Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN
M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO M. MANOTOK III,
MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO,
ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY
ANN V. MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO V.
MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III,
ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA,
MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L.
MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK,
JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA.
THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, ROSA
R. MANOTOK, Petitioners, - versus - HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,
represented by TERESITA BARQUE- HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Antecedents
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by
Teresita Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for administrative reconstitution
of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the
Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr.
submitted the owners duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts
and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty. Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of
the Reconstitution Division, Land Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter
dated 29 October 1996,1 addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer
Dalire), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
In a letter dated 13 February 199710 to the LRA Administrator, Engineer
Dalire explained that the 2 January 1997 letter was forged. Thus:
13 February 1997
The Administrator
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, NIA Road
Quezon City
ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received
today, please be informed that as per the inventory of approved
surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the locator cards, the
microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions,
that are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among
the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our
file, hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital
Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November
1996 (copy attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy
attached to your letter, this letter definitely did not come from
this office; it is a forged document. The statement that the
subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical
Records Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now
the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced in
compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996 and
followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06 February
1997 (copies attached).
filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that
we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December
2, 1996 is not issued by this Office.There are many markings on
the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others,
are:
1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we
issue a copy of plan that is non-existing?
2) The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at
lower half. This is not our practice;
3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the
certification and another for the signing official. We use one
piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one
rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious
plan;
4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans
with the initials of my action officers and their codings
below my signature. These are not present in the spurious
copy of plan;
5) The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR
REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY" is
smaller than our rubber stamp;
6) The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry
our rubber stamp "GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE
SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF ___________________
"This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because all
microfilm copies are for official use only of our LMS. We have
shown you our rubber stamps to prove that the copy of Fls3168-D in your possession is a spurious plan.
I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02
January 1997 stating that copy of subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was
forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records and Statistics
Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is
identical to the microfilm and that the case be given due course
for administrative reconstitution. Certainly this is not true. This
is the handiwork of forgers. How can this be when NCR has
never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The
forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for
our validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05
December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies
attached). Definitely this letter was never prepared and issued
by this Office. Our record books and file attest to this. We do not
use letterheads for letters involving this topic.
Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was
intercepted and did not reach you.
For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and
the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious
documents.
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer
In an Order dated 30 June 1997,12 Atty. Bustos denied the petition for
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the following grounds:
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473
Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472, respectively,covered by TCT No. 210177,
appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of
342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the
name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm.
Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as
categorically stated by Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief,
questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax
receipts also reflect the tax declaration of the property covered
thereby. It is highly irregular that the tax declaration numbers
indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations which appear
to have been canceled would again be revived.
The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No.
RT-22481 [372302] covers only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and
without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D shows that the property in
question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The
same is being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy of
the tax map over the property in question issued by the Quezon City
Assessors Office [annex "H" of Petitioners Position Paper]. Said tax
map shows that similar to TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the
property in question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B.
Granting arguendo that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been
subdivided into two [2] lots from the date of original survey in 1907, it
is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot
822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries
when at the time of the original survey, there were no such Psds yet.
Examination of the technical decription and boundaries appearing in
TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would show that the same do not, in all
respects, conform to the certified technical description and
boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question]
which are the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10
issued by the Bureau of Lands [Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners
Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor
Tuazon Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in
question does not at all adjoin the Payatas Estate which was
surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per certification issued by the
LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex "L" Petitioners Position Paper]. As correctly
pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the
boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not, however,
indicated whether or not it was Lot 822 of the Piedad Estate. 17
However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be
reconstituted after a court of competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT No.
RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks. The dispositive portion of
the LRA Resolution reads:
place before any trial court assailing the validity of the Torrens title of
the Manotoks. Yet, as the final resolution of the Barques simple petition
for administrative reconstitution, the First Division of this
Court cancelled the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of
the Barques not only reconstituted, but also valid.
In a Resolution dated 12 September 2006, this Court, among others,
granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Felicitas B. Manahan and
Rosendo Manahan (Manahans).
