Bemoans the fact that there is no seljuq history

Doesnt proceed to write one

Wants to uncover the ideology of Seljuq power
His story: making his ideology un-invisible
Althusser & Foucault
1. Deconstructing the Great Saljuq Myth
a. Some background history (even here legitimization is already at work)
i. Descend from the Oghuz, a Turkic tribal confederation who
migrated to the Iranian plateau in the 10th century.
1. Reason for coming not clear: court dispute, pastural lands.
Some depict it as hijra.
ii. Superficially Islamic, uncivilized contrasted with the Muslim,
refined Persians.
1. Depicted as nomadic, customary raiding into Islamic
lands, and fierce temperament.
2. Picture is somewhat complicated after all, they were
astute rulers and knew how to deal with the notables
when they came to power.
a. But then he does present the viziers, particularly
Nizam al-Mulk and Kunduri, as mediating between
them and the caliph, them and the scholars, etc.
iii. Origins: descendants of kings (later projections), Safi: most likely
of humble origins
iv. Ancestor Tuqaq: said to have spared Muslim lives
1. Seljuqs said to have come to the aid of Muslims simple
skirmish turns into ghazw.
v. Seljuq: converted his people to Islam; depicted as eager
converts.
1. Bar Hebraeus: Seljuq had a politically expedient reason to
convert, so as to blend in to the conquered peoples.
b. Engaged in inter-Turkic warfare, they end up coming out on top.
c. Unlike Abbasids, cant claim genealogical legitimacy
d. The Seljuqs made use of five modes of legitimization in historical
narratives (not clear how, since he doesnt explicitly claim that the
Seljuqs solicited the narratives)
i. Obedient to Sunni Islamic principles
ii. Loyal to the Abbasid Caliphs
1. Tughril is the right hand of the Commander of the
Faithful
2. Early Ghaznavid source presents Seljuqs as clients of the
Abbasids and dedicated to putting down corruption
a. Indication that the Seljuqs themselves were
involved in the dissemination of ideology

3. Bar Hebraeus preserves letter from the Abbasid caliph to

the Seljuqs ordering them to desist their acts of pillage
and murder
a. Safi dismisses Tughrils claim that he cant control
his tribesmen
4. Seljuq response replete with claims to loyalty to
Abbasids, to holding onto Islamic principles, and so on.
5. Upon entering Baghdad, Bar Hebraeus records further
massacres by Turghil against the Iraqi Turks and the
Daylamis.
6. Interestingly, numismatics seems to confirm this notion
7. I killed my brother for him sounds like loyalty to me
8. Marriage relationships
iii. Promoted social order; protected Muslim lives & property
1. Early sources depict the Seljuqs as having a devastating
impact on the cities. Tughril himself is implicated in the
plunder and murder in Rayy.
a. Written by a source under Seljuq patronage!
i. Part of a cover up: other pro-Seljuq sources
are silent about this
2. Close connection between orthodox religion and social
order
3. Qazwini: Unlike others, they were of pure doctrine and
thus they witnessed no rebellions.
a. Not history since even Nizam al-Mulk bemoans
heretical insurrections but legitimizing Seljuq rule
iv. Patronized orthodox religious scholarship
1. Rawandi: The base reason for why Seljuq rule is
successful is baraka gained from building mosques,
madrasas, khanaqahs, water-stations for pilgrims,
hospices, and so forth. As well as patronizing religious
scholarship.
v. Put down heretics.
2. Nizam al-Mulk
a. Glue between sultans and caliphs, intellectuals, soldiers
b. Helped systematize and order the realm
c. He didnt create the institutions, but he did string them in such a way
for the optimal benefit of the regime
2. viziers were an important institution, they were the glue between
sultans and caliphs, intellectuals and soldiers, Sufis and jurists; Nizam alMulk was a unique

kind of vizier, he helped systematize and order the realm, he went above
and beyond, he was the sultanate; Safi says that he didn't create the
institutions such as

iqta', surveillance, madrasa and khaniqah, but he did 'string' them

together to the optimal benefit of the regime; He is Abu Ali Hasan b. Ali b.
Ishaq al-Tusi, of

landowner background; spent his youth studying Qur'an, hadith and Shafi'i
fiqh; he thinks this might be an attempt by Shafi'i hagiographic sources to
bolster the link

of Shafi'is to Qur'an and hadith, which would be reflected in the fact that a
politician would show interest in these two sources because of his Shafi'i
background.

