Oil Gas Pipeline Failure Rates

OilGasPipelineFailureRates(detailed)
AnalysisofOilPipelineFailuresintheOilandGas...
http://www.iaeng.org/publication/IMECS2012/IMECS2012_pp12741279.pdfDecember07,2014
...Thisresearchworkontheanalysisofoilpipelinefailuresinoilandgasindustriesinthe...VariationofFailureRatebyNDSsforAllOilPipeline...
ProceedingsoftheInternationalMultiConferenceofEngineersandComputerScientists2012VolII,
IMECS2012,March1416,2012,HongKong
AnalysisofOilPipelineFailuresintheOilandGas
IndustriesintheNigerDeltaAreaofNigeria
C.H.Achebe,Member,IAENG,U.C.Nneke,andO.E.Anisiji
AbstractThisresearchworkontheanalysisofoilpipelinesharedhisviewonhowtoimprovepipeline
failuresinoilandgasindustriesintheNigerdeltaareaofIntegrityManagement,opiningthatPipelineoperators
Nigeriawascarriedouttoascertainthecausesofthesefailures.canrealizemanybenefitsbyimplementingadata
Informationonpipelineconditionswasgatheredfortheperiodintegrationapproachthat;enablesintegritymanagers,
between1999and2010.Observationsshowedthatthemajor
riskassessmentspecialistsandpiggingEngineerstoview
causesoffailureinclude:Ageing,Corrosion,Mechanical
failuresweldingdefects,pressuresurgeproblems,stress,wallandanalyzecombinedinformationfromdisparatesurveys
thickness,etc.Fromthedatagotandresultsthatwereandtoincreasethevalueofdatabyshavingitacrossthe
obtained,recommendationsweregivenonmeasurestoentirecorporation.Therehavebeenanumberofstudies
minimizethesefailures.AccordingtotheGasandOilPipelineconductedbyresearchersoncausesofoilpipelinefailuresin
Standards(GOST)ofNigeria,thestandardlifetimeofatheoilandgasindustry.
pipelineis33yearsbutthisresearchfindingsrevealedthatIkporukpo[2]examinedthecausesofpipelineleaks
42%offailuresweremechanicallyinduced,18%bycorrosion,versuspipelinerupturesandtheproportionforeach.In
thirdpartyactivitycontributed24%,10%throughoperationalfailuresresultinginproductloss,leaksconstituted86.8%of
errorand6%bynaturalhazards.Besidesapplyinggood
failuresandruptures13.2%.Corrosionisthepredominant
cathodicprotection,oranticorrosiveagents,reinforced
thermoplasticpipe(RTP)seemstobethebestremedy,asitiscauseofleaks.Accordingtothefindings,thirdparty
abletowithstandmanyfactorsthatleadtofailures.Theuseofdamageistheleadingcauseoflineruptures.Since1994,191
RTPsisthereforerecommendedasagoodmeasureagainsthitswererecorded,andthesearenotincludedonthegraphas
pipelinefailuresintheOilandGasIndustriesinNigeria.theydidnotresultineitherleaksorruptures.Thehits
equalled47%ofallrecordedthirdpartyincidentsforthe
IndexTermsCathodicprotection,Corrosion,Mechanicalyears19941997,demonstratingthatapproximatelyhalfofall
failure,NigerDelta,Reinforcedthermoplasticpipe.thirdpartyincidentsresultedinapipelinefailure.Reference[3]
showedthatabout50%ofthirdpartyincidentsresultedinloss
I.INTRODUCTIONofpipelineproducts.Ndifon[4]reviewedthenumberof
MAJORpipelinesacrosstheworldtransportlargeinternalcorrosionfailuresformultiphasepipelinesand
quantitiesofcrudeoil,naturalgas,andpetroleumproducts.discoveredthatinternalcorrosionfailuresincreasedsteadily
Thesepipelinesplayanimportantroleinmodernwhilethenumberofexternalcorrosionfailuresheldsteady.
societiesandarecrucialinprovidingneededfuelsforHowever,thefailurefrequencyhasbeenquiteconsistent[5],
sustainingvitalfunctionssuchaspowergeneration,heating[6].
supply,andtransportation.InlightofthehazardousMoffatandLinden[7]compiledbackground
propertiesoftheproductsbeingtransmittedthroughtheseresearchandinformationthatisassociatedwithoilpipeline
pipelines,arupturedpipelinehasthepotentialtodofailures,itshowsthatforcrudeoilpipelines,thecausesof
seriousenvironmentaldamage.Thisproblemisfurtherfailuresappearedtobefairlyrandominnature,andthatno
compoundedbythefactthatmanydevelopingcountriestrendswereapparent.Theystatedforsourgaspipelines,
havenotestablishedproperguidelinesandstandardsforinternalcorrosionisthemajorcauseoffailure.External
thedesign,construction,andoperationofmajoroilcorrosionfailureshavedeclinedinrecentyears,possiblyas
pipelines.Thisstudyconcernstheanalysisofoilpipelinetheresultofimprovedcoatingsandincreasedinspection.Ofthe
failuresintheNigerdeltaareaofNigeriawiththeaimsourlinefailures,about86%wereleaksand14%were
toundertakeadeskstudytoevaluatetheproceduresforruptures.Theyusedthelatesttechnologyinthefieldsof
pipelinemaintenanceandcontingencyplansforaddressinginternalelectronicinspection,metallurgy,coatings,cathodic
oilpipelinefailuresintheNigerdeltaareaofNigeria.Theprotection,andchemicalinhibition.
riskassociatedwithpipelineintermsofsafetyofpeople,Nwankwoetal[8]andOdusola[9]extensivelystudiedthe
damagetotheenvironmentandlossofincomehasbeenaeffectsofinternalcorrosionfailuresfornaturalgaspipelines
majorconcerntopipelineintegritymanagers.whichhavegenerallybeenincreasing.Some"other"
SourcesoffailureincludeStructuralproblem40%,categorywhichincludehighvapourpressureliquids,low
Operatorerror6%,Others25%,Outsideforcedamagevapourpressureliquids,fuelgas,andallothersshowed
27%andlastlyControlproblems2%.Agbaeze[1]failureratestoberelativelyfewandthecausestobe
relativelyrandom.
ManuscriptreceivedDecember23,2011;revisedJanuary04,2012.
C.H.AchebeiswiththeDepartmentofMechanicalEngineering,
NnamdiAzikiweUniversity,PMB5025,Awka(Phone:+2348036662053;II.MATERIALSANDMETHODS
email:chinobert2k@yahoo.com).Theaimofthisstudyistoranktheoilpipelineincident
U.C.NnekeiswithNnamdiAzikiweUniversity,Awka.fromdatacollectedfromoilandgasindustry,sothat
O.E.AnisijiwaswithNnamdiAzikiweUniversity,Awka.Heisnow
withProjectDevelopmentInstitute(PRODA),Enugu.
ISBN:9789881925190IMECS2012
ISSN:20780958(Print);ISSN:20780966(Online)
pipelinemanagerscanprioritizetheirstrategiesforflowstationsforcrudeoilprocessing,withmorethan7,000
managingtheriskinvolved.kmofoilandgaspipelinestraversingtheentireareaand
Theobjectivesofthestudyhavebeencategorizedintothesevenexportterminals.
followingdifferentareasofactivities:
Studythehistoricaloilpipelinefailures.
Assessoilpipelinerupturerisksandrecommend
measurestoreduceoilspillprobabilityandimpact
severity.
Identifythebestpracticesindevelopedcountries
andrecommendwaysoftranslatingthemtoareas
havinginadequatearrangementsorcombating
oilpipelinefailuresandmitigationoftheireffects.
Promoteestablishmentofregulatoryand
monitoringsystems.
Promotethedevelopmentofincentivesystemsto
encouragetheoilindustrytominimize
environmentaldegradationarisingfromoil
pipelinespills(inparticular).
Inordertofulfilthestudyobjectives,anumberofworkFig.2.NigerDeltaShowingtheDistributionofOnshore
taskswereidentified,comprising:andOffshoreOilFields;Source:NDRDMP(2006)
Collectionofdataonpipelinenetworkof
ShellPetroleumDevelopmentCompanyThelandareawithinwhichthenetworkoftransport
(SPDC)intheNigerDeltaAreaofNigeria;pipelinesarelocatedisestimatedat31,000km2.Thereareten
Analysisandriskassessmentofthecausesofgasplantsandabout30marginaloilfieldsfarmedout,
oilpipelinefailuresintheNigerDeltaAreaofthroughthenetworkofpipelines,tolocalcompaniesand
Nigeria;forexport.ThreeofNigeria'sfourrefineries,PortHarcourtI
Reviewofthelegalandregulatingregimesof&IIandWarri,arelocatedintheregion,whilethefourthis
ShellPetroleumDevelopmentCompany(SPDC)locatedinKaduna,NorthernNigeria.
pipelinesintheNigerDeltaAreaofNigeria;andDatawascollectedfromknownperiodicalsandother
Recommendationsforstrengtheningtheliterature,aswellasthedatabasesofNigerianNational
regulatoryandmonitoringsystemsintheNigerianPetroleumCorporation(NNPC),DepartmentofPetroleum
oilandgasindustry.Resources(DPR),ShellPetroleumDevelopment
Company(SPDC)andothersecondarysourcesthatare
responsibleforoperatingoilandgaspipelinesintheNigerDelta
AreaofNigeria.Thedatacollectedincludedthefollowing:
Pipelinenetworkdataofthemajorcrudeoiland
producttrunktransportationpipelines,includingfeeder
linesandlocalgatheringsystems(whereapplicable)inthe
StatesofNigerDeltaareaofNigeria.
Pipelinefailuredataduringtheperiod19992005
fromthepipelines.Typesofdatacollectedincluded:dateof
event,sitespecification(thatis,pipelineidentificationand
geographicallocation),spillquantityandduration,
causesandconsequences,cleanupandrestoration,etc.
Geographicalandenvironmentaldatatoidentify
importantenvironmentalfactors,aswellaspopulations,
habitats,orotherenvironmentalfeaturesofeachstateofNiger
Deltaareaalongthepipelinesthatarevulnerabletooilspills.
Oilspillcontingencyplandataincludingexisting
contingencyplans,typeofcleanupequipment,capacities,and
soforthinthegivencountries.
Fig.1.NigeriashowingNigerDelta,majorcities&5Mostofthepipelinedatawereaccessedfromadigitalmap
OperationalZones;Source:Anifowose(2006)ofmainoilpipelines.Thedataincludedlocationofpipelines,
diameterinmillimeters,andlengthinkilometers.The
TheNigerDelta(Fig.1)islocatedinSoutherndatahavebeencategorizedonastatebystatebasisandare
Nigeriaandisworld'sthirdlargestwetland.ItissummarizedinTable1below.
characterizedbysignificantbiologicaldiversityandcontainsTherewereapproximately84,000kilometersofpipeline
thebulkofNigeria'sprovenoilandgasreserves.TheregioninNigeriaasof1998.About90%ofthispipelinehasa
hasabout606oilfieldswith355situatedonshoreand251diameterofgreaterthan504mm(20inches)whileabout
offshore(Fig.2).Thereareabout5,284oilwellsdrilledand52764,000pipelinekilometers,or76%ofthetotal,are
ISBN:9789881925190IMECS2012
locatedintheNigerDeltaStates.Thedistributionofthese
pipelinesintheNigerDeltaareaofNigeriaisshowninTABLE2
Table1.AGEANDPERFORMANCERATINGOFNIGERIAN
Unlikeothercountries,themainpipelinesintheNigerianMAINOILPIPELINESASATTHEYEAR2000
NigerDeltastatesarecombinedintounifiedsystemsthat
transportnaturalgas,oilandpetroleumfuelstobothdomesticYear2000
andinternationalendusers,NaturalgasistransportedAge(years)%total
network
exclusivelybytheNigerianNationalpetroleum%reliabilitylength
Corporation(NNPC);oilistransportedbyacombination<204627
ofmultinationaloilcompaniesandthenationalpipeline20302932
operator;andrefinedpetroleumfuelsaretakencareof>302541
byindependentoilmarketers.
(Source:PipelineOilSpillPreventionandRemediationin
TABLE1
NDS,NNPC,2007)
NUMBEROFPIPELINEKILOMETERSBYDIAMETER
INTHENIGERDELTASTATES
Themainsourcesofinformationforoilpipelinefailures
citedinthisstudyarethefollowing:
DatabaseoftheOilSpillIntelligenceReport
CrossRiver
AkwaIbom
Diameter
Bayelsa
(NNPC),PortHarcourt.
Rivers
Total
Delta
ShellNigeriaAnnualReports,PortHarcourt,Nigeria.
(mm)
Edo
HazardousCargoBulletin(HCB),NNPC,Nigeria.
152284848104 OilandGasJournal(OGJ),Lagos,Nigeria.
228148148 MajorHazardIncidentDataServiceDatabase
30414148168(MHIDAS);HealthandSafetyExecutive(owner),
381136165301AEATechnology(operator),Lagos,Nigeria.
45719716960396 InstitutionofChemicalEngineersAccident
5332452197356629Database(I.Chem.E),PortHarcourt,Nigeria.
609274274 MinistryofNigerDeltaArea,Abuja,Nigeria.
6857426701412
7621832874214832436Note:MinistryofNigerDeltaAreacoversdevelopmental
83828747531973984222projectsintheOilproducingstates.
91440315679582928Therelevantdataoneachoftheoilpipelinefailuresare
990456342798summarizedinTables35below.Thecausesofspills
wereanalyzedinaccordancewiththeinternationally
1066814345625973117
acceptednomenclature(NNPC1997)
1143161897811139
1219501197123116119294019
TABLE3
Total1247453975354711367825121528ASUMMARYOFTHEVARIOUSCAUSESOFOIL
PIPELINEFAILUREINTHENIGERDELTAREGIONOF
=NotavailableNIGERIA
(Source:DepartmentofPetroleumResources(DPR),Shell
Operational
Thirdparty
petroleumDevelopmentCompany(SPDC),PortHarcourt,
Mechanical
Corrosion
2010)
Activity
Natural
Hazard
Failure
Failure
Thespecificageofsomeofthepipelinesarenotknown,
anditwaspossibletomakeanobjectivecorrelation
betweentheageofpipelinesandtheirrateofrupture[10].ConstrucInternal,System,Accidental,
Subside
However,alargenumberoftheoilpipelinesintheNigertion,ExternalHumanMalicious
nce,
Deltaareawereputintooperationinthe1960sand1970'sMaterial(Sabotage),
Flooding
(seeTable2below).Asattheyear2000,pipelinesolderthanandIncidental
and
20yearsconstituted73%ofallpipelineswhilethoseoverStructuralandActsof
Others
30yearsoldaccountedfor41%ofthetotalnetworklength.Vandalism
Reliabilityratingforpipelineslessthan20yearsinservicewas
foundtobeabout46%whilethoseabove30yearswasabout(Source:PipelineOilSpillPreventionandRemediationin
25%.Thisshowsadeclineofabout21%andanoverallNDA,NNPC,2007)
decliningpatternwithageing.
ISBN:9789881925190
IMECS2012
TABLE4Akwalbom,CrossRiver,andEdofewpipelinefailures
NUMBEROFOILPIPELINEFAILURESBYLOCATIONwerereported.Thespillfrequenciesforthesestatesare
(STATE)ANDCAUSEOFSPILL,NNPC,19992005representedbylightlycoloredbarsinFig.3,becausethese
Causeofspillfrequenciesarebasedonastatisticalestimateof0.7
by
Thirdparty
failures(50percentconfidenceinPoissondistributionfor
Operational
Mechanical
Corrosion
Unknown
Location
zeroevents).
location
Natural
Hazard
activity
Failure
Total
Riversstatehasahighpipelinefailurerate.Thishigh
error
ratecouldbeduetogoodreportingofoilspills.Oneoil
spillinRiversstatewasdefinitelyidentifiedassabotage.
Akwa231612
TheagesofRiversstate'spipelinesareunknown,butas
Ibom
Riversstateisamatureoilproducingstate,areasonable
Bayelsa874911847assumptionisthatthepipelinesareolderthanaverage.
Cross134ThepipelinefailurerateinAkwalbomislow.Thiscould
Riverbeduetopoorreportingofoilspills,newerpipelines,better
Delta54371323qualityofmaterialsused,bettermaintenance,orless
corrosive
Edo1224312soil.Asstatedbefore,thiscouldbeduetoteethingtroubles
Rivers657811037fornewpipelinesorwearandtearonoldpipelines.Theage
ofthepipelinesinAkwalbomisnotknownandsoitis
Totalby23211728343137difficulttospeculateiftheyareeitherneworold.
cause
=Notavailable
(Source:PipelineOilSpillPreventionandRemediation
inNDS,NNPC,2007)
TABLE6
FAILURERATESFORNIGERDELTASTATES,1999
2005
TABLE5
NUMBEROFOILSPILLACCIDENTSBYLOCATIONLocationNo.ofFailurerate
(STATE)ANDDIAMETERCLASS,NDS19992005Kilometer
byoilper1,000km
Diameterclass(mm)years
by
StateSpillsyears
Unknown
203381609
Location
AkwaIbom123,1150.19
location
tototo>812Bayelsa395,2220.20
Total
355558812CrossRiver37560.14
Delta416,3280.22
AkwaIbom31116
Edo58900.16
Bayelsa141311139Rivers467,4900.23
CrossRiver3512112Total14623,8011.14
Delta2461215
(Source:PipelineOilSpillPreventionandRemediation
Edo110112
inNDS,NNPC,1997)
Rivers68105433
Totalbyclass1134323010117
=Notavailable
(Source:PipelineOilSpillPreventionandRemediationinOverallFailureRate
NDS,NNPC,2007)12
10
8
III.RESULTSANDANALYSIS6
4OverallFailure
Assessmentofresultsgeneratedinthisstudyofpipeline
2Rate
failures,includingriskassessmentoftheenvironment
fromoilpipelinespills,wasanalyzedonastatebystate0
basisoftheNigerDeltaStates(NDS).Theanalysiswas
performedondatacollectedforthe113NDSpipeline
spillsusedinthisstudythatoccurredbetween1999and
2005.
Table5andFig.3presentthenumberofspills,spillFig.3.VariationofFailureRatebyNDSsforAllOil
frequencyexpressedaskilometeryears,andthefailurePipelineSpills,19992005;(Source:PipelineOilSpill
rateforeachNDState.ExceptforBayelsa,DeltaandPreventionandRemediationinNDS,NNPC,2007)
Rivers,thenumberofoilpipelinefailuresislimited.For
ISBN:9789881925190IMECS2012
V.RECOMMENDATIONS
CausesofOilPipelineFailures,NDA(a)AmongtheNDs,Riversstate,with0.8%oftotal
pipelinekilometershadthehighestpipelinefailurerateduringthe
45periodoftheanalysis.AkwalbomandCrossriverstateshadthe
40
35lowestfailurerates,with3.4%and9.8%oftotalpipeline
30kilometersrespectively.Thesevariationscouldbeduetoa
25
20numberoffactors,includingthefollowing:Differencesintheages
15ofpipelines;Differencesinenvironmental,climatic,
10geological,andsoilconditionsandtheireffectsonpipelinesand
5
0pipelinerouting;Differencesinconstructionstandards;Differences
inimplementationofcontingencyplans;andDifferencesin
reportingthresholdsforoilspillevents.
Thesefactorsshouldbereviewedingreaterdetailsoasto
establishmorepreciselytheparametersthatwouldexplainthe
CausesofOildifferencesinfailurerate.
Pipeline(b)Failuresduetothirdpartyactivitiesaresignificant
Failures,NDAinboththeNDsandWesternEurope,thereby
highlightingtheneedforestablishinganeffective
regulatoryandmonitoringmechanismforoilpipelineoperation
Fig.4.DistributionofCausesofOilPipelineFailuresintheinthecountry.
NDS,19992005(Source:PipelineOilSpillPreventionand(c)Externalcorrosioncanbetackledbyimprovedcoatings
RemediationinNDS,NNPC,2007)andcathodicprotectione.g.useofpolyethyleneandmultilayer
coatingshavelongerlife.Earlydetectionofcoating
IV.CONCLUSIONdegradationisanimportantstrategyandpipesshouldbe
Thefollowingarethemainconclusionsofthisstudy:subjectedtohydrostatictesting[11].
(a)Comparingthesixstates(Akwalbom,Bayelsa,Cross(d)Internalcorrosioncanbepreventedbydehydrationof
river,Delta,Edo,andRivers)oftheNigerDeltaareaasusedingasesandperiodicpiggingoflinestoremoveaccumulated
thisreport,Rivers,DeltaandBayelsa,whicharethemainhubofwateranddeposits.
oilandgasexplorationinNigeria,havehigherpipelinefailure
rates(at0.6,0.5and0.45per1,000kmyearsrespectively)REFERENCES
ascomparedtoAkwalbom,EdoandCrossriverstateswithpipeline[1]Agbaeze,K.N.,(2000);PetroleumPipeLeakages
PPMCReportforChiefOfficiersMandatoryCourse026,
rupturerateofabout0.25,0.2and0.15per1,000kmyears,
Lagos
highlightingthefactthatthepipelinesinRivers,Deltaand
[2]Ikporukpo,Chris,(1998);Environmentalimpact
Bayelsastatesaremoresusceptibletorupturethanintheassessmentandhumanconcerninthepetroleum
otherNigerDeltastates.industry:Nigeria'sexperience,9thInternational
(b)ThespecificagesofthepipelinesinwhichthefailuresConferenceonthePetroleumIndustryandtheNigerian
occurredwerenotavailable,andhence,itwasnotEnvironment,Abuja,pp.766782.
possibletoclearlyestablishthestatisticalsignificanceof[3]Onosode,Gamaliel,(1997);Petroleumdevelopmentand
thisparameterasacauseofpipelinefailure.Thefailureratetheenvironment:NOESPerspective,InNigerian
ofpipelinesusuallyfollowsabathtubcurve.AtthestartandPetroleumBusiness:AHandbook,VictorE.Eromosele
theendofthelifetime,failureratesarehigh;inthemiddleof(Ed.),AdventCommunications,Lagos,pp.287291.
thelifetimefailureratesareusuallylow.Thiscouldbedueto[4]Ndifon,W.O.,(1998);Healthimpactofamajoroil
"teething"troublesfornewpipelinesandduetowearandtearspill:CasestudyofMobiloilspillinAkwaIbomState,
asthepipelinegetsold.9thInternationalConferenceonthePetroleumIndustry
(c)Theseverityofspillage,measuredbytheamountofoilandtheNigerianEnvironment,Abuja,pp.804815.
spilled,ishigherintheNigerDeltathaninWesternEurope.[5]Ekuerhare,B.U.andOrubu,C.O.,(1996);Economicsof
ThereasoncouldbepoorcontingencyplanningforrapidtheNigerDelta,TechnicalReport,NigerDelta
responsetospills;poordetectionprocedures;longEnvironmentalSurvey,PortHarcourt
distancesbetweenemergencyshutdownvalves;orthe[6]Eromosele,VictorE.,(1998);CostingNigerDelta's
largeraveragediameterofpipelines.oilspills:Ajointstakeholder'sapproach.9th
(d)PreventionoffailurescausedbyequipmentmalfunctionInternationalConferenceonthePetroleumIndustry
andtheNigerianEnvironment,Abuja,pp.358368
isamatterofchoosingtherightequipmentandofproper
[7]Moffat,DanielandLinden,Olofu,(1995);Perceptionand
maintenanceandappropriatetestingoftheparticularequipment.
reality:Assessingprioritiesforsustainable
HydrostatictestingbywhichthepipelineissubjectedtodevelopmentintheNigerDelta,AMBIO:Journalof
pressureabovetheoperatingpressure,toblowoutdefectsHumanEnvironment,Vol.24,andNos.78,pp.527538.
beforetheyreachacriticalsizeinserviceisalsousedtodetect[8]Nwankwo,D.I.,Chukwu,L.O.,andBrown,C.O.,
corrodedpipebeforeitfailsinservice.(1998);Theimpactofoilpollutiononthe
hydrochemistryandbiotaofthetidalcreeksandcanals
inOndoState,9thInternationalConferenceonthe
PetroleumIndustryandtheNigerianEnvironment,
Abuja,pp.538576.
ISBN:9789881925190IMECS2012
[9]Odusola,A.F.,(1996);CommunityParticipationin
EnvironmentalAssessment;InEnvironmentalPolicy
Planning,P.C.EgbonandB.MorvaridiEds.,National
CentreforEconomicManagementandAdministration
(NCEMA),Ibadan,pp.152174
[10]Awobanjo,S.A.,(1981);OilspillageinNigeria:1976
1980,Paperpresentedatthe1981InternationalSeminar
ontheOilIndustry,NNPC,Lagos
[11]C.Kato,Y.Otoguro,(1981);GroovingCorrosionof
ElectricResistanceWeldedSteelPipeinWaterCase
HistoriesandEffectsofAlloyingElements
ISBN:9789881925190IMECS2012
LongDistanceOil/GasPipelineFailureRatePredictionBasedonFuzzyNeuralNetworkModel
http://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/csie/2009/3507/05/3507e651abs.htmlDecember07,2014
...forpredictingthefailureratesofthelongdistanceoil/gas..."LongDistanceOil/GasPipelineFailureRatePredictionBasedonFuzzyNeural...
Withanagingundergroundlongdistanceoil/gaspipeline,everencroachingpopulationandincreasingoilprice,theburdenonpipelineagenciesto
efficientlyprioritizeandmaintaintherapidlydeterioratingundergroundutilitiesisincreasing.Failureratepredictionisthemostimportantpartofrisk
assessment,andtheveracityofthefailurerateimpactstherationalityandapplicabilityoftheresultoftheriskassessment.Thispaperdevelopeda
fuzzyartificialneuralnetworkmodel,whichisbasedonfailuretreeandfuzzynumbercomputingmodel,forpredictingthefailureratesofthelong
distanceoil/gaspipeline.TheneuralnetworkmodelwastrainedandtestedwithacquiredLanzhouChengduChongqingproductoilpipelinedata,
andthedevelopedmodelwasintendedtoaidinpipelineriskassessmenttoidentifydistressedpipelinesegments.Thegainedresultbasedonfuzzy
artificialneuralnetworkmodelwouldbecomparativelyanalyzedwithfuzzyfailuretreeanalysistoverifytheaccuracyoffuzzyartificialneuralnetwork
model.
XingyuPeng,PengZhang,LiqiongChen,"LongDistanceOil/GasPipelineFailureRatePredictionBasedonFuzzyNeuralNetworkModel",CSIE,
2009,2009WRIWorldCongressonComputerScienceandInformationEngineering,CSIE,2009WRIWorldCongressonComputerScienceand
InformationEngineering,CSIE2009,pp.651655,doi:10.1109/CSIE.2009.738
OilandGasPipelinesUniversityofColoradoBoulder
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/shakeout/pipelines.pdfDecember07,2014
OilandGasPipelinesPreparedforUnitedStatesGeologicalSurveyPasadenaCA...failureratesontheorderof0.4/kmforhighqualityweldedsteel
...
OilandGasPipelines
Preparedfor
UnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey
PasadenaCA
and
CaliforniaGeologicalSurvey
SacramentoCA
Undercontractto
SPARiskLLC
DenverCO
By
DonaldBallantyne
MMIEngineering,Inc.
TacomaWA
May2008
TheShakeOutScenario:
U.S.GeologicalSurveyOpenFileReport20081150
CaliforniaGeologicalSurveyPreliminaryReport25version1.0Note:overthecourseoftheShakeOutScenario,theprojectname
evolved.WhereastudymentionstheSoSAFEScenarioorSanAndreas
U.S.GeologicalSurveyCircular1324
FaultScenario,itreferstowhatisnownamedtheShakeOutScenario.
CaliforniaGeologicalSurveySpecialReport207version1.0
M7.8SouthernSanAndreasFaultEarthquakeScenario:OilandGasPipelines
DonaldBallantyne,MMIEngineering,2062267496,dballantyne@mmiengineering.com
PhysicalandOperationalImpactsofPipelineFailures
ThereisalongrecordofoilandgastransmissionpipelinefailuresinCaliforniaearthquakesdue
togroundshakingandliquefaction.Thelargemajorityofthesehavebeenjointfailureswhere
thejointswereconstructedusingoxyacetyleneweldsinstalledpriortoapproximately1930.
Pipelinesconstructedusingelectricarcwelding(post1930)haveperformedmuchbetter.There
hasbeenonlylimitedmixedexperienceofmodernpipelineperformanceatfaultcrossings.
Inthe1994Northridgeearthquake,therewere209repairsrequiredtometallicdistribution
lines,and27topolyethylenelines.Therewere35noncorrosionrelatedtransmissionpipeline
repairsofwhich27occurredonpipejointwithoxyacetylenegirthweldsinpre1930pipelines.
Atoneofthosefailures,gasleakedfromafailed56cmlineonBalboaBoulevardandwas
ignitedbytheignitionsystemonanearbytruck(T.ORourke,1994).Thefireresultedinburning
nearbyhouses(Figure1).
Inthe1989LomaPrietaEarthquake,PG&Ehadthreefailuresoftransmissionlines,and
extensivedamagetothecastirondistributionsystemintheSanFranciscoMarinaDistrict
resultinginanextensivepipecastironpipereplacementprogramusingpolyethylene.(EERI,
1990).
Inthe1979ImperialValleyEarthquake,threepipelineswereimpactedbyfaultmovement;none
failed.A10,20,and25cmpipeweresubjectfrom40to60cmofmovement.The10cmline
hadoxyacetyleneweldedjoints,whiletheothertwohadelectricarcweldedjoints.Theselines
wereoperatingatpressuresofupto725psi.(Dobry,1992).
Inthe1971SanFernandoearthquake,over80transmissionlinefailuresoccurredinpipelines
duetoshakingthathadoxyacetyleneweldedjointswhilelessthanfiveoccurredinpipelines
withelectricarcweldedjoints(includingreconditionedjoints).Fortransmissionlinessubjected
topermanentgrounddeformation,approximately10failureseachoccurredinoxyacetylene
andelectricarcweldedpipe.Failuresinelectricarcweldedpipeoccurredinareaswithoffsets
oftwometerswhilenofailuresoccurredinanotheraresubjectedtotwotothreemetersof
displacement(ORourke,1994).
InWashingtonState,twohighpressuregastransmissionlinefailuresoccurredin1997,both
resultingfromgroundmovement.Anotherfailureoccurredin2003.Oneofthe1997failures
resultedinanexplosion.In1999,apipelinecarryinggasolinefailedduetodamagecausedbya
thirdpartyduringconstructiononadjacentfacilities.Thepipelinefailureresultedindischarging
277,000gallonsofproductintoacreekbed.Intheensuingfire,twoboysburnedtodeath,and
oneyoungmanwaskilledafterhewasovercomebyfumes.
1
Insummary,modernsteelpipelineswithelectricarcweldedjointsperformmuchbetter
pipelineswithoxyacetyleneweldedjoints(typicallypre1930construction).Steelpipelineshave
performedwellwhensubjectedtogrounddisplacementsof60cm,butsometimesfailwhen
displacementsreachseveralmeters.Highpressuregaslinesdofailwhensubjectedto
permanentgrounddeformationduetoslides,andifanignitionsourceisavailable,canexplode.
Gasolineleakedfromadamagedproductlinefueledafireballwhenignited.
ExposedAssets
PipelineinformationwasacquiredusingtheHSIPGolddatabase,providedinbothGoogleEarth
andArcGISformat.Sixproductpipelineswereidentifiedinareasofstronggroundshaking,two
ofwhichcrossthefaultatCajonPass.Threerunwesterlyfromthenode/distributionterminal
inColtontowardsLosAngeles,andonerunseasterlyfromthatsamenodeasshowninTable1.
Table1.ProductPipelinesImpactedbytheEarthquakeScenario
PipelineNameDiameterLocationHazard
ColtonBarlow,CalNev35cmCajonPass;SanAndreasFaultCrossing,Landslide,
PipelineCompanyFaultCrossingLiquefaction/LateralSpread
ColtonBarlow,CalNev20cmCajonPass;SanAndreasFaultCrossing,Landslide,
PipelineCompanyFaultCrossingLiquefaction/LateralSpread
ColtonYuma,Kinder50cmColton,eastsoutheastFaultCrossing,Landslide,
MorganSFPPLPalongthewestside(andLiquefaction/LateralSpread,
crossing)oftheSanAndreasShaking
FaulttotheSaltonSea
NogalesColton50cmColtonLosAngelesLandslide,Liquefaction/Lateral
Spread,Shaking
WatsonColton40cmColtonLosAngelesLandslide,Liquefaction/Lateral
Spread,Shaking
ColtonMarch15cmColtontoMarchAFBLandslide,Liquefaction/Lateral
Spread,Shaking
SouthernCaliforniaGasownsgastransmissionanddistributionpipelinesthroughouttheregion.
Twentysevenfaultcrossingswereidentified;eighteentransmission,andninedistribution
pipelines(somelinesarecountedmultipletimesastheycrossmultiplesplaysofthefault).Two
ofthesecrossatCajonPass(transmission),oneatSanBernardino(distribution),fourteenat
PalmSprings(seventransmissionandsevendistribution),andtenatPalmdale(nine
transmissionandonedistribution).Thediameteroftheselinesisunknown.SouthernCalifornia
2
GassentirepipelineinventoryinareaswithPGAsexceeding10to15percentgravityare
subjecttolandslidesandliquefaction/lateralspreadthroughtheregion.
Itisassumedthatalloftheproductandgastransmissionlinesareconstructedusingwelded
steeljoints.Someofthesepipelinesmayhavebeenconstructedusingoxyacetylenewelded
joints(typicallypre1930),andsomeusingelectricarcweldedjoints(post1930).Someofthe
distributionpipelinesmaybeconstructedofcastiron.Inmostcases,thecastironwouldhave
beenreplacedwithpolyethylene.
VulnerabilityofAssets
Buriedpipelinesarevulnerabletopermanentgrounddeformationandwavepropagation
(shaking).Grounddeformationcanincludefaultrupture,landslide,andliquefactionand
associatedlateralspreadingandsettlement.Pipedamagemechanismsinclude:
compression/wrinkling,jointweldcracking/separation(particularlyforoxyacetylenewelds),
bending/shearresultingfromlocalizedwrinkling,andtension.
ThisearthquakescenarioisfocusingonaneventonthesouthernsegmentoftheSanAndreas
Faultthatisexpectedtooffsetasmuchas13metersneartheSaltonSea.A4.5meteroffsetis
expectedatCajonPass.Inadditiontolateralmovement,theremaybeanadditionalvertical
offset.Thefaultoffsetplacestheburiedpipeinshear,compression,ortensiondependingon
thegeometryofthepiperelativetothefault.Thepreferredalignmentwouldbetoplacethe
pipeinpuretension;theworstalignmentwouldplacethepipeinpurecompression.Intension,
steelpipelineswithweldedjointscandistributetensilestrainoverhundredsofmeters
minimizinglocalizedstresses.Anchorpoints(valvesofbends)canresultinlocalstress
concentrations.Bycomparison,pipelinesreadilywrinkleincompression.Itmaybepossiblefor
thepipelinescrossingtheSanAndreasFaultatCajonPasstosurviveiftheyhavebeenproperly
designed.Ifspecialconsiderationswerenottakenintoaccount,itisunlikelythepipelinescould
accommodate4.5metersofoffset.TheAmericanLifelinesAlliance(2001)estimatesthathigh
qualityweldedsteelpipewouldhaveafailureaboutevery400metersgiventheseconditions.
TheColtonBarstowCalNevpipelinesandtheKinderMorganColtonYumapipelineappearto
runparalleltoandnearlyontopofthefault.Dependingontheexactfaultlocation,this
alignmentcouldputthesepipelinesintoalmostpurecompressioncausingthemtofail.
Landslidescanloadburiedpipelinesinasimilarmannertofaultrupture.Pipelinescrossingblock
landslidefailures(butmovingonlyseveralmeters)laterallyareputintoshearatbothedgesof
theblock.Iftheyrunthroughlongitudinally,theyareputintotensionatthetopoftheslide,and
intocompressionatthetoe.Incatastrophiclandslidefailures,thepipemaybeleftunsupported.
Itisdifficulttospeculateaboutvulnerabilityduetolandslideswithoutsitespecificassessments.
Howeverforexample,pipelinealignmentsapproachingCajonPass,theKinderMorganpipeline
northofRedlands,andtheNogalesColtonpipelineeastofWhittierareallinruggedterrain,
subjecttoslides.
Liquefactionandassociatedlateralspreadandsettlementoccurinalluvialdepositswitha
shallowgroundwatertable(lessthan10metersdeep).Mostofthestudyareareceivesminimal
rainfall,andasaresulthasadeepgroundwatertable.Additionalinformationisrequiredto
identifyareasthatmightbevulnerabletoliquefaction.Ifliquefactiondoesoccur,thegreatest
vulnerabilityoccurswhenburiedpipelinesmoveaspartoflargeblocksofsoil,downgradient.
Thevulnerablelocationsareattheblockinterfaces.Thepipelinesaresubjecttosimilarloading
thatwouldbeencounteredinlandslides.
Compressionwavepropagationalongpipelinesputsthemfirstintensionandthenin
compression.Standingonthegroundsurface,humansfeelthisasshaking.Pipelinescanreadily
accommodatewavepropagationmovingthepipetangentialtoitsalignment.
Historically,steelpipelineswithhighqualityelectricarcweldedjointsperformverywellinthis
shakingenvironment.Pipelineswithjointsusingoxyacetyleneweldscanhavefailurerates
nearly100timesgreaterthanthosewithelectricarcweldedjoints.
Themostextremeshakingintensityinthestudyareaisexpectedtobeabout250cm/second,
locatedjustnorthofCajonPassandinthePalmDessertCoachellaareaalongtheKinder
Morganpipeline.Forthislevelofshaking,theAmericanLifelinesAlliance(2001)estimates
failureratesontheorderof0.4/kmforhighqualityweldedsteelpipelines(Figure2).Pipelines
intheSanBernardinoandPalmdaleareaswouldbeexpectedtoexperiencevelocitiesof150to
200cm/secresultinginfailureratesof0.28/kmforhighqualityelectricarcjointweldedpipe.
Ifapipelinedoesfail,theconsequencesaredependentonitscontents,itsdiameter,andthe
pressureofitscontents.Thetwogeneralcategoriesofcontentsareproductincludingliquid
fuelsthatcouldbegasoline,jetfuel,dieselfuel,orotherliquidfuels,andnaturalgas.The
operatingpressureinnaturalgaspipelinescanapproach1,000psi.Gasreleasedthrough
failuresinsmalldiameterlowpressuregasmains(distributionmains)willgenerallydissipate
quickly.Failureoflargediameterhighpressurenaturalgaspipelinescanresultinanexplosion
thatcanblastacraterinthesurroundingsoil,anddamagenearbyandoverheadstructuresand
facilities(suchaspowertransmissionlines).Inanycase,anignitionsourceisrequiredtoinitiate
theexplosion.Ahumancausedsourcecouldbeavehicleignitionsystem,cigarettelighter,or
sparkfromametalonstoneimpact.Thereisspeculationthatpipelinesrunningparallelto
overheadhighvoltagepowertransmissionlinescarryaninducedcurrentthatcouldcausea
sparkifthepipelinewasruptured.Inanycase,thereisahighprobabilitythattherewillbean
ignitionsourceintheeventofruptureofahighpressurepipeline.Asevidencedbythefirethat
occurredinWashingtonState,failureandleakageofgasolinecanresultinanextensivefireifan
ignitionsourceexists.Forsomeliquidfuelssuchasdiesel,thepotentialforafireislow,but
wouldresultinenvironmentalcontamination.
DamageScenarioandLifelineInteraction
Naturalgas,gasoline,anddieselpipelinesruptureatfaultcrossingsatCajonPass,PalmSprings,
andPalmdale.AproductlinecarryinggasolinerupturesatCajonPass;inthehillseastof
4
Whittieranotherproductlinefailsspewingjetfuelintotheair.Theproductreceivingstation
tankfarminColtonisheavilydamaged.
OneofthetwoSouthernCaliforniaGastransmissionpipelinesatCajonPasswillruptureatthe
faultandexplode(SeeFigure3)resultinginalargecrater(seeFigure4).TheSouthernCalifornia
GaspipelinefaultinterfaceoccurswherethepipelineintersectstheCalNev14inchproduct
pipeline,sowhentheexplosionoccurstheCalNevpipelineruptures.TheCalNevpipelineis
transportinggasoline,sothegasolineaddstothefire(seeFigure5).Powertransmissionlines
areoverhead,andthefirereachesthelinescausingthemtofail.
TheSouthernCaliforniaGaspipelineisoneoftwoparallellinesatCajonPass.Delayedby
highwaydamageandtrafficcongestion,operationspersonnelreachthesiteandisolatethe
damagedpipefourhoursaftertheearthquakeoccurs.Theirsecondpipelineistakenoutof
serviceasaprecautionarymeasuretocheckfordamageduetothe5meterfaultoffset.The
secondpipelineistemporarilyputbackinserviceuntiltherupturedoneisrepaired.CalNev
operationspersonnelreachthesiteandisolatetheirline6hoursaftertheearthquake.Electrical
powerisreroutedaroundthedamagedtransmissionline.
The20inchKinderMorganproductlineisrupturedinPalmSprings(Figure6).Thepipelineis
aligneddirectlyoverthefault.Whentheearthquakeoccurs,thepipelineisshortenedfive
meterscausingittowrinkleandrupture(Figure7).Thepipelineiscarryingdieselwhichis
sprayedintotheair.Ultimately200,000gallonsofproductisdischargedintothelocaldrainage
untilthelinecanbeisolated.Asmallernaturalgasdistributionpipelineislocatedinthesame
rightofway.Thefaultdisplacementalsorupturesthisline.Althoughthevolumeofdischarging
gasismuchsmallerthanthatcomingfromthebreakatCajonPass,thegashampersresponse
efforts.TheKinderMorganPipelinefailsatanadditional15locationsduetoshakingatlocations
alongthe60kmalignmentparallelingthefaulttrace.Eachfailurelocationrequires
environmentalcleanupofthedischargeddieselproduct.
InPalmdale,anaturalgastransmissionlinecrossesthefaultmultipletimes.Itruptureswhen
theearthquakeoccurs,spewinggasintotheair.Firstrespondersquicklyevacuatetheareaand
areabletokeepthegasfromignitinguntilaSouthernCaliforniaGascrewarrivestoisolatethe
break.
AlandslideinthehillseastofWhittiershearsoffthe20inchNogalespipelineinthehillseastof
Whittierreleasingjetfuel.100,000gallonsofproductisdischargedbeforethelinecanbeshut
down.Thejetfuelfindsitswayintoalocaldrainage.
TheColtonReceivingStation(Figure8)issubjectedto40percentgshaking.Thereceiving
stationisanodefordistributionofgasoline,dieselandjetfuel.Thefacilityalsocontrolsflowof
jetfueltoMarchAirForceBase.Unanchoredtanksbouncearoundbreakingconnectingpipe.
Fueldischargesintotheretainingdikes,andisignitedbypassingvehicleignitionsystem.
SouthernCaliforniaGashassmalltransmissionanddistributionpipingthroughouttheimpacted
area.Inrecentyears,theyhavereplacedmostofthecastironpipeinthedistributionsystem
withpolyethylene.Theystillsufferapproximately200pipelinefailures,primarilyatfittingsand
transitions.
Mitigation
Tomitigatepipefailures,thereisaseriesofpossiblemitigationmeasuresthatcanbe
consideredonasitebysitebasis.Seismicresistantdesignofpipelinesatfaultcrossingsmaybe
themosteffectivecomparedtolandslideandliquefactionareasbecausefault(particularly
strikeslipfaults)locationscanbedeterminedwithreasonableaccuracy.Thesamemitigation
measurescanbeemployedforareaswithhighsusceptibilitytolandslidesorliquefaction/lateral
spreadingexceptthatthelocationsofblockinterfacesmaybelesscertain.Theremaybean
opportunitytoavoidlandslideandliquefactionzoneswhenselectingthealignmentofnew
pipelines.Selectionofpipejointdesignisimportantinmitigatingpipedamageduetowave
propagation.
Tomitigatedamageduetopermanentgrounddeformation(faultmovement,landslide,
liquefaction)usemodernweldedsteelpipewithbuttelectricarcweldedjoints.Replaceoldpipe
thathasoxyacetyleneweldedjointswithinthefaultzonesandseveralthousandfeetbeyond.
Thepipelinegeometryshouldbedesignedsothepipewillgointotensionwhenthefaultmoves.
Installthepipewithacoating/coveringtominimizesoilpipefrictionallowingthepipetoeasily
slidethroughtheground.Avoiduseofanchors(valves,sharpbends,etc.)toallowthepipeto
movesothatpipestressescanbedistributedalongthepipe.Designthebackfilltoallowthe
pipetomovelaterallyinthetrenchifrequiredtoaccommodatethefaultmovement.
Tomitigatedamageduetowavepropagation(shaking),usemodernsteelpipeemploying
electricarcweldedjoints(thestandardintheindustry).Replaceold(pre1930)pipewithoxy
acetyleneweldedjoints.
Tomitigatetheconsequenceofpipefailure,implementanautomatedcontrolsystemtoallow
quickshutdownofthepipelinesystems.Constructparallel(redundant)pipelinesinindependent
alignmentssoifonefails,theothermayremainintact.
Figure1.BalboaNeighborhoodBurnedbyExplodingGasLineinNorthridgeEarthquake(left);Fireball
thatBurnedtheNeighborhood.
FailureRate(failures/km)
Welded
SteelPipe
PeakGroundVelocity(cm/sec)
Figure2.WavePropagationPipelineFragility(AfterALA2001)
ElectricPower
ProductPipelines
SanAndreasFault
Rail
Highways
Figure3.Oil,ElectricPower,Highway,andRailwayLifelinesinRelationshiptotheSanAndreasFaultat
CajonPass(NaturalGasPipelinesNotShown).