In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006, the Special First Division of this Court
referred the cases to the Court en banc. In its 26 July 2006 Resolution, the
Court en banc accepted the cases. In the Oral Argument on 24 July 2007,
the Court en banc considered the following issues:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners
TCT No. RT-22481 without a trial before the proper regional trial court
in a proceeding directly assailing the validity of petitioners title?
2. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the
allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite
the previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over
the same property?
3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of
petitioners TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution
case filed by respondents with the LRA?
4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide
the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative
reconstitution of title filed by respondents?
The Ruling of This Court
We set aside the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this
Court.
First, the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this
Court overturns well-entrenched doctrines of this Court, such as the
decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro
Balanon.31Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute the Barques
the First Division has no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the
Court en banc or in division. The Court en banc has ruled in Group
Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr.
Malvar48 that a decision of a division is void if it overturns a doctrine
established by the en banc or another division. There, the Court held:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides:
"x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme)
Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc."
A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of
the above constitutional provision would be in excess of
jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.49 (Emphasis supplied)
A void decision vests no right, creates no obligation, grants no title, and
settles no issue. A void decision protects no one and is subject to attack,
directly or collaterally,50 at any time. A void decision has no existence in law.
Therefore, a void decision cannot become final and executory against, or in
favor of, any one.
Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies
only if the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject
matter. A decision rendered by a trial court or hearing officer without
jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot become final and
executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there
can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.51
In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively
the title of the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect
or collateral attack on the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over
the same property. Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree52 states that a "certificate of title shall not be subject to a
collateral attack." The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no
jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack53 on a Torrens title. The
Manotoks prior title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be
assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings. 54
Section 19 of the Judiciary Act61 provides that the "Regional Trial Court
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions,
which involve the title to x x x real property."
That the proper Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to
entertain any action to cancel a Torrens title is reinforced by Section 108 of
the Property Registration Decree. Section 108 states that "no erasure,
alteration or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the
entry of a certificate of title x x x,except by order of the proper Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)."
LRA DECISION ON RECONSTITUTION DOES NOT
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only to
decisions that are capable of becoming final and executory. Decisions of
the LRA on administrative reconstitutions of title never become final and
executory. An administrative reconstitution of title is merely a restoration or
replacement of a lost or destroyed title in its original form at the time of the
loss or destruction.62 The issuance of a reconstituted title vests no new
rights and determines no ownership issues.63 At any time, the LRA can
revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost or destroyed title
is subsequently found.64 The issuance by the LRA of a reconstituted title
is an executive function, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Only
judicial or quasi-judicial decisions can become res judicata. This Court
stated in A.G. Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals:65 "[T]he doctrine
of res judicataapplies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings
and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative,
executive or ministerial determination."66
The 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division grants to the Barques
much more than what the Barques prayed for in their petition for
administrative reconstitution of title. In their petition before the LRA, the
Barques only prayed for the reconstitution of their allegedly destroyed title.
The Decision of the First Division grants the reconstitution, declares the
reconstituted title valid, awards ownership over the disputed property to the
Barques, and cancels the Torrens title of the Manotoks. This violates the
"cardinal principle that (a court) cannot grant anything more than what is
prayed for"67 in the petition.
that records of said plan had already been turned over to the National
Capital Region.
The form letter (Annex "J") from the Records Management Division of the
Lands Management Bureau National Office, that the Barques attached to
their Memorandum, states
x x x plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of and situated in Caloocan
Rizal was among those survey records already turnedover/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), Roxas
Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our file no. NCR199, for their reference/file purposes.
The form letter bears the printed name of Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC,
Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau National Office
although someone whose signature is not legible signed for Rainier D.
Balbuena.
The Barques also submitted a Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex "EI") signed by Rainier D. Balbuena,OIC, Records Management Division,
Lands Management Bureau National Office, stating:
This is to certify that according to the verification of the Records
Management Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila,
EDPs Listing has available record with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, Xerox
copy of which is herewith attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (Now
Quezon City), in the name of Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.