Enjoyed the company of Sufis (Sufism not a marginalized phenomenon

that was the mainstay of illiterate masses). Learned Arabic and Persian,
accounting, administrative

skills; needs to compose court documents elegantly; His siyasatnama is a

literary masterpiece; he was raised in the Ghaznavid divan, and picked up
administration from

them. Nizam al-Mulk leaves the Ghaznavids, and embraces a relationship

with the Seljuqs, he is responsible for establishing their rule. Amid al-Mulk
Kunduri, a rivalry

develops; Mediated between caliphs, intellectuals, administrators.

Vizierate as a necessary institution. Alp Arslan takes over from Turghil,
and he replaces Kunduri

(who might have threatened Arslan's rule; oldness and ties to brother).
Kunduri was hanafi muta'assib, cursed Shi'a and Ash'aris; some
contradictions about Juwayni;

his attacks on Ash'arism a result of politics rather than theology; Nizam alMulk, too, was depicted as muta'assib, but then again as realpolitik, since
the Turks were

largely Hanafi. Nizam al-Mulk aimed at balance where Kunduri aimed for
conflict. Kunduri 'strongarms' the caliphs; Nizam al-Mulk 'radi amir almu'mineen.' Nizam al-

Mulk not favor of the abbasids: practical concerns, they need the latters'
legitimacy. Nizam al-Mulk had Kunduri die a gruesome death (including
castration), and is

warned that he is initiating a bad sunna (what happened to

legitimization?) First order of business: cement relationship with Abbasid
caliphs (particularly through

marriage). Trusted by Alp, and even had many administrative

responsibilities handed over to him. Man of the sword as well. Brought the
Shafi'is back. He had to take on challenges to the vizierate from many,
including his son-in-law Abu al-Mahasin. It appears, however, that a wife
of Malik Shah, Tarkan Khatun, was the cause of his downfall. When Nizam
al-Mulk suggested that her son was not fit to succeed his father, she
waged war (through Taj al-Mulk) against Nizam. This actually explains his
counsel not to follow the counsel of women, and that women can only
bring about the kings downfall its not a timeless attack on women, but
a thinly veiled attack on a particular woman. Why was he killed? Not by
Ismailis or by Hassan al-Sabbah, but perhaps by Malik Shah himself
there had been an estrangement, and Malik even suggested that the
Abbasids move to Damascus or Hijaz so as to be further distanced from
the center of power. Nizam al-Mulk opposed this move, and paid for it with
his life. He then cites Subkis account of Malik Shah having Nizam killed
(but what about the carefully constructed image!) Malik Shah, however,
was killed shortly afterwards (perhaps by the caliph), Tarkan tried to get
her son recognition as sultan, but to no avail and Taj al-Mulk was killed
by military servants loyal to Nizam al-Mulk.

3. Foucault wrote much about the nexus between power and knowledge
production, and how the ruling elite constructs a paradigmatic notion of
what 'normal' is and

enforces it through both repressive and coercive means. True, he's writing
about the modern period, but Safi feels this model is also valid for how
Seljuqs did things;

in his writings, Nizam al-Mulk spoke of surveilling two groups of people,

rebels and political and intellectual elite. Used the barid system to track
movements on

highways and Sufis and beggars who were able to move around more
freely than other goups; need to know everything, spy on tax collectors,
viziers; stability depends on

it; if he doesn't, the people will attribute fasad to the king; particularly
judges; Charles Tilly: statecraft is analogous to organized crime; can't
claim it was

effective, the barid didn't produce good information, rebellions were

usually crushed after they had appeared. IQTA': Different from feudalism:
not hereditary, no lord

and vassal relationship. 'Land grant' seems more appropriate. Nizam alMulk didn't invent it, but did restructure it so that it functioned more
efficiently. Merged

military and administrative iqta's. A way of paying skilled military soldiers,

servants were not entitled. A beneficiary of it himself. Move the grantees
around so

they don't build up power. Also, intended to limit the excesses of the
grantees against peasants. Settling nomadic Turks, avoid their
disgruntlement. Nizam al-Mulk

suggested using secret agents to monitor grantee activity, linking it to

surveillance system. MADRASA: Meisami disputes the notion that the
Seljuqs established all of

the madrasas attributed to them, he takes this as evidence of legitimizing

narrative; Nizam al-Mulk central here, Baghdadi Nizamiya, he even taught
there. one in