Figure4.CraterResultingfromWilliams26inchPipelineExplosioninWashingtonState,December13,
2003.(PhotoCreditWashingtonUtilitiesandTransportationCommission)
Figure5.SmokePlumefrom1999GasolineFireinBellinghamWashingtonresultingfromProduct
PipelineFailureduetoThirdPartydamage.(PhotoCreditCityofBellingham)
Figure6.LayoutofKinderMorgan20inchProductLine(brown)andSouthernCaliforniaGasPipelines
(pink).RelativetheSanAndreasFaultinPalmSprings(dotted).
Figure7.WrinkledPipelineFailedinCompression
10
Figure8.ColtonReceivingFacilitywithTankFarmVulnerabletoEarthquakeGroundMotion
11
Keyfactorsfortheestimationofcrosscountrypipelines...
http://www.erm.com/PageFiles/1962/Keyfactorsfortheestimationofcrosscountrypipelinesfailurerates.pdfDecember07,2014
...thefailureratefornaturalgaspipelinehasbuckedthetrendandhasincreasedbyapproximately...donotdifferforgaspipelinesoroilpipelines.
Keyfactorsfortheestimationof
crosscountrypipelinesfailure
rates
GlennPetittwithcommentsacknowledgedfromRichard
Espiner
Introduction
UndergroundcrosscountrypipelinesarewidelyusedintheOil&GasandPetrochemicalIndustriestotransportraw
materialsandproducts,e.g.crudeoil,naturalgasandgasoline.Thelossofmechanicalintegrityofsuchpipelineshas
occurredonnumerousoccasionsworldwide,duetoavarietyofcausessuchascorrosion,externalimpact,defects,
operationalerrorsandnaturalhazards.Withmaterialsbeingtransportedatveryhighpressures,pipelinefailuresmayresult
inmajorreleasesofhazardousmaterials.AnexampleisshowninFigure1:thedestructionofmanyhousesafteramajorfire
followingagaspipelineruptureinSanBruno,California,USAinSeptember2010.Suchfailurespresentarisktopeople(in
thecaseofignitionofhighpressuregas)andtheenvironment(inthecaseofoilandotherliquidproducts).
Thereareanumberofrecognisedfailureratedatabasesforcrosscountrypipelines,suchasCONCAWE(Europeanliquid
pipelines)[1],EGIG(Europeangaspipelines)[2]andtheUSDoT(bothliquidsandgaspipelines)[3].Itisremarkablehow
closethebasedatafromthedifferentsystemsare,whichleadstosomeconfidencethatthefiguresaresufficientlyrobustto
beusedinriskanalyses.
Foreachdatabasethereisanumberoffailuremodesincluded,suchascorrosion,thirdpartyimpact,materialdefects,natural
hazards.Forsomeofthesefailuremodes,thedatabaseshaveshownthatthereisacorrelationbetweenthefailureratesand
variousriskreductionmechanism,suchasheavywallthickness.Inparticular,areductioninfailureratecanbeappliedfor
thecorrosionandthirdpartyimpactfailuremodesforheavywallthickness.
However,forotherfailuremodes,inparticularmaterialdefects,thedatabasesshownocorrelationbetweenthefailurerate
andkeyriskreductionmechanismssuchasheavywallthickness.Itwouldseemlogicalthatthefailurerateformaterial
defectsshoulddecreasewithincreasingwallthickness,butforfrequencyassessmentsthishasoftenbeenaconstantinpast
studies,bysimpleuseofstatisticsfromthevariousdatabases.
Theauthorhasextensiveexperienceofassessingtherisksassociatedwithpipelinesystems,havingbeenheavilyinvolvedin
thedesignandsubsequentoperationofanumberofhighprofilepipelinesworldwide(fromariskperspective).This
experiencehasbeenappliedtotheanalysisofthevariousfailuremodesinordertodeterminehowvariousriskreduction
techniquescanreducethefrequencyoffailure.Thisincludestheassessmentofstatisticswherethereisnoimmediate
correlationfromthevariousdatabasesforspecificfailuremodes.
Thepaperdiscusseshowsuchdatacanbeappliedwherelogicwouldsuggestthatthereshouldbeareductioninfailure
rates,althoughthisisnotimmediatelyapparentfromthevariousdatabases.
Theworldsleadingsustainabilityconsultancy
istoricaldatabases
H
Table1providesasummaryofhistoricalpipelinefailuredatafromsomeofthebestsourcesofdataforonshorepipeline
systems.Allthesesourcesproviderawdataonfailureincidentsandpipelinelengthandananalysisofthefailurecauses.
Themostrelevantanduptodatedatabasesavailablearethoseof:
CONCAWE,
EuropeanGasPipelineIncidentDataGroup(EGIG),
USDepartmentofTransportation(USDoT).
Table1ComparisonofVariousInternationalPipelineFailureData
SourcePeriodOverall(i.e.unmodified)Failure
Frequency(perkm.year)
CONCAWE197120103.5E4*
198120102.8E4*
199120102.4E4*
200120102.2E4*
EGIG197020103.5E4
198120102.9E4
199120102.0E4
200120101.7E4
USDoT,Liquids198820014.9E4
200220114.5E4
USDoT,NaturalGas198820017.2E5
200220111.1E4
*Thesefrequencieshavebeenfilteredtoincludethoseonlyfromthecrosscountrysections.
TheCONCAWEdatabase[1]appliestocrudeoilandpetroleumpipelinesthatarelocatedinWesternEurope,althoughsince
2001,pipelinesfromanumberofEasternEuropeancountrieshavealsobeenincludedinthedatabase.Dataarecollectedfor
thepipelinenetworkeveryyear.AnumberoffiguresareprovidedinTable1thatshowthatthegeneraltrendofpipeline
incidentsisdecreasing.
EGIGhascompileddatacollectedbyagroupof15majorgastransmissionoperatorsinWesternEuropeovertheperiod1970
to2010[2].FailureratesforthewholeofthisperiodareprovidedinTable1,butagain,morerecentdatashowthatthe
performanceofgaspipelineshasgenerallyimproved.
TheUSDoTcollectsannualstatisticsonpipelinefailuresfromreportableincidents.Resultscanbeobtainedfromtheinternet
backto1988[3].Datafrom2002onwardsaremoredetailedintermsofthefailuremode,hencethesplitintheperiods
showninTable1.Itisinterestingtonotethatwhilstthefailureratehasagaindecreasedforliquidpipelinesinthelater
periodshowninTable1,thefailureratefornaturalgaspipelinehasbuckedthetrendandhasincreasedbyapproximately
50%(probablyduetoimprovedreportinginrecentyears),althoughtheoverallfailurerateisstillbelowthatofEGIG.
Theoverallfailureratedatashowarelativelygoodsimilarly.Datafromthemostrecentyearsisrecommendedfor
estimatingfailureratesduetotheimprovingperformance.Thesedatatakeintoaccountimprovedmechanismsforpipeline
integrity,suchassuperiorpipelinecoatingsandbettercathodicprotectionsystemstoreducethelikelihoodofcorrosion
failures;improvedmillqualitycontrolandconstructiontechniquestoreducethelikelihoodofmaterialfaultfailures;and
enhancedprotectionmethods,suchaconcreteslabbingatcrossingstoreducethelikelihoodofexternalinterferencefailures.
However,anumberoftheolderpipelinesystemsstilldonothavesuchenhancedprotectionmechanismsanddatathat
includesearlieryearsmaybemoreappropriateforthese.
ItshouldbenotedthatthedataareanaverageoverdifferentcountriesinEuropeandoverdifferentstatesintheUS.The
additionofEasternEuropeanliquidpipelinesintotheCONCAWEdatabaseresultedinaslightincreaseintheoverallfailure
ratedatawhenthesewerefirstincluded,duetotheinferiorperformanceofthesepipelines.
Analysisoftherawdataisdescribedinmoredetailinapreviouspaper[4],althoughdatafromthelastfewyearsisnot
included.Thiscurrentpaperismoreconcernedwithhowkeyfactorscanbeappliedfortheestimationofcrosscountry
pipelinesfailurerates.
Failurecauses
Thehistoricaldatabasesalsoprovidegooddataonthevariousfailuremodes.Foralldatabasesthemostcommonfailure
modeisduetothirdpartyinterference.Otherkeyfailurecausesarecorrosion,materialdefectsandnaturalhazards.
Certainlywithregardtogastransmissionpipelines,thirdpartyinterferenceisamajorcauseoffullboreruptures,whichisa
keyfocusofthispaper.Failurecausesaredealtindetailelsewhereandsonotdiscussedindetailinthispaper.However,
Figures2and3showthelatestdatafromCONCAWE(crosscountrysectionsonly)andFigure4showsthelatestdatafrom
EGIG.
Releasesize
Amajorissueforthepotentialsafetyandenvironmentalimpactofreleasesfromoilandgaspipelinesisthesizeofthe
release.
Inparticularforgaspipelines,seriousimpactismostlikelyifthereisafullborerupture;thisisgenerallyunzippingofthe
pipelinesuchthatacompletesectionislostandgasisreleasedfrombothends,initiallyataveryhighreleaserate.Ifthe
failuremodeisaccompaniedbyignition,orifignitionoccursduringtheearlypartofarelease,thenacatastrophicfiremay
ensue.(Ifignitionisdelayed,theremaystillbeamajorfire,althoughmuchoftheearlyinventorywillbelostasthepipeline
rapidlydepressurises.)Hence,forhighpressuregaspipelines,oneisgenerallyconcernedwithfullboreruptures,with
consequencesdemonstratedasshowninFigure1.(Leaksmayalsoresultinseriousfires,butthemagnitudeoftheseis
relativelysmallincomparison.)
Foroilpipelinesthesizeofreleaseisnotassignificantwithregardtoenvironmentalimpact.Asmallreleasehasthe
potentialtocontinueforalargeamountoftime(possiblymanydays)ifitremainsundetected.Thismaycausesignificant
damagetothelocalenvironment.Forenvironmentalimpact,theamountofoilorpetroleumproductlostisthekeyfactor
ratherthanthereleaserate;hence,asmallreleasethatcontinuesformanydaysmaybeassignificantasalargereleasethatis
quicklydetectedandrespondedto.
Concawedata
Accidentsstatisticswereanalysedforholesizedistribution[4].TheholesizefailureratebycauseisshowninFigure5.In
theCONCAWEdatathevariousholesizesaredescribedasfollows:
Pinhole:lessthan2mmx2mm
Fissure:2to75mmlongx10%maxwide
Hole:2to75mmlongx10%minwide
Split:75to1000mmlongx10%maxwide
Rupture:>75mmlongx10%minwide
Intermsoftermsoftheirequivalentdiameter,(requiredforconsequencemodellinginariskanalysis)thesehavebeen
interpretedasshowninTable2.Theruptureholesizeisinterpretedasanyholesizeabove150mm.
Table2EstimatedHoleSizebyFailureMode(CONCAWE)
FailureModeHoleSize
5mm50mm100mmRupture
Mechanicalfailure50.0%38.0%8.0%4.0%
Operational18.8%43.8%25.0%12.5%
Corrosion55.3%37.8%4.7%2.3%
Naturalhazard42.0%29.0%19.3%9.7%
Thirdpartyactivity37.5%29.5%22.0%11.0%
Egigdata
Accidentsstatisticshavealsobeenanalysedforholesizedistribution.TheholesizedistributionbycauseisshownillustratedinFigure6,
whichshowstheoverallfailurerates.Apinhole/crackisinterpretedasa5mmequivalentholeandaholeisinterpretedasa50mm
hole.
Riskreductionmechanisms
Thereareanumberofriskreductionmechanismsthatwillhaveaninfluenceontheoverallfailurerateofthepipeline.These
canbelistedunderthevariousfailuremodes.
Inthissectionallpotentialriskreductionmechanismsarediscussed.Forexternalinterference/thirdpartyactivityand
corrosion,theriskreductionmechanismshavebeendiscussedinapreviouspaperpresentedatHazardsXXIinNovember
2009,andtherehasbeenlittlechangeintheanalysis.However,formaterialfailuresfurtherresearchhasbeencarriedout
onthepotentialriskreductionmechanismsandthisisdescribedinmoredetailinthispaper.
Externalinterference/thirdpartyactivity
Probablythemostsignificanteffortinriskreductionismadetoreducethechanceofpipelinefailuresduetothirdparty
activities,whethertheseareaccidental,intentionalorincidental.(Incidentalfailuresarewhichthereisanexternalimpact,
whichdoesnotcauseafailureatthattime,butwherealossofcontainmenteventuallyoccurs,astheintegrityofthepipeline
reducesatthatpoint.)
Someofthemorecommonriskreductionmechanismsareasfollows:
Pipelinesafetyzones,
Increasedwallthickness,
Increaseddepthofcover,
Warningmarkerposts,
Plasticmarkertape,
Concreteslabbing,
Physicalbarrierwithinpipelinetrench,
Vibrationdetection,
RegularinspectionsofpipelinesROW,
Intelligentpigging.
Pipelinesafetyzonesmaybeestablishedduringthepipelineconstruction.Theintentionistoavoidconstructionactivity
alongorneartherightofway(ROW).RegularinspectionsofapipelineROWwouldhelptodecreasethefailureratedueto
thirdpartyactivity,certainlyaccidentalandintentional,andanappropriatereductionfactormaybeapplieddependingon
theinspectioninterval.
Probablytheriskreductionmechanismwiththelargestinfluenceisthewallthickness(WT).ThisshownbytheEGIGdata
(Figure7),wherethereisalargedropinfailurerateforpipelineswithaWTabove10mmandnofailuresforaWTabove15
mm.Unsurprisingly,thefailurerateismuchhigherforpipelineswithaWToflessthan5mm.Inderivingfailureratesfora
specificpipeline,theWTshouldbetakenintoconsideration,butthemaximumallowableoperatingpressure(MAOP)should
alsobeconsidered,particularlywithregardtoliquidpipelines,asthiswouldbetakenintoaccountinthepipelinedesign,
e.g.aliquidpipelinethattraversesamountainousroutemayhaveathickerwallatthebottomofaslopethanatthetop,due
tothechangeinpressurehead.(Forgaspipelines,essentiallytheMAOPwillnotvarywithchangeinelevation.)
Thedepthofcovermayalsoinfluencethefailurerate,againasshownbyFigure8forEGIGdata.Certainly,wherethedepth
ofcoverislessthan0.8m,thefailurerateduetothirdpartyinterferencesincreasessignificantly.Onewouldexpectthatthe
failureratedecreasessignificantlyasthedepthofcoverincreasesto,say,2m,butthereisnotthedatatosupportthis,
probablyasthenominaldepthformostpipelinesisintheorderof0.9to1.0m.
Theotherriskreductionmechanismslistedabovewouldalsohaveaninfluenceonthefailurerateduetothirdpartyactivity.
Mechanismssuchaswarningposts,concreteslabbingandplasticmarkertapeareoftenusedatroadcrossings,forexample,
althoughthecrossingitselfmaywarrantanincreaseinthefailurerateatthatpoint,andsotheriskreductionmechanisms
mayservetokeepthefailureratethesame,i.e.thefailurerateatacrossingwouldbeincreasedfromthatontherestofthe
pipelineiftherewerenomechanismssuchasconcreteslabbing.WorkbyBritishGas,summarisedbyMorgan1996[5],
foundthatacombinationofslabbingwithavisualwarningsuchasplasticmarkertapewasparticularlyeffectivein
preventingaccidentaldamage.Thesetechniquesmaythereforebeusefullydeployedinothersensitiveareastoreducethe
likelihoodofdamagebymachinery.
Somepipelinesmayincludemechanismstoguardagainstillegalhottaps(intentionalthirdpartyfailures),suchasaphysical
barrierinthetrenchandvibrationdetection.Also,theremaybeincreasedpatrolsbymilitarypersonnel.Insuchcases,the
failurerateduetoillegalhottapswouldbecomeverysmall,althoughthefailurerateduetointentionalactivitywould
changedependingonthecountryorareathatthepipelinerunsthrough,asillegalhottapsareasignificantprobleminsome
locations.
Intelligentpiggingmayreducetheriskoflatentincidentalthirdpartyfailures,bydetectingapotentialfailurebeforethis
becomescriticalaftertheinitialdamagehasoccurred.CONCAWEreports[1]thatoverthepast40years,51spillshavebeen
causedbymechanicaldamage(includingincidentaldamagebythirdparties)orfaultyweldsthatcould,inprinciple,have
beendetectedbyintelligentpigs.
RiskreductionfactorsforexternalinterferencearealsodiscussedindetailinPD80103[6],whichappliestosteelpipelines
onland,andIGEM/TD/2[7],whichappliedtonaturalgaspipelinesonly.
Corrosion
Asignificanteffortisalsomadetoreducetheriskofpipelinefailureduetocorrosion(internalandexternal).Riskreduction
mechanismsinclude:
Increasedwallthickness,
Pipelinecoating,
Cathodicprotection(CP)system,
Internallining,
Intelligentpigging.
Similarlytoexternalinterference,theWTplaysamajorroleindeterminingthefailurerateduetocorrosion.Again,this
shownbytheEGIGdata(Figure9),wherethereisalargedropinfailurerateforpipelineswithaWTabove10mmandno
failuresforaWTabove15mm.
Therelationshipbetweenpipelinecoating,CPandfailurerateduetocorrosionhasbeenanalysedbydelaMareetal.[8]ina
studyonUSgastransmissionpipelines.Thestudyshowedthatduringtheyears19701973,onaverage,thecorrosionfailure
ratewasreducedbyafactorofaboutfiveforpipelinesthathadeitheracoatingorCP.Mostpipelinesnowhaveanexternal
coating,CP,orbothandthisisreflectedinthebasedata.ReviewoftheCONCAWEdatashowsthatwheretherewasa
failureduetoexternalcorrosion,thisisgenerallyduetoafailureoftheexternalcoatingoroftheCPsystem.Hence,itwould
beappropriatetoincreasethefailurerateduetocorrosionifapipelinewasnotprotected,ratherthanreducethefailurerate
ifitwasprotected,particularlyiftherewasanaggressivesoiltypeorinareaswherethesoilwaswet,i.e.wheretheremaybe
moreofapotentialforexternalcorrosion.
Aninternalliningmayreducethepotentialforinternalcorrosion,althoughsuchliningsareoftenusediftheinternalfluidis
corrosive,e.g.sourgas.
Certainly,ifthepipelinefluidistransportedatelevatedtemperaturesduetoahighviscosityatambienttemperatures,thenit
maybeappropriatetoincreasethefailureratedataduetocorrosion,asthisfailuremechanismisenhancedatelevated
temperatures,shownbyCONCAWEdata.
Onewouldnotexpecthighcorrosionratesfornewlylaidpipelines,butthiswouldchangewithtime,soareductionfactor
wouldnotbeexpected,asoneshouldbestudyingthepipelineoveritslifecycle.Itmaybeappropriatetoincreasethefailure
rateforolderpipelines,e.g.pre1960,buttherearelittledatatosubstantiatesuchanincreaseinthecaseofCONCAWE.
Again,intelligentpiggingmayreducetheriskofcorrosionfailures,bydetectingapotentialfailurebeforethisbecomes
critical.Onewouldneedtotakeintoconsiderationhowoftenintelligentpiggingisconducted.CONCAWEreports[1]that
overthepast40years,therehavebeen102spillagesrelatedtoexternalcorrosionand25tointernalcorrosion,atleastsomeof
whichcouldhavebeendetected.(Nearlytwothirdsofthe102spillagesrelatedtoexternalcorrosionoccurredinhot
pipelines,mostofwhichhavenowbeenretired.)
RiskreductionfactorsforcorrosionarealsodiscussedindetailinPD80103[6],whichappliestosteelpipelinesonland,and
IGEM/TD/2[7],whichappliedtonaturalgaspipelinesonly.
Naturalhazards
Thebasefailuredatacontainabackgroundratefornaturalhazards,althoughinreality,thisisduetotheenvironmentwhere
somepipelinesinthedatabasepassthrough.Whereapipelinecrosses,forexample,rivers,seismicfaultlinesandareas
susceptibletolandslides,thefailurerateshouldbeincreasedatthatpoint,unlesstherearesubstantialmeasurestakeninthe
pipelinedesigntomitigateagainstsuchhazards.Naturalhazardsareparticularlyrelevantwhereapipelinepassesthrough
mountainousregions,whereallthreeexamplesofpotentialfailurementionedabovemayexist.
Suchmitigationmeasuresmayincludemicrotunnelsforrivercrossings,inparticularwheretheremaybeaseverewashout
hazardduringaspringmeltofsnow,seismicfaultdesign,andensuringthatapipelineislaidinthedirectionofapotential
landslidearearatherthanacrossit.Soilerosioncontrolandgeohazardmonitoringmayalsobefactorsinreducingthe
potentialstressonapipelineandhencethelikelihoodoffailure.
Thereisinsufficienthistoricaldatatoestablisharelationshipbetweengroundmovementfailuredataandindividualpipeline
parameters[7].Forexample,thepipelinewallthicknessisnottakenintoconsideration.Thefailurefrequencyfornatural
hazardsalongthepipelineROWshouldbeassessedontheparticularnaturalhazardsencounteredatspecificlocationsand
theparticularmitigationmechanismsshouldbetakenintoconsideration.Forexampleguidanceonthepipelinerupturerate
isgiveninIGEM/TD/2fordifferentslopeswherealandslidemaybepresent,asshowninTable3[7].
Table3FailureRateduetoLandslidefromDifferentSlopeTypes
DescriptionPipelineRuptureRate
(perkmyear)
Slopeinstabilityisnegligibleorunlikelytooccur,butmaybeaffectedby0to9E5
slopemovementonadjacentareas
Slopeinstabilitymayhaveoccurredinthepastormayoccurinfutureis1E4to2.14E4
presentandmayoccurinthefuture
Slopeinstabilityislikelyandsitespecificassessmentisrequired>3E4
Withregardtolandslides,thereareanumberofexpertswhocanprovidejudgementsastothelikelyoccurrenceofa
landslideandwhetherthesemaycausearuptureofthepipeline.Suchexpertshaveworkedwiththeauthortoprovide
valuejudgementsatpotentiallandslideareas.Measurescanbetakenformodernpipelinesystems(andcurrentsystems)to
mitigatetheeffects,certainlybydesigningthepipelineroutesuchthatlandslideareasareavoided,orwherethismaynotbe
possible,suchthatthepipelinerunsinthedirectionofthepotentiallandslideandnotacrossit.
Materialfailures
Therearenosignificantmechanismstoreducetheriskofmaterialfailuresorconstructionfaultsonceapipelineislaid,other
thanintelligentpigging,whichmaydetectpotentialweakpointsbeforethesebecomecritical.Asnotedabove,CONCAWE
reports[1]thatoverthepast40years,51spillshavebeencausedbymechanicaldamage(includingincidentaldamageby
thirdparties)orfaultyweldsthatcould,inprinciple,havebeendetectedbyintelligentpigs.However,itshouldbenoted
thatfaultyweldscomeunderthecategoryofconstructionfaults;thespillsizesfromthesetendtobemuchsmallerthan
materialfaults(byafactorofabout40onaverage),asshownbyFigure10.Hence,ifonlyfaultyweldsmaybediscovered
byintelligentpigging,thismaynotreducetheriskofamuchlargerfailureduetoafaultinthematerial.
Onemajorissueisthatthemanufactureofpipeworkintermsofthemillingprocesshasimprovedwithtime,suchthat
modernpipeworksystemsarelesslikelytodevelopfailures.ThiscanbeshownbyFigure11wherethefailurerateversus
yearofconstructionisconsiderablyreduced(EGIGdata).Ofcourse,onekeyfactoristhattherearefarmorekmyearsfor
olderpipelinesinthedatasetandonewouldexpectareductioninthenumberoffailuresinlateryearsforthisreasonalone.
DatashowninPD80103[6]forthefailurefrequencyduetomaterialandconstructiondefectsisgiveninTable4,which
showsthatthefailureratedecreasesasthewallthicknessincreases.UKOPAdatahaveindicatedthatthematerialfailures
manifestasgasleaks,andthattherehavebeennofullboreruptureswithintheUKtodate.ThisiscontrarytotheEGIGdata
showninFigure11,whichindicatesthattherehavebeenanumberoffullboreruptureswithintherestofEurope.
Table4FailureRateduetoMaterialFailuresvsWallThickness
WallThicknessRange(mm)FailureRate(perkmyear)
WT<55.05E4
5<WTd86.4E5
8<WTd104.6E5
10<WTd123.1E5
12<WTd157E6
WT>154E6
ThefailurerateduetomaterialfailuresintheUKisdependentupontheyearofconstructionandhencetheage,designand
constructionstandards,inparticularthematerialselectioncontrolsandweldinginspectionstandardsappliedwhichhave
improvedsignificantlysincetheearly1970s[7].Forpipelinescommissionedafter1980,UKOPAstatesthatthematerial
failuresfailureratecanbeassumedtobereducedbyafactorof5,asshownbyIGEM/TD/2[7].
Akeypointisthattherehavebeennofullborerupturesinpipelinesconstructedfrom1984onwardsinEuropeasawhole,
notjustintheUK.Thisdoesnotmeanthatsuchanoccurrencewillnothappen;however,therehavebeenover25yearsin
thisdatasetfromEGIGanditisanencouragingfactorthattherehavebeennofullborerupturesduetomaterialfailuresin
pipelinesconstructedfrom1984onwards.Hence,thereisjustificationforreducingthefullborerupturefailurerate
significantlyforgastransmissionpipelinesconstructedafter1984.ThishasamajorimplicationonEuropeangaspipeline
riskassessments(andpossiblybeyond),i.e.ratherthanusingafigureofabout4E6perkmyearforfullboreruptures,
whichcanbetakenfromFigure6,amuchreducedlevelcouldbeapplied.Ifareductionbyafactorof5isassumedfor
pipelinescommissionedafter1980,thisreducesto8E7perkmyear.However,afurtherfactorcanbeappliedtotakeinto
accountthattherehavebeennofullboreruptureeventsforpipelinesconstructedinEuropefrom1984onwards.
IfthewallthicknessistakenintoaccountasshowninTable4,thenthisreductionbecomesevengreaterforheavywall
pipelines.Forexample,thedatainEGIGshowthatthefailurerateformaterialfailuresisabout5.8E5peryear.Thistiesin
wellwiththedatashowninTable4.Hence,foraheavywallpipelineofwallthicknessgreaterthan15mmandconstructed
from1984onwards,asignificantreductioninthefailureratecouldbejustified.
Thiswasdemonstratedinarecentquantitativeriskassessmentconductedbytheauthorforamoderngaspipelinesystem
withheavywallthickness.Asignificantreductionintheexternalinterferenceandcorrosionfailurerateswasappliedinan
areawheretherewerenosignificantnaturalhazardsandwhereahottapinerrorwouldbeextremelyremote.Inthiscase,
byapplyingthegenericEGIGdata,thefullborerupturefailurerateduetomaterialfailureswascalculatedtobeabout98%
oftheoverallfullborerupturefrequency.Certainlythiswasnotlogicalgiventhemodernpipelinesystemandthevery
heavywallthickness.Byusingthereductionmechanismsnotedabove,thefailurerateformaterialfailuresbecamemore
reasonable,i.e.moreinlinewiththeotherfailuremechanismswhereonewouldexpectheavywallthicknesstobeanall
roundriskreductionfactor.
Withregardtooilpipelines,thoseconstructedfrom1984onwardswouldalsobeexpectedtohaveadropinthefailurerate
oflargefailures,asthepipelineconstructionmethod(atthemillandattheconstructionsite)donotdifferforgaspipelinesor
oilpipelines.Formaterialdefects,theCONCAWEdatashowonlyonefailureforpipelinesconstructedfrom1984onwards.
(Therehavealsobeenconstructiondefectsforsuchpipelines,butthesefailurestendtobesmallasshowninFigure10.)For
significantreleasesofoilorpetroleumproduct(althoughasnotedabovethismaynotbeforalargeleak)therehavebeena
numberoffailuresinrecentyears,mostnotablyareleaseof5,401m3in2009.However,allsignificantfailureshavebeenin
pipelinesconstructedpriorto1984(wherethepipelineagewasnoted),whichtiesinwiththedataforgaspipelines.Hence,
itwouldalsobeappropriatetoapplysimilarreductionfactorsforoilpipelinesbasedonageandwallthickness.
Overpressureprotection
Liquidpipelinesinmountainousareamayrequireoverpressureprotection.TheMAOPandtheminimumwallthickness
requirementsaretakenintoconsiderationinthepipelinedesign.Somepipelinesrequiresurgerelief(tanksatpumpstations
orpressurereductionstations),andagain,theseareconsideredinthepipelinedesignduetothepotentialforasurge,soa
reductioninthebasefailureratewouldnotbeappropriate.
Designfactor
Thepipelinedesignfactor(theratioofhoopstresstomaterialyieldstress)shouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhenassessing
potentialholesizesforgaspipelines.Thedesignfactorisafunctionofthetypeofsteel,pipelinediameter,wallthickness
andtheMAOP.InparticulartheWTwouldhavealreadybeentakenintoaccountindeterminingtheoverallfailurerate,but
itshouldbenotedthatatdesignfactorsof0.3andWTof>11.91mm,propagationtoruptureisextremelyremote[9],i.e.to
getabenefitfrombotheffects,itrequiresaDFachievedthroughaWT>11.91mmm,andnotmerelyfromgettingalowDF
fromhighergradesteel.(The0.3DFrelatestoleakbeforebreakbehaviourfromcrackgrowthmechanisms.The11.91mm
relatesonlytorupturesduetoimpactfrome.g.diggerteethandotherexternalimpactimplementscommoninagriculture
andconstructionintheUKduringthe1970s.)
Howeverthis0.3figurefordesignfactormaybeconsideredsomewhatconservative,particularlyforlargediameter,heavy
wallpipelines,andthereforethefactorissometimesincreased(i.e.lessonerous),e.g.intheUKInstitutionofGasEngineers
codeIGEM/TD/1[10],to0.5forpipelineswithawallthicknessover19.1mm.
RiskreductionfactorsfordesignfactorarediscussedindetailinIGEM/TD/2[7],wherefailureratepredictionsforexternal
interferenceruptureandleakfrequenciesvsdesignfactoraregivenforspecificdiameterandwallthicknesspipelines.
Conclusion
Thevariousdatabasesgiveexcellentbasedatatoestimatethelikelihoodoffailuresofcrosscountrypipelines.However,itis
notsufficienttorelyonthesedatabasesaloneinpredictingthefailurerate.Oneneedstoincludethevariousfactors:design,
operating,andenvironmentalintheestimationofthefailurerate,whichmaychangealongthepipelineROW.
ApreviouspaperpresentedatHazardsXXI[4]discussedhowthevariousriskreductionmechanismscouldbeappliedfor
thekeypipelinefailuremodesofexternalinterferenceandcorrosion.However,atthattimetherewasnodiscussionofhow
riskreductionmechanismswouldaffectthefailurerateofthematerialfailurereleasemechanism.Thispaperhasprovided
suchadiscussion,asmaterialsfailureisakeyreleasemechanisminestimatingtheoverallfailureratefromacrosscountry
pipeline,andseveralfactorsshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenconductingapipelineriskassessment.
REFERENCES
1.CONCAWE,PerformanceofEuropeanCrosscountryOilPipelines,Statisticalsummaryofreportedspillagesin2010
andsince1971,Brussels,December2011,http://www.concawe.org/
2.EuropeanGasPipelineIncidentDataGroup(EGIG),GasPipelineIncidents,8thReportoftheEuropeanGasPipeline
IncidentDataGroup,Doc.No.EGIG11.R.0402,December2011,http://www.egig.nl/
3.http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline
4.Pettitt,G.,Morgan,B.,ATooltoEstimatetheFailureRatesofCrosscountryPipelines,HazardsXXI,Manchester,
November2009.
5.Morgan,B.,Hill,R.T.,CurrentIssuesandQuestionsConcerningPipelineSafetyReportoftheOECDWorkshopon
Pipelines.(Preventionof,Preparednessfor,andResponsetoReleasesofHazardousSubstances).Oslo1996
OCDE/OECD/GD(97)180.
6.Codeofpracticeforpipelines.Steelpipelinesonland.Guidetotheapplicationofpipelineriskassessmentto
proposeddevelopmentsinthevicinityofmajoraccidenthazardpipelinescontainingflammables,PD80103,
December2008.
7.ApplicationofpipelineriskassessmenttoproposeddevelopmentsinthevicinityofhighpressureNaturalGas
pipelines,IGEM/TD/2,2008.
8.delaMare,R.F.,Andersen,.,PipelineReliability,DNVReport800572,1980.
9.Townsend,N.A.,Fearnehough,G.D.,ControlofRiskfromUKGasTransmissionPipelines,BritishGasplc,Research
andDevelopmentDivision,Presentedatthe7thSymposiumonLinePipeResearch,AmericanGasAssociation,
Houston,USA,October1986.
10.Steelpipelinesandassociatedinstallationsforhighpressuregastransmission,IGEM/TD/1,2008.
Figure1
GasPipelineIncidentinSanBruno,
California,USAinSeptember2010
Figure2FailureCausesfromCONCAWE(1971to2010)
Construction
IncidentalTPFault
damage7.5%MaterialsFault
MaliciousTP7.2%8.3%
damage
5.0%
HumanError
2.5%
AccidentalTP
damage
33.5%External
corrosion
26.0%
Internalcorrosion
Othernatural5.3%
hazards
0.3%
StressCracking
Ground1.1%
movement
3.3%
Figure3FailureCausesfromCONCAWE(2001to2010)
Construction
IncidentalTPFault
damage10.4%
MaterialsFault
7.8%
13.0%
MaliciousTP
damage
15.6%
HumanError
1.3%
External
AccidentalTPcorrosion
damage14.3%
32.5%
Internalcorrosion
3.9%
StressCracking
Othernatural1.3%
hazardsGround
0.0%movement
0.0%
Figure4FailureCausesfromEGIG(1970to2010)
Otherand
unknown
Hottapmadeby6.6%
error
4.8%
GroundExternal
movementinterference
7.4%48.4%
Corrosion
16.1%
Construction
defect/Material
failure
16.7%
Figure5HoleSizeFailureDistributionbyCause(CONCAWE)
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
Rupture
60.0%
Percentage
Split
50.0%
Hole
Fissure
40.0%
Pinhole
30.0%
Nohole
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
MechanicalOperationalCorrosionNaturalhazardsThirdparty
Figure6HoleSizeFailureDistributionbyCause(EGIG)
1.0E4
9.0E5
8.0E5
FailureRate(perkmyr)
7.0E5
6.0E5
Pinhole/crack
5.0E5Hole
Rupture
4.0E5
3.0E5
2.0E5
1.0E5
0.0E+0
ExternalConstructiondefectCorrosionGroundmovementHottapmadeby
interference/Materialfailureerror
Figure7FailureRatevsWallThicknessforThirdPartyActivity(EGIG)
3.0E4
2.5E4
2.0E4
Unknown
1.5E4Pinhole/crack
Hole
Rupture
1.0E4
5.0E5
0.0E+0
d5mm510mm1015mm1520mm2025mm2530mme30mm
WallThickness(mm)
Figure8FailureRatevsDepthofCoverforThirdPartyActivity(EGIG)
4.0E4
3.5E4
3.0E4
2.5E4
Unknown
2.0E4Pinhole/crack
Hole
1.5E4Rupture
1.0E4
5.0E5
0.0E+0
<80cm80100cm>100cm
CoverClass(cm)
Figure9FailureRatevsWallThicknessforCorrosion(EGIG)
1.4E4
1.2E4
1.0E4
8.0E5
Unknown
Pinhole/crack
6.0E5Hole
Rupture
4.0E5
2.0E5
0.0E+0
d5mm510mm1015mm1520mm2025mm2530mme30mm
WallThickness(mm)
Figure10GrossSpillSizevsNumberofSpillsforMaterialFailures(CONCAWE)
10,000
1,000
GrossSpillSize(m3)
100Constructionfaults
Materialsfaults
10
1
05101520253035
NumberofSpills
Figure11FailureRatevsYearforMaterialFailures(EGIG)
1.2E4
1.0E4
8.0E5
Unknown
6.0E5Pinhole/crack
Hole
Rupture
4.0E5
2.0E5
0.0E+0
pre19541954to1964to1974to1984to1994to2004to
19631973198319932003date
YearofConstruction
ERMconsultingservicesworldwidewww.erm.com
LongDistanceOil/GasPipelineFailureRatePredictionBasedonFuzzyNeuralNetworkModel
http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/CSIE.2009.738December07,2014
LongDistanceOil/GasPipelineFailureRatePredictionBasedOnFuzzyNeuralNetworkModelXingyuPengPenghangLiqiongChenSouthwest
PetroleumUniversity
Withanagingundergroundlongdistanceoil/gaspipeline,everencroachingpopulationandincreasingoilprice,theburdenonpipelineagenciesto
efficientlyprioritizeandmaintaintherapidlydeterioratingundergroundutilitiesisincreasing.Failureratepredictionisthemostimportantpartofrisk
assessment,andtheveracityofthefailurerateimpactstherationalityandapplicabilityoftheresultoftheriskassessment.Thispaperdevelopeda
fuzzyartificialneuralnetworkmodel,whichisbasedonfailuretreeandfuzzynumbercomputingmodel,forpredictingthefailureratesofthelong
distanceoil/gaspipeline.TheneuralnetworkmodelwastrainedandtestedwithacquiredLanzhouChengduChongqingproductoilpipelinedata,
andthedevelopedmodelwasintendedtoaidinpipelineriskassessmenttoidentifydistressedpipelinesegments.Thegainedresultbasedonfuzzy
artificialneuralnetworkmodelwouldbecomparativelyanalyzedwithfuzzyfailuretreeanalysistoverifytheaccuracyoffuzzyartificialneuralnetwork
model.
XingyuPeng,PengZhang,LiqiongChen,"LongDistanceOil/GasPipelineFailureRatePredictionBasedonFuzzyNeuralNetworkModel",CSIE,
2009,2009WRIWorldCongressonComputerScienceandInformationEngineering,CSIE,2009WRIWorldCongressonComputerScienceand
InformationEngineering,CSIE2009,pp.651655,doi:10.1109/CSIE.2009.738
Pipelines
http://www.failureanalysis.com/zoilgaspipeline.htmDecember07,2014
OilandGasPipelines....OilandGasPipelinesFailureAnalysis.AMChassignificantexperiencewithoilandgaspipelinefailureanalysis.
AMCspecializesinoilandgaspipelineconstruction&repair,inspection,corrosion,industrialfailureanalysis,metallurgicalengineering,welding,and
weldrepair.Visitourhomepagefordetailedinformationonouroilandgaspipelineconstruction&repair,inspection,corrosion,stresscorrosion
cracking,industrialfailureanalysis,welding,andweldrepairservices.
AMChassignificantexperiencewithoilandgaspipelinefailureanalysis.Ourmetallurgicalengineercanidentifythecauseoffailureofyourpipeline
leakorexplosion.Consultingengineeringforfabricationofpipelinesorrepairofpipelinedamage.ContactAMCandtakeadvantageofourpipeline,
welding,andmetallurgicalengineeringexperiencetosolveyourpipelineproblems.
Questionsconcerningoil&gaspipelineconstruction,orrepaircanbeemailedtoinfo@failureanalysis.com
AnalysisofGasPipelineFailureIowaStateUniversity
http://home.eng.iastate.edu/~jdm/katrina/Data/Natural%20Gas/NG%20Transportation/Analysis%20of%20Gas%20Pipeline%20Failure.pdfDecember07,2014
AnalysisofGasPipelineFailureE.PhillipDahlbergandT.V.BrunoSUMMARYFailureofanoperatinggaspipelineisarareevent.However,whenit
doesoccur,itmust
AnalysisofGasPipelineFailure
E.PhillipDahlbergandT.V.Bruno
SUMMARY
Failureofanoperatinggaspipelineisarareevent.However,whenitdoesoccur,itmust
beproperlyanalyzedtopreventrecurrence.Whatfollowsareanalyticalproceduresfor
analyzingpipelinesalongwithexamplesandcharacteristicsofsometypicalfailures.
INTRODUCTION
Failureofanaturalgastransmissionorgatheringlineduringserviceisextremelyserious
becauseofthepotentialforlossoflife.Yetstatisticsshowthatfailuresoccuronlyoncea
yearperthousandmilesofpipeline.Partofthereasonforthisexcellentrecordisthe
pipelineindustryresearchoverthepastthirtyyearsintofailuresandmeansofprevention.
Figure1.Thiswork,sponsoredbysuchorganizationsasTheAmericanGasAssociation,
TheAmericanIronandSteelInstitute,andTheBritishGasCorporation,hasresultedin
improvedpipelinesteels,manufacturingandinspectionprocedures,andimprovedpipeline
designs.
ANALYTICALTECHNIQUES
Whilepipelineconfigurationsimplifiesthegeometricalaspectsofanalysis,thetrauma
accompanyingthefailureoftenobscuresordestroyscharacteristicsimportanttoidentifying
thecauses.Thesuddenreleaseoflargeamountsofstoredelasticstrainenergycanbadly
deformthepipe,whilegasfires,iftheyoccur,canalterpipeproperties.Inaddition,postFigure1.Numberofgaspipelineservice
failurecorrosionandhandlingawayfromlaboratoryfacilitiesmayobliteratefinescaleincidentsversusyearofoccurrenceby
fracturefeatures.Toovercomeinherentdifficultiesandaccuratelydeterminecauses,acause.(FromGiedon,D.N.andR.B.Smith,
varietyofanalyticaltechniquesmustbeappliedinacarefulandwellprescribedfashion.AnAnalysisofReportableIncidentsfor
NaturalGasTransmissionandGathering
OverallMacroscopicVisualInspectionToidentifythefailureorigin,itisimperativethatLines1970through1978,NG18ReportNo.
acarefulmacroexaminationoftheentireavailablefracturesurfacebedone.Inservice121,Sept.1980.)
pipelinerupturesgenerallydevelopfromaregionofstablecrackgrowthorfromadefect
causedbyanoutsideforceorcorrosion.Certainmacrofeaturesonthefracturesurfacecan
aidinlocatingthefailureorigin.Themostcommonoftheseisthechevronpatternonplane
strainfractureareaspointingbacktotheorigin.Theacuteangleedgeofafullshear
propagationductilefailureoftencontainssecondarycrackswhichformsawtoothlike
ridgespointingbacktotheorigin.Runningafingerbackandforthalongthisedgewill
oftenindicatebyroughnessdifferences,whichwaythecrackwaspropagating.Sincecrack
branchingwillshowpropagationdirections,puttingafragmentedpipelinetogether(usually
donebymatchingpaperpatternsofthevariouspieces)willhelpidentifytheoriginarea.
SectioningandCleaningOften,thecriticalareasidentifiedbythevisualanalysiswill
havetobesectionedfromtherestofthepipeallowingdetailedfractographyand
microstructuralanalysis1.Caremustbeexercisedtopreventdamagetothefracturearea
whencuttingsmallpiecesforlaboratoryanalysis.Inparticular,torchcuttingofsamples
requirescautiontoavoidthermaldamagetothemetalinthefracturearea.Theorientation
ofsmallpiecesrelativetothemacrocrackpropagationdirectionandthepipeoutsideand
insidesurfacesshouldbemarkedforidentificationduringthemicroanalysis.
Thetechniquesforcleaningdebrisandcorrosionproductsfrompipelinefracturesinclude
washingwithamilddetergentandbristlebrush,solventcleaninganddegreasinginan
ultrasoniccleaner,replicastripping,andchemicalorelectrochemicaletchinginmildor
inhibitedalkalineoracidsolutions.Thetechniquesshouldbeappliedinaserialfashion
employingonlytheminimumnecessaryforcleaningthespecificfractureregionanalyzed.
Priortocleaning,potentiallysignificantcorrosionproductsshouldbecarefullyremoved
andsavedforanalysis.
Figure2.Rupturesectionsof85/8inchgas
MicrofractographyTheaimofhighmagnificationfractography,usingtransmissionorpipelinethatfailedduetoexternal
scanningelectronmicroscopy,istorelatethefractureappearancetothecauseormechanicaldamage.
mechanismoffracture.Thisprocedureinvolvescomparingtheservicefailureresulting
Figure3.A31/2inchlonggougefoundnearFigure4.AcrosssectionthroughthegougeFigure5.SEMfractrographoffatiguedamage
themidpointoftheruptureshowninFigure2.Showsadarketchingareaneartheoutsideassociatedwiththelongitudinalweldseamof
Surfacewithasmallsecondarycrack(arrow)a34inchO.D.pipeline.
Nearthefracture.
fromunknownconditionsto"pedigreed"fracturesgeneratedinthelaboratoryunderknown
conditionsofstress,strain,strainrate,andenvironment.Fractographicexaminationscan
alsorevealchangesinfracturemode,localcrackpropagationdirections,andtheprogressor
historyofcracking.
MetallographicAnalysisThefracturepathrelativetograinboundaries,inclusions,
transformedandsecondphases,andexternaldefectscanbedeterminedbymetallographic
analysisusingstandardtechniques.Themountingandpolishingofacrosssectionof
matchingfracturesurfacesatthefailureoriginoftenprovidesevidencetopositively
identifythefailuremode.
ChemicalCompositionandMechanicalPropertiesChemicalanalysesandmechanical
Figure6.Insidesurfaceatthefailureorigintestsaregenerallyruntodetermine:ifthepipeisofthepropertypeandgrade,whetherit
ofa20inchpipeline.meetsappropriatestandards,andwhetheranydeviationcontributedtothefailure.Themost
commonmechanicaltestsaretensile,bend,andflatteningtests.Othertests,suchasCharpy
impacttestsorcracktipopeningdisplacement(CTOD)testsmaybeusefulindetermining
fracturebehavior.
CAUSESOFPIPELINEFAILURES
Overhalfofallinservicepipelinefailuresresultfromsomeexternallyapplied
mechanicalforceasshowninFigure1.Thefollowingareexamplesoffivetypicalfailures.
