Anti Defection and Role of Speaker

Indian Political Science Association
THE ANTI-DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER

Author(s): N. S. GEHLOT
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July - Sept., 1991), pp. 327-340
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41855565
Accessed: 27-05-2015 12:05 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Indian Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Indian Journal
of Political Science.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 124.124.234.170 on Wed, 27 May 2015 12:05:26 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE
ANTI-DEFECTION
THE
ROLE
OF
ACT,
THE
1985
AND
SPEAKER
N. S. GEHLOT
With the deteriorating political situation in the country the
trend of political defections has once again acquired new dimensions in our federal set up and it brought to the limelight the
loopholes in the Anti-Defection Law, 1985, enacted by the then
Rajiv Government with a view of strengthening our political
institutions. The political scenario furtherconfirmed the mis*
givings and doubts expressed at the time of its passage about
the utility of legislation and role of the Speaker in dealing with
the cases concerning the scope of the above-mentioned Act, It
is now admitted that the Act has failed to achieve its purpose,
viz-a-viz checking the unprincipled floor-crossingby our legislators
and ensuring governmental stability both at the Centre and in
the States of the Indian Union. The old game of the 'Aya Ram
and Gaya Ram* has once again made a mockery of our democracy and even of the enactment of the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, because retail defections had been outlawed in
it while wholesale defections have been legalized under this Act.
For example, Mr. Chandra Shekhar with a group of 61 MPs left
the Janata Dal, in a bid to oust the V.P. Singh Government and
then formed the Janata Dal (S) Government but it did not
attract the penalty laid down under the Anti-Defection Law.
The game of wholesale defection was termed as a 'split' in the
Janata Dal and not political defections because of 1/3 strength
of the original party in the Lok Sabha. The operation of 1/3
principle of the Act resulted into the ridiculous formation of a
minorityGovernment of the Janata Dal (S) backed by the Congress (I).
Science
TheIndian
, Vol. 52, No. 3, July- Sept.,1991.
ofPolitical
Journal
P- 5
328
THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE
Provisionof theAnti-DefectionAct, 1985

The Rajiv Government creditably introduced the Anti-Defection Bill on January 23, 1985 to fulfilits promise to ban defections through a constitutional amendment. The Bill was given
assent by the President on February 15, 1985 and it then became
the law of the Constitution. It came into effecton March 1,
1985. The Act added a new Tenth Schedule to the Constitution
of India. It is, however, pertinent to point out that the Constitutional Amendment Bill did not require the ratificationof the
State Legislature under Article 368 of the Constitution. The
Act contains provisions for disqualification of the elected members on the basis of defection. The Act provides that the seat of
a member of Parliament/State Assembly Legislature shall fall
vacant in the following contingencies:(a) If he voluntarily gives up his membership of such
political party; or (b) If he votes or abstains from voting in such
House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to
which he belongs without obtaining; prior permission of such
party and such act has not been condoned by the concerned political party within fifteendays from the date of such voting, or (c)
If an Independent member after his election joins any political
party; or if a nominated member joins any political party after
the expiry of six months from the date he took oath as a member
of House.
But the above mentioned provisions shall not apply
in the following cases.
(i) PartySplit: The disqualification condition on the ground
of defection does not apply when there is a split in the political party and the member concerned belongs to a faction
arising out of such split and group consists of not less than
1/3 members of the original party in the House.
(ii) PartyMerger: These provisions shall also not apply
where two or more political parties have decided to merge
by a 2/3 majority of the total strengthof the party in the
Legislature.
, Chairman
(iii) Resignation of Speaker
Deputy
Deputy Speaker
Chairmanfrom Party Membership
: The above-mentioned
provisions will not apply, when a member of the Lok Sabha/
Vidhan Sabha immediately before his election as a Speaker/
THE ANTI-DEFECTION
ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER329
Deputy Speaker or as a Chairman or a Deputy Chairman,
resigns from the membership of his party become a nonparty entity. These provisions will also not apply to them
when they rejoin the parental party or any other political
party after ceasing to hold such offices. All the proceedings
regarding the decisions on disqualifications of the members
of the House under the Tenth Schedule shall be deemed to
be the proceedings of Parliament/Legislature under Articles
122 and 212, respectively.
:
Decision of Cases Relatingto Disqualification
Para 7 of the Act lays down that any question regarding
disqualification arising out of defection is to be decided by the
Chairman or the Speaker of the House as the case maybe and his
decision shall be final. The courts do not have a jurisdiction in
such cases. It furthermentions that when a question regarding
such disqualification arises about the Speaker or the Deputy
Speaker, Chairman or Deputy Chairman, the question shall be
referred to such members of the House as the House may effect
in this behalf.
Rules and Regulationsof DefectionLaw :
The Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, lays down a set of
rules and regulations forthe Speaker or Chairman, as case may be,
and it provides the procedure with regard to expulsion/admission
of a member of the House from the party. These rules were framed on December 16, 1985 by the Lok Sabha. The Lok Sabha
(Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985 stipulates
that every such petition alleging disqualification should be
addressed to the Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, containing
a concise statement of the material facts against the alleged
Member of Parliament (MP), It is provided that the Speaker
would seek the reply from the affected party within seven days
after receiving the petition from the leader of the parry concerned. The decision of the Speaker in this regard shall be notified
in the Official Gazette and forwarded to the Election Commission
and the Central Government. Likewise, the state Governments
also framed the similar rules and regulations for the application
of the disqualification clauses of the Act for their legislators.
The Speaker of Kerala obtained the firstopportunityto deal with
the case of disqualification under the Anti-Defection Law, 1985
330
against Mr. P. C. Thomas who had quit the Democratic Janata