In sharp contrast, the Manotoks attached to their Memorandum dated 23
August 2007 a certification signed by three persons from the Lands
Management Bureau National Office, namely, Bienvenido F. Cruz,
Chief,Geodetic Surveys Division; Rodel Collantes, Chief, Technical
Services & Survey Records Documentation Section; and Teodoro A. de
Castro, researcher. This certification, dated 2 August 2007, states:
August 2, 2007
LUISA T. PADORA
2830 Juan Luna St. Tondo
Manila
S i r /M a d a m:
This is in connection with your request on the verification of survey
plan. As per our inventory we found out the following:
Survey No.
Location
Accession No.
Fls-3168-D
Verified By:
(Sgd)
RODEL COLLANTES
Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section
Researched by:
(Sgd)
TEODORO A. DE CASTRO
Very truly yours,
(Sgd)
BIENVENIDO F. CRUZ
xxx
x x x How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy
in their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is
mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the
subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January
1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). x x x. 74 (Emphasis
supplied)
As pointed out by Engineer Dalire, under DENR Administrative Order No.
49, series of 1991, the copy of plan Fls-3168-D must be forwarded by
the NCR Regional Office for validation by the Geodetic Surveys
Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. No copy of
the survey plan can be issued by the NCR Regional Office without the
validation of the Geodetic Surveys Division. Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 49 states:
Section 4. Preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved
Plans. The following considerations on the preparation of Certified
True Copies of Approved Plans shall be observed:
xxx
4.3 Decentralized whiteprints or photographic copies of plans
especially those marked "SGD" (i.e. SIGNED) shall not be used for
the issuance of patent or certified true copy or titling
purposes, EXCEPT, upon or prior authentication by the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) after diligent comparison with the
records of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and other depository
of surveys records.
xxx
4.5 The Chief of the Regional Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Service in the concerned Regional Office shall certify all
copies for land registration and for other purposes as true, correct
and exact replica of the original plan. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement of validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division is reiterated
and amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August
1992, thus:
Clearly, in the present cases the copy of the Barques plan Fls-3168-D
issued by the NCR Regional Office is likewise void unless validated by the
Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR Administrative Order
No. 49, series of 1991, as amplified in Lands Memorandum Order No. 36892. Up to this time, the Barques have failed to submit a copy of their
plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Geodetic Surveys Division. The
inescapable conclusion is that the Barques plan Fls-3168-D is void ab
initio.
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques submitted to
the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D,certified by the NCR Regional
Office, to support the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168-D that the Barques
had earlier submitted to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
c. Photo Copy of Plan FLS-3168 (microfilm) duly certified by
Carmelito A. Soriano for the Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR,
Annex "H" hereof. This microfilm copy is exactly the same as the
Tracing Cloth Plan copy, Annex G.
First, there does not appear in Annex "H" a signature over the printed name
Carmelito A. Soriano, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR National
Office.
Second, Annex "H" is not certified by the Chief of the Regional Surveys
Division, Lands Management Service of the NCR Regional Office as
required by Section 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49.
Third, Annex "H" is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that purportedly
originated from the office of Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau. Annex
"H" is also the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for the Barques
showed to the Court during the oral argument.Engineer Privadi Dalire has
categorically declared this copy of Fls-3168-D as "spurious" in his 19
February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus:
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2,
1996 is not issued by this Office. There are many markings on the
copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:
1. We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue
a copy of plan that is non-existing?
decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that
it is a spurious copy.
1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece
stamp. The certification and the signing official are
separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and
Chief in the syndicates (sic) stamp differ from our stamp.
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic)
is Survey without the "s" plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on
the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for
Registration/Titling For Reference Only" is smaller than
our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in
addition to [the] above is "of _________".
5) The copy bears forged initials of my action officer
and myself. I sign completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been
tampered in the master copy.