Figure2showstherupturethatdevelopedinasectionof85/8inchO.D.electric
resistancelinepipe.Visualandmetallographicexaminationrevealedthefailurewascaused
bymechanicaldamage,intheformofagougeanddent,oftenassociatedwithheavy
equipmentsuchasabackhoe.Figure3showsadetailofagougethatwasnearthemid
pointoftherupture.Theprofileofthegouge,showninFigure4,isapolishedandetched
crosssectionofmatchingfracturesurfacesatthefailureorigin.Thecombinationofagouge
anddentisparticularlydamaging.Thegougecoldworksthesteelandreducesitsresistance
Figure7.Crosssectiontakenadjacenttothetocrackinitiation.Thedent,bychangingthegeometry,createsanareaofhighstressand
fractureshowninFigure6.Thearrow
identifiesthefracturesurfaceinthepipeline.stressconcentration.
Asecondformofexternaldamagecanbeintroducedbyfatiguecrackingduring
pipeshipment,particularlyinrailandseashipment.Thedamage,sometimescalledtransit
fatigue,resultsfromflexingthepipeduringloadmovement.Transitfatigueinseamless
pipeandthebasemetalofweldedpiperesultsfromconcentratedstresseswherethepipe
contactsaprotrusion,suchasarivetorbolt,theweldofanadjacentpipe,orbearingstrips
ofinsufficientsize.Insubmergedarcweldedpipe,transitfatiguecrackscandevelopatthe
toeoftheweldevenintheabsencepointcontact.Figure5showsthefineductilefatigue
striationsandsecondarycrackingthatcharacterizetransitfatiguedamage.
Corrosioncancausefailuresbythinningthewalloveralargeareaorlocalized
pitting.Bothexternalandinternalcorrosioncanleadtofailures,butthewidespreaduseof
cathodicprotectionhasgreatlyreducedexternalcorrosion.Figure6showstheinside
surfaceatthefailureoriginofa20inchgaslinethatfailedshortlyaftertheoperating
pressurewasincreased.Thefailureresultedfrominternalpittingcorrosiononthebottom
ofthepipelinethatsignificantlyreduceditswallthickness.Figure7showsthedepthorthe
pittingonapolishedcrosssectioncuttransversetothefraction(arrow).
Anotherformofcorrosion,stresscorrosioncracking,canalsoleadtofailures.
Figure8.Outsidesurfaceofpipelinesection
removedbecauseofaleak.Thearrows
indicatetwoclustersofcrackindications
visibleaftermagneticparticleinspection.
Figure11.Hydrostatictestruptureofseamless65/8inchO.D.pipelineshowingthintongueofmetalprotrudingfromaroundapipe
lamination.
Externalstresscorrosioncrackingresultsfromtheaccumulationofmoistureonthepipe
surfaceatimperfectionsinthepipecoating.Certaincorrosivesinthemoisturein
conjunctionwithnormaloperatingstressescausecracking.Stresscorrosioncrackingin
pipelinesisidentifiedbythedistinctiveintergranularnatureofthecracks.Figure8shows
cracksinasectionofpiperemovedforexaminationbecauseofaleak.Thecracksresulted
fromstresscorrosioncracking.Thesurfaceofacrack,extendingacrossthewall,was
brokenopeninthelaboratoryandisshowninFigure9.Ametallographiccrosssection,
Figure10,showedthecrackstobeintergranular.
Materialdefectsarenotcommoncausesofservicefailuresbecausetheyare
usuallyfoundbeforethepipeisplacedinservice,eitherduringinspectionofthepipeor
duringhydrostatictesting.Thefewfailuresthatdoresulttypicallyoriginateatlongitudinal
weldseamsoratlaminationsinseamlesspipe.Figure11showstheruptureofa65/8inchFigure9.Surfaceofcrack(see
Figure8)that
O.D.seamlesspipelinethatresultedfromapipelamination.Inthisinstance,failurewasbrokenopeninthelaboratory.
The
occurredduringhydrostatictesting.insidesurfaceisatthetop.
CONCLUSIONS
Despiteadvancesinmanufacturing,testing,andinspectionofgaspipelines,
failuresdooccur.Researchandexperiencehavehelpedcharacterizethedifferenttypesof
failuressothattheircausecanbedeterminedandappropriatepreventivemeasuresapplied.
Byusingcarefulanalyticaltechniques,andwithathoroughunderstandingofthepipeline
operatingconditions,thecauseoffailurecanalmostalwaysbedetermined.
Figure10.Microstructureinarea
ofsecond
arycrackshowinganintergranular
cracking
mode.
OILANDGASPIPELINEFAILUREMODELLINGNIGC
http://research.nigc.ir/files/Info_Res/Articles/86123AN_R32.pdfDecember07,2014
ThefailureratedataforoffshorepipelinesandrisersistobefoundinBattelleResearch(1985)and(PARLOC96,...OILANDGASPIPELINE
FAILUREMODELLING9.
09575820/03/$23.50+0.00
#InstitutionofChemicalEngineers
www.ingentaselect.com=titles=09575820.htmTransIChemE,Vol81,PartB,January2003
OILANDGASPIPELINEFAILUREMODELLING
F.K.CRAWLEY1,2,I.G.LINES3andJ.MATHER3
1
DepartmentofProcessandChemicalEngineering,UniversityofStrathclyde,Glasgow,UK
2
W.S.AtkinsConsultantsLtd,Glasgow,UK
3
W.S.AtkinsConsultantsLtd,Warrington,UK
T
hispaperexaminesthekeyparametersforriskassessmentneartooil=gaspipelines
withparticularreferencetoames.Inparticularitexaminesoutowcharacteristicsof
thedifferentuidshandled.Itthenexaminestheconsequencemodelling;more
particularlythesurfaceemissivepowersoftheames,thefailureratedata,theconsequences
usingthePiperAlphareballandnallyfailurestatistics.Itisshownthattheoutow
characteristicsaremorecomplexthanmightbeexpected;theassessmentofsurfaceemissive
powershastobedonewithcare;andnally,olderpipelinesdistortthefailureratestatisticsor
failuremodeswhicharenotrelevanttoamodernpipelinesystem.Onespecicconclusionof
thispaperisthatthelanduseplanningzonesroundmodernlandlinesmaybereducedbymore
rigorousanalysisofbotheffectsoftheleakageandtheappropriatepipelinefailuredata,bothin
frequencyandspectrum.Thispaperuseshithertounpublishedinformationandthereforesome
ofthesourcesmustremaincondential.
Keywords:pipeline;failure;riskassessment.
INTRODUCTIONpublic.Occasionallytheuidsfromoneplatformowtoa
secondwhichactsasagatheringstationbeforeitowsonto
AlloftheNorthSeagasandnearlyalloftheoilproducedinanaldestination(aswithPiperAlpha).
theUKContinentalShelf(UKCS)istransportedtoshoreinInthecaseofNorthSeagaslinesthedistributionnetwork
pipelineswithdiametersoftypically24inchesor0.6m(thiscoversnearlyallofBritainfromtheprocessingfacilitieson
shouldbetreatedasindicative)(DTI,1993).Undertheseatheeastandwestcoaststotheuser.Failureofalmostany
thereareapproximately3000kmofpipelinesoperatingatpartofthegasgridwouldaffectthepublic.Thetransporta
pressuresbetween7and11MPa(DTI,1993)andovertionofoilwithanelevatedvapourpressureislimitedtoa
17,000kmofonshorenaturalgasdistributionpipingoperafewdiscreteareas.ThetransportationofhighpressureLPG
tingatabout7MPa(Braithwaite,1985).Notonlyisoilandandetheneisalsolimitedtoclearlydenedareas.Failureof
gashandledonlandbutalsoethene,LPG,petrol,dieseloiltheselineswouldaffectthepublicandalsotheenvironment.
andotherchemicals.Aroundthelandbasedpipelines(landTheoutowcharacteristicsfromaseveredpipelineare
lines)therearelanduseplanningzoneswherethereareinuencednotonlybythepressure,diameterandlengthbut
restrictionsonsometypesofdevelopments.Thiscouldalsothepropertiesoftheuid.Inthecaseofagastheuid
createalimitationonlandusenearthereceivingstation,couldenterthetwophaseregimeduetoretrocondensation
whichwouldbe,normally,anindustrialsitewithhousinginastheuidspassintothetwophaseenvelopeandcreatea
thevicinity.Whilethemajorityofthelandaffectedwillbetwophasechokedowwithinthepipeline.Thisreducesthe
countrysidetheroutingofthelandlinemaybeaffectedbyoutowandaffectsthecrackpropagationcharacteristics,as
thepresenceoffarmsandsmallvillages.thecrackpropagationvelocitycanbehigherthanthe
Thepipelinescarryingtheproductsoftheoffshoreoilandcompressionwavevelocityintheuid=gasresultingina
gasindustrycanbeanalysedinfoursections.Therstistherunningcrack.Likewiseoilwillevolvelighthydrocarbons
riserortherigidsectionofpiping,whichconveystheuids(fromgasinsolution)resultinginafoamingsystemina
fromtheproductionfacilitiestotheseabed(andviceversa);verticalline(riser)oralandline.Thelowerheadoffrothing
thiscanbeupto175mlong.Failureofthissectionwillaffectoilcanresultinahydrostaticheadwhichislessthanthe
theproductionplatformandtheproductionpersonnel,asuidvapourpressure.Thelossofthishydrostaticheadwill
showninthePiperAlphaDisaster(Cullen,1992).Theresultintheoutowofoilfroth,whichcanlastformany
secondsectionisthesealine,whichtransportstheuidstohours.Thischaracteristiccanresultinalargeseareanda
theshore;thiscanbeover100kmlong.Failureofthisgrosserrorinthepredictionoftheconsequencesthatmay
sectionwillaffectshippingandalsocreatepotentialpolluoccurfollowingapipelinefailure.
tion.Thethirdsectionisthelandapproach;thisisabout1kmTherearetwomethodsfortheassessmentoftheame
long;failureofthissectioncouldaffectthepublic.Thenalcharacteristics.Therstistoassumeapercentageofthetotal
sectionisthelandline,whichisburiedundertheground;thiscombustionenergyisreleasedasradiantheatfromoneor
canbeanylength.Failureofthissectioncouldalsoaffectthemorepointsources.Thesecondistodenethemorphology
3
4CRAWLEYetal.
oftheameandthentoascribeasurfaceemissivepowerFollowinglinerupturetheinitialoutowfromaruptured
(heatowperunitareaoftheameboundary,SEP).Frompipelineistheresultofthereleaseofthestrainenergyin
thistheradiantheatimpactcanbeassessedbymeansofviewboththeoilandthepipelinewalls;thisisoftenreferredtoas
factors.Eachmethodhaspotentialerrors.Thiswillbelinepack.Thistakesplaceoveratimescaleofsome
discussedinmoredetailinthesectiontitledFlameminutes;thereafterthelinedynamicsdominatetheoutow.
Characteristics.Thekeyfeatureisthereservoirofdissolvedgas(solution
Nearlyallreliabilitydatasourceswillincluderelevantgas)withinthehorizontalsectionofthesealineonthe
andnonrelevantdata,andsoitiswithpipelinefailuredata.seabed.Oncethepressureatthefootoftheriserfallsbelow
Theolderpipelines,whichmaynotnecessarilyhavebeenthevapourpressureoftheoiltheamountofgasavailableto
builttothesamestandardsasmoremodernpipelines,candrivethefrothyowincreasessignicantly.Followingthe
dominatethedatainthedatabase.Itisthereforenecessarytoreleaseofthelinepackthemeandensityofthetwophase
analysethedatawithcare.Ingeneralthisresultsinloweruidsintheriserfallsbyafactorofabout3.Thissuggests
failureratesforthemoremoderndesigns=builds.that,inordertopreventthepressureproleintheriser
Takingallofthesefactorstogetheritisevidentthattheredroppingtoalevelwheretheoilinthepipelineactsasa
couldbeasignicanterrorintheperceivedriskifthedriverfortwophaseow,thevapourpressureoftheoil
outow,effectsandfailuremodelsarenotanalysedmustnotexceedabout30%ofthehydrostaticheadinthe
correctly.Thispaperhighlightsthemainsourcesoferror,riser.
theproblemareasinassessingrisksonsealinesandSixsimulationswerecarriedout,usingthecomputercode
landlinesandshows,forlandlines,thatamorerigorousOLGA(Bendiksonetal.,1991)withthreesynthesized
treatmentcouldreducetheconsultationdistancesandfreeoils,threeonthe175mriserandthreeonthe125mriseras
landforbenecialuse.showninTable1.Theapproximatecompositionsareshown
TheresultsofthestudydrawheavilyfromtheoilandgasinTable2.
industrybutthereisareectionoftheresultsofthisTheoutowsforthefourhighestvapourpressuresare
informationontheonshorepipelines.TheoutowswillshowninFigures14.Thedifferenceinthetwogastooil
changeslightlyduetolowerbackpressuresandtheameratiocurvesbetweenthe175and125mrisersisafunction
modellingisidentical,butthedifferentenvironmentinuofthewayinwhichthetwoendsweremodelledas,for
encesthefailureratedata.simplicityandreality,thesealinewastreatedastworisers
of175and125mlengthjoinedbyagentlyrisingsealine.
Further,forreality,thelinewassimulatedwithheatloss
fromthewalltoseasuchthattheuidscooledfrom333to
OUTFLOWCHARACTERISTICS283Koverthelengthoftheline;thetemperature10kminto
thelinewasabout298K.Thetwolowervapourpressures
CrudeOil
depackedandowarrestedwithinafewminutesas
Thepropertiesoftheuidsunderdiscussionaresuchthatpredictedfromtheanalysisofthehighervapourpressure
theyrequirespecialanalysis.Oilisamixtureofhydrocaroils.Thetotalreleaseofoilduringdepackwas2550
bonsandtoagoodapproximationthehigherthemoletonnes.Thetwohighestvapourpressureoilsstillowed
fractionofthelowermolecularweighthydrocarbons,theafter3h,butthemiddletwoarrestedintheinterval23h.It
higherthevaporpressure.Asageneralizationitisbettertoshouldbenotedthattheoilwiththehighestvapourpressure
transportoilwithlighterhydrocarbonmoleculestotheinthe175mriserwasinhydrostaticequilibriumatthefoot
Stabilizationplantandtorecoverthemethanetobutaneoftheriser.Duringthelinedepackingthepeakoilows
thereforbenecialuse.Theactualvapourpressureisawereinitiallyover1200kgs1fallingrapidlytoabout
functionofthecomposition;ahighermolefractionof500kgs1andthentobelow250kgs1within20min.
propanewillhavethesameeffectasalowermolefractionTheoutowsshowedageneraldecaycurveuntiltheow
ofmethane.Astheoilisoversaturatedatthetransportarrested;followingthistherewasaperiodofintermittent
pressure,thelighterhydrocarbonscomeoutofsolutionslugginglastingmanyminutes.Duringthesluggingperiod
whenthepressureisreduced;thisprocessisrelativelythenetoutowwasrelativelysmall.Thesluggingmaybe
slowand,duetothesurfacephysicsoftheoil(includinganartefactofthesimulationoritmayberealandrepresent
viscosity),theoilstartstofoam(thisalsoinhibitsthegasbubblesformedinthehorizontalsectionofsealine
formationofaerosols,seelater).Thisisaknownproblementeringtheriser,beforetheyreenteredsolution,so
instabilizationunitsandisthereforeaccentuatedinadischargingsmallquantitiesofoilinslugs.
connementsuchasapipelinewheregas=liquidseparationOfmorenoteisthegeneralrisingcurveofgastooil
ismoredifcultdue,onceagain,tothesurfacephysicsofratio.Thisreectsadepletionofthesolutiongasinthe
theoil.Theestablishmentofanequilibriumisrelativelyhorizontalsectionofthesealineandthattheowwill
slow,and,whileitmightbeexpectedthatthehydrostatic
headofoilinariserwouldsuppressdesolutionofgases,in
factthefoamdensityfallstosuchalevelthatthehydrostaticTable1.Vapourpressureofthreesynthesizedliveoils.
headislessthanthevapourpressureoftheoil.Theeffects
Vapourpressure(MPa)
ofthefoaminginseveredriserswerestudiedshortlyafter
thefailureofPiperAlpha(Cullen,1992)usingatypicalseaComposition175mRiser125mRiser
line0.6m(DTI,1993)diameter(24inch)andalengthof
100kwithriserheightsof175and125m(DTI,1993).The11.5(333K)0.9(298K)
21(333K)0.6(298K)
oilvapourpressurewascontrolledbysystematicallyvarying30.55(333K)0.2(298K)
themolefractionoflighthydrocarbons.
TransIChemE,Vol81,PartB,January2003
OILANDGASPIPELINEFAILUREMODELLING5
Table2.Compositionofthreesynthesizedoils.
Molefraction
CompoundComposition1Composition2Composition3
CO20.00180.00150.0007
C10.030.0180.004
C20.0350.0320.02
C30.10.10.09
C40.0790.070.068
C50.0820.0840.084
HigherResidueResidueResidue
eventuallyarrest.Thetimetoarrestfollowsthevapour
pressurerelationshipandtheriserheight(imposedpres
sure),aswouldbeexpected.TheincreaseofthegastooilFigure2.Outowfromruptured175mRiserTVP8Bar.
ratiowasasmightbeexpectedwiththegreaterfrictional
lossesinthesealine(alowerdensityrequiredtodrivethe
uidpump),butthemaximuminthe175mrisercannotbeseabedoilwouldstilloozeoutofsmallbreachesafterthe
explainedeasily.(Itwillbenotedthatthegastooilratioislinedepackedbuttheoutowfromafullborebreachwould
about12%wt=wtinthismodel.Normallyavalueofnearerthenbedeterminedbythelocalseabedtopography.At
5%mightbeexpectedforliveoilswhichhaveundergoneatoperatingconditionsa25mmpunctureattheseabed
leastonestageofseparation,butagainitwillbedependentwouldproduceanoutowofaround39kgs1ataline
onthecomposition,particularlythemethanemolefraction.)pressureof70bar,assumingthatthepumpsdidnotshut
Thetotaloutowfortheseexamplesrepresentsbetweendown.Arupturewouldbemoreproblematic;rstthe
12and7.5%ofthetotalsealineinventory.hydrostaticheadcouldequalthevapourpressureandthe
Theoutowfromsmallerholes(thesizeofthefewowcouldinvolvedisplacementofoilbyseawater.Alter
centimetersdiameter)islesscertain.Inthishypotheticalnativelythevaporpressuremaybehigherthanthehydro
example,2550tonnesoflinepackwillbeejectedwhateverstaticpressuresothebalanceofthedrivingforce(vapour
thebreachsize;thedynamicsthereafterwilldependuponthepressureminusimposedhead)woulddeterminetheoutow
breachsizeitself.Forsmallsizesthemassowacrossagainstfrictionlosses.
thebreachmustbebalancedagainstthetwophasepressureForhorizontallandlinesasimilaranalysistothatabove
drop,theoil=gasseparationintheriserandtheimposedshowsthattheoutowwilldependuponthebreachsize,
pressureatthebaseoftheriserbothhydrostaticandlinetopographyandbreachorientation.Smallbreaches
dynamic.Forbreachesoflessthan10cmdiameter,onceareveryproblematicbuttheoutowfroma25mmpuncture
thepipelinehaddepacked,therewouldbeaperiodofwouldbearound53kgs1atpipelinepressure.Large,
reducingtwophaseowintheriseruntiloutowbecameafullborebreacheswillresultinthevastmajorityofthe
gasastherisersectiondevelopedagaseouszoneatthetoplinecontentsbeingejectedatsimilarmassuxesanddueto
(oftheriser)whereoilandgasmaydisengage.thesamemechanismasthebreachedrisers.Becauseofthe
Theoutowfromahorizontalsectionofsealinewouldabruptdropinpressurethemainoillinepumpswill,once
dependupontheimposedbackpressure.Itistobeexpectedagain,shutdownduetothelowlinepressure.Thereafter
thatformajorrupturesthemainoillinepumpswillshuttheinitialoutowwillbealittlehigherbuteventually
downonlowpressureandthesystempressurewillrapidlythedrivingforcewillreducetothevapourpressurewhich
approachthatofthevapourpressureoftheoil.Onthehastoovercomethefrictionalforces.Theinitialdepack
Figure1.Outowfromruptured175mRiserTVP14Bar.Figure3.Outowfromruptured125mRiserTVP8Bar.
6CRAWLEYetal.
problemsforlinerepair.Arunningcrackwillnotneces
sarilyincreasetheriskattheprocessplatform,asthe
effectivereleasepointwouldbemoreremotefromthe
platform.Itcould,however,affectthepublicifthecrack
propagatedfromaremoteareatoaninhabitedarea.Asa
meansofreducingthepropagatingconditions,specialtough
steelscanbeused.Howeverthereisanalternativeonsub
sealines:testshavebeencarriedoutinwaterofabout100m
deeptoinvestigatetheeffectsofthelocalshockwaveatthe
cracktipandthecompensationpressureswhichmighthold
thecracktipclosed(condentialstudy).Thesetestsveried
thatitwasnotnecessarytousespecialsteelsfordeepwater
pipelines.A60mlengthofpipewassunkinabout100mof
seawaterandlledwithasyntheticgasmixsimulating
typicalNorthSeagas.Thelinecontainingabout15
Figure4.Outowfromruptured125mRiserTVP6Bar.tonnesofmixedgaswasscoredandsplitusinghydraulic
rams.Whenruptured,thegaswouldhavecooledtoabout
200Kandbehavedasadensegasatthepointofrelease.
willagainbeoftheorderof50tonnesoverafewminutesHoweverwhenthegasreachedthesurfacetheconewas
butthereafterthefrothyoilwillhavealowerdensity,about1020mdiameterandthegashadwarmedsuf
resultinginahighervelocity,whichwillresultinahighercientlyduringtheturbulentrisetothesurfaceforitto
pressuredrop,thusinhibitingthegrossoutow.Atypicalbehaveasabuoyantgas.Thisexperimenthasnotbeen
0.6m(24inch)pipelinewouldhaveacapacityofaboutreportedinanysubsequentliterature.Theconediameterand
300kgs1withapressuredropofabout12MPaperthewarmingofthegasareveryimportantpiecesofdataas
100km.Thenalanalysiswilldependuponthevapourtheyhelptodenethesourcetermsforthesubsequent
pressureandthegastooilratiofollowingdesolution;dispersionofthegas.Thearrestoftherunningcrackgives
highergastooilratiosshouldproduceloweroutowssomecondencethatacrackwillnotruntotheplatform
thanlowergastooilratios,thereverseofwhatmightbeandthatanydamagedgassealinewouldbecapableofbeing
expectedintuitively.repaired.
Thepeak,instantaneous,outowfromtherupturedTartan
riserhasbeenassessedtobe7000kgs1atasystem
HighpressureGases
pressureof12MPa,fallingtobetween1200and
Theruptureofahighpressurepipelinewillresultinan2400kgs1(dependingonthefrictionfactorused)after
expansionwhichisbetweenisenthalpicandisentropic.The15s.Thereductioninowisduetotheaccelerationlosses
temperaturewillfalland,dependingontheupstreamconinthepipeline,thefrictionallossesandthechokingofthe
ditions,thegascouldenteratwophaseregime.Inthiscaseowasitenteredthetwophaseregime.Theinitialoutow
thecompressionwavevelocityfallsbelowtherecognizedwouldhavebeensonicatthepointofrupturebutwould
value.Thecompressionwavevelocityforapuredrygasforhavebeenslowedbyimpingementontheundersidesofthe
atypicalnorthernNorthSeagasofrelativemolecularmodules.Evenafteranhourtheoutowwouldbeover
weightca21andpressureca17MPais380ms1.100kgs1.Thepictureofatorchre(about2hintothe
Duringthedepressuringcycletheuidentersatwoeventafterthecollapseoftheaccommodationmodule)in
phaseregime,theuidtemperaturefallstoabout200KatthePiperInquiryreport(Cullen,1992)showsaame
thepointofrelease(evenwithheatgainfromthepipewallequivalenttobetween50and100kgs1;thenalpicture
andheatsoakingfromtheseabed)andthecompressionofthestumpsofthejacketshowaamefromaseveredriser
wavevelocityfallstoca200ms1(condentialstudy).ofbetween1and3kgs1(blowdownoflonglinesisalong
(Thisshouldbecomparedtoatypicalcrackpropagationdecaycurve).Theseowsareverymuchasmightbe
velocityofca200ms1.)Shouldtherebeafailureintheexpected.
pipelineresultinginacrack,thecrackwillpropagatedownTheowsfromsimpleholesof10and25mmgiveout
thelineatthesamespeedasthecompressionwavevelocityowsofaround1and7kgs1,respectively(atthesame
thusresultinginarunningcrack.Asimilareffectisnotedconditions),butwillalwaysbesonicuntilthepressureatthe
forpropaneusingBLOWDOWN(RichardsonandSaville,exitfallstoabout2MPa.Theseresultsshowtherearemajor
1996),wherethepressureattheendofthepipelineremainsdifferencesintheoutowsforagasandaliquidsystem.
fairlyconstantasthelinecontentspassthroughthephaseSimilaroutowswouldbeexpectedfromlandlines.The
envelopeandproduceaformofmovingchoke.(Inthecaseeffectsofthepressurewaveshouldbemoreaccentuated,as
ofethenetheminimumtemperaturecouldbeaslowasthebackpressurewillbelower.Thenaloutowswillnot
169K.)Theowexitofthepipewillbeeffectivelysonicberegulatedbythehighstaticheadbackpressure.Thenal
untilthepressurefallstoabout2MPaunder100mofseamodellingwillnotbesignicantlydifferent.
andto200kPaonland.
Theeffectsoftemperatureandcompressionwavevelocity
CONSEQUENCES
haveasignicantimpactontheriskassessments.First,any
emergencyisolationvalve(beitonlandorsubsea)intheTheconsequencesoflargeoutowsofhydrocarbonon
pipelinemustbeclosedpromptlyforreasonsofsafetyandoffshoreinstallationstendtodwarftheunderstandingofthe
valveintegrityandtherunningcrackcouldcreateitsowncombustionprocess.Theresarepotentiallyexceedingly
Table4.LeakratefromTartanriserbycalculatedoutowandbyreball
largeandtherearemanypersonswhoareatriskwithonlydimensions.
onemeansofescape,theTEMPSC(totallyenclosedmotor
propelledsurvivalcraft).Onshore,beitonaprocessplantorOutowassessedAssessed
thepublic,thereareredundantandoftenmultidirectionalfromreballoutow
escaperoutes.Themaindifferencesbetweenthetwoareasdimensions(usingfromline
thecombustionrateofdynamics
aretheimmediateimpactonescapeandthesafehaven(orDiameter(m)0.021kgm2s1)(kgs1)(kgs1)
refuge).Offshorethetwoareintimatelytiedupwiththe
integrityofthesupportingstructure(jacket)butonshoreitis34076007000
180200010002000a
morecloselyalliedtotheabilitytoarrestescalation.
Theoilriserfailureonanoffshoreplatformismostlikelya
Dependentonthesurfaceroughness.
tobetheresultofare,butifthefailurewasduetoimpact,
orotherfailuremodes,thegasrelease(assolutiongas)is
signicant,beingabout5kgs1(18tonnesh1).ReleaseThisanalysissuggeststhatthereballsfromrupturedgas
ratessuchasthoseassessedinthispaperwouldhaveahighpipelinescanbemodelledasaformofBLEVEand
probabilityofignitionoverthereleasetime.Theresultantknowingtheoutowatanytime,t,itispossibletoassess
poolrediameter,forasevered0.6mdiameterriser,wouldthesafestandoffofariserinstallationfromthehostplatform
beintherange75100mdiameter(RewandHulbert,onthebasisofaheatdoseorradiationcriterion.This
1996);thiswouldinhibitevacuationandhaveahighmethodhasbeenusedalreadyonatleastoneNorthSea
probabilityoftotalhumanandfacilitylossduetosmokeplatform.
effectsorthecollapseofthejacket.Theonlymitigation
wouldbetheeffectsofpooldriftundertheinuencesofthe
windandfreefallTEMPSC.
TherequirementsfortheprotectionofinstallationsFLAMECHARACTERIZATION
againstriserfailureonoffshoreplatformsarecoveredbyTheamecharacterizationforanyhydrocarbonreis
theOffshoreRegulations(PipelineSafetyRegs,1996)andfundamentaltothenalriskassessment.Asalreadyindi
arenotconsideredfurther.catedintheIntroductionitisdependentontheSEPandthe
TheruptureoftheTartanriseronPiperAlphademonsurfaceshapewhichdictatestheviewfactor.Thissection
stratedtheneedtomodelandunderstandthehistoryoftheaddressesbothtogether.
uidoutowsandconsequentialres.Theoutowshave
alreadybeenoutlined.Thereballwastheresultofthehigh
velocityjetofgasleavingtheriserimpactingontheunder
SurfaceEmissivePowers
sideoftheplatform.Theinitialrestartedasareasonably
welldenedreballbutrapidlybecameanelongatedreTherearemanyquotedsurfaceemissivepowers(SEP)in
ballorfattorch.Observationofvideofootageoftheactualtheliterature,rangingfromover1000kWm2towell
ruptureshowstheperiodofgrowthofthePiperreballwasunder50kWm2.Therealityisthatfullrecognitionof
verytypicalofaboilingliquidexpandingvapourexplosionboththefuelsourceandamestructureisessential.Jet,or
(BLEVE)whichisthenfollowedbyasteadyshrinkageofpremixed,amesarewellaeratedandburnmorecleanly
theame.Thegrowthperiodtoamaximumdimensionwasthanpoolres.Aseriesoftestsareillustratedinavideo
about57s,whenthereballwasabout340mindiameter.HotStuff:anIntroductiontoFireHazardsbyBP(contact
Afterabout1518stheshapeoftherewasanelongatedBPExploration,Dyce,Aberdeen)andwiththisarequoted
bubblewithaneffectivediameterofabout250m.ametemperaturesandmaximumheattransferuxes
Simpletheoryofreballsgivesequationsfortheeffectivewhichareinformative.(Heattransferuxincludesboth
diameteranddurationbasedonthemassofuid(gasandforcedconvectiveandradiantheatstransfersotheSEP
liquid,Wkg)asshowninTable3.couldnotexceed350kWm2.Peaktemperatureswereof
Whicheverreferenceisused,thepowerofWforareatheorderof1573K.Firstthenatureoftheame,its
timeequalsnearlytounity,soitispossibletoderiveaburntemperatureanditsemissivity,iscritical.Methaneames
rateforthereballameareainkgm2s1;thisisproducelittleornocarbon(soot)andthereforearegrey
0.021kgm2s1(usingMHAP,1982;forthetraditionalbodyradiators(seebelow),whereasheavyhydrocarbons
diffusionameofapoolrethecombustionrateisinthepyrolizeandproducecarbon.Insufcientdepthcarbon
range0.008kgm2s1forsmallpoolresrisingtocanactasatotallyblackbodywithemissivitiestendingto
0.014kgm2s1forlargepoolres).Theequivalentleakunitywhiledeepcloudsofcarbondioxideandwater
rateforthetworeballsisgiveninTable4.Itisofnotethatvapourhaveanemissivityvaluenearer0.1.Inthecase
thePiperreballshavesomepremixingandarenottheinquestiontheveryactivelyaeratedameatornearestto
traditionalsemidiffusiontypeofBLEVE.thejetwillbeopticallythinand,althoughthetheoretical
SEPmightapproach350kWm2,thetruevaluewouldbe
nearer275kWm2.Againstthisisthepartialcombustion
Table3.Tworeballmodels.ofthefuel,leavingsootintheplumepath,againreducing
ModelDiameter(m)Duration(s)thetrueSEP.Asimpleenergybalanceroundaamewould
1=31=3
suggestthatintheidealizedconditionstheSEPforanyjet
MHAP(1982)5.8W0.45Wameshouldnotexceedabout400kWm2;avaluehigher
xy
Lees(1996)K1WK2Wthanthiswouldindicategreybodyradiatorswithame
K15.256.48K20.81.07
x0.3140.333y0.1670.333
coloursapproachingthewhiteendofthespectrum(over
1700K).
8CRAWLEYetal.
ThemeasureduxesintheKuwaitwellres(OTIReport,ThegraduationinSEPsalongaameboundaryis
1992)wereoftheorderof150kWm2;suchvaluesweremodeledinthepoolrethermalradiationmodelbyRew
determinedneartotheamecentreandattheupwindside.andHulbert(1996).
Thisisaswouldbeexpected.Theaveragetakenoverthe
wholeamesurfacewouldnotexceed150kWm2.Thisis
Aerosols
aswouldbeexpectedforasmokyame.
TheanalysisofthestructureofthereballinthepreviousThereisageneralassumptionthattheashfromany
sectiongivesaburnrate;ifthisisconvertedintoasSEPvolatileuidshouldbeenhancedbyafactorof2or3to
withaworstcaseheatradiatedfractionof0.35,theSEPreecttheaerosoleffect.Thismaywellbevalidforsuch
cannotexceed330kWm2.Inreality,duetoincompleteuidsaspropaneorbutanebutthisislesscrediblefor
combustion,thevalueisnearer225kWm2asquotedbydesolutioneffectswheretheviscosityandmasstransfer
MoorhouseandPritchard(1982),whogivevaluesinthewillresultinarelativelyslowandnonvigorousreleaseof
range150300kWm2.Foranoillinerupturewheresomevapour(typicalseparatorsaredesignedwitharesidence
smallamountofoilmaybeatomized,theamecouldtimeof180300s).Furthermore,followingtheruptureofa
besmokyandasaresulttheSEPsquotedmaybealittlelonglinetheefuxvelocityisrelativelylow(oftheorderof
high.ThevaluesquotedbyBPintheHotStuffvideogive10ms1)solittleornosecondaryaerosolformationshould
maximumtemperaturesforawellaeratedoiljetameatbeexpectedfromanoillinerupture.Thiscouldresultina
thebrightestpartoftheamestructureof15731623K,signicantreductioninthereballdimensionsandalsoit
whichforatrueblackbodygivesSEPsintherangecouldmoderatetheSEP.
350400kWm2.However,thesearetheoreticalmaxima
foropticallydenseamesandthetrueSEPsandthoseatthe
FlameShapeModelling
smoky,featheredametipswouldbesignicantlylower.
MethaneameswereapproachingtranslucentgivingSEPsThemodellingoftheshapeofpoolandBLEVEreballs
whichwouldnotexceed75kWm2.Forethene,whichcanisrelativelywelldevelopedtechnology(RewandHulbert,
producesmokeyamesinapoorlyaeratedstate,theSEP1996;MHAP,1982).
shouldnotexceed350kWm2.Themodellingofjetamesisoftencarriedoutusingthe
Jetsofoil,however,begantorainoutunburntoilwhenmethodproposedbyChamberlain(1987).Inthistheame
thepressureatthejetwaslessthan300kPa(HotStuffismodelledasthefrustumofaconeandSEPsarethen
video).Thisisagaineasytounderstand,astherewouldbededucedfromthefractionofheatradiatedfromtheame.
insufcientenergytoproduceadequatesizereductionandTheshapeoftheamesfromtheKuwaitoilwellsisalsoa
dropletformationandthiswouldresultinamixtureofajetusefulmodelofanoiljetreastheexitvelocityandthe
reandapoolre.Thejetre,beingmoreaerated,isbyfargastooilratioaresimilartothoseinquestion.Theshapeof
thehottest.thefrustumisdictatedtoadegreebythereleaseconditions
MoorhouseandPritchard(1982)hasproposedvarious(sourceterms).IntheBPreleasestheupstreampressures
SEPsfordifferentames.Itisessentialthatthevaluesarewereover1MPaandthediametertolengthratiowasofthe
basedonthickameswheretheameisatrueblackbodyorderof0.3(0.250.35).IntheKuwaitres(OTIReport,
andnotagreybodyradiator.ThevaluesforJP4poolresin1992)theratioswerealsooftheorderof0.3.Ofmore
thisreferenceshowamaximumvaluefortheSEP,aswouldparticularsignicancewasthefactthatthemaximum
beexpected,betweentwopoolsizeextremes.Whenthepoolreceivedheatuxeswereexperiencedatrightanglesto
issmalltheamewillnotbeopticallydensebutasthesizetheame=wind.Thisisduetothehigherviewfactorandthe
isincreasedthepoolbecomesmoreopticallydensebutalsoviewofthehotterpartsoftheame.Ananalysisoftheres
smoky,hencethemaximum.ForoilthevalueforapoolreintheOTIreport(1992)(whichhadagastooilratioof
willbeabout75kWm210%wt=wtandwerenotunlikepipelineuids)was
MiznerandEyre(1982)quotetheSEPforpoolresofcomparedwiththeresultsusingChamberlain(1987).Only
naturalgasesintherange150200kWm2.Thesevaluesoneofthewellscouldbeanalysedindetailastherewere
weremeasuredlowintheameandlowervaluesaresomedoubtsastothetruesourceterms(exitorice
measurednearerthetopoftheame.Thisreectsthedimensions)andalsothetruereleaserates.Well17Adata
natureofadiffusionameandtinwellwiththeexpectaseemstobethemostsecureandtheresultsoftheobserved
tionsfrompipeareswherethefractionofheatreleasedandcalculateddimensionsaresomewhatdifferentastabu
frommethaneisabouthalfthatofthemixedhydrocarbons.latedbelow.TheSEPmeasuredonwell19Bwasusedto
ThereontheOceanOdyssey(showninthenewscastsbutdrawthisupinTable5.
alsoreproducedbyBPintheHotStuffvideo)followingaIneffecttheChamberlainmodeldoesappeartoindicate
subseagasreleaseduringdrilling)alsoshowedthisetherealthatamesurfaceareaisalmosttwicethatoftheobserved
burning.ThesamereferencegivesSEPsforLPGandwell17Aame.Thisinturnwillincreasetheviewfactor
kerosenepoolresof4835kWm2.andoverestimatethereceivedradiantheat.Well17C
Table5.Analysisofwell17A.
ObservedObservedmaximumAssessedfractionofheatCalculatedCalculatedPercentofheat
frustumdiameterofradiatedbasedonfrustummaximumfrustumradiated
length(m)frustum(m)ameshape(%)length(m)diameter(m)(fromgraph)(%)
451711.1652728
appearedtobemoreverticalthanwell17AanditislikelyInall39wererejectedasirrelevant,forexamplethe
thatthesourceisadamagedChristmastreeandnotavandalismwasonanabovegroundlineinasiteandone
severedwellhead.Thepercentageofheatradiatedintheearthslipwasduetoafailureofatrestleacrossariver.
caseofwell17Cwasabout16%.TheChamberlaincorrelaThenalpipelinefailurerateis0.00026perkmyear.Ofthe
tionpredictsbothlonger(50%more)andwiderames45remainingeventstheonlyevidenceforfullborerupture
(againbyabout50%).(TheOTIamesarebothshorterandarethoseofsabotage,onefailureduringpressuretest,
narrower.)Thereasonsforthisarenotentirelyclearbutonefailureduetostresscorrosioncrackingandoneunspeci
couldbeduetotheveryhighrelativedensityoftheblowedfailure.Byfarthegreatestleakagewasduetodamage
out,thedropletsinthereleaseduids,therelativelyhighinducedbydiggers,trenchersorsimilar.Whilethebreach
molecularweightofthereleaseduidsandofcoursethesizeisnotspecied,itdoesappearfromtheleakageand
highmomentumuxatthesource.massofunrecovereduidsthatthemajorityoffailureswere
TheSEPassessedbyChamberlainmethodwassimilartopuncturesandofafewcentimetresinsize.Thisalso
thatmeasuredonwell19B,buttheratiooftheradiantheatsuggeststhatrunningcracksarerelativelyrare,asindicated
releasedtothetotalpotentialheatreleased(theAPIFfactor)bytheanalysisofFearnehough(1985).Theruptureratefor
backcalculatedfromOTIdatawasabout1015%.Thisalsoaproperlycontrolledpipecorridorshouldthereforebeof
suggeststhattheareacalculatedbytheChamberlainmethodtheorderof0.00002perkmyearandtheotherfailuressplit,
isalittlehighandthereforealsotheviewfactors.Theactualprobably,onethird25mmandtwothirds510mm
percentageofheatradiated(theAPIFfactor)canbediameter.Thespectrum(perkmyear)isasfollows:
subjectivelyassessedfromthedegreeofsmokiness,the
amecolourandreferencetootheraretypes.Avalueof
1015%wouldseemverylikelyfortheKuwaitblowouts,not
1010mm1.7104
28%fromtheChamberlainmodel.Thetypicalpercentageof21025mm0.9104
radiantheatreleasedfromalowvelocitypipeareburning3Rupture2.0105
methane(F)istakenas15%ofthetotalheatasthebasisofTotal2.62104
arestackdesigns.TheChamberlainmodelinfersthatat
sonicvelocitythevalueisbetween15and20%buttheBP
testsshowanalmosttranslucentamewithapercentage
Similartrendsaretobefoundinsubsequentmoreuptodate
radiantheatreleaseof105%orless.Typically,methane
CONCAWEdata.
burntonaKaldair,orlowemissivity,arealsoproducesanF
valueofabout7.5%.TheChamberlainmodeldoesappeartoFearnehough(1985)suggeststhattheevidencefromgas
transmissionpipinggivesafailurespectrum(perkmyear)as:
overestimatethepercentageofheatradiatedfromjetames.
ThesefeaturessuggestthattheapplicationoftheCham
berlainmodeltooilbasedreleasesmaybeoutsidethe1020mm2.0104
boundaryofvalidationandanyattempttomodifythe22080mm2.2105
3over80mm7.5106
sourcetermstoavoidsomeoftheareasofdifcultymay
leadtofurthererrors.Total2.3104
FailureRateDataAfurtheranalysisoftheresidualCONCAWEdatashows
thattheleakageisdominatedbyinternalandexternal
CONCAWE(CONservationofCleanAirandWater
corrosion.Modernonlineinspectionvehicles(OLIV)or
Europe)producesanannualrecordofonshorepipinginci
intelligencepigscandetectveryearlyevidenceofcorrosion.
dents.Inthe10years19821991therewere183,000kmyears
Fearnehough(1985)alsoshowthat,iftheimposedstressto
experienceand84leaks.Oftheleaksthefollowingfailure
yieldstressratiodoesnotexceed0.3forarticiallycreated
categorieswerenotnecessarilyapplicableorrelevantinterms
defectsand0.6forcorrosiondefects,thereisaleakbefore
ofpredictingthefailurerateforaparticularpipeline:
break,thatisthelinewillnotrupturespontaneouslyundera
corrosionregime.However,therewillbeanupperlimiting
breachsize(ordefect)whichwillresultinarunningdefect
1Vandalism5
2Earthslip=movement2withabreachsizeequivalenttoafullborerupture.This
3Gasketfailure5suggeststhattheuseofintelligencepiggingonaregular
4Collapsedsteel1basisshouldaffordatleastafurtherfactorof2reductionin
5Rubberhose1thefailurerates.
6Pumpgland1
7Drainingformaintenance2
Thefailureratedataforoffshorepipelinesandrisersisto
8Trenchingorequivalent10befoundinBattelleResearch(1985)and(PARLOC96,
9Geologicaldrilling21996).TheBattelledata(therstdataset)werecompiled
10Pumplogicfailure1frommostlyGulfofMexicodataandisamixtureofresults
11Saltinline1takenfromUKCSandtheGulfofMexico.Thesecond,
12Acidinline1
13Failureinpressuretest2PARLOC,istotallyUKCSdata.Thespreadsofthetwodata
14Flangefailure(underspecied)1setsaresignicant.Thefollowingisanabstract:TheNorth
15Farmactivity(unspecied)1Seadataprovidefrequenciesof0.02incidentsperyearin
16Heattreatment1thevicinityofplatforms,0.038incidentsperyearinshore
17Bellowsfailure1
18Poorfabricationofatee1
approachesand0.00016incidentskmyearinopenwaters.
ThiscomparestotheguresfortheGulfofMexicoof
10CRAWLEYetal.
0.0044incidentsperyeararoundplatformsand0.00072reducetheinstantaneousoutowbutextendtheduration.
incidentsperKmyearinopenwater.OnasupercialInthecaseofuids=gasestransportedabovethecritical
analysisthetwodatasetsarenottrulycomparable.Furtherpressuretheoutowwillagainbereducedandduration
themodellingbyBattelleisbasedonanumberofvariables:extendedbytheretrocondensationofdropletsandthe
pipediameter,age,pressuretestprocedure,linetrenchingproductionofatwophasechoke.
andinspection.ItispossiblethatthesizeofthedatabaseTherearealsosignicantdifferencesbetweentheaerosol
wouldnotallowaccuratemultivariableassessments.Theformationbetweenuids.Aftertheinitialdepackingofan
bathtubwearincurve,inparticular,issimulatedbyaoillinetheaerosolformationcannotrealisticallyexceeda
correctionfactorafter4yearsexposure.Thisisanoddfactorof2butforLPGtheaerosolfactorcouldreadilyreach
approachascorrosionisanagingeffect,notaninfantunity.Liveoilscantakeover180sforthedesolution
mortalityeffect,butimpactsaremorelikelyduringprocesstoreachaformofequilibrium.Thisisdueto
constructionwhenthenoanchorzonesarelessrigorouslymasstransferlimitationsinsidetheliquid,whichinturn
controlled.Thisdatasetmaybeatriskofdoublecounting.areaffectedbythephysicalpropertiesoftheliquid.This
FinallytheBattelledatareferstoonlythepipelinewhilethewillresultinamuchsmallerpotentialreballatthepointof
PARLOCdataincludesttings.rupture.
