The Two Words that Explain Chinas

Assertive Naval Strategy

"Active defense" was a favorite tactic of Mao Zedong.
How will China use it to harry U.S. ships in the Pacific?

BY JIM HOLMES-JUNE 3, 2015

The just-completed Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore dwelt largely on Chinas
maritime ambitions, zeroing in on its construction of artificial islands in the South China
Sea. In his keynote address, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter vowed to
continue to protect freedom of navigation and overflight principles that have ensured
security and prosperity in this region for decades. There should be no mistake,
continued Carter, that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the world. The United States, its
allies, and its partners will exercise the rights of all nations to their fullest, he said.

That the U.S. secretary of defense traveled to the far side of the world to speak so
bluntly shows how seriously Washington takes the China challenge.
And understandably so. China is a big, ambitious, oftentimes domineering power. It
covets dominion, if not ownership, of its maritime environs. It chafes at the liberal
Asian maritime order over which the United States has presided since 1945 and
wants to redefine that order in keeping with its own interests and aspirations. This
constitutes a challenge of the first order. Hence the fanfare surrounding Chinas
Military Strategy, as Beijing straightforwardly titled its new defense white paper,
released in late May.
But lets not exaggerate the strategys novelty. For one thing, this isnt Chinas firstever defense white paper, as one observer maintained. Beijing issued its first
public defense white paper in 1998; they have appeared at roughly two-year intervals
ever since.
Furthermore, some of the earlier editions were even more in-your-face than this
years. For example, the 2004 white paper instructed the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) Navy and Air Force to beef up their capabilities for winning both command of
the sea and command of the air. Command connotes absolute, permanent control of
the waters and skies off Asian shorelines. If the PLA Navy and Air Force fulfilled this
decree, Beijings writ would become law in seas and airspace under their command.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would make the rules governing the use of seas
and airspace. Party leaders could abridge freedom of the seas and skies or bar
access altogether should they see fit. No one could gainsay their will.
While the 2015 white paper is doubtless assertive (one adjective commonly affixed to
it); assertiveness has been standard fare in these missives for quite some time. And
the formula for the document remains much the same: Its framers first present the
officialdoms appraisal of the strategic environment, then explain in general terms how
the PLA will configure itself to manage that environment and in so doing, advance
the CCPs purposes.
Typically, the authors take on Chinas surroundings is at once upbeat and
grim. Peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an
irresistible tide of the times, they proclaim. And yet Japan is overhauling its military
and security policies, provoking grave concerns among other countries in the region.
Chinas offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military
presence on Chinas reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied.
Nor are these purely intra-Asian problems. The United States is refurbishing its
military presence and its military alliances in this region. Some external countries
care to guess who? are busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few
maintain constant close-in air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against
China. A lonely nation finds itself under siege, set upon by a bully and his crummy
little toadies. Verily, itstough being China.

What to do? Bolstering Chinese sea power will help Beijing accomplish the longstanding task of safeguarding its maritime rights and interests. But again, Chinas
seaward turn is nothing new. It began in the 1990s. By the turn of the century,
respected commentators were holding forth on it at book length. By historical
standards, in fact, Chinas navy may be nearing maturity giving Beijing the military
implements to put force behind its words.
Which brings us to another point of continuity between Chinas Military Strategy and
its predecessors: Beijings strategic outlook. Notes the strategy, the strategic concept
of active defense is the essence of the [CCPs] military strategic thought. So has it
ever been. Active defense, say the authors, is a strategic concept that derives from
the long-term practice of revolutionary wars. By this they mean the Chinese Civil
War and the struggle to rid China of Japanese conquerors during World War II.
As the white paper points out, Chinas military leadership made active defense the
core of its military strategy shortly after the Peoples Republic was founded in 1949.
Chinese maritime strategy, accordingly, goes by thename of offshore active defense.
The leadership updates its active-defense strategy periodically to stay abreast of new
technology and shifts in the geostrategic setting. But the underlying principles remain,
encoded in Chinas strategic DNA.
This is not a putdown. Theres wisdom in Chinas approach to strategy. The outward
character of war changes over time along with advances in weaponry and war-making
methods. Wars nature, not so much. Thats why you can profitably study and learn
from a book about rowboats and spears in Greek antiquity, a how-to guide to
martial statecraft in ancient China, or a ponderous tome detailing how to fight
Napoleon.
The strategic canon remains evergreen despite the passage of centuries. And so does
the concept of active defense, in Beijings view. Thats why headlines like China to
Embrace New Active Defense Strategy, under which one report on Chinas Military
Strategy ran in late May, are fundamentally misguided. This is old but potent
wine in new bottles.
In fact, active defense is a concept older than the Peoples Republic itself. Mao
Zedong, the CCPs founding chairman, was also the godfather of active defense.
Thats what Mao dubbed the strategy his Red Army used to overcome stronger
Nationalist and Japanese opponents from the partys inception in 1921 until its
greatest triumph in 1949. He codified the phrase in a much-studied 1936 essay on the
Problems of Strategy in Chinas Revolutionary War.
So much for active defenses lineage. But what is it? In brief, its the strategically
defensive posture that a big, resource-rich but weak combatant assumes to weary and
turn the tables on a stronger antagonist. Such a combatant needs time to tap its
resources natural riches, manpower, martial ingenuity so it protracts the war. It
makes itself strong over time, raising powerful armed forces, while constantly