Party in February, 1985 and he rejoined the United Kerala Congress. But he was absolved of the allegation of floor-crossing by
the state Speaker on the ground that the Anti-Defection came
into force on 1st March, 1985.1
SomeSeriousFlaws and Misgivingsof theAct
The anti-defection Act was widely hailed by all the opposition parties, but at the same time it was criticised on some
grounds as cited below:(a) Neither a public debate on its specific provision had
been initiated nor any attempt was made by the Congress (I)
Government to seek a consensus of all political parties
infavour of it. It was hurriedly enacted to benefit the
ruling party alone.
(b) The legislation intended to keep the party-majorityas
captive with the purpose of supression of dissenting voice
within a party. Hence, it would promote an autocratic rule
of party causes. It was pointed out that the Act would
tarnish the image of the Speaker as there was no provision
in it forjudicial review of the Speaker's verdict.
(c) It gave unlimited powers to party bosses to issue arbitrary whips on all kinds of matters and issues other than
those relating to the No-Confidence Motion in a Government, Money Bills and party leadership, taking the support
of the anti-party activity against any member of the party*
if he did not vote according to the wish of the party bosses.
(d) The legislation would not strengthen the party structure operating in India, because attempts had not been made
to uphold the values of factors such as the workingof inner
democracy within a party and recognition of a party under
the Constitutional Law of India. On the other hand, bulk
defections under the condition of 1/3 and merger by 2/3
majority has been legitimised. The Act, thus, has set free
the activities of leaders like Bhajan Lai, G.M. Shah, Rao
Birendra Singh etc. to escape from the clutches of the antidefection provisions and it has left the scope for parties like
the Congress (I) to hatch a conspiracy to cause split in other
parties, by offeringpolitical allurements and rewards.
THE ANTI-DEFECTION
(e) In the case of party split and party merger, the role
of the party organization has been completely ignored and
the legislative wing of the party has been given complete
freedomof action. Thus, the above-cited Act makes a discrimination between an Independent member and a nominated
member. The formercannot join any political party but the
latter can join it within six months of his election. However,
Independents can change his loyalty in favour or against the
Government on crucial occasions.2
In short, eminent Parliamentarians like J P,, Kripalani,
Madhu Limaye, Madhu Dandavate and a host of others had
expressed their apprehensions about the nefarious intensions
of the Act. They had termed it as sinister in character
under the garb of the utmost radical move, as it was meant
to legitimise the party-despotismor party bosses in the country.3Doubts were also raised whether the Act would be able
to provide political stability at the governmental and the
party levels, while honouring the working of inner party
democracy in a party-structure.4 Since the law on defection has not put a ban on defections arising out of the
lust for power and it has legalized wholesale defections, as it
was pointed out, it could not succeed in its mission to prevent the game of wholesale defectionswhich had taken place
in our polity during the 1989 90 phase.
Speaker'sRole UnderThe Anti-DefectionLaw :
The political scenario of instabilityas was obtained in country
after the split of the Janata Dal in November, 1989 also called
in question the impartiality and neutrality attached with the
officeof Speaker.6 Doubts were raised that the Indian Speaker,
while handling the situation arising out of the dissident activities
amongst the elected members and the 'split* caused in the Janata
Dal, did not act judiciously and impartially. It was alleged by
the opposition parties that the role of the Speaker of the Lok
Sabhaand the Speakers of Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar, in granting officialrecognition to the rebels of the break
away group of the legislators was not a sign of impartiality,
especially when they (defectors) had openly flouted the partywhip.
Their voting behaviour, contrary to the party whip, virtually
incurred the disqualification as laid down in the Anti-Defection
332
Law of 1985. The voice was raised that the Lok Sabha Speaker
should have declared them disqualified according to the spirit of
the provisions of the Act. Different legislative parties moved
their petitions lodging the complaints against the behaviour of
the defectors and urged the Speaker to declare them as disqualified under the Anti-Defection Act, 1985.
Our recent experience has shown that Indian Speakers have
not acted in an impartial and independent manner in dealing
with the disputes of disqualifications of the legislators arising out
of the 'split* of a party or violation of the party-whip on Confidence Motion and other cases of floor-crossings. The way in
which the membersof Legislatures changed their party-affiliations
with a desire to grab power, has dragged the august body into fresh
controversies. They have been alleged to have misused their
powers entrusted to them under the Anti-Defection Act, 1985
and they have totally frustrated the very purpose of the Act,
while excercising the powers under Para 3 of Tenth Schedule of
the Act that recognizes the 'split* in the party caused by 1/3
members of that party and Para 4 that recognizes an elected
member as the party-member. They were furtheralleged to have
perverted the spirit of the Act, rendering it so obsolete in our
federeal polity,because their role has weakened the party loyalty
as well as party discipline.
The manner in which the Lok Sahha Speaker, Mr. Rabi
Ray, delivered his rulings relating to the issue of disqualification
of the members of the Janata Dal (S), also shocked many.
Serious concerns have been expressed and the voice was raised
that the Act should be reviewed again in the light of its inherent
weaknesses and flaws, providing checks on Speaker's powers to
strengthen the political system of India. It was realised that
those weaknesses have reduced it to a mockeryin our set-up.
The Anti-Defection Law was conceived as a measure of electoral
reformwith explicit purpose of putting a stop to political defections of over-ambitious membersof legislatures from one party to
another and eradication of the 'Aya Ram Gaya Ram' phase from
our political system. The political turn-out that followed with
the exit of the V. P. Singh Government at the Centre brought to
the lime-light new technicalities of the Act, especially when the
issue of status of the break-away group from the Janata Dal was
to be determined by the Speaker, as these members had been
THE ANTI-DEFECTION
expelled from the party in two batches. It was noted with disgust how the spirit of the Anti-Defection Law was conveniently
ignored by all concerned of the Lok Shbha to suit their convenience of power and how they failed to honour the law of Parliament which had enated it in 1985. Instead, the game undermined
our democratic institutions and rendered the second experiment
of the National Front Government a failure in our political
system.
The Government
:
of Defectorsat theCentre
The National Front Government led by V. P. Singh was
voted out of power on November 7, 1990 following the defections of the thirtyseven members of the Janata Dal (JD). The
list of these members was submitted to the then Speaker of the
Lok Sabha, Mr. Rabi Ray, on November 6, 1991, by its leader,
Mr. Chandra Shekhar, informinghim about the split in the J.D
and the formation of a new political party. On the eve of the
Vote of Confidence in the Council of Ministers led by Mr. V. P.
Singh, the Speaker declared the twenty five members of the
breakaway group of the J. D. as "unattached". Notwithstanding
the ruling of the Speaker, the leader of its group, Mr. Chandra
Shekhar, staked his claim to form the government at the Centre
with the 'outside' support of the Congress (I) and he could
successfully form the government at the Centre. The purpose of
a split in the Janata Dal, thus, was fulfilled; that is, it was
merely a struggle of game for power launched by Mr. Chandra
Shekhar and Mr. Devi Lai to grab the power.
A petition on behalf of the J. D. was filed to the Lok
Sabha Secretariat for the disqualification of 31 members of the
J. D. for defying the party whip and voting against the N. F.
Government. This list included all those dissidents who had
been expelled from the Janata Dal and who had already been
declared 'unattached' by the Lok Sabha Speaker.7 On the other
hand, the J. D, dissident leader also filed his petition, urging the
Speaker to revoke his order declaring the 25 Janata Dal faction
MPs as 'unattached' and appealing to recognize them as a separate political entity (the Janata Dal - Socialist) in the Lok
Sabha under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. His plea
was that the breakaway group of 37 Janata Dal constituted the
334
strengthmore than 1/3 of the Janata Dal Parliamentary Party as