Fortherst4yearstheBattelledatashowafailurerateofCurrentapproachestoamemodelling,notonlyinits
0.0065peryearforrisersandtherst100mofsealinemorphologybutalsosurfaceemissivepower,canproduce
fallingto0.00142perannumafter4years.Thespectrumanoverestimateoftherisk.TheSEPisnonuniformacross
(perriserand1000msealineyear)is:theamesurface(withtheexceptionofaBLEVE)and
moresophisticatedamemodelsarerequired.Theanalysis
ofjetamesinparticularisverysensitivetotheupstream
pressureandhencenotonlyatomizationbutalsoair
1Leak10mm9.32104
2Split25mm2.44104entrainment.Theameshapeasaconewithheightand
3Rupture2.44104basedimensionsisequallyimportant.Theuseofan
Total1.42103articialFfactortoresettheSEPcanproduceerrorsnot
onlyinSEPbutalsoviewfactor,particularlyiftheSEP
variesacrossthesurfaceoftheameowingtotheame
structure.Theanalysisofblowouts,whichmostclosely
ThePARLOCdatagivesadifferentspectrum:resembleholedpipelines,suggeststhatthemaximumheat
uxisonanaxisnormaltothewindandthroughtheame
axis.Italsoshowsthatforoil=gasjetstheSEPsare
somewhathigherthanmightbeexpectedfromtheequiva
1Leak10mm1.74103lentaremodels.Thisisprobablyduetothehigher
2Split25mm5.04104
3Rupture4.43104predictedamedimensions.Ofmoreimportanceisthe
Total2.69103
rainoutofoilswhichcouldoccurwithanoillinerupture
(andwasevidentinthecleanuprequiredaftertheKuwait
res).Therainoutwillburnasaverysmokypoolreand
notcontributetothejetredimensionsandheatow.In
Thesevaluescontainthettingswhicharenotcontainedeffectthejetremodellingforoillinefailuremaybe
intheBattelledatabutwhichmakeuphalfthetotalfailuresignicantlyinerror.
rate.Itisofnotethatthefailurerates,allowingfortheThemodellingofanygaseousreisbydenitionasajet
missingttingsinonedataset,areinremarkableagreement.orloosediffusioname.Theuseofaretypemodelsdoes
HowevertherstsourceisbasedpredominatelyontheGulfappeartoproducesomediscrepancies.Thismaybedueto
ofMexicodataandhasanarticialagingfactorof0.2(thattheveryhighmomentumuxesintwophasereleaseand
isareductioninthefailureratewithtime),whichmightnotthepyrolysisofhighermolecularweightmoleculesinthe
befullyjustiedasitprobablyresultsinsomedoublecombustionzone.Theveryhighpressuregaseousmethane
counting.jetsappeartoproducemoreradiativeamesthantest
Allinalltherearegravediscrepanciesbetweenonandevidencemightsuggest.Whilethesemodelsaretheonly
offshoredataandsignicanterrorpotentialifthedataisnotonesavailableatpresenttheymaybebeingusedoutside
correctlypurgedofirrelevantdata.theirareaofapplication.
Thereliabilitydataforpipelinefailureisverysensitiveto
thesourceandapplicability.Thereliabilitydatashouldbe
takenfromanequivalentenvironmentandequivalentuid,
DISCUSSION
notaglobalsetofdata.Theoffshorerupturerateis,from
Thispaperhasshownthattherearepotentiallymitigatingthedata,signicantlyhigherthanfortheonshoreequiva
circumstancesfortheassessmentofthethermaleffectslent.Therearemanyreasonsforthis,nonelessthanthe
followingthelossofcontainmentofaammableuiduidscouldcontainwaterandofcoursethesealinesare
fromapipeline.Inthecaseofaliveuidsuchashighalwaysunderwater.Theuseofrawdata,whichtreatsthe
vapourpressureoilthedesolutionofgasesmaybothfailuredataasaglobalaveragewithoutanyallowanceforits
exacerbateandreducethepotentialrisk.Offshorethegeographiclocation,couldresultinafactorofupto5
desolutionwillassistinthedeburdeningofthepipelinepessimism,particularlyifageeffects(postconstruction
butonshoreitwillreducetheoutow.Inthecaseoftrulydamage,andallcauses)areincludedwithouttheremovalof
ashingowuidsthetwophasechokingeffectwillirrelevantdata.Further,itisnecessarytoincludemitigating
factorssuchaspatrolandonlineinspection.Thesearethisconclusionshouldnotbeusedarbitrarilytochallenge
essentiallysoftwaresafetynothardwareandthereforeitmayexistingdistanceswithoutdetailedsitespecicanalysis.
bemoredifculttoassessthebenetsinanumerate
manner.Itissuggestedthatthearebasedmodelshitherto
usedfortorchresshouldbereviewedinthelightofmoreREFERENCES
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requiresanelementofjudgement.Modellingjetresbyalargepoolresandreballs,aliteraturereview,inTheAssessmentof
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(IChemE,Rugby,UK).
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modelledcorrectly.96641(HSEBooks,London,UK).
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couldbeoverestimated,resultinginhigherradiantheatPipelines,OTH551(HSEBooks,London,UK).
PipelineSafetyRegs,1996,SI825(HSEBooks,London,UK).
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Thefailureratedatavariesforuidandlocation.WetModel.HSEContractReportno96=1996(HSEBooks,London,UK).
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morevulnerabletoexternalcorrosionandimpactfromIChemE,PartB,ProcSafeEnvProt,74.
shingtrawlers.Globaldatamayincludeinappropriate
failuremodelssothatthoselinesmustbepurgedfromthe
ADDRESS
datasets.
ThedatagainedfromtheparticularoffshoreneedsCorrespondenceconcerningthispapershouldbeaddressedto
followingthePiperAlphadisastercanbereadilytransferredMrF.K.Crawley,DepartmentofProcessandChemicalEngineering,Univer
sityofStrathclyde,Glasgow,G11XJ,UK.
totheonshoreanalysisofpipelinefailures.Email:frank.crawley@strath.ac.uk.
Takingalloftheseresultstogetherthereisgoodreasonto
believethatamorerigorousanalysisaroundlandlinesThemanuscriptwasreceived3May2002andacceptedforpublication
shouldresultinsmallerconsultationdistances.However,afterrevision30September2002.
ERMpaperoncrosscountrypipelinesfailureratesaspresentedattheIChemEHazardsXXIIIConference
http://www.erm.com/en/AnalysisandInsight/Publications/ERMpaperoncrosscountrypipelinesfailureratesaspresentedattheIChemEHazardsXXIIIConference/December07,
2014
ERMpaperoncrosscountrypipelinesfailureratesas...pipelinesarewidelyusedintheOil&Gasand...ofcrosscountrypipelinesfailureratesby
...
byGlennPetittwithcommentsacknowledgedfromRichardEspiner
ThispaperwaspresentedattheIChemEHazardsXXIIIConferenceinNovember2012.ProceedingsfortheconferencecanbefoundattheIChemE
Shop.
UndergroundcrosscountrypipelinesarewidelyusedintheOil&GasandPetrochemicalIndustriestotransportrawmaterialsandproducts,e.g.
crudeoil,naturalgasandgasoline.Thelossofmechanicalintegrityofsuchpipelineshasoccurredonnumerousoccasionsworldwide,duetoa
varietyofcausessuchascorrosion,externalimpact,defects,operationalerrorsandnaturalhazards.Withmaterialsbeingtransportedatveryhigh
pressures,pipelinefailuresmayresultinmajorreleasesofhazardousmaterials.AnexampleisshowninFigure1:thedestructionofmanyhouses
afteramajorfirefollowingagaspipelineruptureinSanBruno,California,USAinSeptember2010.Suchfailurespresentarisktopeople(inthecase
ofignitionofhighpressuregas)andtheenvironment(inthecaseofoilandotherliquidproducts).
Thereareanumberofrecognisedfailureratedatabasesforcrosscountrypipelines,suchasCONCAWE(Europeanliquidpipelines)[1],EGIG
(Europeangaspipelines)[2]andtheUSDoT(bothliquidsandgaspipelines)[3].Itisremarkablehowclosethebasedatafromthedifferentsystems
are,whichleadstosomeconfidencethatthefiguresaresufficientlyrobusttobeusedinriskanalyses.
Foreachdatabasethereisanumberoffailuremodesincluded,suchascorrosion,thirdpartyimpact,materialdefects,naturalhazards.Forsomeof
thesefailuremodes,thedatabaseshaveshownthatthereisacorrelationbetweenthefailureratesandvariousriskreductionmechanism,suchas
heavywallthickness.Inparticular,areductioninfailureratecanbeappliedforthecorrosionandthirdpartyimpactfailuremodesforheavywall
thickness.
However,forotherfailuremodes,inparticularmaterialdefects,thedatabasesshownocorrelationbetweenthefailurerateandkeyriskreduction
mechanismssuchasheavywallthickness.Itwouldseemlogicalthatthefailurerateformaterialdefectsshoulddecreasewithincreasingwall
thickness,butforfrequencyassessmentsthishasoftenbeenaconstantinpaststudies,bysimpleuseofstatisticsfromthevariousdatabases.
Theauthorhasextensiveexperienceofassessingtherisksassociatedwithpipelinesystems,havingbeenheavilyinvolvedinthedesignand
subsequentoperationofanumberofhighprofilepipelinesworldwide(fromariskperspective).Thisexperiencehasbeenappliedtotheanalysisof
thevariousfailuremodesinordertodeterminehowvariousriskreductiontechniquescanreducethefrequencyoffailure.Thisincludesthe
assessmentofstatisticswherethereisnoimmediatecorrelationfromthevariousdatabasesforspecificfailuremodes.
Thepaperdiscusseshowsuchdatacanbeappliedwherelogicwouldsuggestthatthereshouldbeareductioninfailurerates,althoughthisisnot
immediatelyapparentfromthevariousdatabases.
Readthefullpaper,withcommentsacknowledgedfromRichardEspiner(434KbPDF)
1.CONCAWE,PerformanceofEuropeanCrosscountryOilPipelines,Statisticalsummaryofreportedspillagesin2010andsince1971,Brussels,
December2011,http://www.concawe.org/
2.EuropeanGasPipelineIncidentDataGroup(EGIG),GasPipelineIncidents,8thReportoftheEuropeanGasPipelineIncidentDataGroup,Doc.
No.EGIG11.R.0402,December2011,http://www.egig.nl/
AnalysisofOilPipelinesFailureC.H.AchebeIMECS20126p
https://www.scribd.com/doc/189336531/AnalysisofOilPipelinesFailureCHAchebeIMECS20126pDecember07,2014
AnalysisofOilPipelinesFailureC.H.AchebeIMECS20126p....fuelgas,andallothersshowedfailureratestoberelativelyfewandthecausesto
berelatively...
pipelinemanagerscanprioritizetheirstrategiesforTheobjectivesofthestudyhavebeencategorizedintothefollowingdifferentareasofactivities:
Identifythebestpracticesindevelopedcountriesandrecommendwaysoftranslatingthemtoareasoilpipelinefailuresandmitigationoftheireffects.
PromotethedevelopmentofincentivesystemstoInordertofulfilthestudyobjectives,anumberofwork
Collectionofdataonpipelinenetworkof(SPDC)intheNigerDeltaAreaofNigeria
AnalysisandriskassessmentofthecausesofoilpipelinefailuresintheNigerDeltaAreaof
ReviewofthelegalandregulatingregimesofpipelinesintheNigerDeltaAreaofNigeriaand
regulatoryandmonitoringsystemsintheNigerianTheNigerDelta(Fig.1)islocatedinSouthernNigeriaandisworld'sthirdlargestwetland.Itis
thebulkofNigeria'sprovenoilandgasreserves.Theregionhasabout606oilfieldswith355situatedonshoreand251offshore(Fig.2).Thereare
about5,284oilwellsdrilledand527flowstationsforcrudeoilprocessing,withmorethan7,000kmofoilandgaspipelinestraversingtheentirearea
andThelandareawithinwhichthenetworkoftransport
gasplantsandabout30marginaloilfieldsfarmedout,throughthenetworkofpipelines,tolocalcompaniesandforexport.ThreeofNigeria'sfour
refineries,PortHarcourtI&IIandWarri,arelocatedintheregion,whilethefourthisDatawascollectedfromknownperiodicalsandotherliterature,
aswellasthedatabasesofNigerianNationalCompany(SPDC)andothersecondarysourcesthatareresponsibleforoperatingoilandgaspipelines
intheNigerDeltaAreaofNigeria.Thedatacollectedincludedthefollowing:
ofthemajorcrudeoilandlinesandlocalgatheringsystems(whereapplicable)inthe
fromthepipelines.Typesofdatacollectedincluded:dateofevent,sitespecification(thatis,pipelineidentificationandcausesandconsequences,
cleanupandrestoration,etc.
importantenvironmentalfactors,aswellaspopulations,habitats,orotherenvironmentalfeaturesofeachstateofNigerDeltaareaalongthepipelines
thatarevulnerabletooilspills.
soforthinthegivencountries.Mostofthepipelinedatawereaccessedfromadigitalmapofmainoilpipelines.Thedataincludedlocationof
pipelines,diameterinmillimeters,andlengthinkilometers.ThedatahavebeencategorizedonastatebystatebasisandareTherewere
approximately84,000kilometersofpipelineinNigeriaasof1998.About90%ofthispipelinehasadiameterofgreaterthan504mm(20inches)while
about64,000pipelinekilometers,or76%ofthetotal,are
ANINNOVATIVEAPPROACHTOMANAGINGTHEINTEGRITYOFOIL...
http://www.vurup.sk/sites/default/files/downloads/pc_1_2012_usman_152.pdfDecember07,2014
...thedevelopmentofaplanforthemaintenanceofthepipelinesystemisarequirement...infailurerates,...Systemforoilandgaspipelines...
Petroleum&Coal
ISSN13377027
Availableonlineatwww.vurup.sk/petroleumcoal
Petroleum&Coal54(1)18,2012
ANINNOVATIVEAPPROACHTOMANAGINGTHEINTEGRITYOF
OILANDGASPIPELINES:PIPELINEINTEGRITYMANAGEMENT
SYSTEM
M.A.Usman1*andS.E.Ngene2
1
DepartmentofChemicalEngineering,UniversityofLagos,Akoka,Lagos,Nigeria
2
DepartmentofPetroleumResources,Lagos,Nigeria,*correspondingauthor:
mawwal04@yahoo.com;musman@unilag.edu.ng
ReceivedAugust17,2011,AcceptedJanuary5,2011
Abstract
Intheoilandgasindustry,managementoftheintegrityofpipelinehasgrowntobecomeaserious
businessbecauseoftheoverallconsequenceofpipelinefailure:economic,social,environmental,
andpossiblylegal.Thisresearchisanattempttocheckpipelinefailuresbycarefullyfollowinga
suiteofactivities.Thissuiteofactivities,alsocalledPipelineIntegrityManagementSystem(PIMS),
isgeneratedforanoperationalpipelineandpopulatedwithdatagatheredonthepipelinesystem.
Ananalysisofthedatacollectedonthepipelineoveraperiodoffiveyearsindicatesimproved
monitoring,reliability,availability,andcompliancetoregulatoryguidelinesintheoperationofthe
pipelinesystems.
KeyWords:Pipeline;Failure;Integrity;Management;System.
1.Introduction
Inthepast,managementtechniquesforpipelineswereminimal.Ingeneral,pipelines
weretypicallynotmaintainedregardingtheirstructuralintegrityuntilafailureoccurred,
atwhichtimeeitherthefailedsection,ortheentirepipelinewouldbereplaced.These
pipelinesmayhavebeeninspectedatplannedoutages,atwhichtimeobviousproblems
weretypicallyrepaired.Systematicmethodsofmanagingpipe,pipelines,orpipesystems
werenotusedtoanticipatefailuresandattempttoconductpreventivemaintenanceor
replacethepipebeforefailureoccurs[1].Theapproachoffixingthepipelinewhenitfails
maynotbeacceptableincaseswhereburstofpipemayleadtohugedamagetoproperty
orinjurytopeople,orwherelossofthefluidwouldhavedeleteriousenvironmentalconse
quences.Theupwardandcontinuoussurgeinthecostofenergywillalsocompelthe
operatortomakeappropriateplanstoavoidproductiondowntimeduetopipelinefailures.
Apipelineintegritymanagementprogramisneededforthesepipelinesystemstoincrease
theirreliabilityandavailability,andtoeffectivelymanageandminimizemaintenance,repair,
andreplacementcostsoverthelongrun.
PipelineIntegrityManagementSystemisaninnovativeapproachtogenerateasuiteof
activitiesrequiredtoproperlymanagepipelineassetssoastodelivergreatersafetybymini
mizingriskoffailures,higherproductivity,longerassetlife,increasedassetavailability
fromimprovedreliability,lowerintegrityrelatedoperatingcosts,andensurecompliance
withtheregulations.PipelineIntegrityManagementSystemsaredevelopedtoserveunique
operationalneedspeculiartoparticularpipelinesystem.Fornewpipelinessystems,the
functionalrequirementsforintegritymanagementshallbeincorporatedintotheplanning,
design,materialselection,andconstructionofthesystem.However,forpipelineswhich
arealreadyinoperation,theintegritymanagementplanisdrawnafterbaselineassessments
anddataintegration.Anintegritymanagementprogramprovidestheoperatorwithinfor
mationtoeffectivelyallocateresourcesforappropriateprevention,detectionandmitigation
activitiesthatwillresultinimprovedsafetyandreductioninthenumberofincidents[2].In
thedevelopmentofthePipelineIntegrityManagementSystems,theintegrationofinfor
mationfromsomerelevantsourceswiththeevaluatedresultsofintegrityassessmenton
thepipelinesystemisnecessary.Theoperatorwillnormallyuseariskbasedapproachin
prioritizingrepairandmaintenanceactivities,andthustheneedtoidentifythelocation,
natureandrelativeriskoffeaturesthatcouldthreatentheintegrityofeachpipelinesegment
M.A.Uman,S.E.Ngene/Petroleum&Coal54(1)18,20122
beforehand.InNigeriasoilandgasindustry,thedevelopmentofaplanforthemaintenance
ofthepipelinesystemisarequirementforthegrantofOilPipelineLicensetothepipeline
system.Onthisinstance,thePipelineIntegrityManagementSystemispreferredtoany
otherformofplan:ithasthecapacitytomanageallknowntypeofoperationaldifficulties
withpipelinefailures.
2.Methodology
2.1ThePipelineSystem
ThisworkreliedonSystemA(Table1),amajorcrudeoilexportpipeline,toshowthe
effectivenessofthePipelineIntegrityManagementSystem(PIMS)inproviding
availability,reliability,andregulatorycomplianceforoilandgaspipelines.Thepipeline
systemwascommissionedin1971withacrudeoilexportcapacityof550Kbpdandhad
operatedtill2005withoutaformalintegritymanagementplan.Externalcorrosion,internal
corrosion,andfatiguecrackingwerethemostlikelydeteriorationmechanismsforthis
pipelinesystem.CO2andSulfateReducingBacteria(SRB)arethekeyinternalcorrosion
agents.Stagnantwaterissweptfrompipelinebyhighflowratesthusmakingwater
unavailabletosustainSRBgrowth.
2.2TheProcess
Theprocesscouldbesummarizedinthechartbelow:
Identifying
Gathering,Reviewing,
PotentialImpact
andIntegratingData
byThreats
RiskAssessment
NoAllThreats
Evaluated?
Yes
Integrity
Assessment
Responsesto
IntegrityAssessment
andMitigation
[2]
Fig.1IntegrityManagementProcessFlowDiagram.
BasedontheChartabove,thefollowingtoolsweregeneratedforthepipeline:
i.SegmentDataforSystemA(Table1)showsthenecessarypipeattributes,designand
constructioninformationaswellassomevitaloperationaldata.Theseinformationare
requiredtofullydefineSystemA.
ii.IntegrityAssessmentPlan(Table2)whichisfocusedonthemajorthreatsonthesystem:
externalcorrosion,internalcorrosion,fatiguecracking,andtoalesserextentthird
partydamage.Operationalinformationandregulatorycompliancewereusedasguidesin
determiningintegrityassessmentintervalsfortheidentifiedthreats.Mitigativemeasures
suggestedwerealsodependentontheoutcomeoftheassessmentandareasstated
intheplan.TheFailureModeandEffectAnalysis(FMEA)isevaluatedusingtheRisk
MatrixintheAppendixB.TheLikelihoodofOccurrence(LOO)andtheConsequenceof
FailureareobtainedfromtheRiskMatrixandrecordedontheMRP.
iii.MaintenanceReferencePlan(Table3)activitiesarescheduledwithkeenintereston
checkingexternalcorrosion,internalcorrosion,and3rdpartydamages[4].CO2,H2S,
andSRBarekeyinternalcorrosionagentsandthuswerebeproperlymonitoredthrough
theplantoensurereliabilityandavailabilityofthepipelinesystem.Pigging,CPinstallation
andupgrade,inhibition,andothercorrosioncontrolactivitiesareincludedinplan[3,4].
iv.TheIntegrityVerificationPlan(Table4)consideredafiveyearreviewperiodforthe
system(20052009).TheTechnicalIntegrityIndicatorsandPerformanceIndicators
(PI)forthevariousactivitieswerecalculatedandrecordedtoindicatetheintegrity
statusofthepipelineandthedegreeofexecutionofthepreparedMRP.Theoverall
integrityofthepipelineindicatesthatitisstillfitforpurposeatitsderatedoperating
pressureof400psi.
v.TheperformanceMeasurementPlan(Table5)showsa5yearplanwhichcouldleadto
verifiabledeductionsthatPIMSleadstoimprovedmonitoringandmanagementofthe
systemsfailuresandrepairs.Thereismarkedreductioninfailurerates,leaks,and
volumeoffluidspilledandsubsequentlythetotalnumberofrepairsbutanincreasein
thepercentageofplannedofplannedactivitiescompletedaswellasactionthatimpacted
safetyastheyearprogressed.
3.Results
ThesummaryoftherecordedeffectofPIMSisshowninthetablebelow:
Year
IndicesforEvaluation
200020052006200720082009
VolumeofFluidSpilled(Barrels)400024001100600400100
RepairActionsduetoDirect
376542
AssessmentResults
LeaksduetoPipelineFailures
421111
(willfuldamagenotincluded)
ActionsCompletedwhichImpact
14691012
onSafety
AnomaliesFoundRequiring
1287654
Mitigations
4.Conclusions
Thecurrentcontinuousandsustainedincreaseinthepriceofsteelhasplacedthecost
ofsteelpipesininternationalmarketsinacontinuoushikeandthusthereasonforseries
ofcostreviewsinmostrecentpipelineprojects.Theavailabilityandreliabilityofpipelines
foroperationsarethreatenedbypipelinefailures.Environmentaldegradationduetospills
fromlinefailureshasalsocreatedaregulatorydemandfornewandoperatingpipeline
systemstobeappropriatelymonitored.Theseareobviousreasonswhygenerationand
implementationofPipelineIntegrityManagementSystemforoilandgaspipelinesis
necessary.
ThisresearchworkgeneratedPipelineIntegrityManagementSystemsforSystemA,
anoperatingpipelinesystem.TheeffectivenessofPIMSwasmonitoredoverfiveyears
periodusingtheinformationfromtheoperatingSystemAwhoseoperatorhasbeentaking
someactionsconsideredcomponentsofPIMSinthelastsixyearstoensurereliability
andavailabilityofthepipeline.EvaluationoftheresultsgeneratedfromthePIMSforthe
operatingpipelinesystemusingthereviewperiodindicatedimprovementonthethreat
situationandfailuresobservedastheyearsprogressed.Thiscorrespondstodecreasein
anomaliesrequiringrepairsnotmindingthatthepipelinesystemisalreadypastitsdesign
life.ItisanindicationofhowimportantPIMSistothelifeofanoperatingpipeline.Inall,
PIMShasbeenfoundtobeeffectivetoolforresourcesallocationintheprevention,detection,
andmitigationactivitiesthatwillleadtoimprovedsafetyandreductioninthenumberof
incidentsonpipelinesystems.
References
[1]Pittalwala,S.HandWittas,D.J(2006)SystemandMethodforPipelineReliability
ManagementPatentNo:US7,043,373B2.
[2]ASMEB31.8s(2001).ManagingSystemIntegrityofGasPipelinesSupplementto
ASMEB31.8.
[3]MobilProducingNigeriaUnlimited(2008):PresentationtoDepartmentofPetroleum
Resources(DPR)onCriticalCrudePipelineSegmentsReplacement.
[4]ShellPetroleumDevelopmentCompanyofNigeriaLimited(2006):APresentationto
theDepartmentofPetroleumResourcesonPIMSEngagement.
[5]APIRecommendedPractice1160:ManagingSystemIntegrityforHazardousLiquid
PipelinesFirstEdition(August2001).
APPENDIXA
Table1SegmentDataforSystemA
SegmentDataType
PipeGradeAPI5LX60
NominalDiameter42
WallThickness12.7mm
PipeAttributes
ManufacturerN/A
DateofManufactureN/A
SeamTypeSpiralWelded
OperatingPressure280psi
DesignPressure720psi
CoatingTypeCoalTar/Cement
CoatingConditionGood
Design/Construction
PipelineCommissionDate1971
JoiningMethodElectricArcProcess
MediumTypeOffshore
HydrostaticTest890psi
DesignTemperature080oC
ProcessFluidTemperature25oC
o
CrudeQualityAPI=36.8
FlowRate550KBPD
Operation
PlannedRepairMethodReplacement
Leak/RuptureHistory3rdPartyDamage/Corrosion
CathodicProtectionSacrificialAnode
SCCIndicationsYes
Table2IntegrityAssessmentPlan
Criteria/RiskIntegrityMitigationInterval
Threat
AssessmentAssessment
Conduct
Replace/Repair
hydrostatic
Someexternallocationswhere
ExternalCorrosiontestorperform10Years
corrosionobservedCFPisbelow
Direct
1.25xMAOP.
Assessment
InternalcorrosionisConductinline
InternalCorrosiondo5Years
suspectedinspection
PotentialconcernforConductReplace/Repair
FatigueCrackingfatiguecrackingofhydrostaticpipeatfailure10Years
spiralweldpipetestlocations
NoManufacturing
ManufacturingdodoN/A
issues
NoConstruction/
Construction/FabricationNoneRequiredN/AN/A
Fabricationissues
EquipmentNoEquipmentissuesdododo
Conduct
hydrostatic
Afterevery
test,performReplace/Repair
3rdpartydamageisrepair/replace
ThirdPartyDamageILIandpipeatfailure
observementdue3rd
observelocations
damage
repaired
locations
Noincorrect
IncorrectOperationsNonerequiredN/AN/A
operationissues
Weather&OutsideNoWeather/Outside
dododo
ForceForceissues
Table3MaintenanceReferencePlan
LineSystemAExportPipeline
PacerIDSYSA003Dia()42
ServiceOilInstallationDate1971
EnvironmentOffshoreMRPReviewDate
FailureModeandEffectAnalysis
FailureModeLOOCOFRemarks
ExternalCorrosionM5
LineBlockage(Sand)L4
LineBlockage(Scale)L4
3rdPartyDamagesM5
InternalCorrosionH5
LinePiggability(Y/N)YesLastIP(2005)NextIP(2010)
NoLastUT()NextUT()
MRPActivities
NoActivityTitleFrequencyComment
001OffshoreCPPotentialprofileandSixMonthlyReplacemissing/faulty
anodeconditionsurveyanodes
002OffshoreCPshoreapproachdo
survey
003OffshorerisersCPsurveydo
004OffshorerisercoatingsurveyAnnually
005Offshorelinepositionsurveydo
006Nonsupportedspansurvey5Yearly
007RoutinepiggingMonthlyDebris>0.5kg;Mechanical
descalingbeforeIP.
008NonroutinepiggingAsRequired
009ThirdpartydamageMonthly
010H2SMonitoring(MIC)SixMonthlyH2SandpHMeasurement
011BiocideTreatment&BacteriadoCheckeffectivenessonSRB
Count
012WaterChemistrySixMonthly
013CO2corrosionratepredictiondo
014OxygenIngressControlAsRequired
015AcidCorrosionControldopHcheck
016H2SMonitoring(SourService)SixMonthly
017Impingement/ErosionMonitoringAsRequired
018IntelligentPigging5Yearly
019ROWSurveillance&MaintenanceQuarterly
020ValveMaintenanceAnnually
021Inspectionofoffshoremanifoldsdo
andpiping
022CPSystemUpgradedoFollowtherecommendation
ofCPSystemAudit
023PipelineequipmentconditionAnnually
surveymaintenance
024OperationalControlAsRequired
025Manifoldpainting5Yearly
026CorrosionInhibitionAsRequired
027CorrosionMonitoringSixMonthly
028ProtectionofMothballedpipelinesdo
029CPSystemAuditdo
Table4IntegrityVerificationPlan
Line42SystemAExportPipelineWallThickness(mm)12.7
0
PacerIDSYSB03CoatingCoalTar/ConcreteDiameter()42
ServiceOilLength35.00CommissioningYear1971
(Km)
EnvironmenOffshoreGradeAPI5LX60ReviewerSN
t
ThirdPartyTechnicalIntegrityIndicatorPIComments
PeriodSabotageMech.
Damage
09/044170%
08/05
09/053160%
08/06
09/062050%
08/07
09/072160%
08/08
09/082160%
08/09
InternalTechnicalIntegrityIndicatorLastIP2005Comments
CorrosionYearRepairsMRPYes/NoPI
20053CO2Meas.Y100%
20062H2OChemN0%
20072H2SCheckY50%
20081pHCheckY60%
20091BiocideY75%
Treatment
BacteriaY50%
Count
SamplingY100%
InhibitionY75%
ExternalTechnicalIntegrityIndicatorComments
CorrosionYearRepairsMRPTIIPI
20050CPmain75%
stations
20062Testpost100%
checks
20070CIPS50%
20081CPAudit50%
20091Riser75%
Survey
Coating100%
Survey
FailureofAncillaryEquipmentOperationalError
Duringperiodofreviewfour(4)None
ancillaryequipmentfailures
occurred
OverallIntegrityStatus
Thepipelinewhichhasbeenderatedto400psiisstillfitforpurpose.
Table5OverallPerformanceMeasurementPlan
S/Description20052006200720082009
N
1KmofpipelineinspectedVsIntegrity40%50%70%80%85%
ManagementProgramrequirement
2IntegrityManagementProgramChanges85321
requestedbyauthorities
3Percentageofplannedactivities40%55%70%75%80%
completed
4Fractionofthesystemincludedin0.40.50.70.80.85
IntegrityManagementProgram
5Actionscompletedthatimpactsafety4691012
6Anomaliesfoundrequiringrepairs/87654
mitigation
7Externalcorrosionleaks20100
8Internalcorrosionleaks32210
9Leaksduetoequipmentfailures21111
10Leaksduetothirdpartydamage34422
11Leaksduetomanufacturingdefects00000
12Leaksduetoconstructiondefects00000
13InserviceLeaksduetostresscorrosion10000
cracking
14RepairactionstakenduetoInLine00000
Inspectionresults
15Repairactionstakenduetodirect76542
assessmentresults
16Hydrostatictestfailurescausedby01000
externalcorrosion
17Hydrostatictestfailurescausedby32210
internalcorrosion
18Hydrostatictestfailuresdueto00000
manufacturingdefects
193rdPartydamageeventsdetected32423
20Unauthorizedcrossings20010
21Precursoreventsdetected12334
22ROWencroachmentsdetected12232
23Reratingofpipelines01000
24Segmentswithdeeperpittingthan00000
before
25Volumeoffluidspilled2,4001,100600400100
APPENDIXB
RiskMatrixforPipelineSystems
CONSEQUENCESINCREASINGLIKELIHOOD
ABCDE
Environment
Reputation
Severity
IncidentHappens
NeverHappens
People
Assets
Heardofhasseveral
heardofsomany
inoccurretimesper
intimesa
thedinouryearin
theyearina
industrycompanour
industrylocation
ycompany
Nohealth
No
0effect/Noeffect
damageNoimpact
injury
Slight
healthSlightSlightSlight
1
effect/damageeffectimpact
injury
Minor
healthMinorMinorLimitedLow
2
effect/damageeffectimpactRisk
injury
Major
Localise
healthLocalisedConsiderablMedium
3d
effect/effecteimpactRisk
damage
injury
PTDor1
MajorMajorNational
4to3
damageeffectimpact
fatalities
Extensiv
MultipleMassiveInternation
5eHighRisk
fatalitieseffectalimpact
damage
Note:TheRiskMatrixhasthree(3)riskclasses:Low(L),Medium(M),andHigh(H).
TheLikelihoodofOccurrence(LOO)usesthese3classesofrisks.
OilandGasPipelineFailureHazardMitigationPlan
http://gbra.org/documents/hazardmitigation/update/Section15PipelineFailure.pdfDecember07,2014
LocationofOilandGasPipelinesintheGBRABasin...apipelinefailure,itisvaluabletoconsidertheseeventsaspresentingarangein...
OILANDGAS
PIPELINEFAILURE
HazardDescription.................................................................................................................................
.......1
Location...........................................................................................................................................
..............1
Extent.............................................................................................................................................
.............11
HistoricalOccurrences.............................................................................................................................
...11
ProbabilityofFutureOccurrences..............................................................................................................16
ImpactandVulnerability...........................................................................................................................
..16
HazardDescription
Fuelpipelinebreachorpipelinefailureaddressestherare,butserioushazardofanoilornaturalgas
pipeline.Anestimated2.2millionmilesofpipelinesintheUnitedStatescarryhazardousmaterials.
Naturalgaspipelinestransportnaturalgas,andoilorliquidpetroleumpipelinestransportcrudeoiland
refinedproductsfromcrudeoils,suchasgasoline,homeheatingoil,jetfuelandkeroseneinadditionto
liquefiedpropane,ethylene,butane
andsomepetrochemicalproducts.
Sometimesoilpipelinesarealsoused
totransportliquefiedgases,suchas
carbondioxide.
Pipelinefailureisarareoccurrence,
buthasthepotentialtocause
extensivepropertydamageandlossof
life.Pipelineshavecausedfiresand
explosionsthatkilledmorethan200
peopleandinjuredmorethan1,000
peoplenationwideand50peoplein
Texasinthelastdecade.
Location
Figures151onthefollowingpageshowsthelocationsofgasandoilpipelinesthroughouttheGBRA
Basinregion.Figures152through159showlocationsofpipelinesineachrespectivecounty.Itis
importanttonotethatduetoscale,somepipelinescannotbeseenonmapswhereonepipelineruns
directlyoveranotherorwherepipelinesappeartooclosetogethertobevisibleonthemap.
HAZARDMITIGATIONPLANUPDATE:PROTECTINGTHEREGIONAGAINSTALLHAZARDS
SECTION15:PIPELINEFAILURE
Ifanyoftheseenergypipelinesweretorupture,suchaneventcouldendangerpropertyandlivesinthe
immediatearea.Immediateimpactscanoccurwithinahalfmileareaandsecondaryimpactswithina
mileoftheincident.Therefore,duetothelocationofbothoilandgaspipelinesinthecounty,each
participatingjurisdictionfacesamoderatetohighrisk,withtheexceptionofJamaicaBeach.
Figure151.LocationofOilandGasPipelinesintheGBRABasin
GasandOilPipelinesinGBRABasin
HazardMitigationPlanUpdate|201120162
Figure152.GasandOilPipelinesinCaldwell
County
Figure153.GasandOilPipelinesinCalhoun
County
Figure154.GasandOilPipelinesinDeWitt
County
Figure155.GasandOilPipelinesinGonzalesCounty
Figure156.GasandOilPipelinesinKendallCounty
Figure157.GasandOilPipelinesinRefugioCounty
Figure158.GasandOilPipelinesinVictoria
County
Figure159.GasandOilPipelinesinCibolo(inGuadalupeCounty)
Extent
WhilemanyofthehistoricalaccidentspresentedinTable151arerelativelysmallintermsofthe
amountofpropertydamagethatwasreported,andwhilesomemaynotmeettheconventionalideaof
apipelinefailure,itisvaluabletoconsidertheseeventsaspresentingarangeinmagnitudeofa
possibleoccurrence.ReadingTable151inconjunctionwiththeFigures151through159providesan
indicationofthepossibleintensityofanevent.Inadditionhistoricaloccurrencesprovideanindication
ofthetypesofissuesrelatedtogasandoilpresentintheGBRABasinandthepreventablenatureof
manyoftheseoccurrences.Forexample,inTable152,severaloftheincidentsreportedtotheRailroad
CommissionofTexaswereofunknownorigin,theresultofdrivershittingpresumablyunprotected
facilitieswiththeirvehicles.Severalincidentsappearedtobetheresultofmiscommunicationorlackof
communicationregardinglocatespriortodigging.Maintenanceandpossiblyhomeownereducation
couldhavebeenacontributingfactorintwooftheevents.
HistoricalOccurrences
Thecausesofpipelinefailurescanrangefrominternalissuessuchascorrosionormaterialdefectsto
outsideforces.Suchforcescanincludedamagefromnaturalhazards,suchasearthquakes,or
intentionaldestructionbyhumans.Table151summarizestheincidentlogofhistoricalpipeline
accidentsreportedbytheRailroadCommissionofTexas.Table152illustratespipelineaccidentsthat
transpiredbetween2003and2008.

Table151.HistoricalPipelineAccidents(GasandOilCombined)(19852001)
4
Annualized
NumberofEvents
3
ExpectedNumberof
PipelineEvents=
2
1.571429
1
0
198519871989199119931995199719992001
Year
Table152HistoricalPipelineAccidents1(GasandOilCombined)(20032008)2
INCIDENT3
COUNTYTYPEOPERATORDEATHSINJURIESCOSTNEARESTCITY
DATE
CALDWELL07/01/05GASTEXASGASSERVICE00>$5,000LOCKHART
CALDWELL03/09/06LPGL&LTRANSPORT10>$5,000LOCKHART
CALDWELL06/12/06LIQUIDTEPPCOCRUDEPIPELINE,LP00UNKNOWNLULING
CALDWELL06/18/06OGUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNSTAIRTOWN
CALDWELL03/31/07OGUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNLOCKHART
CALDWELL08/28/08GASUNKNOWN00>$50,000PRAIRIELEA
CALDWELL12/08/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNLULING
CALDWELL07/06/09OGUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNLOCKHART
CALDWELL01/02/10OGUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNLULING
MATAGORDA
CALHOUN09/01/03GASLAVACAPIPELINECOMPANY00<$5,000
ISLAND
CALHOUN10/20/03LIQUIDVINTAGEPETROLEUM00$10,000SEADRIFT
CALHOUN10/23/03GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000PORTLAVACA
ATMOSENERGYCORP.,PORT
CALHOUN12/15/03GAS00>$5,000
MIDTEXDIVISIONO'CONNER
CALHOUN03/07/04GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00$20,000OFFSHORE
PORT
CALHOUN04/08/04GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00$12,000
O'CONNOR
PORT
O'CONNER
CALHOUN01/20/05GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00<$5,000MATAGORDA
PORT
O'CONNER
CALHOUN03/07/05LIQUIDNEUMINPRODUCTION00<$50,000SEADRIFT
CALHOUN04/04/05GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX01UNKNOWNSEADRIFT
CALHOUN04/27/05GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00$18,000ROCKPORT
1
Source:TexasRailroadCommission
2
LimitationsofthedatausedtopopulateTable152includethefollowing:morethan25percentoftheentriesdo
notprovideanoperatorname,35percentoftheentriesdonotshowacostfortherelease,twoincidentsare
undated,andthedatarangecoversonlyeightyears(20032010).Allentriesareshowninchronologicalorderby
county.LPGstandsforliquefiedpetroleumgas.
3
OGstandsforoilandgas.
INCIDENT
COUNTYTYPE3OPERATORDEATHSINJURIESCOSTNEARESTCITY
DATE
PORT
CALHOUN08/04/05GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00>$5,000
O'CONNOR
POINT
CALHOUN10/19/05GASLAVACAPIPELINE00$34,700
COMFORT
CALHOUN12/29/05GASVINTAGEPETROLEUM00<$5,000SEADRIFT
CALHOUN02/08/06LIQUIDSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00>$50,000ROCKPORT
CALHOUN04/02/06GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00>$50,000UNKNOWN
CALHOUN04/22/06GASVINTAGEPETROLEUM00>$5,000PORTLAVACA
>$5,000,BUT
CALHOUN05/05/06GASVINTAGEPETROLEUM00SEADRIFT
<$50,000
MAGNOLIA
CALHOUN07/29/06GASLAVACAPIPELINE00<$5,000
BEACH
CALHOUN08/06/06GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000SEADRIFT
CALHOUN10/24/06GASLAVACAPIPELINECOMPANY00<$50,000PORTLAVACA
>$5,000,
PORT
CALHOUN11/08/06GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00POSSIBLY
O'CONNER
>$50,000
CALHOUN12/20/06OGAROCTEXAS,INC.00UNKNOWNUNKNOWN
POINT
CALHOUN03/05/07GASLAVACAPIPELINECOMPANY00<$5,000
COMFORT
>$5,000BUTPORT
CALHOUN03/13/07GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00
<$50,000OCONNOR
$177,100FORPORT
CALHOUN05/13/07GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00
30DAYSO'CONNER
CALHOUN06/18/07GASSABCOOPERATINGCOMPANY00>$5,000UNKNOWN
CALHOUN09/13/07GASMAINENERGY00$9,000PORTLAVACA
CALHOUN12/15/07GASLAMAROIL&GAS00<$50,000SEADRIFT
CALHOUN02/13/08GASUNKNOWN00<$5,000PORTLAVACA
SANANTONIO
CALHOUN03/12/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00<$50,000
BAY
POINT
CALHOUN04/05/08OGUNKNOWN00UNKNOWN
COMFORT
POINT
CALHOUN09/22/08GASUNKNOWN00<$50,000
COMFORT
CALHOUN09/26/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNSEADRIFT
POINT
COMFORT
POINT
CALHOUN12/17/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWN
COMFORT
CALHOUN01/02/09GASUNKNOWN00<$50,000PORT
INCIDENT
DATE
OCONNOR
PORT
OCONNOR
POINT
CALHOUN05/28/09GASUNKNOWN00UNKNOWN
COMFORT
CALHOUN07/22/09GASUNKNOWN00<$50,000PORTLAVACA
POINT
CALHOUN09/13/09GASUNKNOWN00<$5,000
COMFORT
DEWITT04/10/06GASTEXASGASSERVICE00<$5,000CITYOFCUERO
DEWITT06/11/06GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX02UNKNOWNYORKTOWN
DEWITT07/20/06OGROCKOIL00UNKNOWNYORKTOWN
DEWITT03/30/07OGUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNNORDHEIM
>$5,000BUT
DEWITT05/21/07GASENTERPRISEPRODUCTSOPERATING00HOPE
<$50,000
DEWITT03/04/09LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
GONZALES12/22/03GASTEXASGASSERVICE00<$10,000NIXON
DUKEENERGYGUADALUPE
GONZALES06/20/04GAS00$24,000SEGUIN
PIPELINE,INC.
GONZALES12/13/05GASCITGOPRODUCTSPIPELINE00$0GONZALES
GONZALES01/15/06LPGLOGISTICSEXPRESS,INC.02>$5,000WAELDER
GONZALES09/28/06LIQUIDCITGOPRODUCTSPIPELINE00UNKNOWNLULING
GONZALES09/18/07LIQUIDCITGOPRODUCTSPIPELINE00UNKNOWNGONZALES
GONZALES11/29/07LPGPETRON,LLC00UNKNOWNGONZALES
GONZALES12/20/07LIQUIDCITGOPIPELINE00UNKNOWNGONZALES
GONZALES09/12/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNLULING
GUADALUPE01/08/04GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000MARION
GUADALUPE03/30/04LIQUIDEXXONMOBILPIPELINE00$20,000MCQUEENEY
GUADALUPE12/03/04GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000MARION
GUADALUPE04/26/05GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000SCHERTZ
GUADALUPE06/05/06GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000SEGUIN
GUADALUPE09/19/06GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000SCHERTZ
GUADALUPE03/08/07LPGMARSHALLPROPANE00>$5,000SEGUIN
GUADALUPE04/20/07GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00>$5,000SEGUIN
GUADALUPE06/26/07LIQUIDCITGO00DRILLKINGSBURY
GUADALUPE06/08/09LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNSANANTONIO
KENDALL02/21/10GASUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNBOERNE
INCIDENT
DATE
LAVACAUNKNOWNGASUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNUNKNOWN
LAVACA10/04/07LPGPETRON,LLC01UNKNOWNHALLETTSVILLE
LAVACA01/03/05GASHOUSTONPIPELINECOMPANY00>$5,000HALLETTSVILLE
REFUGIO07/29/04GASKINDERMORGAN00<$5,000REFUGIO
REFUGIO10/23/04LIQUIDKOCHPIPELINECO00>$50,000REFUGIO
REFUGIO02/21/05LIQUIDKOCHPIPELINECOMPANY,LP00UNKNOWNTIVOLI
REFUGIO05/17/05LIQUIDEXXONMOBILPIPELINECOMPANY00$0TIVOLI
REFUGIO08/12/05LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNREFUGIO
REFUGIO09/24/06GASNORTHERNNATURALGAS00UNKNOWNTIVOLI
REFUGIO04/14/07LIQUIDENTERPRISEPRODUCTS00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
NORTHERNNATURALGAS
REFUGIO08/10/07GAS00UNKNOWNTIVOLI
COMPANY
REFUGIO07/19/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00<$50,000REFUGIO
REFUGIO06/02/09LIQUIDUNKNOWN00$5,000,000,000REFUGIO
REFUGIO11/13/09LIQUIDUNKNOWN00<$50,000REFUGIO
VICTORIAUNKNOWNGASCROSSTEXENERGY00$20,000BLOOMINGTON
VICTORIA10/25/04GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
VICTORIA03/10/05GASENTERPRISEPRODUCTSOPERATING00<$5,000NURSERY
VICTORIA03/13/05GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000VICTORIA
VICTORIA03/17/05LIQUIDCITGOPIPELINE00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
VICTORIA01/16/06GASVICTORIAFIREDEPARTMENT00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
VICTORIA05/04/06GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00<$5,000VICTORIA
D&SLEASESERVICE(HART
VICTORIA07/02/06OG00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
PETOLEUMLEASE)
VICTORIA01/27/07GASFUTUREGAS00UNKNOWNMCFADDIN
VICTORIA03/13/07LIQUIDCITGOPRODUCTSPIPELINE00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
VICTORIA09/11/07GASCROSSTEXENERGY00UNKNOWNMCFADDIN
VICTORIA02/01/08GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00>$50,000VICTORIA
VICTORIA04/02/08GASUNKNOWN00<$5,000VICTORIA
VICTORIA06/04/08GASUNKNOWN00<$50,000VICTORIA
VICTORIA06/24/08LIQUIDUNKNOWN00UNKNOWNVICTORIA
WILSON02/09/07GASCENTERPOINTENERGYENTEX00$0FLORESVILLE
WILSON12/05/07LPGMARSHALLPROPANE06>$5,000NIXON
ProbabilityofFutureOccurrences
Basedonthepreviousincidentdataandlocationofpipelinesthroughouttheregion,thepossibilityofa
futureoccurrenceislikely,meaningthataneventcouldoccurinthenextthreeyears.