7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have
copy of Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your
Office as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be
disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious
sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of
Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the
spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create
land problem involving prime lots in that area. 80 (Emphasis supplied)
The Barques have the temerity to foist on this Court their copy of plan Fls3168-D which has been repeatedly denounced as a forgery by Engineer
Dalire, the very person whom the Barques claim certified their copy of
Fls-3168-D. Engineer Dalire is the best person to determine the
authenticity of Fls-3168-D not only because he allegedly signed it as
claimed by the Barques, but also because he is the Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, the
office that has the "inventory of approved plans x x x (and) Microfilm
Computer list of plans available for decentralization."
Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of Administrative
Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
On 7 February 1997, the Barques had written the LRA Administrator
complaining against the LRA reconstituting officers alleged "pattern of
effort to delay the administrative reconstitution." 81 The Barques attached to
their 7 February 1997 letter an alleged order of reconstitution signed by
Atty. Bustos approving the reconstitution of the Barques TCT No.
210177. In his 14 February 1997 reply to the LRA Administrator, Atty.
Bustos exposed the alleged order of reconstitution submitted by the
Barques as a "tampered document."
The Barques also informed the LRA Administrator that there was a
"recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic
Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due
course to the said reconstitution." However, in his 13 February 1997
letter82 to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire, the Chief,
Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, disowned this 2 January
1997 letter as a forgery.
On 14 February 1997, the LRA reconstituting officer wrote the LRA
Administrator that:83
1. There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the
aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the
authenticity of the submitted documents;
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the
name of Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is
a tampered document. For your comparison, herewith is a copy
of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked as annex "A";
Mr. Bustos bias was likewise shown when he alerted the Manotoks of
the Barques Petition for Reconstitution which prompted them to file
their opposition to the Barques petition on April 14, 1997. He,
therefore, apparently had the motive to delete the title and name
of the Barques from his resolution.
At any rate, said resolution of Bustos was completely irrelevant to the
LRA proceedings since it is his Order denying Barques petition for
reconstitution that was raised on appeal before the LRA
Administrator. (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the Barques represent to this Court that their copy of
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96), listing their TCT No. 210177
in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. as one of the titles approved for
reconstitution by Atty. Bustos, is authentic, genuine and untampered. This
is contrary to the categorical declaration of Atty. Bustos that the copy of
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) submitted by the Barques is a
"tampered document," and that the original Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that Atty. Bustos himself signed, which
original is on file in his office in the LRA, does not include TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
Ironically, the Barques put the blame on Atty. Bustos for "delet(ing) the
title and name of the Barques from the resolution." The Barques are
now accusing Atty. Bustos of falsification by deleting the Barques name
and title in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before such
deletion, the Barques insist that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q535(96) included the Barques name and title, which is the copy that the
Barques submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the first place, there was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to
include the Barques title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q535(96). When Atty. Bustos signed the order on 27 January 1997, he was
still corresponding with Engineer Dalire on the forgery found in the
Barques plan Fls-3168-D. The last letter of Engineer Dalire to Atty. Bustos
was on 31 January 1997. On 14 February 1997, Atty. Bustos even wrote
the LRA Administrator about the "attempt to mislead us (LRA) into favorable
action by submitting forged documents." Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not
have included the Barques title and name in Administrative Reconstitution
No. Q-535(96).
In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007, the Barques gave the lame
excuse that Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now "completely
irrelevant" because what was raised on appeal to the LRA was the order of
Atty. Bustos denying the Barques petition for reconstitution. If their copy of
Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) is truly authentic and
untampered, the Barques should insist that their petition for administrative
reconstitution was in fact approved by the reconstituting officer Atty. Bustos.
The Barques do not claim or even mention this now, instead they agree
that Atty. Bustos denied their petition, contrary to their claim that Atty.
Bustos granted their petition by including the Barques title and name in
Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply brush aside their submission of tampered or
forged documents. These patent forgeries are grounds to render the
Barques reconstituted title void ab initio. Section 11 of Republic Act No.