Nishapur as well. Not the first to invent madrasas (though this

misunderstanding was alive even in Subki's time), but perhaps the first to
assign stipends to

students.Did not like inter-madhhab strife, and sought to restore Shafi'i

presence (after a long bout of pro-Hanafi, anti-Shafi'i patronage) while
standing in the way

of Shafi'i attempts to threaten other madhhabs. WHAT DO MADRASAS DO?

Counter Isma'ili propaganda, disseminate 'orthodox' Islam (fiqh, not
theology), administrative

issues. KHANAQAH: fluid boundaries between it and madrasa. Ulama could

be Sufis and vice versa. Ghazali. Motif of beginning in madrasa and ending
up in khanaqah later

in life. Ghaznavids are said to be huge on spies, but the Seljuqs are not.
CONTESTED: Spies weren't liked, iqta's were deemed ghasb (people afraid
to offer prayers),

4. Ghazali, born in Tus in 450, student of Juwayni, he was invited to the

presence of Nizam al-Mulk, and Ghazali was a loyal Seljuq agent ever
since. (When/where?)

Ghazali was challenging different trends (Sufis, jurists, theologians,

philosophers, Isma'ilis). Nizam al-Mulk is Ghazali's patron. Nizam al-mUlk
and Ghazali

liked/disliked the same people. Fada'ih al-batiniya, Tahafut al-falasifa,

Nizamiya madrasa, Ghazali went to work upholding the Seljuq-sponsored
interpretation of

Islam. Following the assassination of his patron in 487, he gave up his

position in 488. Skeptical of the 'spiritual path' story told in Munqidh, and
thus some have

suggested that the reason Ghazali left was to escape an unlikeable sultan
or the Isma'ilis. A madrasa is a watchtower (see: Surveillance system).
That's why Ghazali

needed to fake his move to Jerusalem. He made a thing to avoid

munazaras and meeting sultans (might be because he wanted to avoid
prestige and power!). He says that he

refused to travel back to Baghdad because of his family and mentoring

responsibilities. Safi suspects a strong surveillance network. agrees to
teach in Nishapur (!!).

Wants to study Ghazali's political writings. No focusing on one text,

doesn't see consistency in his different writings. Fada'ih: written for alMustazhir around 488.

A refutation of Isma'ilism, which concludes with a statement that the true

Imam is al-Mustazhir. Seljuqs holders of power, and Ghazali acknowledges
that display of raw

power is needed. Whereas Seljuqs are praised for their loyalty to the
caliphs, they aren't a 'thing' in their own right yet. Iqtisad: Theological
tract written in 488.

Ghazali freely uses 'imam' and 'sultan' interchangeably, signaling that

Ghazali is hedging his bets. Ihya': masterpiece, composed between 489
and 495. Brings up the

tyrannical but powerful sultan: public good demands that we obey him.
Implicitly says that Seljuq sultans are unjust (?!) Here, for the first time, a
clear distinction

between caliphate and sultanate, the people of shawka are obedient to

caliph, and the latter possesses judgment. Seljuqs: bute force, Abbasids:
legitimizing. Nasihat al-Muluk: said to be written between 499 and 503,
perhaps one of his last works. Authenticity is disputed. Safi prefers to see
it as authentic - but his argument does ride on its authenticity.
Legitimation of Seljuq rule switches from 'service to the imamate' to

'dispensing justice.' Justice is closely tied with orthodoxy and close ties
with the scholarly class. In the second part (authenticity disputed),
Ghazali says that the sultan must not only be upright in doctrine himself,
but actively suppress heresy in the midst of his realm. The sultans become
the center of religious authority here, being the 'shadow of God on earth.'
As for the brute force, it is now justified as well: people are undisciplined,
and the sultans need to retain this force in order to keep them in line. 'The
whip of 'Umar would have been sufficient to keep the world safe.' TUHFAT
AL_MULUK: Debate about authenticity. Incorporates material from first
part of Nasiha, so Safi deems it likely to be authentic. The sultan-i adl with
his pak doctrines carries over. What effect does it have on people as a
whole? Written for the elite. But just because its for elite doesnt mean its
not of importance. True, but then how is this a legitimizing tactic?