ImpactandVulnerability
Pipelinefailurecanhaveasubstantialimpact.Sucheventscancausemultipledeaths,completelyshut
downfacilitiesforthirtydaysormore,andcausemorethanfiftypercentofaffectedpropertiestobe
destroyedorsuffermajordamage.
Table153andTable154arebasedondatafromtheTexasRailroadCommissionandshowthetotal
numberofpeopleandbuildingsexposedtogasandoilpipelineruptures,respectively.Theanalysisfor
gaspipelinesconsistsofliquidpetroleumgas(LPG)andnaturalgas(NG).Theanalysisforoilpipelines
consistsofcrudeoil(CRD)andnaturalgasliquids(NGL).Theimmediate(primary)areaofimpactfor
bothtypesofpipelineaccidentsisa500meterbuffer.Thesecondaryareaofimpactforbothtypesof
pipelineaccidentsisa2,500meterbuffer.
Table153.PotentialImpactDuetoGasPipelinesbyJurisdiction
TOTALTOTALIMMEDIATEIMPACTSECONDARYIMPACT
POPULABUILD(500METERS)(2,500METERS)
JURISDICTIONTIONININGSINNumberNumberNumberNumber
ValueofBuildingsValueofBuildings
JURISDICJURISPeopleBuildingsPeopleBuildings
Exposed($)Exposed($)
TIONDICTIONExposedExposedExposedExposed
CaldwellCo.14,6616,4624,9442,275$220,481,0008,8713,998$386,230,000
Lockhart11,5914,2174,4841,239$209,500,00011,0814,010$599,465,000
Luling5,0252,5843,5491,715$183,244,0005,0252,584$264,373,000
Martindale917424Negligible0NegligibleNegligible14$4,849,000
CalhounCo.8,5416,4634,0922,940$409,521,0005,9155,899$696,161,000
PointComfort781477581381$108,781,000781477$121,298,000
PortLavaca12,0355,489762334$34,746,0009,4733,990$490,796,000
Seadrift1,3501,069Negligible27$3,781,0001,214839$57,555,000
DeWittCo.8,8055,4176,3332,777$351,817,0009,1724,303$523,970,000
Cuero6,5443,8242,465478$108,074,0008,2463,705$445,559,000
Nordheim323266274150$19,004,000473266$35,517,000
Yoakum5,7293,306911518$48,119,0005,6893,275$368,441,000
Yorktown2,2041,568935507$47,553,0002,6981,568$150,778,000
GonzalesCo.8,3435,6192,3531,538$114,617,0003,9102,565$189,584,000
TOTALTOTALIMMEDIATEIMPACT
SECONDARYIMPACT
POPULABUILD(500METERS)
(2,500METERS)
JURISDICTIONTIONININGSINNumberNumberNumberNumber
ValueofBuildings
ValueofBuildings
JURISDICJURISPeopleBuildingsPeopleBuildings
Exposed($)
Exposed($)
TIONDICTIONExposedExposedExposedExposed
Gonzales7,1603,6361,478700$84,260,0007,1013,596
$397,921,000
Nixon2,1781,326Negligible0Negligible2,1781,326
$94,690,000
Waelder947572Negligible0Negligible395249
$16,926,000
Cibolo(Guadalupe
3,0351,3381,926734$151,541,0003,0351,338
$221,273,000
County)
KendallCo.17,6188,1894,7212,036$355,143,00010,1684,496
$675,621,000
Boerne6,1253,016Negligible0Negligible297161
$36,763,000
RefugioCo.2,6701,3602,1951,098$126,752,0002,6671,349
$148,189,000
Austwell192176Negligible0Negligible192176
$28,397,000
Bayside360304Negligible0Negligible360304
$26,026,000
Refugio2,9201,8052,2541,328$138,391,0002,9201,805
$186,843,000
Woodsboro1,683837Negligible17$1,480,0001,686837
$78,606,000
VictoriaCo.23,4829,69920,1488,307$1,018,746,00023,4079,671
$1,171,269,000
Victoria60,60624,41228,68510,803$1,792,231,00058,58523,357
$3,793,993,000
4
TOTALS213,765103,85593,14439,902$5,527,782,000185,54886,158
$11,211,093,000
4
Totalsforthestudyareamayincludevalueslessthan$5,000fordollaramountsandlessthan50forpopulations
thatareclassifiedasNegligibleinthetable.
17
Table154.PotentialImpactDuetoOilPipelinesbyJurisdiction
TOTALIMMEDIATEIMPACT
SECONDARYIMPACT
TOTAL
POPULA(500METERS)
(2,500METERS)
BUILDINGS
JURISDICTIONTIONINNumberNumberValueofNumberNumber
Valueof
INJURIS
JURISPeopleBuildingsBuildingsPeopleBuildings
Buildings
DICTION
DICTIONExposedExposedExposedExposedExposed
Exposed
CaldwellCo.14,6616,4625,1082,219$207,861,0008,0973,513
$330,166,000
Lockhart11,5914,217Negligible14$1,174,000676263
$39,810,000
Luling5,0252,5842,7071,397$151,366,0005,0252,584
$264,373,000
Martindale917424917424$40,522,000917424
$40,522,000
CalhounCo.8,5416,4631,718915$153,075,0004,1353,853
$486,934,000
PointComfort781477596387$110,085,000362233
$85,232,000
PortLavaca12,0355,4892,6121,243$180,751,00010,6184,633
$552,209,000
Seadrift1,3501,0696956$6,259,0001,4771,024
$67,812,000
DeWittCo.8,8055,417Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
Cuero6,5443,824Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
Nordheim323266Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
Yoakum5,7293,306Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
Yorktown2,2041,568Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
GonzalesCo.8,3435,6191,8681,040$111,340,0003,4602,242
$194,858,000
Gonzales7,1603,6367,1603,636$401,785,0007,1603,636
$401,785,000
Nixon2,1781,326Negligible0Negligible1,8211,157
$75,870,000
Waelder947572947572$37,972,000947572
$37,972,000
Cibolo
(Guadalupe3,0351,338Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
County)
KendallCo.17,6188,189Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
Boerne6,1253,016Negligible0NegligibleNegligible
0Negligible
RefugioCo.2,6701,3601,220649$74,514,0002,0681,065
$113,495,000
Austwell192176192176$28,397,000192176
$28,397,000
Bayside360304Negligible27$3,216,000279240
$20,668,000
Refugio2,9201,805126108$7,564,0001,9571,296
$127,492,000
Woodsboro1,683837461211$18,121,0001,686837
$78,606,000
VictoriaCo.23,4829,6994,8412,024$194,184,0008,8283,655
$392,540,000
Victoria60,60624,412Negligible0Negligible2,8671,116
$106,593,000
5
TOTALS213,765103,85532,75116,424$1,822,876,00062,57232,519
$3,445,334,000
5
Totalsforthestudyareamayincludevalueslessthan$5,000fordollaramountsandlessthan50forpopulations
(whereapplicable)thatareclassifiedasNegligibleinthetable.
18
Wikipedia,thefreeencyclopedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_pipelineDecember07,2014
...oftheproductsbasedonprecalculatedabsorptionrates....Oilandgaspipelinesalsofigureprominentlyinthe...6Bcrudeoilpipelinefailurein...
Pipelinetransportisthetransportationofgoodsthroughapipe.Liquidsandgasesaretransportedinpipelinesandanychemicallystablesubstance
canbesentthroughapipeline.[citationneeded]Pipelinesexistforthetransportofcrudeandrefinedpetroleum,fuelssuchasoil,naturalgasand
biofuelsandotherfluidsincludingsewage,slurry,water,andbeer.Pipelinesareusefulfortransportingwaterfordrinkingorirrigationoverlong
distanceswhenitneedstomoveoverhills,orwherecanalsorchannelsarepoorchoicesduetoconsiderationsofevaporation,pollution,or
environmentalimpact.Pneumatictubesusingcompressedaircanbeusedtotransportsolidcapsules.
Oilpipelinesaremadefromsteelorplastictubeswhichareusuallyburied.Theoilismovedthroughthepipelinesbypumpstationsalongthe
pipeline.Naturalgas(andsimilargaseousfuels)arelightlypressurisedintoliquidsknowsasNaturalGasLiquids(NGLs).Naturalgaspipelinesare
constructedofcarbonsteel.Highlytoxicammoniaistheoreticallythemostdangeroussubstancetobetransportedthroughlongdistancepipelines,
butaccidentshavebeenrare.Hydrogenpipelinetransportisthetransportationofhydrogenthroughapipe.Districtheatingorteleheatingsystems
useanetworkofinsulatedpipeswhichtransportheatedwater,pressurizedhotwaterorsometimessteamtothecustomer.
Pipelinesconveyingflammableorexplosivematerial,suchasnaturalgasoroil,posespecialsafetyconcernsandtherehavebeenvariousaccidents.
Pipelinescanbethetargetofvandalism,sabotage,oreventerroristattacks.Inwar,pipelinesareoftenthetargetofmilitaryattacks.
Itisuncertainwhenthefirstcrudeoilpipelinewasbuilt.Creditforthedevelopmentofpipelinetransportisdisputed,withcompetingclaimsfor
VladimirShukhovandtheBranobelcompanyinthelate19thcentury,andtheOilTransportAssociation,whichfirstconstructeda2inch(51mm)
wroughtironpipelineovera6mile(9.7km)trackfromanoilfieldinPennsylvaniatoarailroadstationinOilCreek,inthe1860s.Pipelinesare
generallythemosteconomicalwaytotransportlargequantitiesofoil,refinedoilproductsornaturalgasoverland.
Naturalgas(andsimilargaseousfuels)arelightlypressurizedintoliquidsknowsasNaturalGasLiquids(NGLs).SmallNGLprocessingfacilitiescan
belocatedinoilfieldssothebutaneandpropaneliquidunderlightpressureof125poundspersquareinch(860kPa),canbeshippedbyrail,truckor
pipeline.Propanecanbeusedasafuelinoilfieldstoheatvariousfacilitiesusedbytheoildrillersorequipmentandtrucksusedintheoilpatch.EG:
Propanewillconvertfromagastoaliquidunderlightpressureunder40psi(280kPa),giveortakedependingontemperature,andispumpedinto
carsandtrucksatlessthan125psi(860kPa)atretailstations.Pipelinesandrailcarsuseaboutdoublethatpressuretopumpat250psi(1,700kPa).
ThedistancetoshippropanetomarketsismuchshorterasthousandsofNGLprocessingplantsarelocatedinoilfieldsorclosebywhenanumber
ofpipelinestieintoeachotherfromvariousrelativelyclosefields.ManyBakkenBasinoilcompaniesinNorthDakota,Montana,Manitobaand
SaskatchewangasfieldsseparatetheNGL'sinthefield,allowingthedrillerstosellpropanedirectlytosmallwholesalers,eliminatingthelarge
refinerycontrolofproductandpricesforpropaneorbutane.
ThemostrecentmajorpipelinetostartoperatinginNorthAmerica,isaTransCanadanaturalgaslinegoingnorthacrosstheNiagararegionbridges
withMarcellusshalegasfromPennsylvaniaandotherstiedinmethaneornaturalgassources,intotheCanadianprovinceofOntarioasofthefallof
2012,supplying16percentofallthenaturalgasusedinOntario.
ThisnewUSsuppliednaturalgasdisplacesthenaturalgasformerlyshippedtoOntariofromwesternCanadainAlbertaandManitoba,thusdropping
thegovernmentregulatedpipelineshippingchargesbecauseofthesignificantlyshorterdistancefromgassourcetoconsumer.Comparedtoshipping
byrailroad,pipelineshavelowercostperunitandhighercapacity.Pipelinesarepreferabletotransportationbytruckforanumberofreasons.
Employmentoncompletedpipelinesrepresentsonly"1%ofthatofthetruckingindustry."[1]
ToavoiddelaysandUSgovernmentregulation,manysmall,mediumandlargeoilproducersinNorthDakotahavedecidedtorunanoilpipeline
northtoCanadatomeetupwithaCanadianoilpipelineshippingoilfromwesttoeast.ThisallowstheBakkenBasinandThreeForksoilproducersto
gethighernegotiatedpricesfortheiroilbecausetheywillnotberestrictedtojustonewholesalemarketintheUS.Thedistancefromthebiggestoil
patchinNorthDakota,isWilliston,NorthDakota,onlyabout85milesor137kilometerstotheCanadianborderandManitoba.Mutualfundsandjoint
venturesarebiginvestorsinnewoilandgaspipelines.Inthefallof2012,theUSbeganexportingpropanetoEurope,knownasLPG,aswholesale
pricestherearemuchhigherthaninNorthAmerica.
AsmoreNorthAmericanpipelinesarebuilt,evenmoreexportsofLNG,propane,butane,andothernaturalgasproductswilloccuronallthreeUS
coasts.Togiveinsight,NorthDakota'soilproductionhasgrownto5timesinlate2012comparedtowhatitwasjust6yearsagocreatingthousands
ofgoodpayinglongtermjobs[citationneeded].NorthDakotaoilcompaniesareshippinghugeamountsofoilbytankerrailcarastheycandirectthe
oiltothemarketthatgivesthebestpricebutpipelinesarecheaper.Railcarscanbeusedtoavoidacongestedoilpipelinetogettheoiltoadifferent
pipelineandgettheoiltomarketfasteranddifferentlessbusyoilrefineries.
EnbridgeinCanadaapplyingtoreverseanoilpipelinegoingfromeasttowest(Line9)andexpandingitandusingittoshipwesternCanadian
bitumenoileastward.[2]Fromapresentlyrated250,000barrelsequivalentperdaypipeline,itwillbeexpandedtobetweenonemillionto1.3million
barrelsperday.ItwillbringwesternoiltorefineriesinOntario,Michigan,Ohio,PA,QuebecandNewYorkbyearly2014.NewBrunswickwillalso
refinesomeofthiswesternCanadiancrudeandexportsomecrudeandrefinedoiltoEuropefromitsdeepwateroilULCCloadingport.
Althoughpipelinescanbebuiltunderthesea,thatprocessiseconomicallyandtechnicallydemanding,sothemajorityofoilatseaistransportedby
tankerships.
Themarketsizeforoilandgaspipelineconstructionexperiencedtremendousgrowthpriortotheeconomicdownturnin2008.Theindustrygrewfrom
$23billionin2006to$39billionin2008.[3]Afterfalteringin2009,demandforpipelineexpansionandupdatingincreasedthefollowingyearas
energyproductiongrew.[4]By2012,almost32,000milesofNorthAmericanpipelinewerebeingplannedorunderconstruction.[5]
Oilpipelinesaremadefromsteelorplastictubeswithinnerdiametertypicallyfrom4to48inches(100to1,220mm).Mostpipelinesaretypically
buriedatadepthofabout3to6feet(0.91to1.83m).Toprotectpipesfromimpact,abrasion,andcorrosion,avarietyofmethodsareused.These
canincludewoodlagging(woodslats),concretecoating,rockshield,highdensitypolyethylene,importedsandpadding,andpaddingmachines.[6]
Theoiliskeptinmotionbypumpstationsalongthepipeline,andusuallyflowsatspeedofabout1to6metrespersecond(3.3to19.7ft/s).Multi
productpipelinesareusedtotransporttwoormoredifferentproductsinsequenceinthesamepipeline.Usuallyinmultiproductpipelinesthereisno
physicalseparationbetweenthedifferentproducts.Somemixingofadjacentproductsoccurs,producinginterface,alsoknownintheindustryas
"transmix."Atthereceivingfacilitiesthisinterfaceisusuallyabsorbedinoneoftheproductsbasedonprecalculatedabsorptionrates.Alternately,
transmixmaybedivertedandshippedtofacilitiesforseparationofthecommingledproducts.[7]
Crudeoilcontainsvaryingamountsofparaffinwaxandincolderclimateswaxbuildupmayoccurwithinapipeline.Oftenthesepipelinesare
inspectedandcleanedusingpigging,thepracticeofusingdevicesknownas"pigs"toperformvariousmaintenanceoperationsonapipeline.The
devicesarealsoknownas"scrapers"or"Godevils"."Smartpigs"(alsoknownas"intelligent"or"intelligence"pigs)areusedtodetectanomaliesin
thepipesuchasdents,metallosscausedbycorrosion,crackingorothermechanicaldamage.[8]Thesedevicesarelaunchedfrompiglauncher
stationsandtravelthroughthepipelinetobereceivedatanyotherstationdownstream,eithercleaningwaxdepositsandmaterialthatmayhave
accumulatedinsidethelineorinspectingandrecordingtheconditionoftheline.
Fornaturalgas,pipelinesareconstructedofcarbonsteelandvaryinsizefrom2to60inches(51to1,524mm)indiameter,dependingonthetypeof
pipeline.Thegasispressurizedbycompressorstationsandisodorlessunlessmixedwithamercaptanodorantwhererequiredbyaregulating
authority.
Highlytoxicammoniaistheoreticallythemostdangeroussubstancetobetransportedthroughlongdistancepipelines.[citationneeded]However,
incidentsonammoniatransportinglinesareuncommonunlikeonindustrialammoniaprocessingequipment.[citationneeded]Amajorammonia
pipelineistheUkrainianTransammiaklineconnectingtheTogliattiAzotfacilityinRussiatotheexportingBlackSeaportofOdessa.
PipelineshavebeenusedfortransportationofethanolinBrazil,andthereareseveralethanolpipelineprojectsinBrazilandtheUnitedStates.[9]The
mainproblemsrelatedtothetransportofethanolbypipelineareitscorrosivenatureandtendencytoabsorbwaterandimpuritiesinpipelines,which
arenotproblemswithoilandnaturalgas.[9][10]Insufficientvolumesandcosteffectivenessareotherconsiderationslimitingconstructionofethanol
pipelines.[10][11]
Slurrypipelinesaresometimesusedtotransportcoalororefrommines.Thematerialtobetransportediscloselymixedwithwaterbeforebeing
introducedtothepipelineatthefarend,thematerialmustbedried.Oneexampleisa525kilometre(326mi)slurrypipelinewhichisplannedto
transportironorefromtheMinasRiomine(producing26.5milliontonnesperyear)toaportatAuinBrazil.[12]Anexistingexampleisthe85
kilometre(53mi)SavageRiverSlurrypipelineinTasmania,Australia,possiblytheworld'sfirstwhenitwasbuiltin1967.Itincludesa366metre
(1,201ft)bridgespanat167metres(548ft)abovetheSavageRiver.[13][14]
Hydrogenpipelinetransportisatransportationofhydrogenthroughapipeaspartofthehydrogeninfrastructure.Hydrogenpipelinetransportisused
toconnectthepointofhydrogenproductionordeliveryofhydrogenwiththepointofdemand,withtransportcostssimilartoCNG,[15]thetechnology
isproven.[16]Mosthydrogenisproducedattheplaceofdemandwithevery50to100miles(160km)anindustrialproductionfacility.[17]The1938
RhineRuhr240kilometre(150mi)hydrogenpipelineisstillinoperation.[18]Asof2004,thereare900miles(1,400km)oflowpressurehydrogen
pipelinesintheUSand930miles(1,500km)inEurope.
Twomillenniaago,theancientRomansmadeuseoflargeaqueductstotransportwaterfromhigherelevationsbybuildingtheaqueductsin
graduatedsegmentsthatallowedgravitytopushthewateralonguntilitreacheditsdestination.HundredsofthesewerebuiltthroughoutEuropeand
elsewhere,andalongwithflourmillswereconsideredthelifelineoftheRomanEmpire.TheancientChinesealsomadeuseofchannelsandpipe
systemsforpublicworks.ThefamousHanDynastycourteunuchZhangRang(d.189AD)onceorderedtheengineerBiLantoconstructaseriesof
squarepalletchainpumpsoutsidethecapitalcityofLuoyang.[19]Thesechainpumpsservicedtheimperialpalacesandlivingquartersofthecapital
cityasthewaterliftedbythechainpumpswasbroughtinbyastonewarepipesystem.[19][20]
Pipelinesareusefulfortransportingwaterfordrinkingorirrigationoverlongdistanceswhenitneedstomoveoverhills,orwherecanalsorchannels
arepoorchoicesduetoconsiderationsofevaporation,pollution,orenvironmentalimpact.
The530km(330mi)GoldfieldsWaterSupplySchemeinWesternAustraliausing750mm(30inch)pipeandcompletedin1903wasthelargest
watersupplyschemeofitstime.[21][22]
ExamplesofsignificantwaterpipelinesinSouthAustraliaaretheMorganWhyallapipelne(completed1944)andMannumAdelaide(completed1955)
pipelines,bothpartofthelargerSnowyMountainsscheme.[23]
TherearetwoLosAngeles,Californiaaqueducts,theOwensValleyaqueduct(completed1913)andtheSecondLosAngelesAqueduct(completed
1970)whichalsoincludeextensiveuseofpipelines.
TheGreatManmadeRiverofLibyasupplies3,680,000cubicmetres(4,810,000cuyd)ofwatereachdaytoTripoli,Benghazi,Sirte,andseveralother
citiesinLibya.Thepipelineisover2,800kilometres(1,700mi)long,andisconnectedtowellstappinganaquiferover500metres(1,600ft)
underground.[24]
Districtheatingorteleheatingsystemsconsistofanetworkofinsulatedfeedandreturnpipeswhichtransportheatedwater,pressurizedhotwateror
sometimessteamtothecustomer.Whilesteamishottestandmaybeusedinindustrialprocessesduetoitshighertemperature,itislessefficientto
produceandtransportduetogreaterheatlosses.Heattransferoilsaregenerallynotusedforeconomicandecologicalreasons.Thetypicalannual
lossofthermalenergythroughdistributionisaround10%,asseeninNorway'sdistrictheatingnetwork.[26]
Districtheatingpipelinesarenormallyinstalledunderground,withsomeexceptions.Withinthesystem,heatstoragemaybeinstalledtoevenout
peakloaddemands.Heatistransferredintothecentralheatingofthedwellingsthroughheatexchangersatheatsubstations,withoutmixingofthe
fluidsineithersystem.
BarsintheVeltinsArena,amajorfootballgroundinGelsenkirchen,Germany,areinterconnectedbya5kilometre(3.1mi)longbeerpipeline.In
RanderscityinDenmark,thesocalledThorBeerpipelinewasoperated.Originally,copperpipesrandirectlyfromthebrewery,butwhenthebrewery
movedoutofthecityinthe1990s,ThorBeerreplaceditwithagianttank.
AbeerpipelinehasbeenproposedforconstructioninBruges,Belgiumtoreducetrucktrafficonthecitystreets.[27]
ThevillageofHallstattinAustria,whichisknownforitslonghistoryofsaltmining,claimstocontain"theoldestindustrialpipelineintheworld",dating
backto1595.[28]Itwasconstructedfrom13,000hollowedouttreetrunkstotransportbrine40kilometres(25mi)fromHallstatttoEbensee.[29]
Between1978and1994,a15kmmilkpipelineranbetweentheDutchislandofAmelandandHolwerdonthemainland,ofwhich8kmbeneaththe
WaddenSea.Everyday,30.000litresofmilkproducedontheislandweretransportedtobeprocessedonthemainland.In1994,themilktransport
wasabandoned.[30]
Inplaces,apipelinemayhavetocrosswaterexpanses,suchassmallseas,straitsandrivers.[31]Inmanyinstances,theylieentirelyontheseabed.
Thesepipelinesarereferredtoas"marine"pipelines(also,"submarine"or"offshore"pipelines).Theyareusedprimarilytocarryoilorgas,but
transportationofwaterisalsoimportant.[31]Inoffshoreprojects,adistinctionismadebetweena"flowline"andapipeline.[31][32][33]Theformeris
anintrafieldpipeline,inthesensethatitisusedtoconnectsubseawellheads,manifoldsandtheplatformwithinaparticulardevelopmentfield.The
latter,sometimesreferredtoasan"exportpipeline",isusedtobringtheresourcetoshore.[32]Theconstructionandmaintenanceofmarinepipelines
implylogisticalchallengesthataredifferentfromthoseonland,mainlybecauseofwaveandcurrentdynamics,alongwithothergeohazards.
Ingeneral,pipelinescanbeclassifiedinthreecategoriesdependingonpurpose:
Whenapipelineisbuilt,theconstructionprojectnotonlycoversthecivilengineeringworktolaythepipelineandbuildthepump/compressorstations,
italsohastocoveralltheworkrelatedtotheinstallationofthefielddevicesthatwillsupportremoteoperation.
Thepipelineisroutedalongwhatisknownasa"rightofway".Pipelinesaregenerallydevelopedandbuiltusingthefollowingstages:
Russiahas"PipelineTroops"aspartoftheRearServices,whoaretrainedtobuildandrepairpipelines.RussiaistheonlycountrytohavePipeline
Troops.[35]
Fielddevicesareinstrumentation,datagatheringunitsandcommunicationsystems.ThefieldInstrumentationincludesflow,pressureand
temperaturegauges/transmitters,andotherdevicestomeasuretherelevantdatarequired.Theseinstrumentsareinstalledalongthepipelineon
somespecificlocations,suchasinjectionordeliverystations,pumpstations(liquidpipelines)orcompressorstations(gaspipelines),andblockvalve
stations.
TheinformationmeasuredbythesefieldinstrumentsisthengatheredinlocalRemoteTerminalUnits(RTU)thattransferthefielddatatoacentral
locationinrealtimeusingcommunicationsystems,suchassatellitechannels,microwavelinks,orcellularphoneconnections.
Pipelinesarecontrolledandoperatedremotely,fromwhatisusuallyknownasthe"MainControlRoom".Inthiscenter,allthedatarelatedtofield
measurementisconsolidatedinonecentraldatabase.ThedataisreceivedfrommultipleRTUsalongthepipeline.ItiscommontofindRTUsinstalled
ateverystationalongthepipeline.
TheSCADAsystemattheMainControlRoomreceivesallthefielddataandpresentsittothepipelineoperatorthroughasetofscreensorHuman
MachineInterface,showingtheoperationalconditionsofthepipeline.Theoperatorcanmonitorthehydraulicconditionsoftheline,aswellassend
operationalcommands(open/closevalves,turnon/offcompressorsorpumps,changesetpoints,etc.)throughtheSCADAsystemtothefield.
Tooptimizeandsecuretheoperationoftheseassets,somepipelinecompaniesareusingwhatiscalled"AdvancedPipelineApplications",whichare
softwaretoolsinstalledontopoftheSCADAsystem,thatprovideextendedfunctionalitytoperformleakdetection,leaklocation,batchtracking(liquid
lines),pigtracking,compositiontracking,predictivemodeling,lookaheadmodeling,operatortrainingandmore.
Pipelinenetworksarecomposedofseveralpiecesofequipmentthatoperatetogethertomoveproductsfromlocationtolocation.Themainelements
ofapipelinesystemare:
Sinceoilandgaspipelinesareanimportantassetoftheeconomicdevelopmentofalmostanycountry,ithasbeenrequiredeitherbygovernment
regulationsorinternalpoliciestoensurethesafetyoftheassets,andthepopulationandenvironmentwherethesepipelinesrun.
Pipelinecompaniesfacegovernmentregulation,environmentalconstraintsandsocialsituations.Governmentregulationsmaydefineminimumstaff
toruntheoperation,operatortrainingrequirementspipelinefacilities,technologyandapplicationsrequiredtoensureoperationalsafety.For
example,intheStateofWashingtonitismandatoryforpipelineoperatorstobeabletodetectandlocateleaksof8percentofmaximumflowwithin
fifteenminutesorless.Socialfactorsalsoaffecttheoperationofpipelines.Inthirdworldcountries,producttheftisaproblemforpipelinecompanies.
Itiscommontofindunauthorizedextractionsinthemiddleofthepipeline.Inthiscase,thedetectionlevelsshouldbeundertwopercentofmaximum
flow,withahighexpectationforlocationaccuracy.
Varioustechnologiesandstrategieshavebeenimplementedformonitoringpipelines,fromphysicallywalkingthelinestosatellitesurveillance.The
mostcommontechnologytoprotectpipelinesfromoccasionalleaksisComputationalPipelineMonitoringorCPM.CPMtakesinformationfromthe
fieldrelatedtopressures,flows,andtemperaturestoestimatethehydraulicbehavioroftheproductbeingtransported.Oncetheestimationis
completed,theresultsarecomparedtootherfieldreferencestodetectthepresenceofananomalyorunexpectedsituation,whichmayberelatedto
aleak.
TheAmericanPetroleumInstitutehaspublishedseveralarticlesrelatedtotheperformanceofCPMinliquidspipelines,theAPIPublicationsare:
Asarulepipelinesforallusesarelaidinmostcasesunderground.[citationneeded]Howeverinsomecasesitisnecessarytocrossavalleyorariver
onapipelinebridge.Pipelinesforcentralizedheatingsystemsareoftenlaidonthegroundoroverhead.Pipelinesforpetroleumrunningthrough
permafrostareasasTransAlaskaPipelineareoftenrunoverheadinordertoavoidmeltingthefrozengroundbyhotpetroleumwhichwouldresultin
sinkingthepipelineintheground.
Maintenanceofpipelinesincludescheckingcathodicprotectionlevelsfortheproperrange,surveillanceforconstruction,erosion,orleaksbyfoot,
landvehicle,boat,orair,andrunningcleaningpigs,whenthereisanythingcarriedinthepipelinethatiscorrosive.
USpipelinemaintenancerulesarecoveredinCodeofFederalRegulations(CFR)sections,49CFR192fornaturalgaspipelines,and49CFR195for
petroleumliquidpipelines.
IntheUS,onshoreandoffshorepipelinesusedtotransportoilandgasareregulatedbythePipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration
(PHMSA).CertainoffshorepipelinesusedtoproduceoilandgasareregulatedbytheMineralsManagementService(MMS).InCanada,pipelines
areregulatedbyeithertheprovincialregulatorsor,iftheycrossprovincialboundariesortheCanada/USborder,bytheNationalEnergyBoard(NEB).
GovernmentregulationsinCanadaandtheUnitedStatesrequirethatburiedfuelpipelinesmustbeprotectedfromcorrosion.Often,themost
economicalmethodofcorrosioncontrolisbyuseofpipelinecoatinginconjunctionwithcathodicprotectionandtechnologytomonitorthepipeline.
Aboveground,cathodicprotectionisnotanoption.Thecoatingistheonlyexternalprotection.
Pipelinesformajorenergyresources(petroleumandnaturalgas)arenotmerelyanelementoftrade.Theyconnecttoissuesofgeopoliticsand
internationalsecurityaswell,andtheconstruction,placement,andcontrolofoilandgaspipelinesoftenfigureprominentlyinstateinterestsand
actions.Anotableexampleofpipelinepoliticsoccurredatthebeginningoftheyear2009,whereinadisputebetweenRussiaandUkraineostensibly
overpricingledtoamajorpoliticalcrisis.RussianstateownedgascompanyGazpromcutoffnaturalgassuppliestoUkraineaftertalksbetweenit
andtheUkrainiangovernmentfellthrough.InadditiontocuttingoffsuppliestoUkraine,RussiangasflowingthroughUkrainewhichincludednearly
allsuppliestoSoutheasternEuropeandsomesuppliestoCentralandWesternEuropewascutoff,creatingamajorcrisisinseveralcountries
heavilydependentonRussiangasasfuel.Russiawasaccusedofusingthedisputeasleverageinitsattempttokeepotherpowers,andparticularly
theEuropeanUnion,frominterferinginits"nearabroad".
OilandgaspipelinesalsofigureprominentlyinthepoliticsofCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus.
Becausethesolventfractionofdilbittypicallycomprisesvolatilearomaticslikenapthaandbenzene,reasonablyrapidcarriervaporizationcanbe
expectedtofollowanabovegroundspillostensiblyenablingtimelyinterventionbyleavingonlyaviscousresiduethatisslowtomigrate.Effective
protocolstominimizeexposuretopetrochemicalvapoursarewellestablished,andoilspilledfromthepipelinewouldbeunlikelytoreachtheaquifer
unlessincompleteremediationwerefollowedbytheintroductionofanothercarrier(e.g.aseriesoftorrentialdownpours).
TheKeystoneXLextensionisdesignedtobeburiedunderfourfeetofsoil,whichwillhinderpostspillvaporizationofthecarrierfraction.Diluentand
bitumenwillmigrateatdifferentrates,dependingonthetemperatureandcompositionofthesurroundingsoils,butseparationwilltakeplacemore
slowlyasthearomaticsdiffusethroughsedimentratherthanthroughair.
Theintroductionofbenzeneandothervolatileorganiccompounds(collectivelyBTEX)tothesubterraneanenvironmentcompoundsthethreatposed
byapipelineleak.Particularlyiffollowedbyrain,apipelinebreachwouldresultinBTEXdissolutionandequilibrationofbenzeneinwater,followedby
percolationoftheadmixtureintotheaquifer.BenzenecancausemanyhealthproblemsandiscarcinogenicwithEPAMaximumContaminantLevel
(MCL)setat5g/Lforpotablewater.[36]Althoughitisnotwellstudied,singlebenzeneexposureeventshavebeenlinkedtoacutecarcinogenesis.
[37]Additionally,theexposureoflivestock,mainlycattle,tobenzenehasbeenshowntocausemanyhealthissues,suchasneurotoxicity,fetal
damageandfatalpoisoning.[38]
Theentiresurfaceofanabovegroundpipelinecanbedirectlyexaminedformaterialbreach.Pooledpetroleumisunambiguous,readilyspotted,and
indicatesthelocationofrequiredrepairs.Becausetheeffectivenessofremoteinspectionislimitedbythecostofmonitoringequipment,gaps
betweensensors,anddatathatrequiresinterpretation,leaksinburiedpipearemorelikelytogoundetected
Pipelinedevelopersdonotalwaysprioritizeeffectivesurveillanceagainstleaks.Buriedpipesdrawfewercomplaints.Theyareinsulatedfrom
extremesinambienttemperature,theyareshieldedfromultravioletrays,andtheyarelessexposedtophotodegradation.Buriedpipesareisolated
fromairbornedebris,electricalstorms,tornadoes,hurricanes,hail,andacidrain.Theyareprotectedfromnestingbirds,ruttingmammals,and
waywardbuckshot.Buriedpipeislessvulnerabletoaccidentdamage(e.g.automobilecollisions)andlessaccessibletovandals,saboteurs,and
terrorists.
Previouswork[39]hasshownthata'worstcaseexposurescenario'canbelimitedtoaspecificsetofconditions.Basedontheadvanceddetection
methodsandpipelineshutoffSOPdevelopedbyTransCanada,theriskofasubstantiveorlargereleaseoverashortperiodoftimecontaminating
groundwaterwithbenzeneisunlikely.[40]Detection,shutoff,andremediationprocedureswouldlimitthedissolutionandtransportofbenzene.
Thereforetheexposureofbenzenewouldbelimitedtoleaksthatarebelowthelimitofdetectionandgounnoticedforextendedperiodsoftime.[39]
LeakdetectionismonitoredthroughaSCADAsystemthatassessespressureandvolumeflowevery5seconds.Apinholeleakthatreleasessmall
quantitiesthatcannotbedetectedbytheSCADAsystem(<1.5%flow)couldaccumulateintoasubstantivespill.[40]Detectionofpinholeleakswould
comefromavisualorolfactoryinspection,aerialsurveying,ormassbalanceinconsistencies.[40]Itisassumedthatpinholeleaksarediscovered
withinthe14dayinspectioninterval,howeversnowcoverandlocation(e.g.remote,deep)coulddelaydetection.Benzenetypicallymakesup0.1
1.0%ofoilandwillhavevaryingdegreesofvolatilityanddissolutionbasedonenvironmentalfactors.
EvenwithpipelineleakvolumeswithinSCADAdetectionlimits,sometimespipelineleaksaremisinterpretedbypipelineoperatorstobepump
malfunctions,orotherproblems.TheEnbridgeLine6BcrudeoilpipelinefailureinMarshall,MichiganonJuly25,2010wasthoughtbyoperatorsin
Edmontontobefromcolumnseparationofthedilbitinthatpipeline.TheleakinwetlandsalongtheKalamazooRiverwasonlyconfirmed17hours
afterithappenedbyalocalgascompanyemployeeinMichigan.
AlthoughthePipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration(PHMSA)hasstandardbaselineincidentfrequenciestoestimatethenumberof
spills,TransCanadaalteredtheseassumptionsbasedonimprovedpipelinedesign,operation,andsafety.[40]Whethertheseadjustmentsarejustified
isdebatableastheseassumptionsresultedinanearly10folddecreaseinspillestimates.[39]Giventhatthepipelinecrosses247milesofthe
OgallalaAquifer,[41]or14.5%oftheentirepipelinelength,andthe50yearlifeoftheentirepipelineisexpectedtohavebetween1191spills,[39]
approximately1.613.2spillscanbeexpectedtooccurovertheaquifer.Anestimateof13.2spillsovertheaquifer,eachlasting14days,resultsin
184daysofpotentialexposureoverthe50yearlifetimeofthepipeline.Inthereducedscopeworstcaseexposurescenario,thevolumeofapinhole
leakat1.5%ofmaxflowratefor14dayshasbeenestimatedat189,000barrelsor7.9milliongallonsofoil.[39]AccordingtoPHMSAsincident
database,[42]only0.5%ofallspillsinthelast10yearswere>10,000barrels.
Benzeneisconsideredalightaromatichydrocarbonwithhighsolubilityandhighvolatility.[clarificationneeded]Itisunclearhowtemperatureand
depthwouldimpactthevolatilityofbenzene,soassumptionshavebeenmadethatbenzeneinoil(1%weightbyvolume)wouldnotvolatilizebefore
equilibratingwithwater.[39]Usingtheoctanolwaterpartitioncoefficientanda100yearprecipitationeventforthearea,aworstcaseestimateof
75mg/Lofbenzeneisanticipatedtoflowtowardtheaquifer.[39]Theactualmovementoftheplumethroughgroundwatersystemsisnotwell
described,althoughoneestimateisthatupto4.9billiongallonsofwaterintheOgallalaAquifercouldbecomecontaminatedwithbenzeneat
concentrationsabovetheMCL.[39]TheFinalEnvironmentalImpactStatementfromtheStateDepartmentdoesnotincludeaquantitativeanalysis
becauseitassumedthatmostbenzenewillvolatilize.[40]
Oneofthemajorconcernsaboutdilbitisthedifficultyincleaningitup.[43]Enbridge'sLine6B,a30inchcrudeoilpipeline,rupturedinMarshall,
MichiganonJuly25,2010,mentionedabove,spilledatleast843,000gallonsofdilbit.[44]Afterdetectionoftheleak,boomsandvacuumtruckswere
deployed.Heavyrainscausedtherivertoovertopexistingdams,andcarrieddilbit30milesdownstreambeforethespillwascontained.Remediation
workcollectedover1.1milliongallonsofoilandalmost200,000cubicyardsofoilcontaminatedsedimentanddebrisfromtheKalamazooRiver
system.However,oilwasstillbeingfoundinaffectedwatersinOctober2012.[45]
Pipelinesconveyingflammableorexplosivematerial,suchasnaturalgasoroil,posespecialsafetyconcerns.
Pipelinescanbethetargetofvandalism,sabotage,oreventerroristattacks.Inwar,pipelinesareoftenthetargetofmilitaryattacks,asdestructionof
pipelinescanseriouslydisruptenemylogistics.
4.TrendsinNaturalGasTransportationRates
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/energy_policy_act_transportation_study/pdf/epactch4.pdfDecember07,2014
Thischapterdiscussestrendsinnaturalgastransportationratesdelivered....OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:...PipelineTransportationRates
4.TrendsinNaturalGasTransportationRates
Thischapterdiscussestrendsinnaturalgastransportationratesdelivered.Becauseofdatalimitations,theestimateoftotal
fortheperiod1988through1994andhowFederalregulationssavingsmaybelowbecauseforoffsystemindustrialcustomers
andpoliciesaffectthosetrends.55Regulatoryreform,newonlythesavingsinwellheadpricesareincluded.However,of
legislation,andrestructuringinthenaturalgasindustryhavethe$6.5billionsavings,industrialcustomerswerethemain
expandedoptionsforsellersandbuyersofnaturalgas,resultingbeneficiaries,receivingoverhalfofthesavings($3.8billion),
inincreasedcompetitionwithintheindustry.Buyersnowhavewhileelectricutilitiesandcommercialcustomerseachsaw
morechoicesforpurchasinggas,andancillaryservicessuchassavingsof$1.4billion.
pipelinetransmissionandstoragerights.Suppliershaveawider
rangeofprospectivecustomersandgreaterflexibilityinsettingAnotherwaytoestimatesavingsistocomparetheaverageprice
thetermsofsale.Thiscompetitionhascontributedtohighergasperthousandcubicfeettoeachendusesectorin1994and
throughputontheinterstatepipelinesystemandloweraverage1988.Thismethodassumesthattransmissionanddistribution
transmissionprices(Figure9).56From1988through1994,costswouldvarywiththevolumesdelivered.In1994,theprice
deliveriestoendusersincreased16percent,whileaverageof1thousandcubicfeetofgas(wellheadpriceplusdelivery
transmissionmarkupsdeclined16percent,from$1.49to$1.25charges)totheendusesectorswasbetween3and19percent
perthousandcubicfeet.Inthefaceofincreasingcompetition,lessthan1988levels.Thedifferentialinsavingsstemsfromthe
manysegmentsoftheindustryhavebecomemoreefficientandrangeofpricesdifferentcustomergroupspayfornaturalgas
reducedcosts,tothegeneralbenefitofconsumers.deliveries.Thepricesarebasedonanumberofelements,
particularlythelevelandqualityofservicerequired.
Naturalgasconsumershavebenefitedintwoways.First,the
wellheadpriceofnaturalgas,effectivelythepriceoftheTheanalysisinthischapterfocusesonlyonthecostsassociated
commodityitself,hasdeclinedsubstantially.Between1988andwiththedeliveryofnaturalgasfromthewellheadtotheend
1994,theaveragewellheadpriceofnaturalgas,inrealterms,user.Interstatepipelinecompaniestransportgasfromthesupply
fell11percent,from$2.05to$1.83perthousandcubicfeet.areastoservesomecustomersdirectly,butmuchofthegasthey
Averagepricespaidbysomecustomerclasses,specificallytransportistothecitygateofalocaldistributioncompany
onsystemindustrialandelectricutilitycustomers,havedeclined(LDC).LDCsthenprovidethedistributionandotherservices
evenmorethanthedeclineinthewellheadprice,indicatingthatneededtosupplyhomeowners,commercialestablishments,and
additionalbenefitshavebeenobtainedfromlowercostsofothercustomers.Theinterstatepipelinecompaniesareregulated
transmissionandotherdeliveryservices.ResidentialandattheFederallevel,andtheextensiveregulatorychangescaused
commercialcustomers,whoforthemostpartobtainalloftheirbyOrders436and636havedirectlyaffectedtheratesthey
servicefromlocaldistributioncompanies,havenotexperiencedcharge.LDCsareregulatedattheStatelevel,andwhilesome
significantreductionsinthecostsofservicebeyondthedecreasechangesarebeingmadeattheStatelevelcomparabletothe
inwellheadprices.AlthoughthesecustomershavepaidlessforFederallevel,therehavenotbeenextensivechangestodate.
transmission,distributioncostshaveincreasedresultinginlittle
overallchange.AsdiscussedinChapter1,therearenopubliclyavailabledata
seriesontheactualpricespaidbyshippersoninterstatepipeline
Intotal,EIAestimatesthatconsumerspaidalmost$6.5billioncompanies.Theinformationavailablerelatesonlytothetariff
(9percent)less,inrealterms,fornaturalgasservice(includingrates(maximumrates)authorizedbytheFederalEnergy
wellheadpurchasescombinedwithtransmissionandRegulatoryCommission(FERC).Theanalysisoftransportation
distributioncharges)in1994thantheywouldhavein1988.ratesinthischapterusesseveralapproaches,bothqualitative
Thisestimateincludes$2.5billioninreducedtransmissionandandquantitative,toillustratehowtransmissioncostshavebeen
distributionchargesand$4billionofsavingsresultingfromtheaffectedbylegislativeandregulatorychanges.Sectionsofthe
11percentreductioninwellheadpricessince1988.Thebulkofchapteraddress:
the$2.5billionrepresentsthereductioninthefixedcostsof
transmissionanddistributionthatdonotvarywiththevolumes
55
Allratesandpricesarequotedintermsofreal1994dollars.
56
Thetransmissionmarkupiscalculatedasthedifferencebetween
theaveragecitygatepriceandtheaveragewellheadprice.The
transmissionprice(ormarkup)representstheaveragepricepaidforall
servicesrequiredtomovegasfromthewellheadtothelocaldistributor.
Thedatareflectthepricespaidforgassalesservicesprovidedby
LDCsonly.
EnergyInformationAdministration39
EnergyPolicyActTransportationStudy:InterimReportonNaturalGasFlowsandRates
Figure9.IndicesofNaturalGasTransmissionMarkupsandDeliveriestoEndUsers,19881994
120
DeliveriestoEndUsers
110
Index1988=100
100
90
TransmissionMarkup
80
0
1988198919901991199219931994
Sources:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1988:HistoricalMonthlyEnergyReview19731992(August
1994).19891994:NaturalGasMonthly(August1995).