required by the Act. Therefore, the question of application of
clauses 6 and 7 of the Anti-Defection Act, 1985 did not arise.8
The issue, according to the leader of the Janata Dal faction,
related to the shortcomingsof the law.
Meanwhile, the Delhi High Court, on January 8, 1991,
directed the Speaker to maintain status quo in respect of the
disqualification proceedings against all the 37 MPs of the Janata
Dal (S). This order was passed by a full bench of the High
Court when a petition seeking the direction of the court was filed
by the Janata Dal (S) members, maintaining the ground that
there was virtually a split in the Janata Party; all the 37 MPs
constituted more than 1/3 of the Janata Dal and they had the
right to form a new party.
While reviewing the petitions of the Janata Dal dissidents,
the Lok Sabha Speaker announced his decision, on January
11, 1991, disqualifying the eight Janata Dal (S) membersincluding the five Ministers of the Union Cabinet under the AntiDefection Law on the basis of their voting pattern on November
7 and on November 16, 1990, which was inconsistent. According
to the Speaker, these members could not claim that they were
not bound by the party whip served to them by the Party High
Command to vote in favour of the confidence motion of Mr. V. P.
Singh in the Lok Sabha on November 16, 1990. It was treated a
case of violation of the party whip and the Speaker, thus, rejected their plea that the whip of the Janata Dal did not apply to
them in view of the 'Conscience vote' appealed by Mr. V. P. Singh
in the Lok Sabha on the same day. The Speaker, however, recognized the 'split' in the Janata Dal and and henceforthtreated
the group of 54 members as the Janata Dal (S), because it had
fulfilledthe criterion of 1/3 of the 52nd Constitutional Amend
ment Act, 1985.
:
of theSpeakarAsserted
Supremacy
The special session of the Lok Sabha held in January 1991
shall be remembered in the parliamentary history of India on
many counts, because the session witnessed many illustratingand
unprecedented examples of peculiar nature, which lowered the
dignity of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the supremacy of
THE ANTI-DEFECTIONACT,1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER335

