Warrior Notes Constitutional Law

Allied Political Law Review of Class 2015
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Notes and Cases from Judge Estela Alma A. Singco
USERS GUIDE
Most likely to come out in the exams:
TN Take note, BAR Bar Question,
***** - Memorize.
From beginning to Legislative, it was arranged
according to the syllabus, but thereafter, its not.
Blue fonts mean, the subheadings were created by us.
The italicized portions came from the cases cited.
The Times New Roman Bold fontface are from
provisions of the law.
Not all cases have been placed with syllabus or cited
Subject Head:
Luigine Chan
Members:
Johnbee Biton, Abegail Borres, Richard Caminade, Kaitlin Caada, Riza Duran,
Bryce Fookson, Rajane Gallego, Ruby Gan, Clyde Gregorio, Rhea Judilla, Fiona
Lao, Jinky Lesigues, Albert Lulu, Miguel Lumapas, Daphne Ortezuela, Angeli
Otero, Athena Salas, Shane Tampus, RalphSanchez, Camille Ubod, Judito Tapia
Jr., Rose Paglinawan, Prince Robles, Joahnna Tan-Yu, Brendale Bayalas, Riza
Torres, Nico Pea, Jovelle Rejuso
USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

I. The Philippine Constitution
A. Constitution: definition, nature and concepts
We start with the Constitutions definition, concept. You
have mastered that: what a Constitution is; the different
kinds of Constitution according to its origin, according to
its form, according to the manner of changing it and
according to the form of government that is established.
So for example, lets have the definition of a Constitution
as a general concept. It is the highest fundamental law of
the land upon which all activities of the government are
based on. And so therefore in case of a conflict between a
statute and the Constitution always the Constitution
prevailing over the statute, as a general rule because
sometimes it would depend on the system of the
government. Where there is the supremacy of the
parliament, in case of a conflict between a statute and the
Constitution, the statute is not necessarily declared
unconstitutional. Nonetheless the parliament act may still
be existing without being declared as unconstitutional.
That goes to show an implication of the principle that the
Constitution always prevails over any other law that may
be passed by the government it could be the parliament
or it could be an administrative body in so far as rules and
regulations or even the president in some cases as
regards to his presidential decrees, proclamations or
executive orders.
Kinds of Constitution According to Origin
1. Conventional
or
Enacted
Constitution
-deliberately made at a definite period of time
2. Cumulative or Evolutionary Constitution When it is a result of an evolution of history of
the activities the people of the country and of the
government in particular
3. Fiat or Granted Constitution - it is a
Constitution made by one country for another
usually its by way of a treaty of peace, after one
territory/country is defeated by another. So a
sovereign country would prepare a Constitution
for a defeated territory
Now, the more important part there is being able to
distinguish what kind of constitution that you have
according to that form or kind of constitution. Yours is
definitely a Conventional or Enacted Constitution has
been as such since we had the 1935 Constitution, 1973
and the 1987 Constitution. So it was deliberately made,
for example, in so far as the 1935 Constitution by the
1934 Con-Con ratified by the people on 14 May 1935.
And then you have the 1973 Constitution that was made
by the 1971 Con-Con and it was declared to have been
validly ratified on 17 January 1973 by Proclamation 1102
by Mr. Marcos. And then you have the freedom
Constitution of course, it was made by virtue of
Proclamation No. 3 by Cory Aquino. And then finally you
have the 1987 Constitution that was made by the 1986
Constitutional Commission, ratified and took effect on 2
February 1987. Case in point, you have the de Leon v.

Esguerra case.
Kinds of Constitution According to Source
1. Written Constitution - a constitution whose
sources are found in one single instrument.
2. Unwritten Constitution - not necessarily not
reduced in writing the sources could still be
written, however the sources are scattered.
The kind of Constitution that you have is a Written
Constitution where all provisions are found in one single
instrument such as the 1987 Constitution.
Kinds of Constitution According to the Manner of
Changing
1. Rigid - is when you follow a specific procedure
on how to change the Constitution, amend or
revise it.
2. Flexible - is when you dont follow any
procedure and you can effect a change to the
Constitution.
So then you have master what kind of constitution you
have. Definitely yours is a Rigid Constitution; so you
master how you propose amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
B. Parts
Then we go to the different parts of the Constitution. First,
you have the Constitution of Government, the Constitution
of Liberties and then you have the Constitution of
Sovereignty.
On the Constitution of government, that pertains to the
provisions that relate to the structure, functions and
operations of the government.
Q: The 1987 Constitution consists only of how many
articles?
A: Eighteen (18) articles.
1.
2.
Constitution of Government - as reflected in

the Constitution, you have Articles VI, VII, and
VIII the legislative, executive and judicial
departments. Of course you have other
Constitutional Bodies, such as the Constitutional
Commissions. And then you have the principles
the underlying principles in the operation of the
government. So you have general principles like
Article II, you have the economic provisions, the
general and transitory provisions and all.
Constitution of Rights - such as the Bill of
Rights, you have Article III. that is your charter
of liberty.

3.
Constitution of Sovereignty - that is giving the

power to the people on how to make
amendments to the Constitution.
TN: Preamble does not form part of the Constitution, it is
not an essential part. You can have a Constitution without
a preamble.
C. Amendments and revisions
This has come out in the BAR exams several kinds.
Especially in the MCQ.
Q: (BAR) What is first the difference between amendment
and revision?
A: Amendment is when you only propose certain changes
to certain provisions or portions or parts of the
Constitution you do not overhaul it. Even if you only
change a certain portion however it changes the
philosophy or the foundation of the Constitution then it is
not just an amendment but a revision.
Lets have an example. If you change the term of office of
the president, its just an amendment, but if you change
the system of the government from presidential to
parliamentary definitely it is a revision because you
practically change the foundation of the government the
system of the government.
Q: Why is it important to know the difference between an
amendment and a revision?
A: Because the matter of proposal also differ. (TN) In so
far as proposal to amend or revise a Constitution, there
are only certain individuals who are authorized to do the
proposal.
Outline of Steps in Amendments
1. Proposal
Q: Who can propose an amendment to the Constitution?
A: First of all, you have Congress. And then you have a
Constitutional convention. And of course you have people
through Initiative.
Q: In revision, can people propose?
A: No, only Congress and the Constitutional convention
can make the proposal if it is a revision.
See the difference here? Lets go to the details.
In so far as an amendment proposal or revision,
Congress can do so.
Q: What is the procedure? How many votes are needed?
A: You need votes of both houses, voting separately.
Although the Constitution says of all members of
Congress, it didnt say voting separately. But there is an
interpretation although there is no jurisprudence that it
should be interpreted as voting separately because
according to some Constitutionalists it may be an
oversight on the part of the members of the Con-Comm
just copying the 1973 Constitution because then there

was no problem because the legislature was unicameral.
It is a problem now because yours is bicameral. So it
should be understood as voting separately. So that, even
you get votes from the House of Representatives,
however you dont get the same number of votes in the
same number of votes in Senate, there cannot be any
proposal for amendments to the Constitution coming from
congress.
Another manner of changing it, you have a Constitutional
Convention both also an amendment or revision.
Q: Who can initiate? Who will decide whether to call a
Con-Con? Or it would be Congress to act as constituent
assembly?
A: That is the discretion of Congress. (BAR) TN of the
voting, the requisite vote. Directly, if Congress will act as
Constituent Assembly . The calling of a Con-con, you
need only 2/3. And if Congress is undecided and will
prefer for the people to decide on it, they would then
submit the issue to the people in a referendum.
Q: And that will require how many votes?
A: Majority.
Q: How about the people?
A: They can only propose amendments but not revision.
And it is through the process of initiative only initiative
on the Constitution not referendum, but initiative.
Q: How do people initiate amendments to the
Constitution?
A: Take note of the following cases that are relevant:
Santiago v. COMELEC
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No.
6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this
substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
empowering the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act
Lambino v. COMELEC
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to
sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed
amendments
to
avoid
fraud
or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of
Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature
sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3
million signatories who were led to believe that the
proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of
elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with
the local elections.
Q: First of all, you should gather how many signatures of
registered voters?

A: 12% of the total registered voters of which, each
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters. Dont just simply say 12%. It should be
12% and 3%. They must concur.
(TN) Additional requirements are discussed in the
Lambino case.
Q: That it should be the petition that is signed by the
registered voters, why?
A: Because after all, they are supposed to be the authors
of the petition to propose an amendment to the
Constitution, and therefore they should sign the petition
itself. That is the requirement. So, you would have copies
according to as many petitioners, if they are to be the
authors of a petition to propose amendments or changes
to the Constitution.
Q: And whats the reason?
A: In both cases, an initiative failed. In the Santiagos
case, the SC was saying that RA 6735 (the law providing
for the manner of initiative, the implementing rule
regarding on people initiating amendments to the
Constitution), is insufficient to provide a procedure
because if you read the law, it does not provide for details
it does not even authorize the COMELEC to promulgate
the rules, unlike in initiative on statute and on local
legislation, which are very specific. Initiative on
amendments to the Constitution however was declared by
the SC to be insufficient.
Nonetheless, in the Lambino case, which was the
subsequent case, the SC was saying if people indeed
would want to propose changes, we cannot stop them. It
is a political discretion in their sovereign capacity, should
they decide. But the initiative that was initiated by
Lambino group on amending the Constitution during the
Arroyo administration still failed because they failed to
prove to the SC the number of petitioners signing
because the copies would not reflect to the number of
registered voters supposedly initiating the amendments to
the Constitution. You need 12% and they were saying that
is equivalent to a number of voters, like 11 million for
example however the copies of the petition was much
lesser than the number of registered voters. And so the
SC was saying, it has not proven that it has obtained the
requisite number of percentage of registered voters
signing the petition as it is required by the law that would
initiate amendments to the Constitution.
2. Submission to the people for study
Q: After the proposal, what happens next?
A: Youll have the submission of the proposal to the
people for further study and investigation. The only
principle that you must remember under this particular
stage of the change of the Constitution is that there
cannot be a piecemeal submission of a proposed
amendments to the Constitution.
Piecemeal submission is prohibited. It should be the

whole thing so that the people can fully understand the
proposed changes or amendments.
3. Ratification
Q: After the submission of the proposal to the people,
what will be the next step to follow?
A: There is now the ratification.
Q: In the ratification, you will have a plebiscite. For the
amendments to be effective, how many votes are
needed?
A: Its plurality only. Majority of the votes cast during the
plebiscite.
Q: And when does the Constitution take effect, under
section 22 of article XVIII?
A: As it was declared by the SC in the Esguerra case, the
Constitution, any amendments thereto or revision shall
take effect only upon ratification by the majority votes, not
upon the declaration by the president that the Constitution
was validly ratified.
That is in so far as the kind of Constitution that you have
which is rigid.
D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
Q: What are the general principles on the interpretation of
the Constitution.
A: The general rule is that it is mandatory, you have to
follow them. It is not just directory, unless the law itself
provides otherwise that it is merely directory or by a
Supreme Court interpretation. And then, it is selfexecuting. You dont need legislation inorder to implement
them. It can be executed right away without need of
implementing rules as a general rule. As exception to that
is ARTICLE II which is not self-executing. You need
legislation inorder to implement. TN of the case of Taada
vs Angara. Suffice to say that as a general rule it is selfexecuting. Later you would learn from the decisions of the
Supreme Court where it emphasized the fact that there is
no need of a law or legislation inorder to implement the
provisions if the Constitution. You could go to court and
seek judicial relief. If it is not self executing that cannot
then be the provisions of the Constitution especially Art. II
cannot be used as judicial basis for judicial action.
Meaning, you cannot question the validity a particular act
of the government if there is no law prohibiting it on the
basis only of Art. II because is not self executing. And our
economic provisions as well. Most of them are not self
executing. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court, it
made emphasis on some provisions there that are self
executing and therefore need not require any legislation.
But generally, it is self executing.
Finally, you dont apply the provisions of the Constitution
retroactively, they only have prospective application
unless it does not conflict with the previous Constitutions
then it may be applied retroactively. General rule is,
prospective application.

E. General provisions
PREAMBLE (MEMORIZE)
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society
and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our
posterity the blessings of independence and democracy
under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.||| (1987 Constitution [1987])
The question is more on technicalities side of the
preamble. As i have said earlier, it is not an intergral part.
It is not even important and necessary because it cannot
be a source of rights and obligations. The utility of a
preamble may be limited to guiding our government,
particulary Congress, in making laws that if they have to
make laws it must be in accordance of the purpose
forwhich the Constitution was adopted. Similarly to the
President in the implementation of the laws if he doesnt
understand how to implement or of the purpose of
Congress then he may always refer to the preamble. As
well as the Supreme Court in interpreting the provisions of
the Constitution and laws passed by Congress. In
applying it to actual cases, it may be guided of the
purposes enumerated in the preamble. If you read the
preamble, it states there WE, THE SOVEREIGN
FILIPINO PEOPLE indicating therefore the source of
sovereignty and authors of the Constitution, the sovereign
filipino people. IMPLORING THE AID OF ALMIGHTY
GOD and this has been questioned saying that we are
suppose to be a counrty with a separation of the church
and the state where it follow non establishment of a
religion.
Q: would there be a violation of the statement to the
Consitution?
A: No. The preamble is more of a description of the kind
of people that we are. Rather than imposing the belief in
God in our establishing of a government or in our
implementing the provisions of the Constitution. So it just
a mere declaration that we implore the aid of the
Almighty God. We are not obliged to believe in God. If
you are an atheist you cannot use that to question the
validity of the Consitution.
And then you have the enumeration of the purposes. Just
go over with the purposes. You can say that there is
redundancy because these principles are already implied
in the subseqeunt provisions of the Consitution.
II. General Considerations
A. National territory
ARTICLE I- NATIONAL TERRITORY. (TN, ***)
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and

aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions,
form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.||| (1987
Constitution [1987])
Master it because of the recent issues. In Scarborough
shoal , what we are concerned of are the living and nonliving forces in the premises as part of our Exclusive
Economic Zone. It is not part of out territory but part of
EEZ. This is explained in our definition of National
Territory. You should TN of this that the definiton of
National Territory is not binding in the international
sphere. It is not binding upon other countries because it is
only a municipal law. This is important for the purposes of
implementing our laws. Identifying our boundaries or
territorial boundaries, that is the most important part
because how would we know if our laws are applicable.
We have to include in the definition of our national
territory for some reaons. In the 1935 Constiution, we had
the definition because we were too afraid that the
american government might just retain some portions of
our territory. Our definition of national territory in 1935
Constitution was based on the Treaty of Paris. It
enumerates all
and specified the delineation and
boundaries of our territory including Marianas Islands in
Guam. Then there was a different reason why we
adopted a definition in the 1973 Constitution. This is
because if we will rely merely on the Treaty of Paris as
our title of what comprises as the Philippine National
Territory it would exclude the Batanes Islands. Because
the Batanes Island were not included in the definition in
the Treaty of Paris. So to inlcude it, we have to define our
national territory and also another reason for that is to
protect our natural resources that are found in the
archipelagic waters. TN that our territory is an archipelago
and therfore if you follow the ordinary principle of
international law in determining territorial seas then you
will be creating pockets of international waters within our
territory.
1.
Archipelagic doctrine
We cannot afford to have that situation so we adopted

another doctrine which is the Archipelagic Doctrine.
It means waters around, between and connecting the
islands regardless of breadth and dimensions are
considered as inland waters, internal waters treated like
canals, rivers or swamps. There is no controversy there
on territorial sea to the extent of jurisdiction beacuse they
are treated as internal waters. In the 1987 constitution we
adopted the defintion of national territory with some
changes in some phrases. Our conflict with Malaysia over
Sabbah, inorder to erase that thought of annoyance or
irritation, we erased the phrase belonging to the
Philippines by historic/legal title instead we have in all
other territories in which the Philippines has sovereignty

or jurisdiction. So whatever the reason is of the definiton
of the national territory that will bind us and not
necassarily the neighboring countries.
The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of
their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines
Q: What is an archipelago?
A: A group of islands surrounded by the sea waters or it
could be a body of water studed with islands. The general
concept of archipelago is the latter defintion,body of sea
water studed with several islands. A territory may consist
of several archipelagoes or just one archipelago. Ours is
just one consisting of 7,106 when low tide and 7,100
when high tide. TN of the definiton of an archipelago in
the UNCLOS,
ART. 46. USE OF TERMS
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by
one or more archipelagos and may include other islands;
(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts
of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters and other natural features form an intrinsic
geographical, economic and
We have big islands Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Then
we have Palawan, the West Philipinnes Sea and you can
also find the islands being the subject of the controversy,
Kalayaan group of Island and the Scarborough shoal.
Q: How did we acquire these islands, not particluarly the
main archipelago?
A: We acquired the islands by virtue of transfer except for
Batanes Islands. Batanes islands were acquired by long
occupation. The rest by Treaty of Paris. And then there
were other islands that were added
Q:
What are other islands added to the Philippines
by virtue of Treaty of Washington and US-British Treaty?
A:
Maxi islands, Turtle islands, Cagayan de Sulu,
Sibuto islands
TN:
If you are to determine the archipelago, it looks
like a triangle, until we have the two islands added the
Scarborough shoal and the KGI. KGI to some extent is
habitable, but Scarborough shoal is not. At any rate, it is
not fit for human habitation or occupation. This
information is significant taking into consideration the

present controversy with China.
Q:
What is the status of these islands today in
relation to RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)?
A:
They used to be part of the archipelago until we
were pressured into redefining, redrawing our archipelago
so that they will be more or less consistent with the
provisions of the UNCLOS. By virtue of this law, these two
other territories that we are claiming as part of our
archipelago, such as the Scarborough shoal and the KGI
were EXCLUDED from the main archipelago and are
ONLY TREATED AS REGIME OF ISLANDS. So in the
WATERS SEPARATING these two from the main
archipelago WILL NOT BE ANYMORE INCLUDED IN
THE
INTERNAL
WATERS
DEFINITION
OR
ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS. The water around it, to
determine its claim over the seawaters, is based on
Normal Base Line, not Exclusive Economic Zone.
The significance there, the waters separating
these islands from the main archipelago will no longer be
considered internal waters. That is the implication. And
weve lost therefore a number of nautical miles of
seawaters because of the exclusion. It used to be
rectangular, now it is only triangle.
TN:
Anything pertaining to maritime jurisdiction or
domain, it is governed by the UNCLOS. Always
remember that. Read it and you will top the bar. Thats not
only applicable in political law but as well as in public
international law.
Q:
These islands are mostly rocks. Why are we
interested in them?
A:
Were interested over the seawaters surrounding
these islands, as bases for our claim over the maritime
domain. They are very rich in resources. They are part of
the Malampaya.
Q: What is the basis of China in asserting claim over
these islands?
A:
Their basis is Exclusive Economic Zone. China
claims that there is overlapping of Exclusive Economic
Zone, and based from their EEZ, that is still covered from
Hainan island.
TN:
Insofar as our claim over the seawater which
used to be just internal waters, now we have to determine
the seawaters and the bases of EITHER theyre part of
the EEZ or its territorial seas.
Q:
What is the purpose of RA 9522?
A:
In gist RA 9522 defines the general configuration
of the archipelago including the extended continental
shelf and the EEZ to make it more compliant to UNCLOS.
Q:
What is TERRITORIAL SEA?

A:
Under ordinary circumstances, if you have this
continent, its only 12 nautical miles from the normal base
line. You draw it from the normal base line of the coastline
of a territory.
Q:
BUT SOMETIMES, there are continents that are
submerged, and there may be an extension of the inland
which is submerged that goes beyond the 12 NM. Is that
part of the territory?
A:
Answer is NO, only up to 12 NM. BUT, we have
sovereign rights over the water beyond that 12 NM up to
another 12 NM from the end of the 12 NM of territorial
seas so 24 NM from the normal base line. Thats what
we call EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF PRINCIPLE.
Q:
What is the purpose of Extended Continental
Self Principle?
A:
For implementing our laws pertaining to sanitary,
customs, fiscals that would go beyond 24 NM from the
normal base line or 12 nm from the end of territorial seas.
Q:
What is EXCLUSIVE
Where is it reckoned from?
ECONOMIC
ZONE?
A:
It is reckoned from normal base line of adjacent
territory, 200 NM. It means that beyond 12 NM onwards to
200 NM, its not part of our territory BUT we have
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS over the seawaters including the
living and non-living resources found therein to Exploit,
Develop and Utilize (EDU).
Q:
Is it provided in the Constitution? Is it merely
directory? Or self-executing?
A:
The Constitution is very clear on this and this is
self-executing according to the Supreme Court, that
because it is exclusive, it cannot be shared with anyone,
not even overlapping. That is your EXCLUSIVE right.
Q:
In the case of (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No.
187167, August 16, 2011), RA 9522 was challenged on
the ground that by adopting this law, in effect, we are
deprived of our rights to explore the resources over the
waters separating these islands such as KGI and the
Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago. How was
this resolved by the Supreme Court?
A:
The Supreme Court ruled that Had Congress in
RA 9522 enclosed the KGI and Scarborough Shoal as
part of the archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines will have committed breach of
the two provisions of UNCLOS. First, Article 47(3) thereof
requires that the drawing of such baseline shall not
depart from any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago. Article 47 of the same
provision provides that the length of the base line shall
not exceed 100 NM same for 3% of the total number of
baselines which can be up to 125 NM. Although the
Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
"depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago."||| (Magallona v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011).
TN:
Thats why if you extend it, the configuration
becomes rectangular instead of triangular which is the
original configuration of the archipelago under the Treaty
of Paris.
Q:
What is our basis of our claim over Scarborough
Shoal?
A:
Primarily on discovery.
Q:
There is another principle on overlapping. What
is the basis for this principle?
TN:
But China claims that they have discovered it as
early as 18th century. Remember that we only started
claiming after the WWII.
A:
It is based on equality, equity, solution in the
determination of extent of jurisdiction proportionate on
how big your island is, adjacent to the EEZ It is not totally
equal but based on equity.
IMPORTANT:
At any rate, the more important basis
for our claim is our EEZ. Part of our 200 EEZ. Read
Carpios paper.
TN:
But for as long as there is no overlapping, there
cannot be sharing in the exploration. What China wants,
the least, is to share the exploration of the national
resources including Malampaya.
Q:
Is the Philippines
exploration of our islands?
allowed
to
share
the
A:
That is contrary to the Constitution if we agree to
that. Why? Read again the constitution, it says: exclusive
rights of Filipino citizen on marine wealth. We may only
hire them as contractors to provide us financial and
technical assistance just like Shell, but there cannot be
any sharing.
Q:
What are our rights over our Internal Waters,
and Extended Continental Shelf?
A:
Our claim over the seawaters separating the
islands, there is no doubt that if we follow the archipelagic
doctrine that theyre part of our INTERNAL WATERS,
PART OF OUR TERRITORY. Our jurisdiction is only up to
the 12 NM which means within 12 NM as part of our
territory which we described as territorial seas, we can
limit foreign vessel navigation and over-flight.
A:
Insofar as the extended continental shelf, we
have up to 24 NM from the normal baseline. Beyond the
12 NM, although still within the continental shelf, it is

allowed as part of the right of way, the same with
Exclusive Economic Zone.
Q:
From where should the EEZ be based or drawn?
A:
In the drawing of the EEZ as part of the territory,
always remember that it has to be drawn from the normal
baseline along the coastline of an island or continental
shelf. NORMAL BASELINE of an island that is
HABITABLE,
Q:
What do you mean by HABITABLE?
A:
That that can be inhabited, or can sustain on its
own economic growth.
Q:
In relation to Chinas claims, will the EEZ apply?
A:
That EEZ of 200 NM cannot apply if your basis is
a reef or rocks. China cannot make a claim because their
bases are the Nine-dash lines and Paracels that cannot
be occupied. If you live there, you need to depend on the
food that is being brought there. But on their own, they
cannot sustain economically. So if that is the basis of the
EEZ. That is not allowed.
TN:
Our archipelago is sustainable economically; we
can survive on our own. It is obviously habitable. If we
follow that, we have better right for EEZ where you can
find the Scarborough Shoal.
TN:
Another point that we should take note is that
this is now being subjected to arbitration under the
UNCLOS. China however refused to submit and opted
out from that arbitration saying that being a sovereign
state it is discretionary on their part whether or not to
submit itself to arbitration.
Q:
Is it correct for China to refuse?
A:
Answer is NO, because they are signatory to the
UNCLOS. When they signed in the UNCLOS, they
consented to follow the provisions of the UNCLOS.
In which case, they have given their consent impliedly
and if they have given their consent, they are subjected to
the jurisdiction of UNCLOS Arbitration.
TN: The jurisdiction of the UNCLOS. Its jurisdiction is
limited only to disputes involving sea waters of the
continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone NOT
Territorial Seas.
Kung mu ingon kag territorial imung dispute involving the
territorial seas or the maritime domain, adto na siya, ang
application kay General Principles of International Law.
ICJ has jurisdiction over that.
But when we say maritime dispute involving claims over
sea waters relating to the continental shelf, extended
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone this is under
the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS. Im just discussing this in
relation to the claims of China over the Regime of Islands.
Aside from the Regime of Islands, you also have other

territories over which the Philippines have jurisdiction or
sovereignty. Jurisdiction we mean that we enforce our
own laws, having a government and implement our own
laws.
Q: Sovereignty, is it necessary that there should be a
government in the territory, Philippine government in
order for it to be considered as part of the Philippine
National Territory?
A: No. for as long as there are sovereign rights based on
historic right or legal title. That would be sufficient to claim
it as part of the national territory. Therefore, our
rephrasing of the provisions of the Constitution relating on
this score, remember the original provision saying: and
all other territories belonging does not actually change
the scenario or our right to claim territories later in the
future if we become a superpower as part of the national
territory as long as it based on historic right or legal title.
We are referring to Sabah. Actually we are not dropping
our claim over Sabah because you cannot deny the fact
that this Sultan of Sulu has proprietary rights over Sabah
or North Borneo.
You must be able to distinguish between Sovereign
Rights and Proprietary Rights. Kung proprietary rights
referring to property rights of a particular individual or
entity. Kung mu ingon ka ug sovereign rights it pertains to
governance and you are making it as part of the
Philippine territory.
As it is now, hand offs ang government over making it as
part of the Philippine territory. We are not asserting
sovereign rights but we are not also disclaiming the
proprietary rights of the Sultan of Sulu over Sabah.
Kung ikaw tag-iya ug isla sa Sabah, what you can claim is
only your proprietary rights and as such, part of your
rights over the property is to possess it. Obviously.
Regardless under whose government or who would it be.
But when we talk about sovereign rights, it now pertains
to governance where you implement your law and you
establish a government there and making it as part of the
Philippine government, thats a different story.
As of now, we are avoiding the issue of sovereign rights
over Sabah but we are also not denying the rights of the
Sultan of Sulu, the proprietary rights over the island
because it was established that indeed once upon a time
that Sabah was owned by the Sultan of Sulu before the
definition of anybodys territory. In fact, it was rented out
to the British East India Company because Malaysia was
under UK. And when it was granted independence, it was
turned over to the Malaysian government instead to the
Sultan of Sulu. Understandably, because most of the
residents are Malaysians. And that was the start of the
claim of Malaysia over the same. Anyhow, we have
exerted our efforts to claim it both based on legal and
extralegal methods. Legally, because of the refusal of
Malaysia to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The least

that they did was to hold a referendum, asking people if
they want to become part of the Philippine territory which
obviously was refused blatantly and so this prompted
probably the government to create a terrorist group in
order to infiltrate the territory. However it was discovered
and all of these terrorists were massacred. That was the
Jabidah Massacre that led to our dropping of our claim
over Sabah. Otherwise, Malaysia was ready to declare
war against us. That was the controversy involving
Sabah.
above, no limits. Up to the universe. But the international

waters is for everybodys use. The subsoil you can go as
if as you can if you have the capacity.
As I have said, the provisions of the Constitution does not

bar us from claiming it in the future when we become so
powerful because we are so rich and maybe we can just
buy Malaysia or just invade Malaysia and Sabah and
establish a government there and sent all our prisoners to
Sabah.
A: You used the straight-line method. Remember the

straight-baseline method wherein you connect the
outermost
islands and all the waters inside are
considered as internal waters. Outside, considered as
part of the territorial seas up to 12 NM subject to
archipelagic plates, in other words, right of way.
Marianas Islands and Guam, our claim is based on the

Treaty of Paris. It is not so potent, our basis of our claim.
So what happened, it just fizzled out. There was a
referendum there and they refused to become part of our
territory and they rather be under the trusteeship of US.
Read the concept of Regime of Islands
Lets talk about Bangsamoro.

Q: How does it affect our territory?
A: It does not at all affect our territorys definition. Its just
delineating, defining what is considered to be the region
to be governed by Muslims in accordance with their
culture, their customs and their traditions. As long as if
they are not a sub-State, there can be no violation of the
definition of the national territory neither can there be of
the provision of the Constitution regarding having one
government because still they will be under the national
government but the control of the national government
over them is lesser as compared to local governments. It
is some kind of federal system of government wherein
they are considered supreme in their own sphere and
their laws and management of affairs is based on their
customs and traditions.
Will see until we read the Organic Law creating it and until
the Supreme Court will resolve the matter because
definitely there will be a challenge because I think it will
be based on the same objections that were raised in the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity before during the Arroyo
administration. That case involving the North Cotabato. It
might be raised again and until the Supreme Court
decides on the issue it is not yet controversial that you are
to worry about it for the bar exams. We will wait and see.
But the general principle is that there should be no substate. At least it is just an autonomous government but
definitely not a sub-state because that would be contrary
to the Constitution, more particularly on having one
republican state and the definition of the national territory.
Now, lets talk about territorial seas referring to the sea
waters along its coastline up to 12 NM. The airspace
You have other sovereign areas: the insular shelves, the

trench and etc just go over with that. The more important
there is the extended continental shelf.
On internal waters:
Q: what do you use as basis or method in determining
archipelagic waters? [BAR]
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over

the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress' decision
to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as
"'Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State's responsible observance
of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.
Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water
at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under
the category of "regime of islands," whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.|||
(Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011)
Q: What are regime of islands?
A: They consist of islands or naturally formed areas of
lands surrounded by water that remains above water
during high tide.
Bahala na ug tumoy ra like the Scarborough Shoal.
The principal forces, claimant states over certain territory
to maintain peace in the area because no country can
claim, exclusive ownership of any of these islands.
So extended continental shelf may also refer to the
contiguous zone.
B. State immunity
Lets go to Article II.
Q: What are the elements of the State?
A: People, Territory, Government, Sovereignty
People- what is significant is the provisions on citizenship.
Territory- we have explained it already.
Government- the discussion will involve all about
government.

Lets talk about sovereignty.
Because the state is sovereign then there can be no
authority higher or equal to that. Therefore, not subjected
to the authority of the courts. The principle why the state
is sovereign, first of all because there can be no legal
right against the authority that makes the law on which
that right depends. (case inaudible) Also for practical
reason, if you subject the state to suits, the government
will just be busy entertaining suits rather than doing its
job.
And besides, under the Principle of Royal Dishonesty,
how can one who is sovereign like the king commit a
wrong against anyone? They only think the best of the
government for the best interests of the people. It can
never commit or do wrong to anyone. This is the principle
of royal dishonesty on the part of the state because even
if you have claims against it, the state is not liable
because it cannot do any wrong against anyone.
Thus, as a general rule: You cannot sue the State.
Q: Now who is the state that you are referring to that can
be subject to a suit?
A: You have the Republic of the Philippines,
unincorporated agencies of the government exercising
governmental functions, the government officials and
employees performing governmental functions.
You cannot file a complaint if the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines. Thats the general rule. But
sometimes there are cases filed against the Republic and
yet the action prospers. Why? Because other than those
enumerated entities that could be the subject to a suit that
is not allowed, there is a requirement that only those suit
against those 3 entities that would require the government
to do an affirmative act such as involving appropriation of
public funds or loss of government property that is not
allowed to be filed against the state.
You may sue the state for as long as it will not entail
appropriation of funds or loss of government property.
Example:
Q: In an application for registration of title, who will be the
respondent in that case if you were the applicant?
A: It will be the Republic of the Philippines, the Bureau of
Lands or the DENR.
Why? Because if there is no claim over the land, the
presumption of the law is that it belongs to the state. But if
you can establish that it does not belong to the state, that
it is an alienable land of the state that can be disposed of
and acquired, and then if it is awarded to you then it does
not involve any loss of government property because it
has never been part of the public estate because you
owned it. You are the owner of the property. You are only
confirming your ownership by asking the court that the
property be registered in your name.
10
And thats precisely even if the Republic of the Philippines

is made party defendant, that action will prosper.
Q: If you claim damages against the government and you
named the Republic of the Philippines as defendant, this
is a personal claim for damages, will your action prosper?
A: Even if the claim is valid, under the principle of royal
prerogative of dishonesty, the case is dismissed because
the state is immune from suit.
Q: How about if you claim for just compensation against
the Republic because you were not paid when the
government took your property for the widening of the
road, can you sue the government through the DPWH?
A: Yes. It will not entail appropriation of public funds.
Before expropriation, there is already appropriation of
public funds. If there was no appropriation in the first
place, then the taking is illegal. Second reason for that,
according to the SC in many decisions, expropriation
must not be used as a tool to oppress property owners
whose property was taken for the use of the public.
You remember that Ministerio case vs CFI
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to
the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed,
may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use
defined in the judgment." 14 If there were an observance
of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the
sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that
precisely because there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand to benefit.
It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law
were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when
the government takes any property for public use, which
is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to
be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits
to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that
the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.
At any rate, thats the bottomline, the common
denominator. If its the Republic of the Philippines, again
as I have said, only when it entails appropriation of public
funds or loss of government property.
In so far as agencies of the government, only those
agencies being sued that are considered as
unincorporated. They are considered unincorporated
because they do not have a personality independent that
of the Republic of the Philippines. They are part of the
government of the Republic of the Philippines. If you sue
an unincorporated agency, it is likened to suing the

government itself. Example of unincorporated agencies:
the different departments of government, the
administrative bodies of the government. If you sue, for
example, the Bureau of Fire because it didnt stop the
conflagration that is tantamount to a suit against the state,
and therefore the case should be dismissed because the
state is immune from suit. Unincorporated.
There are other agencies of the government, although
part of the Philippine government, but which are
considered as incorporated. They have their own charters
creating them allowing that institution of the government
in the first place to sue and be sued; like for example
those engaged in proprietary functions like GSIS,
PhilHealth, SSS. These are incorporated agencies, like
state universities. The charters creating them allow them
to sue, to acquire property, and be sued in relation to the
acquisition of the property - in which case they are
suable; unless they are performing a purely governmental
function, then the application of immunity from suit would
still apply.
Then of course you have Local Government Units. The
LGUs are hybrids; mixed. It has dual function: both
governmental and proprietary.
Q: Are LGUs suable?
A: Yes.
Q: Even if performing governmental function?
A: Yes, because under the Local Government Code, it
has consented to be sued.
Q: Are they liable?
A: No if it involves the exercise of a governmental
function, and therefore it will entail disbursement of public
funds and you will need another consent from the local
government and that is the passage of a supplemental
budget, an ordinance, authorizing the disbursement. But it
is suable. But exercising a proprietary function because it
is also engaged in business, definitely it can be held
liable. Suable and it can be held liable likewise.
In so far as government employees and officials are
concerned, they are also immune from suit for as long as
they are performing governmental functions, except
special agents. Special agents under Art. 2180 (Civil
Code) the state has given its consent to be sued. The
special agent is one who discharges a function foreign
from his regular functions. The government has taken risk
there and it would not be fair that he would be out there
causing injury without any responsibility. Thus, even if this
particular employee or official is performing a
governmental function, but he is designated as special
agent, the state has consented to be sued, to prove the
claim against the state, via this special agent. Second,
even if a government official is performing a function
however without authority, or if he has authority, he acted
with gross negligence or with grave abuse of that
11
authority amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the

state cannot protect him under the immunity from suit. He
can be sued in his personal capacity.
Q: PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE Inc. vs JOSEFINA
TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006
Lichauco was sued in her personal capacity because of
the denial of a franchise. She then invoked immunity from
suit so that the case will be dismissed outright. Should the
court dismiss the case outright?
A: No, because it still has to be established that she did
not act in excess of her authority or with gross negligence
or with grave abuse of her authority amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Because if that is established then
she will be held liable personally, the case cannot be
dismissed automatically. Although if it is in the
performance of a governmental function likewise where
ultimately it will be for the State to answer for the liability,
the case will not prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco
and the unknown awardee, Lichauco was identified in the
complaint as "acting Secretary of the [DOTC]." The
hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a
charge against or financial liability to the government
must be regarded as a suit against the State itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded. However,
government immunity from suit will not shield the public
official being sued if the government no longer has an
interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability
of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious
act in the performance of his/her duties||| (Philippine Agila
Satellite Inc. v. Trinidad-Lichauco, G.R. No. 142362, May
03, 2006)
(TN) Take note of those general principles. Those are
general principles. There are exceptions however.
WHEN THE STATE MAY BE SUED
You cannot sue the state unless the state gives its
consent. When the state gives its consent, you can now
sue it.
Q: How does the state give its consent?
A: Only through legislation, if it is express consent. It
would be by a general law or a special law. Or it would be
impliedly given by the state under certain circumstances.
I repeat: the giving of consent can be express or implied.
EXPRESS CONSENT
Lets talk about express giving of consent. General laws.
It should be a law, ha, for express consent; not by
contract, not even by a declaration of the President.
Remember that case of Caylao vs Republic of the
Philippines GR No. 84645 March 29, 1993 where she
made a public declaration that the military made a

mistake, they should be investigated for liability in relation
to the massacre of the farmers of Hacienda Luisita at the
Mendiola bridge during her administration. They used the
declaration of the President to sue the military, the AFP,
for liability caused by the death and injuries of the
farmers. What happened? The action was dismissed
because the state case was immune from suit. It was the
AFP, government officials, who were sued in their official
capacity. The action definitely will not prosper. But if they
were sued in their personal capacity, then of course it will
prosper because the negligence of an official is not an act
of the state. As I said earlier, the state cannot do wrong. It
only does the right thing. If you do the wrong thing, thats
not the act of the state but your own act as an employee
or official. The state will not get involved in it. You pay; not
the state.
As I was saying, it has to be by legislation, by a statute
passed by Congress.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the
ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.
Although the military officers and personnel, then party
defendants, were discharging their official functions when
the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official
the moment they exceeded their authority. Based on the
Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover,
the members of the police and military crowd dispersal
units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 18
as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
marchers.
While it is true that nothing is better settled than the
general rule that a sovereign state and its political
subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it
has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the
military officers to release them from any liability, and by
the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit
does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded
by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the
part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any
obligation which belongs to the State in its political
capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a
title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22 This
Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in
the government does not confer a license to persecute or
recklessly injure another. (Caylao case)
Q: One time there was a contract entered into by a
government agency with a private individual. The contract
itself provides that in case of breach violation, the office is
suable. It can be sued. Now, would that be a valid waiver
of immunity?
A: No, because if waiver of immunity is express, it must
only be by legislation of Congress.
As I have said earlier, there are general laws and special
laws. The general laws: like the provisions of the Civil
Code (Article 2180, 2186); you have the Local
12
Government Code. These are general laws passed by

Congress where the government is allowed to sue.
Usually this is a consequence of the governments right to
acquire property and as such, in relation to the acquisition
of property, has the right to sue and be sued in relation to
its right to acquire or to possess that property. These are
general provisions of laws: 2180 refers to special agent. I
think 2186 would refer to Local Government units who do
not properly maintain their roads and drainage niya
mahulog ka sa manhole. In the law on torts, the state has
given its consent to be sued for this negligence that may
have been caused by improper maintenance or no
maintenance at all of government buildings and
infrastructures. By that, the state has waived immunity
from suit.
Special laws are laws specifically passed by Congress
authorizing a particular individual to sue the state, where
the state has waived its immunity from suit in a special
law allowing an individual to prove his claim against the
state. A good example is the case of Merritt vs. the
Government of the Philippine Islands where it was
Congress who passed a law allowing the victim there to
sue, to prove his claim against the Veterans Hospital
owned by the government.
Its actually very easy when there is an express law. Ang
problema ang implied giving of consent.
IMPLIED CONSENT
Lets talk about implied giving of consent. You have 3
instances or rather 4 or 5.
First instance is when the government enters into a
commercial contract. Its not just any government
contract. It has to be proprietary or commercial contract. It
has no relation to the principal function of that office. For
example, COMELEC enters into a contract with a printing
company for ballots. Thats governmental contract.
DPWH enters into a contract with a contractor to build
bridges and roads. Thats governmental contract. Thats
not commercial. If the contract is purely commercial
where the government enters into a contract with an entity
to provide a canteen in the office, now thats proprietary
or commercial. In which case, if proprietary or
commercial, the state is considered to have waived its
immunity. It would be treated like an ordinary individual.
(TN) But if commercial contracts, take note, as part of the
giving of consent expressed under PD 447, General
Accounting Laws: if you have claims against the state,
based on a contract for example, contractual obligations
of the state, you cannot sue the state directly. What you
must do in order to sue the state there are certain
requirements. You have to make a claim with COA; until it
is denied by COA, you can always go to the Supreme
Court on certiorari where you can now sue the state. So
it is only after your claim is denied by COA, that you can
sue the state for your monetary claims based on a
contractual obligation. The state has expressly given its

consent there. Even if your money claims is based on a
governmental contract, you can still sue not in the implied
but in the express giving of consent. But in the express
giving of consent, there is a requirement that you must
first make a claim with COA before you can sue COA and
the government agency that you are claiming against with
the Supreme Court.
Again, if it is a contract, the implied giving of consent is
limited to purely proprietary or commercial contracts.
Here, you can sue the state directly.
Second instance of implied giving of consent: when
government engages in purely business transactions,
commercial transactions - business, negosyo. It has to be
primarily commercial. Because the sometimes the
government may also engage in governmental function
and then part of the governmental function, to enhance it,
they may also be engaged in proprietary function.
Q: For example, the Bureau of Customs, their function is
to assess taxes; thats governmental. But theyre also
engaged in arrastre business to carry the items that are
heavy for purposes of assessment. Arrastre is proprietary.
It has nothing to do with the governmental function
because theirs is to collect taxes, but it enhances the
collection of taxes if they can see the item itself where it
will be brought before the office; might as well engage
also in arrastre business. If damage is caused by the
arrastre business, can you now sue the Bureau of
Customs?
A: No, because the arrastre business is not the pure
business that the Bureau of Customs is engaged in. It is
merely incidental to the performance of a governmental
function, and therefore it remains immune from suit.
And then you have when the state initiates the filing of a
suit against an individual for affirmative relief. Initiate,
meaning it is the government who filed the complaint first
against an individual and the purpose is to seek
affirmative relief.
Q: Why is this so important, the seeking of affirmative
relief?
A: Because if the purpose of the suit is to repel, to resist a
claim against the state, the state is not considered to
having waived its community.
Q: Case of PCGG v. Benedicto G.R. No. 129406 March 6,
2006, this is a landmark case. The PCGG initiated an
action against the Benedictos to claim certain shares of
stock of a company. They are saying Benedicto was only
used as dummy, the real owners being the Marcoses
therefore the shares are ill-gotten wealth from the state.
Now the SC declared that the shares of stock belonged to
the Benedictos and not the Marcoses. The Benedictos
then sued PCGG in their counterclaim; and now the
PCGG invoked their immunity from suit. Is PCGG
correct?
13
A: SC said no. The counterclaim will prosper because in

the first PCGG initiated the filing of the complaint against
the Benedictos for affirmative relief.
But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly
countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in
the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively
invoked
On the contrary you have Fernando Froilan vs Pan
Oriental Shipping G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954
There was this transaction between the bank and a
private individual. This private individual failed to pay its
obligation and so the ship that was used as collateral was
foreclosed by the bank, the government intervened to
stop the foreclosure because the government claims that
the ship used as collateral belongs to the state. Later, it
was declared by the SC that it belonged to the individual
who owed money. The bank has already filed a case
against the government to stop the foreclosure causing
damage to the bank.
Q: Will the action prosper?
A: No, because what the government did in this case was
merely to repel or resist a claim against it which claims
that the ship was their property and trying to protect their
rights over the property.
The other ground for dismissing the defendant's

counterclaim is that the State is immune from suit. This is
untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention
the Government in effect waived its right of nonsuability.
The immunity of the state from suits does not
deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its
own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself
of the different forms of actions open to private
litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an
action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes
down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the
right to set up whatever claims and other
defenses he might have against the state. The
United States Supreme Court thus explains:
"No direct suit can be maintained
against the United States. But when an
action is brought by the United States
to recover money in the hands of a
party who has a legal claim against
them, it would be a very rigid principle
to deny to him the right of setting up
such claim in a court of justice, and turn
him around to an application to

Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political
Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U.
S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed.
899.)
It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there
was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against
whom the complaint in intervention was directed. This
contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint
in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the
defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in
question
Finally, as an exception, in expropriation cases, were the
property owner is not paid just compensation, he has the
right to sue the state or any government entity for the
payment of just compensation. There is no violation there
in the immunity from suit. The reason being that,
according to the SC, the immunity of the state from suit
should not be a tool to oppress its citizens.
This principle of immunity from suit also applies to foreign
governments and other international personalities given
legal personality including their representatives.
Case: Archbishop of Manila relating of the acquisition of a
property that was sold to Vatican and then there was a
suit made by Vatican (a state within a state).
The Holy See vs Rosario G.R. No. 101949 December
1, 1994
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign
state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test.
Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in
the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign
state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold
lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an
act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property
for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in
the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the
Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary
14
for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic

mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into
force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is
granted immunity from the civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on
behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic
envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be
recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this
case is the Holy See.
Q: Can it be sued?
A: if purely commercial, yes but if it is something to do
with the official function of Vatican, not suable.
That case involved the performance of an official function
therefore like any sovereign state it is immune.
Article II Declaration of Principles and State Policies
(Political Creed of the Government)
It is the enumeration of the obligations of the government,
underlying principles in the operations of government.
TN: Article II is not self-executing. It cannot be the source
of rights and obligations. If violated, you cannot go to
court and seek judicial relief unless there is a law that was
violated based on Article II.
Similar to the Apostles Creed, there is no sanction there
that you will be less catholic if you violated. Not obliged to
observe. No binding effect if there is no law implementing
such. Legislation is needed to implement it
Taada v Angara G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs.
Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[31] this
Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision
itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to the grants
of rights, privileges and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade
and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the
rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of
Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the
issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And
we hold that there are.

Remember the World Trade Agreement (WTA) where it
stipulates that Congress is prohibited from passing a law
contrary to the provisions of the WTA. That was
questioned by Tanada and others, in effect, in our making
of foreign policies, we are now controlled by foreign
policies. Where is now sovereignty or independence of
the Philippine state in the formulation of its foreign policy?
IOW, it will now violate the provisions relating to
independent foreign policy and the states being
sovereign.
SC dismissed the case outright saying that you cannot
use the provision of Article II as basis to question the
validity of that contract. Legislation is needed to
implement the provisions in Article. SC further discussed
that no man is an island and we cannot live by ourselves,
we need to relate with foreign policies. As long as there is
reciprocity and mutuality in the benefit, it cannot be a
violation.
In Oposa v Factoran, except on the provision of the right
to a balanced ecology, SC held that it is the only provision
that is self-executing. All the rest needs legislation.
Oposa v Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow
that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a
different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when
all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to come generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
C. General principles and state policies
(Only the important ones will be discussed, the rest is up
to you)
Sec. 1. REPUBLICANISM
Sec. 1 The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.
15
Republican representation and renovation kind of

government. Elect representatives in representation. In
renovation, when there are changes everytime a term of
office of a public official expires, you have new
administration that would introduce changes to the
government.
Because it is republican, it is understood that sovereignty
resides in the people. Whatever authority exercised by
officials, they must not forget that the power comes from
the people.
Q: How do you know that the system is republican?
A: You go into the manifestations of republicanism.
1. First, the existence of the Bill of Rights.
2. Observance of separation of powers
3. Non-delegation of legislative powers
4. Government of laws and not of men
5. Popular election
6. Accountability of public officials
7. Rule of majority
Etc etc.
TN: Among the powers that you need to remember are
the principles that are manifest in a republican system.
Separation of powers, checks and balances and
delegation of powers (these are mentioned in the
syllabus for bar exams
The most recent decision on the principle of separation of
powers is the case involving PDAF, Belgica et al v
Executive Sec Ochoa, etc.
Belgica vs Ochoa G.R. No. 208566
19, 2013
November
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern

the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized
to participate in as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various
operational aspects of budgeting," including "the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in
violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada,
cannot be overstated from the moment the law
becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the
principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat,
covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the

same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have
nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents
through the statements of the Solicitor General during
the Oral Arguments have admitted that the identification
of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source,
thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to
the entire budget execution process
One of the issues raised is the constitutionality of the pork

barrel system, WON it violates the separation of powers.
Explanation: there are three branches of the government
supposedly independent from each other because they
do not owe each other powers assigned by the
constitution. It would be express, implied or incidental
powers. For as long as the powers are assigned to that
branch, we call it the full discretionary power. As such, it
cannot be checked, intruded into, interfered, or usurped. It
shall be exclusive. If usurped, violation occurs to the
separation of powers.
Example: in relation to the PDAF, based on funds allotted
to certain members of Congress for projects that they
recommend.
TN: Budget preparation is exclusive to the president
under the constitution. It shall be submitted to congress
within 30 days from the opening of the regular session.
President enumerates the expenses of government with
corresponding amounts and source of the appropriation.
Special appropriation, state the source of revenue. If
general appropriation, it is sufficient that you have the
expense and the amount.
Q: why is it submitted to congress?
A: because it is congress that will pass the law under the
principle that there cannot be any disbursement of public
funds without appropriation or authority.
When congress appropriates the amount, it specifies the
nature of the expense, purpose and amount available in
the General Appropriation Act (GAA).
That power is exclusive to congress and cannot be
usurped by the president. Thats the issue in
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) because there
is no identification of projects. They were supposed to
take it from savings and in effect mentioned in the cases,
Congress was denied to identify the project and
appropriate the amount.
16
PDAF is similarly situated. There was an appropriation for

PDAF. No question about that in the budget. But
remember that the function of congress is simply to
appropriate, not to implement the national budget.
Q: who implements the law?
A: It is the president
Based on the GAA, the president disburses the money.
What happened in PDAF.. History: Remember sometime
in the 1990s, it was challenged as to its constitutionality in
the case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez where the issue
was WON it was constitutional for Congress to identify the
projects to which those appropriated funds. It should not
be constitutional since in effect they are already
implementing the budget. But the decision of the SC was
rather vague. SC held that it is not a violation of the
constitution since what the members did was merely to
recommend the project. Recommendatory only and
ultimately the discretion was left to the president. BUT
apparently, in the recent decision of the SC, it interferes
into the exclusive power of the executive to implement
and enforce the national budget. Because the matter of
identifying the project, they decide and determine the
project and who is going to be the beneficiary. In effect, it
is identified and found not just to be recommendatory. SC
held that it violates the separation of powers as it
interferes the implementation of that national budget
which is exclusive to the president.
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19,
1994
The authority given to the members of Congress is only
to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the
President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the
President must perforce examine whether the proposals
submitted by the members of Congress fall within the
specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set
up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are
in line with other projects planned for the locality.
Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding
under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement
them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by
the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
Sec. 2 THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE
Art. 2 is not self executing. These are only guidelines in

so far as the congress concerned in the making of laws,
as to the president in the execution of the laws, and as to
the SC is concerned in the interpretation of the laws
applied in actual cases. Except: the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology because this is a public
right.

TN: the case of Taada vs. Angara with respect to the
WTO.
Sec. 1 is about republicanism.
TN/(BAR): the principles of republicanism particularly on
the principles of Separation of powers, check and
balances of the powers and the blending of the powers,
non-delegation of powers, the power of judicial review on
the SC to implement on the separation and the nondelegation of the powers, accountability of public officials,
rule of majority, so on and so forth.
Art II sec. 2, this is also important. This has been asked
several times because of public international law, which is
still part of Political Law.
Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Principle of international law is generally accepted, it will
be applied by our courts as though it were local or
municipal statutes. So there is no need for legislation to
accept a generally accepted principle in international law
(GAPIL) in order to implement it in our jurisdiction or apply
it in actual cases in our courts. So lets enumerate the
sources of the generally accepted principles of
international law that are automatically adapted as part of
the legal system.
Treaties.
You have the ratified treaties entered into by our country
with other countries. By ratified, it means that it must
have been concurred by at least 2/3 of the members of
the Senate in order to bind us. There is no need of
legislation in order to apply these agreements.
For example, the World Trade Agreement (WTA) was
concurred in by the Senate, in which case, it was applied
as though it were an ordinary statute. Do you remember
the controversy regarding on the importation of rice?
Because in the WTA, there should have been free trade
on all items or goods, including rice. There shouldnt be
any limitation on importation from different countries. But
a reservation was made in the agreement itself, to protect
our own local farmers, because actually, the agreement
will compete with our local rice production. But that
reservation is only good for a certain period of time which
was 10 years after the execution of the WTA.
Q: Why did it become a controversy?
A: Because if applied, there is this agreement that they
should only pay for the importation of the rice, and they
no longer need to get the permit from NFA to make sure
that they are still within the limits and that the number of
kilograms they import is still within the prescribed limits.
And so they just order as many sacks of rice without the
17
requisite NFA permit. When the court had to resolve this

issue, it had to apply the WTA agreement as though it
were an ordinary law because it was part of the domestic
legal system already.
On the other hand, lets talk about the Rome Statute,
which created the International Court of Justice. Its
noteworthy to mention that this was never ratified by the
Senate, because they never had the chance to, because
Arroyo did not submit the Statute of Rome to the Senate
for concurrence. Nonetheless, the ICJ was established.
Q: Are we bound by the jurisdiction of the ICJ in the event
that one of us or our officials is found to have committed
human rights abuses covered by the jurisdiction of the
ICJ?
A: The general rules is, since we did not concur, that
agreement did not bind us, so were not subject to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Although theres also a principle
that we cannot also violate it simply because we did not
sign it. Thats the general rule. To be part of the legal
system automatically, that treaty must be concurred, duly
ratified, because it must be concurrence, not just the
signature of the President. Although technically when we
say ratification, its the President that signs it, and it is
generally discretionary on the part of the President.
Customary norms
Another source for GAPIL are norms of general or
customary laws. So there are customs or acts or practices
that have been adapted by the international community.
For as long as it has been practices for so many years,
and provided that it also has an obligatory factor that
obliges the international community to comply, then it
becomes a source of public international law and under
the incorporation clause, its automatically adapted as
part of the legal system.
TN of the case of Mijares et al vs Javier GR No. 139325
April 12, 2005. In the Mijares case, this was about the
recognition of foreign judgment by our courts. The
question there is: whether you can enforce a foreign
judgment even when there is no agreement between our
country and another country as regards the recognition
and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
You recall that case involving the violation of human rights
(TN) tried in the US, in Hawaii specifically, which awarded
damages to the victims of the human rights victims during
the Marcos administration. The problem there is that they
cannot satisfy the judgment because the Marcoses did
not have enough properties in America, since their
properties are in the Philippines. So the human rights
victims wanted to enforce this, but first of all, our courts
need to recognize that judgment coming from a foreign
court. Remember that we are sovereign states, and so we
cannot be bound by the judgment of any court from a
foreign state.