!Factorsaffectinginterstatetransportationrates.To
understandhowchangesinlawsandregulationscan!Impactofrevenuefrompipelinecapacityreleasein
affecttransportationrates,itisusefultolookfirstathowoffsettingpaymentsforcapacityreservation.Shippers
ratesarestructured.Thissectionfirstdescribessomeofholdingcapacityrightsoninterstatepipelinesmayrelease
thekeydeterminantsusedtodevelopinterstatethatcapacityinthesecondarycapacitymarketiftheydo
transmissionratesandhoweconomicandregulatorynotneedit.Revenuesobtainedfromthatcapacityrelease
changesbetween1988and1994haveaffectedthearenotreflectedintheoverallmaximumratesdiscussed
calculationoftherates.Inaddition,astherestructuringofearlier,eventhoughtheylowertheoverallcostof
theindustryproceededovertheperiodaddressedbythisshippinggas.
study,FERCimplementedmechanismsforcompaniesto
recovercostsassociatedwiththerestructuring,suchas!Changesintransmissionmarkupsatthenational
reformationofcontracts,strandedinvestments,andotherandregionallevels.Amoreaggregatemeasureoftrends
transitioncosts.Finally,theeffectofthemoreintransmissionmarkupscanbeobtainedbycomparing
competitiveenvironmentonrateschargedbypipelinethedifferencesbetweenwellhead,citygate,andenduse
companiesisbrieflyaddressed.prices.Becauseoftheoptionsavailabletocustomersto
usealternativetransmissionroutes,analyzingratesalong
!Trendsinmaximumratesforselectedinterstatespecificcorridorsmaymisstheimpactoftheincreased
corridors(CorridorRateAnalysis).Someindicationofflexibilityavailabletocustomers.Thissectionexamines
theoverallmovementintransportationratesovertimemarkupsfromthewellheadtothelocaldistribution
canbeobtainedfromlookingatchangesinthemaximumcompanyandfromthecitygatetotheenduser,atboththe
rateschargedbypipelinecompanies.Thissectionlooksnationalandregionallevels.
atratesfor16pipelinecompaniesalong14corridors.
However,becausepipelinecompaniesoftendiscount
rates,theratesactuallypaidbymanycustomersmaybe
substantiallylessthanthemaximumrateapprovedby
FERC.
40EnergyInformationAdministration
FactorsAffectingInterstatecompany,isaweightedaverageofthefirmscostofdebt
andtherateofreturnonequityasdeterminedbythe
PipelineTransportationRatesregulatoryprocess.FERCexaminesanumberof
elementsindeterminingtherateofreturnforaparticular
Pipelinecompanytariffratesforinterstatetransportationpipelinecompany,includingcapitalstructure,risk
servicesaredeterminedusingthetraditionalcostofserviceconditions,andotherfactors.Modificationstoapipeline
approach.Themaximum(tariff)ratethatapipelinecompanycompanysapprovedrateofreturnalteritstotalcostof
canchargeaparticularcustomerisdeterminedbyseveralservice,which,inturn,canleadtochangesinthat
factors.Thekeydeterminantsare:theratebase,theallowedratecompanysmaximumratesfortransportationservices.
ofreturnontheratebase,thelevelofoperatingcosts,theFrom1988through1994,approvedratesofreturnfor
amountofcapacityreserved,theloadfactor,theexpectedlevelpipelinecompaniesdecreased,partlybecausetheir
ofinterruptiblethroughput,andtheratedesign(seeAppendixmarginalcostofdebtdeclined,asreflectedbygenerally
Dforadditionalinformationonthedeterminantsofrates).Thislowerinterestrates.Forexample,therateforAAutility
sectiondiscussestheimpactofeachofthesedeterminantsinbondsdeclinedfrom10.26to8.21percent.Duringthis
isolation,thatis,assumingallotherfactorsremainconstant.Aperiod,thedecreaseintheaverageapprovedrateof
quantitativeassessmentofthetrendineachfactorisalsoreturnforpipelinecompanieswasmoremodestthanthe
presented.reductionininterestrates.Onepossibleexplanationisthe
relativelyhigherinterestcostspaidbythepipeline
!Ratebase.Theratebaseisthehistoricalcostofphysicalcompaniesasaresultoftheirlowbondratings.58
capitalonwhichthepipelineisentitledtoearnareturn.Specifically,thesettlementratesofreturnwerelargely
Theratebaseisgenerallycalculatedasnetplantinflatatabout11.5percentduringmostoftheperiodbut
service(grossgasplantinserviceplusconstructionworkdiddeclinein1994toapproximately10.2percent59
inprogresslesstheaccumulateddepreciation,depletion(Figure10).
andamortization)plusprepaymentsandinventoryless
accumulateddeferredincometaxes.Depreciationofthe!Operationandmaintenance(O&M)expenses.These
physicalassetsinserviceandabandonmentorsalesofarethedirectcostsofoperatingandmaintainingpipeline
existingplantlowerstheratebaseovertimeandwillfacilitiesnecessarytokeepthesystemoperational.O&M
lowerthemaximumratethatpipelinecompaniesarecostsarereviewedaspartofaratehearingandany
allowedtocharge.However,thiseffectisoffsetbyanyincreasesapprovedbyFERCcanbeexpectedtoresultin
investmentinnewcapacityortherefurbishmentofhigherrates.Changesinthesecoststhatwerenot
existingcapacitywhichincreasestheratebase,andtheanticipatedatthetimeoftheratehearingarenot
maximumallowablerates.addresseduntilthenexthearingandthereforedonot
affecttheapprovedrateintheinterim.Asaresultofthe
The1988through1994periodwasmarkedbyaincreasedcompetitionunderopenaccess,pipeline
significantamountofnewpipelineconstruction.Asacompaniesappeartohavebecomemoreefficient,as
result,thecostsofnewconstructionmorethanoffsettheevidencedbyreductionsinoperatingcostsand
effectofdepreciationfortheindustrywideratebaseadministrativeandgeneralexpensesandincreasesin
reflectingthephysicalcapitalusedinprovidingemployeeproductivity(measuredbynaturalgas
transmissionservices.Thisnewconstructionwasdeliveriesperemployee).60Between1988
undertakenforavarietyofreasons,includinghookingup
newsourcesofsupplies(bothdomesticandimports)and
meetingtherequirementsofa13percentincreasein
consumption.Asaresultofthisinvestment,thetotalrate
baseforthemajorpipelinecompaniesgrew,innominal
dollars,from$20.2billionin1988to$25.6billionin58
Foradditionalinformation,seeEnergyInformationAdministration
1994(Table7).57Onewouldexpectratestohave
(EIA)report,NaturalGas1994:IssuesandTrends,DOE/EIA
increasedoverthisperiodbecauseoftheincreaseinthe0560(94)(July1994).
ratebase.59
Itshouldbenotedthattheratescitedrepresentonlythose
revised
ratesthatFERCapproved("settlementcases")duringtheyearand
!Approvedrateofreturn.Theallowedrateofreturn(orhence,donotnecessarilyrepresenttheentireindustry.Thenumberof
thecostofcapital),approvedbyFERCforeachpipelinesettlementcasesduring1993and1994was12and13,respectively,
considerablybelowthe16to18casesperyearbetween1989and
1992.
60
57
Ratebasetrends,only,arestatedinnominaldollarstoconformtoForadditionalinformation,seetheEIAreport,NaturalGas1995:
theratemakingprocessofcomputingrates.However,thereturnonrateIssuesandTrends,DOE/EIA0560(95),tobepublishedinthefallof
baseisconvertedtoconstantdollarstoagreewithotherdiscussions.1995.
Table7.CompositeRateBase,19881994
(BillionNominalDollars)
RateBaseElements1988198919901991199219931994
RateBase
GasPlantinService44.344.248.852.752.354.355.1
AccumulatedDepreciation26.126.528.130.528.629.729.7
NetPlantinService18.217.720.722.223.724.725.4
AdditionstoRateBase8.37.48.58.97.86.95.9
SubtractionsfromRateBase6.36.16.05.45.25.55.7
TotalRateBase20.218.923.225.726.326.125.6
Note:Constructionworkinprogressisincludedinadditionstoratebase.
Sources:19881989:EnergyInformationAdministration,StatisticsofInterstateNaturalGasPipelineCompanies1990(April1992).19901994:
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)Form2.AnnualReportofMajorNaturalGasCompanies,BalanceSheetFilefromFERCGasPipeline
DataBulletinBoardSystem.
Figure10.AverageYieldonAAUtilityBondsandRateofReturnforInterstatePipelineCompanies,
19881994
12
RateofReturn
11
10
Percent
9
YieldonAAUtilityBonds
8
0
1988198919901991199219931994
Note:TherateofreturnrepresentstheaveragesettlementrateofreturnapprovedbytheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission.
Sources:YieldonAAUtilityBonds:MoodysInvestorService,Inc.,extractedfromDRIHistoryfile:USQ0993.WS.RateofReturn:Federal
EnergyRegulatoryCommission,OfficeofPipelineRegulation.
and1994,O&Mcostsdeclinedin1994dollarsfrom$8.5existingreservedcapacity,theoverallaverageutilization
billionto$5.4billion(Table8).Inadditiontoefficiencyofthepipelinesystemwasaboutthesamein1991and
improvements,fallingO&Mcostsmaybetheresultof1994(seeChapter3).Thecombinationofincreasedfirm
severalfactorsincludingtechnologyimprovementsanddeliveriesandpipelineexpansionduringthisperiodmay
thespinoffofpipelinefacilities.indicatethattheamountofreservedcapacityhas
increased.
!Loadprofile.Theloadprofileofapipelinecustomeris
indicatedbyitsloadfactor,whichissimplytheratioofits!Expectedlevelofinterruptiblethroughput.While
average(usually,theannualaverage)levelofpipelineinterruptibleratesmaybelowerthanfirmrates,
throughputtothemaximumpipelinecapacityithasinterruptiblethroughputdoescontributetofixedcosts.
reserved.ShipperswithrelativelylargeloadfactorsareWhendeterminingtariffrates,fixedcostsareallocated
saidtohavehigherloadprofiles,whilerelativelysmallerbetweenfirmandinterruptibleservicesbasedontheir
loadfactorsequatetolowerloadprofiles.Forexample,respectiveloadsonthepipeline.63Theinterruptible
localdistributioncompaniesthatserveresidentialandcustomersloadisestimatedfromtheirforecastedannual
commercialcustomersmustreservesufficientpipelinethroughputlevel.Asaresult,ananticipateddecreasein
capacitytosatisfythewintertimepeakdemandsforthesethelevelofinterruptiblethroughputraisesfirm
customers,eventhoughtheiroffseasondemandcanbetransportationratesbyincreasingtheleveloffixedcosts
satisfiedwithsubstantiallylesscapacity.Thus,anLDCsallottedtofirmtransportationservices.Interruptible
throughputaveragedovertheyearislikelytobethroughputdeclinedoverthe1988through1994period
relativelylowcomparedwiththecapacityitmustreserve(Figure11)puttingupwardpressureonfirm
tomeetpeakdemands.Whenthisisthecase,itissaidtotransportationrates.
havealowloadprofile.Theloadprofileaffectstheway
inwhichfixedcostsareassignedincomputingrates.!Ratedesign.Firmcustomerspayareservationchargeto
Pipelinecustomerswithalowloadfactorwillbechargedreservepipelinecapacityaswellasachargebasedonthe
higheraverageratescomparedwithcustomerswithaamountofgasactuallytransported.Ratedesignrefersto
highloadfactor.Whilethisisanimportantconsiderationhowfixedcostsareallocatedandcollectedinthesetwo
indeterminingrates,thereisinsufficientinformationcharges.From1988through1991,themodifiedfixed
regardingloadprofilestoprovideaquantitativevariable(MFV)ratedesignwaswidelyused.Underthis
assessmentoftheimpactofloadfactorsonchangesinsystem,fixedcostswereallocatedtoboththereservation
transportationrates.andvolumetriccomponentsofrates.FERCOrder636
stipulatedtheuseofthestraightfixedvariable(SFV)rate
!Capacityreserved.Anincreaseintheamountofdesign.Underthismethod,allfixedcostsareallocatedto
capacityreservedonapipelinetendstolowerreservationthereservationcharge,whilevariablecostsareallocated
ratesbecausethefixedcostswillbecollectedovermoretoacommodityorusagefee(Figure12).Thischangein
unitsofreservedcapacity.Reservationchargesarebilledratedesigntendstoincreaseratesforlowloadfactor
toacustomerforeachunitofcapacityreserved,whethercustomersanddecreaseratesforhighloadfactor
ornotthecapacityisused.61Datalimitationsdonotcustomers(seeChapter2).ThechangetoSFV
permitapreciseassessmentofthetrendinreservedreallocatedapproximately$1.7billionfromtheusagefee
capacitybetween1988and1994.However,thereistothereservationfee.64
evidencetosuggestthattheamountofreservedcapacity
hasincreased.Muchoftheincreaseindeliveriestoend!Takeorpaycosts.Contractreformationcostsresulting
usersfrom1988through1994isaccountedforbyfirmfromtakeorpaysettlementsassociatedwith
services(Figure11).62Whilesomeofthisincreasein
deliveriesmaybeassociatedwithhigherutilizationof
63
Thefirmserviceloadisderivedfromtheamountofspacefirm
61
Ifacustomerrequires1millioncubicfeet(MMcf)ofgasonadayservicecustomersreserveonthepipelineorthemeasuredloadfirm
duringthemonthofJanuary(assumingthepipelinecompanydoesnotserviceimposesonthepipelinesystemduringtheperiodofmaximum
offerseasonalrates),thatcustomermustreserve1MMcfofspaceonuse.
thepipelineforeverydayduringtheyear.64
MonetaryestimatefromtheFederalEnergyRegulatory
62
Besidestraditionalfirmservice,thisincludesreleasedfirmCommission,Order636A,footnote314,57F.R.36128,36173
transportation,nonoticetransportation,andshorttermfirm(1992).Actualcostspaidbyanyclassofcustomersdependonthe
transportation.Apipelinecompanymayselltheunusedportionofanydiscountsfromthemaximumallowableratesthatmaybeobtainedfrom
firmtransportationcapacityonitssystemonashorttermbasis.thepipelinecompany.
Table8.CompositeCostofService
(Billion1994Dollars)
Elements1988198919901991199219931994
ReturnonRateBase2.82.62.93.12.93.12.6
OperationandMaintenanceExpenses8.59.36.19.07.56.95.4
OtherExpenses3.43.23.12.43.03.33.1
TotalCostofService14.615.112.214.613.413.311.1
Note:ReturnonRateBase=TotalRateBasemultipliedbyFERCApprovedRateofReturn.
Sources:19881989:EnergyInformationAdministration,StatisticsofInterstateNaturalGasPipelineCompanies1990(April1992).19901994:
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)Form2.AnnualReportofMajorNaturalGasCompanies,BalanceSheetFilefromFERCGasPipeline
DataBulletinBoardSystem.
Figure11.NaturalGasTransmissionbyTypeofService,19871994
25
FirmTransportation
GasSales
NoNoticeService
20InterruptibleTransportation
ReleasedCapacity
15
QuadrillionBtu
10
0
19871988198919901991199219931994
Source:InterstateNaturalGasAssociationofAmerica(INGAA),GasTransportationThrough1994(August1995).
Figure12.RateDesigninTransition:ModifiedtoStraightFixedVariable
ModifiedFixedVariable
DemandCommodity
PeakDay(D1)
Annual(D2)
FixedCostsVariableCosts
LongTermDebtNonlaborO&M
A&GOtherO&M
DDAFixedCostsElementsChanging
OtherTaxesReturnonEquity
O&MRelatedTaxes
DemandCommodity
PeakDay(D1)
Annual(D2)
LongTermDebtNonlaborO&M
A&GOtherO&M
DDAFixedCosts
OtherTaxesReturnonEquityStraightFixedVariable
O&MRelatedTaxes
ReservationUsage
A&G=AdministrativeandGeneralExpenses
DDA=Depreciation,Depletion,andAmortizationExpenses
OtherTaxes=OtherNonincomeTaxes
O&M=OperationandMaintenanceExpensesReturnonEquityNonlaborO&M
NonlaborO&M=NonlaborOperationandMaintenanceExpensesRelatedTaxesOtherO&M
OtherO&M=OtherOperationandMaintenanceExpensesLongTermDebt
A&G
DDA
OtherTaxes
O&M
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,NaturalGas1992:IssuesandTrends.
theimplementationofOrder436havetotaledarelikelyandwillprobablyaffectratesforthenext
3to
approximately$10.2billionasofMay30,1995.655years.
Pipelinecompanieshaveagreedtoabsorbabout$3.7
billion.Oftheremaining$6.6billion,$3.6billionis!Costsofpipelineexpansion.Fortheperiod1991
beingrecoveredthroughasurchargeonfirmthrough1994,theinterstatepipelinecompaniesspent
transportationcustomersandtheremainderisbeing$6.5billiononexpandinginterstatepipelinecapacity.
recoveredthroughasurchargeonvolumetricrates.Expansioncostsgenerallyhavebeenpassedthroughto
Recoveryofthesetakeorpaycostsbeganinthelateallcustomersandwillcontinuetoinfluence
1980sandisexpectedtoresultinhigherratesforsometransportationrates,becausetheyareamortizedover
customersthroughoutthe1990s.manyyears.Pipelineexpansioncostsincreasetherate
baseand,subsequently,transportationrates.
!Transitioncosts.AsofAugust1995,$2.7billionin
transitioncostsassociatedwithOrder636havebeenfiledChangesintheelementsdescribedabovefordeterminingrates
atFERCforrecoverythroughincreasedtransportationoffsetandcounterbalanceeachother.Theratedesign,which
ratestoshippers.66The$2.7billionofcostsinclude$1.4determineshowcostsareallocatedandrecoveredfrom
billionofgassupplyrealignmentcosts;$0.6billionofcustomerclasses,probablyhasthemostsignificantdirect
unrecoveredgascosts;$0.7billionofstrandedcosts,andimpactonrates.Inaddition,industryrestructuringhas
resulted
$9millionfornewfacilities.Additionaltransitioncostsinsignificantcostsassociatedwiththechangesimplementedin
thenewregulations,includingmorethan$10billionintake
or
paycostsunderOrders436and500,andanadditional$2.7
65
AcontractprovisionobligatingthebuyertopayforacertainbillionintransitioncostsassociatedwithOrder636.
minimumquantityofproduct,whetherornotthebuyertakesthat
quantityduringthestatedperiod.WhenOrder636shiftedtheresponsibilityandriskof
66
Shippersincludeanycustomerwhousestransportationservices.maintainingservicefromtheinterstatepipelinecompaniesto
the
EnergyInformationAdministration
45
localdistributioncompaniesandconsumers,theallocationofapplytocustomerswhopaydiscountedratesforservices,
costsforsomeserviceschanged.Forexample,achargethatwaspipelinecompanycorecustomersgenerallypaymaximumtariff
previouslyincludedinthepricepaidforinterstatetransmissionrates.Therefore,theanalysisofmaximumrateswillprovidea
servicemaynowbeincludedinthedistributioncosts(oritmaybasisonwhichtogaugethegeneralmovementoffirm
bepaiddirectlybytheenduserandhencenotreportedbyeithertransportationrates.Thetariffratesanalyzedincludesurcharges
theinterstatepipelineorthelocaldistributioncompany).ThissuchasOrder636transitioncosts.
canaffecttheaccounting(andreporting)ofboththecostsof
longhaultransportation(byinterstatepipelinecompanies)asFirmtransportationratesin1994werecomparedwithratesin
wellaslocaldeliverycharges(bylocaldistributioncompanies).effectin1991forasampleof14supply/demandareasor
Forthisreason,onlyaggregatecostsoftransmissionandcorridors(Figure13).The16companiesrepresentedinthe
distributionserviceareexaminedforsomeoftheareassamplehaveacombinedserviceareathatspansthecountryand
analyzed.Inaddition,firmtransportationratespreviouslymayathroughputlevelthatisalmosthalfthetotalindustry
haveincludedanumberofotherservices,suchasstorageandthroughput.Thesampleofcorridorswasdevelopedbasedon
loadbalancing.Inthisanalysis,itwasnotpossibletoadjustthethemarketcorridorspresentedintheFosterAssociates
datatoreflectaconsistentdefinitionovertime.Therefore,December1994publicationCompetitiveProfileofNaturalGas
trendsintransportationratesmayonlybeapproximations.Services(discussedinmoredetailinChapter5).67Forany
singlecorridorinthesample,theremaybeseveralroutes,with
Thedifficultyofdifferentiatingdistributionfromtransmissioneachrouterepresentingthetransportationservicesofoneor
costspresentsadditionalproblemswhenanalyzingtheeffectsofmorepipelinecompanies.Forinstance,thecorridorfromthe
Federalpoliciesandregulationsontransportationrates.GulfCoastsupplyareatotheBostonmarketareaincludestwo
Distributionrateschargedbylocaldistributioncompaniesareseparateroutes:(1)TexasEasternTransmissionCompanyand
regulatedbyStateutilitycommissionsnotbyFERC.Recently,AlgonquinGasTransmissionCorporationand(2)Tennessee
someofthelargerconsumingStateshavebeenexperimentingGasPipelineCompany.Anaggregateorunitrate,
withvarioustypesofratedesigns,suchasmarketandrepresentingthetotaltransmissionchargeformoving1million
incentivebasedrates,tointroducegreatercompetitiveforcesBtu(MMBtu)ofgas,wasdevelopedforeachofthe21routesin
intothedistributionsystem.SomeStatesareevenadvocatingthesample.Theresultsfromtherateanalysisarepresentedin
thatLDCsunbundletheirservices.constant1994dollars.
Becauseoftheseandotherdatalimitations,thisanalysisdoesTheanalysiscomparestheunitcostforfirm(i.e.,
notattemptseparatelytoattributespecificchangesinnoninterruptible)transportationservice,definedasthecharge
transportationratestospecificFederallegislationorregulations.fortransportingoneunit(MMBtu)ofgas,fortwotypesof
Rather,thechapterpresentsgeneraltrendsintransmissionrates,customers:
showinghowtheyareinfluencedinaggregatebyregulations,
legislation,andpolicies,aswellaseconomicandmarket!Highloadfactorcustomerstendtotransportgasata
elements.constantlevelthroughouttheyear.Thesecustomers
imposeadailydemandonthesystemthatisaboutequal
totheaverageoftheirannualvolumetransported.For
TheCorridorRateAnalysisexample,ahighloadfactorcustomerwhotransports365
Anumberofregulatoryandmarketinfluencesaffectedrates
overthe1988through1994period.Oneofthemostsignificant
regulatorychangesthathashadadirectimpactonratesisFERC
Order636andtheresultingchangeinratedesigntothestraight
fixedvariable(SFV)method.Theanalysisoftransportation
corridorsexaminesthechangeinmaximumtransportationrates
underOrder636butdoesnotisolatethechangesinratesdue
exclusivelytotheSFVratedesign.Rather,itassessesthenet
effectontransportationratesofalloftheregulatoryandmarket
influences,includingratebasechanges,operatingcosts,taxes,
depreciation,interestrates,capacityreserved,loadprofiles,
ratesofreturn,etc.67
Thepipelineroutesandcompaniesinthesamplewerechosenfor
theanalysisbecausetheyhaveadiverseloadprofile,havea
Theanalysiscomparesmaximumfirmtransportationrates,geographicallydispersedservicearea,andhavereadilyavailabletariff
includingsurcharges(tariffrates)chargedbeforeandafterschedules.Thepipelineroutesaccountfor43percentoftotalU.S.
Order636wentintoeffect.Althoughmaximumratesmaynotthroughput.SeeAppendixEforadditionalinformationincludingthe
namesofpipelinecompaniesincludedinthisanalysis.
Figure13.InterstateTransportationCorridorsUsedinCorridorRateAnalysis
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration(EIA),EIAGISNGGeographicInformationSystem.
MMBtuofgasperyearwilltendtotransportabout1earlierinthischapter,manyelementsaffectratesforpipeline
MMBtuofgasperday.Theindustrialcustomers,suchasservice.ExceptforthechangeinratedesigntoSFV,each
analuminumplantorfoodprocessingplant,withahighelementwillhavethesamegeneraleffectoncustomers
loadfactortendtohavegasrequirementsthatarerelatedregardlessoftheirloadfactor.However,theswitchfromMFV
tomanufacturingneedsasopposedtotheseasonaltoSFVratedesignwilltendtohaveadifferentimpacton
demandforspaceheating.Someelectricgeneratorsmaymaximumtariffratesdependingontheloadfactor,increasing
haveuniformusagethroughouttheyearandthusbelowloadfactorrateswhiledecreasinghighloadfactorrates.
characterizedashighloadfactorcustomers.(ForadditionalinformationseeChapter2.)
!LowloadfactorcustomersdonottakegasataconstantForthisanalysisa100percentloadfactorwasusedtorepresent
ratethroughouttheyear.Thesecustomershaveapeakhighloadfactorcustomersanda40percentloadfactorforlow
dailyusagethatfarexceedstheaverageoftheirannualloadfactorcustomers.The40percentloadfactorassumesthat
use.Residentialandcommercialsectorsaregenerallythelowloadcustomerswillimposeapeakdayloadonthe
lowloadfactorcustomersbecausetheydependonsystemthatistwoandonehalftimesthecustomersaverage
naturalgasasaspaceheatingfuel.Theirdemandtendsdailyrequirements.Theloadfactorswereselectedforpurely
tofluctuatewithweathertemperature.Hence,theillustrativepurposes.Actualloadfactorsforshippersmayvary
pipelinecompanymustbepreparedtomeettheloadfromtheseassumedlevels,dependingontheirservice
requirementofthesecustomersuptothemaximumrequirementsthroughouttheyear.Forlocaldistribution
amountofcapacityreservedeventhoughthemaximumcompanies,thiswilldependonthemixofresidential,
loadmayoccuronlyafewtimesayear.commercial,industrial,andelectricutilitycustomersandtheir
servicerequirements.
Thecomparisonofloadfactorratesillustratestheeffectofthe
switchfromthemodifiedfixedvariable(MFV)ratedesigntoTheaverageunitratepaidby100percentand40percentload
thestraightfixedvariable(SFV)ratedesign.Asdiscussedfactorcustomerswillvarydependingonthelevelofthepipeline
companysreservationcharge.Forexample,assumethatfirm
transportationratesincludea$0.25perMMBtudaily
reservationchargeanda$0.05perMMBtuusagecharge.TheInabouthalfofthecasesconsidered,ratestothehighload
100percentloadfactorcustomerthattransports1MMBtuperfactorcustomersdeclined,whileratestothelowloadfactor
daywillpay,onaverage,$0.30perMMBtuforservice(1customerseitherdecreasedbyasmalleramountoractually
MMBtureservationat$0.25perMMBtu+increased.Forexample,onrouteAfromtheGulfCoastto
1MMBtuusageat$0.05perMMBtu).The40percentloadBoston,the100percentloadfactorratedeclinedby23percent
factorcustomer,however,willneedtoreserveenoughspacetowhilethe40percentratedeclinedby8percent.OntheGulf
meethispeakrequirements.Ifthe40percentloadfactorCoasttoLouisvilleroute,the100percentratedeclined18
customertransportsanaverageof1MMBtuperday,itspeakpercent.Insharpcontrast,the40percentrateonthesameroute
requirementswouldequal2.5MMBtu(loadfactor=averageincreasedby9percent.
use/peakuse=40percent=40/100=1/2.5).Therefore,the40
percentloadfactorcustomerwillpayanaveragerateof$0.675Theresultsoftheanalysissuggestthatthehypothesisthatall
perMMBtuforservice(2.5MMBtureservationat$0.25perhighloadfactorcustomerswouldfacedecreasesintransmission
MMBtu+1MMBtuusageat$0.05perMMBtu).(Thisratesandalllowloadfactorcustomerswouldsuffer
simplifiedexampleignorestheseasonalratespipelineeconomicallyasaresultofOrder636isoverlysimplistic.For
companiesmayoffer.)bothsetsofcustomers,someratesincreasedbetween1991and
1994whileothersdeclined.Clearly,thereareelementsother
thantheswitchtoSFVthathadanimpactonratesduringthis
FindingsoftheCorridorRateStudyperiod.Whatisstriking,however,isthelargedifference
betweenthetwocustomerclassesintermsofthemagnitudesof
Noclearpatternemergeswithrespecttothechangeintheratechanges.Onanygivenroute,thehighloadfactor
maximumtariffratesandtherespectivecorridor,supplyarea,customersexperiencedaratechangethatwasmore
ordeliverypoint.However,therearesomenoteworthyadvantageousthantheratechangeexperiencedbythelowload
differencesbetweenthe100percentandthe40percentloadfactorcustomers.Thishasresultedinawideningofthegap
factorrates.Asdiscussedearlier,thechangeinratedesignwasbetweenthe100percentandthe40percentloadfactorrates
theonephenomenonexpectedtohavedifferentimpactsonhighbetween1991and1994.Thus,SFVhadadominantinfluence
andlowloadfactorcustomers.Iftheswitchinrateonthewideninggapinratesforthesecustomerclasses.As
designtoSFVweretheonlychangeduringtheperiod,allhighstrikingastheseresultsare,theymayactuallyunderstatethe
loadfactorrateswouldbeexpectedtodecreaseandalllowactualimpact,becausethedatausedinthisanalysisarefor
loadfactorratestoincrease.maximumpostedrates.Inreality,ratesmaybediscounted.
Discountedrateswilltendtobeobtainedbyhighloadfactor
ItappearsthattheconversiontoSFVratedesignwasthecustomers,suchasindustrialcustomerswithalternativefuel
dominantinfluenceonratechangesforbothhighandlowloadcapability.Accordingly,theactualdifferentialsinthepercentage
factorcustomersfrom1991through1994.Whileotherincreasesanddecreasesbetweenthetwocustomerclassesare
influencesmayhavemitigatedSFVsdownwardpressureonprobablylargerthanthosepresentedinthisreport.
highloadfactorratesandupwardpressureonlowloadfactor
rates,theratedesignshiftwidenedthegapbetweenhighandInadditiontothecostofserviceissuesdiscussedearlierinthis
lowloadfactorrates.Halfthesampled100percentloadfactorchapter,anumberofregulatoryelementsaffectrates.Whilerate
corridorratesincreasedbetween1991and1994,whilehalfdesignmayhavethemostsignificantdirectimpactonrates,
decreased(Table9).Forthe40percentloadfactorrates,onetransitioncostsresultingfromrecentregulatorychangesalso
thirdofthecorridorratesdecreasedwhiletwothirdsincreased.affectrates.Order636transitioncostsinclude:(1)unrecovered
Thishigherincidenceofrateincreasesforthelowloadgascosts,(2)gassupplyrealignment(GSR)costs,(3)stranded
customerssuggeststhatrecentregulatorychangeshavecosts,and(4)thecostofnewfacilities.68Ofthesetransition
benefitedlowloadfactorcustomerslessthanhighloadfactorcosts,theGSRandstrandedcostsarepassedthroughto
customers.Althoughbothcategoriesofcustomershadincreasescustomersintheadjustmentchargesincludedinthecorridor
anddecreasesintariffs,thechangewasmoreadvantageoustorates.Thesechargesincreaseoverall
thehighloadfactorcustomers.Morecompellingevidenceis
providedbyinspectingthedifferentialsinthemagnitudesofthe
ratechanges.Forinstance,ineverycasewherethehighload
factorrateincreased,thelowloadfactorratealsoincreased.
Moreover,inallcases,theincreasewaslargerinbothabsolute
andpercentagetermsforthelowloadfactorcustomers.For
example,thehighloadfactorrateforCanadatoNewYork
increasedby4percentwhilethelowloadfactorrateincreased68
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissionDocketNo.RM9111
by19percent.002,etal.,Order636A,August3,1992,p.336.
Table9.EstimatedMaximumRatesforFirmTransportationServiceonSelectedInterstatePipelineRoutes,
1991and1994
(1994DollarsperMillionBtu)
100PercentLoadFactor40PercentLoadFactor
SupplytoMarketRoutesPercentPercent
19911994Change19911994Change
NortheastRegion
GulfCoasttoBoston
RouteA1.280.98232.192.018
RouteB0.551.111020.932.42160
AppalachiatoBoston
RouteA0.880.74161.551.541
RouteB0.440.52180.731.1456
CanadatoBoston
RouteA0.850.98151.692.2634
RouteB0.520.64230.711.43101
GulfCoasttoNewYork
RouteA0.550.97760.932.09125
RouteB0.930.75191.581.496
RouteC0.850.56341.481.0330
CanadatoNewYork0.800.8341.692.0119
SoutheastRegion
GulfCoasttoLouisville0.660.54181.081.189
GulfCoasttoMiami0.380.55450.731.1963
ArkomatoLouisville0.750.7731.151.6846
MidwestRegion
GulfCoasttoDetroit
RouteA1.030.82201.821.801
RouteB0.710.54241.131.141
RouteC0.430.55280.781.2459
CentralRegion
RockyMountaintoDenver0.380.3930.670.8324
MidContinenttoKansasCity0.440.4770.701.0347
WestRegion
SanJuantoSouthernCalifornia1.040.80231.351.267
CanadatoSouthernCalifornia1.531.36111.532.5265
SouthwestRegion
ArkomaBasintoLittleRock0.460.29370.700.5916
Sources:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1991:GulfCoasttoMiamiH.Zinder&Associates,Summary
ofRateSchedulesofNaturalGasPipelineCompanies(March1991);OthercorridorsFosterAssociates,CompetitiveProfileofU.S.InterstatePipeline
Companies(October1991);1994:FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)AutomatedSystemforTariffRetrieval(FASTR);andFoster
Associates,CompetitiveProfileofNaturalGasServices(December1994).
transportationcostsforfirmservicecustomers.ThecostofnewThereducedvariabilityinratesmayindicatethatinadditionto,
facilitiesassociatedwithOrder636wouldtendtoincreasetarifforpossiblyasaresultofcompetition,firmtransportation
rates.servicesprovidedbyvariouspipelinecompanieshavebecome
moresimilar.Thatis,notwithstandinggeographical
Rateincreasesonaparticularpipelinemaybecausedbytheconsiderations,acustomermaybeabletosubstitutethe
lossofcustomerswhoeitherchosetoexercisetheiralternativetransportationserviceofferedbyonecompanyfortransportation
fuelcapabilitiesorchoseothertransportationoptions.(Asserviceofferedbyanother.Inaddition,Order636sdirectiveto
discussedearlier,Orders436and636openedopportunitiesforuseacommonratedesignmethodforallpipelinecompanies
customerstoswitchserviceproviders.)Ascustomersleaveamayhaveledtomoresimilarityintheratesofferedbypipeline
pipelinesystem,itsfixedcostsmayberecoveredbyfewercompaniesservingthesamecorridor.Whileintriguing,the
customersandlowerthroughputvolumes,leadingtoincreasedfindingofrateconvergenceshouldbeinterpretedwithahigh
rates.Pipelinecompaniesmayalsobediscountingservicestodegreeofcautiongiventhesmallnumberofcorridorsonwhich
retaincertaincustomersandpassingonadditionalcoststootherthefindingisbased.
customerswhohavenootherserviceoptions(captive
customers).Order636permitspipelinecompaniestodiscountAspreviouslydiscussed,thestudycannotisolatenumerous
servicesonanondiscriminatorybasistomeetcompetition.Ininfluencesontheoutcomeofmaximumfirmtransportation
ordernottodiscouragediscounting,FERCallowstherates.Also,affectingthenetcostoftransportationistherevenue
discountedunitstobefactoredintothedeterminationofreceivedforcapacityrelease.Capacityreleaserevenuecredits
maximumrates.69arepassedthroughtofirmtransportationcustomers;however,
theunitdecreaseisnotreflectedinthemaximumtransportation
Inacompetitivemarket,pricedifferencesacrossfirmsreflectrate.Theextentofthereleasedcapacitysinfluenceon
qualityandgeographic(e.g.,locational)differences.Pricetransportationrateswilldependonthedevelopmentofthe
differencesinexcessofwhatcanbeaccountedforbythesesecondarymarket.
elementsmayindicatethemarketsinefficiencyatsettingprices.
Onthisscore,theconvergenceincorridorrates,whilenot
conclusive,suggeststhatthemarketfortransportationbecame
moreefficientduringtheperiod1991through1994.
CapacityReleasesand
TransportationRates
ComparingpreandpostOrder636ratesinthecorridors
servedbymultiplepipelinessuggeststhattransportationThecapacityreleaseprogramisanotherprovisionofOrder636
servicesofferedbydifferentpipelinecompaniesmayhavethathasthepotentialtoaffecttransportationratesdirectly.Prior
becomemoresimilar,asevidencedbyaconvergenceinrates.toOrder636,capacityrightsonapipelinewerenontransferable.
Inthesample,multipleroutesareavailablewithinfiveAcustomercouldeitherusethecapacityitselforitwouldbe
corridors:GulfCoasttoBoston,AppalachiatoBoston,Canadaavailabletothepipelinecompanywithnocompensationtothe
toBoston,GulfCoasttoNewYork,andGulfCoasttoDetroitcustomer.UnderOrder636,ashipperwithexcessreserved
(Table10).For100percentloadfactorrates,threeoutoffivecapacitycanreleasethatcapacitytoanothershipperinreturnfor
ofthesecorridorsshowedatrendtowardaconvergenceofrates,acreditonitsreservationcharges.70
onecorridorshowednochange,andthefifthshowedamodest
increaseinthevariationofrates(Figure14).Thecorridorsthat
didexhibitconvergencedisplayedasubstantialreductioninthe
variationinrates.Forexample,forthetworoutesfromtheGulf
CoasttoBoston,theratedifferenceforhighloadfactor
customersdeclinedfrom$0.73perMMBtuin1991to$0.13
perMMBtuin1994(Table10).Particularlynotableinthis70
analysisisthatlowloadfactorcustomershavealsoseenaTherearetwowaysinwhichareleasearrangementisprocessed.
(1)Areleasingshippermaymakeaprearrangeddealwiththe
reductionintheratevariationinfouroutoffivecorridors.
replacementshipperifthepriceforthecapacityisequaltothe
However,thisreducedvariabilityresultsfromlowendratesmaximumfirmrateinthetarifforifthedurationofthecontractdoes
movinguptothelevelofhighendratesratherthanareductionnotexceedonecalendarmonth.(2)Ifneitheroftheseconditionsare
inhighendrates.met,thereleasingshipperwillposttherelease(alongwiththe
correspondinglimitationsorconditions,suchasrecallrightsandaward
criteria)onthepipelinecompanyselectronicbulletinboardwhere
69
Inotherwords,apipelinecompanythattransports100MMBtuprospectivereplacementshippersbidonthecapacityrights.This
ofgasathalfofitsmaximumtransportationratewilldevelopratesprocessresultsincapacityreleaseratesthataresetbythemarket
assuming50MMBtuweretransportedforthatservice.IftheconditionsinsteadofaFERCratemakingprocess.Currently,the
transportationcostsremainthesame,firmtransportationrateswillmaximumrateforcapacityreleasemaynotexceedthemaximumfirm
increasebecausethosecostswillberecoveredonfewerunitsofgas.ratestatedinthepipelinecompanystariff.
Table10.RangeofMaximumTransportationRatesforCorridorswithMultipleRoutes,1991and1994
(1994DollarsperMillionBtu)
100PercentLoadFactor40PercentLoad
Factor
SupplytoMarketCorridors
199119941991
1994
GulfCoasttoBoston0.730.131.26
0.41
AppalachiatoBoston0.440.220.82
0.40
CanadatoBoston0.330.340.98
0.83
GulfCoasttoNewYork0.380.410.65
1.06
GulfCoasttoDetroit0.600.281.04
0.66
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1991:FosterAssociates,CompetitiveProfileofU.S.Interstate
PipelineCompanies(October1991);1994:FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)AutomatedSystemforTariffRetrieval(FASTR);and
FosterAssociates,CompetitiveProfileofNaturalGasServices(December1994).
Figure14.RangeofMaximumTransportationRatesforCorridorswithMultipleRoutes,1991and1994
100PercentLoadFactor
1.40High
1.20Low
1.00
1994DollarsperMillionBtu
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
1991199419911994199119941991199419911994
GulfCoastAppalachiaCanadaGulfCoastGulfCoast
toBostontoBostontoBostontoNewYorktoDetroit
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1991:FosterAssociates,CompetitiveProfileofU.S.Interstate
PipelineCompanies(October1991);1994:FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)AutomatedSystemforTariffRetrieval(FASTR);and
FosterAssociates,CompetitiveProfileofNaturalGasServices(December1994).
51
Underthecapacityreleaseprogram,alocaldistributionRatesforcapacityreleasetransportationrepresentanaverage64
company(LDC)mayassigntootherssomeofitsrightstopercentdiscountfromthemaximumfirmtransportationrate.72
capacityonthepipelinesystem.ThiswouldtypicallyoccurTheaveragepriceforreleasedcapacityhasbeenfairlystable
duringthesummerwhenthereisnodemandforspaceheating.exceptformodestseasonalfluctuationsduringthewinter
Ifthisreassignmentofcapacityresultsinnewincrementalload,months(Figure16).Thiscontrastswiththeamountofcapacity
thepipelinesystemwilloperateonamoreuniformbasistraded,whichhasincreasedsteadily(Figure17).Thehighly
throughouttheyear,resultinginmoreefficientuseofthediscountedpricelevelmayindicatethatanabundanceof
existingpipelinecapacity.Capacityreleasealsopermitsmorecapacityisavailablefromreleasingshippers.
buyerstoreachmoresellersbymakingfirmtransportation
availabletoshipperswhomaynototherwisebeabletoobtainThepriceforcapacityreleasehasapronouncedseasonalpattern
service.Forexample,priortocapacityrelease,ashipperwouldintheNortheastRegion(Figure18),indicatingastrongdemand
notbeabletocontractforfirmtransportationserviceonaforcapacityduringwinterperiods.Thepricesforcapacity
pipelinethatwasfullysubscribed(allcapacitywascontractedreleaseareattheirhighestlevelsduringthewinterseasonwhen
for).However,undercapacityreleasetheshippermaybeablecapacityonpipelinesystemsismorelikelytobeconstrained.
tousereleasedcapacitytoconnecttothegassupplyofitsLDCs,whocomprisethebulkofthereleasingshippers,must
choice.retaintheircapacitytosupplygastotheirresidentialand
commercialheatingloadcustomers.Duringthesummer
Therevenuegeneratedbycapacityreleasedecreasesthetotalmonths,whenpipelinecapacitymaybeunderutilized,released
costofpipelinetransportationtolowloadfactorcustomers.71capacityisabundantandreturnsamuchlowerprice.
Asdiscussedearlier,thesecustomerspayreservationchargestoAlternatively,aconsistenthighaveragepriceforreleased
holdspaceonthepipelinetomeettheirmaximumrequirementcapacitymaysuggestaconsistentstrongdemandforthe
onanysingleday.Thesecustomersfrequentlyunderutilizethiscapacity.ThismaybethecaseintheSoutheastRegionwhere
capacity,whichcausestheiraveragecostoftransportationtobethe1994averagepriceforreleasedcapacitywasmorethan
relativelyhigh.Therevenuethesecustomersreceivefortheirthreetimesthenationalaverageprice(Table11).TheSoutheast
releasedcapacityoffsetssomeoftheirtransportationcosts.Regionhasanexpandinggasmarketandonlyafewpipelines
servingthearea.Therefore,capacitymaybeconstrainedor
Thecapacityreleasemarkethasgrownsteadilysinceitsfulltheremaybeonlylimitedreleasedcapacityinthatregion
activationonNovember1,1993.Pipelinecapacitytradedleadingtothehighpricesforreleasedcapacity.
duringthe199394heatingseason(November1993through
March1994)amountedto762billioncubicfeet.CapacityheldThecapacityreleasemarketnotonlyreducesthecostof
byreplacementshippersduringthe199495heatingseasonwasreservingcapacityonthesystem,italsogivesreplacement
1,570billioncubicfeet.Approximately$568millioninrevenueshippersagenerallylowcostalternativetocapacityobtained
creditsfromNovember1993throughMarch1995weredirectlyfromthepipelinecompany.Beforethismarketemerged,
generatedbythecapacityreleasemarket$528millionfromeconomiesofscalelimitedcompetitiononacorridortoasmall
releasedpipelinecapacityand$40millionfromreleasedstoragenumberofpipelines.Asaresultoftheemergenceofthe
capacity.Revenuesfrompipelinecapacityreleasedduringthesecondarymarket,ashippernowcanpotentiallyobtaincapacity
199495heatingseasonincreasedinallregionscomparedwithfromanaverageofalmost70holdersofcapacityrightsona
the199394heatingseason(Figure15).FortheNortheastgivenpipeline.73Thenumberofeffectivesuppliersisprobably
Region,therevenuesinthe199495heatingseasontotaledsubstantiallylowerthan70perpipeline.Forexample,the
almost$74million,morethandoubletherevenuesgeneratedshippersmayneedsomeofthecapacityforthemselves;the
duringthe199394heatingseason.Althoughtheapparentdeliverypointsofthepotentialreleasingandacquiringshippers
growthinthecapacityreleasemarketappearspromising,itsmaynotmatch;andtheexcesscapacitymaybeupstreamwhile
effectivenessatreducingthecostoffirmtransportationwillthecapacitydesired
dependontheunitpricereceivedforreleasedcapacity
comparedwiththatpaidforfirmtransportation.
Ratesforreleasedcapacityvaryfromregiontoregionandtend
tobesignificantlylessthanmaximumfirmtransportationrates.
71
SomeLDCswithverylowloadfactorsmaynotbeabletoobtain
therevenuecreditingbenefitsfromreleasedcapacity.Thelowestload
72
InterstateNaturalGasAssociationofAmerica,Gas
factorcustomersaregenerallythesmallestLDCs.SincetheyareoftenTransportationThrough1994,August,1995.
73
servedunderonepartrates,theyarenotabletomitigatetheircostsSeeArthurDeVanyandW.DavidWalls,NaturalGasIndustry
throughcapacityrelease,becauseitonlyappliestocustomersreceivingTransformation,CompetitiveInstitutionsandtheRoleofRegulation,
serviceundertwopartrates.EnergyPolicy1994,22(9)755763,footnote31.
Figure15.HeatingSeasonRevenuesfromReleaseofPipelineCapacity
Central
WesternMidwest
Northeast
56.714.222.69.0
11.973.7
25.6
AverageCostofAcquiring
29.61McfofCapacityfor1Day
($/Mcfday)
Southeast
199394199495
SouthwestHeatingHeating
40.9
SeasonSeason
CapacityReleaseNE$0.15$0.16
Revenues
SE$0.40$0.46
(milliondollars)
0.31.2MW$0.13$0.08
199394HeatingC$0.13$0.09
Season4.2
W$0.15$0.12
199495Heating
SW$0.07$0.21
Season
$/Mcf=Dollarsperthousandcubicfeet.