6732 (RA 6732),87 the law allowing administrative reconstitution of titles,
provides:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or
other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the
same and all persons having knowledge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court would never countenance these blatant and glaring forgeries.
The present cases involve 34 hectares of prime land located beside the
Ayala Heights Subdivision in Quezon City. Its value is estimated
conservatively at P1.7 billion.
Fifth: The Barques Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City
Hall Fire
The Barques filed their petition for administrative reconstitution on 22
October 1996, eight years after the original of their Torrens title was
allegedly burned in the 11 June 1988 fire that destroyed the records of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds. In contrast, the Manotoks administratively
reconstituted their Torrens title on 1 February 1991,three years after the
fire and just one year after the effectivity on 17 July 1989 of RA 6732
allowing again administrative reconstitution of titles under certain
circumstances.
Sixth: The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax
Declarations
The Manotoks claim that the Barques erased the following notation in the
tax declarations they submitted to the LRA reconstituting officer: "Memo:
This property appear (sic) to duplicate the property of Manotok Realty,
Inc., declared under TD No. B-067-02136 with area of 343,945 sq.m./P.I.
no. 21-4202."88 In their Petition For Review dated 30 March 2004, the
Manotoks submitted certified true copies of the Barques Tax Declarations
0689289 and 0689590 containing this notation. In their Memorandum of 23
August 2007, the Manotoks again submitted copies of the Barques tax
declarations containing the same notation.
During the oral argument, counsel for the Barques denied the erasure of
the notation on the Barques tax declarations. However, counsel for the
Barques admitted that he has not seen the original tax declarations on file
with the Assessors Office, thus:
Justice Carpio:
x x x The Manotoks are claiming that the Barques erased,
removed annotation in the tax declaration of the Barques that in
the tax declaration on file with the Assessors Office the tax
declaration of the Barques is supposed to contain annotation
that this property appears to be registered in the name of
Manotok Realty Inc., is that correct?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, that is a serious accusation, Your honor and I have no
knowledge about that.
Justice Carpio:
But does the tax declaration of the Barques contain that
notation?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There is none that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
So, from 1975 to the present they have not taken possession of
the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There were attempts to take possession, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
What kind of attempts, did they file ejectment suit?
Atty. Flaminiano:
In fact Your Honor I understand that some of the Barque girls
even went around the property.
Justice Carpio:
Went around the property (interrupted)
Atty. Flaminiano:
Went around the property to take a look at the property but after
that they left for the United States and for one reason or
another they have not been able to take the proper steps
(interrupted)
Justice Carpio:
So, they never filed any suit to recover possession of the
property, is that right?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
Did they send any demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the
property since they were the owners?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The Decision of the First Division misapplies the Alabang ruling by holding
that the LRA Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title
by a finding that the title was not "duly issued." Even the Register of Deeds,
who physically issues a Torrens title as part of his regular functions, cannot
adjudicate on the validity of a title. The Decision states that the "function of
the (LRA) is adjudicatory in nature it can properly deliberate on the
validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution." This is grave error.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even judicial
reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a
property.105 Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in
the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the
original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as
when the land covered is part of the public forest, 106 the reconstituted title
does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director of Lands v. Gan
Tan:107
But the lower court claims that petitioner, even if he complied with all
the requirements of the law, is not entitled to have his title
reconstituted for the reason that, being an alien, he is not
qualified to acquire the land covered by said title under our
Constitution. However, we find this claim untenable in the light
of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked.
The rule on this matter is that this issue can only be raised in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose(Legarda vs. Saleeby,
31 Phil., 590). Moreover, it is a well known doctrine that a Torrens
title, as a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible (Bachrach Motor Co.
vs. Kane, 61 Phil., 504), and our duty is to see to it that this title is
maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct
proceeding.