The second problem there is, there is no agreement
between the US and the Philippines that both will
recognize the court judgments of the other state. But it
has been the practice in the international community that
foreign judgments are recognized for as long as you
follow certain rules for its authentication, that indeed it
exists, that its in accordance with the rules, etc. then we
can recognize the same and even enforce it. So the SC
said in the case of Mijares that there is no obligatory rule
derived from treaties or convention that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments or allow the
procedure for the recognition thereof, however, GAPIL,
and by virtue of the incorporation clause, commands us to
recognize these practices even if they do not emanate
from treaty obligations.
Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable
theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory
force, there is consensus that the viability of such
recognition and enforcement is essential.
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of
worldwide renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis
for recognizing foreign judgments,
there can be little dispute that the end
is
to
protect
the
reasonable
expectations and demands of the
parties. Where the parties have
submitted a matter for adjudication in
the court of one state, and proceedings
there are not tainted with irregularity,
they may fairly be expected to submit,
within the state or elsewhere, to the
enforcement of the judgment issued by
the court.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or
conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize
foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof.
However, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.
So the customary practices are a combination of two
elements
TN:
1.
2.
Established, widespread and consistent

practices on the part of the states;
There is an opinion as to law or necessity.
So if these two elements are established, then it becomes

customary international law and it also becomes a GAPIL,
and so under the incorporation clause, it becomes part of
the
legal
system.
Lets have a concrete example and lets talk about the
immunity from suit of heads of state. So for example, if
the head of state commits rape in the Philippines publicly
18
and even if everyone witnessed the act. There is no

criminal prosecution because it is GAPIL that a
representative of a sovereign state cannot be subjected to
the authority of another states court. For as long as the
court knows that he is a head of state, automatically the
court will desist from proceeding with the case for lack of
jurisdiction because of the principle of immunity from suit.
Treaties that have become customary norms.
This is another source of GAPIL.
Example: Do you remember the Geneva Conventions
where we were not signatories to these treaties? These
treaties, this was after WW2, allowed for the
establishment of military commissions which had
jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals.
TN of the case of Kuroda vs Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662
March 26, 1949. One of the captured Japanese generals
questioned the jurisdiction of the Philippine military
commission, saying that it had no jurisdiction since its
creation was invalid because the Philippines was not a
signatory to the Geneva Convention.
Q: What did the SC say about this?
A: It said that we might not be a signatory to it, but it has
to be noted that that Convention or Treaty has become a
customary law, and as such, it has also become GAPIL,
and is automatically adapted as part of the legal system
of the land, because again of the incorporation clause.
That principle was also applied in the case of the Statute
of Rome, because while we were not a signatory to it, but
the Statute of Rome was accepted by the international
community and through time it became a customary
international law. Meaning, even if there was no
concurrence or ratification, but by virtue of it being a
customary law, we are subject to it under the
incorporation clause because it has become a GAPIL.
TN also of the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs Duque G.R. No. 173034
October 9, 2007. Ive mentioned this before that this
pertains to the requirement that if youre a manufacturer
of milk, youre supposed to put in the can or carton that
breast milk is still the best milk in the universe. At that
time, the bill was still pending in Congress, and so the
manufacturers questioned the requirement of Duque.
Q: Now, what was invoked by Duque who was then the
Secretary
of
Health?
A: That Convention where were a signatory that has
become a customary law that requires that it should be
stated in all milk products that breast milk is still the best.
Again, by virtue of the incorporation clause, this was
automatically adapted in our local laws. You dont need
local jurisdiction to implement it.
Q: But what happens when there is a conflict between a
GAPIL and a statute?

A: TN here guys of the case of Ichong vs Hernandez G.R.
No. L-7995 May 31, 1957, where the SC said that as
much as possible, both have to be reconciled because it
is not the intention of Congress or the President to pass a
law or enter into a treaty with the purpose of intentionally
violating existing laws or Congress violating what has
been agreed upon by the President in a treaty. Thats
always the principle: you harmonize it. If it cannot be
harmonized, which of these two will prevail? You follow
Ichong vs Hernandez, that it should always be the
municipal law, because after all, the court that decides
whether or not the international law or the municipal law
which should be sustained is an organ of law, of
Congress, in which case, it must always sustain our own
laws. But if the international law conflicts with our
Constitution, the Constitution always prevails.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is
also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that
the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals
of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are
granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the
treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by
a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257,
260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope
of the police power of the State (plaston vs.
Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
xxx
(A)nd that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and the police
power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty
or any other conventional agreement.
But TN that in the international community, both statute
and law are considered as equal and no source is more
superior compared to the other.
So, the manner of construing the conflict is this:
It depends on which came first or later.
If for example, the law was passed prior to the treaty, then
always, the treaty prevails and it should be treated as an
amendment to an existing law. If the law was passed after
the treaty was signed, then it should be construed as a
law amending the treaty. So you follow statutory
construction and thats how we construe laws conflicts
between a treaty and a statute.
Regarding the renunciation of war. Its only aggressive
war. But I tell you class that in the BAR, the question is
always about the incorporation clause.
Sec. 3. CIVILIAN SUPREMACY
First of all, you have the President as the Commander-in-
19
Chief of the AFP, the highest authority who is a civilian

and not a member of the AFP.
As one of the instruments of maintaining the supremacy
of the civilian authority, you have the creation of court
martial that discipline the behavior of the AFP members,
the decision of which are subject to the review of the
President, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief in
order to maintain civilian supremacy over the military.
You also have some cases like IBP vs. Zamora, GR
141289, Aug. 15, 2000 24. Gudani vs. Senga, GR
170165, April 15, 2006
In the IBP case, this is about the deployment of the
marines in the malls. The SC said that theres no violation
of the civilian supremacy over the military because the
marines were still under the leadership of the local chief
police force, who is in charge in the maintenance of
peace and order.
In the Gudani case, this is when Gudani, notwithstanding
the directions of his Chief of Staff not to appear in a
legislative inquiry, defied the order and appeared and
testified. So he was court martial-ed. He questioned the
jurisdiction of the court martial by saying that all that he
did was to heed the order of Congress exercising its
power to conduct legislative inquiry. But the Supreme
Court said that no, your accountability is direct to the
Chief of Staff or to the President as the Commander in
Chief. You follow the chain of command in order to
maintain the supremacy of the civilian authority over the
military. The Chief of Staff, as directed by the Commander
in Chief (the President) told you not to appear, in which
case, you should follow that first, because it would be too
dangerous if a person can just defy an order from the
Commander in Chief. If there is a sanction and Gudani
cannot appear in a legislative inquiry, thats already
Congress problem and not Gudanis problem, because
his primary concern is his accountability to the
Commander in Chief and not to Congress.
SECTION 5: RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN ORDER TO
PROTECT LIFE, LIBERTY, PROEPRTY
Section 5 came out in the BAR exam, and this is with
regard to the maintenance of peace and order if we are to
enjoy the blessings of democracy. There should be
protection of life, liberty and property and you need to do
this by bearing arms. In such a case, you are armed with
a gun or any weapon in order to protect your property or
your life or your liberty. So the question is this: is carrying
a firearm a right or a privilege that is merely granted by
the state?
TN: Remember the case of Chavez vs Romulo G.R. No.
157036, June 9, 2004, because in America, this is
considered as a property right, so therefore the permit
cannot just be revoked by the state without hearing. In the
case of Chavez, he questioned the order of the General
Chief of the PNP revoking all the permits of all those who

had firearms without hearing, or the revocation was
effected by that mere pronouncement.
So, Chavez was saying that that cant be done because
thats an intrusion to the right of the person to protect his
life, liberty and property without due process. But
according to the SC, the right to carry firearms is not a
property right and so it is not covered under the due
process clause. It is a privilege granted to a person
subject to revocation to be exercised by the state under
its police power.
SECTION 6: SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

What is important under the separation of church and the
state are the exceptions.
Exemptions of the principle of separation of Church
and State:
1. Tax exemptions for those actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious purposes. Number
one as an exception recognizing the contribution of
the church to the state is tax exemptions to
properties that are actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious purpose, however limited only to
property tax, regardless of ownership. Purpose has
to be looked into, not mere ownership.
2.
3.
4.
Teaching of religion in public elementary and

high schools. You also have the teaching of
religion in public elementary and high schools.
Remember that for as long as there is consent
from the parents or guardians in writing and that
it is not within school hours and without an
additional cost to the government to be
conducted by an accredited religious teacher.
That is allowed in public schools.
Religious people in the military and in
orphanages. Another exception is on the
appropriation of public funds. That is prohibited if
it is used for the support of any church or any
priest and minister, except when the priest or
minister is working for the AFP or for orphanages
or government leprosarium, they can receive
support from public funds from the government.
That is an exception.
Ownership of educational institutions. Finally,
on ownership of educational institutions. The rule
is only a Filipino citizen or a private Filipino
corporation can establish an educational
institution, except when that educational
institution is established by a religious group or
20
mission board. Even if they are all foreigners,

they may do so by way of exception as
accommodation to the church as an exception to
the separation of church and state.
Practical application of this concept? TN of that RH Law,
the case of Spouses Imbong et al vs the Executive
Secretary GR No. 204819 April 8, 2014 and many other
cases. That was decided only sometime in April 2014.
One of the things that was stressed there.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On
the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one
religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term
"church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a
mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which
metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus,
the "Church" means the religious congregations
collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need
to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays
down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and
Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution. xxxx
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom

provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State

from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in
affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits
the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise

clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience. Under this part of religious freedom

guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.
||| (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 204819, April 08,
2014)
D. Separation of powers
The recent decisions applying of the separation of powers
is that case of Belgica, et al vs. Executive Secretary
Ochoa and SJS et al vs. Drilon et al and the cases
relating to PDAF.
Q: One of the reasons why PDAF was declared as
unconstitutional was because it was violative of
separation of powers. How?
A: Considering the 2 other cases that were rendered by
the SC prior to this case, these are the cases of
Philconsa vs. Enriquez and LAMP et. al vs. Sec. of
Budget and Mgt. and Orders. In the case of Philconsa,
the SC was saying that there was no violation of the
separation of powers because in the PDAF, what the
congressmen and senators do, they simply recommend
the projects to which the funds will be allotted to. Its
recommendatory, its not for them to actually determine
the project to be supported or set for, in so far as the
PDAF is concerned, there is no intrusion of the power in
the executive branch to execute the general appropriation
act. In the case of LAMP (April 2012), the SC did not
make any clear pronouncement whether there was clear
separation. It simply ruled that it was not substantiated by
LAMP that indeed there was a violation of separation
powers because it was not supported by evidence that
indeed the congressmen or senators interfered in the
execution on the appropriation law, as regards to the
disbursement of funds relating to projects that were
identified by the members of congress. In other words,
there is no clear ruling on the principle of separation of
powers relating to PDAF because there was no evidence
to show that the principle was violated.
Finally, this case of Belgica, the SC was already clear on
the pronouncement that there was a case and up to that
case, with regard to the PDAF expended, there exists a
violation of the separation of powers.
One of the things that was stressed there, while according
to the SC the state respects religion and the church, or
anyones belief, like if you believe that contraceptive
should not be used as a form of preventing pregnancy or
family planning purposes and all, the State respects
respect. But your belief or other peoples belief should not
be imposed upon the state because there is separation of
the church and the state.
There may be some accommodation because after all the
state has recognized the contributions of the church. The
bottom line there is that for as long as there is no clear
and imminent danger of any substantive ill to happen that
the state has the obligation to prevent, by all means, the
21
state should allow any person to enjoy his religious belief

or non-belief of anything.
In the case of Estrada vs Escritor A.M. No. P-021651. August 4, 2003, you have another term, as long
as there is no compelling state interest, or national
security or for public order, public convenience or public
health, by all means you should be allowed to freely
exercise religion or whatever beliefs you have under the
Principle of Benevolent Neutrality- Accommodation.
Given that a free exercise claim could lead to
three different results, the question now remains as to
how the Court should determine which action to take. In
this regard, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling state
interest test which is most in line with the benevolent
neutrality-accommodation approach.
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the
principle underlying the First Amendment is that freedom
to carry out ones duties to a Supreme Being is an
inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of
legislature. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive
right and not merely a privilege against discriminatory
legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence
and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Considering that laws nowadays are rarely
enacted specifically to disable religious belief or practice,
free exercise disputes arise commonly when a law that is
religiously neutral and generally applicable on its face is
argued to prevent or burden what someones religious
faith requires, or alternatively, requires someone to
undertake an act that faith would preclude. In essence,
then, free exercise arguments contemplate religious
exemptions from otherwise general laws.
Strict scrutiny is appropriate for free exercise
challenges because [t]he compelling interest test reflects
the First Amendments mandate of preserving religious
liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.
Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws
burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.
Sec. 7 Independent Foreign Policy
In the case of Tanada vs. Angara (id), while be believe in
Independence, Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and
Defense etc. you must also understand that no man is
island, should there be any exchange or trade or
whatever, this arrangement should be based on Equality
and Reciprocity. TN
Sec. 8 Prohibition against the stocking of Nuclear Arms.
One of the issues raised in that amendment to the VFA
now with the controversy of China. They are going to
question the validity of the Executive Agreement signed
by the President recently to the U.S. allowing the U.S.
troops even to stay specifically on previous bases that
they have abandoned like Subic or Olongapo. There may
not be a problem in the entry; the problem is on the
possibility of using nuclear firearms. It is not revoked and
that is prohibited under the Constitution.

TN: As a general rule, the entry of foreign military troops
is prohibited by the Constitution.
Except here it was only by way of an exception rather
than as a general rule, specifically because of the
possibility of nuclear weapons being brought here into
country. That is prohibited. But suppose in the future,
(alangan man primi canyon nalang cge atong gamiton,
unya tanan nuclear weapons), it depends on national
interest, and it is Congress who will determine that.
22
wants an abortion, it is allowed under the law and it is

prohibited and was declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Allowing married women, not in an emergency situation or
life threatening case, to undergo reproductive procedure
without the consent of the spouse. If you were the
spouse, how would you feel? Your wife was already
ligated and you were not informed. Before that was
allowed under the law and is now declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Sec. 12 Sanctity of the Family
Those were the provisions

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
This is the bases on questioning the constitutionality of

RH Law, otherwise known as RA 10354.
Sec. 16 Balanced and Healthful Ecology
TN: That it may violate or threat the life of an unborn. To

the controversy or issue on when does life start, because
of the use of contraceptives. They are saying in effect it
promotes abortion, (unsaon man nimo pag abort kung
wala paman gani) it prevents fertilization, because they
are saying precisely that should start from the contact. It
cannot be understood.
Case in point: Oposa vs. Factoran (id). All the rest of the
cases were decided taking into consideration this case.
This is a landmark case. The point that was emphasized
in the Oposa case, which was reiterated in succeeding
environmental cases, that this is Self-Executing. You dont
need legislation in order to enforce it. The SC also
emphasized the fact that this is a public right of the
people. This is as important as the guaranteed protection
under Art. III.
What must be emphasized is that there is no violation of

the rights of the unborn according to the SC because
what is being protected is the fertilized ovum from being
expelled. It does not allow abortion. They are trying to
give access to the poor women to protect their
reproductive health in having so many children as a kind
of means of leisure so that they can enjoy without paying
for it. Since they have access to contraceptives, they will
have more children, and more mouths to feed. For as
long as the ovum has not been fertilized yet, there is no
violation. What is being prevented is the expulsion of the
fertilized ovum, in fact the law is against abortion.
The provisions that were declared unconstitutional are
Art. 7, 17 and 23.
Take for instance, Ill give you an example. One of the
provisions in RA 10354, if for example you are an
employee of POPCOM (population commission) or in a
health care, your duty is supposed to be to introduce
contraceptives as a means of family planning. And since it
is against your religion, what is your tendency? You will
not introduce that to the public especially to the poor
because you would feel guilty about introducing it
because as far as the church is concerned that is a sin,
there can be only family planning but the natural way.
So many women are deprived because they cant afford.
But for you it is a sin. So you do not introduce. But do you
know under the law you can be penalized? So the SC
said that is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Now you would be a
violation of the freedom of religion. It is true that you
cannot impose your beliefs but you should not also be
punished for what you believe in.
Penalties for Health Service providers that require
parental consent from minor patients who are not in an
emergency or serious situation. So even for a minor who
that
were
declared
Sec. 17 Priority to Education

This is with reference to giving priority to education. This
is always invoked by the students against tuition fees
hike, that the government should give priority to education
by subsidizing, especially the government universities and
colleges. This is merely directory.
General Rule: The provisions in the constitution are
mandatory.
Q: What are the exceptions? What are the provisions in
the Constitution that is not mandatory?
A: Sec. 17. It is merely directory in the sense that even if
its not followed, there canot be no violation of the
Constitution.
According to the SC, as it was emphasized in the
Carague vs. Guingona (id) case, the government is never
precluded or deprived from attending to other imperatives
of the government. There are other needs of government
that needs attention, not just education. But there is that
direction or instruction to give priority. And so with that
priority, we have free education, in elementary and even
secondary like night school. But in college, you cannot
college education because this is not mandatory. The
government can only provide for State Colleges and
Universities with low cost tuition fees or otherwise grant
scholarship to deserving students in college.
This is on the indispensible role of the private sector. This
is part of the Non Governmental Organizations and to
implement this you have like, allowing them the chance to
participate in governance, such as the establishment of
the party-list system. Wherein they can have the chance
or opportunity to become members of the government.

Sec. 22 Indigenous Cultural Communities
On the promotion of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national development, this was
always invoked in the case of Bangsamoro. Political
Entity, and the concepts of Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands, this will be discussed when we go to the
topic on Regalian Doctrine.
Sec. 25 Autonomy of Local Govts.
To ensure local autonomy. There will be a separate
discussion on this on Art. X. Suffice to say what is now
relevant is the Bangsamoro in relation to the framework
agreement. I suppose once it is passed there will be a
question later in the future regarding its validity. What is
emphasized is Local Autonomy. Local Devolution of
Services rather than Decentralization of powers.
Q: What do you mean when you say Decentralization of
Powers?
A:
It is the transfer of powers from the National
government to the Local Government
There is no such thing. Our local governments are not
independent from the National Government. They are still
under the control and supervision of the National
Government.
Q: Who has the control of Local Governments?
A: It is Congress
Q: Who has the supervision?
A: It is the President
Sec. 26 Equal Access to Opportunities for Public Office/
Prohibition of Political Dynasties
BAR Q: Is Political Dynasty Unconstitutional?
A: Until there is a code that punishes political dynasty for
penalties and activities defined as such, there is political
dynasty to speak of as of today.
The thing is you are given equal access and opportunity
to participate in governmental affairs. So just because you
have that right, you can demand.
Like you have the case of Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 161872 April 13, 2004 who wanted to become the
President of the Republic, however he was declared to be
a Nuisance Candidate. He invoked Sec. 26 saying that I
have the right to equal opportunity and access to public
service, why are you denying me of this right.
SC said that this is not self-executing. There are laws
providing for limitations and qualifications. He was
running against Estrada. Nobody knows him, he does not
have the money to campaign, so Nuisance candidate, you
are disqualified.
23
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of

Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and
there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does
not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right
but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Sec. 28 Honesty and Integrity in Public Service
This is with regards to the mandate of the government to
maintain honesty and integrity.
You have now the requirements of SALN Statement of
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth, they are also abusing
this. What happened? Because of this, it took no less
than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court being
impeached because of his failure to state correctly his
statement of assets and liabilities. Why is that that after
that, almost all the members of Congress corrected their
SALN. Why did they not give him the chance to correct it?
Because under the law it provides for reservation that if it
is incorrect, you are given a period of time within which to
make the necessary corrections to state the actual assets
and liabilities that you have.
Q: As part of accountability should it be disclosed to the
public?
A: There is already a recent decision of the Supreme
Court on this matter. There is this order of the SC
prohibiting the disclosure of the assets and liabilities. The
Justices and Judges were saying, Ah we can be
kidnapped for ransom because the public knows our
assets and liabilities. But recently in 2013, the SC was
saying that these are public records, and should be
disclosed to the public as part of public accountability
subject to rules that may be prescribed in the disclosure.
[2013 case involving the SALN of lieutenant focuses more
on AMLC freeze order, this 2012 case is more
appropriate]
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE
OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012
The Court notes the valid concerns of the other
magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some
individuals in their requests for access to such personal
information and their publication. However, custodians of
public documents must not concern themselves with the
motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking
access to the records. The moral or material injury which
their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors
responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made

subject to the consequences of the law. While public
officers in the custody or control of public records have
the discretion to regulate the manner in which records
may be inspected, examined or copied by interested
persons, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or
copying of the records. After all, public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
E. Checks and balances
Q: How was this violated?
In the exercise of the powers incumbent, we have three
branches - executive, legislative and judicial the powers
are granted by the constitution. For as long as the
express grant of powers by the constitution, these are
considered as full discretionary power of the each branch
and therefore as a rule they cannot interfere with the two
other branches in the government but the confusion will
usually be resolved because corollary to the separation of
powers to balance the power where there is a checking
and sometimes the powers are shared and thats what we
called principle of blending of the powers.
On the checking for example, in the making of the laws,
we have the president power to veto although it is within
the full discretionary power of congress to make laws, that
power can still be checked by the president through its
veto power likewise, the same power can be checked
ultimately by the SC in the exercise of judicial review.
Thats checking.
In the blending of the power or the sharing of the power,
take for instance the preparation of the budget, the
budget primarily under the constitution is prepared by the
executive department the president that is so provided
in the constitution but the constitution also had it shared
with congress by requiring the president to submit the
budget to congress for appropriation. So we have the
stages in the preparation of the budget and finally in the
enforcement. The budget will be submitted within 30 days
from the opening of the regular session of congress to
congress for appropriation the bill however should
originate or should start or initiated by the House of
Representative. Your appropriation law is passed and
then it will be submitted to the president, the president
under his veto power can veto it not necessarily the whole
thing this is the exemption. He can make itemized veto as
to the amount or as to particular project because it goes
to show that the president has the discretion to identify
projects to which the money should be extended. So, the
one who propose is first the congress and the one who
spends the money from the purse it is the president under
the principle of separation of powers or discretionary
powers they cannot be intervened with.
24
Q: Assuming that the general appropriation act was

passed and approved by the president, what would be the
next step?
A: It would be enforced.
Q: Who is going to enforce the budget?
A: Under the constitution, it is the presidents power to
enforce.
Then finally, oversight function of congress to determine if
indeed the funds of which that were appropriated for
certain projects as identified in the general appropriation
act had actually been implemented and they would pass
laws or determine or review whether they were effective
or not. Thats oversight function of congress. Thats the
process of budget preparation.
Q: With respect to PDAF applying these steps, how does
the separation of powers violated?
A: So you have the president submitting the budget, they
appropriate funds. In accordance with the budget that
were submitted by the president, that may include the
PDAF allotted for members of congress but it does not
say exactly particular projects for which this PDAF are
being allotted for because that function is the function of
the president. It is for him to spend the money and identify
the projects. Now then, under the law of PDAF it
authorized the members of congress to identify the
project for which the funds are appropriated for.
Q: In effect, interfering into what?
A: The execution of the general appropriation act. Thus, a
violation of separation of powers. Also, it violates the
delegation of powers because that power to identify the
project under the constitution or expenditures of the funds
is assigned to the president and instead the president
refer it to the senators to identify what projects are they
going to support their PDAF for.
Basically, that were the reasons that were advanced by
the SC in saying that there was a violation of the
separation of powers and, even more on the provisions of
the constitutions were violated because of PDAF.
We have many old cases where they is always a
discussion on the separation of powers. If there is any
case that would reach to the SC involving the president
and congress, its always on the question of
usurpation/interference in the exercise of these powers
and thus violative of the separation of powers and
ultimately it is the SC that decides on it, through the
exercise of judicial review.
F. Delegation of powers
In connection of the separation of power is the nondelegation of powers. The rule is in as much as the
constitution assigned each branch its powers, then it is
establish for that branch to exercise. It cannot just simply
delegate it to someone else simply because they are
25
afraid to exercise their power or they dont like to exercise

the power.
emergency power should be delegated to the president in

case of war, under sec. 23.
Q: So, in as much as the delegated power, why

delegated? Who delegated the power?
Q: So the question on the issue whether or not can

declare a state of national emergency? Should it be
congress to do that, as a prelude to or a condition to a
delegation of emergency power? It is not then a
usurpation of legislative function to declare a state of
national emergency, so that congress will have a reason
to delegate the exercise of emergency power to the
president? What was the decision of the SC on this
matter?
A: the people through the constitution. The constitution

assigned the powers and the people elect the
representatives to exercise to rule the power to each
particular branch. So what has been delegated, is now
the principle, cannot be delegated to another delegate.
Thats the general rule.
Q: But what happened in reality because of the growing
complexities of the needs of the people in the society?
A: Theres more on to the delegation on the power rather
than confining it to a branch on what could be the branch
to exercise. And thus, we have the exception called
permissible delegation of powers.
Q: What would be on the delegation of legislative power?
A: This power is primarily assigned to congress. The
constitution says this power may also be delegated to
another entities or individuals in the government.
So lets have the exceptions.
The exceptions are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
delegation to the president (sec 23 and 28 of art.

6);
delegation of the power to the administrative
bodies under the executive department under
the principle of subordinate legislation;
delegation of powers to local government units
under RA7160;
delegation of the power to the people under art.
6 sec 32 & RA 6735.
With regard to sec. 23 this is the emergency power that

may be delegated to the president.
Q: So if youre ask in the MCQ, where does this power
originate?
A: It originates from the congress then delegated to a law
in order for the president to exercise the power.
So, in as much as this is a delegated power, it is a limited
power. No less than the constitution sec 23 enumerates
the limitations on the exercise of the power. 1) There
should be a law or statute authorizing the delegation in
cases of a war or a national emergency.
TN: because this has become controversial when
president arroyo issued Proclamation 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency. If you are to compare this to
a declaration the existence of the state of war, under the
constitution it is clear that it is for congress to do so
because the purpose of which is to determine whether the
A: The SC in the case of David et al vs. Drilon and

Exec. Secretary GR 171396 May 3, 2006, SC was
saying that there was no violation at all of the separation
of power neither the non-delegation of powers in this case
because the president being the chief executive is in the
best position to know the state of peace and order in the
country as the PNP is directly under the supervision of the
president. As to whether there is any threat to national
security the president is in better position compared to
congress, as the national defense and the AFP are
directly under her control and supervision. In other words,
the president, as the commander in chief of the armed
forces, all that she did was to call upon the armed forces
to assist her in the performance of her function which is
so provided under the constitution. Therefore, there
cannot be a violation of separation of powers. But in the
declaration of the existence of the state of war, it is not for
the president to do so because the constitution expressly
provides that it is the congress by 2/3 votes. (BAR)
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers
of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions
as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by Congress.
xxx
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no
power to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected
with public
interest. The President cannot decide whether
exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take
over of privately-owned
public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when
such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation, the President has no power to point

out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State
under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.
Q: (BAR) what if there is no declaration of the existence
of the state of war? Can she not declare war then being
the commander in chief?
A: She was never precluded from declaring war even if
there is no declaration of a state of war or she can
exercise the emergency power such as disbursing funds
in the prosecution of the war because there cannot be a
delegation without the congress declaring the existence of
the state of war. So you make a comparison, in the case
of a declaration of national emergency or state of
rebellion.
While it is true that the president can declare a state of
national emergency without a law being passed
authorizing her to do so, she cannot however, exercise
emergency power in relation to it because sec. 20 is clear
that there has to be a statutory law giving the exercise of
the power to the president; this is part of the reason why
partly
the
Proclamation
1017
was
declared
unconstitutional.
Unlike in a declaration of state of war, the president can
still declare war even without a declaration of the
existence of a state of war provided that she does not
exercise emergency powers. It is only temporary, the
purpose of which is only to carry out the proper and
necessary defense policy of congress.
A declaration of state of war is not the same with a
declaration of a state of national emergency. A declaration
of a state of national emergency can be a prelude to a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. It is still within the power of the
president to declare being, not only as the president, but
also as the commander in chief of the armed forces. In
the matter of declaration of state of war, the constitution
has expressly provided that only congress can make such
a declaration. While the president as the commander in
chief may declare war without a declaration of the
existence of a state of war, he cannot exercise
emergency powers nonetheless.
The exercise of emergency power is only temporary,
meaning as long as the war exists, he will continue to
exercise the power provided that it will not last until the
next adjournment of congress; automatically the exercise
of the power will be withdrawn.
TN in an MCQ: There is no need of a statute or a law to
withdraw the power from the president by congress, by a
mere resolution it can be withdrawn (a resolution does not
require the signature of the president) so that the
president will not have a chance to veto the withdrawal of
emergency powers from him.
26
Aside from sec. 23 you have sec. 28 on tariff powers of

the president wherein the president also has the power
to tax such as: tariff rates, import/export quota, wharfage
dues, and other tax impost and assessment.
TN: this has to be expressly delegated to the president,
the standard should be within the framework of the
national development of the economy of the country.
Also, TN: the case of Abakada Guro Party List v
Purisima GR No.166715 August 14, 2008 recall the
increase of VAT from 10% to 12% where there was an
accusation that the president usurped legislative function
by declaring an increase of the VAT, but it was clarified
by the SC that while the president has the power to tax,
that does not include domestic taxation because such
power is vested in congress. In this case, there was no
usurpation of legislative function because all that the
president did here was to ascertain the facts whether the
requirements for an increase of the VAT as provided in
the law were present because these offices that provide
for the information are under her, and when she learned
that all requirements under the law have been complied
with, she had no choice but to implement the increase.
She just ascertained the facts, and when found to be
existing, she just implemented the law, she did not make
the lawthat function is exclusive to congress in so far
as taxation is concerned.
Then you have the exercise of the legislative power by
the administrative bodies. So you have the departments,
agencies and bureaus of the government authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations in order to implement
existing laws. First of all it presupposes the existence of
a law passed by congress, and as much as the law
cannot cover everything, as theyre not experts in all
fields. You have the experts coming from the different
administrative bodies providing for details, parameters or
boundaries within which you implement the law for
effective implementation for the promotion of the general
welfare by way of promulgating rules and regulations.
Q: Why is this considered as a delegation of legislative
power?
A: Because these rules and regulations have the force
and effect of laws, which means that if you violate the
rule, it is tantamount to violating the law itself, which is
only being enforced by the rules and regulations. Thats
why we call it implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
It is what we consider as subordinate legislation,
providing for details in the contingent provisions that will
at least anticipate how the law might be enforced
effectively, not just at the present time, but also the future
needs of the people in relation to the law. However,
there are certain requirements you have to follow, certain
standards, like it has to be complete: you have to pass
the completeness test and sufficiency of standard. In
other words, there is nothing that is left to the
administrative body with what the law is, all they do is to
simply apply the law by promulgating rules and
regulations. It is more of rule execution rather than law
making, rule executing or rule making to implement the
law.

TN in relation to the completeness test: read the case of
Defensor-Santiago v Ramos (id) the resolution of the
Comelec implementing RA 6735 on the initiative on the
amendments to the constitution, was declared
unconstitutional because in the first place, RA 6735 did
not provide for procedure on how to propose
amendments to the Constitution through charter change
by the people directly, there is nothing in the law. So how
can the Comelec then promulgate rules that are absent
of any authority by any law because the law is insufficient
or not complete.
Then you also have to pass the sufficiency of standard:
there has to be a sufficient standard on the promulgation
of the rules and regulation.
27
A: The experts from the Bureau of Corrections and Jail

Management. However in this case, the promulgated
rules were only signed by the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, it was never approved by the Secretary of
the Department of Justice. SC emphasized that while a
bureau may promulgate rules and regulations as an
administrative body, it should be however, with the
imprimatur of the superior of the department under which
the bureau belongs.
Then we have the delegation of the power to the LGUs.
This is important!
Q: Among the government units, what are the political
subdivisions?
TN: The most recent decision regarding that is the case

of Gerochi v Department of Energy GR No. 159796
July 17, 2007, relating to the EPIRA law that imposes
universal charge on electricity distribution. There was an
accusation against the department of energy (DoE) that it
was usurping legislative function because in effect it
imposes taxes on the distribution of electricity. The
Supreme Court held that this was not taxation power that
was exercised by DoE because it has no power to do so,
that power is vested in congress. What they did was to
promote the general welfare. Promotion of general
welfare that was the sufficient standard, universal or
national electrification, distribution of electricity all over
the country for the promotion of the general welfare.
When the DoE imposed an amount in the general fund
for universal charge for the purpose of adding funds to
be used in the distribution of electricity all throughout the
country.
A: autonomous regionsARMM (which will soon be

replaced by the Bangsamoro Political Entity (BPE) as
soon as the framework agreement is passed into law),
provinces, cities, municipalities, barangays.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past,

accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of
law
and
order;"[51]
"adequate
and
efficient
instruction;"[52] "public interest;"[53] "justice and
equity;"[54] "public convenience and welfare;"[55]
"simplicity, economy and efficiency;"[56] "standardization
and regulation of medical education;"[57] and "fair and
equitable employment practices."[58] Provisions of the
EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric
power[59]
and
watershed
rehabilitation
and
management[60] meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
Q: With respect to the delegation of legislative powers,

can it (BPE) form its own laws?
Finally, we have this requirement on, the rules and

regulation promulgated should be with the imprimatur of
the head of the department it is not just by the chief of the
bureau. Case in point, you have People v. Echegaray
GR No.117472 February 7, 1997 on the manual relating
to the implementation and execution of the lethal
injection. There was a law which imposes death penalty
using the lethal injection.
Q: This is delegated by what law?
Q: Who is in the best position to promulgate the rules on

how to do it?
Our system of government is unitary, although we are

trying to establish local autonomy.
Q: What is the extent of local autonomy?
A: There is no decentralization of powers rather only
decentralization of administration. There cannot be a
state within a state. If you consider the Bangsamoro as a
sub-state or a juridical entity, then it will be contrary to the
provision of the constitution relating to the system of
government that we have under the 1987 Constitution. It
can only be considered as an autonomous political
subdivision.
A: Yes it can, the same with other political subdivisions.

However, BPE may be special to a certain extent because
theyre given more independence as compared to other
political subdivisions. These are embodied in the
framework agreement. Anyway, the general concept here
is that they will have their own laws that will be in
conformity to the culture of the people of the different
provinces composing the Bangsamoro.
TN in so far as the province and the others: can they pass
laws?
Yes.
A: RA 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government

Code under the general welfare clause.
TN: the delegation of the power involves passing laws
that are not contrary to the constitution. Likewise, it
should not be in violation of any existing laws passed by
congress because LGUs cannot rise above the source of
their authority. Therefore, they cannot pass a law in the
guise of promoting the general welfare while prohibiting

an activity that is allowed under existing laws. They may
only regulate the activity, but never prohibit it. Similarly,
they cannot in the guise of promoting the general welfare,
allow an activity that is prohibited under existing laws.
Neither can they pass laws that will amend the national
laws. TN: Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25,
1983
One of the issues raised with PDAF is that it is a violation

of local autonomy because the people did not have the
chance to determine what projects they need because it
is determined by the congress (which supposedly is none
of their business as far as LGUs are concerned).
Suffice to say with respect to delegation of powers, the
LGUs have the power however limited.
Then there is the exercise of the legislative power by the
people.
Q: Why the need for a delegation when sovereignty
resides in them?
A: Because we need a particular mechanism or
procedure on how the people can do that. Sec. 32 of Art
VI mandates that Congress should pass a law that would
provide for the procedure, and thus RA 6735 was passed.
Under this law, the people can propose amendments to
the constitution.
TN: Amendments only!
The people can also propose statutes through the
process of initiative and referendum. Likewise, the local
people can propose local legislative acts or resolutions, or
ordinances through the process of initiative and
referendum.
TN the difference between initiative and referendum: In

initiative, people directly propose, go through the process.
Whereas in referendum, it will be for the legislative body,
may it be national or local, to propose; and the people to
approve or reject them in a referendum.
That principle was raised as an issue in the PDAF
controversy: that there may be a violation of the
delegation of the power to congress in so far as
identifying the projects to which to spend the public funds
for because the manner of spending as regards to how
much is to be expended, it is the presidents power for as
long as it is included in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Apparently, in the GAA what is only mentioned are
those funds for projects for country development, but as
to the identification of specific projects, they are not stated
in the GAA. That supposedly, it is within the power of the
president to identify and implement, and not for congress.
By giving that power to congress in effect, there is a
28
violation of the non-delegation of powers. In this particular

case, executive power.
According to SC in the case of Philconsa v Enriquez,
what has been done by the congress is only to
recommend (but in reality they are actually the ones who
determine the projects). So this was questioned again in
2012 in the Lamp case (Lamp v Secretary of Budget
and Management), but the SC said, case dismissed,
there is no evidence to show that the power is violated.
Until finally the Belgica case (Belgica v Ochoa) wherein
the SC said that indeed there was a violation because in
reality it is the congressmen who determine the projects
and determine the beneficiaries (in fact they use to get
20% until finally it becomes 100% because the
beneficiary does not exist at all).
When you take the bar this will still be a hot issue, so
compare the cases I mentioned: Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991 , Philconsa, LAMP,
Belgica so you would have a better understanding of the
issues. Not only was there a discussion on the separation
and non- delegation of powers, there was also a
discussion on judicial review, i.e., the elements of judicial
review on the procedural aspect (especially in the Belgica
case regarding the concept of transcendental
importance)]
Those are the important principles you should remember
for bar examination purposes with respect to
republicanism.
G. Forms of government
Let us now go to the purpose of a government. One of the
elements of a state is the existence of a government.
There are important forms of government which are
important for purposes of the Bar examination.
According to the number of rulers
a)
b)
c)
Monarchy
Aristocracy
Democracy
The most important form is democracy because

we have Section 1 of Article of the 1987
Constitution which states that, the Philippines is
a Democratic and Republican State.
According to how the powers are distributed:
a)
b)
Presidential System the powers are

separated from each other because the
three branches of the government are
coequal and independent from each other,
although they coordinate with each other.
Parliamentary System is that form of
government where there is fusion of powers
of the executive and legislative.
The thing that you should TN is, between the

two, the most adversarial form of government is

the Presidential System because of the principle
of checks and balances. Here, the three
branches of the government do not trust each
other. Hence, there is the checking of each
others powers to make sure that they are
balanced in order to maintain the equality among
the three branches.
Another feature that you must also remember is
that in the presidential system of government,
there is the enjoyment of fixed term of office of
the President. The term of office of the president
is six (6) years without re-election. Whether or
not the term should be fully served in order to be
disqualified for another re-election, is an issue
that has to be resolved by the Supreme Court.
You should remember the case of Pormento vs.
Estrada et. Al, G.R. No. 191988 August 31,
2010 where there was a question of the
qualifications of Estrada when he ran for the
second time for the presidency. The argument
there of Estradas Lawyer was that the term of
office is six years but the Constitution is silent on
the issue on whether resignation may be
considered as an interruption.
In a modified parliamentary system where Mr. Marcos

was the president, and you had a prime minister who
was nominated by Mr. Marcos, elected Consuelo de
bobo by the members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa
(IBP), and. As to the Prime Minister he stayed in power
for as long as he held the trust and confidence ultimately
of the President not of the IBP
As to whether a government is De jure or De facto
The distinction between de jure and de facto is
only relevant when there are two governments at
the same time. If there is only one government
there is no need to make a distinction.
a) De jure
Q: In the Constitution, resignation or voluntary

renunciation is not considered an interruption of
the term of office for purposes of determining the
consecutiveness or successiveness of the term.
In the case of the President, there is no
successiveness of term to speak of because the
term is only one. But the trouble is, Estrada was
not able to finish the full term because allegedly
he resigned. Should that then be considered as
a
disqualification?
A De jure government is the legitimate

government. It usually has the general
support and consent of the people. How this
is manifested is by the ratification of a
Constitution and elections of government
officials.
b)
Parliamentary
There is fusion of the Executive and Legislative
Departments where there is the supremacy of the
Legislature; the Legislature is the parliament and there
is always the supremacy of the parliament in the
government; the Members of the Cabinet come from the
parliament thus the fusion of powers between the
Executive and the Legislative departments so there is no
confusion as to who is more superior to the other
because it is understood that there is the supremacy of
De Facto
A De Facto Government is one that is
established against the will of the people.
Usually, it does not have the general
support of the people.
A: That is an issue that has to be resolved by the

Supreme Court because instead of deciding the
case on the merit, the SC dismissed the case
because Estrada was never elected; the issue
has become moot and academic. The SC held
that there was no actual case or controversy.
The fact remains that the term of office of the
President is six (6) years without re-election.
TN also of the main differences of a Parliamentary
System and a Presidential System of Government. The
two features that dominate the differences between
Parliamentary and Presidential Systems are the following:
29
the parliament.
The Prime Minster has no fixed term of office. He is
chosen by the members of the parliament. He stays in
power for as long as he holds the trust and confidence of
the members of the parliament. Where there is major
conflict of issues between the two departments, either
the President or the Prime Minister will dissolve the
Parliament, OR the Parliament will remove the Prime
Minister through a vote of no confidence.
As regards to a de facto government, take

note that there are three kinds. Read the
case of Co Kim Cham vs Tan Keh G.R. No.
L-5 September 17, 1945
1.
The first, or government de facto in a proper legal

sense, is that government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal governments and
maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as
Presidentialthe
government
of
England
under
the
There is fusion
of the Executive
and Legislative
Commonwealth,
first by Parliament
and later by
Departments
Cromwell
whereasthere
Protector.
is the supremacy of the
Legislature
When the control of the government is usurped by
the voice of the majority, and this government
maintains itself against that rightful authority which is
the legitimate government. So you have an
incumbent government and then you have another
The preside
years
As to his remeans that h

as he lives

force that overthrows the incumbent government. So
there are two governments at the same time.
That was precisely the question on that government
of Cory Aquino the Revolutionary Government. The
Marcos government was what the Cory Aquino
government was maintaining against so that
considered the Aquino government as de facto.
If the basis was the 1973 Constitution, then the
Marcos government was the De Jure Government. If
the Marcos government was successful the Aquino
government had possession and control then. The
thing is that, there was already no more Marcos
government. What was left was only the Aquino
government.
While we were saying that there cannot be a
distinction if there is only one government left, can
we consider the Aquino government as de facto?
The Supreme Court explained that, it may have been
initially considered as de facto because it was not
based on the 1935 or 1973 Constitution. There was
no Constitution. It was established by direct action of
the people through a revolution. In fact, the Freedom
Constitution was only formulated some time on
March 14, 1986 and was established on February 28,
1987. Between those periods, you can consider the
Aquino government as de facto. It eventually became
a De Jure government when the 1987 Constitution
was already promulgated as basis of the Aquino
government and later recognized by the Family of
Nations; and eventually there was a ratification of the
1987 Constitution and the election of government
officials. It was only then that it became clear that it
was established by the consent of the people who
ratified the Constitution and elected the government
officials.
2.
The third is that established as an independent

government by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state of such as the
government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt
not concerned in the present case with the first kind,
but only with the second and third kinds of de
facto governments.
Another kind of de facto government is a government
established by the inhabitants of a country who rise
in insurrection against the mother country.
Example
The government of Aguinaldo; June 12 was the
declaration of independence not from the Americans
but from the Spaniards in Kawit, Cavite that led to the
establishment of the first Philippine Republic
otherwise known as the Malolos Republic. It was
never recognized by the Family of Nations because it
only lasted for a month. When it was introduced it
died in its natural death.
30
There was no government to speak of at least as a

de facto government against the de jure government
of the Spaniards.
3.
The second is that which is established and

maintained by military forces who invade and occupy
a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and
which is denominated a government of paramount
force
Another kind of de facto government is that which is
established by the foreign military troops in a
defeated territory. This is called as Government of
Paramount Force or Belligerent Occupancy. This
was the kind of de facto government that we had
during the Japanese Occupation under the
leadership of the Red, the de jure government being
the Common Wealth Government which was
established by Filipinos under the Second Philippine
Republic under the leadership of Laurel can only be
described as a de facto government.
Consequences of the Change in Government

Q: TN What are the consequences or effects of having
this kind of government while the Commonwealth was still
considered as the de jure government?
A: Under a de facto government or belligerent occupancy,
the political laws of the de jure government are merely
SUSPENDED. They are not automatically abrogated. The
municipal laws still apply unless they are repealed by the
belligerent occupant.
Q: What were the effects of liberation on the de jure
government? What were the effects when the Japanese
left the country? The Doctrine of Postliminum
A: Political laws passed by the belligerent occupant or de
facto government were automatically considered as
repealed or nullified or abrogated.
Non- political laws that were passed by the
belligerent occupant are still considered as good and
valid.
Decisions or policies of the government which are
tainted with political complexion are automatically
abrogated.
Indac vs Director of Prisons
November 29, 1946,
G.R. No. L-1133
[Judge was actually talking about Justice Perfectos

dissent in this case by saying that the judgment of
conviction was void because it was tainted with political
complexion, but the majority in this case decided to deny
the release of Indac in his petition for habeas corpus]
J. Perefectos dissent:
Santiago Indac was sentenced for theft to an aggregate
maximum penalty of 24 years, 11 months and 11 days,
which he began serving on March 28, 1944, in criminal
cases Nos. 2332 and 2333 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
31
His wife now seeks his release by habeas corpus.

There is no question that the decisions in the two cases
were rendered by a court under the Japanese regime in
1944 which, according to our opinion in Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh (L-5, 41 Off. Gaz., 779), formed part of
the processes declared null and void in one of the
proclamations of General Douglas MacArthur.
There is also no question that the scrap iron, electrical
supplies, cables, and fixtures stolen by the prisoner from
the Japanese imperial army formed part of its vital
supplies; and petitioner contends that the stealing of the
them was a form of sabotage, directed against the
enemy, for the purpose of weakening him.
No copy of the decisions could be presented to us, and
there is no way of ascertaining the circumstances under
which the prisoner committed the thefts. Considering the
fact that the Japanese army's ownership of the stolen
goods is, at least, doubtful, upon facts of general
knowledge and of which the members of this court had
ample opportunity to learn the Japanese not having
brought, during their invasion and occupation, any scrap
iron, but collected it from all parts of the country by illegal
means, to be sent to Japan to bolster up their dwindling
materials of war and the electrical supplies, cables,
and fixtures which were stolen by the prisoner were most
probably commandeered from our people; xxx Under
such circumstances, although we understand the fact that
the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced to the
heavy penalty of from 11 years to 24 years of
imprisonment an unprecedented cruelty as penalty for
simple theft the prisoner explaining that the Japanese
military authorities had instructed all courts to impose
heavy penalty on crimes having the nature of political
offenses, we are of opinion that, after liberation, the
prisoner is entitled to be immediately released as, from
the point of view of our people he did not commit any
punishable act.
Penal laws are not political laws. It has nothing to do with
the relationship of the government and the governed. The
judgment is supposed to be valid. But what complicated
the situation was, apparently the conviction was tainted
with political reasons because one was charged with
robbery. The reason of the robbery was to undermine the
operation of the Japanese military authorities. He was
stealing cables of the Japanese in order to undermine
their operation. The judgment was tainted with political
complexion, in which case it should be abrogated. The
Judgment was invalidated. Otherwise, in the absence of
any political complexion, penal laws are non-political and
they should be respected as good and valid
notwithstanding the liberation of the people from the de
facto government.
(Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738,
March 02, 2001)
Q: Was the Arroyo government a de jure government?

A: It was resolved by the Supreme Court that the Arroyo
government was a de jure government as it was done or it
happened by way of succession when Pres. Estrada was
considered resigned.
Q: What is the Difference between Federal and Unitary
System of Government? (BAR)
A: In Unitary government the powers are concentrated in
the national government; the local government is
dependent upon the national government.
In Federal, the executive, legislative, and judicial
powers are distributed equally between national and local
wherein the local government is considered supreme
within their own sphere, independent of the National
government.
A good example is the government of U.S. The
federal government as national government and the
different states with their respective local governments
considered as the local counterparts. These different
states are independent from the federal government.
They can make their own laws for as long as it is not
contrary to the US constitution. Different states have
different laws. The common denominator is the laws
should not be contrary to the US Constitution. (TN) Laws
against the federal government or federal laws are alright,
but not against the Constitution.
We are trying to establish a federal system by having this
concept of Bangsamoro political entity. How we talk about
it without violating the constitution, we will wait and see if
there are any objections to that. Basically you are
practically establishing a substate that is prohibited by the
constitution.
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP GR No. 183591
October 14, 2008 enumerates the objections in the
constitutionality of Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. More or
less this Bangsamoro (political entity) is patterned from
the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. The difference is in the
Bangsmoro Juridical Entity, there is no ratification from
the people who might be affected by it. Unlike in the
Bangsamoro Political Entity there is a framework
agreement signed by the president to be submitted to
Congress. Congress would then pass a law adapting it.
Before adapting it, they will discuss it and they will always
consider if the contents is within the framework of the
provisions of the constitution. Assuming that it will be
passed into law, according to the framers of this
agreement, it is more democratic because it will still be
submitted to the people for ratification. According also to
that framework, there will be an election of government
officials, they will not be appointed. There will be election
of members of legislature who will elect the head of the
Bangsamoro Entity. Its like a parliamentary system of
government. They will be independent in the making of

their own laws. Laws would be different from the national
government.
To make it more acceptable, they are saying that the
name is just changed but it will be the same as an
autonomous region, just a mere replacement to ARMM. It
is however different to ARMM as regard to the concept
and operation.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status
closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the
present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the
concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however,
does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the
status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter
into relations with other states.
Q: What is the difference between Martial Law, Military
Government and Revolutionary Government?
A: When a government is under Martial Law, it is still
civilian. The head of State will only be assisted by the
Armed Forces. It doesnt make it a military government.
There will be more or some regulations on civil rights but
there is still the bill of rights.
Military government - the president is the head of a
military group rather than one who is ordinarily the
president of a civilian government. Executive and
legislative powers are removed from a civilian authority
and transferred to the head of the military government.
The government is more controlled by the military. It is
usually established after a war between two countries or
states, not just a coup dtat within. It technically involves
two countries fighting against each other, thereafter the
military
government
is
established
in
the
invaded/defeated territory. An example would be the kind
of government we had at the beginning of the American
Occupation. The government then was under the
President of the U.S. Pres McKinley, the commander in
32
chief until there was a transfer of power to the civilian this

time by the US Congress, when the land laws were
enacted. In laymans understanding, a government ran by
the military.
Revolutionary government - a government that is not
based on any constitution. The establishment of the
government is based on the direct action of the people
who directly seize the power from the incumbent
government and establish a government of its own.
In these kinds of government (military, martial law,
revolutionary) the leader is very powerful because both
executive and legislative powers are exercised by the
leader of the group, usually a member of the military.
Even judicial function may be exercised by the leader of
the group.
During martial law, President Marcos exercised both
legislative and executive power, even judicial powers.
Cases against civilians who were charged of violations
against national security were not tried before the civilian
courts. They were tried before court martials, whose
decisions are appealable to the commander in chief of the
armed forces.
In the Constitution of 1973 and 1987, notwithstanding the
definition of martial law, there is always at all times the
supremacy of the civilian authority. The 1987 Constitution
provides safeguards to make sure that we will not have
the same experiences we had under the Marcos
administration during Martial Law.
The government of Cory was a Revolutionary
Government. All executive and legislative powers were
exercised by Cory Aquino. Why? Because the 1973
Constitution that justified the existence of the Batasang
Pambansa was not recognized by the government of
Cory. In other words, there was no legislature. In its
absence it was for Cory Aquino to exercise legislative
powers that allowed her to promulgate her own
Constitution by issuing Proclamation No. 3 The
Freedom Constitution. Until there was the enactment of
Proclamation No. 9 creating the constitutional commission
to draft the 1987 Constitution, which created a legislature.
The first thing that had happened was in 1987 when we
had election for the members of Congress that became
the legislature. Finally the concept of Revolutionary
government was diminished by having the complete
branches of government under the 1987 Constitution.
III. Legislative Department
A. Who may exercise legislative power
Q: What is Legislative Power?
A: It is the power to propose, enact, amend or repeal
laws.
Different Kinds of Legislative Power:
1. Orginal v. Derivative

Original power is the power vested directly in the people,
who is the source of Sovereignty. What is exercised by
the legislature is merely a Derivative power.
B. Houses of Congress
2. Constituent v. Ordinary
Constituent function is the power of Congress propose
amendments to the Constitution acting as a constituent
assembly, it is not a law-making power. On the other
hand, Ordinary function is the power of Congress to make
laws and changes in the law.
Qualifications
Other Functions of Congress that are not law-making

power
1. Electoral Function
There are also other non-legislative functions vested in
Congress like electoral function, whereby Congress
canvasses electoral returns for the Vice President and
Presidential positions. Ordinarily this function is given to
the COMELEC however, by the express provision of the
Constitution, it is vested in Congress.
2.
Concurrence of Appointments made by the

President
It is for Congress to concur appointments made by the
Presidents to certain positions in the Government such
as, heads of the executive branch, officers of the AFP,
Constitutional Commission appointees (COA, COMELEC,
and CSC), and regular members of the JBC.
3.
Concurrence of Treaties made by the President
4.
Impeachment - Described somehow as quasijudicial function on the part of Congress.
Others
1. Congress
Q: Where is Legislative Power Vested?
A: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (Art. VI, Section 1)
2. Regional/Local legislative power
3. Peoples initiative on statutes
The Reservation in the People to make Laws
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body
xxx (Art. VI, Section 32)
So, since there is a constitutional mandate to provide a
system of initiative and referendum, Congress has
enacted RA 6735.
a) Initiative and referendum
4. The President under a martial law rule or in a revolutionary
government
33
TN: We have a Bicameral Congress.
Q: Are you qualified?