Notes:Revenuesusedinpricecalculationexcludedatawithcapacityreleaseratesthatarestatedasapercentofeffectivemaximumrates,
capacity
transactionswithincompletedata,andonetransactionwithinconsistentreleaserates.Theexcludeddataaccountforabout10percentofpipeline
capacityvolumestraded.Also,revenuescalculatedforcapacitytransactionswithvolumetricratesassume100percentloadfactoruseofcapacity.
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:capacityreleasetransactiondataprovidedbyPasha
Publications,
Inc.
maybedownstream.Nevertheless,thecreationofasecondary
NaturalGasPricesand
marketinpipelinecapacityrepresentsasubstantialincreaseinMarkups,19881994
thedegreeofeffectivecompetitioninthemarketforpipeline
capacity.ThiscreationofanintrapipelinemarketincapacityWhilesometransmissionrateshavedeclinedasaresultof
preservesthescaleeconomiesinherentintransmissionwhilechangesinFederalpolicies,othershaveincreased.Acursory
effectivelyprovidingforacompetitiveandthusmoreefficientanalysismightconcludethatrecentpolicieshavehadamixed
marketinpipelinecapacity.effectonthecostofnaturalgastransmission.However,
transmissionrates,whethertheyrepresentmaximumpostedor
Currentlyseveraltransportationservicescompetewiththeactualtransactions,donotfullyreflecttheimpactofpolicy
capacityreleasemarket.Theseservicesincludetraditionalchangesonthecostofmovinggasfromthewellheadtothe
interruptibletransportation,shorttermfirmtransportationcitygateortotheburnertip.Recentpolicyhasbeentoprovide
offeredbypipelinecompanies,andcapacityobtainedthroughbothproducersandconsumersofgaswithmorechoices.Prior
graymarkettransactions.74However,thereislittledoubtthatthetotherecentinstitutionalchanges,thecombinedmerchant/
emergingcapacityreleasemarketrepresentsanimportantshipperstatusofthepipelinecompaniesresultedinconsumers
institutionalinnovation.ofgashavingverylimitedchoiceswithrespecttobothgas
supplyandtransmission.Thechoicescurrentlyavailableto
marketparticipantshaveaffectedthecostofmovinggasinways
thataresimplynotcapturedinthetariffrateassociatedwith
movinggasfrompointAtopointB.Underthenewpolicies,gas
74
thatpreviouslymovedfromAtoBmayinsteadflowatlower
Shorttermfirmcapacityisthatportionofunusedfirm
overallcostfromanewpoint,CtoB.
transportationcapacityonitssystemthatapipelinecompanydecidesto
sell.Thegraymarketisbroadlyviewedastransportationorstoragethat
isbundledwithgasandsoldasaderegulatedservicebymarketersand
LDCshippers.
53
onlycanelectricutility(andindustrial)consumersobtain
Table11.AveragePriceforReleasedPipeline
transportationserviceatlowerprices,theycanalsoshopforthe
CapacitybyRegion,1994
lowestpricedgassupplies.Asaresult,realelectricutilitygas
(DollarsperThousandCubicFeetper
pricesdeclinedbetween1988and1994,butexperiencedan
Day)
upturninboth1992and1993reflectingtheincreasein
RegionPricewellheadpricesinthoseyears.
Northeast0.11
Thecitygatepriceistheaveragedeliveredpriceofgastothe
Southeast0.45
LDC.Itrepresentsaweightedaverageofthedeliveredcostof
Midwest0.09
Central0.14
gasacrossallcustomerclassesservedbyLDCsales.Between
Western0.111988and1994,therealcitygatepricedeclined13percent,from
Southwest0.12$3.54to$3.08perthousandcubicfeet(Table12).The
U.S.Average0.13
magnitudeofthedeclinevariesbyregion,withthepricefalling
lessthantheaverageintheNortheast(9percent)andmorein
Notes:RevenuesusedinpricecalculationexcludedatawiththeMidwestandWest(19and18percent,respectively).
capacityreleaseratesthatarestatedasapercentofeffectivemaximum
rates,capacitytransactionswithincompletedata,andonetransaction
withinconsistentreleaserates.Theexcludeddataaccountforabout10Thewellheadpriceisthepricepaidtotheproducerforthe
percentofpipelinecapacityvolumestraded.Also,revenuescalculatednaturalgas,inotherwords,thecommoditycost.Between1988
forcapacitytransactionswithvolumetricratesassume100percentloadand1994,therealnaturalgaswellheadpricedeclined11
factoruseofcapacity.
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,
percent,from$2.05to$1.83perthousandcubicfeet(Figure19
derivedfrom:capacityreleasetransactiondataprovidedbyPashaandTable12).
Publications,Inc.
Becauseofthedifferentservicerequirementsoftheenduse
sectors,therelativeimportanceofeachcomponentofprice
Enduse,citygate,andwellheadpricescanbeusedtoestimatevariessubstantiallyamongthesectors(Figure20).
transmissionanddistributionmarkupstothevariousenduse
sectors.Thetransmissionmarkuprepresentsthecostofmoving!Forresidentialandcommercialcustomers,mostof
gasfromthewellheadtothecitygateandiscalculatedasthetheendusepriceisdirectlyrelatedtothecostsof
differencebetweenthecitygatepriceandthewellheadprice.localdistribution.Forinstance,theLDCmarkup
ThedistributionmarkuprepresentstheLDCschargeforaccountedfor52and43percentofthetotalpricepaidby
deliveringthegasfromthecitygatetotheenduserandistheresidentialandcommercialconsumers,respectively.
calculatedasthedifferencebetweentheretailpricetoonsystemThecostsoftransportationservicesbypipeline
endusersandthecitygateprice.companiesaccountedfor20and23percentofthe
respectiveenduseprices,whilethewellheadprice
Theendusepriceistheaverageretailpricepaidforgasbyaaccountedfor29and34percent,respectively.76
singlecustomerclassorsector(e.g.,residential,commercial,
industrial,andelectricutility).Itincludesthecostsofthemany
transactionsnecessarytobringnaturalgasfromtheproducing
fieldtotheburnertip,includingthecitygatepriceandthe
wellheadprice.Between1988and1994,endusepricesforall
sectorsfell,withthegreatestdeclinesexperiencedbythe
onsystemindustrialandelectricutilitysectors,15and19
percentrespectively.Thedeclineinendusepricesexperienced
byresidentialandcommercialcustomerswasconsiderablyless,
only4and3percent,respectively(Table12).
Retailgaspricedatafortheelectricutilitysectoraretheonly76
Thecitygatepriceusedinthecalculationofthesecomponents
is
datathatencompassbothonsystemandoffsystempurchasesofaweightedaverageofthedeliveredcostofgasacrossthecustomer
gasbyendusers.75TheyshowclearlythebenefitsofenhancedclassesservedbyLDCsales.Becauseitmayincludelowercost
competitionandopenaccessinthetransportationmarkets.Notonsystemindustrialandelectricutilityvolumes,itmayunderstate
the
deliveredcitygatepricetotheresidentialandcommercialsectors.
Asa
result,thedistributionmarkuptoresidentialandcommercial
customers
75
Pricedataforelectricutilitiesarebasedonreportsbytheutilitiesmaybeoverstated,andthetransmissionmarkupmaybeunderstated.
themselvesontheirtotalgaspurchases.RetailpricedatafortheotherHowever,thisproblemisrelativelyminorgiventhatapproximately
87
sectorsarebasedonreportsbypipelinecompaniesandLDCsontheirpercentofdeliveriestothecitygatein1994wereaccountedforby
gassalestothesesectorsandthereforedonotincludeoffsystemsales.deliveriestoresidentialandcommercialcustomers.
55
Table12.AverageNaturalGasPricesandPriceChanges,1988and1994
(1994DollarsperThousandCubicFeet)
Price19881994PriceChangePercentChange
Wellhead2.051.830.2211
Citygate3.543.080.4613
EndUse
Residential6.646.410.233
Commercial5.625.430.193
OnsystemIndustrial3.583.050.5315
ElectricUtility2.832.280.5519
Note:Industrialendusepricedatarepresentonsystemsalesonly.Theonsystemshareoftotalsalestoindustrialconsumers
declinedfrom43percentin1988to22percentin1994.
Sources:EnergyInformationAdministration.1988:NaturalGasAnnual1992,Vol.2(November1993).1994:NaturalGasMonthly
(August1995).
Figure19.WellheadandEndUsePricesbySector,19881994
Price
7.007YearAverage
Residential
6.00
Commercial
1994DollarsperThousandCubicFeet
5.00
4.00
OnsystemIndustrial
3.00ElectricUtility
Wellhead
2.00
1.00
0.00
1988198919901991199219931994
Note:Industrialendusepricedatarepresentonsystemsalesonly.Theonsystemshareofindustrialdeliveriesdeclinedfrom43percentin1988
to22percentin1994.
Sources:EnergyInformationAdministration.1988:NaturalGasAnnual1992,Vol.2(November1993).19891994:NaturalGasMonthly
(August1995).
Figure20.ComponentsofEndUsePricesbySector,1994
(DollarsperThousandCubicFeet)
ResidentialCommercial
TotalPrice=$6.41TotalPrice=$5.43
$1.25
TransmissionMarkup$1.83$1.25$1.83
(19.5%)WellheadPriceTransmissionMarkupWellheadPrice
(28.5%)(23.0%)(33.7%)
$3.33$2.35
DistributionMarkupDistribution
Markup
(52.0%)(43.3%)
OnsystemIndustrialElectricUtility
TotalPrice=$3.05TotalPrice=$2.28
$1.83$1.83
WellheadPriceWellheadPrice
(60.0%)(80.3%)
$0.45
$1.22Transmissionand
TransmissionandDistributionMarkup
DistributionMarkup
(19.7%)
(40.0%)
Note:Industrialendusepricedatarepresentonsystemsalesonly.In1994,22percentofsalestoindustrialconsumerswereonsystem.
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:NaturalGasMonthly(August1995).
57
!Fortheonsystemindustrialandelectricutilityincreasetheaveragecostoftransmissionfortheselowload
sectors,thewellheadpriceofnaturalgasisthefactorsectors.Asdiscussedearlierinthischapter,anumberof
largestcomponentofthetotalenduseprice.In1994,considerationsputeitherupwardordownwardpressureson
thewellheadpriceaccountedfor60percentofthemaximumtariffratesforpipelinetransportation.Apossible
industrialpricewhilethecombinationtransmissionandreasonforthelowertransmissionmarkuptothesesectorsisthat
distributionchargeaccountedfortheremaining40thehigherreservationchargesarebeingspreadoverahigher
percent.Intheelectricutilitysector,thewellheadpricevolumeofdeliveries.Also,theregulatorychangesduringthe
accountedfor80percentofthe1994endusepricewhileperiodmayhavepermittedsomeLDCstoexploitpreviously
thetransmissionanddistributionchargecomprisedtheunavailablelowercosttransportationoptions.
remaining20percent.
Incontrasttothetransmissionmarkup,thedistributionmarkup
Beforeproceeding,itshouldbenotedthatasaresultofforresidentialandcommercialcustomerswasroughlyflatin
datalimitations,theendusepricesusedtocalculatetherealtermsfrom1988through1993,butincreasedsubstantially
industrialandcommercialtransmissionanddistributionfrom1993to1994(Figure23).Thesharpincreaseinthe
markupsreflectonlyonsystemsales.Asaresult,themarkupsdistributionmarkupbetween1993and1994mayreflectthe
overstatetheactualmarkupsforthesesectors(Figure21).highercostsincurredbyLDCswho,withtheunbundlingof
Whilethisissueisaconcerninthecaseofthecommercialpipelinecompanyservices,havehadtotakeresponsibilityfor
sector,whereonsystemsalesaccountfor78percentofsecurityofsupply,includingstorage.Bypassbyindustrial
deliveries,itisanespeciallyseriouslimitationintheindustrialcustomersandelectricutilitiesmayalsohavecontributedtothe
sectorwheretheburnertippricereflectsonly24percentoftheincreasedLDCmarkupspaidbyresidentialandcommercial
market.customersin1994.
Exceptforthecommercialcustomers,combined
transmission/distributionmarkupsdeclinedduringtheperiod
1988through1994(Figure22).Specifically,themarkupforthe
TrendsinRegionalPrices:
industrialsectorfellby20percent,whiletheelectricutilityEndUseandCitygate
markupdeclinedby42percent.Thedeclinesinthesemarkups
arenodoubtlargelyattributabletotheincreaseintransportationChangesinendusepricesbetween1988and1994varied
optionsavailabletothesecustomerclassesduringthisperiod.greatlybygeographicregion(Figure24).Asatthenational
level,theregionalchangeswerethegreatestintheonsystem
Infact,averageindustrialretailpriceshavebeenlowerthanindustrialandelectricutilitysectors.Inmostregions,real
citygatepricesasLDCshaveattemptedtopreventtheiraveragepricesdeclinedby10percentormoreinthesesectors
industrialcustomersfrombypassingtheirsystemwithdirecttie(1994dollars).
instonearbypipelines.Lossofindustrialcustomers,withtheir
higherandlessvariabledemands,wouldincreasetheLDCsThelargestregionalpercentagechangeduringtheperiodwas
unitcostofservice.Thesehigherrateswouldhavetobea29percentdropintherealpriceofnaturalgastoelectric
coveredbytheresidentialandcommercialcustomersremainingutilitiesintheWesternRegion.In1988,thepriceofgasto
onthesystem.ThereforeitmaybetotheadvantageofallofitselectricutilitiesintheWesternRegionwas$3.52perthousand
customersforLDCstodiscountpricestothosecustomerswhocubicfeet(1994dollars),thehighestofanyregion.Evenafter
contributemosttoloweringtheoverallcostsoftheLDC.droppingto$2.50perthousandcubicfeetin1994,electric
utilitiesinthisregionstillpaidthehighestaveragepricefor
Thecombinedtransmission/distributionmarkupforthenaturalgasofalltheregions.Thepricechangefrom1993to
residentialandcommercialsectorsdeclinedmarginallyinthe1994contributedsignificantlytotheoveralldropinprices
1988through1993period,butrosemodestlyfrom1993toduringtheperiod.From1993to1994,electricutilitygas
1994.Forthesesectors,thecombinedtransmission/distributionconsumptionincreased30percentinthisregion,possiblyasa
markupin1994waswithin3centsofthelevelin1988.WhileresultofdroughtconditionsintheNorthwestthatreducedthe
thetotalmarkuppaidbythesecustomershasremainedroughlyavailabilityofhydroelectricpower.Theaveragepriceofgasto
constant,thetransmissioncomponentofthetotalmarkup(ortheelectricutilitiesfellby$0.57perthousandcubicfeet(1994
markuptocitygate)declined16percentinrealtermsfromdollars)or19percentfrom1993to1994.
1988to1994(Figure23).Thisisstrikinggiventhatsome
analystsbelievedthattheswitchtostraightfixedvariablefromThelargestactualpricechange(andsecondlargestpercentage
modifiedfixedvariableratedesignwouldchange)alsooccurredintheWesternRegion,butinthe
onsystemindustrialsector.Therealaveragepriceofgasto
industrialusersfell$1.20perthousandcubicfeet
Figure21.Transmission/DistributionMarkupsbySector,1988and1994
Transmission
5.00
MarkuptoCitygate
4.00
ThousandCubicFeet
1994Dollarsper
3.00
CombinedTransmissionandDistributionMarkup
2.00
$1.49
$1.25
5.00
1.00
$4.59$4.58
0.00
4.00
19881994
$3.57$3.60
Citygate
3.00
2.00
$1.53
$1.22
1.00
$0.78
$0.45
0.00
1988199419881994
1988199419881994
OnsystemElectric
IndustrialUtility
Notes:Industrialmarkupsreflectendusepricesforonsystemsalesonly.Theonsystemshareofindustrialdeliverieswas43percentin1988
and22percentin1994.
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1988:NaturalGasAnnual,Vol.2(November1993);1994:
NaturalGasMonthly(August1995).
Figure22.IndicesofTransmission/DistributionMarkupsbySector,19881994
120TransmissionMarkuptoCitygate
100
Index
1988=100
80
60
40
20
120
1988198919901991199219931994
100
Index1988=100
80
60
CombinedTransmissionand
Distribution
40
Residential
Commercial
20OnsystemIndustrial
ElectricUtil
ity
0
198819891990
1991199219931994
Notes:Industrialmarkupsreflectendusepricesforonsystemsalesonly.Theonsystemshareofindustrialdeliverieswas43percentin1988
and22percentin1994.
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1988:NaturalGasAnnual,Vol.2(November1993);1989
1994:NaturalGasMonthly(August1995).
Energy
InformationAdministration59
EnergyPolicyActTransportationStudy:
InterimReportonNaturalGasFlowsandRates
Figure23.IndicesofResidentialandCommercialDistributionMarkupsandCitygateTransmission
Markup,19881994
120
100
80
Index1988=100
60
40DistributionMarkupCommercial
DistributionMarkupResidential
TransmissionMarkuptoCitygate
20
0
1988198919901991199219931994
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:1988:NaturalGasAnnual,Vol.2(November1993);1989
1994:NaturalGasMonthly(August1995).
Figure24.PercentageChangeinEndUsePricesbySectorandRegionBetween1988and1994
10
(10)
Percent
(20)
(30)
OnsystemIndustrialElectricUtility
(40)
NortheastSoutheastMidwestCentralSouthwestWesternUnitedStates
Notes:Changeswerecalculatedin1994dollars.Industrialendusepricedatarepresentonsystemsalesonly.Theonsystemshareofindustrial
deliverieswas43percentin1988and22percentin1994.
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration,OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:NaturalGasMonthly(August1995).
(27percent),perhapsbecauseofcompetitionfromCanadian
imports.The1988priceof$4.45perthousandcubicfeet
Conclusion
(1994dollars)wasthethirdhighestintheonsystemindustrial
sector,andby1994,theWesternRegionhadonlythefourthFERCOrder636,issuedin1992andimplementedin
highestindustrialgasprices.TheaveragerealpricetoindustrialNovember1993,probablyhadthemostsignificantdirecteffect
usersfellby10to16percentinallotherregionsduringtheontransportationratesbetween1988and1994.Specifically,
period.Order636separatedthepipelinesmerchant/shipperrole;
unbundledtransportation,storage,andancillaryservices;
Thepricechangeswerenotasdramaticforresidentialandchangedthemethodofcomputingtransportationrates;and
commercialusers,butaveragerealpricesinthesesectorsdidinitiatedacapacityreleaseprogramthatallowscustomersto
fallfrom2to10percentineveryregion,withtworeassigntheircapacityrightsforarevenuecredit.Thecoststo
exceptionsresidentialpricesintheNortheastandcommercialpipelinecompaniesofcomplyingwithOrder636and
pricesintheWesternRegion.Thepriceofnaturalgastorestructuringtheiroperations(transitioncosts)havealso
residentialusersrose$0.47perthousandcubicfeet(6percent)affectedrates.AsofAugust1995,$2.7billionintransition
inrealtermsintheNortheastRegion.Residentialgaspricesincosts,foreventualrecoveryfrompipelinecustomers,hadbeen
theNortheastwerehigherthaninanyotherregionthroughoutfiledatFERC.
theperiodandreached$8.06perthousandcubicfeetin1994.
ThelargestdeclineinrealresidentialpricesoccurredinthePriortoFERCOrder636,Order436(issuedin1985)initiated
Midwestwhererealpricesfellfrom$6.15perthousandcubicindustryrestructuringbyencouragingpipelinecompaniesto
feetin1988to$5.56in1994(10percent).offeropenaccess.Openaccesspromotedproducercompetition,
exertingdownwardpressureonwellheadprices.Other
Inthecommercialsector,thelargestrealpricedropalsolegislationandpolicies,suchastheCleanAirActAmendments,
occurredintheMidwest.Commercialpricesfellfrom$5.51tohaveindirectlyaffectedtransportationratesbyexpandinggas
$4.98perthousandcubicfeetduringtheperiod(10percent)inmarketsand/orencouragingconservation,Also,ratespaid
thisregion.Whilethepricesinmostotherregionsfellfrom2tobetween1991and1994werestronglyinfluencedbygreater
10percent,pricesrose$0.44perthousandcubicfeet,or8efficiencyinoperations,thecostofcapacityadditions,andtake
percent,tocommercialusersintheWesternRegion.Thisorpaycostsincurredbypipelinecompanies.
increasemovedtheWesternRegionfromthethirdtothesecond
highestpricedregionforcommercialgasusersbetween1988Additionalconclusionsare:
and1994.
!Onaverage,customersarepayingless(inrealterms)for
Between1988and1994,citygateprices,theaveragedeliverednaturalgasservicein1994,comparedwith1988.This
priceofgastothelocaldistributioncompany,decreasedincludesdeclinesof11and13percentinthewellhead
$0.46perthousandcubicfeet,or13percent.Althoughtheandcitygateprices,respectively,andanaveragedecline
averagecitygatepricemaynotbroadlyapplytoanyspecificofbetweenof3and19percentinenduserprices.
customersector,itmayindicatetheregionalcosttocustomers.Residentialandcommercialpricesgenerallydeclinedthe
Comparing1994and1988citygatepricesacrosstheregions,least,whileelectricutilitypricesdeclinedthemost.
thepricedecreaserangedfrom$0.26perthousandcubicfeet(8Onsystemindustrialpricesdeclinedalmost15percent
percent)intheCentralRegionto$0.72perthousandcubicfeetbetween1988and1994.
(19percent)intheMidwest(Figure25).Forallbuttworegions
(NortheastandCentral),thedecreaseinthecitygateprice!Between1988and1994,totaltransmissionand
exceeded$0.50perthousandcubicfeet,representingatleastadistributionmarkupstotheresidentialandcommercial
15percentreductionsince1988.Thesmallerreductioninthesectorsremainedfairlyconstantinrealterms,while
Northeastprobablyreflectsthecostsassociatedwithcomparablepricestotheonsystemindustrialandelectric
incrementalpipelinecapacityaddedbetween1988and1994asutilitysectorsdeclineddramaticallyby20and42percent,
wellasthegreatdistancebetweenthisregionandthemajorrespectively.
supplyareasofboththeUnitedStatesandCanada.Foreach
region,thedecreaseincitygatepricesexceededtheaverage!Transmissioncosts,thecostofmovinggasfromthe
decreaseinthewellheadprice($0.22perthousandcubicfeet).wellheadtothelocaldistributor,decreased16percentin
Thispointstoanoverallreductioninthecostsforinterstaterealtermsbetween1988and1994.However,the
transmission.TherelativelysharperdeclinesintheSoutheast
($0.56perthousandcubicfeet),Midwest($0.72perthousand
cubicfeet),andSouthwest($0.62perthousandcubicfeet)may
suggestthatlocaldistributioncompaniesintheseregionsderive
moredirectbenefitsfromreducedtransportationcosts.
Figure25.CitygatePricesbyRegion,1988and1994
3.143.79
WesternMidwest
2.593.39Northeast
Central3.133.07
3.69
3.37
3.76
3.39
SouthwestSoutheast3.20
2.77
1988CitygatePrice
1994CitygatePrice
Source:EnergyInformationAdministration(EIA),OfficeofOilandGas,derivedfrom:aspecialextractfromFormEIA857,MonthlyReportof
NaturalGasPurchasesandDeliveriestoConsumers.
decreaseinthetransmissioncomponentwasalmostfirmrateswouldtendtohavethesamegeneralimpacton
completelyoffsetbyanaveragerealpriceincreaseof7customersregardlessoftheirloadfactors.
and13percentinthelocaldistributioncompanymarkup
fortheresidentialandcommercialsectors,respectively.!ComparingpreandpostOrder636ratesinthecorridors
Althoughtotaltransmissionanddistributionmarkupstoservedbymultiplepipelinessuggeststhattransportation
captiveresidentialandcommercialconsumershaveservicesofferedbydifferentpipelinecompaniesmay
remainedfairlyconstantinrealterms,theymaybehavebeenmorecomparableovertheperiod.The
benefitingfromtheincreasedcompetitionininterstatevariationamongpipelinesinacorridoris
transportation.decreasingwiththedecreasebeingmorepronounced
forlowloadfactorcustomers.Thecomparisonshows
!Theanalysisofmaximumallowableratessuggeststhatsomeconvergenceofratesbetween1991and1994for
lowloadfactorcustomershavebenefitedlessthanhighseveralofthecorridors.Onepossibleexplanationisthat
loadfactorcustomersfromtherecentregulatorychanges.increasedcompetitionandintegrationofthepipelinegrid
Althoughbothcategoriessawbothincreasesandmayhaveincreasedthecomparabilityofservicesoffered
decreasesintariffs,inallcasesthechangewasmorebypipelinecompanies.Inaddition,Order636sdirective
advantageoustothehighloadfactorcustomers.touseacommonratedesignmethodforallpipeline
companiesmayhaveledtomoresimilarityintherates
!WhileotherinfluencesmayhavemitigatedSFVsofferedbypipelinecompaniesservingthesamecorridor.
downwardpressureonhighloadfactorratesandupward
pressureonlowloadfactorrates,thechangeinrate!Totalrevenuesgeneratedbythecapacityreleaseprogram
designwasthedominantinfluenceinwideningthegapfromNovember1993throughMarch1995totaled$568
betweentheratespaidbythetwogroups.Exceptforthemillion.Tradingofcapacityhasincreasedsignificantly
changeinratedesign,otherkeydeterminantsofsincetheprogrambeganandcurrentlyrepresents13
percentoftheoverallvolumesmovedto
market.Onaverage,capacitytradesata64percentinotherregionspossiblybecauseofcapacityconstraints
discountfrommaximumrates.ortherelativeunavailabilityofreleasedcapacityinthe
region.
!Theregionalratesforreleasedfirmcapacityvary
significantly.RatesintheSoutheastarehigherthanthose
OntheEstimationofFailureRatesofMultiplePipelineSystems
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=20474871December07,2014
OntheEstimationofFailureRatesofMultiplePipelineSystemsAuteur(s)/Author(s)...OilpipelineUncertainsystemGaspipelineUncertainty
Rupture
DepartamentodeIngenieraMetalrgica,IPNESIQIE,UPALMEdif.7,Zacatenco,Mexico,DistritoFederal07738,MEXIQUEColegiodeCienciay
Tecnologa,UniversidadAutnomadelaCiudaddeMxico,Mexico,DistritoFederal09090,MEXIQUEInthiswork,thestatisticalmethodsforthe
reliabilityofrepairablesystemshavebeenusedtoproduceamethodologycapabletoestimatetheannualizedfailurerateofapipelinepopulation
fromthehistoricalfailuredataofmultiplepipelinesystems.Theproposedmethodologyprovidespointandintervalestimatorsoftheparametersofthe
failureintensityfunctionfortwoofthemostcommonlyappliedstochasticmodels:thehomogeneousPoissonprocessandthepowerlawprocess.It
alsoprovidesstatisticaltestsforassessingtheadequacyofthestochasticmodelassumedforeachsystemandtestingwhetherallsystemshavethe
samemodelparameters.Inthisway,thefailuredataofmultiplepipelinesystemsareonlymergedinordertoproduceagenericfailureintensity
functionwhenallsystemsfollowthesamestochasticmodel.Thisallowsstatisticalandtoleranceuncertaintiestobeaddressedadequately.The
proposedmethodologyisoutlinedandillustratedusingreallifefailuredataofoilandgaspipelinesystems.JPVTAS2008,vol.130,n2,[Note(s):
021704.1021704.8](9ref.)AnglaisAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,NewYork,NY,ETATSUNIS(1974)(Revue)INISTCNRS,Cote
INIST:6120J,35400019755538.0150
OilandGasPipelineDesign,MaintenanceandRepair
http://eng.cu.edu.eg/users/aelsayed/Part%208%20%20Maintenance,%20%20Reliability%20and%20Failure%20Analysis.pdfDecember07,2014
PE607:Oil&GasPipelineDesign,Maintenance&RepairMaintenancePlanForeachsystem,determineamaintenancestrategyForeach
systemidentifiedfor...
OilandGasPipelineDesign,
MaintenanceandRepair
Dr.AbdelAlimHashem
ProfessorofPetroleumEngineering
Mining,Petroleum&MetallurgicalEng.Dept.
FacultyofEngineeringCairoUniversity
aelsayed@mail.eng.cu.edu.eg
ahshem2000@yahoo.com
Part8:Maintenance,Reliabilityand
FailureAnalysis
PE607:Oil&GasPipelineDesign,Maintenance&Repair
Contents
Maintenanceobjective
Maintenanceplan
Maintenancestrategies
Correctivemaintenance
Failuremodes
Proactivemaintenance
PdMtechniques
Reliability
Maintenanceandtheconstructioncodes
Elementsoffailureanalysis
MaintenanceObjective
Ensuringthatphysicalassetscontinuetodo
whattheiruserswantthemtodo[Moubray]
Topreservethesystemfunction"[Smith]
Physicalassets"arepipes,valves,active
equipment(pumps,compressors,etc.,also
referredtoasdynamicorrotatingequipment),
instrumentation,fixedequipment(vessels,heat
exchangers,etc.,alsoreferredtoasstatic
equipment),inlinecomponents(traps,strainers,
etc.),insulationandsupports.
MaintenanceVarietyofManners
Maintenanceinformationisignored.Thingsare
fixedastheybreak,timeandagain.
Maintenanceinformationisrecordedasdata,
somewhereonaserver,onashelforina
drawer.
Maintenancedataisconvertedintoknowledge
forafew,themaintenancemechanicand
possiblythesystemengineer.
Maintenanceknowledgeisconvertedinto
wisdom,byanalysis,trending,and
communication(inaclearandillustrated
manner)tothewholeorganization.
MaintenancePlan
Foreachsystem,determineamaintenancestrategy
Foreachsystemidentifiedforproactivemaintenance,
prepareacomponentlist(pipesegments,valves,pumps,
compressors,etc.).
Foreachcomponent,specifytherequiredfunction,its
failuremodeandfailurecause.
Foreachcomponentfailurecause,selecttheproper
inspectiontechnique,Theobjectivehereistodecide
whatneedstobeinspected,when,whereandhow.
Determinetheacceptancecriteriathatwillbeusedto
evaluatetheinspectionresultsandtodeterminethe
"fitnessforservice"ofthesystem
MaintenancePlan
Planandimplementmaintenanceinspections,eitheron
stream(online)orduringanoutage(shutdown).
Documentresults,intelligently,clearly,andsuccinctly.
Illustratewithdigitalphotographs.Recordinaretrievable
andsortablemaintenancedatabase.Maintain"system
healthreports".
Issueclearrecommendations,forexampleinthree
categories:green(okasis),yellow(planforfuture
inspection,degradationistakingplacebutequipmentis
fitforservicetillnextinspection),orred(repairor
replace).
MaintenanceStrategies
Therearetwomaintenancestrategies
1.Areactiveapproach(corrective
maintenance,runningequipmentto
failure,ornearfailure)
2.Aproactiveapproach(inspecting
equipmentandtakingearlystepsto
overhaul,repairorreplace,before
failure).
Systemsofaproactivemaintenancestrategy
include
Facilitysafetybasis:systemsessentialtoprevent
ormitigatecredibleaccidentsthatwouldhave
unacceptableconsequencestotheworkers,the
publicortheenvironment.
Productionloss:systemsessentialtomaintainan
acceptablelevelofproductionthroughput.
Maintenancecost:systemswithequipmentthat
wouldbecostlytoreplace,orwouldrequirelong
leadtimes.
Systemsofaproactivemaintenancestrategy
include
Riskoffailure:systemsatgreaterriskoffailure,
forexamplebecauseofcorrosion,operationat
highpressureortemperature,operationbeyond
vendorrecommendations,orbasedonpast
companyorindustryexperience.
Regulatoryrequirements:systemsor
componentsthatarerequired,byregulation,to
beperiodicallyinspectedortested
CorrectiveMaintenance
Isreactivemaintenance:runtofailure,then
repairorreplace
Quitecommonfornonessentialsystems
Maintenancemanagerscitelimitedmanpower
andbudgetsfocusedfirstonsolvingtheday's
emergenciesasanimpedimenttopredictive
maintenance
Arecentsurveyreportedcorrectivemaintenance
at40%ofthemaintenanceworkload
Wellimplemented,correctivemaintenance
yieldsawealthofknowledge
CorrectiveMaintenanceWork
Package
Equipmentmakeandmodel.
Asfoundcondition(photographsare
recommended).
Mechanics'opinionastothelikelycause
offailure.
Correctiveaction(andpossibly
recommendationtoavoidrecurrence).
FailureModes
Failuremodeandfailurecauseshouldbe
capturedinastandardformat,andregularly
sorted,analyzedandtrended
Theobjectivestounderstandfailurecause,and
takepreemptivemeasurestoavoidrecurrence,
optimizeperformance,reducecosts,and
improvesafety
Companymaydevelopitsownmaintenance
historysoftware
Tohelpindocumentationandsorting,each
classofequipmentwouldhaveastandardlistof
failuremodesandfailurecauses
FailureMode1PumpsFailsto
Start
CorrespondingFailureCauses:
Lossofpower.
Internalbinding.
Failedbearing.
Failedcoupling.
Openorshortedmotor.
Startcircuitfails.
FailureMode2PumpDelivers
InadequateFlow
Wornorbrokenimpeller.
Wornwearring.
Dischargevalveclosed.
Cavitation.
Sealfailure.
Casingcracked.
Gasketleak.
Cloggedstrainer.
Shaftdamage.
FailureMode3PumpExhibits
AbnormalCondition
Excessivevibration.
Leakofprocessfluid.
Oilleaks.
Excessivetemperature.
Unusualnoise.
ASecondLevelofFailureCauses
Thecauseofthecause
Maybenecessarytodiagnoseandcorrect
thefailuremode.
AnExampleofSecondLevel
FailureCauses
FailureCause1stLevelExcessiveVibrationinPump
FailureCause2ndLevel:
MechanicalCause:
Unbalance.
Eccentricrotor.
Bentshaft.
Axialmisalignmentatshaftcoupling.
Angularmisalignmentatshaftcoupling.
Loosefoot.
Rotorrubsagainstfixedpart.
Bearingwear.
Oilinstabilities.
AnExampleofSecondLevel
FailureCauses
FailureCause1stLevelExcessiveVibrationin
CentrifugalPump
FailureCause2ndLevel:
MechanicalCause:
Gearwornorbroken.
Faultymotor.
Beltdrivemisaligned.
HydraulicCause:
Pressurepulsingfromvanepass.
Flowturbulence.
Cavitation.
Hydraulicresonance(Helmholtzoscillator)
ProactiveMaintenance
PreventiveorPredictiveMaintenance
InspectionChecklists
PreventiveorPredictive
Maintenance
Whereasystemcannotberuntofailure,ithas
tobepartoftheproactivemaintenance
program.
AchoicemustnowbemadebetweenPreventive
Maintenance(PM)orPredictiveMaintenance
(PdM).
WithPM,alsoreferredtoasScheduled
Maintenance[Patton],predetermined
maintenanceactivitiestakeplaceat
predeterminedintervals;forexample,replacing
pumplubeoileveryXmonths,testingarelief
valveeveryXyears,etc
PreventiveMaintenance(PM)
Also,referredtoasScheduledMaintenance[Patton],
predeterminedmaintenanceactivitiestakeplaceat
predeterminedintervals
Forexample,replacingpumplubeoileveryXmonths,
testingareliefvalveeveryXyears,etc
Basedonseveralfactors:
Equipmentfailurehistory.
Vendorrecommendations.
Industrypractice,codes,standards.
Personnelexperience.
Risk:likelihoodandconsequenceofmalfunctionor
failure.
PredictiveMaintenance(PdM)
Giventothecombinationofthree
activities:vibrationanalysis,thermography,
andoilanalysis
Viewedinamuchbroadersense
Basedontheexpertinspectionand
analysisasquantitativeaspossible
Involvesmoreupfronteffortandmore
expertisethanPM
InspectionChecklists
Useinspectioncheckliststoguideanddocumentthe
inspection
Visualinspectionssupplementedbyperiodicsurface
inspections:
(typicallyliquidpenetranttesting(PT)ormagnetic
particletesting(MT)orvolumetricinspections
(typicallyultrasonictesting(UT)orradiographic
testing(RT)
Basedonthesystem'sorcomponent'srisk
Degradationofpipingandequipmentsupports(steelor
concretestructures)mustbedeterminedcasebycase,
applyingtherulesoftheconstructioncodesand
standards
IllustrativeExampleforPdM
HeatExchangerValves
Vertical
Vessel
6pipe
2Bleed
Supportpipe
PdMTechniques
Thesystemconsistsof6"pipe,fromavertical
vesseltohorizontalheatexchanger,withtwo
weldedmanualvalves,asupportandaspring
hanger(linehotinservice);anda2"branchline
withathreadedmanualvalve
Themaintenanceplanfollowstheoutlineof
section
Maintenancestrategy:predictivebecausethe
systemisessentialtooperations
ComponentList,Function,Failure
ModeandFailureCause
Piping6"and2",needstoremainleaktight
Failuremodewouldbelossofpressureboundary
Failurecauses:corrosionorfatiguecrackingManual
valves,normallyopen,mustbeabletoclosefor
isolation
Manualvalves,normallyopen,beabletocloseforisolation
Failuremodewouldbelossofoperability(handwheel
cannotbeturned),lossofleaktightnessifclosed,
lossofpressureboundarythroughbody,bonnet,
packing,joints
Failurecauses:corrosionbuildup,corrosionofwall,
packingwear,debrisatvalveseat,wearofvalvedisk
orplug.
ModeandFailureCause
Verticalvesselmustremainleaktight.Nooverpressure.
Failuremodewouldbelossofpressureboundary
(leak)orrupturebyoverpressure.
Failurecauses:corrosion,failureofpressurerelief
valvetoopenanddischargeatsetpressure
Heatexchangermustoperateatnominalandfullflow,need
tomaintainheattransfer.Nooverpressure.
Failuremode:tubeleak,shellandheadsleak,head
flangeleak,overpressure.
Failurecauses:corrosion(thinning,crackingor
plugging),inadequateflangegasket,boltsorassembly
torque,tubevibrationincrossflow,failureofpressure
reliefvalvetoopenanddischargeatsetpressure
ModeandFailureCause
Supports,mustmaintainpipeinposition,variable
springneedstoremainwithintravelrange.
Failuremode:supportfails,pipedislodges,
andspringmotionexceedstravelallowance.
Failurecauses:corrosion,impact(suchas
waterhammer)orvibration,wearofsupport
parts,externaldamage
Inspectionlocationsandtechniques
Pipingandvessels:visualinspectionof
equipmentandsupports
ModeandFailureCause
Inspectionlocationsandtechniques
Valves:manyfacilitiesoverhaulvalvesona
rotatingschedule(preventivemaintenancePM)
Supports:oncriticalsystems,support
membersandanchorboltsvisuallyinspected,
forevidenceofdamage
Acceptancecriteriafortheintegrityofthe
pressureboundaryofpiping,vessels,heat
exchangersandvalvebodiesarebasedon
fitnessforserviceprocedures,
Reliability
Therearebasicallythreemethodstogainknowledge
frommaintenanceactivities.
Thefirstmethodistoinvestigateafailureormalfunction
inthefield,asithappens.
Theadvantageofthisapproachisthatalotoffirsthand
informationcanbegatheredregardingfailuremodeand
failurecause.
Theshortcomingisthedifficultytogeneralizethe
findings.
Thesecondmethodistoqualitativelyreviewhistorical
maintenancerecords,particularlycorrective
maintenance,foraclassofequipmentoveraperiodof
time
SomeExamplesofMeanFailure
Rates
TanksandVessels
TankleakageIE7/hour
Vesselruptures5E9/hour
Heatexchangertubeleak1E6/hour
1/4"leakinvesselorstoragetank4E5/year
4"leakinvesselorstoragetanklE5/year
Ruptureofvessel6E6/year
Ruptureofstoragetank2E5/year
Rates
PipeandFittings:
Leakofmetallicstraightpipe0.0268E6/hour
Leakofmetallicfittings0.57E6/hour
Flangegasketleak1E7/hour
Pluggedstrainer3E6/hour
1/4"leakin3/4"pipelE5/yearft
1/4"leakin6"pipe4E7/yearft
1/4"leakinpipelargerthan16"6E8/yearft
Ruptureof%"pipe3E7/yearft
Rupture6"pipe8E8/yearft
Rupturepipelargerthan16"E8/yearft
Rates
Valves:
Solenoidvalvefailsopen3E6/hour
Solenoidvalvefailsclosed3E6/hour
Solenoidfailstorespond2.83E3/demand
Motoroperatorfailstorespond5.58E3/demand
Airoperatorfailstorespond2.2E3/demand
Safetyrelieffailstoopen3E3/day
Safetyrelieffailstoreclose3E3/day
CheckvalveleaksthroughE6/hour
Checkvalveleaksthrough3.18E6/hour
Rates
PumpsandCompressors:
Compressorfails1430E6/hour
PumpmotorfailstostartlE2/demand
Centrifugalpumpmotorfailstostart18.6E3/demand
Centrifugalpumpmotorfailstofurlatratedspeed
920E6/hour
Centrifugalpumpmotorfailswhilerunning292E6/hour
Pumpoverspeed3E5/hour
Pipeleak3E9/hourfoot
PiperuptureIEI0/hourfoot
ElementsofFailureAnalysis
DataCollection
VisualExamination,Macrofractographyand
NDE
MetallographyandMicrofractography
ChemicalAnalysis
MechanicalTests
StressandFractureAnalysis
Improvements
ShearandTensionOverload
Tension,ShearandTearing
Failures
Failure
Analysis
Logic
TheHistoryofOilPipelineSpillsinAlberta,20062012
http://www.seankheraj.com/?p=1257December07,2014
AccordingtotheGlobeandMail,thisrupture,whichoccurredalongapipelineoperatedbyPaceOil&Gas,...Thismeasurementofpipelinefailure
rate,...
[ThisarticlewasupdatedonJune8,2012]
LateThursdayeveningonJune7,2012,theSundrePetroleumOperatorsGroup,anotforprofitsociety,notifiedPlainsMidstreamCanadaofamajor
oilpipelinefailurenearSundre,Albertathatspilledanearlyestimateofbetween1,000and3,000barrelsoflightsourcrudeoil(~159477cubic
metres)intoJacksonCreek,atributaryoftheRedDeerRiver.Theriverisoneoftheprovincesmostimportantwaterways,providingdrinkingwater
forthousandsofAlbertans.
ThisrecentspilloccurredjustweeksafteranotheroilpipelineburstinAlbertainlateMay,spillinganestimated22,000barrelsofoilandwater(~3,497
cubicmetres)across4.3hectaresofmuskeginthenorthwestpartoftheprovincenearRainbowLake.AccordingtotheGlobeandMail,thisrupture,
whichoccurredalongapipelineoperatedbyPaceOil&Gas,Ltd.,ranksamongthelargestinNorthAmericainrecentyears,andcertainlyinthe
provinceofAlberta.Acoupleofweeksaftertheaccident,thecompanydowngradedtheestimateto5,000barrelsofsweetcrudeoilwithnowater
(~795cubicmetres).
Theserecentspillsareconsiderablysmallerinvolumeofliquidhydrocarbonsreleasedthanlastyears28,000barrel(~4,452cubicmetres)spillon
theRainbowpipelineoperatedbyPlainsMidstreamCanadanearLittleBuffalo,Alberta.Whilethe2011PlainsMidstreamoilpipelinerupturemay
havebeenthelargestsinglespilleventinrecentmemory,theentireoilpipelinenetworkinAlbertahasspillednearlyequivalentvolumesofliquid
hydrocarbonseveryyearsince2006.
AsmybriefhistoryofoilpipelinespillsinAlbertafrom1970to2005demonstrated,theproblemofpipelinerupturesisendemictotheindustry.Now
withover399,000kilometresofpipelinesundertheauthorityoftheprovincesEnergyResourcesConservationBoard,industryspecialistsand
regulatorsnotonlyknowthatthissystemhasneverbeenfreefromoilspills,butthataspillfreesystemisanimpossiblegoal.Therecenthistoryof
pipelinerupturesinAlbertasince2006furtherunderlinestheserealities.
At1:46amonOctober10,2006,theRainbowPipeLineCompanybecameawareofacrudeoilspillonitspipeline20kilometressoutheastofSlave
Lake.Roughly7,924barrelsofoil(~1,260cubicmetres)pouredintoaseriesofpondsnearthenorthernAlbertatown,despoilingwildlifehabitaton
whatonelocalnewsoutletironicallyreferredtoasBlackTuesday.DarinBarterfromtheAlbertaEnergyUtilitiesBoardtriedtoreassureAlbertans
thattheincidentwasanomalous.AccordingtotheCBC,BartersaiditisrareforpipelinestofailinAlberta.TheEUBpressreleasealsostressedthis
point,insistingthat[p]ipelinefailuresinAlbertaarerare.
Theallegedrarityofsuchoilpipelinespillswasprobablyoflittlesolacetotheresidentsandtouristswhoenjoyedtherecreationalbenefitsoflifeon
GlenniferLake.InmidJune2008,PembinaPipelineCorporationaccidentallyleaked177barrelsofoil(28.1cubicmetres)intotheRedDeerRiver,
eventuallyresultinginalargeoilslickonthesurfaceofGlenniferLake.Whilethevolumeofthespillwasconsiderablysmallerthanthe2006Rainbow
Pipelinespill,thelocationoftheruptureinariverandlakemadethisincidentmorethreateningtohumanlives.AsPembinasdistrictsuperintendent
SandyBuchantoldtheRedDeerAdvocate,Anytimeyouareputtingoilintotheriverandyouareaffectingpeoplesdrinkingwater,youneedtotake
itveryseriously.PembinainstructedlocalresortsonGlenniferLaketoturnofftheirdrinkingwaterintakestoavoidhumanconsumptionofthe
contaminatedwater.FromJune18to27,thecompanytruckedindrinkingwatertoservicethecommunitythroughoutthecourseoftheemergency
untiltheDavidThompsonHealthRegiondeclaredthewatersafefordrinkingagain.ThedayafterPembinadiscoveredtheoilspill,theEnergy
ResourcesConservationBoardonceagaintriedtoreassureAlbertansabouttheinfrequencyofpipelinefailuresintheprovinceandissuedapress
releasewhichemphasizedthattherateofpipelineruptureswasatarecordlow2.1failuresper1000kmofpipelinein2007.Thismeasurementof
pipelinefailurerate,however,issomewhatmisleadingintermsoftheenvironmentalimpactofoilpipelinespills.