the parliament itself. As many as eight members of the Lok
Sabha, belonging to the Janata Dal (S), for example, were disqualified en block including the five Union Ministers of the
Chandra Shekhar Government by the Speaker, Mr. Rabi Ray,
under the Anti-Defection Law. It caused a serious setback to the
minorityGovernment headed by Chandra Shekhar. Following
the judgement of the Delhi High Court and the inteview of Dr.
S. Subramaniam Swamy, the then Union Law Minister, against
the ruling of the Speaker, the Speaker's position was put in an
embarrassing position. The then Union Law Minister, in his
interview, threatened the Speaker to get him arrested if he
(Speaker) did not postpone indefinitelythe last date for submission of the replies of 37 Janata Dal (S) members,whose disqualification under the Anti-Defection Law had been sought by the
A vociferous protest against the atrocious conduct
Janata Dal.
of the Minister was raised in both the Houses of Parliament
on January 2, 1991. The Minister's interview, published in
46TkeHindustanTimes", (New Delhi) dated 27th December, 1990,
was taken as a gross contempt of the House committed by the
then Union Law Minister. The episode was furtherdescribed as
'institutional damage to parliamentary democracy5.
Pertinent issues debated in the Lok Sabha related to the
dignity of the Speaker's authority and the jurisdiction of the
Indian Parliament, as the disqualification case of the MPs versus
the judgement of the Delhi High Court in which the dignity and
neutrality of the Office of the Speaker was called is questioned,
were of serious concerns. There was a general consensus that,
under no circumstances, should the Speaker allow the unbecoming
conduct of the Union Minister to cloud the judgement of the
Speaker and the interview given by the Minister amounted to
the violation of the sixth clause of the Anti-Defection Law,
which upholds that the Speaker's ruling is 'final'. Consequently,
the arrant Minister had to tender his apology in the Lok Sabha
on January 14, 1991.
As regards the jurisdiction of the Speaker and the High
Court which resulted in a clash between the Delhi High Court
and the Speaker's authority on the disqualification issuse, it was
a healthy development that it was judiciously averted by modifyingthe affidavitfiled by the then Union Government of the
Janata Dal (S). The Government declared in the Lok Sabha to
P- 6
336
uphold the dignity of the House and the Speaker as well.9 And
finally,on the question of remaining in officeby the five Union
Ministers, who had already been disqualified by the speaker in
the disqualification case, it was widely viewed as the defiance of
Speakers ruling. The Janata Dal (S) was charged in the Lok
Sabha of reducing the spirit of the Anti-Defection Act, 1985 that
is political stability and public morality,as keeping the Ministers
in office amounted to legitimatising defectors under Article 75
(5) of the Constitution of India. The Government's attention
was drawn to the specific recommendation of the Defection
Committee formed in 1967, which had suggested that defectors
should not be given any ministerial birth. Even the opposition
parties, namely the Janata Dal, the B. J. P. and the Left parties, in their memorandum to the President of India, urged to
sack those Ministers in order to uphold the sanctity of the constitutional law. The controversy lateron ended when the Prime
Minister relieved the Union Ministers from their portfolios
following the mounting pressure of the Congress (I).
Meanwhile, a full bench of the Delhi High Court revoked
its stay order on 11th January,1991, declaring that the Speaker
of the Lok Sabha enjoyed jurisdiction in the matters of disqualification cases of the members of the Lok Sabha. It was a healthy
development that during the Lok Sabha debate, the wisdom
prevailed and the dignity of the House as well as the authority
of the Speaker was maintained. It was, however, unfortunate
that the entire embroglio left a bad reflectionof the standard of
political conduct of a Minister in our Parliamentary history.
Validityof Speaker'sRuling Questioned
Notwithstanding the fact that the Speaker's rulings in the
disqualification was widely welcomed, the doubts about the
impartiality of the Lok Sabha Speaker were aroused because of
Speaker's political affiliation with the party which had elected
him as Speaker. The Speaker of Kerala's Legislative Assembly,
Mr. V. Radhakrishna, for example, questioned the impartial role
played by the Lok Sabha Speaker, as he had not given a chance
to the members of the break-away Janata Dal to submit their
explanations before declaring them 'unattached'. He should
have taken into account the claims and counter-claims of the
members of the Janata Dal and its faction before his judgement.
THE ANTI-DEFECTIONACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER337