A: Yes. Definitely. Even if you did not finish law? Yes.
Because all that is required is able to read and write. As
long as you know how to sign your name, you are
qualified. One has to be a natural born. For senator 35
yrs, house of Representatives at least 25.
TN: on the day of election, not on the assumption of
office. Not even at the time you filed your certificate of
candidacy. You may qualify on the day of election. Now
you must also be a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines if you are running for the Senate 2 years and
1 year for the house of representatives except for the
party list sectoral representation, the residency Is not
required.
Special Elections
TN: on special elections. In case a vacancy occurs in
either house before expiration of the term of office, should
there a special election, is it mandatory?
A:The answer is no. Special election is discretionary. And
if special election must be called by congress or the
house concerned, vacancy must be occurring not less
than 18 months. Meaning if vacancy occurs within 18
months, there is no more election. You just have to wait
for the regular election. If vacancy occurs in the house of
Representatives within one year, again you just have to
wait for the regular election. No more special election.TN
1. Senate
Q: How are the members of Senate chosen?
A: Under Art. VI, sec. 2, Senators shall be elected at
large.
Q: Is there a possibility that Senators may be chosen
differently as we use to elect them?
A: Yes, they can be chosen in a different manner
determined by law, as clearly gleaned from the phrase as
may be provided by law (Art. VI, sec. 2). This is
illustrated by the prevailing Philippine method of choosing
twelve (12) senators every three years.
A different manner choosing may involve as much as
changing the election of senators from national votes into
votes per region instead. This can be done by passing a
law.
For Senators:
The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators
who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law. (Art. VI, Section
2)

TN: The composition of Senators cannot be altered by an
ordinary law (except if the constitution would be amended
for that matter) as it is fixed by the Constitution, while that
of the House of Representatives can be increased as
expressly provided by the phrase unless otherwise fixed
by law.
2. House of Representatives
For the House of Representatives:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. (Art. VI, Section 5)
a) District representatives and questions of apportionment

Composition of the Lower House
Insofar as the lower house is concerned, it is composed
of both representatives from the districts and party-list
representatives. There is some issue with regard to
district representatives as it would relate to the
apportionment of districts and its voters.
In making legislative districts it is required that territories
contiguous, compact and adjacent, as far as practicable,
to another to prevent gerrymandering. Gerrymandering
means lumping of voters, who may be from separate
areas or districts, into one district or place in order to get
a favorable concentration of votes to a particular party.
On another point, TN of the number of registered voters
per district to be considered as such because the
Constitution is silent on this matter. TN of jurisprudential
principles pertaining to this issue. The Contstitution is
silent on the minimum number of voters to be declared as
a legislative district because one province is entitled to
one district regardless of the population. In other words,
so long as it is a province, it is entitled to at least one
legislative district representative.
For a City, the rule is different.
Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 07, 2010
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes
a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between
the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
Aldaba, et. al. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078, 15 March
2010.|||
This has reference to the creation of City of Malolos as a
highly urbanized City in order to be considered a
legislative district
34
It was not established that City of Malolos has actual or

projected population of not less than 250,000 population
before May 2010 elections.
SC: Clearly, there is no official record that the population
of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or
projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the
immediately following election after the supposed
attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is
not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
Q: Who can apportion a district?
A: It is the Congress.
Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995
This was in relation to the creation of Biliran as a province
separate from Leyte.
It was the COMELEC that
apportioned these municipalities but was declared by the
Supreme Court as unconstitutional.
The SC emphasized that insofar as the apportionment of
legislative districts, such is a legislative function. Not at all
a function of the COMELEC.
Q: What about the Regional assembly of ARMM, can they
create cities, provinces or legislative districts?
A: No.
SEMA vs. COMELEC GR No. 134163 December 13,
2000
SC said that Congress cannot validly delegate to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative
districts. The power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives and to
reapportion
legislative
districts
is
still
vested
EXCLUSIVELY to Congress.
Q: How often can apportionment of legislative districts be
done?
A: It can be done every after three (3) years from the
survey.
b) Party-list system
Party-list System
Q: What is the percentage in the composition in the
House of Representatives?
A: Not more than 20% of the House of Representatives.
Depending on the number of members coming from the
different districts you will have as many as 20% of them
coming from the party list system.
TN: The following cases in determining qualification in
order to get a seat from the party list:
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC||| G.R. No.
136781, October 6, 2000|||

Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. COMELEC||| G.R. No. 179271, April 21,
2009|||
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives,
the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats
available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.
xxx
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the
manner of
allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A.
No. 7941,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of
which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x
x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,
[22] the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes:
Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes. This is where
petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in
Veterans
lies.
Veterans interprets the clause in
proportion to their total number of votes to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party.
This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats
when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
35
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has
two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast
to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only
in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941.
The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes,
according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved
under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Recently: The case on Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec GR
No. 203766 (April 02, 2013)
Q: Veterans Case: it was emphasized there that to qualify
for a seat, the party list must garner how many votes?
A: 2% of the total votes cast for the party list.
Our perception was, that even with additional seats, you
must also get at least 2%, that was the perception. But
the Supreme Court said in the BANAT case that it will
defeat the purpose of filling up the 20% allocation. Thus it
was clarified under the BANAT case that while 2% is
36

required for a guaranteed seat, you may get less than 2%
for as long as in the ranking in the determination of the
20% allocation, you would still be included. Even if you
get just 1% of the total votes cast for the party list. Just as
long as you first fill up the seats from the party list
members who garnered the 2%. Additional seats will be
proportionate to the seats available for the party list. But
shall in no case shall 1 party list organization get more
than 3 seats, that is the threshold.
Important numbers that you
remember for the Bar exam:
should
therefore
Total membership coming from party list 20%

To get a guaranteed seat 2% (of the total votes cast)
Maximum seats that one party list can get Only 3 seats
Q: Do you need to represent a sector if you are coming
from a party list in order to be accredited as such?
A: Clarified in the Atong Paglaum Case. The SC has
reminded organizations participating in the party list,
there are 3 kinds:
(1) National Parties or Organizations,
(2) Regional Parties or Organizations,
(3) Sectoral Parties or Organizations.
Insofar as the National and Regional Parties or
Organizations, they do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and under-represented sector. So they need
not represent certain sectors like labor, fisherfolks, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities. For as long as
they are organizations, national or regional, they can be
accredited to join the party list system without needing to
represent any sector of the marginalized or underrepresented.
But focused on the requirement of representation coming
from the marginalized or under-represented groups are
the Sectoral parties or organizations.
They MUST represent these sectors (this is mandatory),
sectors like labor, peasants, fisherfolks, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicaps, veterans and
overseas workers.
The Sectoral parties or organization must may either be
(1) marginalized or
(2) under-represented OR (this is now what is clarified by
the SC)
(3) lacking in well-defined political constituency
Q: What does lacking in well-defined political
constituency mean?
A: In the case of peasants, klaro man na imong members
kay farmers. In the case of labor, klaro pud na workers.
But there are too many kinds of professions, so there
arises these professions lacking in well-defined political
constituency, way klaro kung kinsay ilang miyembro. Or
you have for example the elderly, the womens sector or
the youth. All that is required of them is to have an
advocacy pertaining to their special interests or concerns.
The members of which may not necessarily be a specific

group, for as long as they advocate for the interests of
their sector, they qualify already for accreditation. That is
new in this particular case, its a new thing now. It is
clearer in other words, in the determination of who can be
accredited in the party list. The membership coming from
the party list has become broader as compared to before,
because our understanding then of the representation
coming from the party list is that it must represent a
marginalized or under-represented sector of society, that
is only so far as Sectoral Parties or Organizations. But for
those lacking in well-defined political constituency, it is
enough that there is advocacy.
Another point that was clarified in Atong Paglaum is on
the participation on major political parties. The SC was
rather unclear on whether they should be allowed to
participate in the party list system, their decisions were
flip-flopping. At one time, the SC said no. But in BANAT
they said yes.
Now in the recent decision in Atong Paglaum the SC ruled
that major political parties can participate in the party list
system. However, there is a condition to that: That they
must not participate in the legislative district
representation. So, Supreme Court said then in this
particular case that insofar as political parties, they can
participate in party list elections provided (1) they register
under the party list system, and (2) they do not field
candidates for the district elections. A political party
whether major or not that fields legislative candidates in
an election can participate in the party list system only
through its sectoral wing. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
Another point to TN, this is with reference to
disqualification of a nominee representing the party list.
That does not disqualify the party list organization itself so
long as there are other nominees available to replace
him. That is precisely the reason for the requirement of
submission of 3 names for the nominees. In case one is
disqualified, there are still others that may still represent
the party list organization. The disqualification of the
nominee does not automatically disqualify the party list
from accreditation.
Summary of Parameters in Atong Paglaum case:

In determining who may participate in the coming 13
May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
theCOMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1.
Three different groups may participate

the party-list system: (1) national parties
organizations, (2) regional parties
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties
organizations.
in
or
or
or
2.
National parties or organizations and

regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and

do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.
37
TN: On the party list, read the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April
8, 2010,|||That is sectoral representation, representing the
marginalized and under-represented sector of society. In
the Ladlad case the SC has explained the qualifications to
represent a marginalized group. The SC said in this case
that the LGBT qualifies to be accredited under the
marginalized group because it has qualified with the
following qualifications:
(1) there must be possible division or discrimination
suffered by the group, and certainly they are
discriminated.
(2) a distinguished characteristic, attribute or experience
that defines them as a discreet group. Definitely there is a
distinguishing characteristic.
(3) there is present political or economic powerlessness.
3.
Political parties can participate in party-list

elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections
can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either

be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking
in
"well-defined
political
constituencies." It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack
"well-defined
political
constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.
According to the SC, ang Ladlad has shown that the

LGBT sector has been historically disadvantaged or
discriminated against because of negative public
perception. And there have been alleged acts of violence
perpetrated against the members of the LGBT community
by reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity. It
added that the massive opposition to the participation of
the LGBT in the party list system is by itself demonstrative
of the lack of political power, so too is the fact that
legislation to prohibit the discriminatory treatment against
them is languishing in the Congress.
A majority of the members of sectoral

parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong
to
the
"marginalized
and
underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees
of
sectoral
parties
or
organizations
that
represent
the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or
that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must
be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
Q: What are the organizations that cannot be accredited

for the party list system? (BAR)
(1) Religious group that represents the church. If layman
lang but does not represent the church, it is allowed. Ex:
Ang BUHAY, its linked to El Shaddai.
(2) Supported by a foreign government or organization
(3) Supported or subsidized by the Government
(4) Groups promoting violence or the purpose of which is
to overthrow the present Government.
5.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or

organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified. THESAD
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766,
April 02, 2013)
TN of RA 7941 as to what may be accredited. The more

important part there is those disqualifications for
accreditation.
TN, in the BANAT case the SC said that major political

parties can participate under the party list provided that
they have to run under the sectoral organization, that was
the qualification. Now, you should not also field a
candidate in the legislative district.
TN, the matter of advertising or disclosing the name of
nominees coming from the party list. Always remember
that in the party list system, you do not elect the
nominees unlike in the legislative election where you elect
the candidate representing the political party, not the
political party itself. In the party list, you elect the
organization.
Not the political party itself. In the party list, you elect your
competition. May it be national, regional, or, sectorial.
Thus the prohibition against disclosure on the names of
the nominees in the certified list that must be posted at
the polling place.
38
What you see on the certified list are only the names of
the organizations. Now, at one time in the case of [Judge
cited Bara case, but the doctrine discussed here is not
there], they asked for the names of the nominees of this
different organizations accredited by the Comelec
because they suspected that most of them are relatives of
President Arroyo, if not friends, and Comelec said that is
confidential, that cannot be disclosed. Supreme Court
said however, the Comelec abused its discretion because
that is of public record and there is no prohibition against
disclosure for as long as it is not disclosed in the certified
list. You have seen this in the polling place.
do they became billionaires? Some. I think not everyone

because some of them are already billionaires when they
entered the congress.
We used to have alphabetical names of organizations.

Youll notice that most of the organizations start with a
letter A. what was the election 2016? Not anymore
alphabetical but random. The sequence instead of
alphabetical, there will be a raffle instead. They will listed
in the certified list but not anymore alphabetical so they
will have equal chance.. Short memory raman ta. Kung
unsay unang nalista, they will also be the only thing that
you will write in your ballot. Dili man ni check-check, you
have to write the name of the organization that you are
trying to vote. Hasol kaau so. Ang makita ninyo sa folder
na nag-una, usually will get your vote. Now it is being
written in a certified list, randomly.
A:Answer is no. Because at the time the salary was

increased, the term of office of the senators has not yet
been completed. It has to be upon the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the house to effect the
proposed the increase of the salary.
C. Legislative privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications

Term of Office
President and Senate is 6 years. In the house of
Representatives, 3 years. But not more than 3 successive
terms. Common denominator that YOU SHOULD
REMEMBER IN THE BAR, that voluntary renunciation or
resignation shall not in any way interrupt in the continuity
of the service. It will be considered as one full term. In the
computation of the successiveness of term.
This is what is lacking in the case of the President
because there is no restriction in so far as the President
completing his term of six years. Is he still qualified to run
for President. Mao ni gipanindigan ni Erap Estrada. He
was just saying yesterday that he is going to run as
President again if Binay will be anointed by President
Aquino as Presidential candidate. That will be his third
running for election as President. The second time, he
almost won the election. However the case of Pormento
vs Estrada et al (id) was dismissed by the supreme court
for the issue has been found to be moot and academic as
he was not elected. That issue has never been settled.
And as long as the issue is not settled he would run again
in election. Because the provision regarding the
resignation as not an interruption in the continuity applies
to only to the members of the Senate and even for local
elective officials. They have not anticipated that of the
term of office of the President. That is still debatable.
Salary of members of congress is only 204k per annum,
for officers such as the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House, that is only 240k per annum. How
Q:Can their salary be increased?

A: Yes. So long as they do not enjoy it. It will be enjoyed
by the members of the next term. Which means, for
example, dba ang Senate 6 yrs, hor 3 yrs.
Q:You finished already the term as member of the house
of Representatives, can you now enjoy the increase if u
run the next election?
Q:Can it be decreased by law?

A:Oh, definitely. There is no prohibition against it.But they
are not stupid to passing law against themselves. So that
is impossible.
Now there are some of the perks enjoyed by the
members of the congress. The privileges that they enjoy.
TN this may be relevant especially the impending arrest
of the 2 other senators.
Q: Now what are the perks?
A: You have 2 Privileges: Immunity from arrest and
detention and the freedom of speech.
Immunity from arrest and detention
For as long as the penalty is only 6yrs or lower, one
cannot be arrested during tenure. For as long as he is a
member of congress, he cannot be arrested to make sure
that he will attend the session. Even if he is not attending
the session and just sleeping in his mansion, he cannot
be arrested if the crime he is charged with is not
punishable by more than 6yrs of imprisonment. Definitely
plunder is punishable by death as maximum. With the
suspension of death penalty, Reclusion Perpetua, that
means more than 6yrs of imprisonment. Therefore he can
be arrested anytime even if you are attending session in
Congress. Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817,
June 27, 2008 and Pp. vs Jalosjos G.R. Nos. 132875-76.
November 16, 2001
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and
that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former
Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas
he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts
that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since
the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged
with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of
statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded
as a "political offense".
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence

of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances
against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft
and corruption in the AFP. CASaEc
In sum, petitioner's first ground posits that there is a world

of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos
respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing
of the motion, and other circumstances which
demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in
the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime

is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ ofhabeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required. (Underscoring
supplied) ASTDCH
The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
39
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail

when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup
d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there
is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or
moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's
application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application
for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a
valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail
in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal
action." Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally
to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos
||| (Trillanes IV v. Pimentel, Sr., G.R. No. 179817, June
27, 2008)
TN: The case of Jalosjos. He was convicted already of
rape and the judgment has already become final. Prior
thereto he was reelected as congressman. And so he
said in effect he was exculpated or exonerated following
the Aguinaldo case in the administrative cases. Supreme
Court was saying this is different. Your election does not
erase your criminal liability. So even if you are reelected,
still the fact remains that you are convicted and the
judgment has already become final and executory. Now
as for the penalty is more than 6 years of imprisonment,
that he will be allowed to attend sessions with escorts
from bilibid, the supreme court denied it saying that
before the eyes of the law he is not special because he is
a member of the congress apart from an ordinary
criminal. The supreme court did not allow him to attend
sessions and in fact he was expelled because the
decision became final and that disqualified him from
holding any public office. In the case however of Trillanes,
it was different.
You TN, this is significant if the three senators or sila
tanan makasohan ug Plunder, wala na mabilin sa senado.
What will happen to the operation of the Senate?
Because they can be arrested and detained of the
penalties more than 6yrs.
TN of the hypothetical question that might be asked on
the bar. What if for example Enrile and Estrada will be
arrested, the same with Revilla, they can be arrested and
detained any day as the matter immunity does not apply.
Now, the argument of Trillanes in his case is, you are not
convicted as of yet because of the presumption of
innocence. He wanted to attend session and was

approved because according to him when he was
charged with an offense that is punishable by reclusion
Perpetua.. more than 6yrs imprisonment but he was not
yet convicted. He said, do not compare me to Jalosjos.
Jalosjos was convicted, I am only a detention prisoner.
The case is still pending. I have in my favor presumption
of innocence. Supreme court say however in the case of
Trillanes, presumption of innocence does not necessarily
carry with it the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Still
the case of Jalosjos applies to him. He was not allowed
because he was facing charges that was punishable by
more than 6 yearrs imprisonment.
Q: By his detention, is he deprived of his duty to function
as member of the congress?
A: Answer is no. He can continue to perform his functions
as a member of congress. Because he is not yet
convicted. The judgment is not yet final. They can
continue to do their job from camp Crame. They should
not be deprived to represent the constituents because the
people, because we have elected them nationwide. You
should not forget that they are not yet convicted but only
detention prisoner. But because of media, we thought that
they are already guilty. There is still the hearing and the
presumption of innocence. So even if they are convicted
by the trial court, for as long as judgment has not become
final and executory, they continue to hold public office
unless suspended indefinitely or if expelled from the
roster of Senate members or of the House of
Representatives.
As to Trillanes, he cannot attend, but he can still continue
to do his function. And he did. In fact there was an issue
against him because insofar as his PDAF. He had
expended his PDAF and how is that possible when he
was detained. Because he continue to perform his
legislative function according to him.
Trillanes was never denied to continue his functions. So
why make an exception with these three others that are
charged with plunder. Unless of course if they are
suspended. I doubt it. Then they run as president. Free
promotion. (Story of Revilla and Jinggoy)
TN, Its security from arrest and detention has always
been considered only as a privilege and must be granted
in the restrictive sense (it is more of an exception rather
than a general rule)
You cannot detain a congressman going to Manila to
attend session. You can be penalized under the RPC.
Freedom of speech.
You can say anything you want to say under the sun. No
civil or criminal liability. For as long as it is said in the halls
of congress or anywhere else as long as that member is
performing a legislative function. So committee meetings
is included (outside the hall of congress). This is applied
to their agents, meaning to their staff and applies even to
their reports. This is because, it is not limited oral
40
statements delivered but also includes or applies to all

matters communicative in nature is covered in the
immunity from prosecution maybe civil or criminal liability
TN: There is no immunity to administrative liability, if that
would constitute a disorderly behavior. Osmea vs
Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960. Where
the Supreme Court said that the immunity applies only to
civil and criminal. While they cannot be held liable for
damages or be sued for libel or slander, for
communications or speeches may be written or verbal,
delivered in the Halls of Congress or while in the
performance of a legislative function, but not for
administrative liability
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
PROHIBITIONS
Disclosure (Sec 12)
These are part of the transparency of the government.
That requires the disclosure of financial and business
interest of the members of congress to avoid any conflict
of interest. So if they are into the business of real estate,
they have to disclose that.
Example: A corporations owned by a congressman,
bidding a contract with government. Unya mo ingon ra
sila na thay have already renounced or waived their
shares of stock in that corporation in favor of our children.
It is the same, they still own the corporation, as long as
you are alive and kicking.
Prohibited and Forbidden Offices (Sec. 13)
You cannot hold any other office or employment in the
Government,
or
any
subdivision,
agency,
or
instrumentality thereof, including government0owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall be appointed
to any office which may have been created or
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected.
TN: Two kinds of office which he cannot be appointed to,
for as long as he is still a member of the congress:
1. Forbidden appointments
- Even if the senator or congressman resigns, he
is still disqualified for appointment to a particular
office when that member of Congress is
responsible to the
o Creation of the office which he may be
appointed later
o Responsible in the increase of salary or
emoluments of that office
2.
Prohibited/ incompatible appointments

- you cannot be appointed to any other positions
in government that are in conflict with your
legislative function
- Ex. you cannot be appointed as cabinet
member without forfeiting your seat during your
TENURE (so if you accept the appointment, then
you need to resign)
.
The prohibition is that he cannot be appointed to an office
which is incompatible to his office, to a possibility of fusion
of powers of legislative and executive. For example, he
cannot be appointed at the same time as secretary of
department under an executive branch. If he accepts, he
automatically forfeits his eat in the congress. Many
members of congress being appointed to the cabinet of
the president, automatically they forfeit. Even for
controlled corporations if appointed, he forfeits his seat in
the congress
41
Regular session should be every 4th Monday of July and

it should continue until 30 days before the opening of the
next regular session excluding Saturdays Sundays and
regular holidays. So there will be recess of 30 days
Special session- is a session called by the president
during the recess of congress
Sine die session- is where they kill the clock. (US vs
Pons G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916.) This is done if
expiring na ila term. So they can continue to act on
administrative matters, no more legislative functions.
They would not consider the clock. So they continue on
administrative matters no longer law making functions.
Usually mo adjourn na sila if the elections is forthcoming,
they will have a sine die session to attend administrative
matters. Examples on matter regarding on canvassing.
Officers in the congress. TN
Gordon vs Liban GR NO. 175352 July 15, 2009. Gordon

was the chairman of the Red Cross. The question is,
should he forfeit his seat in the congress when he was
appointed or elected as the chairman of the Red Cross.
TN. SC said Richard Gordon did not relinquish his
senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance of
the position of Chairman of Philippine National Red Cross
Board of Governors [Note: This was overturned in the
January 18, 2011 resolution of the MR which ruled that
Red Cross is sui generis status not anymore a simple
private corporation, but the ruling that Gordon doesnt
violate this prohibition of a Senator]
Q: Why?
A: Because PNRC is a private organization merely
performing governmental function and PNRC Chairman is
not a government official or employee. Not being a
government office, PNRC Chairmanship may be held by
any individual including a Senator or House of Congress.
PNRC is autonomous, neutral and independent of the
Philippine government. It is a voluntary organization that
does not have government assets and does not receive
any appropriation from Congress. PNRC is not part of any
of the government branches; PNRC Chairmanship is
neither a government office nor an office in a GOCC for
the purposes of the prohibition in the Constitution.
Senator Gordon therefore can validly serve as Chairman
of PNRC without giving up his Senatorial position
Q: What kind of office is this that even if you resign as a
senator or congress, you cannot be appointed to that
office?
A: If that office is created during your term or that the
emoluments of that office where increased during your
term. You cannot be appointed to those offices even if you
resign. This is called the forbidden office.
D. Quorum and voting majorities
Sessions of Congress
TN: Session of congress may be regular or special. BAR
(there is also a sine die session)
Q: Who are the officers in congress?

A:
In the Senate:
1. President
2. Majority floor leader
3. Minority floor leader
4. Chairmen of the different committees
In the house of representative:
1. Speaker of the house
2. Deputy Speaker (in the Luzon, Visayas,
Mindanao and representing the women sector)
3. Majority floor leader
4. Minority floor leader
5. Sergeant of arms
6. Chairmen of the different committees
TN
Q: How are they chosen?
A: by majority votes. Regardless of political party
affiliation. In other words, a president of the house may
not belong to the majority political party, he may come
from the minority political party. Like Enrile, he came from
the minority party.
CASE of Santiago.
Q:What do you mean by majority?
A: More than 50% of the membership. For as long as you
get the number, regardless of your political party
affiliation, then you can be elected as an officer in the
congress, either be in the Senate or House of
Representatives
Q: What is quorum?
A: refers to majority only of the membership of house. It
maybe a simple mathematical computation but take not of
the case of Avelino v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 6322,
February 21, 1912. Let us say, there are 24 members, 5
of whom are absent.
Q: What would be the basis of computation for majority?
A: On the total membership of 24.
Q: Why?
A: Because they can always be compelled to attend the
session. If they are alive and congress. for as long as

there are 13 who attended the session, they can proceed
legally with their business. And to pass a legislative
proposal, all there is need is the majority of the quorum
Principle of shifting majority, because as the number of
members attendance increase, then the increase also in
the requisite majority of the passing of the law.
Q: What if for example, one is really sick and he cannot
attend the session (in the ICU) will he be included in the
computation of the quorum?
A: Yes! For as long as he is under the coercive power of
the congress. Under the jurisdiction of the congress.
But if he is abroad, in the case of Avelino of Cruz. Even if
a warrant of arrest is issued, it cannot be enforced aboard
since it is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
congress. Thus, it is useless to include him in the
computation of the quorum. Thus if one of the members
of the senate is abroad, then the basis of computation of
majority is only 23, not 24. Divided by 2 plus 1.
Santiago vs Guingona.
On the rules of proceeding, every congress, they have to
promulgate their own proceedings. But they are not
obliged to follow them if they do not want to. Arroyo v. De
Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, June 26, 1998) SC cannot
compel them to follow the proceedings, under the
separation of powers. SC: they are mere procedures
which may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
party.
E. Discipline of members
BAR: if you have immpeachment to remove the president
or vice president? How do you remove the member of
congress before the expiration of his term of office?
A: you have by expulsion. To discipline members of
congress, each house has a committee. You have a
committee on discipline.
Q: what will be a ground for removal? Or for disciplining?
A: in impeachment there are 6 grounds enumerated
under the constitution. But in congress there is only
disorderly behavior. Defined by the house concerned
through their rules of proceedings. they define what is
disorderly behavior and that is discretionary on the house.
TN: the penalty to be imposed from reprimand to
expulsion, should suspension be the penalty, the
constitution is clear that it should not be more than 60
days, if you suspend a member for more than 60 days
then it will be expulsion.
Preventive suspension that may be imposed by the courts
will not violate the separation of powers because
preventive suspension of members of congress by the
courts
42
example: Revilla, Estrada and Enrile, they can be

suspended indefinitely because they are charged with
corruption. The suspension is 90 days (3 months)
mandatory. Ministerial functions are exercised by the
court for preventive suspension of not more than 90 days.
Q: can they complain about the violation of separation of

powers as of this provision that only congress can
suspend them
A: no because preventive suspension is not a penalty
yet. It is a mere precautionary measure and therefore it
does not violate the separation of powers provided in
article 6 section 16 paragraph 3
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Q: How many votes is needed to expel a member? Or to
convict a member?
A: 2/3 votes. The same as you convict an impeachable
official you need 2/3 votes of the members of the senate.
JOURNAL and ENROLLED BILL
Q: Publication of the proceedings in the journal
There are 2 records that you need to remember for
purposes of determining on how are laws passed in
congress?
A: The journal and the enrolled bill. These are evidences
of the enactment of a law.
The journal is being kept by the secretary of each house.
Q: The matters contained in the journal there are 4.
1. the yaes and the nays of every law that is
being carried out by the majority votes
2. the veto of the president
3. the votes of yes and nays overriding the
veto of the president
4. the result of any deliberation as long as it is
requested by at least 1/5 of the members
Those contained in the journal are conclusive as to the
probative value and they are binding upon the courts
Q: What about an enrolled bill?
A: when it is enrolled or engrossed
Q: When is it enrolled?
A: After a certification is issued by the speaker of the
house or the senate president that here is the version that
we agreed on and as to any insertions to the bill while it is
submitted to the president for signature
Q: What is its probative value?
A: It is binding as so far as to its execution, the tenor as
to its contents, it is binding upon the courts.
So if you want evidence on that is the tenor of the bill then
you refer to the enrolled bill because that is conclusive as
far as the court is concerned.

The due execution of the bill you go back to the enrolled
bill
Q: what if there will be a conflict between the enrolled bill
and the journal
A: the journal is practically a transcript of the proceedings
of deliberations of a particular bill, it is verbatim. Records
of what happened.
Q: apparently a conflict was created, your journal is
different as a result of the deliberation but in the enrolled
bill it is differently stated? Which of the 2 will prevail?
A: when the question as to whether the bill was properly
passed you go by the journal. Or if it is with regard to the
tenor, then you go by the enrolled bill.
[Judge forgot the title of the case, but its more likely to
be Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 on
VAT]
They were confused on what is the subject of the product
and the raw materials because in the journal apparently it
is subject to tax because the raw material are the
byproducts but it came out in the enrolled bill that what
was subject is already the by product. It is clear in the
intention of congress is for the byproduct but it is not that
way in the enrolled bill.
Supreme Court said that what must be with always is the
enrolled bill you go by the tenor or the validity of the bill.
Q: What then would be the remedy of congress?
A: They have to amend the bill. Withdraw it rather than
just change it without going through the process. As far as
the court is concerned, the enrolled bill is binding as to its
tenor.
Q: Whether there was a valid deliberation of the bill?
A: What will prevail is the journal. On how many votes
was passed then it will be the journal.
TN: US vs Pons
Neither House during the sessions of the
Congress shall, without the consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two Houses shall be
sitting.
F. Electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
Section 17 of Article 6
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties
43
and the parties or organizations registered under the

party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
TN: these are favorite in the bar
Electoral tribunals. There are 2 electoral tribunals. One in
the senate and one is in the house of congress.
Q: what is the Composition of the electoral tribunals?
A: there are 9 members each. 3 senior justices of the
supreme court and 6 coming from the political parties on
proportionate representation.
TN: Q: once you are elected in the electoral tribunal, is
there any security of tenure?
A: even if you change your political party affiliation it will
not be a ground to remove you from the electoral tribunal
that is the case Bondoc v. Pineda, G.R. No. 97710,
September 26, 1991
electoral tribunals practically exercise the electoral
function.
Q: What is the function of the Electoral tribunals.
A: It is the sole judge (only judge) of election contest.
Involving election returns and qualification of members of
congress ( senate or house of representatives) as the
case may be.
Q: Define our terms
A: sole judge meaning- there a=can be no other judge or
courts that will have jurisdiction over members of
congress. You cannot go to the supreme court to
question the election return or qualification of the
members. That is the exclusive jurisdiction of the electoral
tribunals. It is the sole judge and therefore its decision is
not appealable unless there is abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Case of Abubakar v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 173310, 173609, March 07, 2007
The SC jurisdiction to refute decisions of HRET operates
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Otherwise its decision is final and executory.
Q: what are the cases that are within the jurisdiction of
the electoral tribunals?
A: election contest.
Q: what is an election contest?
A: it may be a winner or a loser. The loser has the
intention to remove the winner so that he will become the
member of congress.
Q: Therefore if isa lang ang candidate in one legislative
district. Do they have jurisdiction if a voter of that district
will question the qualification of the sole candidate of that
district? Where do you question?
A: with the electoral tribunal, comelec or the Supreme
Court
The Sampayan v. Daza, G.R. No. 103903, September 11,
1992. Only candidate of northern Samar in his district.

There was a question on his qualification because
according to the complainant he is not a resident of the
Philippines as he is a green card holder.
Q: Does the electoral tribunal have jurisdiction over him?
A: No, because the constitution is clear that only when
there is an election contest where there is a winner and a
losing candidate where the losing candidate will replace
him in congress.
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction as well because that
should have been asked before the election as to a
qualification contest to COMELEC.
Q: If it was not resolved by the COMELEC and election
was conducted?
A: over run by the election. The moment that candidate
has sworn into the house as member. COMELEC will lose
jurisdiction.
Q: Who is going to question of one already a member?
A: Supreme Court said that the congress or the house
concerned is never precluded to conduct exclusionary
proceedings in order to preserve the integrity of the house
that only qualified members shall continue to serve the
house. Shall remain as members as the house
Q: Jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals because
sometimes it will overlap with the jurisdiction of
COMELEC. When does the electoral tribunal assume
jurisdiction over an election contest.
A: only when it involves a member.
Q: If he is not yet a member because he is not yet
proclaimed as the winner?
A: Then it would have to be resolved first by the
COMELEC on the issue on qualification or returns or
election prohibition and returns.
Matters relating to the prohibition against the

increase of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court without its advice and consent.
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true
legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize
an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court. No countervailing argument has been
cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which was intended to
give this Court a measure of control over cases
placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging
its
appellate
jurisdiction
would
unnecessarily burden the Court.||| (Fabian v.
Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998)
There should not be any law that would allow
recognition of nobility. Walay queen or king.
Procedural/ Process
If there is any proposal, it may be initiated by the
House of the Representatives or House of the
Senate.
The
session
may
be
held
simultaneously on the same subject matter or
sequential. From one house to the other house,
following the same process.
Q: define returns? What is involved in the election in the

jurisdiction of the electoral tribunal? What do you mean by
election?
A: when it was attended with fraud or when there was
vote buying, violence or intimidation of election. It is in the
electoral tribunals. As to qualifications those that are
provided for in the constitution. Or even to his loyalty to
the republic. The returns should be something to do with
the election figures and results.
Q: What is the process?
G. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative
The Law-Making Process
Q: What are the limitations?
A: There are substantial and procedural limitations.
Q: What would the committee on

governments do upon receipt of your bill?
Substantial limitations:
For as long as they are not contrary to the
Constitution, there cannot be any problem as to
whatever law that may be passed by Congress.
It must not be irrepealable , all laws passed by
Congress are subject to amendments or even
repeal.
Except: for a law that may violate the
non-impairment clause. (ex. the grant of
44
tax
emption
for
a
valuable
consideration. It cannot be repealed as
it will violate the non-impairment
clause).
A: First, there is the calendaring of the bills at the

beginning of their term. E-calendar na nila with
the Secretary of the House. The secretary will
set a schedule in the calendar when is it to be
called. Iya rang title ang tawagon. It will be
referred to the concerned committee. If your bill
pertains to local governments, it will be given to
the committee on local governments.
local
A: it is discretionary, this is what makes a

chairman of the committee very powerful, he
may act on it or gave due course to your
proposed bill or simply ignore it.
If it is acted upon, research will be
done; if not, public hearings will be
conducted. The Committee will propose
changes to your bill. The Committee will
submit a draft of their proposals to your
bill as to the changes, and It will be
submitted to the plenary session;
meaning, as a house.

Q: What would happen if it is submitted to the
plenary session?
A: This time, not only the title will be read, but
the provisions with the recommended proposals
for changes by the Committee will be discussed,
so that debates and discussion will follow on the
bill.The final draft will be prepared, it will be
printed and distributed among the members of
the House, and thereafter the vote will be taken,
this time only the title will be read.
(TN) A bill must embraced only one
subject matter to prevent log rolling,
Hodge podge.
They will submit a draft of their proposal to your bill as to
the changes and they will be submitted to plenary
session, meaning as a house
Q: Now what will happen after it was submitted to the
plenary session?
A: This time not only the title will be read but the
provisions with the recommended proposal for changes
by the committee will be discussed, so that debate and
discussion will follow
Q: Now what will happen?
A: The final draft will be prepared, printed and distributed
among the members of the house and thereafter a vote
will be taken, this time only the title will be read, then that
will go to the house of the senate to go through the same
process.
Q: what will the president do??

A: He has a period of 30 days to act if he does not act on
the bill
Q: what will happen?
A: The bill becomes a law regardless of his objection, if
he has to make an objection he has to do that within 30
days..
Q: What will he do??
A: He can VETO THE ENTIRE BILL AS A GENERAL
RULE not just a portion of it but the entire bill the only..
EXCEPTION to that if it involves what??
1.
2.
3.
Appropriation bill
Revenue bill or
Tariff bill
then he can make ITEM VETO, this is denied by

the president in the PDAF CASE, there is no vetoing
of the identification of the projects and as to the
amounts that may be spend for that project the
president would not have that opportunity with
regards to the PDAF thats why one of the reason it
was declared unconstitutional because it will violate
the veto power of the president.
Another point you should TN as to the presidents
signing it so if he disagrees with the bill,
Q: What if they cannot agree on their version??
Q: what will he do?
A: Then there is bicameral conference committee to iron

out the differences or conflicts of version between the two
houses they shall be compose equal number coming from
both houses.
A: He returns the bill to the house of origin with his veto

message,
Q: is this a third house?

A: NO, their purpose is only to iron out,
Q: is there a chance for the bill to be save?

A: YES. 2 INSTANCES
1.
Q: Do they prevail?
A: Virtually they prevail but TN: there has to be approval
or concurrence by MAJORTIY VOTES OF BOTH
HOUSES, in other words they may also amend the
version of both houses and come up with their own
version, mao ni gitwag nila ug AMENDMENT BY
SUBSTITUION but such will only be effective if approve
by majority votes of both houses, it will be submitted to
plenary session of both houses and thereafter
Q: what will happen?
A: if they can agree now then there is the signing by
officers of both houses certifying to the effect that this is
45
now the version of both houses and then it will be

submitted to the president, and then
2.
If they do not agree with the president they

may vote again upon the bill without any
changes notwithstanding the
recommendation of the president thats what
we call REPASSING of the bill, overriding
the power of the president however you
need a vote 2/3 of both houses not just from
the house of origin but also to the other
house, if they fail to get the 2/3 votes of the
other house the bill is as good as dead or
They may consider the recommendation of
the president to amend the bill and return
the bill to the president so that he will sign it.
By the way on ITEM VETO it involves like appropriation,

revenue or tariff bill one condition that must be complied
that the remaining provisions of the veto bill can stand

independent from that portion vetoed by the president
also the president may veto in effect, reject
INAPPROPRIATE provisions being inserted in the bill,
that may also be veto by the president by way of
exception to the exception.
There is also that IMPOUNDMENT POWER of the
president is so far as appropriation are concerns even if
there is an appropriation for a particular disbursement of
the government the president may refuse spend the
appropriated amount.
BAR Q: who grants tax exemption?

A: it is only congress by majority votes of all members of
congress
BAR Q: WHEN DOES A BILL BECOME A LAW?
Q: how about tax treaties?
A:
When the president does not act within the
period of 30 days from receipt
A: is should be with the concurrence of the 2/3 votes of

the senate
When the president signs the bill

When the bill written by the president is
overridden by the 2/3 votes of both houses
46
A: equitable because that would depend on the capacity

to pay taxis, uniform that whatever tax that would be
impose should be applied to all person situated under the
same circumstances. Progressive because as your tax
base increases your tax rate increases base on uniformity
and equitable taxation.
Another point on the grant of tax exemption it could be by

a statue or by a constitutional provision
Executive action
TN: on properties that are actually, directly, and

exclusively use for religious purpose, exempted from
property tax only, public cemeteries, monasteries etc.
charitable institution, in relation to this guys if funds
should be appropriated to the church, its priest or any
dignitaries of the church or religious sec.
Overriding the veto power of the president
Q: is that allowed?
Recall of the emergency power of the president

The calling of a special election for president
need have the signature of the acting president
A: NO, that would be a violation of separation of church

and state EXECPTION if payment are made to priest
working for AFP; penal institution; and orphanage and
leprosarium
BAR Q: is the three reading of the bill indispensable or

dispensable??
On congress with regards to delegation Tariff power to the

president, go over with section 28.
A: Indispensable
TN: on sec. 32 on the mandate on passing of a law to

allow the people to legislate through the process of
initiative and referendum RA 6735.
Q: WHEN DOES A BILL BECOME A LAW WITHOUT THE

SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT?
A:
Q: is the three reading on separate days indispensable or

dispensable?
A: Dispensable, for as long as there is certification by the
president as to the urgency of the bill, that if it is not acted
upon immediately, there will be danger to public safety or
national security, TN it can be done in one day not on
separate days, nonetheless three readings gihapon, its
indispensable thats on of the procedural limitations.
TAXATION
Q: in case of doubt whether you are taxable or not? How
do you resolve the doubt
A: against the taxpayer
Q: characteristics of our taxation?
A: uniform; equitable; and progressive.. Equitable
meaning according to the capacity to pay taxis, this was
ask in the BAR exam
BAR Q: what is the difference between uniform taxation
and equitable taxation?
a) Legislative inquiries and the oversight functions

Legislative Inquiry
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected
by, such inquiries shall be respected.
TN: What is important with regards to legislative inquiry,
this power is a discretionary power of Congress.
Q: Who may be required to appear before a legislative
inquiry?
A: Any person.
Q: Does that include the president and his cabinet?
A: The president NO because of the executive privilege.
As regards the cabinet members, YES they may be
compelled unless the president invokes his executive
privilege.

(TN) |||Senate of the Phils. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777
April 20, 2006
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being
summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he
must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President
or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls
for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive
Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear
before Congress and may then opt to avail of the
necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for
requiring officials to secure the consent of the President
under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the
rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by
Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the
Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear
that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be
invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by
the need to ensure respect for such officials does not
change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public

Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643,
September 04, 2008
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right
of respondent Committees to obtain information
allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people's right to
public information. This is the reason why we stressed in
the assailed Decision the distinction between these two
rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his
right to information does not have the same obligatory
force as a subpoena duces tecumissued by Congress"
and "neither does the right to information grant a citizen
the power to exact testimony from government officials".
As pointed out, these rights belong to Congress, not to
the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this
juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees
and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for
information on the part of any individual citizen. This
Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information
in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to
information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed
Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected
from them is to respect matters that are covered by
executive privilege.
47
Q: What is the subject matter covered in a legislative

inquiry?
A: Any matter. Not necessarily in relation to a pending
legislation for as long as it relates to the scope of its
legislative inquiry. One can be asked whatever topic and
he may be asked to appear before the House or any of its
committee to shed light on those subject matters.
TN: They must promulgate their own rules and
regulations and the most important part, these rules must
be PUBLISHED. There will be a violation of DUE
PROCESS OF LAW should there be failure to publish
such rules and regulations. (Senate of the Phils. v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006)
The same principle was then invoked by Ombudsman
Gutierrez as regards to impeachment. The one who
initiates
the
impeachment
is
the
House
of
Representatives and it is the Senate which hears the
proceedings. OMB Gutierrez was then saying that the
right to due process was violated because the
impeachment rules and regulations were not published.
SC was saying that unlike proceedings in a legislative
inquiry, the Constitution requires that it should be
published in compliance with due process but there is no
such publication insofar as publishing the rules and
regulations with respect to the conduct of the
impeachment proceedings. Just to emphasize that indeed
the requirement of publication of the R&R with respect to
the conduct of legislative inquiry is MANDATORY.
While "promulgation" would
seem
synonymous
to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their
usage.
The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12
times. A number of those instances involves the
promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances
emanating from xxx It is not for this Court to tell a coequal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of
promulgation.The Court is in no position to dictate a
mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the
Constitution.|||xxx Had the Constitution intended to have
the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated
so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than
"promulgate," there is no other single formal term in the
English language to appropriately refer to an issuance
without need of it being published. (Gutierrez v. House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459,
February 15, 2011)
(TN) The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by,
such inquiries shall be respected. This includes his right
against self-incrimination.
(TN) The subject matters that may not be looked into by
Congress thru a legislative inquiry notwithstanding the
prerogative of exercising the power. It must always be in
aid of legislation not in aid of prosecution.
Case in point: Bengson v The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. This one has to be read in the light of the

decision of the SC in the Standard Chartered Bank v The
Senate Committee on Banks.
Citing Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, the petitioners claim that since the
issue of whether or not SCB-Philippines illegally sold
unregistered foreign securities is already preempted by
the courts that took cognizance of the foregoing cases,
the respondent, by this investigation, would encroach
upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts.
The argument is misplaced. Bengzon does not
apply squarely to petitioners' case.
It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the
issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction
had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to
allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate
the matter would create the possibility of conflicting
judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable
controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive
domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.
To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a
number of cases already pending in various courts and
administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to
the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there
is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon.
However, the similarity ends there.
Central to the Court's ruling in Bengzon that
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any
constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative
investigation was the Court's determination that the
intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court
found that the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought
such investigation contained no suggestion of any
contemplated legislation; it merely called upon
the Senate to look into possible violations of Section
5, Republic Act No. 3019. (Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)
Q:What was invoked here (in Bengzon)?
A: In Bengzon, the person who was summoned before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee already had a
pending case before the Sandiganbayan.
The separation of powers between Congress and the
Judiciary, represented by the Sandiganbayan. Congress
has no power to determine the guilt of a person in a
legislative inquiry, because theirs is limited only to
understanding possible subject matter of future
legislation. Congress cannot determine whether a person
has a violated a law, or whether he is guilty or not.
48
not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry,

otherwise it would be easy to subvert any intended inquiry
by Congress through the institution of any particular
criminal or administrative action. This is the most recent
one with respect to the extent of legislative inquiry of
congress.
Q: What is subjudice?
A: TN, this is a limitation on the conduct of legislative
inquiry. SC said this subjudice rule restricts comments
and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
pre-judging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice. This is from Romero II vs.
Estrada.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule
may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec.
3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.||| XXX
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that Chavez is
still pending final adjudication by the Court, still, such
circumstance would not bar the continuance of the
committee investigation. What we said in Sabio v.
Gordon suggests as much:
The same directors and officers
contend that the Senate is barred
from inquiring into the same issues
being litigated before the Court of
Appeals and theSandiganbayan.
Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide
that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action
should not stop or abate any inquiry
to carry out a legislative purpose.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court
proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts
conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to settle,
through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable
the legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine whether
there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new or
remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in
any potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do
not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
||| (Romero II v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, April 02, 2009)
Q: What happened in Standard Charter Bank vs. The

Senate Committee on Banks?
Q: Why are these cases relevant?
A: This was a case about the sale of shares of stocks of

Standard Charter without the approval of Bangko Sentral.
Those investigated said theres already a pending
investigation by the BSP. To have them appear before the
Senate committee would violate their right against selfincrimination and the separation of powers.
A: Now that the cases have been filed against the 3

senators regarding the PDAF, I suppose that if they
continue legislative inquiry, they must be excluded. TN
that if it goes into disclosing information that might affect
the prosecution of the cases against the accused
senators, you must comply with the subjudice rule.
TN SC said the mere filing of a criminal or administrative

complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should
Q: What is the exercise of contempt power?

A: Incidental to the legislative inquiry power, but is not
expressly provided by the Constitution. It is implied that
should Congress choose to exercise the legislative
inquiry, Congress can cite one in contempt should a
person refuse to cooperate by not appearing if summoned
by Congress or any of its committee.
49
Q: What is operational proximity test?

A: It involves communication with the President and his
subordinate if it involves consultative communication.
Because of the proximity of that officer with the President,
there may be communication that should not be disclosed
to the public, as it becomes part of the executive privilege.
Q: How long will you be detained if the power of contempt

is exercised through detention as penalty?
Q: What matters can Congress not look into?
A: Contempt by Senate forever. Because Senate is a

continuing body. The seats are never vacant, because
you only elect 12 Senators every election.
A: Matters under executive privilege; diplomatic

negotiations of the President entered into with foreign
countries
Contempt by HR or any of its committees 3 years. TN.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while

possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in
the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section
21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to
the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the
conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion.
Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has
been given the authority to concur as a means of
checking the treaty-making power of the President,
but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity
as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives fail to present a "sufficient showing of
need" that the information sought is critical to the
performance of the functions of Congress, functions that
do not include treaty-negotiation
||| (Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, G.R. No.
170516, July 16, 2008)
Q: What is question hour?

A: This is upon Congress initiative, in compliance with its
oversight function.
Q:Two modes of question hour.
First, a cabinet member with the consent of the President
may ask that he appear before any of the committees or
any of the houses. Once Congress refuses, he cannot
impose because of the principle of separation of powers.
Second, it may be the House concerned that would
request the appearance of a certain department head, in
compliance with its oversight function.
The oversight function has always been mentioned with
regards to DAP and PDAF as justification.
Q: What is an oversight function?
A: TN, this is a function that embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of
an influence of the legislation it has enacted. This function
is complied with under Section 22, Article 6.
Q: What does oversight encompass?
A: Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
taken by Congress to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program

objectives
determine whether agencies are properly
administered
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty
prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority
assess
executive
conformity
with
the
congressional perception of public interest
Q: When can it be held?

A: Only in executive sessions, with the exclusion of media
when the matter involves national security or if requested
by the President that it should be done in closed doors.
Q: TN, what are the acts done by Congress in the
exercise of its oversight power?
A: Scrutiny, Investigation, Supervision
Q: Who is going to determine whether it is EP or not?

A:SC is the one that defines what may be covered under
EP or not. Now they want that Congress may define by
law what may constitute matters that may not looked into
by Supreme Court or Congress in the exercise of its
legislative inquiry.
b) Bicameral conference committee
c) Limitations on legislative power
TN of the Non-delegation of legislative powers, and the
permissible delegation
Delegation of Power
1. To the People, to a certain extent under RA 6735
(Initiative and Referrendum)
2. To the President, under Secs. 23 and 28 of Article VI
3. To the Administrative bodies
4. LGUs under RA 7160
Q: Can the President exercise legislative power on its
own under Secs. 23 and 28 of Article VI without a valid
delegation?
A: NO. Since, what the Philippines have is a Republican
system which maintains the principle of Separation of
Powers. However, under Martial Law (even if there is a
legislative body like the Interim Batasang Pambansa), or
if the government is revolutionary and there is no
legislative body at the moment, the president may
exercise legislative powers on its own.
Anyway, a good example of contests involving issues
regarding on election whether it was attended with fraud,
vote buying, violence or intimidation in elections, then
accusations like these are within the jurisdiction of the

electoral tribunal ordinarily if the candidate has already
been sworn into office as member of congress. When we
say qualifications, obviously it pertains to whether he has
the qualifications prescribed by the constitution like
whether he is a natural born citizen or even including his
loyalty to the Republic, that is included in the
qualifications.
Q: When you say returns, it has something to do with the
election returns. Have you seen an election return?
A: It is a tabulation of the number of votes obtained in the
election. And then you have the corresponding words and
figures of the votes that you have obtained. That is with
respect to the election returns. Sometimes, pag-ihap nimo
sa kahon, it does not jibe with the figures and the words
as stated in the election returns. Example, sa kahonkahon, it shows therein one million, but when they
counted it again, it was only 500,000. Now in things like
this, you go to the Electoral Tribunal if the member has
already become a member of the house. These are the
controversies involving election contest.
Q: What could be the process?
A: It would be an ordinary election contest or quowarranto. Kung election contest, ordinarily qualification
etc. Kung Quo Warranto, those involves qualifications,
that he is not qualified because he does not have the
qualifications prescribed by the constitution or he has
been convicted of disloyalty to the republic of the
Philippines. Quo warranto na siya ang imong petition.
Either petition the electoral tribunal has jurisdiction.
Q: Going back to what I was asking earlier: When does
the jurisdiction of the Electoral tribunal start?
A: Upon the valid proclamation of the member and he
swears in office as member of congress. COMELEC shall
be ousted from jurisdiction. Thereafter, the electoral
tribunal shall have sole jurisdiction over the election
contest. TN however of the cases of Codilla and the
Limkaichong case.
Codilla vs De Venecia G.R. No. 150605 December 10,
2002
Diba Ormoc man ni siya nga Congressman before Lucy
Torres Gomez. What happened in this case is that he was
disqualified even before the election because he was
engaged in electioneering. He was accused of kana
bitawng you are not supposed to spend public funds
during the election period because you might be using the
funds just to promote your own interest. What happened
was, I think, naappropriate na siguro ang funds for the,
kana bitawng, there are too many libaongs in their place.
Unya, it was during the election period nga gi-pang fill-uppan. He was accused of electioneering and the Comelec
disqualified him. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he
still won the election. But it was disregarded by the
COMELEC because he was already disqualified. Ang
kontra was proclaimed as the duly elected member of
congress. Codilla however was able to seasonably file his
motion for reconsideration with the disqualification.
In other words, even before the election, or even before
the proclamation of Locsin, he already filed the MR. Ang
50
problema lang ka delayed ang pag resolve sa MR. The

MR was not resolved after the election and after the
proclamation of Locsin. It was only resolved finally by the
COMELEC at least two weeks before the next election.
Imagine ka, 2 weeks nalang and the COMELEC said
reversed ang decision! Meaning Codilla was not involved
in electioneering therefore he is qualified. His vote should
be counted and in the counting, he won in the election.
Karon, ni adto siya ni De Venecia. He asked De Venecia
that he be sworn in kay hapit na mo expire ang term. De
Venecia refused. De Venecia said that you file first a
petition for quo warranto to remove Locsin because
Locsin now is a member. The case went all the way to the
SC questioning De Venecia for his refusal to swear him
in. Was De Venecia correct in this case.
SC said De Venecia was incorrect. Why? Because when
the COMELEC made a declaration, that indeed it was
Codilla who won, the Electoral Tribunal.
TN here, the tribunal has no jurisdiction over the case of
Codilla because the COMELEC was not ousted yet of its
jurisdiction over the controversy. This is because Codilla
was able to file his MR seasonably even before the
proclamation of Locsin. Sa ato pa, ang proclamation diay
ni Locsin was premature and therefore invalid. If there is
any question on the qualification, it is the COMELEC. And
the resolution then here of the COMELEC with respect to
Codilla is still valid because the comelec was never yet
ousted of jurisdiction over the controversy.
Limkaichong vs COMELEC G.R. Nos. 178831-32
July 30, 2009
Limkaichong of Negros Oriental ran for member of
Congress from here district. A petition for disqualification
was filed against her. Kay kuno, ang papa ni Limkaichong
was a naturalized Filipino citizen, Chinese man. But they
alleged that ang naturalization kuno sa iyang papa was
invalid. So kung invalid ang naturalization sa iyang papa,
that means that she never acquired the citizenship of the
father as Filipino because in the first place, the
proceedings were invalid. That was pending in the
COMELEC. In the meantime, nag election and
limkaichong won. She was proclaimed notwithstanding
the disqualification case. And she became the member of
congress.
Q: What is the difference between the Codilla case and
her case.
A: There is a lot of difference. In the Limkaichong case,
the COMELEC passed a resolution that even if there is a
pending disqualification case, if you won in the election,
you should be proclaimed because time is of the essence.
That resolution was not issued yet in the case of Codilla.
But in that resolution, it made some reservations that this
is without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings. This time, because that candidate is now a
member, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction. Comelec
has no more jurisdiction upon publicly proclaiming the
candidate as the duly elected member of Congress. That
is what happened to the case of Limkaichong.