5. Studies on Sufi personalities don't pay sufficient attention to their social

dealings with the institutions and personalities of their social landscape;
question

asked here is: how is the authority and charisma of the saints
appropriated to legitimize Seljuq authority? Real saint is one who 'mixes
with people.' Depiction of

Sufis today (as private mystics) is inconsistent with their historical

experience and is likely based on the modern, Protestant view of what
'piety' and 'mysticism'

should look like. Firasa: they predict a politician's success before it

actually happens. Second, giving baraka to established politicians for
continued success;

politicians devotion to the saint and his followers. Power derived from
sanctity, walaya (with God) and wilaya (with people). Who cares about fact
or lack thereof?

These stories are true to a certain community, so we can get a sense of

the meaning these narratives had for them. This makes the fantastic
character of the stories

irrelevant. Baba Tahir `aryan: We dont know much about time. We're not
even sure when he lived, which means he's elusive (or a fairy tale). Skilled
poet. 'Thus I have

handed you dominion of the world. Stand for justice.' Prefers to see
mediation rather than subjugation. Just as quickly as he appears, he
disappears. [seems to confirm

the marginality of Sufis?] Mountain (on high), called khidr (ladunni

knowledge), other saints serve as witnesses. Vizier is on the side of
Turghil, indicating he

mediated the exchange. His giving him a ring signals a physical 'proof' of
the exchange. Seal of Kingship [but perhaps the Sufis were trying to ride
the people's love of the Seljuqs, not the other way around?] Abu Sa'id Abu
al-Khayr: hagiography written in trying times, touches on all the themes
alluded to, seems to be trying to 'reshape behavior.' "I have given you
dominion over Khurasan...over Iraq." They treat HIM as a king. (Chaghri
and Turghil) In turn, notable must show gratitude and support khanaqahs.
"I need you" the hagiographies are just that: hagiographies OF shaykhs,
not a tribute to Nizam al-Mulk. 'Whatever I have attained is because of
Shaykh Abu al-Khayr" 'Dust under their feet' 'All his earthly successes are
due to him.'

Conclusion: 'politics of representation and depiction,' not history strictly

speaking. Questions at 201.
Disclaimers:

Prof. Safi is the sweetest human being on Earth.

Its easy to tear down an argument, not easy to construct one. That he
took 15 years doing so is not something I take lightly.
Im ordinarily sympathetic to the narrative advanced here
Im not saying hes wrong: I dont know enough about Saljuq history. Im
saying that the evidence he proffers appears to allow for alternative
explanations that seem consistent with his findings. Im not adopting any
of these explanations as my own. Like a judge.

Criticisms:
1) Safi admits that the narratives that he adduces are found in later sources
that are engaged in pious mythmaking. If later, it isnt clear why these
narratives need to be seen as legitimizing if later than the events in
question, its not clear why it needs to be legitimized. Perhaps: (1) parable

2)

3)

4)
5)

and discourse on proper behavior; (2) An attempt to explain why things are
bad now; (3) Advice to the new rulers. In fact, Safi alerts us to fragments of
earlier sources that are found in the later sources that are inconsistent with
the image that the Seljuqs would have wanted to build for themselves this
indicates that the Seljuqs are not commissioning these works.
Safi appears to be too willing to believe the claims of pillage and massacre,
while contrary reports as ideology. Might the groups killed have been
Qarmati loyalists? That later sources tend to pass over these events in silence
assuming they are true - might be later historians idealizing the past, not
necessarily a function of state-sponsored ideology.
How is the relationship of the Seljuqs to the Abbasids any different from that
of any military contingent and a caliph? As it were, a caliph would rely on the
loyalty and obedience of a military corps he cant, as it were, force them to
do anything if they happen to rebel against him except to pitch them against
another military corps that is more loyal (is an analogy between this scenario
and that of the Marwanids and Hajjaj in order?)
It is sometimes not clear whether he is in fact simply doing a study of the
politics of representation, or writing a history of the Seljuqs
Whatever happened to the limits of religious inquiry

A professor is calling Saljuq chronicles dull

As much as we want to be