The corollary of the Speaker's decision was that he should have
disqualified the rest of the dissidents in the faction since they did
not constitute one- third of the Janata Dal. In this context, a
matter of national debate at that time was whether the power
to decide upon the petitions regarding political defections under
the Tenth Schedule to our Constitution should vest solely with
the single individual? The pertinent issue was how to ensure a
fair and impartial role of the Speaker in deciding the question of
the disqualification of the MPs. It was felt that however perfect
a provision may be provided for, when it comes into operation,
the Speaker - intentionally or otherwise - might be tempted by
his party loyalty, even after his election for this august office
while disposing of such petitions of political nature.
Constitutional experts and eminent jurists such as Dr. L. M.
Singhvi, K. K. Venugopal and others were of the opinion that
the Speaker of the Lok Sabha should not be vested with an
absolute and final authority of disqualifying a member on
grounds of defection, and to this effect,the Constitution of India
should be amended to insert a provision of judicial review of
Speaker's ruling by a special Judicial Tribunal constituted for
this purpose, consisting of retired judges of the Supreme Court
of India to adjudicate the cases of defections.10In their opinion,
a legislator should not be denied the right to seek a judicial
review of the judgement given by the Speaker. Likewise, Speaker
of the Kerala Legislative Assembly, also called fortwo important
amendments to the Anti-Defection Act, 1985. First, it should
apply to all the disqualifications alike - individual or organization. Condoning of defection even if a defecting group has 1/3
strength of the party in the House is against the basic tenet of the
parliamentary formof democracy. Secondly, the power to disqualify membersunder the provisionsof the 52nd Amendment Act
should be vested in the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
India or the High Court.
ConcludingObservations
The political conditions as prevalent in the country at the
time of the passage of the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, warranted
the dire need of such an act for maintaining political stability
and public morality. But its major drawback was that it was
enacted in a hurried manner by the then Union Government of
338
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, without seekingthe consensus to other political