Now, because of the proclamation of Limkaichong, she
became a member of congress. The disqualification case
continued at the electoral tribunal.
Q: Does electoral tribunal has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case against Limkaichong? This is on the
citizenship of Limkaichong. Kung ordinaryo ra unta to siya
nga question of citizenship, most definitely, the electoral
tribunal has sole jurisdiction over the qualification of that
member. But TN, what was questioned here is the
naturalization of the father of Limkaichong which the
electoral tribunal has no jurisdiction. Who has jurisdiction
over naturalization?
A: You have a Naturalization Tribunal to revoke the
naturalization of a particular alien who is now a Filipino
citizen by virtue of the alleged naturalization taken as
invalid. In other words, what will the electoral tribunal will
do is that it will refer it to the naturalization tribunal. You
will wait for the result and by then, tapos na. Duha na
siguro ka term ang natapos before a resolution can be
secured from the naturalization tribunal to say WON the
naturalization of the father of Limakaichong is valid or not.
So what happened in the case of Limkaichong, it was
dismissed because the electoral tribunal has no
jurisdiction on the naturalization proceedings. If it was just
a simple question of qualification of Limkaichong,
definitely, Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case.
So as it was declared in the case of Limkaichong vs.
COMELEC, Biraogo vs. Nograles, Paras vs. Nograles
and Brillante vs. COMELEC, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. the proclamation of a winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.
In the case of Villando vs. HRET and Limkaichong, SC
said Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through its representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate
of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. HRET no matter how complete and
exclusive does not carry with it authority to delve into the
legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of
disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would
operate as a collateral attack of the citizenship of the
Father of Limkaichong which is not permissible.
Again I repeat, two modes of Petition may be filed.
A Petition for Electoral Protest or Petition for Quo
Warranto.
You also have those cases like Pimentel vs. Zubiri (SET
Case No. 001-07), where you have to look into the
election returns in Maguindanao. That opening of the
ballot boxes and the election returns is administrative
kuno sa COMELEC and that the COMELEC has the
authority to order the Election supervisor to bring them in
the Comelec for them to see if indeed there are
51
something wrong in the election returns. Pimentel went all

the way to the SC asking the court to compel the
COMELEC to produce the ballots and the election
returns. SC said we dont have jurisdiction. Should you
have such request, and then go to the electoral tribunal
who has jurisdiction because in this case, Zubiri was
already proclaimed as member of the Senate. Should
there be any questions with the election returns, it must
be with the Senate, not any other tribunal either the
comelec or the SC.
Q: What about party-list, who has jurisdiction on the
qualifications of the Nominees? If you are to question the
qualification of the nominee, who has jurisdiction, the
Comelec or the Electoral Tribunal? Two instances that
may happen. There may be a question on the validity of
the nomination of a nominee by a party-list organization.
Who is to resolve the conflict? Is it Comelec or electoral
tribunal. If there is a question on the qualification of the
nominee himself, who has jurisdiction?
Let us have the consolidated cases of Abayon vs. HRET,
Palparan vs. HRET G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010.
SC said party-list nominees are considered as elected
members, therefore, HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. But if it is a question of
leadership of the accredited partylist organization that
based the nomination, TN that in the case of Lokin, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June 26,
2012, Villanueva claimed his own nomination while Perla
the Secretary General also claimed their own nomination.
There was confusion. Who has jurisdiction to resolve the
issue as to who was validly nominated.
A: As this would involve a question of leadership of the
organization, jurisdiction is with the COMELEC. Comelec
must first resolve who is the rightful authority to make the
nomination. So the SC said in this case RA 7941 vested
the comelec with jurisdiction over the nomination of partylist representatives and prescribing qualifications of each
nominee and that no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the Comelecs First Division and Comelec en
banc which had declared President Villanueva as the
proper party to submit CIBACs certificate of nomination
instead of Perla. Again I repeat, if it falls into the validity of
the nomination, ultimately to the leadership of the
organization, COMELEC has jurisdiction. But if it falls into
the qualification of the nominee, HRET has jurisdiction.
Q: Can you represent the partylist in the HRET?
A: YES, if they comply with the requirement of
proportionate representation of the political party as
member of congress. If they can, then definitely, they may
have seat in the HRET
Q: What forum has jurisdiction over party-list
representatives?
A: In terms of qualifications, they shall be considered as
elected and therefore jurisdiction is still with the Electoral
Tribunal but if it relates to leadership of the organization
that the nomination of such leader is being questioned
then it would not be with the Electoral Tribunal rather it
will be with the COMELEC. (TN)

Q: What forum has jurisdiction over party-list
representatives?
A: In terms of qualifications, they shall be considered as
elected and therefore jurisdiction is still with the Electoral
Tribunal but if it relates to leadership of the organization
that the nomination of such leader is being questioned
then it would not be with the Electoral Tribunal rather it
will be with the COMELEC. (TN)
(i) Limitations on revenue, appropriations and tariff measures
Power of the Purse
Though both houses can make bills, theyre equal, but
this is with respect to some of the bills that must originate
from the HR before Senate can act on them.
Q: What are these bills?
A: Memorize them. *****
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Appropriation bills
Revenue or Tariff Bills
Bills Increasing Public Debts
Bills of Local Application
Private Bills
Q: What does it mean that it should be HR that should

initiate these kinds of bills?
A: The senate may prepare its version, but they cannot
act on their version before they receive a copy of the bill
coming from the HR.
52
Q: That budget of the President, can it be increased by

Congress?
A: No, but it may be decreased. Remember.
Q: Effectivity?
A: 1 fiscal year
Q: What if no appropriation law was passed, like what if
they cant find funds? What is the effect?
A: Automatically, the budget of the previous fiscal year is
carried out for the meantime during that year where there
is no approval yet of a general appropriation law.
TN with regards to the general appropriation that there
should be no riders, no insertions. GA bills are approved
easily, generally, because without authority to disburse,
the government will be paralyzed in their rendering of
services.
Q: What are riders or insertions?
The insertions of some subject matters in the
appropriations bill that is not related to it, like the creation
of offices for example. Or maybe a particular substantive
law that may relate to the appropriation of funds for the
implementation of that substantive law. These are riders
that cannot be allowed.
TN of procedure in approving appropriation in Congress
(will be discussed more as we go along)
Q: Can Senate amend the bill that originated from the HR

entirely by substituting it with their own version of the bill?
Specifically state the amount, for example. Or if amount is

not specified, it must be determinable.
A: Yes, that is called amendment by substitution. This is

allowed, for as long as it has been initiated by HR.
Ex. If there is utang in the IMF, and it has to be paid next

year, then that appropriation bill will be approved because
the amount is already determinable. You dont have to
include that in the next budget, because it is understood
to be automatically included because you have to pay
your utang, as thats your obligation.
Section 25 Pay particular attention to this because of

PDAF, DAP, etc. This is with respect to appropriations in
general.
Q: Who prepares the budget?
A: President
Q: What is a budget?
A: List of expenses of the government by different
agencies, with the corresponding amounts.
Q: Special Appropriation vs. General Appropriation

A: General Appropriation - you may not specifically state
there the project
Special Appropriation you have to specify the project, its
purpose, and the availability of funds. Needs a
certification from the National Treasury that there are
funds allocated specifically for this purpose.
Q:When is it submitted by the President?
This section is Important. The bone of contention of

asking the DAP to be declared unconstitutional.
A: Within 30 days from the opening of the regular session

of Congress.
Q:What happened in this DAP?
Q: To whom is it submitted?
A: Congress
Q: What is an appropriation?
A: An authority or law that authorizes the disbursement of
public funds for a public purpose or for a specific public
purpose.
A: The President supposedly took some savings from the

other departments of the executive branch and augment
the allocations of the Congressmen, for projects that they
can identify.
Q: What is the general rule in appropriation?
A: The general rule is it cannot be transferred, it is already
appropriated. And therefore cannot be transferred for one

department to another. Or within the same department. Or
for one item to another item.
Q: Who are the persons allowed by law to transfer
appropriations?
A: Executive Branch The President
The President of the Senate with respect to the House of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives
with respect to the budget of the House of
Representatives, you have the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court with respect to appropriations of the
Supreme Court and the Heads of the Constitutional
Bodies with respect to their budget. Again, I repeat, there
has to be a law, because this is an exception. There has
to be a statute, it is Congress that authorized; these
officers that I have enumerated to transfer their savings
from one department to another or from one item to
another.
The word is savings that must be transferred to augment
the appropriation of an item in their department that is
lacking or insufficient.
Q: Would you consider savings of a department of which
the President deliberately impound the disbursement or
budget? What do you mean by impoundment? Where the
President refused to disburse the amounts appropriated
for that particular project in his department.
A: Because, at the end, I supposed, that was June, at the
middle of the year; because the appropriations were not
expended, they were impounded by the President, the
money was still there. Instead he had that money
transferred for the expenditures for acceleration programs
to be identified by Members of Congress.
Q: That is why they are saying, how can they be savings?
A: Savings are only accounted for after spending it and
then there is excess of the spending for that
appropriation. In this case, there was no expenditure for
the purpose it was appropriated. It was impounded, and
they were considered as savings and thereafter
transferred, thats the question; because when we speak
of savings, it must have been expended and the excess
of the expenditure are now considered as savings. You
would only know that at the end of the fiscal year, not at
the middle of the fiscal year.
So then, they are expecting that it might be declared
unconstitutional, aside from the fact that there was no law
authorizing the President to transfer, and it should be from
one department to another department under the same
branch, or from one item to another item within the same
department. Here, from the President to Congress.
The money that was given to Congress, in relation to the
impeachment of Corona were taken from DAP. There
were proves that the DBM Secretary wrote letters to the
Congressmen asking them, what project do they want for
their money that was earmarked for them from the DAP to
spend for. Thus, violating not only par. 5 of section 25, but
as well as the separation of powers.
53
Q (student): Is DAP a law?

A: It is not a statute, that was the term they described the
expenditure of the money. It is still questionable because
it should be within the department, and the money should
be savings. How could there be savings when they were
never spended, because the President impounded the
funds. Although the President has that discretion to
impound; this one happened before during the time of
Cory Aquino. She did not like the CAFGU. The money
appropriated for the CAFGU was not appropriated by her.
Since there was no money coming from the government
to support CAFGU, CAFGU died in its natural death. [In
the case of Araullo vs Aquino, it happened to be provided
in a Budget Circular issued by Sec. Abad]
Q: Can she be compelled to spend the money?
A: No, because under the principle of separation of
powers it is for Congress to appropriate, it is for the
President to spend. If the President does not spend, he
cannot be compelled by Congress or by the Supreme
Court. Congress is to appropriate or authorize the
disbursement. In this case, the President was authorizing
himself through an Executive Order, and they are asking
where the Executive Order is? They cannot produce it.
Because according to them, he (President) is authorized
under Article VI Sec. 25 par 5. But you have to define
your terms, because the law is very clear that there
cannot be any transfer of appropriation; this is to prevent
juggling of funds.
Q: What was the question on, that may have been
violated here, on the separation of powers?
A: Because in effect, it was the President who determines
for what the project the money will be spent for, when it
should have been Congress having the power to
appropriate funds. TN (DAP issue)
Q: who has the authority, if authorized by law, to transfer
funds?
At one time, it was the Chief of the AFP that transfer the
funds from the savings of AFP for a particular item to
another item. (BAR)
Q: Does the Chief of Staff have that power?
A: No, he doesnt have that power. If at all, the power is
given to the President being the commander-in-chief of
the AFP but is limited only to the executive branch. If AFP
is under the executive branch then probably, the
President has the power if authorized by law.
Paragraph 6 Section 25 of Article VI, on discretionary
funds, most of the funds that are discretionary, they need
not liquidate them. You just state there that it was spent
for a public purpose. so I doubt there are appropriate
vouchers; most of the intelligence funds are discretionary
funds, there are no receipts attached supporting the
disbursement for as long as you have the certification to
the effect that it was spent for a public purpose.

Suplico, et al. vs Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830,
July 14, 2008 (TN) if you can recall the ZTE; in order for
us to implement the project we need money. So we
borrowed money from China also.
54
Thus, the Executive branch cannot spend a single

centavo of government receipts, whether from taxes,
sales, donations, dividends, profits, loans, or from any
other source, unless there is an appropriation law
authorizing the expenditure.
Q: What did the government do on this?

A: We contracted a loan. Instead of remitting the
proceeds of the loan to the national treasury, they applied
the proceeds directly to the project. In effect, there was no
appropriation law authorizing the disbursement of those
proceeds.
Gi automatic nila, pareho ba og mangutang ka nga dili na
kinahanglan og appropriation law kung monthly na nimo
or annual amortization because the amount is already
determined. In the next budget, you dont even have to
include that, it is understood that it is included in the
budget of that department nga naka-utang, and
automatically the money is disbursed and is with
authority. It is what exactly they did, shortcut, they
borrowed the money for a specific purpose of government
and then it was approved, they got the money and
supposedly applied it directly for the project.
Q: Is that allowed:
A: Supreme Court said, Any government expenditure
without the corresponding appropriation from Congress is
unconstitutional. There can be no dispute that the
proceeds of foreign loan, whether concluded or not,
cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without
prior appropriation from Congress. When the executive
branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods or
services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury
as part of the general funds of the government. Congress
must appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the
procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan
proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch.When
the loan falls due, Congress must make another
appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the loan
out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This
appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is
covered by the automatic appropriation.
The Constitution requires an appropriation law before
public funds are spent for any purpose. Section 29 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution provides:
No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
The power of the purse or the power of Congress
to authorize payment from funds in the National
Treasury is lodged exclusively in Congress. One
of the fundamental checks and balances finely
crafted in the Constitution is that Congress
authorizes the amount to be spent, while the
Executive spends the amount so authorized. The
Executive cannot authorize its own spending, and
neither can Congress spend what it has authorized.
The rationale of this basic check and balance is to
prevent abuse of discretion in the expenditure of
public funds.
Any government expenditure without the corresponding a

ppropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There is
no exception to this constitutional prohibition that "no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." This
constitutional prohibition is self-executory.
To further insure compliance with Section 29 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, the Administrative Code of
1987 expressly
prohibits
the
entering
into
contractsinvolving the expenditure of public funds unless
two prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must be
an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure
required in the contract. Second, there must be
attached to the contract a certification by the proper
accounting official and auditor that funds have been
appropriated by law and such funds are available.
Failure to comply with any of these two requirements
renders the contract void.
||| (Sulpico v. NEDA, G.R. No. 178830, 179317, 179613,
July 14, 2008)
So in this case, nang loan ka e-remit nimo, to get the
money back, in order to apply it to the project you
appropriate the funds. Pagkatapos bayaran nimo ang
utang, then there has to be also appropriation law
authorizing payment. Pero ang iyang repayment na,
subsequent payment it will now be covered by automatic
appropriation.
There was a case involving the COMELEC. There was
appropriation of funds for the procurement of election
paraphernalia, but what happened here, nagbidding, ang
nakada-ug ang highest bidder, beyond the appropriated
amount. (BAR)
Q: What happened?
A: it was nullified by the Supreme Court saying that it was
not authorized by an appropriation law.
(ii) Presidential veto and Congressional override
2. Non-legislative
a) Informing function
b) Power of impeachment
c) Other non-legislative powers
Confirmation of Appointments
Q: What is the Commission on Appointments? (TN)
A: This is another extension of Congress where members
all come from Congress. 12 Senators and 12 members
coming from the HR to be headed by the President of the
Senate who can only vote if there is a tie.
Q: When can they hold session? (TN)
A: Only when Congress is in session.

Q: Does the composition need to be fully or completely
filled up? (TN)
A: No. For as long as they will constitute a forum, that is
alright.
Q: What are its functions? (TN)
A: Basically, just to confirm and affirm nominations made
by the President while Congress is in session. These are
what we call Regular Appointments.
Q: What is the Commission on Appointments? (TN)
A: This is another extension of Congress where members
all come from Congress. 12 Senators and 12 members
coming from the HR to be headed by the President of the
Senate who can only vote if there is a tie.
Council
Heads of Executive Departments (Cabinet and

Cabinet-rank officials)
Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and

Consuls (under the 1987 Constitution and the
Foreign Service Act)
Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of

Colonel or Naval Captain
Chairman and Commissioners of the

Commission on Elections
Chairman and Commissioners of the

Commission on Audit
Members of the Regional and Consultative

Commissions
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Q: What are its functions? (TN)

A: Basically, just to confirm and affirm nominations made
by the President while Congress is in session. These are
what we call Regular Appointments.
Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil

Service Commission
Q: Does the composition need to be fully or completely

filled up? (TN)
A: No. For as long as they will constitute a forum, that is
alright.
TN: With regards to the enumeration, that cant be

increased or reduced by ordinary legislation, should you
increase the number of government official requiring
confirmation by the CA, you need an amendment to the
Constitution. Similarly, if you are going to reduce those
appointments that would require confirmation, it has to be
an amendment to the Constitution.
Additionally, heres the list in the Commission on
Appointments Primer
Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar
Q: When can they hold session? (TN)

A: Only when Congress is in session.
Q: What are these appointments that require confirmation

by the CA? ***
A:
1. Heads of the different departments of the
Executive Branch except for the VP who may be
appointed to a Cabinet position; that does not
require confirmation of the CA.
2. Officers of the AFP whose rank ranges from
Colonel to General in the army. In the navy,
Captain to Admiral.
3. Ambassadors and other public officers including
the consuls.
4. Appointment vested in the President by the
Constitution (i.e. appointment of Constitutional
Commissioners and Regular members of JBC)
55
7.
Chairman of the Commission on Higher

Education
Chairman of the Commission on Information
and Communications Technology
Chairman of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council
Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority
National Security Adviser
Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority Presidential Adviser on
Peace Process
Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty
Commission Punong Chairman of the
Commission on Filipinos Overseas
Chief of Philippine National Police
However, it must be noted that the appointments

of all judges and the Ombudsman shall not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Instead, they are recommended by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and the President shall select from the
recommendations.
Q: 2 kinds of Presidential Appointments?
1. Regular Appointments - President
makes a nomination while Congress is
in session
2. Recess / Ad Interim Appointments
Nominations made while the Congress
was not in session. Such does not
confirmation by the CA.
Q: How about if the appointment is only temporary or in
acting capacity? (TN)
A: That would not need any confirmation by the CA.
[Temporary appointments are provided in Admin Code]
Case in point: Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005
SC sustained the President Arroyo in this case. If only a
temporary capacity to fill in the gap while the President
is still meditating on who to appoint (regular appointment)
as Secretary of a particular department or Cabinet
member, that would not require a confirmation by the CA.
As regards Ad interim appointment however, it
becomes effective upon qualification of the nominee.

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III
of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
In distinguishing ad interim appointments from
appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook
writer on constitutional law has observed:
Ad-interim appointments must be
distinguished from appointments in an
acting capacity. Both of them are effective
upon
acceptance.
But
ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting
appointments may be extended any time
there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim
appointments are submitted to the
Commission
on
Appointments
for
confirmation
or
rejection;
acting
appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily
filling important offices but, if abused,
they can also be a way of circumventing
the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case.
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from
President Arroyo's issuance of ad interim appointments
to respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
|||
Q: What is the process in regular appointments? (Primer
of the Commission on Appointments)
A: The regular appointments which are contemplated
under the first paragraph of Article VII, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution go through the following stages:
1.
nomination
2.
consent
3.
appointment
4.
acceptance by the nominee
What the President sends to the Commission is just a
nomination. After the Commission has given its consent,
the President issues the appointment. It is only when the
last stage has been completed may the officer concerned
take his oath of office.
Q: What is the process in ad interim appointments?
(Primer of the Commission on Appointments)
The second paragraph of Article VII, Sec. 16, of the 1987
Constitution also empowers the President to issue
appointments while Congress is not in session. Such
appointments are called ad interim appointments, and it
goes through the following stages:
1.
appointment
2.
confirmation
An ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and
takes effect immediately. Thus, one who was issued an
ad interim appointment may immediately enter upon the
discharge of his functions.
56
An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid upon

disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or, if not
confirmed, until the next adjournment of Congress.
Judge: Unlike temporary appointment, this is
PERMANENT. This is issued by the President when
Congress is not in session and therefore CA is not in
session. It is effective upon qualification of the nominee.
However, if its not confirmed, it will last only until the next
adjournment of Congress. Such nominee can be
renominated.
Q: If disapproved, can the President re-nominate the
same candidate?
A: NO.
Q: If approved, what will happen next?
A: The President would issue a Commission. Thereafter,
that officer is going to take his oath of office.
Q: If not acted upon, what would be the
effect/consequence?
A: It is understood that the appointment shall last only
until the next adjournment of session of Congress.
Q: Can such appointee be re-nominated?
A: Yes. That happened to De Lima, Dinky Soliman. For 4
years, they have not been confirmed, until finally, just
recently, their nominations were confirmed by the CA.
Q: Is there a limit on the number of re-nomination?
A: No. That is the prerogative of the President. To limit
that would be a violation of the separation of powers.
What they must do is DISAPPROVE so that, that
candidate will not be re-nominated.
TN: CA promulgates its own rules and regulations,
independent of the rules and regulations of the Congress.
Congress cannot interfere in the promulgation of such
rules. In that sense, CA is independent. Although highly
partisan because if you are no longer a member of the
political party that nominated you as a member of the CA,
automatically you cease to be a member of the CA.
(Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13,
2005)
Case in point: | Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036,
April 02, 2002
20.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISAPPROVED
CANNOT
BE
REVIVED
BY
ANOTHER AD
INTERIM APPOINTMENT. The prohibition on
reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor bypassed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad
interim appointment because the disapproval is final
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not
because a reappointment is prohibited under Section
1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad
interim appointment because there is no final disapproval
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such

new appointment will not result in the appointee serving
beyond the fixed term of seven years
presidential immunity always remember this guys if the

president is immune from suit
Q: Would that constitute a violation against prohibition on

re-appointment if the same person is re-nominated by the
President?
A: No violation because that statement in the provision of
the Constitution stating that it is without re-appointment is
applicable only to REGULAR APPOINTMENTS. An ad
interim/recess appointment is not the kind of appointment
contemplated by law that prohibits re-appointment. (TN)
Q: up to what extent?
Q: Any chance of a party-list representative being

represented in the electoral tribunal or in the commission
on appointments?
A: Yes. For as long as the representative complies with
the requirements under the Constitution for appointment
as member of the said bodies such as proportional
representation from the political parties. Its up for these
bodies to promulgate the rules and regulations that may
allow the members coming from the party-list to represent
in the electoral tribunal and/or in the commission on
appointments.
Congressional Records and Books
The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall
be preserved and be open to the public in accordance
with law, and such books shall be audited by the
Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an
itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each
Member.
IV. Executive Department
What you must TN on article VII guys that is EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, you have to know what is Executive Power,
Q: if executive power is vested in the president, what
would be the consequence?
A: He is the chief executive and the administrator of the
laws of the land, you know already if he is the chief
executive, he controls the executive branch and all offices
belonging to the executive branch, as the administrator of
the laws of the land he make sure that laws are faithfully
executed.
There are powers however, that are not expressly
provided in the constitution being given either to the
legislative or judiciary branch it is understood that this
power should be exercise by the president, this is what
we call RESIDUAL POWER of the president, being the
chief executive. One of these powers is the power to
deport undesirable aliens; the power on who is to enter
into the country is also a residual power TN of the case of
Marcos vs Manglapus.
Another power of the president which is not provided in
the constitution that is understood that this power should
be exercise by him, this what we call the IMMUNITY OF
THE PRESIDENT FROM SUIT, the source of immunity is
not by express provision of the constitution rather it is
more of jurisprudential source rather than provided by the
constitution TN of the extent of the enjoyment of the
57
A: only for acts he committed in the performance of his

official function as president during his incumbency,
actual tenure NOT TERM, so even if he has still five
years, however, is no longer the president of the republic
he can no longer enjoy the immunity from suit, TN of the
case of Estrada vs Desierto, and the case of Romualdez
vs Sandiganbayan so you notice in all cases although the
target is the president, he is never impleaded as the
defendant rather it is always the executive secretary
thats the case of David et al vs Ermita, SC said it is not
proper to implead the president as respondent settled is
the doctrine that the president during his tenure of office
or actual incumbency may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case and there is no need provide for it in the
constitution. CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ha sa ato pa.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be
claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of
a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision
of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not
acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
other trespasser.||| (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos.
146710-15, 146738, March 02, 2001)
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo
as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not
be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.||| (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
171396, May 03, 2006)

Q: if a case is filed against the president for collection of
sum of money during his incumbency, will the action
prosper?
58
Q: case for murder? Will the action prosper?
plunder his right to run from public office likewise is

removed from him by perpetual disqualification. What is
the defense of Estrada was that he was granted with
absolute pardon. If absolute pardon was granted to him
then he will be restored to his political and civil rights. And
that is discretionary also to the president as one of his
powers not subject to review even by the Supreme Court.
A: no, you wait until he finishes his tenure
Term of Office
A: no
Another point you should TN also on immunity from suit it

is special to the president therefore, only the president
can invoke the immunity not his cabinet members even if
they are consider as there alter ego, so you remember
also that case of Soliven vs Makasiar, where Soliven ask
for the dismissal of the complaint filed by president
Aquino against the star(not sure) and the publisher on the
ground is immune from suit, they are saying that wla tay
dag anan ani we cannot file a counter suit because he is
immune from suit, SC said the privilege pertains to the
president by virtue of his office, there is nothing in our
laws that would prevent the president from waiving the
privilege, the choice whether to exercise the privilege or
to waive it is solely belongs to the president you cannot
use that as a defense against the president
REMEDIAL
LAW;
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE;
PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; LIBEL; RULES
THEREON SHOULD BE EXAMINED FROM VARIOUS
PERSPECTIVES
IF
DIRECTED
AT A HIGH
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL; THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD DRAW A FINE LINE INSTEAD OF LEAVING IT
TO A LOWER TRIBUNAL. In fact, the Court observed
that high official position, instead of affording immunity
from slanderous and libelous charges would actually
invite attacks by those who desire to create sensation. It
would seem that what would ordinarily be slander if
directed at the typical person should be examined from
various perspectives if directed at a high government
official. Again, the Supreme Court should draw this fine
line instead of leaving it to lower tribunals.||| (Soliven v.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 82827, 83979, November 14,
1988)
Now on the qualifications of the president the most
important part on the qualification on citizenship he must
be natural born, registered voter, able to read and write,
40 yrs of age on the day of election and resident of the
Philippines for 10 yrs, just over with that guys, the VP
shall have the same qualification, although he may be
nominated as a cabinet secretary without need of
confirmation by the CA.
Q: Section 4, what is the controversy relating to this?
Formento vs. Estrada (id). What is the term of office of the
President?
A: This would now be an issue aside from the fact that
there was a question as to the qualification of Estrada due
to his conviction for plunder. They are asking for the
disqualification of Estrada as mayor because according to
the complainant in as much as he was convicted for
TN as to the term of office. The president and the vice

president are directly elected by the people for a definite
term of 6 years. As to re-election; the president shall not
be eligible for any re-election. The vice president has 1
re-election.
Q: Any possibility of the president serving more than 6
years?
A: Yes, provided that he has not served for more than 4
years as acting president rather as presidents successor.
Meaning, he was a vice president and he succeeds to the
presidency, provided he has not served for more than 4
years he can run for election as president in the next
election then definitely if he has fully served the 6 years
term as president in the election after that election, then
he would like have 10 years. Now, is this disqualification
perpetual regardless he did not finished his term. Like
Estrada, he served only for like 3 years. He did not finish
his 6 years. That is why he ran for president.
Q: What was the theory here?
A: Because he has not finished his term and therefore the
disqualification against re-election will not apply. But it has
never been resolved by the Supreme Court. TN
TN: as regards to Vice president, 2 terms and the 2nd
paragraph is clear that no voluntary renunciation in the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term
for which he was elected. That only applies to the VP not
to the President. That if he resigns before the term
expires it didnt say that it will be an interruption in the
continuity of his term. What is mentioned is that it is not
an interruption it is only with the respect of the term of
office of the vice president because apparently he has 2
terms to compute the consecutiveness of the term they
have to say that. Since there is no mention about
interruption on the continuity of his term should he not
finish his term then he is still eligible for election as
president. There can hardly be called as re-election I
suppose as far as he understands the law.
Q: On the canvassing of the election returns. Who does
that?
A: It is not the COMELEC neither the SC but the
members of the congress as the canvassers of the
election returns of the president and the vice president.
Whoever garners the highest number of votes shall be
declared as the winner. In case of a tie, it shall be broken
by majority votes of the members of the congress voting
in a joint session voting separately.

Presidential Electoral Tribunal
Electoral tribunal for vice president and president is the
PET. Macalintal questioned the constitutionality of the
creation of PET consisting of the justices of the SC
because under the Constitution it says that theyre not
supposed to do non-judicial function as it will violate the
separation of powers. This is an election function
(electoral tribunal). It was then asked by Macalintal
whether or not it is constitutional. SC said that a plain
reading of article 7 par.7 sec.4 readily reveals a grant of
authority to the SC sitting en banc in the same vein
although the method by which the SC exercise this
authority is not specified in the provisions the grant of
power does not contain any limitation on the SCs
exercise thereof. The SC method of deciding presidential
and vice presidential election contest through the PET is
actually a derivative of the exercise of prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision thus
the subsequent directive in the provision for the SC to
promulgate its own rules for the purpose. It is beyond
cavil that when the SC, as PET, resolves Presidential or
Vice Presidential Contest it performs what is essentially a
judicial power.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme
Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government
along
constitutional
channels."
In
fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a
definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that
time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present
Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and
vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in
the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts
of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the
whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless,
distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all
Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional
proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the
petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this
is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI,
explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices
shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals,
respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In
the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4,
Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court,
constituting the PET, from the same prohibition.
59
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply

an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the
framers
of
the
Constitution,
is
to
be
an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
||| (Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
191618, November 23, 2010)
In the landmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
JP Laurel inoculated that it would inconceivable if the
constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which
to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels. In fact Angara pointed out that the constitution
is a definition of the powers of the government and yet at
that time the 1935 constitution did not contain the
expanded definition of judicial power. So, this is not an
electoral function but rather, it was emphasized in this
case that this is a judicial power and therefore does not
violate article 7 section 4 par. 7 thereof. TN of that.
Q: Also, in relation to the filing of the election protest in
the presidential electoral tribunal, what will happen if the
protestant will resume the function of whatever position
that he left before he ran as president? Like, Santiago she
went back as member of the senate because she cant
wait for the result of the election. What was the effect of
her returning to the senate while there was still the
pending election protest that he filed against Ramos?
A: She is then considered to have withdrawn or abandon
her election protest against ramos. In the case of legarda,
legarda filed an election protest against de castro. While
waiting for the outcome of the election protest she ran as
senator.
Q: What was the effect?
A: Like in the case of Santiago she was considered to
have effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest
when she ran in the senate which term coincides with the
term of the Vice Presidency.
Q: On the Salaries of President and Vice President, it
shall be determined by law. Can it be decreased during
his tenure?
A: No, it cannot be decreased. But it can be increased.
However, it will only take effect after the expiration of the
term of office.
Filling up of vacancy
Q: 2 ways by which vacancy may occur:
(1) at the beginning of the term or
(2) during the incumbency of the president.
At the beginning of the term it could be temporary or
permanent.
Temporary Vacancy, when the president does not qualify
in the meantime because there are still controversies as
to his qualification, no president was chosen

Q: Who will succeed?
A: The VP shall only act as the president.
Q: What if there is no Vice President?
A: It will be the President of the Senate that will act as
President.
Q: In the absence of the President of the Senate?
A: It will be the Speaker of the House of Representative.
Q: In Permanent Vacancy, What if at the beginning of the
term the president dies, resigns, permanently unable to
perform his duties? What will happen?
A: The VP will not just be acting but becomes the new
president. There will be a vacancy in the office of the VP.
Q: How will it be filled up?
A: There will be a nomination of the President coming
from congress who will be chosen by majority votes of the
members of the congress.
During incumbency:
Q: Permanent vacancies: 4 ways to have a permanent
vacancy.
A:
1) he dies
2) he resigns (TN of the definition of resignation in the
case of Estrada vs. desierto. What was emphasized is
that there is no form of resignation. It may not be formal,
need not be in writing. For as long as there is the intention
to relinquish the powers of the office and his acts
corresponds to the renunciation or to the giving up of the
powers then one is considered to have resigned. Vice
president will be now the President.)
3) removed through impeachment
4) one who is permanently incapacitated to perform his
duties.
Q: Temporary Vacancies: (TN)
A:
1) When the president is under temporary disability (TN of
the circumstances)
a) president himself declares that he cannot
performs his duties. Automatically the VP will act as the
president.
b) by the declaration of the majority of the
members of the cabinet to the congress that the president
is unable to perform his duties. Automatically the VP shall
act as a president but of course that can be disputed by
the president if he does not agree and can simply tell the
congress that his cabinet is lying.
c) if this majority of the cabinet would inist the 2
second time that indeed the president is unable, then the
congress will now have to decide to declare the president
under temporary disability.
Q: How many votes of the congress is needed?
A: 2/3 of the members voting separately.) TN of the case
of Estrada vs Desierto on temporary disability.
Petitioner now appears to fault Congress
for its various acts expressed thru resolutions which
brushed off his temporary inability to govern and
President-on-leave argument. He asserts that these
acts of Congress should not be accorded any legal
60
significance because: (1) they are post facto and (2)

a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be
implied.
We disagree. There is nothing in section 11
of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the
declaration by Congress of the President's
inability must always be a priori or before the VicePresident assumes the presidency. In the cases at
bar, special consideration should be given to the fact
that the events which led to the resignation of the
petitioner happened at express speed and
culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in
session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a
priori on petitioner's letter claiming inability to
govern.
||| (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738,
April 03, 2001)
Q: Going back to permanent vacancy, who will succeed?
A: It will be for the VP.
In the absence of VP, it will be the President of the
Senate.
In the absence of the President of the Senate, it will be
the Speaker of the House of Representative.
Q: Now then, in the absence of those mentioned above?
A: They will convene and pass a law providing for the
manner of succession.
Q: Can they call for a special election?
A: You remember if the vacancy occurs within 18 months
before the next regular election, no more special election.
You have to wait until a regular election will be called
which is every 2nd Monday of May.
TN: the calling of special election does not need the
signature of the acting president.
TN: Printing of the bill before it is voted upon is
dispensable if there is a certification that the bill is urgent.
Q: When there is vacancy in both offices (president and
VP)?
A: There will be a special election. [Art. 7 Sec. 10 of 1987
Consti]
Section 13 HOLDING OTHER OFFICES/ CONFLICT OF
INTERESTS
He cannot appoint any of his relatives either by
consanguinity or affinity in the fourth civil degree.
BAR Q: To what positions in the government during his
tenure?
A:
1. As
members
of
the
constitutional
commission
2. Office of the ombudsman
3. Secretaries under secretaries
4. Chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices
including GOCCs and their subsidiaries.
Section 14 APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN
ACTING PRESIDENT

It will only be effective until it is not revoked within 90
days. From the assumption of office by the president
regular, it becomes permanent. If there is any revocation
of the appointments of the acting president , it should be
done within 90 days from the assumption and reassumption of office.
Section 15 MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS
The President should not make any appointments. TN:
Within 60 days or 2 months before the regular
Presidential election. This does not apply to local chief
executives. It only applies to the President.
Q: What is the extent?
A: Practically, all government positions including the
judiciary, except justices of the Supreme Court.
CASES: de Castro vs. JBC; Soriano vs. JBC.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments
in the
Judiciary, because
their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the
nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of
the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in
the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with
irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in
the last days of his administration out of a desire to
subvert the policies of the incoming President or for
partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made
after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering
from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing
of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory
construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the
enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the
intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason
for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable
light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the
enactment should be construed with reference to its
intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek
to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it. ||| (De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002,
March 17, 2010)
The gist of the Supreme Court regarding the midnight
appointments even applied to appointments of the
judiciary except for the Supreme Court because of that
provision of the constitution that the President must make
an appointment within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy. He has to fill that up. It is mandatory. The same
goes with the Sandiganbayan. Controversy: Relating to
the return of the JBC list for appointment to the
Sandiganbayan, which the JBC also returned to the
President because they are not going to change the list
and so the President was compelled to make the
appointment because the period within which to make the
appointment which is 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy had already lapsed. Because of that
61
requirement, under the Constitution, that the appointment

of the justices of the Supreme Court, according to the
Supreme court, the matter of midnight appointment does
not apply to the SC justices.
CASE: Pimentel vs. Ermita regarding on the acting
appointments not requiring any confirmation from the CA
because that is a discretionary power of the President
that cannot be included into by the CA or the Commission
on Appointments.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of
prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may
become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the
acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President's confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President
mustappoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice
even while Congress is in session. That person may or
may not be the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee
will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make
such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that "[t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch." Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
||| (Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978,
October 13, 2005)
Section 16 APPOINTMENTS REQUIRING THE
CONFIRMATION
OF
THE
COMMISSION
ON
APPOINTMENTS
To emphasize, on the appointments of the President
during recess, it is permanent. Immediately effective upon
qualification of the nominee, however, the term is limited if
not confirmed. It shall last only until the next adjournment
of the Congress.
Section 17 CONTROL OF THE PRESIDENT OVER THE
EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENTS,
BUREAUS
AND
OFFICES
To ensure that laws are faithfully executed, TN: As part of
the control, the President has the power to reorganize the
office.
Q: As part of the reorganization of the executive branch,
what is included?
A: He can create offices without violating the separation
of powers or even abolish the office.
The creation of the Truth Commission that was sustained
by the Supreme Court as constitutional after all that is
62
part of his executive power as regards to make sure that

laws are faithfully executed. According to the Supreme
Court in those cases where the President makes an office
under the executive branch, it is not usurpation of
legislative function because it does not entail another
appropriation of funds for the operation of the office
because the funds will be taken from the appropriated
amount for the executive branch.
the act of the President, unless it is reprobated, repealed

or disapproved by the President.
With regards to the abolition, inasmuch as the office is

created by law, it is understood that if there is any
abolition of that office, that is within the prerogative of the
Congress.
Even if it is delegated by the President, or even if ratified

by him, the same act of the alter-ego is ineffective and
does not bind because such functions can only be acted
upon by the President, that cannot be delegated.
1) Immunity from Suit -can only be
enjoyed by the President
2) Power to declare Martial Law
This cannot be delegated to any
secretary of the President. Even if the
President declares it or ratifies it
through the Executive Secretary or
Justice Secretary, such is invalid.
3) Power to suspend of the privilege
of the writ of Habeas Corpus
4) The power to enter into treatiesexclusive to the President and
cannot be delegated
5) The power to grant pardon
TN: CASE: Buklod ng Kawaning EIIP vs. Zamora

where the Supreme Court said,
GR: The power to abolish a public office is lodged with
the legislature.
EXC: However, is that as far as bureaus, agencies (TN:
this may also be asked in administrative law), or offices in
the executive department, Executive Department are
concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify
him to inactivate the function of a particular office or
certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry out
the organization measures for simplicity, transparency
and expigiency in the government service. The Chief
Executive under our laws has the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the office of the
President.
CASE: Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission,
Supreme Court said suffice to say there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocation of
existing funds already appropriated accordingly there is
no usurpation on the power of the Congress to
appropriate funds for the establishment of the Truth
Commission therefore there cannot be a violation of the
separation of powers.
Difference between control and supervision:
In control, the President can change the decision of the
subordinate. In the matter of supervision, the President
only oversees to make sure that the government official
performs his functions in accordance with law. He cannot
change the decision of the subordinate. That is the
difference, the President who is only supervision over
local governments.
Q: Who has control over local governments?
A: It is the congress through the Local Government
Code.
But the President has only supervision over the local
government units therefore the President cannot change
the decisions of local governments.
ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE
TN: With respect to the secretaries or heads of the
executive branches of government, they are considered
as extensions of the office of the President. In other
words, the secretaries are considered as the alter-egos of
the President. The act of a Secretary is considered to be
TN: There are certain functions of the President that

cannot be delegated to an alter ego
BAR: Limitations on the Delegation Power of the
President
Case:
With constitutional parameters already established, we
may also note, as a source of suppletory guidance, the
provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1
thereof empowers the Secretary of Finance with the
approval of the President and after consultation of the
Monetary Board, "to borrow from time to time on the
credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or
sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue
therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine
Government." Ineluctably then, while the President wields
the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who
normally carries out its thrusts.|||(Spouses Constantino v.
Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005)
Section 18 POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AS THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AFP
Q: What are the calling-out powers of the President?
A: These are:
1. Declaration of Martial Law
2. Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
3. Review decisions of Court Marshalls
DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW
Q: When can the President call out the AFP to assist him
in the discharge of his functions?
A: Whenever it becomes necessary in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
Q: Is it subject to judicial review?
A: NO.
Q: Is it subject to revocation by Congress?
A: NO. In fact, it is the most potent power that the
President may exercise as the Commander In Chief of the
AFP.

SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Q: When?
A: When there is actual rebellion or invasion, when
public safety requires it. It is only effective for 60 days if
not extended or revoked by Congress, automatically, it
shall be lifted by operation of law after expiration of the
60-day period, reviewable by the SC under its exercise of
judicial review.
Q: Is this Remedy of revocation of judicial review
simultaneous or the choice of a person who may question
the factual basis of the declaration of ML or the
suspension of privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
Would you go directly to the SC or should you wait until
after the Congress shall have decided whether to revoke
the declaration of Martial Law?
A: This is successive, not simultaneous. Precisely the
requirement of the President from the declaration of ML or
the suspension of the privilege of he writ of habeas
corpus to do a report within 48 hours. Immediately then,
the Congress will convene and will decide whether to
revoke it or not.
BAR:
Q: How many votes are needed to revoke it?
A: MAJORITY VOTING JOINTLY. The revocation of the
declaration of Martial Law or the suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus is the only instance
where there is joint voting. Thereafter, if it is not revoked,
there is another option: To go to the Supreme Court and
ask for a judicial review.
***Remember that the Bill of Rights are not suspended,
therefore, you cannot be detained for more than 72 hours
without being judicially charged. The right to bail is still
available if the offense charge is bailable.
In reality, as regards to the suspension of the priv writ of
habeas corpus, it will not be suspended for a period of 60
days with respect to the person arrested without a
warrant. The suspension of the privilege with respect to a
particular individual arrested without a warrant shall last
only for a period of three (3) days because if he is not
judicially charged, he should be released otherwise you
can demand for habeas corpus so that the court can
inquire to the legality of detention.
For a particular individual, whether it is a suspension of
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, it is only for a
period of three (3) days that he cannot avail of the
privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus because the Court
has no jurisdiction due to the suspension.
LIMITATION: You should not be detained without being
judicially charged for more than 72 hours.
In effect, this suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus merely extends the period of custodial
investigation without judicial interference because the
longest period under grave offenses that you can be
detained without the court interfering for a custodial
investigation is 36 hours only. When there is a suspension
of the privilege, it will be extended to 72 hours so
63
However it is limited only to involving offenses related to

the declaration of ML or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. The offenses that you may be
charged have to relate to invasion or rebellion. If there is
no relation to those offenses, then there is no effect on
the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus for ordinary offenses. The court still has the
jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of detention.
POWERS
OF
THE
PRESIDENT
AS
THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES
A. Calling out power
To call on the members or the AFP

Q: What is the purpose?
A: Whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out the
members of the Armed Forces to assist him in the
discharge of his functions in order to prevent or to
suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion
B.
C.
D.
Declaration of Martial Law

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
Reviewing decisions of Court Martial
TN the difference between the calling out power of the
President and the declaration of martial law.
Q. Can this power be delegated to local chief executives?
A. That was the issue in the Kulayan case, whether or
not the governor of Maguindanao can also call out the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in order to assist him in
the suppression or prevention o lawless violence or
rebellion in his locality?
A. JAMAR KULAYAN VS. TAN, JULY 3, 2012
Where the SC said that the calling out power
contemplated under the constitution is exclusive to the
President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief, that
a provincial governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the Armed Forces at his own bidding. It ruled
that only the President is authorized to exercise
emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Art. 6
and the calling out power under Section 7, Art. 7 of the
1987 Constitution. SC said that while the President
exercises full supervision and control over the police, a
local chief executive such as the governor only exercises
operational supervision over the police and may exercise
only a day to day operation. As discussed in the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission only the
President has full discretion to call on the, military when in
his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence,, invasion or rebellion.
Q. How is it different from the declaration of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?
A. On the calling out, it is the discretion of the President,
unless there is abuse of discretion that cannot be
reviewed by the SC under the power of judicial review.
Likewise, the President is not obliged to report to
Congress if he exercised the power.
Unlike martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus you will not that if the President
does that it must be for a particular ground or grounds:

1.
2.
Either there is rebellion or invasion

The public safety requires the declaration or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
TN, should the President do that, he has to make a report

in writing within 48 hours and immediately Congress must
convene. That power of the President then may be
checked by Congress because if Congress finds it
baseless, meaning no factual basis to declare martial law
or suspends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
Congress can always revoke it by a MAJORITY VOTE in
a joint session, voting jointly.
Q. If Congress failed to check the power of the President,
is there still a remedy to correct what has been done by
the President in so far as the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?
A. It can be brought up all the way to the SC under the
power of judicial review. Therefore, in the matter as to
whether or not the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
a justiciable question, it is settled that it is a justiciable
question.
Q. Who is a proper party to question the factual basis or
the validity of the declaration of martial law or he
suspension of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus?
A. TN, that it can be raised by any citizen of the country.
He need not be the person directly injured. The
constitution expressly provides that any citizen can
question the factual basis of the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Other limitations on the declaration of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
Its only good for 60 days, meaning if not

extended by Congress, it shall automatically be
lifted after the lapse of 60 days from its
declaration
Secondly, If one is arrested without a warrant,

can he still avail of his right to bail? Answer is
YES, the only guarantee here that there will be
no judicial intervention within a period of 72
hours. If one is detained for more than 72 hours
already without being charged in court, then he
can always ask for habeas corpus. It is not
precluded, because the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a
particular individual who was arrested without a
warrant actually is effective only for 72 hours.
Although the effectivity of the suspension is good
for 60 days but for a particular individual it
should not last more than 3 days.or 72 hours
without being judicially charged. Once charged
and it is not bailable then you can be detained
until your case is terminated.
PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (Art. 19)
******
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If you can recall, Estrada was convicted after 6 years of

prosecution, spending millions of money. After he was
convicted, what happened? He filed a motion of
reconsideration and even before that was resolved by the
court, Arroyo offered pardon to him. He didnt ask for it, it
was offered to him through Secretary Puno and he
accepted the pardon that was offered to him and it was
not clear whether it was absolute or conditional.
Apparently, if it is not clear whether he was absolutely
extended with pardon, what would be the consequence
because this is now an issue as against Estrada. If you
are convicted and you are granted pardon, you may be
relieved only of the effects of further infliction of the
punishment. So if you were detained and granted pardon,
you will be released without fully serving the sentence.
But remember if convicted, there are accessory penalties.
Q. What are the accessory penalties?
A. It could be perpetual public disqualification and thats
the question on Estrada. The point there here guys is you
have to take note of this power of the president because it
might be an issue when you take the bar examination
next year. I suppose there is a pending complaint already
filed in the Supreme Court disqualifying Estrada as mayor
of Manila because of his previous conviction. They
believed that it was never erased that conviction. That
conviction did not at all affect his public disqualification
as the pardon granted to him was silent as to whether or
not he was restored to his civil or political rights.
Always remember that this power is vested in the
President. It is a full discretionary power of the President
This power is one of the powers that cannot be delegated
to an alter ego. This is exclusive to the president.
Q. What are the different kinds of pardon that may be
granted by the President?
A.
1. Pardon
2. Amnesty
3. Commutation
4. Reprieves
5. Remission of fines and forfeiture
Comparing Pardon and Amnesty
Pardon, usually is granted by the President to persons
convicted by final judgment for ordinary offenses. Take
note of the conditions, ha. Here the accused is already
convicted and the conviction is already final and
executory and he is granted pardon by the President.
Q. What will be the effect if granted pardon?
A. It depends. There are two kinds of pardon that may be
granted:
1. Absolute
If it is absolute, there is no need of acceptance
by the pardonee. Whether he likes it or not, he
will be granted the pardon and enjoy the benefits
of the grant.
2. Conditional
If it is conditional, it has to be accepted because
it might be more burdensome to accept it. They
would rather continue with the service of the

sentence and stay free board and lodging in the
Bilibid rather than going out of the prison.
Sometimes, they will not accept because there
are certain conditions that they need to comply
before they will be granted pardon.
Now, as I was saying earlier , pardon has to be
final. There has to be a conviction, and it must
be final, so that if you have still a pending
appeal, you cannot be granted pardon by the
President.
Q. What would be then effect if
granted pardon
assuming that you are convicted, the judgment of
conviction has become final , you accepted the grant of
pardon. What would be the effect?
A. The effect would be, that you would be relieved of
further infliction of the punishment. Say for example your
sentence is 20 years of imprisonment. After 1 year of
serving without appealing the judgment you were granted
pardon.
Q. Do you need to serve the 19 more years ?
A. The answer is NO, once granted pardon. In other
words that further infliction of punishment is removed
because of the grant of pardon. If convicted there is the
accessory penalty.
Q. What is the accessory penalty? You have public
disqualification, not only that, you will be deprived of your
civil rights like for example, parental authority over your
minor children, or your authority over your wife, you would
also be denied of that right over your wife , administration
over your conjugal properties thats one among what we
call civil interdiction.
Public disqualification for office is either for appointive or
elective public positions. As a consequence of
disqualification from public office, you cannot run for
public office anymore or you cannot anymore be
appointed to any office of government. You cannot also
be reinstated to any public office.
Q: Now then, if for example, you already fully served your
sentence, is pardon still relevant to you? You have served
your sentence for 20 years and thereafter you were
granted pardon. Is that still important?
A: Yes. For purposes of removing the accessory penalties
such as public disqualification or civil interdiction. If
pardon is granted, it may restore your civil and political
rights.
Let us apply this to the case of Erap Estrada. Erap
Estrada was convicted of plunder. That was only after six
years that he was convicted and millions of pesos were
spent by the government to arrive at his conviction. It took
so long, only to be granted pardon by Arroyo only a few
months or weeks after his conviction. In the meantime, he
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and then he accepted
the pardon granted on Arroyo. There was no resolution on
that Motion for Reconsideration.
65
Q: Was the conviction final or still pending, given that the

Motion for Reconsideration was not resolved? Was the
MR mooted by the grant of pardon?
A: The theory here is that Arroyo may have abused her
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
grant of the pardon was null and void. One can still
question it anytime or any stage before the Supreme
Court.
The things that they were pointing out questioning the
grant of pardon to Estrada are:
The things that they were pointing out questioning

the grant of pardon to Estrada was that the
judgment was not yet final when the pardon was
granted due to the pending MR.
Arroyo abused here discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because she granted the
pardon to Estrada without any qualification
considering the number of years and the amount
spent to arrive at Estrada's conviction.
Hopefully, that would be laid to rest with the SC with this

pending complaint filed for the disqualification of Estrada,
questioning the validity of the pardon given by Arroyo to
Estrada.
Q: Is this pardon, if granted, subject to Judicial Review by
the SC?
A: Generally, NO. Pardon is subject to the full
discretionary power of the President. It is final and
executory unless there is an allegation of abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. That
is now their assertion as to the pardon given by Arroyo to
Estrada.
TN that NOT ALL cases may be subject of pardon.
EXCEPTIONS:
Impeachment
Convicted of election offenses - you cannot
be granted pardon unless there is a
favorable recommendation form the
COMELEC
If cited in contempt by the Congress
pursuant to a Legislative Inquiry
If cited in contempt by Civil Courts
AMNESTY
TN that this is not under the sole discretion by the
President. This is subject to the favorable
recommendation of the Congress.
TN that this can only be granted to individuals or class of
persons who are charged with offenses of political nature.
This can be granted even before conviction. So this
particular power of the President may be availed of before

or after the conviction. You need not wait for the final
conviction of the person granted amnesty.
Q: If granted, what will happen?
A: It would be as if he never committed the crime. There
is total absolute exculpation and exoneration from the
criminal culpability.
TN of the concurrence of the Congress to the grant of
amnesty. There has to be a law where there is the grant
of amnesty.
Q: What are powers similar to the pardoning power of the
President?
A:
Commutation - reduction of the penalty by one

degree lower
Reprieve - postponement of the execution of
judgment
Remission or Cancellation of Fines and
Forfeiture.
The president may also grant pardon to persons who are

convicted in administrative cases for the purpose of
reinstating him in his office. However, there is one
exception that the president cannot grant pardon in
administrative cases. That is when the administrative
case involves judges and other court personnel. They
cannot be granted pardon by the president. Amnesty may
be granted by the Supreme Court but not by the
President.
TN/Q: Parole if granted, what would be the effect?
A: You are still in custody of the law but outside of jail. You
are continuing to serve your sentence BUT you continue
serving it outside of jail.
Probation - granted to those who have been convicted in
cases where the penalty is less than 6 years of
imprisonment but it is not up to the President to grant
probation, rather, it is the courts who grant probation.
Article VII, Section 20:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
BAR: This was asked in the Bar Examination on
guaranteeing of foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines. This may be delegated to the chairman of
the Bangko Sentral. TN that this does not need the
concurrence of the Senate. All that is needed here is the
concurrence of the Central Monetary Authority (BSP).
Article VII, Section 21:
No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at
66
least two-thirds of all the Members of the

Senate.
TN: You must note the difference between an Executive
Agreement and International Agreement/Treaty.
International
Agreement/Treaty
requires
concurrence by 2/3 vote of the members of the
Senate in order to validate it. The one who ratifies
the treaty is the President but to bind the public,
there must be the 2/3 vote of the Senate.
Executive Agreement - does not need the
concurrence of the Senate.
Q: So what they're doing in the DFA is that they are
making the Visiting Forces Agreement which
implements the RP-US Mutual Defense Agreement
into a simple Executive Agreement. The RP-US
Mutual Defense Agreement is the one that requires
the concurrence of the Senate but not the VFA.
What is the difference?
A: Usually, a treaty or international agreement
affects political or national issues that are more or
less permanent. Executive agreements only provide
for details, transitory, implementing international
agreements which is why it does not need Senate
concurrence.
There is an issue related to this because of the
impending establishment of military bases, whether
temporary or permanent by the US forces in Subic
Olonggapo while we still have this ongoing conflict
with China. They are trying to amend the VFA in
order to allow them entry into the country with their
arms (the US).
TN that those cases like Bayan v Exec. Secretary,
and that case of Smith - we will tackle that in our
discussion on transitory provisions.
TN of the power of the President in his participation
in treaty-making. It is the sole power of the
President to ratify a treaty. Not even the SC can
compel the President to submit a treaty to the
Senate for concurrence. (Pimentel vs Exec.
Secretary)
In other words, if the President refuses to submit
the treaty to the Senate for concurrence, the
President cannot be compelled to submit the treaty
to the Senate. The Senate, even if they concur to
the treaty, if the President refuses to ratify the treaty,
the Senate cannot compel the President to do so
because the matter of ratification of a treaty is up to
the sole discretionary power of the President.
Q: What other powers does the President have?
A:
Sec. 22 (Budget)
Section 22. The President shall submit to the
Congress, within thirty days from the opening of
every regular session as the basis of the general
appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and

sources of financing, including receipts from existing
and proposed revenue measures
However, the difference between the SC's judicial

review power and that of the lower courts is that the
lower court's reviews are not final because they are
still subject to review by the Supreme Court which
means that it can be reversed by the SC. What will
bind the whole country or the world insofar as the
decision of the court is concerned is the prevailing
principle or jurisprudence is always the deicison of
the SC, and not the lower court.
Section 23 (SONA)
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress
at the opening of its regular session. He may also
appear before it at any other time.
The President will lay down his programs, what he
has achieved, WON he has already complied with
his promise. That is part of the transparency of the
government.
Another point is that, while this is a power enjoyed

be the lower courts, it must be exercised by the
lower courts with utmost prudence and caution
because it may cause political unrest resulting from
different interpretations of the laws and the
Constitution.
If you will be asked to cite provisions of the

Constitution which promotes transparency, one of
those would be under Section 23 on SONA of the
President. This is usually the time that he appears
before the Congress to address the Congress,
although he may appear any time he wants to
appear.
Q: You must also master Judicial Review. What are

the requisites?
A: There must be an actual case or controversy
raised by the proper party at the earliest opportunity
of time
V. Judicial Department
The Judicial Department is vested with judicial
power.
The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of

the case.
Q: What does judicial power mean?