harrowing the enemy. It chips away at enemy strength where and when it can.
Ultimately the weaker becomes the stronger contender, seizes the offensive, and wins.
It outlasts the foe rather than hazarding a battle early on a battle where it could lose
everything in an afternoon.
***
Theres a stark geospatial component to active defense. Commanders need lots of
maneuvering space to make it work. Fortunately for them, a battlefield as large as
China offers maneuver room aplenty. Maos Red Army had the luxury of withdrawing
into the remote interior. Commanders compelled enemy forces to choose between
breaking contact and ceding the initiative and giving chase and overextending
themselves.
This is a time-honored strategy of large but militarily backward powers.seducing
Napoleon, the god of war, deep into the Russian interior during the little emperors
1812 campaign." style="box-sizing: border-box; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; border:
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Russian forces seducing Napoleon, the god of war, deep into the Russian interior
during the little emperors 1812 campaign. The result: disaster for France. It worked for
the tsars hosts. It can work for Chinese Communists.
Surrendering ground, then, yields operational advantages. By falling back toward their
base areas lure him in deep, counseled Mao Red Army units operated closer to
their supplies, ammunition stockpiles, and manpower reserves. Thats a good thing
from a logistical standpoint. They could harry oncoming yet increasingly overstretched
foes. They could stage raids, cut supply routes, or fall on and annihilate isolated units.
They gave the enemy no rest.
Minor tactical victories, then, could add up to major damage to a superior opponent.
Driving deep into hostile territory could enfeeble the opponent until it was superior no
longer. Maos armies would lift themselves gradually to strategic parity, gain
ascendancy, and ultimately win through a conventional counteroffensive.
Transposed to the offshore realm, active defense means sniping at U.S. Pacific Fleet
reinforcements steaming to the relief of Japan, Taiwan, or some other beleaguered ally
during a conflict. U.S. Pacific Fleet expeditionary forces would arrive in the theater
battered and overextended.
Luring U.S. Navy expeditionary forces in deep while pummeling them with missiles
and torpedoes would help even the force balance. Active defense would grant PLA
commanders some prospect for victory should a major fleet action transpire off Asian
coasts.
Seaborne active defense, admittedly, looks markedly different from the Red Army
slugging it out in the mud against the Nationalists or the Imperial Japanese Army. But

the strategic logic remains as sound on the briny main or in the wild blue yonder as it
is in Chinas hinterlands.
What about individual PLA service branches? One passage from the 2015 white paper
that was bandied about in press reports declares that the PLA Navy will gradually shift
its focus from offshore waters defense to the combination of offshore waters defense
with open seas protection. But Beijing has broadcast its intent to venture beyond the
near seas the Yellow, East China, and South China seas for years now
(see here andhere). Its now starting to make good on its intent.
Western commentary also alighted on the 2015 white papers mandate for the PLA Air
Force to shift its focus from territorial air defense to both defense and offense. But
again, defense white papers as far back as 2004 directed the flying service to ready
itself to wrest air supremacy from rival forces. And heres the 2006 white paper: The
Air Force aims at speeding up its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive
and defensive operations. Same, same.
The trend lines in Chinese foreign policy and strategy may be worrisome, then, but
theyre not new. Beijing has been admirably frank about its purposes and power for
nearly two decades now: It wants to remake the Asian order in its interest. What is
new is that China increasingly boasts the physical might to put steel behind ambitious
words. China, for example, now fields more submarines than the U.S. Navy. Its
first aircraft carrier is now at sea. It has settled on a satisfactory design for guidedmissile destroyers, modern navies premier surface combatant ships. Yes,
questions linger about the quality of Chinese hardware and seamanship and tactical
acumen within the officer and enlisted corps. Nevertheless, this is a sea power on the
move.
This inspires consternation outside China. Why, since Beijing has repeatedly said what
it wants? Henry Kissinger writes that the bane of stable international systems is their
nearly total inability to envision mortal challenge. In other words, the guardians of a
mutually beneficial order cant bring themselves to believe that revolutionaries really
mean the wacky things they say about amending it. What fool abolishes a system that
provides for the good life including for the fool?
If Kissinger has it right, complacency dulls status quo powers intellectual capacity. And
when intellect lags, strategy and forces are apt to lag as well. Only when the
revolutionaries do or say something that makes their intentions utterly plain do the
status quos guardians say, in effect: Oh, youre serious! But by then the hour is late.
undergoing their oh, youre serious moment vis--vis Chinas rise to sea power."
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line-height: inherit; vertical-align: baseline;">The United States, its allies, and its
friends seem to beundergoing their oh, youre serious moment vis--vis Chinas rise
to sea power. Intemperate words, brinkmanship on the part of
PLA mariners and aviators, and quixotic yet oh-so-provocative projects like island
building in the South China Sea have combined to bring about a great awakening.

That is good.
Now that we have awoken, by all means lets parse the words of white papers and
other Chinese statements of purpose. They furnish clues as to what to expect from
China and how we can reply. But lets also realize this is a challenge thats been a long
time in the making and, in all likelihood, will persist far into the future. Meeting it will
require matching Beijings steadfastness of purpose.
AFP/Getty Images
Posted by Thavam