parties, or launching a nation-wide debate on the crucial issues.
Consequently, the Act neither could lay a ban on the trend of
mass-defections nor did it take into account the possibility of
partial role to be played by the Presiding Officers,while dealing
with cases of disqualifications falling under the ambit of the Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. It is a matter of deep regret
that its inherent flaws and drawbacks, as brought to limelight at
the time of debate in the Parliamentary proceedings in 1985, were
ignored and which have been, in practical terms, responsible for
frustratingthe objectives of the Act. These drawbacks have not
only weakened the working system of the parliamentary institutions but they have also undermined the party-system in the
country. Its flaws have furthergenerated a tug-of-warbetween
the Parliament and the Judiciary, resulting into the flood of petitions in the Court of Law against the decisions delivered by state
Speakers from time to time.
The manner in which the wholesale defections took place in
the Janata Dal leading to the floating of the new party (Janata
Dal-S), or the way in which Speaker exercised his powers in dealing with the disqualification cases arising out of a split in the
Janata Dal, has proved these apprehensions correct, as were
originally expressed at the time of its passage.
The inherent loopholes in the Act, therefore,should be held
responsible for the destabilization of Governments of NonCongress parties. It is regrettable that the role of the Speaker in
handling a split in the party and thereby tackling the disqualification cases of elected members, has rendered the spirit of the
Amendment Act, 1985 a mockery in our federal set-up. For its
failure, the ruling political party, which had chosen him as Presiding Officerof the Legislature, with a view to act in a manner
to serve the political purpose of the party in power, should
equally be blamed for the political crises the nation has ever faced
with. In order to strengthenthe working systemof our political
institutions and the party structure, the following suggestions
should be incroporated in the 52nd Constitutional Amendment
Act, 1985, so that the unsavoury incidents involving the officeof
the Speaker could be avoided and wholesale defections checkmated.
THE ANTI-DEFECTION
First, a fresh country-wide debate should be called for to
evolve a national consensus as to how to overcome the trends of
defections and how to remove the drawbacks of the Anti-Defection Law, with a view to strengtheningour parliamentary democracy. Second, there is an utmost need to have some effective
checks on the unlimited powers of the Speaker in dealing with the
disqualification cases of elected members. The demand that the
Speaker's ruling should be made subject to judicial review by the
special tribunal constituted for the purpose should be seriously
taken into consideration.
Apart from this, the wholesale defections shall have to be
banned under the law, because dissident members in a political
party are free to act according to their convictions at the party
forum but they must resign and seek fresh mandate from the
electorate who have elected them on the label of a particular
party. The lacuna as referredto by the Lok Sabha Speaker in his
ruling should also be taken into account. It is, however, important to explore the scope of allowing dissidence to function within the organization of a political party,because dissident opinion
is one of the important ingredientsof democracy and it should be
encouraged in our party system. The political party is more important than the individuals in a democratic setup as electors
vote for a party and not for candidates. Also, a deterrentprovision has to be made placing a ceiling on the size of the Council
of Ministers so as to circumscribe the scope of sheilding political
rewards to defecting members.
Lastly, there is utmost need to introduce the principle of inner
democracy within the organization of a political party in India to
eliminate the evils like bossism in the partysystem. In the absence
of inner party elections, the political parties have come into existence on the basis of autocracy, feudalism, religion, casteism and
regionalism, which have subverted the virtues of party system,
such as dissension, emergence of rival leadership and periodic
elections within the organization. These evils have given birth to
psychophancy and mental-slaveryin the rank and file in the name
of loyalty, discipline and ideology. It is regrettedthat the political parties which have ruled the largest democracy of the world
have sofar not honoured the concept of inner-partydemocracy in
their organizations. It is, therefore, suggested that the party
system in the country should be recognized under the constitu-
340
tional law, while making inner party democracy mandatory for