A: The ordinary meaning of judicial power is the
power to settle disputes among parties involving
rights that are legally demandable or enforceable;
simply settling conflicts and controversies.
Q: Who is the proper party?

A: One who is directly injured or in the imminent
danger of sustaining injury.
However, there is the expanded judicial power. The

courts can now determine whether there exists a
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. This is done by the courts via
judicial review.
Q: In the ratification of the Constitution as to its

validity, who is the proper party?
A: An ordinary citizen may be the proper party, even
if not directly injured. This is an exception.
Q: What about the factual basis of the declaration of
Martial Law? Who is the proper party?
A: Also an ordinary citizen may be a proper party.
Q:Where is this power vested?

A: It is vested in one Supreme Court and other such
courts as may be established by statutes i.e.
Statutory Courts.
Q: Who exercises judicial power?
A: It is exercised, not only be the Supreme Court,
but also by the lower courts.
Q: Cite provisions in the Constitution which
supports the principle that judicial review is not only
exercised by the Supreme Court but also by all
other courts.
A:
Section 1 - It is vested in the SC and the other
statutory courts.
Section 5 - relating to the review power of the SC of
the session of the lower courts as to the
constitutionality of laws, treaties, etc. What will the
SC review if the courts do not also exercise the
power in reviewing WON a law or an act is in
consonance of the Constitution?
These two legal provisions arrive at the conclusion
that even lower courts exercise judicial review.
67
Q: When is the taxpayer considered a proper party?

A:
When it involves disbursement of public funds

that is anomalous or contrary to law;
misapplication of public funds
Involves imposition of unreasonable taxes. This
amounts to deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Q: Who else can be a proper party? Can the
government be a proper party in relation to the
validity of its laws?
A: Yes. Case in point - People vs Vera.
Q: What about members of Congress, may they be
a proper party in a question involving the validity of
laws?
A: Yes. When they will intrude into the legislative
prerogative or impairs their discretionary powers, in
which case they can be a proper party.

The bottomline, regardless of whether you have an
actual interest in the outcome of the case is what
we call legal standing or locus standi. That's all that
you need. You dont need to have a real right on the
outcome of the case. For as long as you have the
legal standing, you can be a proper party. However,
all this can be set aside by the Supreme Court at its
discretion when the issue raised is of paramount
public interest or of transcendental importance.
Take note of this since this is common in the bar
exams.
In all questions regarding constitutionality, you will
observe the PDAF cases, the RH law, when there
was a question on constitutionality of these laws,
there was always a question on whether the party
who filed the case was a proper party. So, the
requirement of the proper party may be set aside as
a mere procedural technicality if the issue raised is
of transcendental importance or of paramount
public interest.
Q:And then there's the requirement of actual case
or controversy. What does this mean?
A: That by "actual case", it means that the case is
existing until the issue is resolved because it is
possible that the controversy is existing at the time
of filing but becomes moot and academic as the
time lapses or as the circumstances change, in
which case it will be dismissed because the case
has become moot and academic.
68
There has to be a blatant violation of the constitution and

a possibility that it will be repeated and yet it will evade
any resolution.
And finally, that the issue raised is of transcendental
importance or of paramount public interest.
(TN) Another point on actual case and controversy, that it
must be a justiciable question. In other words, it is only
involving questions that are based on a law or a
constitutional provision because if you go into the wisdom
of the act complained of, or the reason why the law was
passed, or its propriety, that is a political question beyond
the ambit of judicial inquiry, therefore should have been
answered by makers of the law themselves being the
representatives of the people, or the president himself
who implements the law. But there is an exception to this
again because even if the issue is political however there
is allegation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction, still the court may look
into it by way of exception as part of the expanded
jurisdiction of the SC.
(TN) Another point also, it must be raised at the earliest
opportunity of time.
Q: What is earliest opportunity of time?
A: You have to allege that in the pleading otherwise, if not
alleged, you may not be allowed to raise that for the first
time during the trial, or if it is not raised during the trial,
you may not be allowed to raise that for the first time on
appeal.
In the case of Pormento vs Estrada.

Since Estrada was not elected as president, that
was the change in circumstance. It may have been
relevant at the time of filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy for President since he was running for
presidency notwithstanding the fact that he already
served the six-year term as President where the
Constitution provides that he is no longer eligible for
another election. Instead of discussing the minutes
of the case on the constitutionality, the SC said that
the case is already moot and academic since
Estrada lost the election and thereafter dismissed
the case. I repeat, the controversy must be existing.
But even if the issue has become moot and academic,
according to the SC in the case of David et. al. vs. Exec.
Sec.,it is not a mathematical formula that the SC would
not just discuss on the merits because it is possible that it
may occur again in the future especially when there is
blatant violation of the constitution and the issue raised is
of transcendental importance or of paramount public
interest. If you can recall in the case of the
constitutionality of the declaration of a state of national
emergency, the SC was saying that even if it was lifted
and the issue therefore has become moot and academic,
nonetheless the SC proceeded in discussing the merits of
the case because there is always a possibility that it will
recur, it will be repeated in the future and yet it will evade
any discussion or resolution on the merits of the case.
So these are the requisites:
Exceptions:
1. When the issue raised is the jurisdiction- anytime
at any stage of the proceeding
2. When you cannot resolve the case without first
settling the issue of constitutionality in civil cases
3. In criminal cases- anytime because after all,
where there is no law punishing the act, no crime
is committed. So if the law is nullified, it is as if
theres no crime committed by the accused.
(TN) And finally, the issue raised must be the lis mota of
the case because if it is not, then the court by all means
must use other grounds to dispose of the issue without
going into the merits of the case in order to maintain the
equality among the 3 branches and maintain the
separation of powers so that one cannot be accused of
intruding into the prerogative of the 2 other branches of
the government.
So you take note of those requisites for a valid exercise of
judicial review
because they are repeated in the
subsequent and more recent decisions of the SC.
Q: What would then be the consequences after the
resolution of the case?
A: It depends on what the resolution is.
Q: If the law is valid, what would SC do?
A: Make a double negative declaration- that the law is not
69
unconstitutional. In effect legitimating, if not ratifying the

validity of the law.
only be chaired by the incumbent chief justice is without

merit. http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/07/
Or the SC will declare the law to be null and void for being
unconstitutional. By that act, through the exercise of
judicial review, the SC checks. Thats part of the checking
power of the court over the act of executive and
legislative departments. Either way, the SC will perform its
symbolic function to educate the bench and the bar by
providing principles, precepts, guidelines on how the law
should be construed or interpreted in actual cases.
On Section 2, this is with reference to the powers

being vested to the courts by congress
Q: (BAR) If the law is declared unconstitutional, what

would be the effect of the declaration of
unconstitutionality?
A: What we follow is the modern view.
Q: What does it mean?
A: It is valid until declared null and void for being
unconstitutional but you have to respect the operative
effects of this law before the declaration of nullity.
We have some case on this where SC does not disturb
the effect of the application of the law before the law is
declared unconstitutional. They must be respected.
Once declared a nullity, you follow the traditional view. It
is not a law, it creates no rights, imposes no obligations,
creates no office and affords no protection. It will be as if
the law has never been passed. Just take note of that
operative effect principle. Because that was asked in the
bar exam particularly in the MCQ.
As regards to that, read the cases of Dulay vs. JBC,
Chavez vs. JBC.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction
between the two Houses in their participation in
the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of
the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by
adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of government
the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the
Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice
(representing the Executive Department), and a
representative of the Congress (representing the
Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight.
In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to
the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a
certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major
branch of government.(Chavez v. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013)
However, the Supreme Court has provided some
guidance regarding the issues we have raised. In the en
banc decision in Dulay vs. Judicial and Bar Council and
Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, the Supreme Court
made two significant rulings. First, the court ruled that the
most senior justice who is not an applicant for the position
of chief justice shall "preside over the proceedings in the
absence of the said constitutionally named Ex-Officio
Chairman." Second, the proposition that the JBC may
So you have the Rules of Court enumerating the

jurisdiction of court. But take note, in so far as amending
the Rules of Court, that is now exclusive to the SC under
Section 5 as part of its rule-making power. But, in the
case of Gingoyon v. Republic, the SC was saying that
notwithstanding that the SC has the power to amend the
Rules of Court, still the power being legislative in nature,
plenary in so far as congress is concerned, it was never
precluded from making a law that will amend Rules of
Court. You remember that case involving payment of just
compensation? Because there is definition there in the
Rules of Court particularly Rule 67 on just compensation
determined by the court at 10% of the assessed value of
the property for taxation purposes, that was amended by
R.A. 8974 passed by congress where it was based on
market value or BIR zonal valuation- 100% and not just
10% and it was an amendment of Rules of Court and it
was questioned, and SC was saying that the congress
was never precluded from amending Rules of Court
although now, that power is govern to the SC
promulgating rules governing pleadings and procedures
in the practice of law. You have writ of amparo, writ of
habeas data, and writ of kalikasan. You have the judicial
affidavit rule, etc. in effect amending the Rules of Court
without passing through congress although in Section 2, it
should have been congress because it is congress that
vested and prescribed and apportioned jurisdiction on
various courts.
On Section 3 on fiscal autonomy
it is one of the factors that maintain the independence of
SC and there had been so many instances that this fiscal
autonomy has been challenged by the 2 other branches
in the government.
Q: What do you mean by fiscal autonomy?
A: It means that their budget cannot be reduced by
congress even if they hate the guts of the justices of the
SC. Whatever is the budget in the last fiscal year, if they
will not increase it, they cannot also reduce it. Should they
reduce the budget, automatically the old budget will be
adopted because of fiscal autonomy. They cannot
interfere on how the SC should spend the money
appropriated for the SC but recently there is a question
regarding on this because there are so many vacancies in
the court. At the end of the year, youre supposed to remit
kuno the money that was expended, intended for this
vacant court to the national treasury. But what did SC do?
Asserting its fiscal autonomy, they put up a separate fund
where this savings will go and not to the general fund of
the national treasury and thats the start of the quarrel
between the executive department, including now the
congress, and the SC because the SC was saying, we
enjoy fiscal autonomy, ayaw mo panghilabot in so far as
our budget is concerned. Karon ka, what theyre doing
now, ang DBM will not release the whole budget for the
Judiciary. They will wait until you fill up that vacancy then

they will release the money. That will be the challenge
regarding fiscal autonomy.
On section 4, this is with regard to the composition of the
SC. There is 1 chief justice and 14 associate justices.
Q: In case of vacancy, what is the period of filling up?
A: 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Q: For vacancy in the lower courts, how should it be filled
up?
A: Its actually 90 days from the submission of the list of
names of nominees of JBC reckoned from the
submission. So it may have been vacant for 20 years, but
the moment the list is submitted by JBC to Malacaang,
the President has the period of 90 days from the
submission of the list within which to make an
appointment. But how come it can go beyond 90 days?
Because it can easily retroact the date of appointment.
*** Q: What are the cases that are decided by SC sitting
en banc and sitting in Division? The more important part
there is the sitting en banc. What are the cases?
A: You have to memorize Section 4 on cases involving
constitutionality of treaty or international agreement or
executive agreement; cases that had been decided by a
Division and case of modification or reversal; to reverse a
prevailing principle or jurisprudence; dismissal or fine of a
judge or any court personnel for more than 10,000; when
the Division cannot obtain the majority, it has to be
transferred to SC siting en banc; where the penalty for the
capital offenses Reclusion Perpetua to death.
Q: What would be the composition of a Division?
A: It could be a Division of three, five, or eight. So if you
want to get a majority for very decision, a Division of 3always 3, unanimous. If you cannot get that it will be
decided by SC sitting en banc. If its a Division of 5- you
should have no less than 3. In the Division of 8- that is 5.
You should have also at least 3 votes if there is only
quorum of 5.
Practically most of the cases are decided in division but
there are specific cases however that must be decided en
banc. You take note of that.
*** Now the most import part of the judicial departmentSection 5. If you want to know all the powers of
SC, memorize section 5.
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
70
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or

validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or
question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower
courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the
judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial
to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.(1987 Constitution [1987])
Q: In criminal cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, is that automatic reviews
of SC?
A: There is now a circular of SC. It is no longer automatic
to sc. It must pass through an intermediate review by the
CA before it goes to the SC. And that is declared as
constitutional.
You have on purely questions of law, also with the SC.
The temporary assignment of judges. If its for more than
6 months, you need the consent of the judge.
On the change of venue, also you must ask permission
from SC. In case of doubt whether it should be granted or
not, it should be decided in favor of the change of venue
to avoid miscarriage of justice.
(BAR) Sec 5(5) on the rule-making power of the SC
Rules concerning enforcement and protection of
constitutional right, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts; admission in the practice of law; the Integrated
Bar; legal assistance to the underprivileged.
(BAR) As regards to the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, take note of the writs promulgated by

SC: writ of amparao, writ of habeas data, writ of Kalikasan
and other rules and regulation amending the Rules of
Court.
Kadagahan na nigawas ang writ of amparo ug writ of
habeas data. Theyre related to each other but they re not
the same.
Q: All this in protection of the right to privacy particularly
the writ of amparo, what is being protected?
A: Right to life, liberty and security, not property. The
recent decision on the writ of amparo is this: that to apply
the writ of amparo there must be an element of
government involvement. If there is no government
involvement, although it may also apply to private entities,
but without government involvement, the writ of amparo is
not the proper remedy. Thats the bottom line on the
recent decision of SC.
To give you an example, this is a case involving a person
who was abducted by a security guard of a subdivision.
Then he made a complaint to the security guard, it was
not acted upon. And then that person became missing. So
the relatives of this person who was abducted accused
the security guard and filed a writ of amparo.
Q: Will the action prosper?
A: According to the SC, no because the security guards
are private individuals. No showing that it involves the
government or its law enforcers. Here it was dismissed.
Q: (TN) What are the remedial or preliminary remedies
you may avail of while you are applying for writ amparo?
A:
1. temporary protection order
2. inspection order
3. production order
4. witness protection order
You have also the Writ of Habeas data which is a
limitation to the right of information. It is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee or a
private individual or entity engaging in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family home, correspondence of the aggrieved
party (A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC).
Q: If you think that because of some erroneous
information the military is following you because you are
suspected to be a member of the NPA. What do you do?
A: You ask the military to produce the information so that
it can be corrected or destroyed if it is totally untrue. You
can avail of that by obtaining a writ of habeas data.- TN
On the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
the only limitation in the promulgation of rules by the
Supreme Court is that it shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights (Sec. 5(5), Art. XVIII,
Constitution).
Power to Appoint
71
Also, the Supreme Court has the power to appoint its own
officials and employees in accordance with the Civil
Service Law (Sec. 5(6), Art. XVIII, Constitution). This is to
maintain its independence subject to civil service law.
The Supreme Court shall have administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof
(Sec. 6, Art. VIII).
The administrative supervision of the Supreme Court over
judges and court personnel is exclusive. The
Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over judges and
court personnel because the supervision over them is
exclusive to the Supreme Court.
Q: Can the ombudsman investigate a judge involving a
criminal case?
A: The Ombudsman has to wait for the recommendation
of the Supreme Court to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
Q: In an administrative case?
A: It should be dismissed because the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction since the Constitution provides that
supervision of judges and court personnel is exclusive to
the Supreme Court. In fact, the President cannot grant
pardon to a judge or court personnel who is convicted.
TN
Section 7. Qualifications.
No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme
Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of
the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age,
and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge
of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of
judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed
judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines
and a member of the Philippine Bar.
A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence. - TN
Q: What is the qualification for a member of the judiciary
that is not required in ordinary employees in the
government?
A: He must be a person of proven competence, integrity
and independence. (BAR)
(BAR) Section 8. Composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.

The regular members of the Council shall be
appointed by the President for a term of four years
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Of the Members first appointed,
the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years,
the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one year.
XXX XXX XXX
XXX XXX XXX
The Council shall have the principal function of
recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.
Q: What would the President do if he does not like any of
the nominees in the list? Can he return it to the JBC?
A: No. He has to choose from the list. Otherwise, the
purpose of the JBC to screen applicants for the judiciary,
ombudsman and deputy ombudsman would be useless.
However, the nominees in the list should be at least 3 for
every vacancy. The Presidents choice should be limited
only in the names that were submitted by the JBC.
The Composition of the JBC is shared by the Justice of
the Supreme Court. Now, there is a controversy involving
the Chief Justice as chairman of the JBC because the
SOLGEN applied for the Supreme Court as Justice. Now,
he wants the Chief Justice to inhibit in participating
because according to him the Chief Justice had already
made statements against him. The thing is it is chaired by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
TN
It is also composed of ex-officio members and regular
members. In Chavez v. JBC, there is a controversy
because supposedly each branch of the government
should be represented in the JBC. For the executive
department, it is the DOJ secretary. For Congress they
must also have a representative. But Congress have two
(2) representatives, 1 in the Senate and 1 in the House of
Representatives while the Constitution is very clear that it
should only be A REPRESENTATIVE- singular. Back
then, it was alright to have two representatives for
Congress because each representative will be entitled to
vote. But in has been the practice to accord each
representative 1 full vote. Thus, it is unfair on the part of
the other branches of the government and there is no
more equality among the three branches of the
government.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees preferred by the Judicial and
Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation. (Self-Explanatory). The Salary of the
justices and judges is fixed by law.
Section 11 Retirement Age
The retirement age is 70 years old but we are given an
option to retire at 60 or 65.
72
The Supreme Court Justices enjoy security of tenure

which means that they cannot be removed in any other
manner except on impeachment.
Q: Can you sue a justice of the Supreme Court involving
a criminal case?
A: You cannot. Not even a disbarment case against them
because it is a circumvention of the Constitution. You
have to wait until they retire so you can sue them
criminally. But I suppose you can sue them for collection
of sum of money.
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and
of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative function.
In Macalintal v. PET, the Supreme Court acted as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). There was a
question of constitutionality on the creation of the PET
because according to Macalintal by being a member of
PET, in effect, the Supreme Court performs a quasijudicial function. But the Supreme Court said that the PET
does not perform quasi-judicial functions but judicial
functions.
Q: What are the two exceptions of Section 12?
A: Justices of the Supreme Court appointed to the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal and the Chief Justice as
the chairman of the JBC.
Section 13 Procedure in the making Decisions.
There must be a deliberation either in en banc or division.
Usually, the decision is written by the most junior Justice.
There is a certification that will be made by the Chief
Justice to the effect that whatever decision may have
been reached is a result of consultation and concurrence
of the majority of the Supreme Court. If there is no
certification, it will not affect the validity of the decision.
Section 14. SC Decisions
No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. This is mandatory. However, the
exception to this is cases on certiorari or petition for
review filed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court can issue a 1 page minute resolution dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. This is an exception because a
petition for certiorari is not a matter of right. It is merely a
privilege. The Supreme Court has the discretion either to
give due course or not to the petition. If the Supreme
Court denies the petition, it is in effect adopted the
decision in toto of the lower court. However, if the
Supreme Court gives due course to the petition and
dismisses it thereafter the Supreme Court has to comply
now with Section 14. (BAR)
Section 15. Resolution of Cases.
This is mandatory because a judge can be sanctioned or
punished for non-observance of the prescribed period. It
is, however, directory in the sense that even if the
judgment is rendered beyond the prescribed period the
decision remains valid.

Cases relating to the Judiciary
1.CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
SUPREME COURT;
"RESOLUTIONS"
ARE
NOT
"DECISIONS";
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE NOT APPLICABLE TO
RESOLUTIONS.
As
early
as Novino,
et
al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., it has been stressed that
these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the
constitutional requirements of Section 14, Article VIII; they
merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it; and the petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to
fully explain the Court's denial since, for one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' decision. This was reiterated
in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal vs.
Commission on Audit, et al. that the constitutional
mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for
decision," i.e., given due course and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but
not where the petition is refused due course, with the
resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus,
when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and
subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised are factual or
there is no reversible error in the respondent court's
decision, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.||| (Komatsu Industries (Phils.),
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24,
1998) HDATCc
The grant of due course to a petition for review is not a

matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion. Thus,
when the Court denies due course to a petition because it
fails to show any reversible error committed by the Court
of Appeals (CA), there is no need to fully explain the
Court's denial. For one thing, the facts and law are
already discussed in the CA's opinion. A minute
resolution denying a petition for review of a decision of
the CA can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees
with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA,
and deems the CA decision as correct.
We reiterate that a "resolution" is not a "decision" within
the constitutional requirement of Section 14, Article VIII.
The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases
"submitted for decision", i.e., where the petition is given
due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda
and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is
denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis thereof.
In Candelaria v. CA, we held that a resolution denying a
petition for review on certiorari actually states the legal
basis therefor, which is that the petition failed to
sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any
reversible error in the challenged decision. The patent
significance of such ground for denial is that the
allegations of the petition aimed at proving errors in the
73
challenged decision failed to persuade the Supreme

Court that the imputed errors had been committed and,
thus, there was no cause to reverse or modify the
conclusions set forth in the decision. In such case, there
is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court thereby
affirmed.| (Joaquin-Agregado v. Yamat, G.R. No. 181107,
March 30, 2009)
Included in the judiciary on judicial privilege (different from
judicial review) but more or less the same as executive
privilege especially on issues relating to whether or not
the co-equal branches of govt may compel the judiciary
to produce information relating to a particular case for to
whatever acts may have been discharged by the supreme
court in the performance of its functions.
This was an issue in that case involving the Arroyos when
a TRO was issued against the DOJ when they wanted to
abroad for medical treatment. This came out during
impeachment proceedings where there were questions
whether or not the justices who issued the TRO can be
compelled by congress acting as a tribunal to testify on
the circumstances relating to the issuance of the TRO
whether or not there was compliance to the requirement
as conditions of the TRO. Testify on the circumstances on
the issuance of the TRO. Issue whether they may invoke
judicial privilege for they may not be compelled to testify
on those matters relating to the issuance of the order.
In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court
officials and employees as witnesses
under the subpoenas of February 10,
2012 and the various letters for the
Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated
January 19 and 25, 2012.n February 14,
2012
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may
not be compelled to testify in the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members
of the Court about information they acquired in the
performance of their official function of adjudication, such
as information on how deliberations were conducted or
the material inputs that the justices used in decisionmaking, because the end-result would be the disclosure
of confidential information that could subject them to
criminal
prosecution.
Such
act
violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it
pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of
adjudication.
To summarize these rules, the following are privileged
documents or communications, and are not subject to
disclosure:
(1)Court actions such as the result of the raffle of
cases and the actions taken by the Court on
each case included in the agenda of the Court's
session on acts done material to pending cases,
except where a party litigant requests
information on the result of the raffle of the case,
pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
74

(2)Court deliberations or the deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending before the Court;
(3)Court records which are "predecisional" and
"deliberative" in nature, in particular, documents
and other communications which are part of or
related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes,
drafts, research papers, internal discussions,
internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers.
(4)Confidential Information secured by justices,
judges, court officials and employees in the
course of their official functions, mentioned in (2)
and (3) above, are privileged even after their
term of office.
(5)Records of cases that are still pending for
decision are privileged materials that cannot be
disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and
resolutions that have been made available by
the court to the general public.
(6)The principle of comity or inter-departmental
courtesy demands that the highest officials of
each department be exempt from the
compulsory processes of the other departments.
(7)These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as
an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or
her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher
than the individual justices or judges, no sitting
or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief
Justice, may claim exception without the
consent of the Court.
Basically, when we speak of judicial privilege, there are
information that is confidential. That cannot be disclosed
just to anyone. Specially on testimony made on a witness
during a judicial proceeding or statement made by the
presiding judge or the lawyers. All of them may not be
compelled to testify on what transpired.
In relation to the TRO, they may not be compelled to
testify on the circumstances especially on deliberations
how the SC may have voted on certain issues. There
were dissenting opinions by Carpio and Sereno saying
that Judicial privilege may not be invoked if it relates to
matters that are criminal in nature that may involve illegal
acts. What was emphasized by the dissenting opinion
was Judicial privilege is not absolute.
Carpios Dissent
However, there are clear limits to Judicial Privilege, as
there are clear limits to Executive and Legislative
Privilege. One overriding limitation on Judicial Privilege is
that it can be invoked only if the information arose
from the performance of official adjudicatory
functions of Members of the Judiciary. As succinctly
stated in the Resolution, Judicial Privilege refers only
to"matters that are part of the internal deliberations
and actions of the Court in the exercise of
the(ir) adjudicatory functions and duties" of Justices.
The Resolution further states that the matter must refer
to "the performance of the(ir) official functions of
adjudication" of Justices.
Serenos Dissent
Thus, in U.S. jurisprudence, judicial privilege has always

been qualified and had been found to exclude any
protection for administrative and non-adjudicatory matters
in cases where a Member of the judiciary is being
investigated for criminal acts or wrongdoing.
I am taking this up with you because of the statement
made by Congress that they may summon the Chief
Justice to testify on matters relating to the Judicial
Development Fund.
Q: Can they compel?
A: First of all, they are co-equal branches. To compel a
Chief Justice to testify, even if it may relate to matters of
public interest, there is no obligation on the part of the
justices because of the separation of powers and give
respect between co-equal branches.
Just take note of this just in case. TN of the basic
knowledge about judicial privilege.
VI. Constitutional Commissions

On constitutional commissions, you have three:
COMELEC, Civil Service and Commission on Audit.
TN Safeguards to the Independence
Constitutional Commissions
of
the
1. First of all, theyre created by the Constitution therefore

they cannot be abolished by ordinary legislation. Theyre
considered to be independent, and therefore cannot be
controlled by the three branches of government. Each
constitutional commission is conferred with powers that
cannot be reduced or diminished by ordinary legislation to
maintain their independence. Likewise, always remember
that they are removable only through impeachment.
TN of the term of office of the commissioners.
2. It is 7 years without re-appointment. We have the
scheme to have continuity in their term of office. We have
the staggered appointment the first appointment to each
commission 7, 5, 3 years.
It says without re-appointment. The term applies only to
regular appointments of a commissioner (TN). So that if
he is appointed in a recess session, so its by a recess
appointment such as that case of Benipayo, thenchairman of the COMELEC before, during the time of
Arroyo. He was appointed when the Commission on
Appointments was in recess. And so it was a recess
appointment. The appointment though was permanent,
because it was effective immediately upon Qualification of
Benipayo, because it was not however confirmed by CA
upon its resumption of its session in effect it was
bypassed, so it lasted only until the next adjournment of
session of Congress. So when the term of Benipayo then
expired, he was again re-appointed by Arroyo to the same
position, thus the Question now on constitutionality of the
re-appointment. Remember the case of Matibag v.
Benipayo.

Q: What did SC say on the matter? Was there a violation
of the constitution by the re-appointment of Benipayo?
A: The SC was saying that: That provision against reappointment applies only to regular appointment by the
President that would reQuire confirmation by the CA (TN).
Theres a recent decision of the SC related to it as well.
Remember the case of Funa, involving the appointment of
Villar as the Chairman of the Commission on Audit.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1 (2), Art.
IX (D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment
of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or
upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a
prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
Attention is drawn in this regard to the Court's disposition
in Matibag v. Benipayo.
Villar's promotional appointment, so it is argued,
is void from the start, constituting as it did a
reappointment enjoined by the Constitution, since it
actually needed another appointment to a different office
and
requiring
another
confirmation
by
the Commission on Appointments.
Central to the adjudication of the instant petition
is the correct meaning to be given to Sec. 1 (2), Article IX
(D) of the Constitution on the ban against reappointment
in relation to the appointment issued to respondent Villar
to the position of COA Chairman.
Without question, the parties have presented
two (2) contrasting and conflicting positions. Petitioner
contends that Villar's appointment is proscribed by the
constitutional ban on reappointment under the aforecited
constitutional provision. On the other hand, respondent
Villar initially asserted that his appointment as COA
Chairman is valid up to February 2, 2015 pursuant to the
same provision.
The Court finds petitioner's position bereft of
merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word "reappointment"
as, in context, embracing any and all species of
appointment.
XXX
XXX
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1 (2), Article IX (D)
that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the
aforestated circumstances or conditions.||| ||| (Funa v.
Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)
Q: What were the circumstances in that appointment?
This also further explained the nature of the appointment
and the term of office of a commissioner because this
applies not only to COA but to all commissioners. In this
particular case, Villar had been appointed as a member of
the COA. However, he didnt finish his term he resigned.
And then, he was appointed thereafter as chairman of
COA, when the Chairman retired.
When the chairman retired and the question on wether or
not he is qualified for appointment, wherein it was
practically a re-appointment this time as chairman of
COA. The Supreme Court in this case said that for as
long as he did not finish his term, because he did not
75
finished as he resigned. He may be appointed to the

commission as chairman, provided, that there is a
vacancy caused by death or resignation or removal of that
previous chariman whose term has not been completed.
So that he can only be appointed and assume office of
the un-expired portion of the term of office of his
predecessor.
TN It says here, the appoinment of the members of any
of the 3 Constitutional Commissions after the expiration of
the un-even terms of office of the first set of the
commissioner will always be a fixed term of seven years.
An appopintment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing officer cannot validly
shorten the full term of seven years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of
the rotational system prescribed by the Constituion.
Q: What is this Rotational System of the Term of Office
of the commissioners? (BAR)
A: Where if one of the commissioners term of office
expires there will be always two others who are left. There
cannot be any vacancy that would occur in the
commission in the event one of the commissioners term
of office expires.
SC was saying here that appointments to vacancies
resulting from certain causes like death, resignation,
disability or impeachment shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the tem of office of the predecessors. Such
appointement cannot be less than the unexpired portion
as this will distrupt the staggering of the terms lay down
under SEC. 1 PAR. 2 of ART. IX. Members of the
commission are appointed for the full term of seven years
and who served the entire period are BARred from reappointemnt to any position in the commission. The
commissioner in this case, Villar, who resigned after being
in the commission for less than seven years is eligible for
appointment to the position of the Chair for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chair. Such
appoinment is not covered by the ban on re appoinment
provided the that the aggregate period of length of service
as commissoner in the unexpired period of the term of
office of the predecessor will not exceed seven years and
provided further, the vacancy position of the chair
resulted from death, resignation, disablity or impeachment
and any member of the commission cannot be appointed
or designated in temporary or acting capacity. In this
case, Villar served for only 3 years so he has then
remaining four years at the time he resigned. Thereafter,
he was appointed as chairman of COA when the
chairman of COA at that time, also resigned.
Q: Was the appointment of Villar to the chairmanship valid
considering that it was a re-appoinment but this time as
chairman?
A: SC was saying that he is eligible provided that it will
not exceed seven years. So if he already served 3 years,
he has 4 more years to serve. In this case, the term of
the predecessor chairman, the remaining term was only 3
years also so he could not ecxeed the unexpired portion
of his predecessor. In other words, while he is eligible for
appoinment, his term should not ,in total, what he had
served before he resigned and now his new appoinment

be more than seven years. And should not also exceed
the term of the remaining portion of the term of his
predecessor. He can assume the unexpired but not more
than seven years. TN of that. Also being empahized in
this case that being appointed,
Q: Can there be appointment in acting or temporary
capacity?
A: No. It should be permanent. This is to guarantee the
independence of the Constitutional commissions.
Q: Can the salaries of the Chairmen and Commissioners
be decreased? Increased?
A: They are fixed by law and they cannot be decreased
during their term. May be increased but cannot be
decreased.
Q: How do the Constitutional Commissions enjoy fiscal
autonomy?
A: Their budget cannot be reduced lower than they are
presently enjoying. So that in the event that their budget
for the next fiscal year is reduced, automatically that is
void, automatically the budget of the previous year shall
be reenacted.
Q: Can the ConComs pass their own rules and
regulations? What are the limitations?
A: They also can promulgate their own rules and
regulations for as long as it will not diminish decrease or
modify substantive rights. This is without prejudice of
course to the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules
and regulations governing pleadings and procedures in
court.
Q: In cases of conflict, whose rules should prevail?
A: There is this one case where the COMELEC
promulgated a rule governing their procedure, however,
affecting the rules promulgated by the SC governing
procedures in courts. So in cases of conflict, always the
rules promulgated by the SC shall prevail because that is
exclusive to the Supreme Court if this will affect
procedures in court.
Q: What rules govern in appointing the officials and
employees of ConComs?
A: It must be in accordance with the civil service law to
maintain their independence.
Q: How many votes are needed in decision making?
A: It has to be majority of all the members of the
commission.
TN: A commission that has only three commissioners,
always unanimous.
TN: For the COMELEC, we will have a majority of seven.
But in adjudicatory cases, when they decide the case on
merits, it is always decided by a division, so still
unanimous three.
Q: When a decision decided by a COMELEC division is
unfavorable, cann you go directly to the SC?
A: No. the Motion for Reconsideration must be decided
first by the COMELEC en banc because of the
requirement of the constitution that only decisions en
banc of the commissions can be appealed directly to the
76
SC. They are also required to decide cases within 60

days from the submission of the case for decision or
resolution.
Q: Where do you appeal the decisions of the COMELEC,
COA and the Civil Service?
A: Except for the Civil Service, COA and COMELEC
decisions are appealable directly to the SC on certiorari
under rule 65 of the Rules of Court and it should be within
60 days from the receipt of decision of the judgment of
the tribunal.
CSC
Q: What about Civil Service Commission?
A: There is SC circular that you have to pass through CA
first before you go to the SC. That is under Rule 43 of the
ROC.
TN: Qualifications of the commissions.
There are only 3 - one chairman and two members. This
is important - Section 2, you should know the scope of
the Civil Service covered by its jurisdiction.
Q: What is within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission?
A: All branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including governmentowned and controlled corporations with original charters
[Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-B,Constitution].
Q: What do you mean by original charters?
A: Original charter means that the GOCC was created by
a special law by congress.
Those without original charters are those created by the
corporation code, it is not under the Civil Service. They
are not subject to the Civil Service Commission. So they
are considered as an ordinary corporation.
As to the previously GOCCs, when they are later
privatized, they cease to be under the Civil Service.
TN of the cases regarding the scope of the Civil Service
Commission.
[BAR] TN Q: Are water districts under the Civil Service
Law?
A: Water districts are under the Civil Service.
TN: MWSS v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 71818, August 19,
1986if one is employed in a GOCC whether or not
regular, the Civil Service Law applies. So it is not true
either that with respect to money claims, the Labor Code
applies. In this case, since the employment or claim of an
employee in a GOCC with an original charter is governed
and covered by the Civil Service Law.
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE LAW;
GOVERNS EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION. Republic Act No.
6234created it as a "government corporation to be known

as the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System."
As in the case of the National Housing Authority,
therefore, employment in the MWSS is governed not by
the Labor Code but by the civil service law, rules and
regulations; and controversies arising from or connected
with that employment are not cognizable by the National
Labor Relations Commission.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUDES CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES
OF
GOVERNMENT-OWNED
OR
CONTROLLED
CORPORATION. The argument of the Labor Arbiter
that it is only disputes between the MWSS and
its regular employees that are beyond the jurisdiction of
the NLRC, not those between it and its "non-regular or
contractual" employees, is sophistical. There is no legal
or logical justification for such a distinction. Indeed, it is
ruled out by the fact that positions in the civil service are
classified into career and non-career service, and that the
non-career service includes inter alia ". . . Contractual
personnel or those whose employment in the government
is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job, requiring special of technical skills
not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in no case
shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the
specific work of job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring
agency."
||| (MWSS v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 71818, August 19,
1986)
Question [student]: Who determines if it is a GOCC?
A: It is governed by the law that created it. It is in the law.
So if it is created by a special law or charter, it is a GOCC.
So even if created by a general law, it is covered by the
Corporation Code, that is not under the civil service law.
You would note that it is in the charter itself.
Question by Luj (regarding Red Cross)
A: It is a private corporation. It renders only public service.
That is not under civil service. That was the case of Liban
v. Gordon. The most recent one, the Supreme Court said,
it is private. It is only that they render public service. It is
not part of the Government of the Philippines, not a
corporation of the Philippines. That was settled. [Judge
was talking about the 2009 case, theres a recent 2011
resolution on this case]
[Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC
is now sufficiently established. Although it is neither a
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government,
nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a
subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision
of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a
Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that
the PNRC is a "private corporation" within the
contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that
must be organized under the Corporation Code. As
correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
77
basis.||| (Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18,

2011) Caveat: It was not discussed in the case the
implications on the jurisdiction of employment disputes
with such pronouncement as sui generis corporation]
TN: The different kinds of positions in Civil Service. The
Competitive and Non-Competitive. So this is relevant
also when you are ask about administrative laws.
So basically kung competitive, the entry in the
government is based usually in merit and fiTNess
determined through competitive examinations. While noncompetitive, it does not require civil service eligibility.
There are three kinds of non-competitive: Policydetermining, Primarily Confidential and Highly Technical.
Policy-determining - it is the government that formulates
the method of action; what is the policy that you have
been appointed to in which case that would not require
any eligibility.
Primarily Confidential - because the relationship is
based on trust and confidence with the appointing
authority. Ex: Executive Assistants, Executive Secretaries.
But PAGCOR, as it was settled in one case, the
employees, while it is true that they are supposedly
working in confidence because they are trying to protect
their clients, diba? The deckers and managers in the
casino, while their operations may be confidential for
security reasons, Supreme Court was saying that it was
not a confidential position and therefore they are not
covered under this non-competitive but competitive
position.
Highly Technical - that is also non-competitive because
that would be based on skills, not on a civil service
eligibility.
(TN) Q: What would then be the test whether one is
competitive or non-competitive?
A: It will be based on the nature of the responsibilities; not
the administrative or legislative description given to it.
That was in the case of PAGCOR, take note of that.
2.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; P.D. NO. 1869; SECTION 16

THEREOF CLASSIFIES ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE
CASINO
AND
RELATED
SERVICES
AS
"CONFIDENTIAL" APPOINTEES; CLASSIFICATION,
NOT BINDING ON COURTS. Petitioner argues that
pursuant to Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869,
respondent is a primarily confidential employee. Hence,
he holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power
and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in
him by the latter. Such would not amount to a removal but
only the expiration of his term. However, there should be
no lingering doubt as to the true import of said Section 16
of P.D. No. 1869. We have already definitively settled the
same issue in Civil Service Commission v. Salas, to
wit: . . . we approve the more logical interpretation
advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16
of P.D. 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions

from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has
been amended, modified or deemed repealed by
the 1987
Constitution and Executive
Order
No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987). However, the same
cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section
16 which provides that "all employees of the casino and
related services shall be classified as 'confidential'
appointees." Justice Regalado's incisive discourse yields
three (3) important points: first, the classification of a
particular position as primarily confidential, policydetermining or highly technical amounts to no more than
an executive or legislative declaration that is not
conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature
of the position. Second, whether primarily confidential,
policy-determining or highly technical, the exemption
provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from
competitive examination to determine merit and fiTNess
to enter the civil service. Such employees are still
protected by the mantle of security of tenure. Last, and
more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869, insofar as it
declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily
confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.
3.ID.; ID.; CASINO OPERATIONS MANAGER, NOT
PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL. Respondent's duties
and responsibilities call for a great measure of both ability
and dependability. They can hardly be characterized as
routinary, for he is required to exercise supervisory,
recommendatory and disciplinary powers with a wide
latitude of authority. His duties differ markedly from those
we previously ruled as not primarily confidential. In this
sense, he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file in that
his appointment to the position entails faith and
confidence in his competence to perform his assigned
tasks. Lacking, therefore, is that amplitude of confidence
reposed in him by the appointing power so as to qualify
his position as primarily confidential. I
||| (PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25,
2001)
Q: This competitive or non-competitive, do they enjoy
security of tenure?
A: Definitely. They only differ in the manner in which they
are filled out as regards to qualifications or requirements.
Q: You know already who provides or prescribes the
qualifications?
A: Its always by the law.
Q: And what is the role of the Civil Service Commission
with respect to appointments?
A: Only to attest whether this particular appointee or
nominee has the minimum qualifications described by
law. So once it is found that the qualifications are
complied with, what they can only do is to attest to the
validity or the eligibility of the appointee. Its not for them
to decide who is more qualified among the appointees.
That discretion is still left to the appointing authority. In
other words, the Civil Service cannot add qualifications
other than those provided by law.
78
Q: Another point which is asked in Administrative Law

relating to the Civil Service is on the Next-in-Rank Policy.
Is this mandatory?
A: No. While the person next-in-rank is entitled to
preferential consideration, it does not follow that only he
and no one else can be appointed. In other words, still it
is within the discretion of the appointing officer or
authority to choose from among the candidates. What is
required by law is that the appointee has complied with
the minimum qualifications prescribed by law.
Another classification of position is - according to Tenure:
you have Career service and Non-career service. The
other one is Competitive and Non-competitive. This one is
now on tenure, career or non-career.
Career service is usually based on merit and fiTNess to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examinations based on technical qualifications; whereas
in Non-career, entrance is based on other than usual test
of merit and fiTNess. Lets say for example, elective
positions are non-career. Usually the executive officers of
government or those even rank-and-file but based on civil
service eligibility, thats considered as career, when there
is room for promotion. When you are elected as
BARangay captain, theres no way that you would be
promoted as governor if you dont run as governor.
Q: For career, they are entitled to security. What about
non-career? Like if you are an elected official, what is
your security of tenure?
A: It is limited only, during the period of your term of
office. If you are, for example, a confidential employee,
like you are an executive assistant, yours is only coterminus to the appointing authority. Once your appointing
authority is dismissed, its good as you are already also
dismissed; or once the term of office of the appointing
authority has already expired, your term also is good as
expired. Or limited to the duration of a particular project
for which purpose the employment was made. So once
the project is completed, youre done.
(BAR) Q: What is favored in the BAR exam is this
doctrine and principle of Security of Tenure. Do you what
this security of tenure is?
A: Its that you cannot be removed from office without just
cause provided by law. All government officials and
employees as a rule enjoy security of tenure.
(TN) But take note, when you say you can only be
removed for legal cause provided by law, it must be
related to and affects the administration of office. It must
be substantial, directly affecting the rights and interests of
the public. Of course, you always have the Civil Service
Law providing for the process. It also presupposes that
even if there is a basis for your removal, you cannot just
be outrightly removed without hearing. So there is always
due process both substantial and
***** What is important is you have to have the necessary

qualifications to the position and eligibility.

Even if you have the qualification but not the eligibility,
there is no guarantee that you will stay in that position
under the principle of security of tenure. That is not the
kind of security of tenure we are referring to.
For example: youre a lawyer occupying a position as
director of the LTO. There is now a requirement of CESO
Carrier executive eligibility. You may have the best
qualifications that are required but it also requires this
particular eligibility. If you dont have that you can always
be removed or transferred and security of tenure cannot
be invoked. Same applies for the reverse, no qualification
but has the eligibility.
In other words, the qualifications and requisite
eligibility must concur.
TN: Achacoso v Macaraig (BAR)
1.CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW;
BILL
OF
RIGHTS;
SECURITY OF TENURE; PERMANENT APPOINTMENT
ISSUED ONLY TO PERSONS QUALIFIED. A
permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which
he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE
REQUISITE QUALIFICATION DEEMED IN ACTING
CAPACITY. The mere fact that a position belongs to
the Career Service does not automatically confer security
of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the
required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on
the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on
his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to
the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
3.ID.;
ID.;
ID.;
TEMPORARY
APPOINTMENT;
PURPOSE. The purpose of an acting or temporary
appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of
official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the
same pending the selection of a permanent or another
appointee.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON
APPOINTEE. The person named in an acting capacity
accepts the position under the condition that he shall
surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by
the appointing authority.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPIRATION OF TERM; METHOD OF
TERMINATING TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT. In
these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated
by a method of terminating official relations known in the
law of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is
79
understood at the outset as without any fixity and

enduring at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
When required to relinquish his office, he cannot
complain that he is being removed in violation of his
security of tenure because removal imports the
separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his
term. This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is
for cause as provided by law. The acting appointee is
separated precisely because his term has expired.
Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional
provision on security of tenure.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. The case of
Luego v. Civil Service Commission is not applicable
because the facts of that case are different. The
petitioner in Luego was qualified and was extended
a permanent appointment that could not be withdrawn
on the ground that it was merely temporary. In the case
at BAR, the petitioner was not eligible and therefore
could be appointed at best only in a temporary
capacity. The other cases he cites, viz. Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, and Dario v. Mison, are
also
not
pertinent
because
they
also
involved permanent appointees who could not be
removed because of their security of tenure.
||| (Achacoso v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023, March 13,
1991)
A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person
who meets all the requirements for the position to which
he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career
Service does not automatically confer security of tenure
on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of appointment which interdepends on his eligibility
or lack of it.
(BAR)
Q: Is there security of tenure for non-competitive
positions?
A: Yes, however, limited. Even non-career. Confidential
employees hold office only as long as confidence remain
in them.
In other words, if the appointing authority loses
confidence, then he is fired. This shall not be taken as
dismissal but as an expiration of term. For there must be
a genuine loss of confidence, there is no removal. Noncareer employees do not enjoy security of tenure.

Political appointees in the Foreign Service possess
tenure, coterminous with the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure. So, there has to be a valid
appointment in order to enjoy security of tenure.
Otherwise, appointment is void; there is no expectation of
security of tenure.
80
another position but it must be in ex officio capacity. Like

the President that you selected is also appointed as the
chairman chief of the national housing corporation and
authority or a congressman sitting as member of the JBC.
Q: How about temporary employees, are they covered by

the? Are they protected by the security of tenure?
TN on civil service with respect to suspension and

dismissal in relation to security of tenure, i.e., the
entitlement to reinstatement with backpay; if reinstated,
would he be entitled to backpay:
A: No. In fact, even if the appointing authority does not

give any reason simply does not want or like the way the
employees must adhere that could be a ground for his
removal. He does not have to explain because a
temporary employee does not enjoy security of tenure. He
can be removed anytime even without cause. So, if they
are dismissed, it just simply an expiration of their term.
Q: For example, hes under preventive suspension for

three months, then he was exonerated, can he recover
his salary for the period of his preventive suspension?
A: Generally, for as long as its legitimate, we follow the
principle no work, no pay; unless it is expressly provided
in the constitution that he is entitled to payment of
backpay during the period he was placed under
preventive suspension.
Another prohibition if you are an employee in the

government, you cannot engage directly or indirectly in
political partisanship or electioneering political activity
(TN)
Q: And then on the matter of, can you organize a union or
association to protect your economic interest? (BAR)
A: There is no prohibition against joining a union. It is not
prohibited under the constitution.
What is, however, prohibited by statutes not by the
constitution is the right to strike because after all,
according to the SC, in many cases, the right to strike
does not formally integral part of the right to association.
You can always have an association or organization even
without engaging in concerted activities.
So we have statutes, executive order, there is the Civil
Service Memorandum prohibiting the employees
engaging in concerted activities.
Another thing to (TN), losing candidate. Political laying
ducks are prohibited. They are disqualified for
appointments within 1 year from the election that he loss.
(TN)
Elective official are not eligible for appointment in any
capacity to any public office or position during their
tenure. They may accept it, however they have to resign
from their local position. And thats why we need to
amend this provision in order to totally ban elective
officials from appointment so that they cannot just leave
their office and accept an appointment, that would not be
fair to their constituents. But her it is allowed provided that
he resigns or he forfeits his elective position. Now, the
exception to the appointment to any other positions in the
government is when you are appointed, you have an
appointment now regular, you can be appointed to
If it is suspension as a penalty or even dismissal from the

service, this does not apply.
Q: If in the event, in an appealed case, he is reinstated
because he is found to be innocent, is he entitled to
backpay?
A: General rule still appliesno work, no payunless the
dismissal or suspension is illegal.
TN: case of DOTC v Cruz G.R. No. 178256 July 23,
2008 the SC follows as a precedent, DOTC did not effect
Cruz's
termination
with
bad
faith
and,
consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his favor.
In all these cases, the suspensions
and/or dismissals were held unjustified, the
therein
petitioners
having
been
either
exonerated from the charges-bases of
suspension or dismissal or were victims of
proscribed abolition of office or issuance of
appointment to a different position which soon
after resulted in dismissal therefrom.
That the DOTC's termination of
[Mamaril's] services in accordance with the
August 20, 2001 Resolution of the CSC was not
attended with bad faith and/or grave abuse of
discretion, it cannot, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, be gainsaid.
||| (Department of Transportation and
Communications v. Cruz, G.R. No. 178256,
July 23, 2008)
But if it is illegal, like in David v Gania G.R. No.
156039. August 14, 2003 a civil service employee who
has been found illegally dismissed or suspended is
entitled to be reinstated and to backwages and other
monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal or
suspension up to his retirement. If he is already of
retirement age, he is entitled not only to backwages, but
also to full retirement benefits.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED, DESPITE THE
PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT
RESPONDENT DID NOT ACTUALLY ASSUME AND

PERFORM THE DUTIES OF HER POSITION SO AS TO
DEPRIVE HER OF BACKWAGES AND OTHER
BENEFITS. There is more than substantial evidence in
the record consisting of the general payroll and
attendance sheets to prove that petitioner assumed and
exercised the functions of Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer at MSU as early as
June 1995 after the MSU Board of Regents approved her
permanent appointment which was issued earlier on 10
April 1995. It cannot be refuted that in September 1998
she was terminated from the service on the alleged
ground of expiration of her term and stopped from
performing the functions of her position, and
subsequently reinstated to her job upon the declaration of
the CSC that her dismissal from the service was illegal.
Clearly, the CSC gravely erred when thereafter it ruled
that respondent did not actually assume and perform the
duties of her position so as to deprive her of back wages
and other benefits. In Gabriel v. Domingo this Court held
that an illegally dismissed government employee who is
later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and
other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal
dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and
sensible because an employee who is reinstated after
having been illegally dismissed is considered as not
having left his office and should be given a comparable
compensation at the time of his reinstatement.
Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or
to render any service from the time she was illegally
dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy
of "no work, no pay" cannot be applied to her, for such
distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or
liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a
consequence of her removal and while she was jobless.
Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other benefits
during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in
the civil service.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE STATE UNIVERSITY CANNOT BE
MADE TO PAY ALL ACCRUING BACK SALARIES AND
OTHER BENEFITS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT; THE
SUPERIOR OFFICERS FOUND TO BE IN BAD FAITH
OR HAVE ACTED WITH PERSONAL MALICE WILL BE
HELD PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE. We also agree
with the Court of Appeals that MSU cannot be made to
pay all accruing back salaries and other benefits in favor
of respondent. There are allegations to the effect that
officials of MSU disobeyed in bad faith the writ of
execution issued by the CSC. In Gabriel v. Domingo we
held that if the illegal dismissal; including the refusal to
reinstate an employee after a finding of unlawful
termination, is found to have been made in bad faith or
due to personal malice of the superior officers then they
will be held personally accountable for the employee's
back salaries; otherwise, the government disburses funds
to answer for such arbitrary dismissal. This rule is also
enunciated in Secs. 38 and 39 of Book 1, E.O. 292, and
in Secs. 53, 55, 56 and 58 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
||| (Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania, G.R. No.
156039, August 14, 2003)
I was talking about compensation earlier; double
compensation is prohibited, but
81
TN/Q: if you have retired already from the government

service and youre receiving pension, and you're reemployed by the government, this time can you receive
the salary from your current employment with government
after retirement, considering that youre receiving
pension?
A/TN: Yes. Pension is different from salary. Santos v CA
G.R. No. 139792. November 22, 2000 SC said that
double compensation is not applicable to pension. A
retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to
receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts
another government position to which another
compensation is attached.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE COMPENSATION, CONCEPT; A
RETIREE RECEIVING PENSION OR GRATUITY CAN
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE IT EVEN IF HE ACCEPTS
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT POSITION TO WHICH
ANOTHER COMPENSATION IS ATTACHED. The
petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph
of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which
provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered
as additional, double, or indirect compensation. This
provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or
gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity
even if he accepts another government position to which
another government position to which another
compensation is attached. Indeed, the retirement benefits
which petitioner had received or has been receiving
under R.A. No. 910, as amended, do not constitute
double compensation. He could continue receiving the
same even if after his retirement he had been receiving
salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This
is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards
for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his
compensation for his services as Director III of the
MMA.||| (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139792,
November 22, 2000)
Earlier I was saying that the holding of strike is prohibited,
TN/BAR: SSS Employees Association v CA G.R. No.
85279 July 28, 1989 while the Constitution and the Labor
Code are silent as to whether government employees
have the right to strike, they are prohibited from striking,
by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6
series of 1997 of the Civil Service Commission and as
implied in E.O. No. 180.
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE;
PROHIBITION TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FROM
STRIKING. While the Constitution and the Labor Code
are silent as to whether or not government employees
may strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987
of the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O.
No. 180.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO
STRIKE. Government employees may, therefore,
through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions
of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for
the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.

