Environment
&
+
++
Warhead Lethality
(Probability of Damage Given a Hit)
1++1
cost
El
Overall
&I
Acceptable
Good
Preferred System
72
January 1997
NAVAL E N G I N E E R S J O U R N A L
NAVAL E N G I N E E R S JOURNAL
January 1997
REFERENCES
[l.] Prezelin, Bernard and A.D. Baker 111 (ed. 1, Combat
73