all the political parties.
It is, however, important to mention that mere legislative
measures cannot cover the entire field. The democratic conventions have to be evolved, coupled with some statutory provisions
to circumscribe ills of our parliamentary democracy. Loopholes
are bound to remain which are to be plugged by the prevalence
of healthy traditions. But to cure the disease forever,the people
shall have to be educated and trained in the right direction, sothat a healthy and awakened public opinion is generated to
punish the culprits and to discourage unprincipled defections.
The electorate should be made more vigilant to have a strictwatch
on the role of their elected members.
NOTES
How the game of defections proved a double-edged
in
the post- 1967 period in making and unmaking governweapon
ments in our polity, see Subhas G. Kashyap's study: The Politicsof
, National, Delhi, 1969 and ThePoliticsofPower,National,
Defections
1974
for a detailed study.
Delhi,
2. Bhatia, Surdarshan., "Politics of Defections," The
HindustanTimes, 22-12 - 90. See my Book, Dynamicsof IndianPoli'
tics,Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1986, Chapter 10,
p. 159.
3. Siwach, J. R., Dynamicsof Indian Government
and Politics,
Sterling, New Delhi, Und Edn; 1990, p. 653.
4. Dhavan, Rajiv., "Governors, Speakers and Defectors",
The Indian Express,May 23, 1990, p. 8.
5. Tharyan, P., "Plugging the loopholes of Anti-Defection
Law", The HindustanTimes,8 - 3-91.
6. Ganeshan, K., "Constitution and Anti-Defection Law"
The Indian Expresi,December 16, 1988.
7. On the same day, Mr. Chandra Shekhar announced that
he would present a proposal for forming a new Government at
the Centre. The Indian Express, New Delhi Edn: November 9, 1990.
8. Bhandari, M. C., "Disqualification: Make it Justifiable",
The HindustanTimes'.19- 11- 90.
9. Editorial., 'Parliament is Supreme', The HindustanTimes
11- 1- 199 1
10. The Timesof India, 6th January, 1991.
1.

Anti Defection and Role of Speaker

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Anti Defection and Role of Speaker

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Indian Political Science Association

THE ANTI-DEFECTION ACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

Provisionof theAnti-DefectionAct, 1985

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

against Mr. P. C. Thomas who had quit the Democratic Janata

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

strengthmore than 1/3 of the Janata Dal Parliamentary Party as

THE ANTI-DEFECTIONACT,1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER335

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

THE ANTI-DEFECTIONACT, 1985 AND THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER337

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, without seekingthe consensus to other political

THE INDIANJOURNALOF POLITICALSCIENCE

tional law, while making inner party democracy mandatory for

You might also like