To our mind, the only issue here is whether there is a title to be
reconstituted. That is the only purpose of the law (Rep. Act No. 26). If
there is, then it is the duty of the court to comply with its
mandate. Whether the petitioner has the right to acquire the land
or not, is beyond the province of this proceeding. That should
be threshed out in a proper action. The two proceedings are
distinct and should not be confused.108 (Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
The fallacy in the dissenting opinions argument is that it assumes that the
LRA Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of a Torrens title. The
original jurisdiction to adjudicate or to decide the validity of a Torrens title is
vested by law exclusively in the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 48
of the Property Registration Decree. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in
the Regional Trial Court the "exclusive original jurisdiction" to decide
factual and legal issues "which involve the title to x x x real property."
This means the Regional Trial Court first decides the validity of the Torrens
title, and this power to first decide is to the exclusion of all other organs of
the State. Not even the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court can usurp
this exclusive original power of the Regional Trial Court. Any judgment
resulting from such usurpation is void.
What the LRA Administrator or agencies like the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) can issue are administrative, non-adjudicatory
findings on whether a Torrens title is spurious or authentic. These
findings are mere evidences that must be submitted to the Regional
Trial Court, which alone has the power to adjudicate whether the title
is void. Findings by the LRA or the NBI that a title is spurious are
merely administrative opinions, not a judicial determination that
settles rights and obligations between parties over a disputed
property. These findings are merely evidences, not the judgment itself
of validity or invalidity which can only come from the Regional Trial
Court. These findings do not become res judicata, while the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court can become res judicata.
Clearly, the grant of a reconstituted title is not an adjudication of the
titles validity. The Barques received an undeserved windfall when the
First Division declared their reconstituted title valid when the only relief they
sought in the administrative reconstitution was the restoration of their title in
its condition at the time of the alleged loss or destruction. This Court has
ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.:109
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself,
does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the
re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original
form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A
reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself
Fifth, the Manotoks did in fact raise the issue of the LRA Administrators
jurisdiction in relation to the LRA Administrators opinion that the Manotoks
title was "sham and spurious." In their Motion for Reconsideration dated 27
August 1998 before the LRA Administrator,116 the Manotoks stated:
Moreover, it is not disputed that herein oppositors are the holder of an
existing valid and effective TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covering the
same land embraced by TCT No. 210177 in question found which, as
stated, is non-existing and spurious. Given said fact, no
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 should proceed.
As held by the Supreme Court, to wit:
So too, this Court has stressed "that lands already covered
by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their
issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot
be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly
lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first
securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles." (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco, 234 SCRA 458 [1994])117 (Emphasis supplied)
Sixth, the principle of estoppel applies only if the LRA had in fact
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks, so as
to bar the Manotoks, who previously claimed that the LRA had no
jurisdiction, from later taking a contrary position. Thus, the Court declared
in People v. Casiano:118
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of
jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually
had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may
not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5
C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal,
to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had
proved that Alex David delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the
sale.
Rexlon Realty does not involve two conflicting titles over the same property,
which is the situation in the present case. In Rexlon Realty, the opposing
parties agreed that there was only one set of titles covering the same
properties. The only issue in Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were
lost, and if so, the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of
the titles; but if the titles were not lost, then the trial court had no jurisdiction
to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David, which
covered properties that Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex
David. Rexlon Realtys obvious interest was to maintain the validity of
the titles to the properties it had purchased, the titles to which were in
Rexlon Realtys possession. Thus, Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree, the law requiring a direct
proceeding in the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing the
validity of a Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title,
which is at issue in direct proceedings under Section 48, is a separate
and distinct issue from the propriety of a reconstitution of title.
What Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in
issuing replacement titles to the properties in the name of Alex David who
claimed that he lost the titles. In assailing as void the trial courts judgment,
Rexlon Realty invoked, as stated by the Court, "Section 2, of Rule 47 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure," which provides "the grounds to
annul a judgment of a lower court x x x [based on] fraud and lack of
jurisdiction." Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
x x x In the Strait Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals,
also on facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that if
an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been
lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision
has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be
attacked any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and
genuineness of the owners duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T52538 in the possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed
of Sale in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to