3.ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
EMPLOYEES ARE PART THEREOF AND COVERED BY
MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES. SSS
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by
the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes.
4.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 180; ALLOWS GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG
THOSE FIXED BY LAW. E.O. No. 180 which provides
guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, allows negotiation where the
terms and conditions of employment involved are not
among those fixed by law.
5.ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT ARE GOVERNED
BY LAW; EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT STRIKE TO
SECURE CHANGES. Section 4, Rule III of the Rules
and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took
effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and
conditions of employment in the government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and
government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof."
||| (SSS Employees Ass'n. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
85279, July 28, 1989)
Kindly check again, we were discussing about judicial
review on judicial powers, we mentioned about operative
fact doctrine as a consequence of a law that was declared
unconstitutional
We follow the modern view. It is valid until it is declared a

nullity. However, you cannot just simply ignore the effects
of the law while it was still being enforced. It may affect
substantive rights if you will also nullify those acts as a
consequence of the declaration of unconstitutionality of
the law or of the act of government. You TN of this
Operative Fact Doctrine because that was emphasized in
the recent DAP case.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP
resulted into the use of savings pooled by the Executive
to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or
that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as
to augment items pertaining to other departments of the
Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To
declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional
without recognizing that its prior implementation
constituted
an
operative
fact
that
produced
consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the
Government and the Nation is to be impractical and
unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive
as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere
as the recipients could be required to undo everything
that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP.
82
That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the

Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been
adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive
results that enhanced the economic welfare of the
country. To count the positive results may be impossible,
but the visible ones, like public infrastructure, could easily
include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless,
hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the
doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause
the physical undoing of such worthy results by
destruction, and would result in most undesirable
wastefulness.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the
deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does not
always apply, and is not always the consequence of
every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be
invoked only in situations where the nullification of the
effects of what used to be a valid law would result in
inequity and injustice; but where no such result would
ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is
totally ineffective should apply. EIaDHS
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the
doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs
(Programs, Activities and Projects) that can no longer be
undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on
the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there
are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the
proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil,
administrative and other liabilities.
||| (Araullo v. Aquino, III, G.R. No. 209287, July 01, 2014)
As we have explained before, it was declared
unconstitutional, and we have expected that because
number one, it violated Section 25 paragraph 5 thereof,
where the transfer of savings was violated in this
particular case because they did not follow what savings
means. Apparently, they get the unobligated funds of the
different departments and impound them, did not spend
them, and at the middle of the year, they were then taken
by the President and classified them as savings. And then
the same is thereafter transferred to other offices, other
than the executive department like COA, the Autonomous
Region of Cordillera, members of Congress likewise were
also benefited from it. There was a violation of cross
border here as regards the transfer of appropriation and it
was without the aid of the appropriation law because they
simply got it from the savings and allocate them to
projects as it may be desired by the President.
The Supreme Court was saying that under the Operative
Fact Doctrine, it will not affect the projects, but this does
83
not apply to the persons responsible for the illegal acts of

transferring these funds from the executive department
into other offices of government other than the executive
department.
Constitution, only the decisions of the Constitutional

Commissions en banc are appealable to the Supreme
Court on Certiorari.
You have to make then a distinction as to the declaration

of unconstitutionality following the principle of the
Operative Fact Doctrine. Again, what was emphasized by
the Supreme Court is that this only applies to the projects
as recipients of the disbursement of the funds, but cannot
apply as to liability if theres any for those government
officials. Just TN of that.
*****Q: What about election contests involving municipal

officials, where do you file?
COMELEC
Q: Can they issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus?
A: Answer is yes, but only in aid of their appellate
jurisdiction. Lets go into the powers of the COMELEC
guys. This will be discussed in detail in your Election
Laws, so Im not going to deal so much on that. Well just
go to provisions that are mentioned in the Constitution.
Now lets go directly to Section 2, on powers and
functions. Enforce and administer all regulations relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall. You must know the meanings of
these terms.
*****Q: Okay, so they have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to what? Election returns and
qualifications of all elective officials coming from the
regional, provincial and city officials. Lets now go to the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC? Have you mastered this?
Election contests involving barangay officials, where do
you file your election protest or Quo Warranto Petition?
A: You file it with the MTC or the City Courts that has
jurisdiction.
*****Q: If the decision is rendered by the MTC, you are
aggrieved, where do you appeal?
A: You dont appeal to the RTC. You appeal directly to the
COMELEC. MTC to COMELEC.
*****Q: If the decision is rendered by the COMELEC,

where do you appeal?
A: You cannot appeal anymore. The decision is Final and
Executory.
Unless there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, then you
can go directly to the Supreme Court on Certiorari.
However, on the condition precedent to that you have to
file a Motion for Reconsideration because decisions
election cases that are adjudicatory in nature are only
decided by the COMLEC by division and under the
A: File it with the RTC.

*****Q: If you lose the case in RTC, where do you appeal?
A: You go to the COMELEC.
*****Q: And if you still lose the case in the COMELEC,
where do you go?
A: Nowhere. Because decision of the COMELEC is final
and executory, unless you allege grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
*****Q: If it involves City Officials or Provincial Officials,
where do you file?
A: You file directly with the COMELEC. Original
Jurisdiction.
Q: If you lose the case in the COMELEC, where do you
appeal?
A: You appeal to the Supreme Court on Certiorari, as a
matter of right.
In other words, COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction
involving Barangay and Municipal Elective Officials. And
their decisions are Final and Executory.
Q: Does COMELEC have contempt powers?
A: Yes, but only in relation to its Quasi-Adjudicatory or
Quasi-Judicial Function. It cannot exercise this in
connection which is purely executive or ministerial
functions.
TN In a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC
exercises Quasi-Judicial and Administrative Powers. Its
jurisdiction over Election Contest is in exercise of its
Judicial Functions.
TN Bedol Case.
Do you know where Bedol now is? He is now a
classmate of the Senators at the PNP Custodial Center
(laughs) You know what happened to that Bedol?
[Provincial COMELEC Maguindanao Chief]. He was
asked to submit all Election Returns, sa Maguindanao
bah, involving the Election of Senators where Zubiri was
proclaimed as the Elected Senator, last Senator. And
Pimental was saying, No, he was cheated. And Pimentel
wanted to know where are the Election Returns so that
they would be able to know if what was indicated therein
are correct. What happened? Bedol did not appear. He
said he lost all the Election Returns. Gi Magic. So he was
cited for Contempt.
He was saying, You cannot cite me for Contempt
because that was an exercise of Administrative Functions
of the COMELEC, when he was ordered and summoned
to appear before COMELEC and bring all the Election

Returns and Paraphernalia.What did the Supreme Court
say in this case of Bedol? Ngano na priso naman na siya
karon?
The Supreme Court said the COMELEC possess the
power to conduct investigation as an adjuct to its
constitutional duty to enforce and administer all Election
Laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of the
Constitution.
In the same vein, to withhold from the
COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to
appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a
previous notice and order to attend, would render
nugatory the COMELEC's investigative power, which is
an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to
secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In
this case, the purpose of the investigation was however
derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear
during said hearings and to answer questions regarding
the various election documents which, he claimed, were
stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for
such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC
was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it
required petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the
occasion to rule that the powers of the board of
canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board
exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function
and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted to
them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers. When the results of the elections in the province
of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for
various candidates posited numerous questions on the
certificates of canvass brought before the COMELEC.
The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it in
order to shed light on the issue of whether the election
documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or
not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear,
COMELEC undeniably acted within the bounds of its
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions.
||| (Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, December 03,
2009)
So what happened here with Bedol.
The Supreme Court here was saying that the Task-ForceMaguindanao Fact-Finding-Investigation was created for
the purpose of probing into the veracity of the alleged
fraud that marred the elections in the Province of
Maguindanao and consequently, to determine whether
the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious and
whether an election offense had possibly been committed
could by no means be classified as purely ministerial or
administrative function.
So since it is not a ministerial or administrative function, it
was a quasi-judicial function according to the Comelec. It
was just right for the Comelec to sight this Atty. Bedol in
84
contempt. So the Comelec from the Task-ForceMaguindanao (TF) was exercising its quasi-judicial power
in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive
fraud during the elections in Maguindanao; to achieve its
objective the TF conducted hearings and required the
attendance of the parties concerned, including Bedol,
and the counsels to give them the opportunity argue and
support their respective positions.
Task Force Maguindanao's fact-finding investigation to
probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred
the elections in said province; and consequently, to
determine whether the certificates of canvass were
genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had
possibly been committed could by no means be
classified as a purely ministerial or administrative
function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao,
was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the
truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the
elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the
Task Force conducted hearings and required the
attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to
give them the opportunity to argue and support their
respective positions.
||| (Bedol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, December 03,
2009)
So when Bedol therefore was cited for contempt, it was

an exercise of its quasi-judicial power; because of his
contumacious refusal to attend the TF hearings thus he
was arrested. Here, as you would note, to withhold,
according to the Supreme Court, from the Comelec the
power to punish individual who refuse to appear in a factfinding investigation despite previous notice in order to
attend would render nugatory the Comelecs investigative
power which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections; in this case, the purpose however of the
investigation was derailed when Bedol obstinately refuse
to appear during said hearings in order to answer
questions regarding the various elections documents
which he claimed was stolen when they were in his
possession and custody. The issue then of Pimentel vs.
Zubiri was mooted by Zubiris resignation and so
Pimentel then took over the remaining term of office of
Senator Zubiri.
Q: Does this include the setting the date of the elections?
Do they have the power to set the date of elections?
A. Answer is NO.
Take note of the case of Maguindanao Federation of
Autonomous Irrigators Association Inc. (represented

by Abas Kida) et. al vs. The Senate. Remember that
the terms of office of the officials of the ARMM had
already expired; because of the situation in the
Maguindanao, they wanted to postpone the elections, and
in effect, by postponing it what would happen is Comelec
would be extending the term of office of the incumbents.
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of special elections in the
ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely empowered
the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations
relative
to
the
conduct of an
election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has
granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections
to another date, this power is confined to the specific
terms and circumstances provided for in the law. XXX
XXX XXX
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision,
both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address
instances where elections have already been scheduled
to take place but do not occur or had to be suspended
because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances,
such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous
circumstances.
In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law,
in furtherance of the
constitutional
mandate of synchronization of national
and
local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the
circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section
6 of BP 881.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the
date for the next ARMM elections and the COMELEC has
no authority to set a different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to
hold special elections, and this Court can compel the
COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to
shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to
synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013
national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court
nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting
as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to
three years.
||| (Abas Kida v. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 196271,
196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392, 197454,
February 28, 2012)
So again
Q: Does the Comelec have the power to postpone and
set the date of elections, or if not does the Congress have
the power to extend the term of office of these local
elective officials in ARMM?
These were the issues in the case of Maguindanao
Federation.
A. TN -The Supreme Court said, the power to fix the date
of the elections is essentially legislative in nature as
85
evident from and exemplified by Section 8, Article VI, and

also Section 4, par. 3 of Article VII.
So, it is not for the Comelec but it is for the Congress.
Nonetheless, it was also emphasized in the Maguindanao
case that while it is Congress that fixes the date of
elections, it cannot extend the term of office because in
effect that will amend the Constitution. The Constitution is
very clear on the term of office.
In the meantime where there cannot be an election
because of the circumstances
Q: Who has the power then to fill the vacancy because
the term had already expired and so vacancy had
occurred? There cannot be an extension by the Congress
because in effect that would violate the Constitution.
A. It is then for the President, having the supervision over
the Local Government Units, to appoint an officer-incharge in the meantime until elections shall be held.
TN Sema vs COMELEC
Supreme Court said that the COMELEC does not have
the requisite power to call elections as the same is part of
the plenary legislative power.
Q: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to determine
leadership of or the election in political parties? Do they
have the power to intervene? For example in the LP case
there was a question of leadership, during the time of
Arroyo, between Atienza and Drilon. They had their sets
of officers elected as officers of LP. They were
questioning the validity of the election of Drilon and
others. Atienza filed at COMELEC. Does COMELEC have
jurisdiction over the controversy involving leadership of a
political party?
A: Yes. The political partys identity is crucial here. Its
accreditation is with the COMELEC. So in as much as this
would involve leadership affecting the political party itself,
it is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to settle the
controversy.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is
limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any
and all controversies involving political parties. Political
parties are generally free to conduct their activities
without interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only when
necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership
disputes has already been settled by the Court. The
Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELEC's powers and functions under Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELEC's power to
register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf.
Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party
leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as
an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas' election as LP
president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to
settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP
president is the issuing authority for certificates of
nomination of party candidates for all national elective
positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize
other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for
candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is
the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer
of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain
rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its
official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon
registered political parties that have to be carried out
through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership
issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the
peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.
||| (Atienza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188920, February 16,
2010)
Supreme Court said, reiterating the case of LDP vs
COMELEC, the COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide
questions of leadership within a party and to ascertain its
legitimate officers and leaders. The COMELEC is
endowed with wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was
created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.
Q: What about disciplining members? Does COMELEC
have jurisdiction over the controversy? As a consequence
of the case involving LP, Atienza was hereinafter
removed/expelled as a member of LP. Atienza
complained and went to the COMELEC. Does COMELEC
have jurisdiction?
A: No. This is under the jurisdiction of the political party. It
is within the discretion of the political party.
While the question of party leadership has implications
on the COMELECs performance of its functions under
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same
cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s
expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is, for the
moment, an issue of party membership and discipline, in
which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited
scope of its power over political parties
TN
Limkaichong vs COMELEC
Case regarding the proclamation of the winners,
notwithstanding the pendency of disqualification cases
against them. This is allowed pursuant to Resolution No.
8062, issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-legislative function.
86
A: (1)It is a religious sect or denomination,

organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2)It advocates violence or unlawful means
to seek its goal;
(3)It is a foreign party or organization;
(4)It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election
purposes; cdtai
(5)It violates or fails to comply with laws,
rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6)It declares untruthful statements in its
petition;
(7)It has ceased to exist for at least one (1)
year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the
two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
||| (Party-List System Act, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941
[1995])
On the rules of procedure they are promulgated by the
COMELEC.
The thing you should TN is on decision making, kung
purely administrative it is always decided by the
COMELEC en banc, meaning 7 of them, pero kung
Adjudicatory powers, it is always decided in division. So
kung in Division, and its say for example you file a case in
a division and it was dismissed outright,
Q: Can you directly go to the supreme court on certiorari?
A: No. you have to file an MR for the purpose of having it
resolved by the COMELEC en banc TN
The only exception: Where the COMELEC may call
adjudicatory. Adjudicatory gani means division gyud na.
The only exception here is when the Comelec en banc
may directly assume over to a petition to correct manifest
errors in the tallying of results by the board of canvassers.
Direcho na en banc, di na mu agi og division.
Q: Can the COMELEC execute its own judgment?
A: YES. They can issue a writ of execution. Balajonda v.
COMELEC TN
Registration of political parties, TN of RA7491. --TN
Q: What are political parties that cannot be accredited in

order to participate in the party list system? TN
Early last year, the Court, through Mr. Justice Antonio T.

Carpio in Batul v. Bayron, affirmed a similar order of the
COMELEC First Division directing the immediate
execution of its own judgment. Despite the silence of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the
issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is

no reason to dispute the COMELEC's authority to do so,
considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of
Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that
absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
Batul also clearly shows that the judgments which may be
executed pending appeal need not be only those
rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well.
It stated, thus:
It is true that present election laws
are silent on the remedy of execution
pending appeal in election contests.
However,
neither Ramas nor Santosdeclared
that such remedy is exclusive to
election contests involving elective
barangay and municipal officials as
argued by Batul. Section 2 allowing
execution pending appeal in the
discretion of the court applies in a
suppletory manner to election cases,
including those involving city and
provincial officials.
Batul is different from this case in that in Batul the
decision subject of the order of immediate execution was
rendered by the poll body in the exercise of its original
jurisdictionwhile the decision in this case was
promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Still, there is no reason to dispose of this petition in a
manner different from Batul. The public policy underlying
the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to
obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as
determined by either the courts or the
COMELEC. Towards that end, we have consistently
employed liberal construction of procedural rules in
election cases to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. Balajonda's argument is anchored
on a simplistic, literalist reading of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 that
barely makes sense, especially in the light of the
COMELEC's specialized and expansive role in relation to
election cases.
||| (Balajonda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February
28, 2005)
Q: unsay election period?
A: Art 11 Sec 9.
It commences 90 days before the date of the election and
30 days thereafter unless the COMELEC fixes another
period. Election period applies even, it could be lesser, it
could be shorter but generally it is 90 days, 30 days and
this applies to plebiscites and referendum as well not just
election of officers.
87
Another thing is on grant of pardon as one of the

exceptions where the president cannot unless there is a
favorable recommendation from the COMELEC.
Q: What is your political party system?
A: Its free and open, its multi - party. We dont have
two-party system here.
Q: Is Block Voting allowed?
A: Prohibited
COMISSION ON AUDIT
Section II on the powers of the commission audit.
Examine audit and settle accounts pertaining to revenue
and receipts of funds or property or expenditures or uses
of funds.
Recent decision on audit
There are 2 kinds audit:
1. post audit
2. pre-audit
The provision didnt mention about pre-audit, only conduct
of post audit with respect to the following. There is never
any mention of pre-audit. The COMELEC has exclusive
power to determine the scope of their audit-- that is
discretionary of COA.
TNrecent decision of the Supreme Court relating to
audit
Most recent case: Dela Llana v. Chairperson of COA
Petitioner's allegations find no support in the
aforequoted Constitutional provision. There is nothing in
the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a preaudit of all government transactions and for all
government agencies. The only clear reference to a preaudit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1,
which provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain
government or private entities with state subsidy or equity
and only when the internal control system of
anaudited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or
special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a
mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to
perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and
explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application. Neither can the scope of the provision be
unduly enlarged by this Court.
||| (Dela Llana v. Chairperson of COA, G.R. No. 180989,
February 07, 2012)

Supreme Court said:
There is nothing in the provision that requires COA to
conduct a pre-audit because you know the controversy
relating to the PDAF and all; it was always involving COA
because apparently what COA did was to only make
special audit.
Apparently what COA did was only to make special audit.
Because there is no pre-audit, they do so only after the
expenditure is made. That is post-audit.
Q: Can they be compelled to do pre-audit?
A: No. (See case citation)
So pre-audit is discretionary, only when the internal
system of a department has failed or is inadequate.
However, the audit that they do is not exclusive to COA.
This was emphasized in the case of DBP, that a private
accounting firm may also be hired by the Government to
do the accounting and audit, especially when the funds
subject of the audit is borrowed money from an
international bank where it is required (because they do
not trust the Government, much less the COA to do the
audit).
The thing is, the audit is not exclusive to COA. In this
case of DBP vs. COA,
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON AUDIT;
POWER THEREOF TO EXAMINE AND AUDIT IS NONEXCLUSIVE. The clear and unmistakable conclusion
from a reading of the entire Section 2, Article IX-D of
the 1987 Constitution, is that the COA's power to
examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand,
theCOA's authority to define the scope of its audit,
promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow
unnecessary expenditures is exclusive. Moreover, as the
constitutionally mandated auditor of all government
agencies, the COA's findings and conclusions necessarily
prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as
government agencies and officials are concerned. The
superiority or preponderance of the COA audit over
private audit can be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission. . . . The findings and
conclusions of the private auditor may guide private
investors or creditors who require such private audit.
Government agencies and officials, however, remain
bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA,
whether the matter falls under the first or second
paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings
and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts.
The power of the COA to examine and audit government
agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be taken away
from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution
mandates that: "Sec. 3. No law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary
in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public
funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit."
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government
agencies does not divest the COA of its power to
examine and audit the same government agencies.
The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even
88
with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions
will still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of
public funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of
a COA audit. Manifestly, the express language of the
Constitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to
only one indubitable conclusion the COA does not
have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution
were fully aware of the needs to allow independent
private audit of certain government agencies in addition
to the COA audit, as when there is a private investment in
a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or
as in the case at bar when the government borrows
money from abroad.||| (DBP v. COA, G.R. No. 88435,
January 16, 2002)
Supreme Court said that the mere fact that these private
auditors may audit Government agencies do not divest
COA of its power to examine and audit the same
agencies. Nonetheless, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution point to one indubitable proposition, that
COA does not have the exclusive power to examine and
audit Government agencies.
The only thing that is exclusive to them is to determine
the scope of their audit and their system of audit. But the
conduct of the audit itself is not exclusive.
Q: Who can be audited by COA?
A: All government agencies.
Q: What about private agencies? Can they be audited by
COA?
A: Yes, if they are holding Government funds or property.
We have the case of Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs
Tantuico Jr.:
3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON AUDIT;
JURISDICTION;
SECTION
2(1),
ART.
IXD, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;
AUTHORITY
TO
EXAMINE AND AUDIT FUNDS INCLUDES SUCH NONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES RECEIVING SUBSIDY OR
EQUITY FROM THE GOVERNMENT. The petitioners
also question the respondents' authority to audit them.
They contend that they are outside the ambit of
respondents' "audit" power which is confined to
government-owned or controlled corporations. This
argument has no merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the
Constitution provides that "The Commission on Audit
shall have the power, authority and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities,
including
government-owned
or
controlled corporation with original charters, and on a
post-audit basis . . . (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity directly or indirectly from or
through the Government which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition
of subsidy or equity." The Constitution formally embodies
the long established rule that private entities who handle
government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined

or audited in their handling of said funds by government
auditors.(Blue Bar Coconut Phil. v. Tantuico, Jr., G.R.
No. L-47051, July 29, 1988)
Corporations covered by COAs auditing powers are not
limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity
handles public funds, it falls under COAs jurisdiction.
TN, they only have jurisdiction over liquidated funds. So if
the funds are still unliquidated, you can still go to court to
contest it because they are civil liabilities. The amount is
not yet actually determined, COA has no jurisdiction.
89
you should know, well, you will have a separate subject

for local government.
These are the only things you should TN, for purposes of
the BAR relating to local governments, this pertains to,
ang importante ani.
Q: Who has control over local governments?

They only audit liquidated funds. So kung unliquidated pa
cya, jurisdiction is with the court, not with COA.
A: Its congress. Through a law, Local government code

RA 7160. And the president has only supervision.
Q [student]: Can you increase the functions of COA

(widen scope of audit)?
A: Yes. Section 8, common to all, each commission shall
perform such other functions as may be provided by law
so it may be increased. But not diminish their functions
though.
XII. Local Governments
Local governments would be, HOT ISSUE WHEN YOU
TAKE THE BAR EXAM, because of the operation of the
BANGSA MORO, political entity.
Q: So as now under the constitution, what are the

territorial and political subdivisions mentioned?
A: Provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. It
didnt say BANGSAMORO. It says however, there should
be Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
Cordillera. So it will then be considered as an
Autonomous Region rather than a sub state. It must be
within the framework on the provision to the constitution
otherwise, magkamali sila. While they may not describe it
as a sub state, but virtually it is as such, not an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. Then that would
be contrary to section 1. And this is self-executing.
Q:They enjoy local autonomy, but that autonomy does not

mean what?
A: Independence from the national government. So we
have several decisions on this. Still we have a unitary
system of government. These local governments do not
enjoy the same power as that of the national government.
And there is more to decentralization of administration or
devolution of services rather than transfer of powers. So
Q: What is the difference between control and

supervision?
A: Control is when the head of office or the superior can
even change the decision of the subordinate and replace
it with his decision. Supervision, its only monitoring to
make sure that the government officials act in accordance
with law. He cannot change or modify the decision of a
subordinate because its only supervision.
Now, TN of section 5 also. Thats also asked in the BAR

exam.
Q: what are the sources of income of local government
units?
A: So basically they can raise their own revenues by
levying local taxes, fees and charges.
The emphasis will be local autonomy. We must

understand its nature or implication (BAR)
Q: What will be the extent of the supervision or control of
the national govt over the local govt under the concept of
local autonomy?
A: Control over local government under the concept of
local autonomy. Control over local govt is by congress by
virtue of the Local Government Code. The president only
has supervision.
Pimentel et al v Executive Secretary
Relating to the Pantawid ng Pamilyang Pilipino
Program of the DSWD or the conditional cash
transfer.

-
This was questioned by former Senator Pimentel

being the father of local autonomy. He
sponsored this concept. He questioned the
program through the DSWD.
Pimentel et al v Executive Secretary Ochoa and

DSWD [G.R. No. 195770. July 17, 2012.]
The essence of this express reservation of power (Sec.
17 (c) of LGC) by the national government is that, unless
an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing
agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.
The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals 17 that
while it is through a system of decentralization that the
State shall promote a more responsive and accountable
local government structure, the concept of local
autonomy does not imply the conversion of local
government units into "mini-states." 18 We explained
that, with local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing
more than "to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of the local government" and,
thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership
and interdependence between the central administration
and
local
government
units." 19 In Pimentel
v.
Aguirre, 20 the Court defined the extent of the local
government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with
the national government in the pursuit of common
national goals, referring to such key concepts as
integration and coordination.
XXX
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it. The national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned
Q: Can Barangay also levy their own taxes without

express law granting it such authority?
A: YES. Sec. 5 is self executing. It doesnt need an
enabling law to execute the provision.
A: Recall the examples. It is part of the power to tax by

these local governments. It is settled in the case of
MCIAA (Lapulapu) that the LGU has the power totax
because it is engaged in proprietary functions.
In contrast however, in the case of MIAA (Pasay), this

property is owned by the state in its sovereign capacity,
and therefore exempt from tax although exercising
proprietary functions. Because they are titled in the name
of the Republic not as patrimonial properties, but as
properties owned by the state in its sovereign capacity,
therefore exempt.
PPA is subject to tax. Because while they are rendering

public service, the property is owned in their proprietary
capacity.
GSIS is subject to tax. Accdg to the SC, unless it is

exempt! Because under the LGC, they (LGU) are
authorized to tax them. And so because of that decision
against GSIS, the law of GSIS was amended expressly
authorizing their exemption from taxation of local taxes.
Q: In case of doubt whether an entity is subject to local

tax or not, how do you resolve the doubt?
A: Against the local taxing authority. Meaning, it is exempt
from taxation
Sec. 6 Internal Revenue Allotment.
That is automatically released. The amount is to be

determined by Congress, subject to the availability of
funds.
TN If there is any law to that effect, it is only limiting the

exercise of their taxation power.
What is subject to the discretion of Congress is only the
amount. But as to its released, once it is determined, it
should be automatically released.
Q: Can the Local Govt. tax their local government
instrumentalities?
90

Sec. 7
TN The case involving Palawan and the Malampaya.
DOE doesnt share with the Palawan province. SC upheld
the right of the Palawan Province of an equitable share
from the proceeds of the utilization and development of its
national wealth within its area, invoking this provision,
including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of
direct benefits. [couldnt find exact case]
TERM OF OFFICE
91
of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because

Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend
the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be
legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new
term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position
for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment
by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President.
Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have
undertaken.
XXX XXX XXX
3 years term, except barangay ha which cannot be

changed by law. The term of the barangay officials can be
changed by law, not the other local elective officials. 3
years but in no case shall be more than 3 consecutive
terms.
When you serve, even if you dont finish your term, it may
be considered one full term for purposes of determining
the continuity or successiveness of the term of office.
Regular election ra ha! Not succession, recall election TN
And then you have the case of Maguindanao (Abas Kida

case). Thats the most recent decision on the term of
office. Unsay sulti sa SC? DIba na-expire na ang term of
office sa local officials, unya kay napostpone man ilang
elections kay tungod sa peace and order, so they cannot
call for an election.
Q: Can Congress, by postponing the elections, extend the

term of these local elective officials?
A: In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has
been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for
any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed
term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three
years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress. ADSTCa
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively
another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for
Congress to create a new term and to appoint the
occupant for the new term. This view like the extension
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to

appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither
novel nor innovative.|||
||| (Abas Kida v. Usman, G.R. No. 196271, 196305,
197221, 197280, 197282, 197392, 197454, o, October
18, 2011)
Q: who can fill up the vacancy because the term of

the government officials have already expired
A: the grant to the President the power to appoint an OIC
to undertake the function of the elective of the members
of the regional legislative assembly is neither novel or
innovative
There were previous decisions to this supporting the
ruling of the Supremer Court that it should be the
President to appoint the Officer-in charge.
TN OF THE FOLLOWING CASES:
Aldovino vs COMELEC (Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009) Preventive
suspension does not constitute voluntary renunciation.
(infra)
Bolos vs COMELEC
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected
as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms,
satisfying the first condition for disqualification.
What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed
to have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong

Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won
as Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said
office.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was
voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his position
as Punong Barangay.
The COMELEC correctly held:
XXX He knew that his election as
municipal councilor would entail
abandonment of the position he held,
and he intended to forego of it.
Abandonment, like resignation, is
voluntary. 12
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong
Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang Bayan member
and, upon winning, assumed the position ofSangguniang
Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office
as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a
voluntary renunciation of said office.
||| (Bolos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184082, March 17,
2009)
Adormeo vs COMELEC citing Lonzanida vs
COMELEC (which was also cited by Judge)
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
ELECTIVE
LOCAL
OFFICIALS;
VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE DOES NOT CANCEL THE
RENOUNCED TERM IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE
THREE-TERM LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. Neither can
respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as
"voluntary renunciation" for clearly it is not.
In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: . . . The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people's choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three-term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term. ||| (Adormeo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 147927, February 04, 2002)
92
Borja vs COMELEC
1. POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; TERM OF
OFFICE
OF
ELECTIVE
LOCAL
OFFICIALS;
PROHIBITION AGAINST SERVING FOR MORE THAN
THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS; TO BAR THE
ELECTION OF A LOCAL OFFICIAL BECAUSE HE HAS
ALREADY SERVED THREE TERMS, ALTHOUGH THE
FIRST AS A RESULT OF SUCCESSION BY
OPERATION OF LAW RATHER THAN ELECTION
WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT
TO CHOOSE THOSE WHOM THEY PLEASE TO
GOVERN THEM. A fundamental tenet of
representative democracy is that the people should be
allowed to choose those whom they please to govern
them. To bar the election of a local official because he
has already served three terms, although the first as a
result of succession by operation of law rather than
election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE X, SECTION 8 OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATES SERVICE BY
LOCAL OFFICIALS FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE
TERMS AS A RESULT OF ELECTION. Not only
historical examination but textual analysis as well
supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, Section
8 contemplates service by local officials for three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The first
sentence speaks of "the term of office of elective local
officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more
than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
explaining when an elective local official may be deemed
to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected." The
term served must therefore be one "for which [the official
concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is
to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number
of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if
he is not serving a term for which he was elected
because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have
fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration. DCcHAa
||| (Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, September
03, 1998)
Ong vs Alegre
1.POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE-TERM LIMIT
RULE; PETITIONER'S PROCLAMATION AS THE DULY
ELECTED MAYOR IN THE 1998 MAYORALTY
ELECTION COUPLED BY HIS ASSUMPTION OF
OFFICE AND HIS CONTINUOUS EXERCISE OF THE
FUNCTIONS THEREOF FROM START TO FINISH OF
THE TERM, SHOULD BE LEGALLY BE TAKEN AS
SERVICE FOR A FULL TERM IN CONTEMPLATION OF
THE THREE-TERM RULE. The three-term limit rule for
elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of the Local
Government Code restates the same rule. For the threeterm limit for elective local government officials to apply,
two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that

the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post,
and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive
terms. With the view we take of the case, the
disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus
effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner
Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001
elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and
the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein
controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral
term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis
ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998
elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral
term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him
mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The
question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether
or not Francis's assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001, may be considered as one full term service in the
context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold
that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis,
"service for the full term," and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit
prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions,
supra, barring local elective officials from being elected
and serving for more than three consecutive term for the
same position. It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines
Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was
Francis' opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998
mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected
mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must
be stressed, was without practical and legal use and
value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis'
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the
1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under
protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor.
His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office
and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term
rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a
contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would under the three-term rule
be considered as having served a term by virtue of a
veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a
proclamation made in due course after an
election.||| (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, 163354,
January 23, 2006)
93
Q: Dismissal?
A: there is an interruption because he did not finish the
term . then it is not considered as the full term that they
serve.
CASE OF ALDOVINO JR VS COMELEC
The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes of the 3 term limit rule
under the Constitution and the local government code.
Preventive suspension by its nature does not involve an
effective interruption of service.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and

the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the
Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is
therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the
three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an

effective interruption of a term and should therefore not
be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose
as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be
noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake
than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require
relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time.
It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative
charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing
preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a
term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly
disallows as an interruption.
So for example, first term, elected. Second term,

elected,Third term elected. During his third term, he was
placed under preventive suspension. So nakuhaan iyang
term because he was suspended for six months. Instead
of 3 years, he only served for two years and 6 months.
Q: Can he run in the next election?

A: No. Because the preventive suspension was not
considered an interruption.
Example: if you resign that is not considered as an

interruption.
Q: what if you are suspended?
A: depends
Preventive suspension no interruption
Mandatory suspension there is interruption
It would have been different if suspension was not

preventive suspension but suspension imposed as a
penalty then he has not fully served his third term, which
makes him qualified. Or he has been dismissed . When

you are suspended as a penalty or you are dismissed,
that is not considered as a voluntary interruption. But it
was qualified if preventive suspension because here, you
still hold the title and the office. There is no interruption in
preventive suspension.
The interruption of a term exempting an official from the

three-term limit is no less than an involuntary loss of the
title to the office. In involuntary suspension, the
suspended official is barred from exercising the functions
of his office but does not vacate and lose title to his office.
Loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an
eventual finding of guilt or liability. TN
94
Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the ViceMayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No.
7160. Potencioso's assumption of office as Vice-Mayor
was considered an involuntary severance from his office
as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption in his
second term of service. The Court held that it could not
be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of law. Hence,
Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for
municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu
in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. |(Bolos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184082,
March 17, 2009)
Ardomeo Case; Recall Term

BAR; Case - Bolos Jr vs COMELEC
FACTS: Bolos Jr. served as a barangay captain in his

third term. He didn't finish it.
Then there was an election in the town municipal hall so
he ran for the office of a municipal councilor and he won.
Afterwards, he got bored because he was only a councilor
compared to when he was the barangay captain where he
is the boss. So during the next barangay election, he ran
for barangay captain.
ISSUE: Is he qualified to run for Bgy Capt. when his third

term as a barangay captain was a voluntary resignation.
HELD: The SC said that Bolos was serving his third term
as punong barangay when he ran for the Sangunian
Bayan membership and upon winning and assuming the
position as a Sangguniang Bayan member, thus
voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Baranggay.
The court deemed this as a voluntary loss of title to the
office of Punong Baranggay and therefore, does not
interrupt the three-term limit.
An interruption in the service of a term of office, by

operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v.
Commission on Elections. The respondent therein,
Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected and served
three consecutive terms as Municipal Councilor of
Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 20042007. However, during his second term, he succeeded as
Facts: First, Second and Third Election, he won.

Pagkatapos, iyang kontra ni-daog. However, he ran
during a recall election.
ISSUE: Was he qualified?
HELD: Yes.Because there was already an interruption. He

did not run the fourth election . He ran only during the
recall election which was after the fourth election.
Therefore, the three-term limit is already interrupted.
1.POLITICAL
LAW;
ELECTION
LAWS;
DISQUALIFICATION;
THREE-TERM
RULE;
CONDITIONS FOR THE APPLICATION. The issue
before
us
was
already
addressed
in Borja,
Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we
held, To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. . . . Likewise, in the case
of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999),
we said, This Court held that the two conditions for the
application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT;
ELECTIVE
LOCAL
OFFICIALS;
VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE DOES NOT CANCEL THE
95
RENOUNCED TERM IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE

THREE-TERM LIMIT; CASE AT BAR. Neither can
respondent's victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as
"voluntary renunciation" for clearly it is not.
In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: . . . The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny
states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected." The clear intent of the framers of the constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the people's choice and grant their elected official
full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three-term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any
length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The
petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term. aTcESI
ISSUE: Why was it created as a province when in terms

of area, it was lacking?
||| (Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February

04, 2002)
XI. Accountability of Public Officers

***Memorize Section 1
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
TN: Creation of cities, municipalities and provinces, in

terms of requirements
Q: What are the requirements?

A: In terms of INCOME, POPULATION and AREA. ****
One thing you should take note is Navarro vs Ermita.
FACTS: This is the creation of the Kingdom of Ecleo,

Dinagat Island. There is a specific requirement for area.
This is an island which was sought to be considered as a
province. IT was considered as a province even though it
lacked the area requirement to form a province.
RULING: The land area requirement area does not apply

where the proposed province is composed on one or
more islands. Thus it was declared valid. Accordingly, RA
9355, creating Dinagat Province is declared as valid and
not unconstitutional. The proclamation of Dinagat Islands
as a province and the officers thereof are also valid.
The land area requirements of a province comprising of

one or more islands does not apply.
TN: League of the Cities of the Philippines v Comelec gi

increase ang income, from 20M to 100M.
Q: Is MMDA a local government unit?
A: No. It is only an administrative coordinating body. So
therefore it does not exercise those powers that are given
to LGUs.
***Memorize impeachable officials: (President, VicePresident, Supreme Court Justices, Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions and Ombudsman). That is
EXCLUSIVE and the GROUNDS also are EXCLUSIVE.
Grounds for Impeachment:
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
a. Q: Is the offense relating to that
impeachable
offense?
Can
the
President be impeached for it?
b. A: It is impeachable but whether he can
be impeached is another story. Its a
waste of time according to Fr. Bernas.
You know some people they just want
to put an impeachment complaint on
record even if it may not prosper at all.
Makataghap diay. (Its clear that there
was a violation, particularly Section
25(5) of Art. VI, whether there was good
or bad faith, but the next question is
whether it is culpable. Thats another
story.)
2. Bribery
3. Graft and Corruption
4. Betrayal of Public Trust
5. Treason

6.
Other high crimes
The most important part here is the process. So we have:

1. Initiation
2. Prosecution
Q: How is initiation done?
A: There has to be a filing of the complaint. Any citizen
may file a complaint but it has to be endorsed by a
member of the House, if the one who filed is a member of
the House, theres no more need of endorsement.
Q: How many votes are needed in order to affirm a
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment?
A: 1/3. The Articles of impeachment will be prepared and
filed with the Senate.
Q: Assuming that it was filed by a private individual and it
was endorsed by a member of the House of
Representatives, what will happen next?
A: It will be referred to the Committee on Justice. The
moment it is referred, regardless of the action, that may
be taken by that committee. It is deemed initiated.
Section 3.
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, theChief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of twothirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
96
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment

to effectively carry out the purpose of this section
Q: What happens the moment it is referred to the
Committee on Justice?
A: Regardless of the action that is taken by the
committee, is it deemed initiated. Once it is deemed
initiated, you cannot file a complaint within the one year
because of the one year bar rule.
Q: What about several complaints?
A: In the case of Gutierrez vs. The Ombudsman, there
were several complaints filed against her, it was made the
same year, the Supreme Court ruled that for as long as it
is simultaneously referred it is considered as one
initiation. It is possible that in one years time there are
several complaints, however, they are to be consolidated
and simultaneously referred to the committee and
considered as one initiation only.
Q: What may the Committee do once the complaint is
referred to it?
A: Once it is referred to the committee, the committee
may recommend its dismissal or it the filing.
Q: To whom it is recommended?
A: To the plenary session of the House.
Q: Within how many days does the Committee act?
A: 60 days and it is mandatory. They can be compelled to
file their report by mandamus should they fail to file it in
60 days because it is their ministerial duty to submit the
report in 60 days.
Q: What if the recommendation is the dismissal of the
complaint? Is there any chance of that complaint
prospering? And it will be brought to the senate for
prosecution?
A: Yes, all that is needed is one-third (1/3) even if two
thirds of the members of the house are agreeable to the
dismissal. If there is still one third of the membership left,
that is against the dismissal. Still, that case is initiated and
it can be filed with the senate for prosecution.
Even if the recommendation is for filing and two thirds are
against the filing for as long as the recommendation has
the support of one third of the members of the house it
can still be filed with the senate.
Q: So what will happen in the Senate?
A: There will be a hearing.
Q: Who is going to preside it?
A: Ordinarily, if the impeachable official is not the
president, it would be the president of the senate.
Otherwise if the subject of the impeachment is the
President, then it would be Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.
Q: How many votes in order to convict?
A: 2/3 votes. TN
Q: Does the requirement of publication, under the Rules
of Procedure, apply to impeachment proceedings?

A: Again in the case of Gutierrez vs. The Ombudsman,
one of her grounds for dismissal of the case was that the
rules of procedure on impeachment was not published.
She said that it violated her right to due process. Is she
correct? Supreme Court said No, she is not correct
because the requirement of publication of the rules of
procedure in congress applies only to the rules of
procedure relating to legislative inquiry not to
impeachment proceedings. So even if it is not published
there cant be a violation of due process because that is
not required under the Constitution.
97
Ombudsman vs CA, Et al., GR NO. 1772224, January 26,

2011 The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant
to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal shall
not stop the decision from being executor. Also, the power
of the Ombudsman to implement the penalty is not merely
recommendatory
but
mandatory.
Because
the
Constitution says it may recommend, No, it should be
interpreted as mandatory.
Administrative cases
Sec. 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law

Q: is this a Court?
A: Yes.
Q: Is this part of the Judiciary?
A: Yes, it is part of the Judiciary but it is not part of the
Ombudsman. It is a court not an Office, an Anti-Graft
Court.
Q: What is the role of the Ombudsman?
A: In relation to the Sandiganbayan, it becomes the
prosecutor. But there is the Special Prosecutors Office
that is under the Office of the Ombudsman that presents
evidence in the Sandiganbayan.
Q: Can a private prosecutor appear in the
Sandiganbayan?
A: No, unless the intention is to recover civil liabilities. If
theres no civil liability, then a private prosecutor has no
personality to appear in an Anti-Graft cases.
Q: What powers does The Ombudsman, have?
A: It has investigatory and prosecutorial power. When
they conduct investigation in a criminal case, they act like
a regular prosecutor.
In a criminal case, they act like a regular prosecutor
determine probable cause, whether a crime has been
committed and the person charged is probably guilty
thereof. It will be filed with the regular courts in the event
they will find probable cause. It is not for them to
determine whether he is guilty or not.
In an administrative case, the Ombudsman acts like a
judge to determine the guilt or innocence of the
respondent public officer.
So many cases wherein the Ombudsman had dismissed
government officials.
Q: Is the dismissal executory?
A: Yes.
Q: Pending appeal?
A: Yes. Immediately executory. (TN)
Q: Who are covered by the Ombudsmans investigatory

power?
A: Tanan. Except President, Vice-President because they
are impeachable; Members of Congress because they
are subject only to the exclusive disciplinary power of
each house; Justices of the Supreme Court because they
are impeachable; and Judges and even ordinary court
personnel because supervision is exclusive to the
Supreme Court.
Criminal Cases
Q: what is the extent of the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman?
A: All, including the senators. Even the President but only
after his tenure. Justices of the Supreme Court also after
their tenure.
Q: Does the power to prosecute or to investigate criminal
cases is exclusive to the Ombudsman?
A: No. It is concurrent with DOJ, concurrent with the
fiscals.
So you may file the anti-graft case in the fiscals office.
However, there is a condition to that, if the case is within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it has to be with the
imprimatur of the Ombudsman or the deputy of the
Ombudsman; otherwise, the information can be quashed
for lack of authority on the part of the prosecutor to file the
case in court.
Again, if the case is triable before the Sandiganbayan it
should be always with the approval of the Ombudsman or
the deputy Ombudsman. (TN)
Q: How long can the Ombudsman place someone under
preventive suspension?
A: Not more than six (6) months.
Q: how long can the ombudsman place someone under
preventive suspension?
A: not more than six (6) months
Q: On recovery of ill gotten wealth, is there any
prescriptive period?
Cases
Facura vs CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011.
Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases do not stay the execution of the
penalty imposed.
A: There is none. Walay prescriptive period, forever, but

prosecuting these persons responsible, TN 15 years from
the commission of the crime or from the time of discovery
of the crime, it prescribes ang criminal action but not on
the recovery of ill gotten wealth.

(BAR) Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
*** Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
The enumeration is exclusive. It cannot be modified by
legislation.
Q: Is the Deputy Ombudsman impeachable?
98
legislative
prerogative
and can be
exercised by
the Congress
only within
the limits of
the authority
conferred
upon it by the
Constitution.
This authority
may not be
expanded by
the grantee
itself even if
motivated by
the desire to
strengthen
the security
of tenure of
other officials
of the
government.
A: NO. It was answered in Office of the Ombud vs CA

and Mojica [G.R. No. 146486. March 4, 2005.], citing the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions
The
impeachable
officers are
the President
of the
Philippines,
the VicePresident,
the members
of the
Supreme
Court, the
members of
the
Constitutiona
l
Commissions
, and the
Ombudsman.
(see Art. XI,
Sec. 2) The
list is
exclusive
and may not
be increased
or reduced
by legislative
enactment.
The power to
impeach is
essentially a
non-
It is now provided by decree (see P.D. No. 1606) that

justices of the Sandiganbayan may be removed only
through process of impeachment, the purpose evidently
being to withdraw them from the removal power of the
Supreme Court. This prohibition is of dubious
constitutionality. In the first place, the list of impeachable
officers is covered by the maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Secondly, Article VIII, Section 11, of the
Constitution states that all judges of inferior courts and
this would include the Sandiganbayan are under the
disciplinary power of the Supreme Court and may be
removed by it.
Q: Can President remove the Deputy Ombudsman?
You remember the case involving the Quirino hostaging of

Chinese Nationals by a police Rolando Mendoza? They
said the policeman acted this way because he had a
pending MR with the Deputy Ombudsman with the
Military which was not immediately acted upon. As a
result of such incident, the president removed the deputy
ombudsman from office. Now, the deputy ombud is not an
impeachable official. Who then can remove him from his
office? Can he be removed by the President considering
that it was the President who appointed him to the
position, which then includes the power of removal?

A: NO. The President cannot remove the Deputy
Ombudsman. There is a process that we must follow
otherwise, it would undermine the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. This was enunciated in the
recent case of
99
Ombud Gonzales and Special Prosuctor Sulit. In this

same case, SC upheld the Presdients disciplinary power
as limited only to the Special Prosecutor because it is not
part of the Office of the Ombudsman. [Judge said there is
still no resolution yet on this matter as the case is still
pending with the CA, most probably daw different from
the Deputy Ombud nevertheless, heres the excerpt from
the Gonzales case, which tells us Judge is correct.]
Gonzales III vs. OP of the Phil., G.R. No. 196231 &

196232, January 28, 2014
In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the

Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the
Executive
Department
are
subject
to
the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority, cannot but
seriously place at risk the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate,
includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the
Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence
is what Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so
doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle
of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and
necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents
of the Ombudsman in the performance of their
duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to
place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who
are not as independent as she is, if only because they are
subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.
This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and
truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where
graft and corruption is still a major problem for the
government. For these reasons, Section 8 (2)
of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may
remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared
void.
Q: How then can the Deputy Ombudsman be removed?
A: There is a procedure in the office of the ombudsman. It
will go through a committee of peers, among themselves
in the office of the ombudsman, to investigate and
discipline the deputy ombudsman and the special
prosecutors.
Q: what about the Special prosecutor which is an organic
part of the office of the ombudsman?
If you can recall, because of that plea bargaining with
deputy ombudsman Gonzales, which allowed Major
Carlos Garcia to plead to a lesser offense. It was later
found that the plea bargaining was disadvantageous to
the government. The President thereafter fired Deputy
Under Section 11 (4) of RA No. 6770, the Special

Prosecutor handles the prosecution of criminal cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this
prosecutorial authority includes high-ranking executive
officials. For emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor
to
disciplinary
and
removal
powers
of
the
President, whose own alter egos and officials in the
Executive Department are subject to the prosecutorial
authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself
at risk.
Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not

expressly made part of the composition of the Office of
the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic
component of that Office militates against a differential
treatment between the Ombudsman's Deputies, on one
hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the
other.What is true for the Ombudsman must be
equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for
other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as
agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance
of her duties.
In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court was
confronted with an argument that, at bottom, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor is not a subordinate agency of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, in fact, separate and
distinct from the latter.
||| (Gonzales III vs. OP of the Phil., G.R. No. 196231 &
196232, January 28, 2014)
Non-disclosure of maters in the SALN there is no such

provision as a ground for impeachment
Q: What was then the ground for which corona was
impeached?
A: It was betrayal of public trust, not even for graft and
corruption.
culpable violation of the constitution it is not just a
violation of the constitution, but there has to be willful,
intentional violation of the constitution that is legal or
unlawful. I am referring to this because when the SC
declares a law to be unconstitutional would it necessarily

follow that the president may be charged of culpable
violation of the constitution?
What theyre afraid of after the administrations term of
office expires, they might be charged with technical
malversation of public funds or other violations of the antigraft law. Thats why they are trying to invoke good faith.
TN: no jurisprudence yet on culpable violation of the
constitution, you can only understand it in its ordinary
concept.
The RPC defines: treason, bribery while other special
penal laws define graft and corruption like RA 3019. On
the other hand, other high crimes and betrayal of public
trust have not been defined yet, ultimately it is for the
senate to define that, and they did not even explain why
they removed Corona, only that they have decided that he
has betrayed public trust because of his non-disclosure of
his real income in his SALN.
Sec. 4 on impeachment proceedings
Q: Who initiates impeachment proceedings (not
impeachment complaint), how is it initiated, what are the
limitations?
A: TN to consider an initiation of impeachment
proceedings, there has to be a filing of the complaint,
which has to be sufficient in form and substance.
form means it has to be a verified petition and endorsed
by a member of congress.
There is no need for an endorsement of a member of
congress IF it was filed by a member of congress himself
or if it was signed by at least 1/3 of the members of the
house of representativesthat would no longer go to
committee on justice, rather, what will happen thereafter
is the preparation of the articles of impeachment that
would be filed in the senate for trial.
Q: Assuming that a complaint is filed and endorsed by a
member of congress, is there an initiation of impeachment
proceedings?
A: Not yet until it is referred to the committee on justice.
The initiation of impeachment proceedings consists of the
filing the complaint and its referral to the committee on
justice regardless of whatever action that may have been
taken by the committee. Thats the case of Francisco et
al vs House of Representative Gr No. 160261
November 10, 2003
7.POLITICAL
LAW;
LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT; IMPEACHMENT POWER; ONE-YEAR
BAN
PROHIBITING
THE
INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIALS UNDER SECTION
3(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION; MEANING OF TIE TERM
"INITIATE"; CASE AT BAR. From the records of the
Constitutional
Commission,
to
the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners,
100
it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the

filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled
with
Congress' taking initial action on said complaint. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and
referral
or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint
to
the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at
least
one-third of the
members of the Houseof Representatives with
the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section
3(5) of Article
XI
becomes
clear.
Once
an impeachment complaint
has
been
initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO MAKE AND
INTERPRET ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT IS NOT
ABSOLUTE; IMPEACHMENT RULES
MUST
EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
Respondent House of Representatives counters

that
under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and
interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised
on
the
assumption
that
Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced. Section 3(8) of Article
XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules
on impeachment to
effectively
carry
out
the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate
its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly
provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules.
In the case of Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice Gr No. 193459 remember the
ombudsman who was the subject of impeachment Here,
there were several complaints filed against her, so she
invoked the one year bar of filing of a petition for
impeachment wherein you can only have the initiation of
the impeachment proceedings once in a year.
Since there were several complaints that were all referred
to the committee on justice, was there a violation of the
one year bar rule?
SC held that there was no violation of the one year bar
rule because while there were several complaints, they
were all together referred to the committee on justice at
the same time.
The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an
impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting
bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing
one-year bar, however, is to commit the apparently
unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment
proceeding, which may be struck down under Rule 65 for
grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the oneyear bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the
House's power or function to refer a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a
clearly constitutionally-prohibited second impeachment
complaint on the matter of whether to make the
appropriate referral goes precisely into the propriety of
the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The
House needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of
the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to
the claims set forth in the complaint.
XXX IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did
apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the present
case, with Francisco as the guiding light
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, G.R. No. 193459, March 08, 2011)
This may apply now since there were three or four
impeachment complaints filed against the president, for
as long as they were endorsed simultaneously to the
committee referred to then there is only one initiation of
the impeachment proceedings.
TN: The House of Representative is given the discretion

to promulgate its own rules and regulation governing the
initiation of impeachment proceedings. This is in relation
to the issue raised in the Gutierrez case wherein she
contended that the complaint and the proceedings were
invalid because the rules regarding the impeachment
proceedings were never published.
The Supreme Court was saying that the Constitution does
not state that its rules and regulations governing
impeachment proceedings should be published. The only
thing that was mentioned by the Constitution regarding on
the rules governing rules and regulations are those rules
governing legislative inquiry. Remember the case of Neri
vs Executive Committee (supra). In that case, the
proceedings were nullified because there was no
publication of the rules and regulations governing the
legislative inquiry in that Congress. Again, and for brevity,
that requirement is not needed in impeachment
proceedings, because again, the rules need not be
published. And you should also TN that it is exclusive to
the House of Representatives.
Another point that you should TN here guys is on the
voting for the impeachment complaint.
Q: What is the requirement in order to prepare the Articles
of Impeachment?
A: All you need is one-third of the members of the House
of Representatives. From the filing, it is referred to the
Committee of Justice. They have only 60 days within
which to act on it. That means should they not act or
refuse to act on that complaint;
Q: can they be compelled by mandamus?
101
A: The answer is yes. The recommendation of the

Committee could either be dismissal or they will
recommend for the indictment, or the Articles of
Impeachment is prepared.
Q: How many votes are needed?
A: Either way its one-third.
Q: What does this mean?
A: It means that even if the recommendation is for the
dismissal, it can easily be overturned by the House of
Representatives members, for as long it can obtain onethird votes of the members of the House of
Representatives regardless of the recommendation of
dismissal of the committee. Or even if the
recommendation is for indictment, for as long as it is
supported by 1/3 votes of the members of the House of
Representatives, it will prosper and the impeachable
official can be indicted. Thereafter, the Articles of the
Impeachment will be prepared, theres a charge sheet.
Q: What is the nature of the proceedings once it reaches
the Senate?
A: It is a kind of specie or genus, of its own, but the nature
would be administrative because the purpose of the
proceedings is to determine whether the official is guilty or
not, for purposes of removing him from office. But
because its adversarial, its also criminal in nature, and
therefore the respondent impeachable official shall be
treated like an accused, and that means that he should be
afforded with all the Constitutional rights of the accused.
Q: Now who is going to preside over the hearings?
A: You have the President of the Senate if it is the
President who is the subject of impeachment, it will be the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Q: How many votes is needed in order to convict and
remove him from office?
A: It will be 2/3 votes of the members of the House.
Q (student): Judge, can it be endorsed by a member of
the Senate?
A: No, it has to be a member of the House of
Representatives. If its the Senator, it still needs to be
endorsed by a member of the House.
This is exclusive to the House of Representatives, but
there is no provision exactly in the Constitution which
states that he should be a member of the House, because
it might be from the Senate. That depends on the rules
and regulations that may be promulgated by the House of
Reps, but what is certain is that the initiation is exclusive
and the initiation is not just limited to the filing, but as well
as referral.
Q(student): But when 1/3 has signed it already Maam?

A: No need to sign anymore. Its already deemed initiated
already.
Q (student): What if the complaint is irregular in form and
substance, will it still be considered initiated?
A: The one whos going to determine that is the
committee, so its deemed initiated. Regardless of the
action, when you say initiated, filing and referred to, so
the form and the substance will be determined by the
committee. So if its not compliant with the requirements
insofar as form is concerned, then it will be dismissed so
its deemed initiated already. Commenced na ang
proceedings, and so that would bar another impeachment
proceedings within the same year.
You should differentiate the initiation of the proceedings
from indictment. Not the complaint, because the
complaint for example, one of the things that they have to
establish is that the ground must be one of those
enumerated in the Constitution and secondly, it has to be
verified. If you cannot comply with that, then its defective,
in which case the Committee would recommend its
dismissal. Again, and just for emphasis, if its referred
already, then it is deemed initiated. Thats precisely the
emphasis on the proceedings being initiated for purposes
of determining whether the one year bar against the filing
of the impeachment complaint would now apply.
Q (student): What if it does not go through the referral
part or when its already deemed initiated by 1/3 of the
members of the House?
A: They dont go into the form anymore. Theyre already
in the Senate.
Q: But the one year ban still applies?
A: Yes, definitely.
[Judges point is that for so long as it has the imprimatur
of 1/3 of the House Reps, then the one-year bar rule
already applies, even if it doesnt go through referral in
cases where the 1/3 of the HR themselves initiate the
impeachment.]
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The SDB is the anti graft court. It is a part of the
Judiciary. It is NOT part of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of
the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed.
102
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the

Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be appointed by
the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law
The Ombudsman is vested with both Investigatory and
Prosecutorial functions.
For the Prosecutorial functions, this is where the
Ombudsman files cases either to the Sandiganbayan or
to the regular courts through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
Under its Investigatory Functions, we have both
Administrative and Criminal Jurisdiction.
Ombudsmans Administrative Jurisdiction
It covers all public officers and employees. There are no
exceptions, whether he occupies consultancy or
contractual positions, so long as you received salary from
government funds. Here, the Ombudsman acts like a
judge. It determines whether the public officer is guilty or
not.
There is an exception though for Impeachable Officials.
Ombudsmans Criminal Jurisdiction
Ombudsman acts as a prosecutor. This power, however,
is not exclusive to the ombudsman.
This is concurrent with DOJ.
(TN) (BAR) - What must be taken into consideration
should the DOJ also investigate a public officer, if the
case is triable before the Sandiganbayan, is that the
information prepared by the DOJ must be with the
imprimatur of the Ombudsman.
Q: Who is subject to the criminal investigatory power of
the Ombudsman?
A: All public officers. There is no exception. Except the
president because he is immune from suit.
Q: Can Binay, an impeachable official, be investigated by
the Ombudsman?
A: For purposes of removal, NO. Administrative aspect
For the criminal aspect, YES. He can be prosecuted in
the Sandiganbayan.
Q: Can the Ombudsman prosecute cases in the regular
courts, through the office of the deputy ombudsman?
A: YES.
George Uy vs Sandiganbayan has already been
reversed. The SC now says that the Ombudsman or
the deputy Ombudsman has the power to prosecute
cases even in the regular courts through the
ombudsman prosecutors and investigators. The
information may only be signed by the deputy
ombudsman or the ombudsman.

Should the case be filed in the Sandiganbayan,
even if the prosecution of cases involving graft and
corruption is concurrent with the DOJ, it has to be
with the imprimatur in the Ombudsman.
Employees of the Ombudsman are appointed by the
Ombudsman in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Q: Can the Ombudsman execute its own judgment?
A: Yes!, to give teeth to anti graft laws.
Thus, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 17, is categorical in providing that an
appeal shall not stop an Ombudsman decision from being
executory. This rule applies to the appealable decisions
of the Ombudsman, namely, those where the penalty
imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, or a
penalty of suspension of more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to more than one month's salary. Hence, the
dismissal of De Jesus and Parungao from the
government service is immediately executory pending
appeal. ||| (Ombudsman v. De Chavez, G.R. No. 172206,
July 03, 2013)
Sec. 8 Qualifications of the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsman (TN)
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of their
appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity
and independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and
must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must
have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in Section
2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
(TN) they are subject to the screening of the Judicial and
Bar Council, not the Commission on Appointments
Q: What is the term of office for an ombudsman, a deputy
ombudsman?
A: 7 years.
Sec. 13 Powers and Functions of the Ombudsman. Go over.
Sec 14 Fiscal Autonomy.
Ombudsman has its own budget, like the Supreme Court.
It cannot be reduced. Whatever budget that has been
allocated to it this year, the next fiscal budget may be
maintained but cannot be reduced.
Sec. 15. Recovery of ill-gotten wealth (BAR)
No prescription.
However, in prosecution of public officers involving graft
and corruption or ill-gotten wealth there is a prescription
of 15 years from the commission or the discovery of the
commission of the crime.
103
Sec. 17 Statement of assets and liabilities.

Required upon entry to government office.
Should be filed on or before the 30th day of April every
year.
Controversial because of the refusal of the Justices of the
Supreme Court to give copies to the BIR.
Before it used to be the refusal to present SALN to the
media.
There has been a recent decision that the SALN is a part
of public record, and a part of public accountability, and
should be disclosed to the public. (Supra)
The Supreme Court in its refusal did not say that they
dont have the right. The SC is just asking for the legal
bases of why they should be given copies of the SALN.
Especially when they found out that there has been an
increase considerably of the income of all Justices.
Sec. 18 Change of citizenship because of double allegiance
Dual citizenship is not prohibited, what is prohibited is
dual allegiance.
Green card holders, change of citizenship or of status as
an immigrant with another country shall be dealt with
accordingly by our laws.
ARTICLE XII NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
Regalian Doctrine *****
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of waterpower, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Concept: That all lands and mineral resources belong to
the State
Classification of lands:
1. Lands of public domain
2. Private lands
Classification sof Public domain:
1. Agricultural lands
2. Mineral lands

3.
4.
Timber lands
National parks
Only agricultural lands are alienable and disposable,

meaning can be acquired only by the citizens of the
country. However it is limited, not more than 12 hectares
Q: What about a qualified Filipino corporation? Can it
acquire?
A: He cant. It is a public domain. It can only lease.
Q: What is the extent or duration?
A:
Individual citizen: 500 hectares for 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years
Qualified Filipino corporations: 1000 hectares for 25
years, renewable 25 years
The most important part relating to this:
Q: When does a qualified Filipino corporation acquire a
land of public domain?
A: Once a public domain is acquired by a Filipino
individual citizen, it becomes a private land. And when it
becomes a private land, it can now be acquired by Filipino
corporations.
Case: Amari case
When you say agricultural land, it is not necessary that
you plant rice, corn or coconut. It simply means, that it
can be alienated or disposed of or acquired by individual
citizens. Now, what happened in this case, it was
reclaimed then it was later classified as agricultural land,
the corporation who reclaimed it wanted to acquire the
land as some kind of payment for the reclamation.
Q: Can they do that?
A: No, but there is no ban against the members of the
corporation or for the board of directors who are Filipino
citizens to acquire the land. And once they are acquired
by this board, it becomes a private land and it can now be
acquired by a qualified Filipino Corporation. That is on an
assumption that a reclaimed land was converted into an
agricultural land.TN BAR
1. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW; REGALIAN DOCTRINE;
SUBMERGED LANDS ARE PROPERTY OF THE STATE
AND ARE INALIENABLE. Submerged lands are
owned by the State and are inalienable. [Pursuant to]
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. . . Submerged lands,
like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the
State's inalienable natural resources. Submerged lands
are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable
and outside' the commerce of man. This is also true with
respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of submerged or
foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECLAIMED LANDS ARE NO LONGER
FORESHORE OR SUBMERGED LANDS AND THUS
MAY QUALIFY AS ALIENABLE AGRICULTURAL
LANDS; COURT RULING IN PONCE CASES NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. This is why [in
the Ponce Cases], the Cebu City ordinance merely
granted Essel, Inc. an "irrevocable option" to purchase
the foreshore lands after the reclamation and did not
104
actually sell to Essel, Inc. the still to be reclaimed

foreshore lands. Clearly, in the Ponce Cases the option to
purchase referred to reclaimed lands, and not to
foreshore lands which are inalienable. Reclaimed lands
are no longer foreshore or submerged lands, and thus
may qualify as alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain provided the requirements of public land laws are
met. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of
the Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to this
very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the
Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area
are still submerged, permanently under the waters of
Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the PEA conveyed
to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual
reclamation, although the documentation of the deed of
transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be
made only after actual reclamation.
||| (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250
(Resolution), November 11, 2003)
Question of SRP, the first corporation that acquired a
portion of SRP is Big Foot, how come they acquired it?
Where it should have been individual citizen of the
country! (case still pending)
What was applied in that case is the NHA case, The NHA
case, they reclaimed Smokey mountain, ang NHA maoy
nag pa reclaim, daun ang RH building company, ang
contractor asked for payment by way of acquiring lands.
The question was WON that corporation can acquire the
land that they reclaimed, so, there was a comparison in
the case of Chavez vs PEA (the Amari land) , ingon ang
Supreme Court in that Chaves case, a corporation cannot
acquire a reclaimed land since it is a land of public
domain, however it was classified as agricultural until it is
acquired by a private individual citizen and then sell it to a
qualified Filipino corporation, since it becomes a private
land.
NHA case relating to Smokey Mountain, take note:
Read: Chaves vs PEA and Chavez vs NHA
The Supreme Court said:
To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a
private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain
alienable lands of public domain which can be transferred
only to Filipino citizens but not to a private
corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO
525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of
public domain and it is only when it is transferred to
Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On
the other hand, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its
charterThe Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
The NHA is an end-user agency authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment
titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents
(like SRP) are transferred to the NHA by the Register of
Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial

properties (meaning private lands, not land of public
domain) of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens
and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos.
The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not
converted to patrimonial land (or private land) once
transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer it
to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate
lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain
its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and
prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP.
4. ID.; ID.; PRIVATE CORPORATIONS ARE BARRED
FROM ACQUIRING ALIENABLE LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN; CASE AT BAR. Finally, the Ponce
Cases were decided under the 1935 Constitution which
allowed private corporations to acquire alienable lands of
the public domain. However, the 1973 Constitution
prohibited private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain, and the 1987
Constitution reiterated this prohibition. Obviously, the
Ponce Cases cannot serve as authority for a private
corporation to acquire alienable public lands, much less
submerged lands, since under the present Constitution a
private corporation like Amari is barred from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain. ||| (Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250 (Resolution),
November 11, 2003)
The moment titles over reclaimed land based on special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of
Deeds they are automatically converted to patrimonial
properties meaning private lands of the government. Dili
lang of public domain so it says here which can be sold to
Filipino citizens and to private corporations 60% of which
are owned by Filipinos
The reason is obvious if the reclaimed is not converted to
patrimonial land or private land once transferred to NHA
then it would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it
cannot alienate lands of public domain. More importantly
it cannot attain its avowed purposes since it can only
transfer patrimonial lands who qualify beneficiary and
prospective buyers.
TN: The only issue with the SRP is that it can only be
done in a public bidding. A qualified Filipino corporation
may acquire however possible through a public bidding.
That is now pending in the Supreme court. There is a
decision already sustaining the decision of the CA that is
has to go through a public bidding
TN: in the case of DENR vs YAP involving DENR and the
Boracay Island. It is a timberland. Save for those that
have titles you consider them as agricultural land but
generally half of the island is classified as a timberland
even if it is no longer a woody land. It doesnt matter as
long as it has not been reclassified because in its
classification it is still a timberland and it is inalienable
until it is reclassified.
105
A positive act declaring land as alienable

and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of
the
government,
such
as
an
official
proclamation, 80 declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 81 In
fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been
"officially delimited and classified." 82
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. 83 To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 84 There
must still be a positive act declaring land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable. 86aI
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof. 87
||| (Secretary of DENR v. Yap, G.R. No. 167707, 173775,
October 08, 2008)
Q: Who is going to reclassify?
A: it is the president upon the recommendation of the
DENR
TN: that friar lands are supposedly inalienable but once
reclassified it may be applied for title.
TN and BAR: case of Malabanan vs Republic of the
Philippines has been asked even in Civil Law it has been
asked in the Bar. How do you convert public domains as
patrimonial property to private property? Only upon a
declaration that it is alienable and disposable together
with the express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth . only

when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of the property of
public domain begin to run.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative
to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely: EaIDAT
(1)As a general rule and pursuant to
the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are
not clearly under private
ownership
are
also
presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may
not
be
alienated
or
disposed;
(2)The following are excepted from
the general rule, to wit:
(a)Agricultural lands of the
public domain are
rendered alienable
and
disposable
through any of the
exclusive modes
enumerated under
Section
11
of
the Public
Land
Act. If the mode is
judicial
confirmation
of
imperfect
title
under Section 48
(b) of the Public
Land
Act, the
agricultural
land
subject
of
the
application needs
only
to
be
classified
as
alienable
and
disposable as of
the time of the
application,
provided
the
applicant's
possession
and
occupation of the
land dated back to
June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive
presumption that
the applicant has
performed all the
conditions
essential
to
a
government grant
arises, 36 and the
applicant becomes
the owner of the
land by virtue of an
imperfect
or
106
incomplete title. By
legal fiction, the
land has already
ceased to be part
of
the
public
domain and has
become
private
property. 37
(b)Lands of the public
domain
subsequently
classified
or
declared as no
longer intended for
public use or for
the development of
national wealth are
removed from the
sphere of public
dominion and are
considered
converted
into
patrimonial lands
or lands of private
ownership
that
may be alienated
or
disposed
through any of the
modes of acquiring
ownership under
the Civil Code. If
the
mode
of
acquisition
is
prescription,
whether ordinary
or
extraordinary,
proof that the land
has been already
converted
to
private ownership
prior
to
the
requisite
acquisitive
prescriptive period
is a condition sine
qua
non in
observance of the
law
(Article
1113, Civil Code)
that property of the
State
not
patrimonial
in
character shall not
be the object of
prescription.
||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987,
September 03, 2013)
TN: so if you have been an occupant of the property of
your predecessors. Take note of the period when to recon
from the possession to recon the 30 years. You must
have the possession of the property since June 12, 1945.
That at the time of the occupation of the land it was not

yet classified as alienable or patrimonial property of the
government. 30 years.
Q: when can you apply for title once this is classified as
private land?
A: you have until December 21, 2020 within which you
can apply for title. This applies to friar lands a lot of them
in cebu actually which was a land of public domain and
later reclassified as patrimonial or a land of the
government, In which case the occupants may now apply
for title provided they can prove that they have been
occupying the land since June 12, 1945.
EXN to the Regalian Doctrine TN: on the concept of
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN on lands are not covered by the
regalia doctrine. It is based on a native title of the
indigenous people or the cultural communities. They are
considered as private lands and therefore they never
belong to the state and never became part of the state.
Case of Cruz vs the secretary of the DENR and the case
of Cario vs the Insular Government where the supreme
court said that in relation to this TN: of the RA 8371
categorically declares ancestral lands as domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains
and lands under native title are therefore undisputedly
presumed to have never been public lands and they are
private lands. The right to ownership granted to
indigenous people over their ancestral domains does not
include the natural resources. The right granted to the
indigenous people to negotiate the terms and conditions
over the natural resources covers only the exploration to
ensure ecological and environmental protection. This is
emphasized because of the Bangsamoro. The reason
why it is delayed is the one thing they cannot just yet
reconcile is that their claim over the ancestral lands and
especially on the exploration natural resources. The
sharing now on the resources because while they own the
land and domain but the exploration they are given only. I
think they are sharing now over the natural resources
because while they own the lands or the domain but, their
exploration, they are given only the priority. They are like
sharing 80-20 if not 100%. So I think they have agreed
like 60-40, 60 to the Bangsamoro, 40% to the national
government on the exploration of the natural resources
that may be found there because of the premise that the
ancestral lands do not belong to the state unlike all other
lands or other resources because even on private lands,
you may own the private land but the natural resources
found in your land, you dont own them, they belong to the
state. That is the concept of the Regalian doctrine. So
that is the reason why.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded
primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources.
The State may directly undertake the exploitation and
development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the
private
sector
through
co-production,224 joint
venture, 225 or
production-sharing
agreements. 226 These agreements may be for a period
of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State,
107
through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of

natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale
exploration of these resources, specifically minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the
President, may enter into technical and financial
assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and
the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076)
the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing, may apply to both largescale 227 and
small-scale
mining. 228 "Small-scale
mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and
do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." 229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that
grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of
ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership,
but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in
Section 7 (a) as:
"SECTION 7.a)Right of ownership.
The right to claim ownership over
lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing
grounds,
and
all
improvements made by them at any
time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership
over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains." It will
be noted that this enumeration does not
mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in
the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional
fishing grounds, forests ortimber in the sacred
places, etc. and all other natural resources found
within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of
ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover
"waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to
the State. AECcTS
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the
Regalian doctrine.
||| (Cruz v. DENR Secretary, G.R. No. 135385, December
06, 2000)
Before we used to pay royal taxes. Now, what is the
requirement? Mu-abang ra ang government sa pag gamit
sa imong yuta because the mineral resources on your
land do not belong to you. They belong to the state.
Unlike the 1973 constitution, both mineral resources and
the land belong to you.
Q: So let us say for example, because of the typhoon
Yolanda, you have your land, and a hole was created in
your land where water is found, a lake is formed in your

land. Question, who owns the lake which is now found in
your land?
A: It is not you, it belongs to the state. You only own the
surface but not the mineral resources.
That is the point there.
So unlike the ancestral lands, the ancestral lands belong
to the IP.
Q: What about the natural resources?
A: What was emphasized is the priority in the exploration
of the natural resources. The case of Cruz is actually
based on a land mark case that is Carino vs. The Insular
Government. This is the camp john hay case recognizing
the existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue
of possession under the claim of ownership since time
immemorial as an exception to the theory of jus
regalia.
Another point that you should take note here, on private
lands.
Private lands are owned by private individuals.
Q: Who can acquire them?
A: They can be acquired by Filipino citizens, and a
qualified Filipino corporation.
Q: How about a foreigner, can he acquire private lands?
A: Yes but only in hereditary succession where he is a
compulsory heir. Not as a voluntary heir.
Q: (BAR) Who has the exclusive right to enjoy the
nations marine wealth in the archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and EEZ?
A: It is reserved in its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino Citizens only. That is why the argument relating to
kaning gi-claim sa China. Can we instead settle the issue
by just having a joint venture with them to explore the
natural resources in the economic zone? NO. because
that will violate paragraph 2 section 2. So put a star on
that. That was explained then by Justice Carpio. One of
the things is that it might violate because it says use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. There cannot
be a joint venture or co-production in the exploration with
the chinese. TN Also, fish farming cooperative. TN.
Subsistence to Filipino citizens also.
And then you have enter into agreementsforeign. Kung
small scale lang nah siya, dili pwede ang foreign
corporations. Pero kung large scale na gani ang
exploration, of natural resources, you may enter into
contract with foreign corporation, like mining for example.
However limited only to provisions of service contracts to
provide financial or technical assistance. They cannot
enter into joint venture.
Kung Filipino corporation, it may enter into joint venture,
production sharing or co-production. But not with a foreign
corporation. Limited only into entering service contracts to
provide financial or technical assistance.
By the way, private lands ha, limited onlyforeigners. A
condominium is not a land so therefore, it can be acquired
by foreigners. While the condominium building may have
108
been erected on the land, the land is not acquired by the

foreigner. Only the condominium unit that can be acquired
by a foreigner.
Q: What about a balikbayan, can he acquire? By
balikbayan, we mean he is a former natural born citizen
now a foreigner. Can he acquire lands in the PH?
A: Yes but limited. For whatever purposes now, maagricultural or residential, they can acquire. What is the
limit? 3000 sq meters kung rural. Kung residential it will
be in the city, 5000 sq meters. TN
Section 10 on NEDA, just read that.
Section 11 on Franchise, Operation of Public Utilities.
Q: Who can operate?
A: Filipino citizen and a Qualified Filipino Corporations.
Q: What is the capital?
A: 60-40.
Q: What is a public utility?
A: That which renders public service.
Example is transportation, communication etc. I think
there is a controversy relating to PLDT because more
than 60% is owned by Malaysian Corporation. There is
still an MR pending in the SC regarding on that. This is
one of the things that they want to amend. They want the
foreigner investors that there will be no limit on the
percentage. If there is, they might probably increase the
limitations on investments that may be made by
foreigners in certain areas of business investments.
Also that you must take note on public utilitiesthis does
not include build, operate and transfer (BOT). Example is
NLEX and SLEX. BOT man nah siya. MRT, LRT, these
are not covered by public utilities. So the limitation on
investments by foreigners does not apply. So it could be
100% foreigner. Foreigner man na ang NLEX and SLEX I
think. A corporation that is building the highway like you
are in abroad. It is so wide. They collect toll fess as
payment. So that is not covered by the Public Utility. BOT
is not a public utility.
The franchise is good for 25 years. Renewable for
another 25 years. Section 11 is the exception to the nonimpairment clause. Because a franchise may be a
contract between a corporation or an individual citizen
engaged in the operation of public utilities, that however is
subject to amendment, repeal or alteration. That is so
provided in the constitution itself.
Q: What about the officers of these public utilities?
A: Proportionate to the investment made. As to the
election and the citizenship of the managing officers of
the corporation or association that has been asked
already in the bar exam.
(BAR) Section 12. The State shall promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.

Section 13.
This was the case of Angara. That there is no violation of
sovereignty sa WTO. That there is no violation of
sovereignty because it is the trade, the policy, the basis of
which is serving the general welfare and utilizing forms
and arrangement of exchange on the basis of equity and
reciprocity. Put a star there. That was asked in the bar.
Section 14
The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents
consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and
skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be
promoted by the State. The State shall encourage
appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the
national benefit. The practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases
prescribed by law.
What was asked is the second paragraph of section 14.
On the practice of profession in the PH shall be limited
only to Filipino citizens unless allowed by law.
Section 15,
That is on social justice and economic development. That
is a matter of policy. It needs to be enforced by law.
Section 16.
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for
the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability.
****Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
****Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national
welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries
and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government.
This is with respect to the taking over of government over
certain industries. One is temporary, the other one is
permanent.
If it is temporary in cases of emergency, there is no just
compensation.
if it is permanent for reasons of general welfare, there
has to be payment of just compensation.
Section 17 is only temporary. In times only of national
emergency when public interest so requires.
109
BAR: You must read Section 17 in relation with Sec

23 of Art VI.
Article VI Section 23.
1.
The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both

Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
2.
In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
Section 18 is permanent. No need of emergency but only

for reasons in the interest of national welfare or defense.
May also operate vital industries. In this case, there has
to be payment of just compensation.
Section 19
Q: WON monopoly of certain industry is unconstitutional.
A: NO. Here the State may only regulate. Prohibit only
when the interest of the public so requires. Because
sometimes there is monopoly in transportation or
communication in fact for lack of investment. For as long
as it doesnt affect public interest, it may not be
prohibited.
Section 20
Q: What is the role of the Central Monetary Authority
especially in contracting foreign loans
A: It must be with the concurrence of the CMA (foreign
loans).
Read the case of Labugal Bulaan vs. Ramos, this is in
relation to service contracts with foreign corporations.
Exploration of the natural resources especially mining
must be under the control of the state, if they contract a
foreign corporation to the large-scale mining, it is not a
violation of the Constitution as long as it is limited to
service contract
Consonant with the State's "full supervision and control"
over natural resources, Section 2 offers the State two
"options." One, the State may directly undertake these
activities itself; or two, it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60% of whose capital
is owned by such citizens.
A third option is found in the third paragraph of the same
section:
The Congress may, by law, allow
small-scale utilization of natural

resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and
fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
While the second and third options are limited only to
Filipino citizens or, in the case of the former, to
corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos, a fourth allows the
participation of foreign-owned corporations. (La BugalB'laan Tribal Asso. Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882,
January 27, 2004)
ARTICLE XIII SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Human Rights
Q: Is the Commission on Human Rights a constitutional
body?
A: No. it is only a statutory body.
TN, the chairman must be appointed permanently not as
acting capacity. This is order to preserve its
independence.
Q: What are the powers of the Commission?
A: Basically, they only have
investigatory/recommendatory. They do not have
adjudicatory power.
Q: What will the commission do if they found a violation of
human rights?
A: They will recommend the filing of the administrative
case to the proper forum or recommend the filing of a
criminal case to the prosecutors office for the proper filing
of the case in court.
Q: Can the Commission impose penalty?
A: They cannot, they do not have the power.
Q: Can the Commission issue writ of injunction?
A: No, they cannot issue injunctive writ or TRO against
any violators of human rights.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide
for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining
order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Oroso, Jr.
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January
1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26
October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by
implication. (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No.
88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al., G.R.
Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.).
110
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid

services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary
writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the
proper
courts on behalf
of
the
victims
of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a
writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the
judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of
the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge
of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial court] in
any action pending in an inferior court within his district."
(Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection
of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no
other purpose. prcd
||| (Export Processing Zone Authority v. Commission on
Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476, April 14, 1992)
Q: What is the role of the Commission in relation to the
Human Security Act?
A: They are given prosecutorial power against the police
or military who may have violated the Human Security
Act.
Q: What is Human Rights?
A: It is limited to violation of civil and political rights either
by a government official or private individual.
Q: The Constitution mandates the highest budget for
education, is this mandatory?
A: No, it is only directory. As emphasized by the Carague
case.
Q: Who can own educational institution?
A: Filipino or Qualified Filipino Corporation (60% of capital
is owned by Filipino and 40% owned by foreigner).
Except, those established by religious groups or mission
boards but control and ministration should be left to the
Filipino Citizens.
The revenues and assets of non-stock, non profit
educational institutions are exempt from taxes and duties.
Proprietary educational institutions are allowed the same
exemptions unless otherwise provided for by law. Ex.
Local Ordinance subjecting them to tax.
ARTICLE XIV ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Article XIV, Section 5, par. (2) Academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. (TN)
(Take note of the cases)
Q: unsay academic freedom?

From the point of view of the institution, of the academe,
from the students. You should know what is the extent of
academic freedom.
Q: Only enjoyed by whom?
A: institution of higher learning.
A review center is not covered by the academic freedom.
An elementary school is not covered by academic
freedom.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as
contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degreegranting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of
the CHED. A review course is only intended to "refresh
and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills
of reviewees." A reviewee is not even required to enroll in
a review center or to take a review course prior to taking
an examination given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee
enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review course
is not mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend
each review class. He is not required to take or pass an
examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also
not required to submit any thesis or dissertation. Thus,
programs given by review centers could not be
considered "programs . . . of higher learning" that would
put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers
providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not
covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC,
which include, although not limited to, college entrance
examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial
services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify
as programs of higher learning
||| (Review Center Ass'n of the Phil. v. Ermita, G.R. No.
180046, April 02, 2009)
From the standpoint of the educational institution
and the academe it has the power to determine who
may teach, what may be taught and how shall it be
taught and who may be admitted to study. (TN)
The above conclusion, however, will not deter this Court
from proceeding with the judicial determination of the
basic legal issues herein. We must bear in mind that
procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper
administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. 14 A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus
be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the
existence of courts. 15 Noting that this case involves the
exercise of a fundamental right academicfreedom no
less of the State University, and that the petitioner has,
in any event, raised before us the legal question of
whether the RTC correctly required respondent to
confer cum laude honors on the petitioner because of
respondent's alleged grave abuse of discretion, for
pragmatic reasons and consideration of justice and
111
equity, the Court must go on to resolve the second

assignment of error.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of University of
San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 16 the discretion of
schools of learning to formulate rules and guidelines in
the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms
part of academic freedom. And such discretion may not
be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the courts may not disturb the University's
decision not to confer honors to petitioner.
||| (Morales v. Board of Regents of the University of
the Phil., G.R. No. 161172, December 13, 2004)
UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- this is with reference to a
UP professor who went AWOL (absence without
leave) despite his having gone AWOL, he went back
and got promoted. He should have been dismissed
under the Civil Service Law because he went on
leave without permit, he went absent, missing
without leave from the administration. Instead,
because he was very good, he was promoted so he
would stay. So it was then question before the
Supreme Court and SC here, as between the Civil
Service Law and the academic freedom of UP to
choose who may teach in the university, the latter
prevails.
UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870,
enacted on June 18, 1908, it enjoys not only academic
freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of
the said Act grants the UP Board of Regents the power
"to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the
university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other
employees of the university, to fix their compensation and
to remove them for cause after an investigation and
hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed
by virtue of this provision. Cdpr
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the
Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative
disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service.
Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the
power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section
37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a),
provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
(30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days'
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal
or dismissal from office."
||| (University of the Phil. v. Regino, G.R. No. 88167, May
03, 1993)
The University has the academic freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study. Clearly, this
freedom encompasses the autonomy to choose who
should teach and, concomitant therewith, who

should be retained in its rolls of professors and other
academic personnel.
This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila University
v. Capulong: As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently
endowed with the right to establish their policies,
academic and otherwise, unhampered by external
controls or pressure.
ADMU vs Capulong G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993

It is to be realized that this individual aspects of
academic freedom could have developed only pari
passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate
entities, educational institutions of higher learning
are inherently endowed with the right to establish
their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered
by
external
controls
or
pressure.
In
the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the
areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the
curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.
There was a case involving a professor who after
probational period was not accepted, admitted as a
regular professor. She complained to the Supreme
Court, the SC said, that is a discretion part of the
academic freedom of the school to determine
whether she should be admitted to teach or who
may be employed to teach and how it should be
taught that is also within the academic freedom of
the institution. So if they, for example they have a
way of how they should be graded. This is important
because of these expulsions of some students who
got involved in hazing.
Q: Can they be interfere with the courts should the
parents of the students would then complain,
especially for graduating, to the Supreme Court
questioning on the expulsion of the students in this
incident?
A: here there is a precedent case of this De La Salle
University vs CA, so notorious na jud ni sila into this
hazing thing because it was also incident involving
hazing. Tapos they were expelled and they
complained to the Supreme Court. De LaSalle
University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section
5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all
institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
This institutional academic freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them
free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public interest calls for
some restraint. According to present jurisprudence,
academic freedom encompasses the independence
of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
112
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties

all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding
public
interest
calls
for
some
restraint. 74 According
to
present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses
the
independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. 75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in
teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the
right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach." 76 Indeed, while it is
categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation," 77 such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid
down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU,
therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom,
which includes its free choice of students for admission to
its school.
||| (De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007)
ARTICLE XIV LANGUAGE
This was ask in the bar, Sec. 6.
Q: unsa kuno ang ato-ang national language? (BAR)
A: Filipino.
Q: what are our official languages? (BAR)
Official languages, those are used as our medium of
instruction not only in school but as well as in
government offices.
Q: Unsa man kuno nga language nga gigamit nato
in our recording?
Q: Unsa kuno ato gi gamit nga language in our recording?
sa court proceeding or sa government offices for example
A: it says under sec. 7 the official languages of the Phils.
Are Filipino, unless otherwise provided by law its English
so mainly its Filipino. So ang ma maintain ang Filipino
Q: do you have to repeal the law in order to have another
official language?
A: NO, only by law and what can be change is the other
foreign language could be English or any other foreign
language

You have your regional languages as your auxiliary official
language so it becomes auxiliary ang Cebuano or
medium of instruction in schools, being auxiliary it can be
required, or even in courts.
Sec. 8 on promulgation Filipino and English or regional
languages or dialects in Arabic and Spanish
Sec. 9 science and technology just read
Arts and culture wla man ni, these provisions are not self
executing mao rani ang relevance
Family, the issues that may be raised here and the issues
on the pending divorce bill whether it violates the
constitution? Marriage is an inviolable social institution
therefore it is against divorce (not necessarily noh?!) just
go over that
113
For as long as you are still active in the military service

you cannot be appointed to any civilian positions in the
government including GOCCs. You must first retire and
then you can be appointed now.
Then you have this proportionate recruitment.
Proportionate to the population. Otherwise it could be
easy to create a leak in the military which is prohibited
because of the possibility of a coup de etat.
Q: On the matter of tour of duty of the chief of staff, how
many years?
A: 3 years unless it is extended. Retirement age of a
military is 55 and it cannot be extended. It says here
(TN) Officers and men of the regular force; laws of
retirement shall not allow extension of the service. 55 ra
intawn na sila.
ARTICLE GENERAL PROVISIONS

Q: On Adoption of the name of the country cannot be
change by ordinary legislation?
A: Yes, provided it has the approval or ratification of the
people not in a plebiscite but in a national referendum
5.
Laws on retirement of military officers shall not

allow extension of their service.
6.
The officers and men of the regular force of the

armed forces shall be recruited proportionately
from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.
7.
The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed

forces shall not exceed three years. However, in
times of war or other national emergency declared
by the Congress, the President may extend such
tour of duty.
Composition of the arm forces of the Philippines

This once ask in the MCQ, it consist of the armed citizens
because of the principle of supremacy of the civilian
authority at all times over the military, parihas ra gud nah
but they emphasize on citizen armed
This on sec. 5 paragraph one
Section 5.
1.
All members of the armed forces shall take an

oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.
This was ask in the bar exam, kani bitawng who can take
an oath and affirmation to uphold and defend the
constitution? Dili lang ang president, the armed forces of
the Philippines and public officers and employees
Also the 4th paragraph that was also ask in the bar exam
4.
No member of the armed forces in the active

service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in
the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries.
No member of the military shall directly or indirectly, in

any partisan political activity, allowed except to vote
including public employees and officers. Except cabinet
members or political officers.
Par 4. AB: To maintain the supremacy of the civilian
authority at all times over the military
Sections 6.
Police Force is Civilian. National in scope but civilian in
character. Under authority of the local executives. They
are only operational because they are directly under the
DILG. Under the president through the DILG.
Section 11
On mass media: (pending amendment) No foreigner shall
be allowed to engage in this kind of business but in
advertising, foreigners are allowed. 70% fil 30 %
foreigner. But in mass media 100% Filipino. However, the
truth of the matter is, wala nka kwarta ang government
because our media companies are directly entering into
contracts with the foreign outfits and they are feeding
them news from the Philippines. They are giving them
news. So why not allow them instead to invest money in
mass media so they can be regulated by the government
because ,as of now, it is prohibited. The requirement in
mass media is still 100% Fil.
BAR: In advertising, proportionate gihapon ang iyang
managing officers. (70%fil 30% Foreign)
ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
TN: who can propose; the process; proposal; submission
and then ratification.

Q: Who can propose?
1.) We have the congress as a constituent assembly by
votes or at the discretion of congress by majority votes
may call for a referendum to ask the people whether or
not they want a constitutional convention or
2.) 2/3 votes to create a constitutional convention to
propose either amendment or revision.
3.) 3rd way of proposing, we have the people, however
limited only to amendments, through initiative.
The petition is signed or initiated by at least 12% of the
total registered voters of which 3% of each legislative
district is represented by at least 3% of its registered
voters. Take note of the case of Santiago vs. Ramos,
Lambino case on the requirements of peoples initiative
on amendments of the constitution.
In the case of Santiago case, it was emphasized that RA
6735 is insufficient but not in Lambino case. Instead, in
Lambino case, the Supreme Court laid down the
procedure on how to initiate amendments to the
constitution. The Supreme Court emphasized that the
people, being the authors of the proposal, must sign the
petition itself.
On submission, TN that there cant be a piece meal
submission of a proposed amendment or revision to the
constitution.
On ratification, TN that the effectivity of any proposed
amendment or revision is only upon ratification of the
proposed amendment or revision by majority votes cast
during the plebiscite called for the purpose. That is as to
effectivity. Another point that you should take note is that
any question as to the validity of the ratification that can
be raised by an ordinary citizen. It is an exception, even
though he may not be directly injured, the constitution
allows any citizen to question the validity of the
ratification.
TN also on the plebiscite that may be called, it should not
be called earlier that 60 days not more than 90 days after
the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the case of Province of North Cotabato vs GPI, the
Supreme Court said that the president cannot propose
changes to the constitution unlike Marcos and Cory
Aquino. Marcos was able to propose amendments
because the constitution during that time, allows him to
exercise legislative power and we were under martial law
also he was exercising legislative power. Cory Aquino,
under the revolutionary government, the freedom
constitution likewise allows her to propose changes but
not under the 1987 constitution.
The Executive branch thus guarantees to the MILF
that the Constitution shall be drastically overhauled
to conform to the MOA-AD. The Executive branch
completely disregards that under the Constitution the sole
discretionary power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies with Congress, and the power to approve
or disapprove such proposed amendments belongs
114
exclusively to the people.||| (Province of North Cotabato

v. Republic, G.R. No. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951,
183962, October 14, 2008)
What is important in Article 18 are the transitory
provisions, especially with this EDCA, amending the VFA.
Take note of the cases Lim vs Executive Secretary and
Bayan vs. Zamora. We have a mutual defense agreement
or treaty that we signed with the US. Now if it is a treaty,
it needs the concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations
powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate." 12 Even more pointedly, the
Transitory Provisions state:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991
of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the
United
States
of
America
concerning Military Bases,foreign mili
tary bases, troops or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred
in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting state.
The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy
towards foreign military presence in the country, or
of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troopsare
allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct
exception. Conflict arises then between the fundamental
law and our obligations arising from international
agreements.
||| (Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11,
2002)
Q. How many votes are needed?
A. 2/3 votes
The VFA was and executive agreement.
Q. Does an executive agreement require the concurrence
of the senate?
A. NO. Unless it will be an international agreement.
Q. What is the difference between a treaty or international
agreement and executive agreement? You should the
know the difference especially in PIL.
A. A treaty or international agreement is permanent. Its
a matter of policy that would make a permanent change in
political matters or even in our dealings with another
country which is more or less permanent.

An executive agreement, just simply make some
changes and provide some details for purposes of
implementing a treaty or an international agreement and
that does not need any concurrence.
The VFA was not a treaty but was an executive
agreement. It was treated as an international agreement.
In fact it was concurred by the senate. According to the
SC in the case of Lim or Bayan, even if US would not
treat it as treaty, we dont care. We treat that as an
international agreement. In fact it was concurred by the
Senate. Should there be any changes to it , you follow
treaty making changes. Thats the case of Nicolas vs.
Romulo.
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RPUS Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit
the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but
merely to the US Congress under the Case Zablocki
Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason
that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a
binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this
substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII,
Sec. 25 of our Constitution.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is
complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the
US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence
"allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since
the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified
and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the
US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional
provision resulting from such presence. IcDESA
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties
are required as a matter of international law to abide by
its terms and provisions.
||| (Nicolas y Sombilon v. Romulo, G.R. No. 175888,
176051, 176222, February 11, 2009)
The VFA for example. Di ba VFA allows joint military
training of US soldiers with Filipinos. The US-RP Military
Base Agreement had not renewed and we have a
prohibition in our Constitution against military troops. It
was emphasized in the case of Lim, take note because of
this EDCA controversy, where the SC said that under
Sec. 25 of the transitory provision , shows a marked
antipathy. It is against towards foreign military presence
in the country or a foreign influence in general. Hence
foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only
by way of direct exception. Now, here under the
constitution US forces are prohibited from engaging in an
offensive war in Philippine territory against the Chinese
even. The SC however cannot accept in this case per
allegation
that Arroyo administration engaged in
doublespeak in trying to pass off a military training
exercise, and offensive effort by foreign troops on native
soil.
In the case of Bayan vs. Zamora, SC said, the VFA was
duly concurred by the Philippine senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the US and attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the US
government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for
115
advice and consent of the US Senate does detract from

its status as a binding international agreement or a treaty
recognized by the said state for this is a matter of internal
US law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known
practice by the US submitting to its Senate for advice and
consent agreements that are policy making.
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the
determination of which provision of the Constitution
applies, with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its
constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners
argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable
considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence
of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents,
on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII
should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing
arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the
temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in
joint military exercises.
XXX XXX
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international
agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of
at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate
is required to make the subject treaty, or international
agreement, valid and binding on the part of the
Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on
treaties or international agreements and applies to any
form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such
as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those
economic in nature. All treaties or international
agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of
subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision
that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the
Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance
with the constitutional requirements and to consider the
agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article
XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by
virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA
to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the
Senate extended its concurrence under the same
provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under
Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the
fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the
Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the
treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting
the Philippines.
||| (Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, 138572, 138587,
138680, 138698, October 10, 2000)

In the case of Nicolas vs.Romulo. Remember, in the
VFA, we have jurisdiction over offenses that maybe
committed by the American soldier. Whoever takes the
rights over the case has the exclusive jurisdiction.
Nakauna man ta sa rape case. In fact he was convicted.
The law says that kung kita gani ang nag-hearing sa kaso
he should be put in our jail. Now, na-convicted na siya
gibalhin man noon siya didto sa US embassy premises.
Wa man silay prisohan, nagbuhat sila prisohan in a
container van, however air-conditioned. Na-convicted
siya, gi-appeal sa Court of Appeals and we wondered
why,apparently VFA was amended by the agreement
between Secretary Romulo and the Ambassador of the
US.
Q. Is that a valid amendment of the VFA, the transfer of
custody of the US soldier to the US while the appeal was
still pending?
A. In the cases of (Nicolas vs. Romuloet al ; Salonga vs.
Smith et al; Makabayan vs. Arroyo et al) SC said that the
Visiting US Agreement between the Republic of
Philippines and the US entered into on February 10, 1987
is
upheld as constitutional but the Romulo-Kenny
agreement on December 1992 was declared not in the
accordance with the VFA and respondent Secretary of
Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate
with the US representatives for the appropriate
agreement
on detention facilities under the Philippine
authorities as provided in Article 5, Section 10 of the
VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained
under further orders by the Court.
In other words, you have to go to the process of treaty
making rather than just through an informal agreement
between officers of the government. That has nothing to
do with treaty making because we should not be content it
that way because it was treated as an international
agreement. Should there be any change it should go
through the process.
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
First, you must TN what person is being referred to here,
natural or juridical persons. However, with respect to
juridical persons, what is protected here is only the right
to property because they cannot be protected in terms of
life or liberty as their existence is determined by law.
Another thing that you should TN/(BAR), hierarchy in the
protection insofar as the right of life, liberty or property. So
you have, according to how it is being phrased, you have
the right to life and then you have liberty and then, finally,
the least protected is the right to property. TN in the case
of Social Justice Society et al vs. Atienza where the SC
said, essentially the oil companies are fighting for the right
to property, they alleged that they spend billion of pesos
to force to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy on
the constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
116
precedence over the right to property, the reason is

obvious, life is irreplaceable while property is not. So you
TN of this guys.
Social Justice Society vs Atienza G.R. No. 156052

February 13, 2008
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right
to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of
pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the
hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property.171 The
reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGUs exercise of police power
clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former
should prevail.
Insofar as the matter of life, liberty and property as to
definition, you know that already. But to emphasize on the right
to property, what is being covered it does not include the right
to possess firearms, that is not included. It is neither a property
right nor property subject to the protection of due process and
equal protection clause. As well as, to operate a mobile/a
car/vehicle is not covered by the protection under the right to
property. Like the right to bear firearms, is neither a property
nor a property right covered by the protection of due process
and equal protection clause. TN of that guys.
We have the cases of:
Garin vs. MMDA G.R. No. 130230
April 15, 2005
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to

operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a
privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended
or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power,
in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to
the procedural due process requirements. This is
consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of
Rizal8 on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director
of Forestry9 and Oposa v. Factoran10 on timber licensing
agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality
of Surigao11 on a legislative franchise to operate an
electric plant.
Chavez vs Romulo G.R. No. 157036

2004
June 9,
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad

discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that "the Chief
of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
117
determined by him and under such conditions as he

may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry
them outside of residence." Following the American
doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does
not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution.
due process.||| (Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy

Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-IAD, G.R. No.
196425, July 24, 2012)
Now, another point you should TN on Sec. 1, the concept

of due process of law. Due process of law applies only to
government exercising its powers. This does not apply to
private entities exercising its powers.
Procedural due process in civil cases
There are two kinds of due process. We have the

substantive and procedural due process. On substantive
due process, you must comply with the requirements for
the valid exercise of this power: subject matter is to be
lawful, and the means of achieving is, likewise, legal or
lawful.
Now then, what about procedural due process, there is
more questions on the procedural aspect of due process.
The essence of the procedural due process of law is
simply giving the opportunity of hearing before one is
condemned for whatever judgment. So, when we say,
opportunity of hearing, case in point is Pichay Jr. vs.
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
et al this was decided on July 24, 2012 where the SC, in
all proceedings of the government, may be criminal or
administrative or civil, we have specially in the Pichay
case, the administrative proceedings the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person charged
to answer the accusation against him, continue as the
minimum requirements of due process. Which simply
means having the opportunity to explain ones side. Thats
the bottomline of the procedural due process of law.
his right to due process was not violated when the
IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative
complaint against him since he was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by
Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute
the
minimum
requirements
of
due
process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain one's side. Hence, as long as petitioner was
given the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors
is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The
records show that petitioner was issued an Order
requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath
with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed
against him. His own failure to submit his explanation
despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of
Minimum Requirements of Procedural Due Process

(TN)
5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS. As

applied to judicial proceedings, due process of law
implies that there must be a court of tribunal clothed with
the power to hear and determine the matter before it, that
jurisdiction shall have been lawfully acquired, that the
defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, and that
judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.|| (El
Blanco Espaol - Filipino vs Palanca G.R. No. L-11390,
March 26, 1918)
Procedural due process in criminal cases

2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; COURT
OF COMPETENT URISIDICTION CAN NOT BE
QUESTIONED
ON
GROUND
OF
INJUSTICE
AS DUE PROCESS WAS
OBSERVED.
A due process question would have arisen if the decision

arrived at the endds of justice were not served. Such is
not the case, however. It is an admitted fact in this case
that respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
presided by then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was vested with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners.
As admitted in the petition, the decision reached by him,
thereafter affirmed with modification by respondent Court
of Appeals, was "duly rendered and signed" on July 25,
1966 at a time before his retirement; though it was not
until after his retirement on August 23, 1966 that said
sentence was read to petitioners. had it been
promulgated then and there, this particular question
raised in this petition would not have risen.
3.ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS MEANT TO EMBODY
CANON OF
FAIRNESS
AND
AVOIDANCE
OF
ARBITRARINESS. What gave petitioners' cause
plausibility, was that it was not until after his retirement on
August 23, 1966 that such a sentence was read to
petitioners. Considering all the circumstances detailed
above and the Tijam doctrine on which reliance could be
had, it cannot be said that injustice was thereby
committed against petitioners. They were given all the
opportunity to defend themselves not only before the
respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur but
likewise before respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioners
cannot rightfully complain of having been the victims of
arbitrary governmental action. They tried to have this
Court, in an earlier petition for certiorari, to review the
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals, but they did not
meet with success because of their inability to
demonstrate that they failed to receive the protection
that due process accords every accused. What was said

by Justice Cardozo fits the occasion: "The law, as we
have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of
the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair
trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable
men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however
crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But
justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true. (Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-31218, February 18,
1970)
Procedural
proceedings
due
process
in
administrative
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character. The first
of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance
of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.||| (Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No.
46496, February 27, 1940)
Procedural due process in disciplinary cases

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
requires observance of procedural due process. And it
bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, contrary to petitioners' view, an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum
standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
118
students must be informed in writing of the nature and

cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the
case.||| (Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. L68288, July 11, 1986)
What is important here guys is the opportunity of hearing,
where there is total absence of hearing that is what is
abhorred. For as long as there was opportunity of hearing
there cannot be a violation of due process of law.
However, there are instances where hearing is not
required and it cannot be a violation of due process,
regardless of the lack of hearing.
Q. What are the exceptions? (see Admin notes) *****
A.
1.
When administrative agencies are exercising

quasi-legislative function no need for a hearing;
2.
abatement of nuisance per se, also no need of

hearing;
3.
granting of court of provisional remedies, such

as the writ of preliminary attachment or a
temporary restraining order, it can be issued ex
parte by the court, provided that the defendant is
notified and simultaneous with service of the
writ;
4.
you have removal of a temporary employee in

the government service because they do not
enjoy security of tenure;
5.
we have preventive suspension, no need to first

notify the erring public respondent. He can be
suspended right away, preventively, because
after all it is not a penalty, it is merely a
precautionary measure;
6.
Issuance of warrants of distraints or levy by BIR

commissioner, no need of hearing because there
was already a notice of delinquency or
inefficiency prior to the distraint; and,
7.
the cancellation of passport of the person

charged with the crime;
8.
Issuance of sequestration orders/ judicial orders

which prevents an accused from travelling
abroad.

9.
Judicial orders which prevent an accused from

travelling abroad this is what we call, the hold
departure order, if the accused has not been
arrested yet. Or you have what they call in the
DOJ, the watchlist. You need not be notified prior
to placing you into watchlist.
10. And then you have suspension of bank
operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima
facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. you have extradition proceedings theres no
need first to notify the extradite before he is
being (inaudible) in court.
12. Then of course you have reinvestigation of
criminal cases already subjected to a preliminary
investigation. where it merely reiterates its earlier
finding of probable cause against the accused
theres no need of notifying there.
Equal Protection of Laws
That all persons should be treated alike by the law,
insofar as they are situated under the same
circumstances. It does not guarantee absolute equality.
What is being guaranteed under this only legal equality,
that, in terms of rights that may be conferred by law and
obligations imposed here it should be treated alike if
youre situated under the same circumstances.
TN however of valid classification that you must

memorize.
Q: What are the requisites for valid classification as an

exception to equal protection clause?
A:
1.
First there has to be a substantial distinction
2.
and it must be relevant to the purpose, or

germane to the purpose of the law.
3.
It applies to all persons who are situated under

the same circumstances
4.
not only for existing conditions but also for future

conditions.
TN of those guys and some of the examples on this, you

have the case of Trillanes relating to the case of Jalosjos
relating to classification in terms of the enforcement of the
law. There shouldnt be any classification. Because of the
condition of Jalosjos, he wanted to continue to attend
sessions in Congress, SC was saying, you are already a
convicted felon and the rule should be applied equally to
you as applied to all convicts.
Insofar as Trillanes, the SC was saying while not
convicted, but the same; Election to Congress is not a
119
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as

the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinction which lifts one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.
Also you TN of the case of Farias v. the Executive
Secretary with respect to appointive officials who may run
for public office. If youre appointive youre automatically
considered to have resigned. If youre elective it does not
apply. Theres valid classification here because elected
officials are elected for a definite term whereas an
appointive is accountable only to the appointing authority.
SC was saying here, there is valid classification.
People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76,
February 03, 2000 also cited in Trillanes IV vs
Pimentel
8.ID.;
BILL
OF
RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
PERFORMANCE OF LEGITIMATE DUTIES BY PUBLIC
OFFICER IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO FREE A PERSON
VALIDLY IN PRISON. The performance of legitimate
and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION TO POSITION OF
CONGRESSMAN
IS
NOT
A
REASONABLE
CLASSIFICATION IN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. We, therefore, find that election
to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class.
Farias v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 146494 July
14, 2004
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those

persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those
who fall within such class and those who do not.
Another point you should TN is PAGCOR. PAGCOR was
assessed with taxes and they were saying, we are a
government corporation, we should not be taxed by the
BIR. PAGCOR, according to the SC, cannot find support
in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,
because it was granted a franchise subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Constitution. So,
equal protection of laws does not apply. (See Tax Case)
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The right to privacy. If youre asked in the BAR, cite a
provision in the Constitution that protects the right to
privacy.
TN of this, this is applicable not only to Filipino Citizens
but as well as to Foreigners. Its demandable as a matter
of right.
This is guaranteed also under the writ of Amparo insofar
as protecting your right to privacy, your right to life, liberty
or security. While Section 1 includes property, Section 2
applies insofar as your right to privacy insofar as liberty
and security against intrusion into your person.
Q: Who is protected?
A: Your person, your houses, your papers and effects.
Should there be any search and seizure of these things,
there has to be a warrant whatever the reason or
purpose. Without the warrant, then it is unreasonable
therefore unconstitutional. Should there be any arrest or
seizure of a person or search of a person it has to be with
a warrant a warrant of arrest or a search or seizure
warrant. Without such warrant then it is unreasonable
whatever is the reason or purpose therefore
unconstitutional. TN of that.
Now, the next question would be,
Q: How do you acquire a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest?
A: The requirements are enumerated in Section 2.
Lets first take up on the Search Warrant.
SEARCH WARRANT
120
Q: What would be covered by your search warrant? Why

do you apply for a search warrant?
A: First of all, you apply for a search warrant to search
what?
1. The things that are used in the commission of the
crime.
2. when the things are the fruits of the crime or used as a
means in committing a crime. So you apply for a search
warrant.
Q. what are the requirements?
A. There has to be determination of probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge. It should be in a
searching question and answer.
Q. what is probable cause? what else that do you need to
establish here?
A.aside from probable cause to be determined by the
judge, there has to be a summary hearing ex parte
through a searching question and answer. If the judge is
convinced then the court issues the warrant.
Microsoft v. Maxicorp software probable cause
such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as
will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action
and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper; OATH must refer to the truth of the facts WITHIN
THE PERSONAL KNOLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR
HIS WITNESSES; probable cause deals with probability
and not absolute certainty
Q. what are the requirements in the issuance of the
warrant?
A. you have to state that particularly what was the crime
committed and what are the things or items that are to be
searched and seized including the place that are to be
searched. Without the particularity as required in the
constitution the warrant is general and therefore it is
unconstitutional. There should be one warrant for every
crime or offense. This is to prevent a scrattered shot
warrant. A scattered shot warrant is a general warrant
prohibited by law.
Q. On particularity, do you need a tax declaration or a title
that would define technically the place to be searched and
seized?
A. you dont have to as long as it can be identified by the
searching party.
As a genral rule there has to be a warrant for every
search. There are exception you have to memorize them.
TN
Q. What are the exception? For even without a warrant
the search is valid.
A. first is when there is consent. When there is a waiver.

To make it a valid waiver TN of the requirements. The
person subject of the search knew that he has that
right,either actually or constructively and despite having
known that he has that right, he intelligently and
voluntarily relinquished that right. This must concur
otherwise there cannot be a valid waiver.
Q. what else?
A. when the search is made incidental to a lawful arrest.
Search is incidental so therefore the arrest must be lawful
to make the seacrh also lawful. So that if the arrest is in
the first place unlawful then there cannot be a valid
search.
In this particular case you should TN on the lawful arrest
there has to be a warrant, if not then it false under the
exceptions provided under RULE 113 of the RULES OF
COURT,
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Otherwise if the search is not made under any of the
circumstances then the search is likewise invalid. Another
point, it must be done within the area or premises
under the control of the person being arrested. You
cannot make a separate search after the arrest of the
accused. Like you arrest him here in the AVR while one
will search his place at the 4th floor. It has to be in the
same premises where the accused is arrested. TN of that.
By the way, you have to compare the search incidental to
lawful arrest with stop and frisk search under the terry
search. The Terry search refers to the stop and frisk. This
is limited only to protective search for one is suspected to
be engaged in illegal activity or is committing a crime.
Q. What would the police do?
121
A. the police may ask him to stop and if he does not stop
then it is a justification for extensive search, not just
frisking. In the stop and frisk, you are stopped and then
you are frisked, however the frisking is limited only to
protective search which means only to outer garments
and not extensive but if probable cause is established that
you are commiting a crime then in the course of the
search they found a contraband in your possession then
search ca be made now after lawful arrest because here it
will be as if you are commiting a crime in the presence of
the arresting officers search conducted is incidental to
that lawful arrest. So then on mere suspicion you can
stop and frisk but if you are to make an arrest and make a
search incidental to that arrest you must establish
probable cause, otherwise there is no justification for
further extensive search.
Q. another exception?
A. the search of a moving vehicles, especially at the
check points. TN moving vehicle is limited only to visual
search unless when probable cause is established that
would justify an extensive search. Check point also
limited to visual search unless proabable cause is
established.
Customs search, limited only on warehouses but
residential houses where there is a suspicion that
smuggled goods are kept for non-payment of taxes,
cannot search without a warrant. In a warehouse,
may even without a search warrant.
not
the
you
you
Then you have on Armed conflict , check points, exigent

and emergency circumstances the conduct of area target
zone and saturation drives
Routine airport security is now one of its exceptions.
Then you also have evidence in plain view.
TN: Requirements of evidence in plain view:
1. The searching party must have justification to be
in the premises to the search.
Q: How do you justify presence in the premises?
A: By virtue of a search warrant or otherwise they are
there because of a buy bust operations, there is a
commission of the crime in the presence of the
arresting officer
So, first of all, the presence of the officer must be
legitimate.
2.
The evidence is immediately apparent to the eye

or the hand of the searching party without need
of further search.
Then in this case, you can seize it even without
a search warrant.
TN: Del Rosario vs. People (taken up in Evidence)

The Supreme Court enumerated the requirements.

1.
2.
3.
There has to be a valid intrusion based on a

valid warrantless arrest.
The evidence is discovered by accident or
inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be present as to where they are.
The evidence must be immediately apparent and
plain view justifies the seizure without further
search conducted.
TN: Manalili Case (taken up in Evidence)

Q: What would be the consequence if the right of a
person against an unreasonable search is violated?
A: The evidence is inadmissible. TN: Under the principle
or rule on exclusionary.
[BAR]: Q: What does it mean as being the fruit of the
poisonous tree?
A: Its a poisonous free. Therefore, inadmissible.
122
Here, the court may base on the finding of probable

cause of the fiscal for as long as it is personally examined
ang records of the PI by the judge and he makes his own
personal judgment. Unless, he needs for more
clarifications, then he may call for a hearing ex parte.
If the court finds that there is no basis, the court can
dismiss the case outright and not issue the
warrant of arrest.
*** Q: What are the exceptions to the rule on the
issuance of warrant?
A: Rule 113
1. Caught in the act or in flagrante delicto.
When the person to be arrested must have
committed a crime, in the process of
committing a crime and about to commit the
crime in the presence of the arresting officer.
When you say in the presence, doing those
within the hearing distance of the arresting
officer.
You have the right to recover the things searched and

seized unless they are contraband or prohibited by law.
Then they shall remain in custody by law. If not returned
you can always ask for a Writ of Replevin.
Summary to Execptions of Prior Issuance of a Search
Warrant:
Even an ordinary citizen can make an arrest.

Provided that, he surrenders him to the
nearest police station before the expiration of
the period of detention under Article 125 of
the RPC.
Hot Pursuit
He was not present when the crime was
committed but he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that this person to be
arrested must have committed the crime.
1.
Consented Search
2.
Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
3.
Stop and Frisk
4.
Search of Moving Vehicles
5.
Customs Search
Then in which case, you can make an arrest

even without a warrant.
6.
Armed conflict , exigent and

emergency
circumstances the conduct of area target zone
and saturation drives (Justifications for the
conduct of a checkpoint)
If it is based only from an information of an

informant or from a source eventhough
reliable, but not personal to the police, he
cannot make an arrest under the hot pursuit.
7.
Routine Airport Security
8.
Evidence in Plain View
TN: There should be no interruption from the

time of the commission of the crime to the
actual apprehension of the accused. The
immediacy of the arrest, no gap. Because if
there is gap, then there is no more hot
pursuit. In which case, you have to file a
case in court to issue the warrant if there is
an interruption in the chain of events from the
commission of the crime to the actual
apprehension of the accused.
WARRANT OF ARREST
First, there has to be a warrant of arrest. But unlike in a
search warrant, it is not necessary that its application has
to be done summarily. Theres this PI conducted by the
fiscal and then if there is probable cause or it is
established, the case is filed in court.
Q: What does the judge do?
A: The judge within 10 days from receipt of the records
must determine probable cause, not for the purpose of
indicting, but for the purpose of determining whether there
is basis to believe that a crime was committed and the
person to be arrested must have committed the crime. He
must immediately be place in the custody of law.
2.
TN: [BAR] Luz vs. People

SC: If the offense charged the penalty is a fine, not
imprisonment, you cannot make an arrest. So there is
no justification to a search incidental to an arrest.
Ang nahitabo gidakop nila ni ang suspect for violation of
traffic laws. Wa mani siguro siya nag helmet. Then, he
was advice to go with the law enforcer didto sa police
station. At the police station, he was asked to remove all
the things from his pants and they found out the

contraband. He was then put to jail thereafter. What was
the justification of the police? It was kuno a search and
seizure incidental to a lawful arrest. In traffic violation, the
penalty is only fine.
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the
motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions
while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at
that moment placed under custody (such that he should
have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither
can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the
functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither
can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the
time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a
fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated
as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for
a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,
or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that
petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged
down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with. (Luz y Ong v.
People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
Q: Can there be a search incident to a lawful arrest for
violation of traffic rules?
A: No. In traffic violations, the penalty is only a fine. And
therefore, he cannot be arrested. And if he cannot be
arrested, there cannot be a search incidental to a lawful
arrest because in the first place, there was no arrest.
There cannot be an arrest when the penalty for the
offense charged is only fine.
Q: What is an Administrative Arrest?
A: In some instances, you can arrest even without a
warrant
Q: What are examples of these instances?
A: If you breach the peace and order in the locality, when
you disrupt a court hearing, if youre in a drunken state in
public highways, in case of blocking traffic without
authorization, refusing to give your ID and youre in that
country illegally
123
Summary of Exceptions to Prior Issuance of a

Warrant of Arrest
1.
In flagrante delicto
2.
Hot Pursuit
3.
Arrest of an Escapee
4.
Apprehension of a violator of a crime punished

with a fine
5.
Administrative Arrest
Section 3.
1.The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.
2.Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Q: What is covered by this protection?
A:
It
covers
everything,
including
electronics
communication now. Emails, texting, cellphone calls, etc.
Q: Is evidence obtained in violation of this protection
admissible? What are the Exceptions?
A: Any evidence in violation of this right is inadmissible.
The only exception are when there is a warrant or a lawful
order of the court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as may be prescribed by law.
What
you must consider then in the privacy of
communication and correspondence is:
Q: With respect to prisoners, do they have privacy of
communication and correspondence?
A: They have no right. According to the Supreme Court,
under the law, the right of one who is detained, their
expectation of privacy is not as much as those who are
outside of jail or the public at large. If they are detained,
there is their loss of right to privacy.
But take note of the case of Alejano et al vs. Cabujay on
letters of prisoners.
CASE: Alejano v. Cabujay (case of Trillanes)
-
Regarding the privacy of communication enjoyed

by prisoners or detainees, including one who has
already been convicted of final judgment or only
a preventive detention prisoner (pending case)

-
The fact that a person is facing criminal charges

in court, he does not enjoy the same privacy with
those who are free or the public at large
ISSUE: WON the letter should be opened and read
by the officers of the prison
-
Complained that it was a violation against their

privacy of communication and correspondence
RULING OF THE SC:
-
While it is true that it is guaranteed under the

Constitution, however, insofar as detention
prisoners are concerned, the right is limited
The letters can be opened, for as long as they
are not privileged communication between
lawyer and client
The prison officers can open, however, without
reading them. Unless it is stated that the letter is
confidential, then it can be read.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN RIGHT TO

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION IS NOT
VIOLATED EVEN WHEN THERE IS AN
INSPECTION OF FOLDED LETTERS OF
DETAINEES; RATIONALE; APPLICATION
IN CASE AT BAR. Thus, we do not agree
with the Court of Appeals that the opening
and reading of the detainees' letters in the
present case violated the detainees' right to
privacy of communication. The letters were
not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of
the folded letters is a valid measure as it
serves the same purpose as the opening of
sealed letters for the inspection of
contraband. The letters alleged to have
been read by the ISAFP authorities were
not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner
who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees' personal courier
and not as their counsel when he received
the letters for mailing. In the present case,
since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If
the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the detention officials should
not read the letters but only open the
envelopes for inspection in the presence of
the detainees. That a law is required before
an executive officer could intrude on a
citizen's privacy rights is a guarantee that is
available only to the public at large but not
to persons who are detained or imprisoned.
The right to privacy of those detained is
subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as
to the limitations inherent in lawful detention
or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
124
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted

prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights. In assessing the regulations
imposed in detention and prison facilities
that are alleged to infringe on the
constitutional rights of the detainees and
convicted prisoners, U.S. courts "balance
the guarantees of the Constitution with the
legitimate
concerns
of
prison
administrators." The deferential review of
such regulations stems from the principle
that: [s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments
of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper
their ability to anticipate security problems
and to adopt innovative solutions to the
intractable
problems
of
prison
administration.| (Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R.
No. 160792, August 25, 2005)
TN: Remember also the case of Zulueta, even private
letters cannot be used as evidence if they violated the
privacy of communication and correspondence.
TN: You have to read this case in relation to the Waterous
Drugs case.
TN: You have the protection under RA 4200 or the AntiWire Tapping Law and it provides for exceptions.
TN: Also take note of the human security act where it
provides for exceptions as regards the intrusion of privacy
of communication and correspondence.
TN: Read these in relation to Writ of Habeas Data where
the government may order the production of information
that may violate the privacy of a particular individual.
Q: As between Privacy of Communication and
Corresprondence and Public Interest, which shall prevail?
A: ALWAYS accommodate public interest.
Section 4. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Case in point, you have the most recent decision of
Chavez vs Secretary Gonzales
Having settled the applicable standard to content-based
restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its
application to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a
governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of
the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear
and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.

This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like
the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test;
(b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party
to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence
necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar,
respondents who have the burden to show that these
acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press
failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It
appears that the great evil which government wants to
prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged
violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the
case at bar, however, are confused and confusing, and
respondents' evidence falls short of satisfying the clear
and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements
of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices
in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
"complete" version and the other, an "altered"
version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the
who's and the how's of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tape's different versions. The
identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission
and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing
would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and
of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and
doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which
even if violated have only an adverse effect on a person's
private comfort but does not endanger national security.
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by
itself and without more, cannot support suppression of
free speech and free press. In fine,violation of law is
just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be
weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of
speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must
be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by
the Constitution and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling
for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the
Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing
violations of law. By all means, violations of law should
be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their
own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to
prevent their violation cannot per se trump the
exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred
right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy
the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the
anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
||| (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
168338, February 15, 2008)
125
Take note of the possibility that this might be violated

the chilling effect of people afraid of expressing
themselves because of laws limiting the exercise of their
freedom of expression. And even before its application,
Q: Can a law allegedly infringing on the freedom of
expression be challenged even before its application?
A: Yes, it can be questioned on its face, as what
happened in the Cybercrime Law.
Relevant excerpts on the Cybercrime SC Ruling Disini
vs Secretary of Justice:
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of
expression and violates the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes
that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must
satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom
and right mentioned.
Computer data 99 may refer to entire programs or lines of
code, including malware, as well as files that contain
texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having
to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the
digital space, it is indisputable that computer data,
produced or created by their writers or authors may
constitute personal property. Consequently, they are
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures,
whether while stored in their personal computers or in the
service provider's systems. aEcAD
H
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the right to be secure in one's papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states
that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here,
the Government, in effect, seizes and places the
computer data under its control and disposition without a
warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot
substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute
speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a
restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace.
Certainly not all forms of speech are protected.
Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare
certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive
officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without
any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the
opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so
would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled
into one. 100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial
intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential
guidelines established to determine the validity of
restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are
generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three
tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger
rule. 101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the

data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of thecybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can actually be made to apply in
relation to any penal provision. It does not take into
consideration any of the three tests mentioned
above. EHSIcT
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section
19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to
freedom of expression and against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
XXX
The very public structure of the Internet and the nature of
traffic data per se undermine any reasonable expectation
of privacy in the latter. The Internet is custom-designed to
frustrate claims of reasonable expectation of privacy in
traffic data per se, since the latter are necessarily
disclosed to the public in the process of
communication. DTEAHI
Individuals have no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the data they disclose to the public and should take the
risks for that disclosure. This is the holding of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.
XXXX
A facial challenge refers to the call for the scrutiny of an
entire law or provision by identifying its flaws or defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation on the
attendant facts raised by the parties, but also on the
assumption or prediction that the very existence of the
law or provision is repugnant to the Constitution. 35 This
kind of challenge has the effect of totally annulling the
assailed law or provision, which is deemed to be
unconstitutional per se. The challenge is resorted to by
courts, especially when there is no instance to which the
law or provision can be validly applied. 36 TADCSE
In a way, a facial challenge is a deviation from the
general rule that Courts should only decide the invalidity
of a law "as applied" to the actual, attending
circumstances before it. 37 An as-applied challenge
refers to the localized invalidation of a law or provision,
limited by the factual milieu established in a case
involving real litigants who are actually before the
Court. 38 This kind of challenge is more in keeping with
the established canon of adjudication that "the court
should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied." 39 Should
the
petition
prosper, the
unconstitutional aspects of the law will be carved
away by invalidating its improper applications on a
case-to-case basis. 40 For example, in Ebralinag v.
Division of Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 41 the
Court exempted petitioner-members of the religious
group Jehovah's Witness from the application of
the Compulsory
Flag
Ceremony
in
Educational
Institutions Act on account of their religious beliefs. The
Court ruled that the law requiring them to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge
cannot be enforced against them at the risk of expulsion,
because the law violated their freedom of religious
126
expression. In effect, the law was deemed

unconstitutional insofar as their religious beliefs were
concerned.
Because of its effect as a total nullification, the facial
invalidation of laws is deemed to be a "manifestly strong
medicine" that must be used sparingly and only as a last
resort. 42 The general disfavor towards it is primarily due
to the "combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes." 43 Claims of facial invalidity "raise the
risk of 'premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of
factually barebones records.'" 44
||| (Disini v. The Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014)
Q: What acts are within the scope of the protection to
freedom of expression?
A: Freedom of speech is not limited to oral utterances, it
could also be acts which conveys message to the public
(including picketing)
Q: Are there speeches that are NOT PROTECTED by
law?
A: Yes, they are those that are libelous, violent, seditious
statements.
36:51 43:50
You have private speech, commercial speech or
general speech. And then you have government
speech.
On private speech, there is more leeway for the
protection of your freedom of speech. TN that on so many
principles on this, speeches the content of which are
general speeches like political, religious, historical, YOU
HAVE THE LEEWAY to say anything you want to say. You
can say whatever you want.
However, if it is a government speech or commercial
speech, it is LIMITED.
There may be a restriction on what you should say about
the stance of the government.
Example: The government is for the promotion of the
reproduction health. So if you have to speak about it, it
should AWAYS be for the promotion if you are
speaking as a connection of the government. You
have no choice, especially in its implementation.
So then, if you are restricted or even punished for what
you should say against what the government stands for,
you cannot invoke freedom of speech since it is limited
here in government speech.

Therefore, be an ordinary individual so that you can
speak whatever you want about the law which you are
against. Otherwise, shut your mouth.
On commercial speeches, it may also be restricted by
government, especially when it involves an interest
protected by the government and you are defrauding the
public insofar as the item or property or transaction that
you are promoting is concerned. If it is against the law,
there may be a restriction on commercial speeches
involving advertisement of goods or services.
Another thing you should take note on speeches like

Hecklers Veto.
There may be a restriction on your delivery of your
speech publicly if it disturbs the peace and order.
That is called Hecklers Veto because of the heckle to
the public. You may be stopped right away from
continuing the delivery of the speech so that it will not
disturb the peace and order. That is Hecklers Veto.
Another point, you have to consider the restrictions on
your freedom of expression, may it be freedom of speech,
press or assembly.
Q: What are the restrictions? Because corollary to that,
you have what?
A:
1.
2.
3.
The Clear and Present Danger Rule

Dangerous Tendency Rule
Balancing of Interests
Q: In the determination of the restriction, you have what?

What are the Prior Restrictions?
1.
2.
Content-based Restrictions
Content-neutral Regulations
The Content-based Restrictions are restrictions on the

content of the speech itself. It can be restricted only when
there is a clear and present danger of a substantial evil
to happen which the state has the obligation to prevent.
On Content-neutral Regulations, it has nothing to do
with the content of the speech. It has something to do
with the time, place and the circumstances in the delivery
of the speech that can be regulated.
e.g the permit to use a public place can be a form of
content-neutral regulation. BP 880 requiring a permit
before using public place. What they apply there is not
content-based, only content-neutral regulations;
regulating only the time and place and manner of the
exercise of the freedom of expression.
You already mastered clear and present danger,
dangerous tendency and balancing of interests. Just go
over that.
Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales (supra)
127
Example of content-based regulations

Hello Garci Tapes
The DOJ Secretary and NTC threatened ABSCBN that should they continue to publish or
replay the Garci Tapes, the franchise of ABSCBN will be cancelled.
SC: This violated the freedom of expression of
the petitioner in that case because it goes to the
content already of the speech or the expression
here of the petitioner and that is prohibited under
the law because that can only be regulated when
there is a clear and present danger of any
substantial evil to happen which the state has
the obligation to prevent.
Also, you have to relate on the Freedom of Expression

such limitations as Void-For-Vagueness and the
Overbreadth Doctrine. They also apply to freedom of
expression. Where the basis for the question on the
constitutionality on the face of the law is on two grounds:
1.
2.
It is void because it is vague and therefore

violative of due process of law, or it can be
Overbreadth (Overbroad?)
Know that there are differences between the two. They

are exact opposites of each other.
This Overbreadth and Void for Vagueness Doctrines can
only be used to challenge the constitutionality of a law
affecting freedom of expression, particularly freedom of
speech ON THE FACE (need not be AS APPLIED) in
actual cases.
FACIAL CHALLENGE (Overbreadth/Void for Vagueness
Rule) vs AS APPLIED CHALLENGE
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether
the words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is
a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must
be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging

the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This
rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing. (Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No. 204819
April
8, 2014)
And then you have the rule on the MTRCB. You know that
already. MTRCB only has supervision over the TV
personality. They do not have any control over them. They
only have supervision and monitoring of programs of TV
and movies and films. They cannot suspend a TV
personality. That is clear in the case of Soriano vs.
Laguardia.
Soriano vs Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785
15, 2010
March
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV

program in question does not, under the factual milieu of
the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the
nature of subsequent punishment for past violation
committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of
the program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner
has not contested the fact of his having made statements
on the air that were contextually violative of the programs
"G" rating. To merit a "G" rating, the program must be
"suitable for all ages," which, in turn, means that the
"material for television [does not], in the judgment of the
[MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for children
and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or
supervision."3 As previously discussed by the Court, the
vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television
can in no way be characterized as suitable for all ages,
and is wholly inappropriate for children.
(TN) Also take note on commenting on acts of
government officials. You must read the case of Borjal vs.
CA, US vs. Bustos.
Doctrine of Fair Comment in Borjal vs CA G.R. No.
126466. January 14, 1999 citing US vs Bustos
Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings
are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised
Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate
court, they are neither private communications nor fair
and
true
report
without
any
comments
or
remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that
they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration
under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule
on privileged communications had its genesis not in the
nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the
press.[19] As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete,
[20]
this Court ruled that publications which are privileged
for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This
constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere
128
failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in

the statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit
in the freedom of the press. As held in Elizalde v.
Gutierrez[21] and reiterated in Santos v. Court of
Appeals[22] To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed
to petitioners for the alleged offending publication without
doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As
was so well put by Justice Malcolm in Bustos: Public
policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection
of public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result
has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases
resonates the rule that privileged communications
must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This
closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech
as essential to collective self-determination and eschews
the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of
self- expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling
Professor Owen Fiss,[23] makes its appeal to the
individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and
political culture. It is therefore clear that the restrictive
interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on the penal
provision exempting from liability only private
communications and fair and true report without
comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the
objective of the rule on privileged communications, sadly
contriving as it does, to suppress the healthy effloresence
of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly
democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an
action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts.[24]

But the same principle do not apply to the members of the
Supreme Court, as this might affect the sub judice rule. It
is stricter in so far as criticizing the Supreme Court.
But not so much as the present political scenario. Theyre
not afraid anymore of the courts. So they can just criticize,
starting with the President, theyre not afraid anymore.
You cannot put him in contempt. You cannot put him in
jail. He is immune from suit. That is in so far as the
freedom of expression. Just take note of that.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.
On Section 5, that is on freedom of religion or the nonestablishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The thing you should take note on thisthe
cases you need to take notemore recent decision,
Escritor (supra); still a prevailing principle. This can only
be intruded by the state when there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil to happen which may take
the form of compelling state interest. That is the Escritor
case.
In the Ebralinag case (supra), the saluting of the flag is no
longer mandatory insofar as the members of the
Jehovahs Witness, as it may violate the freedom of
religion.
There are 3 things you should take note in Section 5:
(1) non-establishment of religion, (2) freedom of religion,
and (3) the religious test.
All of these will apply only to the government; not against
private entities that would require religion as a
requirement for one to be allowed to exercise a particular
act. So this applies only to the government entities. (TN)
Just take note of that.
The bottom-line there, should there be any interference
by the State, you can only be justified by Clear and
Present Danger Rule.
Another one that is related to the religious test:
Conscientious Objector Test. That is respected by the
State. Like for example in some states they allow this you cannot be compelled to defend the state, to serve the
military if it is against your religion. In the Philippines, we
dont have that. There is no exception to serving the
defense of the State here. You cannot use that
Conscientious Objector Test.
I think they use Conscientious Objector Test with the RH
Law. The Conscientious Objector Test is applied with the
RH Law. Like its against your religion. You are working
with PopCom. You are working to promote population
control through use of contraceptives. That is against your
129
Catholic beliefs. In that RH Law, you can be punished. It

can be a crime or you can be charged administratively.
And that was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court being violative of your freedom of religion, taking to
consideration the Conscientious Objector Test. You read
this case. Thats the most recent decision of the SC
where there is a discussion on the respect for religion.
However, whatever your beliefs are you should also not
impose that on the state. That was the bottom line in the
RH Law. So read that case Imbong vs. the Executive
Secretary. (TN) You take note of that case. There is the
application of the Conscientious Objector Test. That one
has not been asked in the bar exam but that is included in
the bar exam of 2014. How it was applied in the RH Law.
[If you got time, read this RH Bill case of Imbong vs
Ochoa, its discusses so many rights under the Bill of
Rights]
A good example of a Conscientious objector is if youre
released from the obligation to serve in the armed forces
or to participate in selective service registration. That is a
good example of Conscientious Objector test. The same
with the liability of a government employee who does not
promote the RH Law if its against his religion there
should be no criminal liability or administrative liability.
That would be a violation of his freedom of religion.
Relevant excerpts from Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No.
204819 April 8, 2014
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise
clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by
the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was
stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In
the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with
respect to these governmental actions, accommodation
of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory
of
accommodation
is
not
a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,'
whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious
freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is
the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and
that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to
determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on
the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the
Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but
did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be
cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The
Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave
danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the
law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal
of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed
the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo
went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the
maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly,
all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in
one form or another, religious speech as this test is often
used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other
hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that
religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which
was the authority cited by German has been overruled by
Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate
danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed
the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained
previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the
facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican
Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and
German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is
not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach,
thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct
arising from religious belief. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on
the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing
a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words
of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of
130
such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the

"aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert,
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere
balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling
one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the
state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall
be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same
time affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved
conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the
paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very
state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]
xxxx
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the
Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at
bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
xxxx
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the
principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
xxxx
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts
what the government can do with religion, it also limits

what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they not cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a
state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud
his conscience. The demarcation line between Church
and State demands that one render unto Caesar the
things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221
xxxx
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is
allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice,
the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in
Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an
intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One
side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament
of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.222
131
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an optout clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but
he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
LIBERTY OF ABODE & RIGHT TO TRAVEL
On Section 6, on liberty of abode and the right to travel.
What you must take note on the liberty of abode is that
you also have the right to change the same within the
limits prescribed by law.
00:50:01-00:57:50 Ortezuela
TN: You also have the right to change the same within the
limits described by law. What are the limitations,
exceptions when there is a lawful order of the court, then
you cannot demand where you want to reside.
Q:But the right to travel, what are the restrictions?
A:In the interest of national security, public health or
public safety.
Q:Who determines?
A: Its not the court. It could be administrative agencies
exercising its functions that may have the responsibility to
make sure that there is no violation of the states public
health, or public safety, or national security.
Q: And thus the question of the right to travel of the
Arroyo couple they are going abroad. Can it be restrained
because there is an impending investigation conducted
on them? Of course not. What is the limitation?
A: Only in the interest of national security, public health,
public safety. Which was not established by the DOJ
nonetheless they refiled for the TRO.And so they were
not able to go abroad because eventually there was a
filing of an election case against them where it became
nonbailable as far as the president is concerned and then
after, the plunder case, which is an even more
nonbailable offense.
Q:But what about the requirement of judges and court
personnel?
A: To first secure a permit to travel before going abroad.
Q:Does this violate the right to travel?

A:TN the case of the Office the Administrator services,
office of the court administrator in Judge Ignacio Makarili,
where the supreme court said the right to travel
guaranteed by the constitution should by no means be
construed as limiting the supreme courts inherent power
of administrative supervision over lower courts. The law
does not restrict but merely regulates by providing
guidelines to be complied by the judges and court
personnel before they can go on leave to travel abroad.
To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person from doing
something to regulate however is needed to govern or
direct according to rule. There is no prohibition but merely
a regulation.
It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on
vacation leave to be spent abroad unduly restricts a
citizen's right to travel guaranteed by Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. 10 Section 6 reads:
Sec. 6.The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall theright to
travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. [Emphases
supplied]
Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizen's
constitutional right to travel. It is, however, not the issue
in this case. The only issue in this case is the noncompliance with the Court's rules and regulations. It
should be noted that respondent, in her Comment, did not
raise any constitutional concerns. In fact, she was
apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad
without the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the
proper vehicle to thresh out issues on one's constitutional
right to travel. Cdasia
Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of
one's right to travel or the freedom to move from one
place to another, 11 as assured by the Constitution, is not
absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 itself
provides that "neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law."
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are
those that naturally emanate from the source.
These are very basic and are built-in with the
power. An example of such inherent limitation is
the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons
charged with a crime to leave the country. 13 In
such a case, permission of the court is
necessary. Another is the inherent power of the
legislative
department
to
conduct
a
congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In the
exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the
power to issue a subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum to a witness in any part of the country,
signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson
and the Speaker or acting Speaker of the
132
House; 14 or in the case of the Senate, signed

by its Chairman or in his absence by the Acting
Chairman, and approved by the Senate
President. 15aEcHCD |||
(Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services-OCA v.
Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927,
December 13, 2011)
Q:Does this right to return to the country part of the right
to travel?
A:The answer is NO. what is the applicable to law on the
right to demand that youd be allowed to return to the
country after going abroad? We have article 13 paragraph
2, and article 12 paragraph 4. Of the universal declaration
of human rights civil and political rights respectively.
Where it guarantees that you have the right to return to
the country of origin if you live there.
Now they are considered as accepted principles of the
international law and under the incorporation clause part
of the legal system, they should be applied as if they are
part of the ordinary statutes.
And then you have on the human security act where (1) if
you violate suspected terrorism you can be placed under
house arrest, travel and communication is restricted,
under section 26 of the human security act.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
Section 7, the right to information.
What is important? Section 7. This is a political right.
This is not demandable by some matter of right.
Two things that you should TN on the right to information:
1.
The right to information and
2.
The right to access to information
This is relevant because of the pending approval of the

FOI. The Freedom of Information bill. This is selfexecuting but you will notice that if you demand
information from government, it is for the government to
determine whether it should considered as a public
information or confidential information. And since there is
no law defining what may be considered as information as
a public concern, it is now the supreme court that
legislates by way of jurisprudence. Defining what may be
considered as a public information that must be readily
accessible to the public or information that must remain
confidential.

We can only rely on jurisprudence and they dont want
that. They want congress to formulate the law that would
state as a fact on the information that are accessible to
the public as a matter of right.
The right to information is absolute. The access however
to this information is subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed by law.
Q:Now TN to the exceptions of this: what are information
that cannot be made accessible to the public? What are
these information?
A:You have, first of all, the executive privilege of the
president. The executive privilege example, the
operational proximity test. communication between the
president and his subordinate. That is consultative in
nature, not accessible. Negotiation made by the president
not accessible to the public. Anything that pertains to the
performance of function of the president that might
undermine his authority he can invoke the privilege which
cannot be the subject of compulsion on the part of any
court for them to disclose that is considered as an
accepted privilege.
Using the above elements, we are
convinced
that,
indeed,
the
communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by
the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications
relate to a "quintessential and nondelegable
power"
of
the
President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other
countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. 45 Second, the
communications are "received" by a
close advisor of the President. Under
the
"operational proximity"
test,
petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of
President
Arroyo's
cabinet. And third, there
is
no
adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation
of
the
privilege
and
of
the unavailability of the information
elsewhere
by
an
appropriate
investigating authority.|||
(Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643,
March 25, 2008)
Q:What else that is not covered by the right to
information?
133
A: You have military secrets, of course. Obviously, that

cannot be disclosed to the public. Otherwise it will be too
dangerous if it goes into the wrong hands. What else?
Intelligence reports on what? crime investigations. Even if
its wrong, and therefore not too intelligent, cannot be
accessed by the public because these are confidential.
National security matters, trade secrets, banking
transactions TN except when it is a subject of a court
litigation or impeachment. You notice that already when
we had the impeachment. Diplomatic correspondence,
executive sessions of congress, closed door meetings are
confidential.
SUMMARY OF MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN SCOPE
OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
1.
Executive Privilege
2.
Judicial Privilege
3.
Military Secrets
4.
Intelligence Reports on Crime Investigations
5.
Matters of National Security
6.
Trade Secrets
7.
Banking Transactions EXCEPT if subject to court

litigation and in impeachment cases
8.
Diplomatic Correspondence
9.
Executive Sessions and Closed door meetings

of Congress
TN of the following cases:

> Chavez vs. PEA ongoing contract negotiation of
Government, the people have the right to know. Treaty
negotiation thats executive privilege, so try to spot out the
difference, do not be misled.
Latest jurisprudence on Freedom of Information
citing Chavez vs PEA
The people's right to information is based on Art. III, Sec.
7 of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 7.The right of the people
to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to
government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be
provided by law.

The
policy of public
disclosure and transparency of governmental
transactions involving public interest enunciated in
Art. II, Sec. 28 of the Constitution complements the
right of the people to information:
Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public
interest.
The purpose of these two constitutional provisions, as we
observed in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, is:
to promote transparency in policymaking and in the
operations of the government, as
well as provide the people
sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional
rights. These twin provisions are
essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression.
. . . Armed with the
right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions
leading to the
formulation of government
policies and their effective
implementation. An informed
citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper
functioningof any democracy. 46
This right to information, however, is not without
limitation. Fr. Joaquin Bernas S.J. notes that the two
sentences of Section 7 guarantee only one general right,
the right to information on matters of public concern. The
right to access official records merely implements the
right to information. Thus, regulatory discretion must
include both authority to determine what matters
are of public concern and authority to determine the
manner of access to them. 47
We have sufficiently elucidated the matter of right
to information in Chavez, where We said: DCISAE
We must first distinguish
between information the law on
public bidding requires PEA to
disclose publicly, and information the
constitutional right
to information requires PEA to
release to the public. Before the
consummation of the contract,
PEA must, on its own and without
demand from anyone, disclose to
the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These
include the size, location,
technical
description and nature of the
property being disposed of, the
terms and conditions of the
disposition, the parties qualified to
bid, the minimum
price and similar information. PEA
must prepare all these
data and disclose them to the public

at the startof the disposition process,
long before the consummation of the
contract, because the Government
Auditing Code requires public
bidding. If PEA fails to make this
disclosure, any citizen can
demand from PEA
this information at any time during
the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going
evaluation or review of bids or
proposals being undertaken by
the bidding or review committee is
not immediately accessible under
the right to information. While the
evaluation or review is still on-going,
there are no "official acts,
transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a
"definite proposition" on the
part of the government. From this
moment, the public's right
to information attaches, and any
citizen can access all the nonproprietary information leading to
such definite proposition. In Chavez
v. PCGG, the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the
intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that
it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government
representatives, to disclose
sufficient
public information on any
proposed settlement they
have decided to take up
with the ostensible
owners and holders of illgotten wealth.
Suchinformation, though,
must pertain to definite
propositions of the
government, not necessarily
to intra-agency or interagency recommendations
or communications during
the stage when common
assertions are still in the
process of being formulated
or are in the "exploratory"
stage. There is
need, of course, to observe
the same restrictions on
disclosure of information in
general, as discussed
earlier such as on
matters involving national
security, diplomatic or
foreign relations,
134

intelligenceand other
classified information."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The right covers three
categories of information which
are "matters of public concern,"
namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining
to official acts,
transactions and decisions; and (3
) government research data used
in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that
is part of the public records in the
custody of government agencies or
officials. The second category refers
to documents and papers recording,
evidencing, establishing, confirming,
supporting, justifying or explaining
official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to
research data, whether raw, collated
or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating
government policies.
xxx xxx xxx
We rule, therefore, that the
constitutional right
to information includes
official information on on-going
negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions
by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information,
military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.
Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right
to information in several legislations.
(Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted.)
We
further
explored
the
matter of right
to information in Chavez v. NHA, where We ruled
that:
. . . [G]overnment agencies,
without need of demand from
anyone, must bring into public view
all the steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the
transactionand the contents of the
perfected contract.
Such information must pertain to
"definite propositions of the
government," meaning official
recommendations or final positions
reached on the different matters
subject of negotiation. The
government agency, however,
need not disclose "intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or
135
communications during the stage

when common assertions are still
in the process of being formulated
or are in the exploratory stage."
The limitation also covers
privileged communication
like information on
military and diplomatic
secrets; information affecting
national security; information on
investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the
accused; information on foreign
relations, intelligence, and other
classified information. 48
Even without any demand from anyone then, it behooved
PSALM to publicly disclose, information regarding the
disposition of Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant|||
(AHEPP). Here, PSALM routinely published
news and updates on the sale of AHEPP on its
website. 49 It also organized several forums where
various stakeholders were apprised of the procedure to
be implemented in the privatization of AHEPP. As there is
yet no sufficient enabling law to provide the specific
requirements in the discharge of its duty under the
Constitution, these unilateral actions from PSALM must
be construed to be a sufficient compliance of its duty
under the Constitution.
||| (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment Through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. v. PSALM Corp., G.R. No.
192088, October 09, 2012)
> Request for copy of 2008 SALN,PDA and Curriculum
Vitae of Supreme Court Justices. This case was decided
2013. This issue was brought about by Kim Henares. The
Supreme Court did not categorically declare that it is
prohibited from giving out said documents but it asked
Kim Henares to state your legal basis first. The SC in
this case said that the right to information goes hand in
hand with the Constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public service under Sec.
17 ART XI has classified information disclosed in the
SALN as a matter of public interest hence there is a duty
on the part of members of the government to disclose
their SALN to the public in the manner provided by law.
While the public officers in the custody and control of
public records have the discretion to regulate the manner
in which records may be inspected or copied by
interested parties, such discretion does not carry with it
the authority to prohibit access to inspecting these
records. After all, a public office is a public trust. In this
case, what they wanted was detailed disclosure, not just
the summary.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF
ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012

Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7,
Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of
public disclosure of SALN and other documents of public
officials, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people
to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and
paperspertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the
foregoing constitutional provision, the Court, in the
landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,[50] elucidated
on the import of the right to information in this wise:
The
cornerstone
of
this
republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to
the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within
the limits of the authority conferred by
the
people. Denied
access
to
information on the inner workings of
government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of
those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public
office
is
a
public
trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution
to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly
be mere empty words if access to
such information of public concern
is denied x x x.
x x x The right to information
goes
hand-in-hand
with the
constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as
well as in checking abuse in
government. (Emphases supplied)
In Baldoza v. Dimaano,[51] the importance of the
said right was pragmatically explicated:
The incorporation of this right
in the Constitution is a recognition of
the fundamental role of free exchange
of information in a democracy. There
can be no realistic perception by the
public of the nations problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making
if they are denied access to information
136
of general interest. Information is

needed to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of
the times. As has been aptly observed:
Maintaining
the flow
of
such
information depends on protection for
both
its
acquisition
and
its
dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.
However, restrictions on access to
certain records may be imposed by
law.
Thus, while public concern like public interest
eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to
know, either because such matters directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen,[52] the Constitution itself,
under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information
disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and
interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from
the right to know. Both of constitutional origin, the
former is a command while the latter is a permission.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed
in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
On Sec.8: The right to form unions. It does not allow the
right to strike. And it does not form an integral part on the
right to information.
The right to an association includes the right not to be
compelled to be a member. But TN of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, that is an exception. You can be
compelled to be a member for reasons of public interest.
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
On Sec. 9: Eminent Domain. The power of the State to
take private land for public use upon the payment of just
compensation.
The things you should TN, in expropriation cases, what
are the requirements?
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)
5.)
Private Property
Entry to the property in the Constitutional sense
For public use
Payment of just compensation
Observance of Due process
Private property is property owned by an entity or

individual in its private capacity. This includes patrimonial
properties of Government. If taken (by Government, for
public use), it is compensable.

Entry into the property in the Constitutional sense,
TN the case of Republic vs. Castillve, that there must be:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Actual entry in the property that is the subject of

expropriation, either legally or under the color of
title.
That the entry must be for public purpose.
That it must be more or less permanent, not only
for a momentary period.
That the owner of the property is deprived of the
use and concession of his property.
We
hold,
therefore,
that
the
"taking'
of
the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the
year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should
not be determined on the basis of the value of the
property as of that year. The lower court did not commit
an error when it held that the "taking" of the property
under expropriation commenced with the filing of the
complaint in this case.|||(Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi,
G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974)
If from the very beginning, if the entry of the Government
is without color of title, then there is no valid entry for
purposes of determining just compensation. It must be
reckoned from the time expropriation case was filed not
from the time of actual occupancy by the government,
because for entry to be lawful it must be under the color
of title.
But generally the basis for determining just compensation
should be reckoned from the time of taking of possession
by the Government, even if this is before the filing of the
expropriation case.
It must be for public use, defined as anything that
redounds to the benefit of the public. Even if only a
greater number of the people or the public may be
benefited from it. TN of the case of Vda. De Ouano vs.
The Republic. This was decided just last 2011, this is the
IT Park case I think. Public use, according to the
Supreme Court, includes any use that is of usefulness,
utility or advantage.
In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking,
the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to
defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In other
words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of
property against his will. Withal, the mandatory
requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed,
such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take private property,
the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably
deducible from the complaint.
DTAIaH
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now
acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is
of "usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive
of general benefit [of the public]." 41 If the genuine public
necessity the very reason or condition as it were
137
allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a

private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more
cogent point for the government's retention of the
expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if
the government devotes the property to another public
use very much different from the original or deviates from
the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It
has been said that the direct use by the state of its power
to oblige landowners to renounce their productive
possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizen's own private gain, is
offensive to our laws. 42
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant
to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation,
failing which it should file another petition for the new
purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return
the said property to its private owner, if the latter so
desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the
property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in
the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This
is not in keeping with the idea of fair play.
The notion, therefore, that the government, via
expropriation
proceedings,
acquires
unrestricted
ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land, is
no longer tenable. We suggested as much in Heirs of
Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently in Lozada,
Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a
piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely
transferred by way of an unconditional purchase and sale
contract freely entered by two parties, one without
obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play.
There is really no occasion to apply the "fee simple
concept" if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a
private land in expropriation proceedings is always
conditioned on its continued devotion to its public
purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is
terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former
owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of
course to the return, at the very least, of the just
compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a piece of
land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to swallow for the
owner. But to be asked to sacrifice for the common good
and yield ownership to the government which reneges on
its assurance that the private property shall be for a
public purpose may be too much. But it would be worse if
the power of eminent domain were deliberately used as a
subterfuge to benefit another with influence and power in
the political process, including development firms. The
mischief thus depicted is not at all far-fetched with the
continued application of Fery. Even as the Court
deliberates on these consolidated cases, there is an
uncontroverted allegation that the MCIAA is poised to
sell, if it has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu
Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added
dimension to abandon Fery.
(De Ouano v. Republic, G.R. No. 1687702, 168812,
February 09, 2011)

Specific v. General Purpose of Expropriation.
Insofar as Rule 67, it is 10% while
Here you must qualify whether the expropriation was for a

specific or general purpose. If the purpose is general, it is
a general conveyance, then the owner cannot recover
from the government the property expropriated if it is now
being used for a different public purpose. On the other
hand, if it is for specific purpose then the owner may
recover in this particular scenario.
In RA 8974, it is 100%
When we say general purpose, it is an absolute

conveyance; there is this even what they call as fee
simple.
In the case of Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation vs
DOTC, 2008. SC said that the State thru the expropriation
proceedings may take private property even if admittedly
it will transfer the said property again to another private
entity as long as there is public purpose to the taking.
In recognizing the right of AEDC to the award of the
NAIA IPT III project, would the public purpose of the
expropriation be defeated by the government's taking
over a privately owned structure, only to turn over its
operation to another private entity (AEDC)? The answer
is no.
To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The

meaning of the term "public use" has evolved over time in
response to changing public needs and exigencies.
Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly
limited to actual "use by the public" has already been
abandoned. 128 "Public use" has 'now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public
welfare" and "public convenience." 129 It includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage.130 Whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use. 131
(Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of

Transportation and Communications, G.R. No. 169914,
174166, April 18, 2008)
Here in this case, it appears that the conveyance was of
general in nature because there was no specific purpose
specified.
Payment of Just Compensation
Q: In payment of Just Compensation, what rule or laws
should you consider?
A: Rule 67 of the Rules of Court as basis for the
compensation, and also RA 8974.
In the Local Government Code, it is 50%.
138
TN: In rule 67, the base is the assessed value of the

property for taxation purposes. Under Rule 67, it must be
based on the market value or the zonal value of the
property whichever is higher.
RA 8974 applies only to National Infrastructure.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation
The LBP disputes this ruling, maintaining that while the
determination of just compensation is a judicial function,
courts should take into serious consideration the facts
and data gathered by the DAR, through the LBP, as the
administrative agency mandated by law to make an initial
determination of the valuation of the parcels of
agricultural land acquired for land reform.
We agree.
That it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power
to
determine
just
compensation
for
parcels
of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian
reform program, is made clear in Section 57 of RA 6657
||| (LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp.,
G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012)
To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657
enumerates the factors that have to be taken into
consideration to accurately determine just compensation.
xxx
Here, it is expressed that just compensation is a judicial
power. Whatever law there is, it is just a guideline, and
determination of just compensation still clearly lies in the
sound discretion of the courtdiscretionary power of the
court.
Q: (Bar) If a Water District expropriates, what is the
requirement?
A: It must be a BOARD RESOLUTION subject to the
approval of the Local Water Utilites Administration.
Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. J. King and Sons
Co., Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009
Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire
private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. 25 The power of eminent domain is
inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government. Its
exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional
requirements: first, that there must be just compensation,
and second, that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. 26
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to
expropriate pertains to the legislature. However,
Congress may, as in fact it often does, delegate the
exercise of the power to government agencies, public

officials and quasi-public entities. Petitioner is one of the
numerous government offices so empowered. Under its
charter, P.D. No. 198, as amended, 27 petitioner is
explicitly granted the power of eminent domain.
On 7 November 2000, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8974,
entitled "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-ofWay, Site or Location for National Government
Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes". Section 2
thereof defines national government projects as
follows: SDHA
EC
Sec.
2.National
Government
Projects. The term "national
government projects" shall refer to all
national government infrastructure,
engineering works and service
contracts, including
projects
undertaken by government-owned
and -controlled corporations, all
projects covered by Republic Act No.
6957, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7718, otherwise known as the
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and
other
related
and
necessary
activities, such as site acquisition,
supply
and/or
installation
of
equipment
and
materials,
implementation,
construction,
completion, operation, maintenance,
improvement,
repair
and
rehabilitation, regardless of source of
funding". (emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 8974 includes projects undertaken by
government owned and controlled corporations, 28 such
as petitioner. Moreover, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly includes water
supply, sewerage, and waste management facilities
among the national government projects covered by the
law. 29 It is beyond question, therefore, that R.A. No.
8974 applies to the expropriation subject of this
case.IHETS
||
There is a deadline in the payment of just compensation.
It should be paid within 5 years from the finality of the
decision in the expropriation case, otherwise the owner
has the right to recover the property and file a case for
reconveyance.
Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29,
2005
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is
that "the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession
of
the
expropriated
lots, 26 however, in
cases
where
the
government
failed
to
pay
just
compensation within five (5) 27 years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property.
This is in consonance with the principle that "the
government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment." 28 To be sure, the five-
139
year period limitation will encourage the

government
to
pay
just
compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the payment of just
compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals, 29 we defined just compensation as
not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the property owner but also the
payment of the property within a reasonable
time. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just."||| (Republic v. Lim,
G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005)
From the finality of the judgment in the expropriation case
otherwise, the owner of the property shall have the right
to recover it. This is already settled.
Q. What would be the just compensation?
A. Money. Money should be the payment except
regarding on the implementation of the Agrarian Reform
Program. In this program it could be through bonds. It
could also be through tax credit in so far as the taking of
income because of the implementation of VAT. The
payment is in a way of expropriation because it is
beneficial to the public. The payment of the government
to the owner of the stores or companies granting VAT is
through tax credit.
Again, the manner of payment could be in Money, Bonds,
or Tax Credit.
TN: By the way another definition of public use;
Socialized Housing is considered public use. Tourism
purposes is also public use.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
The rule is, Congress is prohibited from passing a law
that would modify or change the terms of an agreement of
an existing contract affecting rights and obligation of the
parties.
TN: Take note of the exceptions. Despite of an agreement
it may be superseded by the States exercise of Police
Power, Eminent Domain, Taxation, or when the parties
themselves stipulate in the contract that is subject to
future laws that may change the terms of the agreement.
There is a waiver against non-impairment clause.
TN: The exception regarding on Taxation, just take note
of this, if the exemption from taxation is based on
valuable consideration that cannot be repealed or
changed, as it would violated the non-impairment clause.
But if the exemption is based on gratuitous consideration,
then it can be repealed any time without violating the nonimpairment clause.
Lets go directly to Civil Liberties

Section 18.
1.
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his

political beliefs and aspirations.
2.
No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist

except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.
TN: Take note of the other exceptions to Section 18

where you can be compelled to serve: punishment of a
crime, service in the defense of the State, Naval
enlistment, (Fosi Comitatus {I dont know how to spell Luj.
Not so familiar with this}), return to work order, patria
potestas.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax.
Non-imprisonment for debt or for non-payment of poll tax;
the only thing you should take note for non-imprisonment
of debt is a debt arising from contract and not from the
commission of a crime. It has to be contractual obligation
in order for you not to be imprisoned.
BAR: This applies to non-payment of rentals. You cannot
be put be put to jail for non-payment of rentals. Case in
point Vergara vs. Vigorio. This has been asked in the bar
exam many times.
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003
Quick Facts: At bar is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision of the Court of Appeals which denied for
lack of merit petitioners' petition for issuance of a
140
writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners were arrested by

virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the probate court.
Among other, petitioners contended that the appellate
court erred in affirming the Decision of the probate court
finding them guilty of indirect contempt for noncompliance with its October 5, 1999. Order which
required petitioners, as recognized lessees of the
estate of the deceased Anselma P. Allers, to pay rentals
to the administratrix, herein private respondent, and
directed their imprisonment until they comply with the
probate court's order. According to petitioners, they did
not comply with the order for the reason that they were
not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the
rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had
originally leased the subject property to them.|||
4. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
NO
PERSON SHALL BE IMPRISONED FOR DEBT;
PAYMENT OF RENTALS
COVERED
BY
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE; CASE AT BAR. In
Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no person
shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the
Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising
out of a contract, express or implied. In the present case,
petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of the
deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the
rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply
with the order for the principal reason that they were not
certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the
rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had
originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the
payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.|||
Non-payment of Poll Tax means non-payment of
community tax. You cannot be put to jail for that.
----- Nothing Follows ----

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Allied Political Law Review of Class 2015

Notes and Cases from Judge Estela Alma A. Singco

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

February 1987. Case in point, you have the de Leon v.

Constitution of Government - as reflected in

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Constitution of Sovereignty - that is giving the

just copying the 1973 Constitution because then there

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Piecemeal submission is prohibited. It should be the

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and

We cannot afford to have that situation so we adopted

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

information is significant taking into consideration the

What is the purpose of RA 9522?

What is TERRITORIAL SEA?

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

From where should the EEZ be based or drawn?

What do you mean by HABITABLE?

In relation to Chinas claims, will the EEZ apply?

Is it correct for China to refuse?

Aside from the Regime of Islands, you also have other

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Malaysia to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. The least

above, no limits. Up to the universe. But the international

As I have said, the provisions of the Constitution does not

A: You used the straight-line method. Remember the

Marianas Islands and Guam, our claim is based on the

Read the concept of Regime of Islands

Lets talk about Bangsamoro.

You have other sovereign areas: the insular shelves, the

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

And thats precisely even if the Republic of the Philippines

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

authority amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Government Code. These are general laws passed by

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

A: SC said no. The counterclaim will prosper because in

The other ground for dismissing the defendant's

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Republican representation and renovation kind of

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

One of the issues raised is the constitutionality of the pork

PDAF is similarly situated. There was an appropriation for

Sec. 2 THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE

Art. 2 is not self executing. These are only guidelines in

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

requisite NFA permit. When the court had to resolve this

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Established, widespread and consistent

So if these two elements are established, then it becomes

and even if everyone witnessed the act. There is no

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

Chief of the AFP, the highest authority who is a civilian

USC WARRIOR NOTES 2014 Political Law Review (Constitutional Law)

SECTION 6: SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Teaching of religion in public elementary and