TheERCBhasusedtheratioofthenumberofpipelinefailureincidentstothetotallengthoftheprovincespipelinenetworkasametrictoillustrate
thesafetyofthesystem.Forexample,inits2011fieldsurveillanceandoperationssummary,theERCBboaststhatthefailureratewas1.6per
1000kmin2010.Furthermore,ofthe1,174liquidpipelinereleasesin2010,94percenthadnoimpactonthepublic.Thismetricformeasuringthe
safetyofthepipelinesystemdoesnot,infact,measurefrequencysincefrequencyismeasurementoftime,notameasurementofdistance.Assuch,
itmakesmoresensetolookatthenumberofpipelinefailuresperyear.In2010,therewere20crudeoilpipelinefailuresand241multiphasepipeline
failures(carriescrudeoilandgas).AccordingtotheERCB,thesepipelinefailuresreleased3400cubicmetresofliquidhydrocarbonsorroughly
21,000barrelsofoil.Ifweconsiderjustthecrudeoilpipelinefailuresin2010,therewereanaverageof1pipelinefailureevery18.25days.Ifwe
includemultiphasepipelinefailures,thats1every1.4days.
Thetrouble,ofcourse,isthattheratioofpipelinefailurestototaldistanceofthenetworkandthevaguedescriptionofimpactonthepublicdoesnot
adequatelyconveytheenvironmentalrisksoflargeoilpipelinenetworks.Theenvironmentalimpactofoilpipelinespillsisobscuredunderthisrubric.
Theratioofnumberofpipelinefailurestothetotallengthofthenetworkdisguisesthreeimportantmeasurementsoftheenvironmentalimpactofoil
spills:volume,producttype,andlocation.WhiletherateofindividualpipelineruptureshasdeclinedinAlbertasince2006,thisrateincludesall
substances,includingwater,anddoesnotconveythevolumeofindividualspills.Whenconsideredbyproducttype,between20062010therehave
been109failuresoncrudeoilpipelinesand1,538failuresonmultiphasepipelines,whichcarryacombinationofcrudeoilandgas.Byvolume,the
quantityofliquidhydrocarbonspillsonAlbertaspipelinenetworkisstaggering.From20062010,thepipelinenetworkleakedroughly174,213barrels
ofoil(~27,700cubicmetres).In2010alone,morethan21,000barrels(~3,400cubicmetres)werespilledacrossthenetwork,nearlytheequivalentof
themostrecentoilspillnearLittleBuffalo.
Asthe2008pipelinefailureontheRedDeerRiverandGlenniferLakedemonstrated,whenitcomestotheenvironmentalimpactofoilspills,itisall
aboutlocation.Evenarelativelysmallspillinacriticalbodyofwatercanhaveenormouslydetrimentaleffectsonpeopleandwildlife.Thecostof
cleaningsuchspillscanalsovarygreatlybylocation.Unfortunately,theERCBdatafromthefieldsurveillanceandoperationssummariesdonot
includegeographicdatatoassessenvironmentaleffectsofoilpipelinespills.
TokeeptrackoftherecenthistoricalgeographyofoilpipelinespillsinAlberta,Ihavecreatedthefollowingmapbelow.Themapincludesrough
geographicdataaboutmajoroilpipelinespillsinAlbertafrom2006to2012.Thespatialdistributionofthesemajoroilpipelinespillsreveals,perhaps,
whytheseeventssoquicklyfadefrompublicdiscourseandpopularmemory.Allbuttwoofthesubstantialoilspillssince2006occurrednorthof
Edmonton,awayfromtheprovincesmajorurbancentres.Assuch,mostordinaryAlbertanshaveneverpersonallywitnessedtheenvironmental
consequencesofthesepipelinefailures.TherelativelysmallleakofcrudeoilintotheRedDeerRiverin2008drewalotofpublicandnewsmedia
attentionbecauseofitsproximitytothecityofRedDeerandapopulartouristdestination.Similarly,themostrecentspillonJacksonCreekislikelyto
drawconsiderableattention.HadtheMay2012PaceOil&GasspillinnorthwestAlbertanearRainbowLakeoccurredtothesouthinamore
populous(andpopular)location,suchasBanffNationalPark,italmostcertainlywouldhaveattractedgreaternationalmediaattention.The
geographyofoilpipelinespillsthenhaspoliticalconsequencesthatmustalsobeconsideredwhenassessingextensionofthepipelinenetwork.
Amoreaccuratemeasurementoftheenvironmentalimpactofoilpipelinespillsshouldincludeinformationaboutvolume,producttype,andlocation.
OnlythencanCanadiansunderstandtheenvironmentalhistoryofoilpipelinesandreasonablyassessfutureplanstoexpandthenetwork.
PleaseletmeknowinthecommentsifIhavemissedanymajorspillsonthemapbelow.
GasPipelineFailure
http://www.oilcoalgas.com/gas/gaspipelinefailure.phpDecember07,2014
NaturalGasOilFiredCoalFiredNuclearPowerGenerationPowerDistribution...PipelineFailureInvestigationReportsresultingfromfourgas
pipelinefailures.
ThefollowingprovidessummariesofthePipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration(PHMSA)PipelineFailureInvestigationReports
resultingfromfourgaspipelinefailures.Thesearenotintendedtoprovideacomprehensivestudyofgaspipelinefailures,.Thesesummariesareonly
intendedtogiveafewreallifeexamplesofwhatcanhappen.
Thecompletereportsareavailableonlineat:SeeCompleteReport
OnNovember3,2011apipelinefailedattheArtemasCompressorStationinBedfordCounty,PA.Thefailureresultedinthereleaseofnaturalgas
andresultedinafire.Propertydamagewaslimitedtothecompressorstation,andthemainofficestructureandseveraloutbuildingsweredestroyed
duetotheheatandflames.Therewasnodamagetopublicproperty.Therewerenoinjuriesorfatalitiesasaresultofthisincident.
Whathadfailedwasatwoinchmanualdrainline,locatedatthebottomofFilterSeparatorA.Thedrainpipewallhadthinnedasaresultofinternal
corrosion.Thepressureinthefilterseparatoratthetimeoffailurewas1,940psig.Thiswasbelowthe2,400psigMaximumAllowableOperating
Pressure(MAOP)forthefilterseparator.
Thecorrosioninthedrainlinewascausedbyfluidcollectingandremainingstagnantinthemanualdumpdrainlineforlengthyperiodsoftime.The
fluidswouldbedrainedwhenthedumpvalvewasmanuallyoperated,butthiswasdoneinfrequently.Theseparatorwasequippedwithanautomatic
dumpsystemwhichresultedinthemanualdumpvalveonlybeingoperatedoccasionally.
Accordingtothelaboratoryanalysisthestagnantfluidledtointernalcorrosionandwallthinninginthefailedsectionofpiping.Theinternalcorrosion
wasonlyfoundinthemanualdumppiping.Therewasnoindicationsofinternalcorrosioninthepipingassociatedwiththeautomaticdumpsystem.
Topreventsimilardamageinothermanualdumpvalves,allmanualdumpvalveswillbeoperatedweekly,duringthewinterseason,toremovefluids
andsolids.Whereapplicable,theheattracingonliquidremovaldeviceswillbeinspectedonceperweekduringthewinterseason.
TennesseeGasPipelineCompany(TGP)providestransportationofnaturalgasforindustrialandcommercialdeliveriesfromSouthTexastotheEast
Coastthroughseveralsystems.Thefailuredescribedhereoccurredinthe100System.
The100Systemhas4,600milesofmultiplepipelinesrunningfromTexastoWestVirginia.OnDecember8,2010areleaseofnaturalgasinthe
dischargeheaderareaofStation17atEastBernard,TXwasdetected.Thefailedpipewasadeadleg24inchdiameter,halfinchwall,X40lateral
thatconnectedtothestationdischargeheaderpiping.
TheMAOPofthepipingis750psig.Thefailureoccurredatapressureof720psig.
Thefailurewasasuddenrupturethatlefta100footby25footholearoundthepipeline.Approximatelyatwelvefootsectionofthepipewasthrown
295feetfromthehole.Noinjuriesorfireresultedfromthisfailure.AlldamageswerecontainedwithinStation17.
ThestationESDwasactivatedimmediatelywhentheincidentoccurred.Approximately9milesof30
pipelinewasblowndowntosecurethe
location,takingabout6hours.
Theinvestigationrevealedthatadeadlegwasestablishedin2000whena24inchhighpressurepipelinewassoldanddisconnectedfromtheTGP
system.Inspectionduringthedisconnectingprocessrevealednointernalcorrosionissues.Thedisconnectresultedinapproximately40feetof
isolatedpipewithoutanygasflow.Thisabandonedconnectionbecameadeadleginthepipingatthestationandwasthepointoffailureforthe
rupture.
Thefailuremechanismthatledtothepipelinerupturewasidentifiedasinternalmicrobiologicallyinducedcorrosion(MIC).An83.6%walllosswas
measured.Therewereobviousindicationsofresidualmoisturegatheringinthedeadleg,contributingtointernalcorrosionandathinningofthepipe
wall.Thefinalconclusionwasthatthemoistureinthepipepromotedthegrowthofmicrobiologicalorganismswhichresultedincorrosion.Evaluation
ofallotherdeadlegsegmentsofpipeintheStationyardfoundnoadditionalareasaffected.
Atapproximately5:08pmonNovember30,2010TennesseeGasPipelineCo.(TGP)reportedareleaseofnaturalgasdueanunknowncauseon
theirpipelinedownstreamofStation40,Natchitoches,Louisiana.
Afailed30inchpipewasfoundapproximately1.4milesdownstreamofthecompressorstation.A50inchlong,straightcircumferentialcrackhad
occurredinawrinklebend.Wrinklebendswerecommoninconstructionwhenthepipelinewasinstalledin1948.Thefailurewassudden,leavinga
15
holearoundthepipeline.Therewasnofireorinjuriesassociatedwiththisfailure.Thesectionofpipelinewasisolatedandthesystemwasblown
downbyapproximately4:40pm.
ThepipelineMAOPis750psigandwasoperatingnormallyatapproximately671psigwhenthefailureoccurred.
Ananalysisofthepipefailurewasdonewiththefollowingconclusions:
Apipelinetechnician,assignedtotakeannualcathodicprotectionreadings,noticedbubblesinstandingwaterwithinthepipelinerightofway.The
areaiscrisscrossedwithsmalldiametercrudeoilgatheringpipelinesandthisresultedinuncertaintyaboutthesourceofthebubbles.
ThesourceofthebubbleswasfoundtobealeakintheTransco24inch"APipeline."Productionsupplyingthe"APipeline"wasshutinandthevalve
segmentisolated.Excavationrevealedthatthegaswascomingfromasmallexternalcorrosionanomalylocatedonthepipelineatapproximatelythe
5o
clockposition.Additionalisolatedcorrosionpitsinthepipeneartheleaksiterequiredthatabout30feetofthepipebereplaced.
Ametallurgicalevaluationdeterminedthattheprobablecauseofthefailurewasmicrobiologicallyinducedcorrosion(MIC).Theanalysisalso
indicatedthatthecoaltarcoatingneartheleakwasdegraded.Thismostlikelywascausedbyhydrocarbonliquidsleakingfromadeteriorated
gatheringpipelinethatcrossedabovetheTransco"APipeline."Theleakinghydrocarbonswouldhavecreatedanenvironmentconducivetothe
growthofsulfatereducingbacteria.
Transcohadrecentlychangedthecathodicprotectiononthissegmentofthepipelinefromusingthe850mVwithconsiderationforIRdroptothe100
mVdepolarizationcriterion.Acloseintervalsurvey(CIS)performedin2009didnotindicateanyareaswherethe100mVcriterionwasnotbeingmet.
WhileMICisadifferentfailuremechanismthantraditionalelectrochemicalcorrosion,researchhasfoundthat200to300mVofpolarizationmay
protectcarbonsteelfromcorrosioncausedbysulfatereducingbacteria.Higherpolarizationpotentialsmayberequiredtoaccomplishthisprotection
dependingonthespecificenvironmentaroundthepipeline.WhiletherewasnoindicationthatTranscowasnotmeetingtherequiredcathodic
protectionrequirementsofPart192,thelevelofcathodicprotectionpotentialsmaintainedonthe
APipeline
apparentlywerenotofahighenough
leveltoinhibitMIC.
PipelineCapacityandUtilization
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/usage.htmlDecember07,2014
NaturalGasPipelineCapacity&UtilizationOverview|UtilizationRates|IntegrationofStorage...Thesystemwidepipelineflowrate,...
Integratingstoragecapacityintothenaturalgaspipelinenetworkdesigncanincreaseaveragedayutilizationrates.Thisintegrationinvolvesmoving
notonlynaturalgascurrentlybeingproducedbutnaturalgasthathasbeenproducedearlierandkeptintemporarystoragefacilities.
Ontheotherhand,duringperiodsofhighdemandfornaturalgastransportationservices,usageonsomeportionsofapipelinesystemmayexceed
100%ofcertificatedcapacity.Certificatedcapacityrepresentsaminimumlevelofservicethatcanbemaintainedoveranextendedperiodoftime,
andnotthemaximumthroughputcapabilityofasystemorsegmentonanygivenday.
Utilizationratesbelow100%donotnecessarilyimplythatadditionalcapacityisavailableforuse.Apipelinecompanythatprimarilyservesa
seasonalmarket,forinstance,mayhavearelativelylowaverageutilizationrateespeciallyduringthesummermonths.Butthatdoesnotmeanthere
isunreservedcapacityonalongtermbasis.
Mostcompaniestrytoschedulemaintenanceinthesummermonthswhendemandsonpipelinecapacitytendtobelower,butanoccasional
unanticipatedincidentmayoccurthatsuspendstransmissionservice.
Naturalgaspipelinecompaniesprefertooperatetheirsystemsasclosetofullcapacityaspossibletomaximizetheirrevenues.However,theaverage
utilizationrate(flowrelativetodesigncapacity)ofanaturalgaspipelinesystemseldomreaches100%.Factorsthatcontributetooutagesinclude:
Storageisusuallyintegratedintooravailabletothesystemattheproductionand/orconsumingendasameansofbalancingflowlevelsthroughout
theyear.Trunklinesservingmarketswithsignificantstoragecapacityhavegreaterpotentialforachievingahighutilizationratebecausetheload
movingonthesepipelinescanbeleveled.Totheextentthatthesepipelinesservemultiplemarkets,theyalsocanachievehigherutilizationrates
becauseoftheloaddiversityofthemarketstheyserve.Trunklines,whicharegenerallyupstream(closerto)thenaturalgasproductionfieldsand
storageareas,maysometimesexhibitpeakperiodutilizationratesexceeding100%becausetheyareoccasionallycapableofhandlingmuchlarger
volumesthanindicatedbytheoperationaldesigncertificatedbyFERC.Utilizationonthegridsystems,whichareclosertotheconsumingmarket
areasanddownstreamofthestoragefields,ismorelikelytoreflectaseasonalloadprofileofthemarketbeingserved.Thegridtypesystemsusually
operateatloweraverageutilizationlevelsthantrunklinesandusuallyshowmarkedvariationbetweenhighandlowflowlevels,reflectingseasonal
serviceandlocalmarketcharacteristics.Thereareseveralwaysthatnaturalgaspipelinesystemutilizationmaybeestimated,asdemonstratedin
thefollowingcases:AsameasureoftheaveragedaynaturalgasthroughputrelativetoestimatesofsystemcapacityatStateandregional
boundariesThesystemwidepipelineflowrate,whichhighlightsvariationsinsystemusagerelativetoanestimatedsystempeakthroughputlevel
Thelattermeasureisagoodindicationofhowwellthedesignofthesystemmatchescurrentshipperpeakdayneeds.Forexample,whenapipeline
showsacomparativelylowaverageusagerate(basedonannualormonthlydata)yetshowsausagerateapproaching100percentonitspeakday,
itindicatesthatthesystemiscalleduponandiscapableofmeetingitsshipper'smaximumdailyneeds.Nevertheless,alargespreadbetween
averageusageratesandpeakdayusageratesmayindicateopportunitiestofindbetterwaystoutilizeoffpeakunusedcapacity.Insomecases,
utilizationratesexceeding100percentmaybeanartifactofthedatathatobscuresthetrueoperationalstatusofthepipeline.Insomeinstancesthe
sumofindividualtransportationtransactionsmayexceedpipelinecapacityeventhoughphysicallythepipelinemaynotbefull.Forexample,suppose
asegmentfrompointsAtoD(withpointsBandCbetweenAandD)hasacapacityof200millioncubicfeet(MMcf)perday.Supposefurtherthat
thissegmenthandlesa100MMcfperdaytransactionfromAtoB,asecondof100MMcfperdayfromBtoC,andathirdof100MMcfperdayfrom
CtoD.Thepipelinecompanywillreporttransportationvolumesof300MMcfperday,eventhoughitscapacityis200MMcfperdaybutisonly50
percentutilizedonanyonesegment.
OilPipelineFailure
http://www.oilcoalgas.com/oil/oilpipelinefailure.phpDecember07,2014
OilPipelineFailure....ThefollowingprovidessummariesoffiveoilpipelinefailuresasreportedtothePipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafety
Administration...
ThefollowingprovidessummariesoffiveoilpipelinefailuresasreportedtothePipelineandHazardousMaterialsSafetyAdministration(PHMSA).
Thesesummariesarenotintendedtobeacomprehensivestudyofoilpipelinefailures,.Thesesummariesareonlyintendedtogiveafewreallife
examplesofwhatcanhappen.
Afarmerinstallingdraintilestruckandrupturedthe10inchBuckeyeLine803inCayugaCounty,NewYork.Approximately595barrelsofgasoline
werereleased.Thispipelinerunsapproximately95milesfromtheAuburnTerminaltotheRochesterTerminal.Thepipelinelocationwasproperly
marked.ThefarmerhadbeenincontactwithlocalBuckeyepersonnelduringtheinstallationofthedraintileinhisfieldadjacenttoBuckeye
s
pipeline.ThefarmerhadbeeninstructedbyBuckeyenottodiginthepipelinerightofway,whichextendsapproximately25feetfromthecenterlineof
thepipeline.Onthedayoftheincident,thefarmerwasplowingthefieldperpendiculartothepipeline,andfailedtostopthetractorandraisethetile
plowoutofthegroundpriortoproceedingoverthepipeline.Afterhittingthepipeline,thefarmercalledBuckeyetoreportthathehadhitthepipeline
andthatgasolinewasescapingfromthepipe.Buckeyepersonnelarrivedatthesitewithin15minutestobegintheemergencyresponse.Ontheday
oftheincident,Line803wasnotflowingproductandwasshutinduetoanunrelatedleakattheAuburnTankFarmthathadbeenfoundearlierthe
samemorning.
BuckeyewasintheprocessofpumpingUltraLowSulfurDiesel(ULSD)fuelfromtheirCoraopolisTerminaltotheirMidlandTerminalinShippingport,
PA.Thepressureatthesiteatthetimeoffailurewas462psigwhichwasbelowtheMAOPof1,147psig.Aresidentreportedasprayofproductthat
couldbeseenrisingabovethetreesinawoodedareabehindagypsumplant.Buckeyerespondedanddeterminedthattheirline820thatwas
leaking.Theleakwascausedbyanexternalcorrosionpit.Approximately300barrelsofdieselfuelwerespilled.Itwasestimatedthat238barrels
wererecovered.Thespillfollowedthenaturalterrainfromtheleaktoastormwaterdrainagecanallocatedbehindthegypsumplant.Theleaking
productwascontainedinthedrainagecanalandpreventedfromenteringtheOhioRiver.Buckeyeisolatedthelineandtheleakingsegmentwas
drainedintotanktruckslocatedattheMidlandTerminal.Theleakwasrepairedbycuttingoutandreplacinga10footsectionofpipewithnewpipe.
ThepipelinewasreturnedtofulloperationonMarch23rd.ThecauseoftheleakmayhavebeenrelatedtoanApril2010washoutneartheleak
location.Approximately2feetofpipewasexposed,butitwasdeterminedatthetimethatthecoatingwasintactandnotdamaged.Aprofessional
metallurgicalanalysisofthefailedpipeindicatedthatitwaslikelythatlowpHwaterdirectlycontactingtheexposedsegmentofpipelinecausedthe
localizedexternalpittingcorrosion.Thecorrosionwaslimitedtothesectionofexposedpipingwherethecoatinghadbecomedisbonded.
OntheeveningofDecember1,2010,ChevronPipeLineCompany(CPL)shutdowntheirNumber2pipelinebecauseoferraticsupervisorycontrol
anddataacquisition(SCADA)informationfollowingrestartofthelineafteraplannedshutdown.Becausethispipelineexperienced
slackline
phenomena,CPL
sleakdetectionsystemoftenwouldtriggerfalsealarms.SCADAcontrollerscouldnotreliablyrecognizeanactualreleasebelowa
certainthreshold.TheNumber2pipelinedeliverscrudeoiltotheChevronSaltLakeCityrefinery.ThepipelinetransportscrudeoilfromRangely,
ColoradototheSaltLakeCityrefinery.ItcrossesWolfCreekPassandthenquicklydescendsintotheSaltLakeBasin.Aftershuttingdownthe
pipelinefieldteamsweresentouttopatroltheline.AreleaseofcrudeoilwasfoundattheChevronRedButteBlockValveinstallation,adjacenttothe
UniversityofUtah
sarboretumand100yardsuphillfromRedButteCreek.Adamaged6inchvalve,that"stubbed"offoftheNumber2pipelinein
theRedButteblockvalvevault,wasthesourceoftheleak.ThefailedvalvewaswaterinjectionvalveforawatertestconductedinJune2010.The
valveislocatedinabelowgradeopenvault.Thereleasedcrudeoilfilledthevault,spilledoutofthefencedareaandfloweddownhilltowardRed
ButteCreek.Thelowtemperaturesthatnightcongealedthecrudemakingitmoreviscous.Thecrudeoildidnotreachthecreek.Thefailedvalvewas
intheclosedpositionatthetimeoftherelease.Analysisofthevalveshowedthaticehadformedinsidethevalve,forcinganopeningbetweenthe
bonnetandvalvebody.Duetothepipeline
stopography,andthefacttheleakyvalvewasimmediatelyupstreamofthemainlineblockvalve,oil
continuedtoflowouttheruptured6inchvalveevenaftertheshutdown.Thefinalspillamountwas500barrels,ofwhich250wererecovered.The
investigationshowedthattheOEM'swinterizationrecommendationshadnotbeenfollowedandthewaterhadnotbeenflushedfromthevalve.In
addition,therewasnoformalwinterizationplaninplaceforidentifyingandcorrectingthistypeofcircumstance.,andtheprocedureforthewatertest
wasdevelopedwithoutadequatecommunication.Asaresultoperationspersonnelwerenotawarethatwaterwasisolatedinthevalveafter
commissioning.TheinvestigationalsorevealedCPLdidnothaveanadequateleakdetectionsystemontheNumber2crudeline.In2007CPLhad
performedastudytoidentifypotentialimprovementstotheleakdetectionsystem,buthadnotimplementedanyoftherecommendationsatthetime
oftheleak.
Aflangegasketfailedresultinginthereleaseof1,700barrelsofVacuumGasOil(VGO)fromtheSunocoFM1pipeline.Theoilflowedintoanopen
ingroundvalvepitandthesurroundingareaintheWestYardoftherefineryinPhiladelphia,PA.Thefailedflangegasketwasdownstreamofamain
linevalveinadeadlegofpipeleadingtotheFM1pigtrap.Alossofpipesupportandleakagethroughaclosedvalvecontributedtothefailure.
Therewerenofatalitiesorinjuries,andtheincidentdidnotresultinafire,explosionorevacuation.
ASwasnormalpractice,MidValleyemployeeshadmanuallylinedupthemanifoldvalvestoreceiveashipmentofcrudeoilintothe#7tank.Upon
startup,crudeoilwasobservedgushingfromthesoilinthemanifoldarea.Theflowwasstoppedandthereleasewasidentifiedashavingcomefrom
oneofseveralburiedlineswithinthemanifoldarea.Aninspectionofthemanifoldareaindicatedthataburieddeadlegsectionofthemanifoldpiping
thatdeliveredcrudeoiltotanks#13and#14wasreleasingproduct.ThesectionofmanifoldpipinghadanMOPof275psig,andwasoperatingat
lessthan150psigwhenthereleaseoccurred.198barrelsofcrudeoilwereestimatedtohavebeenreleasedand196barrelswererecovered.Mid
Valleyisolatedtheundergroundsectionofthemanifoldpipingandinstalledblindflangestoisolateitfromtheabovegroundheader.Oncethespill
wascontrolled,approximately25feetof8"buriedheaderwasexcavatedforevaluationand/orremoval.Itwasdeterminedthattwolocalizedspotsof
internalcorrosionwerethesourceoftheleak.MidValleydeterminedthatcrudeoilfeedtotanks#13and#14wasnotessentialtotheiroperations
andtheychosentonotreplacethissectionoftheheader.
AnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGas
http://theprintableform.rhcloud.com/analysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas/December07,2014
analysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas....(eg,gasflowrate,...Abstractanalysisofvibrationandfailurereciprocatingtriplexpumpsforj.c
...
Readarticlethatrelatedaboutanalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas.HerewewilldiscussaboutAnalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoil
andgas.Fig4distributionofcausesofoilpipelinefailuresinthends,19992005(source:pipelineoilspillpreventionandremediationinnds,nnpc,
2007).Naturalresourcesdefensecouncil4charpenier,ad,jabergerson,andhlmaclean,(2009),understandingtheanadianoilsandsindustrys
greenhousegas.Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustryinstrumentationformeasuringkeyparameters(eg,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,flame
temperature,.
www.iaeng.orgNaturalresourcesdefensecouncil4charpenier,a.d.,j.a.bergerson,andh.l.maclean,(2009),understandingtheanadianoilsands
industrysgreenhousegas.Ebooktitle:GhgemissionfactorsforhighcarbonintensitycrudeoilsTechnologiesfortheoilandgasindustry
instrumentationformeasuringkeyparameters(e.g.,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,flametemperature,.Ebooktitle:Technologiesfortheoilandgas
industryJointundp/worldbankenergysectormanagementassistanceprogramme(esmap)crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsand
prospectsjune2003.Ebooktitle:Crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospectsFig.1:geometricshapeofgaspipelinewallcorrosion
definedusingilidata.atthesametimetoanalyzestressstateandevaluateremainingstrengthofthe.Ebooktitle:Analysisofthecorrodedpipeline
segmentsusinginlineSevereoperatingconditions.criticalsafetyoperations.dependabilityinremotelocations.allthesefactorsarekeyconcernsfor
oil&gasequipmentusedin.Ebooktitle:Valvesforoil&gasindustriesmogasUpstreamoil&gasoperationalexcellencechoosetheleaderinvensys
isaworldleaderinupstreamoil&gasautomation,providingafullrangeofcontrol,safetyand.Ebooktitle:Upstreamoil&gasinvensys|industrial
automationOilandgasprojectproposalsthataresubjecttothecoastalcommissionscoastaldevelopmentpermitandfederalconsistencyreview
authorityinclude(1)offshore.Ebooktitle:Oilspillpreventionandresponseca.coastalcommission
Pipelinefailurecauses
http://www.corrosiondoctors.org/Pipeline/Pipelinefailures.htmDecember07,2014
PipelineFailureCauses....ruptureofpreviouslydamagedpipe,andvandalism.Thedatashowthatforhazardousliquidpipelinesandgas
transmissionpipelines,...
Therearemanycausesandcontributorstopipelinefailures.TheU.S.DepartmentofTransportation
sResearchandSpecialPrograms
Administration,OfficeofPipelineSafety(RSPA/OPS)compilesdataonpipelineaccidentsandtheircauses.(reference76)
Thiscombineddatafor20022003indicatethat
outsideforce
damagecontributestoalargernumberofpipelineaccidentsandincidentsthanany
othercategoryofcauses,ifallaccidentsinvolvinghazardousliquid,naturalgastransmission,andnaturalgasdistributionpipelinesareconsidered
together.Whenhazardousliquidpipelinedataisconsideredseparately,corrosioncontributestoahighernumberofaccidentsthanothercategories.
Outsideforcedamagecanincludetheeffectsof:earthmovement,lightning,heavyrainsandflood,temperature,highwinds,excavationbythe
operator,excavationbyathirdparty,fireorexplosionexternaltothepipeline,beingstruckbyvehiclesnotrelatedtoexcavation,ruptureofpreviously
damagedpipe,andvandalism.Thedatashowthatforhazardousliquidpipelinesandgastransmissionpipelines,thelargestportionofoutsideforce
damageresultsfromexcavationdamage.Thismayoccurwhenexcavationactivityoccurringnearthepipelinecausesanaccidentalhitontheline.
Therangeofexcavationdamagerunsfromdamagetotheexternalcoatingofthepipe,whichcanleadtoacceleratedcorrosionandthepotentialfor
futurefailure,tocuttingdirectlyintothelineandcausingleaksor,insomecases,catastrophicfailure.
FollowingaretablesandgraphsbasedonrecentRSPA/OPSstatistics,showingthecausesofpipelineaccidents.InformationonOPSSafety
Initiativesthataddressthesesignificantfailurecausesmaybefoundhere.
Notes:
(1)ThefailuredatabreakdownbycausemaychangeasOPSreceivessupplementalinformation
onaccidents.
(2)Sumofnumbersinacolumnmaynotmatchgiventotalbecauseofroundingerror.
Notethatcorrosion(externalandinternal)isthemostcommoncauseofnaturalgastransmissionpipelineincidentsin20022003.
Notethatover60%ofnaturalgasdistributionpipelineincidentswerecausedbyoutsideforcedamagein20022003.Theseincidentscaninclude
damagefromexcavationbytheoperatororbyotherparties,aswellasdamagefromnaturalforces.
Seamweldfailureinapetroleumpipeline
http://www.dnv.com/industry/oil_gas/publications/updates/pipeline_update/2012/01_2012/CASE_STUDY_Seam_weld_failure_in_a_petroleum_pipeline.aspDecember07,2014
Therearemorethan2.5millionmilesofoilandgaspipelinesintheUnitedStates....SeamweldfailureinapetroleumpipelineHavealookatwhatI
foundonDNV...
Therearemorethan2.5millionmilesofoilandgaspipelinesintheUnitedStates.Thesepipelinestypicallycontainlongitudinalseamweldsineach
pipejointandgirthweldsthatconnecttheindividualjointstoformthepipeline.Bothtypesofweldsarepronetofailurefromtimeindependentand/or
timedependentfailuremechanisms.
Whilesomesmallerdiameterpipelinesareseamless,mostpipelinesaremanufacturedbyformingflatplateorskelpintoatubularformand
completingalongitudinalseamweld.Bothsubmergedarcweldingandautogenousweldingprocessesareusedforweldcompletion.
Submergedarcweldedlinepipeismanufacturedbyfirstformingaflatplateorskelpintoatubularshape(can)inasetofpresses,followedbyweld
completion.Priortoformingthecan,theedgesaretypicallybeveled.Historically,singlesubmergedarcwelding(SSAW)anddoublesubmergedarc
welded(DSAW)processeshavebeenusedbut,currently,theDSAWprocessistheonlysubmergedarcweldingprocessthatisapprovedinAPI5L.
InSSAWlinepipe,theedgesarejoinedbyasinglepasssubmergedarcweldmadefromtheoutsidesurfaceontoabackingshoelocatedattheID
surface.DSAWlinepipeisformedinasimilarmannerexceptonepassismadefromtheODsurfacefollowedbyapassfromtheIDsurface,orvice
versa.Fillerweldmaterialisusedinbothprocesses.OnevariationofthisprocessisusedtoproducedspiralweldedDSAWlinepipeinwhichskelp
ishelicallywoundandweldedtoproduceaspiralweld.
Historically,therehavebeenseveraldifferentautogenousweldingprocessesforlongitudinalseamweldsincludingfurnacelapwelding,furnacebutt
welding,electricflashwelding(EFW)andelectricresistancewelding(ERW).ERWcurrentlyisthedominantautogenousweldingprocessforpipe
manufacturing.ERWlinepipeismanufacturedbyformingplateorskelpintoatubularshapeandheatingthetwoadjoiningedgeswithelectriccurrent
andforcingthemtogethermechanically.Anautogenousbondisformedbetweenthemoltenedges.UpsetmaterialattheweldistrimmedontheOD
andIDsurfaces.
Varioustypesofdefectscanbeproducedintheseweldsandthedefectstypicallyareuniquetothespecificweldingprocedure.Someofthese
defectsaretoosmalltobedetectedinthemillandareneveranintegrityproblemforthepipelines.Otherdefectsthatarenotdetectedatthemillcan
failduringtheinitialhydrostatictestofapipeline,orgrowinservicebyfatigue,stresscorrosioncracking,orothermechanisms,resultinginaservice
leakorfailure.Becauseofdifferencesinthemetallurgyattheweldandthebasemetalofthepipe,theweldscanalsobepronetoenvironmentally
inducedfailuremechanismssuchaspreferentialcorrosion.
Thiscasestudydescribesaruptureofseamweldduringahydrostaticpressuretest.Thepipelinethatfailedwascomprisedof16inchdiameterby
0.312inchwallthickness,API5LX52linepipethatcontainedanERWlongitudinalseam.Thepipelinetransportedrefinedpetroleumproducts.The
maximumoperatingpressure(MOP)onthislinesegmentwas1,408psig,whichcorrespondsto69.4%ofthespecifiedminimumyieldstrength
(SMYS).Thefailureoccurredduringinitialpressurizationatatestpressureof1,390psig,whichcorrespondsto98.7%oftheMOPand68.5%ofthe
SMYS.Thenormaloperatingpressureatthefailurelocationrangedfrom1,000to1,100psig(71.0to78.1%ofMOP).
Thepipelinewasinstalledin1965andwasexternallycoatedwithcoaltar.Thecoatingwasnotintactnearthefailure.Thepipelinehadanimpressed
currentcathodicprotectionsystemthatwascommissionedaround1965.Thispipelinesegmentwaspreviouslyhydrostaticallytestedinthefallof
1965.Thehydrostatictestlasted24hoursandthemaximumpressurewas1,760psig(125%ofMOPand86.8%ofSMYS).
Thepipesectionwasvisuallyexaminedandphotographedintheasreceivedcondition.Transversebasemetalandcrossweldsampleswere
removedfromthepipesectionformechanical(CharpyVnotchandtensile)testing.Samplesforchemicalanalysisofthesteelwereremovedfromthe
basemetal.Magneticparticleinspection(MPI)wasperformedwherethecoatingwasremovedtoidentifydefectsatorneartheseamweld.
Transversemetallographicsampleswereremovedfromtheseam,atandawayfromthefailureorigin.Thesamplesweremounted,polished,andlight
photomicrographsweretakentoexaminethemorphologyandsteelmicrostructure.Sampleswereremovedfromthefailureorigintoanalyzethe
morphologyofthefracturesurfaceinthescanningelectronmicroscope.
TheresultsoftheanalysisindicatedthattheruptureinitiatedatanIDconnectedpreexistinghookcrack.Thisandallhookcracksareslightlyoffset
fromthebondlineoftheERWseam.Noevidenceofinservicegrowthbyfatiguewasfound,althoughthequalityofthefractographywaspoorasa
resultofcorrosionofthefracturesurfacesthatoccurredaftertherupture.Thetensilepropertiesofthelinepipesteelandthesteelchemistrywere
typicalofthevintageandgradeandmettheAPI5Lspecificationsinplaceatthetimeofmanufacture.ThemicrostructureandCharpytoughness
propertiesofthesteelalsoweretypicalforthevintageandgrade.
http://activehistory.ca/2012/06/thehistoryofoilpipelinespillsinalberta20062012/December07,2014
Thismeasurementofpipelinefailurerate,...HadtheMay2012PaceOil&GasspillinnorthwestAlbertanearRainbowLakeoccurredtothesouthin
amorepopulous...
LateThursdayeveningonJune7,2012,theSundrePetroleumOperatorsGroup,anotforprofitsociety,notifiedPlainsMidstreamCanadaofamajor
oilpipelinefailurenearSundre,Albertathatspilledanearlyestimateofbetween1,000and3,000barrelsoflightsourcrudeoil(~159477cubic
metres)intoJacksonCreek,atributaryoftheRedDeerRiver.Theriverisoneoftheprovincesmostimportantwaterways,providingdrinkingwater
forthousandsofAlbertans.
ThisrecentspilloccurredjustweeksafteranotheroilpipelineburstinAlbertainlateMay,spillinganestimated22,000barrelsofoilandwater(~3,497
cubicmetres)across4.3hectaresofmuskeginthenorthwestpartoftheprovincenearRainbowLake.AccordingtotheGlobeandMail,thisrupture,
whichoccurredalongapipelineoperatedbyPaceOil&Gas,Ltd.,ranksamongthelargestinNorthAmericainrecentyears,andcertainlyinthe
provinceofAlberta.Acoupleofweeksaftertheaccident,thecompanydowngradedtheestimateto5,000barrelsofsweetcrudeoilwithnowater
(~795cubicmetres).
Theserecentspillsareconsiderablysmallerinvolumeofliquidhydrocarbonsreleasedthanlastyears28,000barrel(~4,452cubicmetres)spillon
theRainbowpipelineoperatedbyPlainsMidstreamCanadanearLittleBuffalo,Alberta.Whilethe2011PlainsMidstreamoilpipelinerupturemay
havebeenthelargestsinglespilleventinrecentmemory,theentireoilpipelinenetworkinAlbertahasspillednearlyequivalentvolumesofliquid
hydrocarbonseveryyearsince2005.
AsmybriefhistoryofoilpipelinespillsinAlbertafrom1970to2005demonstrated,theproblemofpipelinerupturesisendemictotheindustry.Now
withover399,000kilometresofpipelinesundertheauthorityoftheprovincesEnergyResourcesConservationBoard,industryspecialistsand
regulatorsnotonlyknowthatthissystemhasneverbeenfreefromoilspills,butthataspillfreesystemisanimpossiblegoal.Therecenthistoryof
pipelinerupturesinAlbertasince2006furtherunderlinestheserealities.
At1:46amonOctober10,2006,theRainbowPipeLineCompanybecameawareofacrudeoilspillonitspipeline20kilometressoutheastofSlave
Lake.Roughly7,924barrelsofoil(~1,260cubicmetres)pouredintoaseriesofpondsnearthenorthernAlbertatown,despoilingwildlifehabitaton
whatonelocalnewsoutletironicallyreferredtoasBlackTuesday.DarinBarterfromtheAlbertaEnergyUtilitiesBoardtriedtoreassureAlbertans
thattheincidentwasanomalous.AccordingtotheCBC,BartersaiditisrareforpipelinestofailinAlberta.TheEUBpressreleasealsostressedthis
point,insistingthat[p]ipelinefailuresinAlbertaarerare.
Theallegedrarityofsuchoilpipelinespillswasprobablyoflittlesolacetotheresidentsandtouristswhoenjoyedtherecreationalbenefitsoflifeon
GlenniferLake.InmidJune2008,PembinaPipelineCorporationaccidentallyleaked177barrelsofoil(28.1cubicmetres)intotheRedDeerRiver,
eventuallyresultinginalargeoilslickonthesurfaceofGlenniferLake.Whilethevolumeofthespillwasconsiderablysmallerthanthe2006Rainbow
Pipelinespill,thelocationoftheruptureinariverandlakemadethisincidentmorethreateningtohumanlives.AsPembinasdistrictsuperintendent
SandyBuchantoldtheRedDeerAdvocate,Anytimeyouareputtingoilintotheriverandyouareaffectingpeoplesdrinkingwater,youneedtotake
itveryseriously.PembinainstructedlocalresortsonGlenniferLaketoturnofftheirdrinkingwaterintakestoavoidhumanconsumptionofthe
contaminatedwater.FromJune18to27,thecompanytruckedindrinkingwatertoservicethecommunitythroughoutthecourseoftheemergency
untiltheDavidThompsonHealthRegiondeclaredthewatersafefordrinkingagain.ThedayafterPembinadiscoveredtheoilspill,theEnergy
ResourcesConservationBoardonceagaintriedtoreassureAlbertansabouttheinfrequencyofpipelinefailuresintheprovinceandissuedapress
releasewhichemphasizedthattherateofpipelineruptureswasatarecordlow2.1failuresper1000kmofpipelinein2007.Thismeasurementof
pipelinefailurerate,however,issomewhatmisleadingintermsoftheenvironmentalimpactofoilpipelinespills.
TheERCBhasusedtheratioofthenumberofpipelinefailureincidentstothetotallengthoftheprovincespipelinenetworkasametrictoillustrate
thesafetyofthesystem.Forexample,inits2011fieldsurveillanceandoperationssummary,theECRBboaststhatthefailureratewas1.6per
1000kmin2010.Furthermore,ofthe1,174liquidpipelinereleasesin2010,94percenthadnoimpactonthepublic.Thetrouble,ofcourse,isthat
thismeasurementofpipelinefailurerateandvaguedescriptionofimpactonthepublicdoesnotadequatelyconveytheenvironmentalrisksoflarge
oilpipelinenetworks.Theenvironmentalimpactofoilpipelinespillsisobscuredunderthisrubric.
Theratioofnumberofpipelinefailurestothetotallengthofthenetworkdisguisesthreeimportantmeasurementsoftheenvironmentalimpactofoil
spills:volume,producttype,andlocation.WhiletherateofindividualpipelineruptureshasdeclinedinAlbertasince2006,thisrateincludesall
substances,includingwater,anddoesnotconveythevolumeofindividualspills.Whenconsideredbyproducttype,between20062010therehave
been109failuresoncrudeoilpipelinesand1,538failuresonmultiphasepipelines,whichcarryacombinationofcrudeoilandgas.Byvolume,the
quantityofliquidhydrocarbonspillsonAlbertaspipelinenetworkisstaggering.From20062010,thepipelinenetworkleakedroughly174,213barrels
ofoil(~27,700cubicmetres).In2010alone,morethan21,000barrels(~3,400cubicmetres)werespilledacrossthenetwork,nearlytheequivalentof
themostrecentoilspillnearRainbowLake.
Asthe2008pipelinefailureontheRedDeerRiverandGlenniferLakedemonstrated,whenitcomestotheenvironmentalimpactofoilspills,itisall
aboutlocation.Evenarelativelysmallspillinacriticalbodyofwatercanhaveenormouslydetrimentaleffectsonpeopleandwildlife.Thecostof
cleaningsuchspillscanalsovarygreatlybylocation.Unfortunately,theECRBdatafromthefieldsurveillanceandoperationssummariesdonot
includegeographicdatatoassessenvironmentaleffectsofoilpipelinespills.
TokeeptrackoftherecenthistoricalgeographyofoilpipelinespillsinAlberta,Ihavecreatedthefollowingmapbelow.Themapincludesrough
geographicdataaboutmajoroilpipelinespillsinAlbertafrom2006to2012.Thespatialdistributionofthesemajoroilpipelinespillsreveals,perhaps,
whytheseeventssoquicklyfadefrompublicdiscourseandpopularmemory.Allbuttwoofthesubstantialoilspillssince2006occurrednorthof
Edmonton,awayfromtheprovincesmajorurbancentres.Assuch,mostordinaryAlbertanshaveneverpersonallywitnessedtheenvironmental
consequencesofthesepipelinefailures.TherelativelysmallleakofcrudeoilintotheRedDeerRiverin2008drewalotofpublicandnewsmedia
attentionbecauseofitsproximitytothecityofRedDeerandapopulartouristdestination.Similarly,themostrecentspillonJacksonCreekislikelyto
drawconsiderableattention.HadtheMay2012PaceOil&GasspillinnorthwestAlbertanearRainbowLakeoccurredtothesouthinamore
populous(andpopular)location,suchasBanffNationalPark,italmostcertainlywouldhaveattractedgreaternationalmediaattention.The
geographyofoilpipelinespillsthenhaspoliticalconsequencesthatmustalsobeconsideredwhenassessingextensionofthepipelinenetwork.
Amoreaccuratemeasurementoftheenvironmentalimpactofoilpipelinespillsshouldincludeinformationaboutvolume,producttype,andlocation.
OnlythencanCanadiansunderstandtheenvironmentalhistoryofoilpipelinesandreasonablyassessfutureplanstoexpandthenetwork.
PleaseletmeknowinthecommentsifIhavemissedanymajorspillsonthemapbelow.
SeanKherajaregularcontributortoActivehistory.caandisanassistantprofessorofCanadianandenvironmentalhistoryatYorkUniversity.Heblogs
athttp://seankheraj.com
http://allgoebook.rhcloud.com/get/analysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas/December07,2014
...(esmap)crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospectsjune...(eg,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,...Analysisofvibrationandfailure
problemsin.
AnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGasInthisAnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGasebookyoucanreadallinformationin
thispdf.inthisebookyouwillalsolearnaboutAnalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas.Fig4distributionofcausesofoilpipelinefailuresin
thends,19992005(source:pipelineoilspillpreventionandremediationinnds,nnpc,2007).Naturalresourcesdefensecouncil4charpenier,ad,ja
bergerson,andhlmaclean,(2009),understandingtheanadianoilsandsindustrysgreenhousegas.
DocumentPreviewSourceFile:www.iaeng.org
Download
Naturalresourcesdefensecouncil4charpenier,a.d.,j.a.bergerson,andh.l.maclean,(2009),understandingtheanadianoilsandsindustrys
greenhousegas.
Ebooktitle:Ghgemissionfactorsforhighcarbonintensitycrudeoils
Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustry
Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustryinstrumentationformeasuringkeyparameters(e.g.,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,flametemperature,.
Ebooktitle:Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustry
Jointundp/worldbankenergysectormanagementassistanceprogramme(esmap)crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospectsjune
2003.
Ebooktitle:Crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospects
Analysisofthecorrodedpipelinesegmentsusinginline
Fig.1:geometricshapeofgaspipelinewallcorrosiondefinedusingilidata.atthesametimetoanalyzestressstateandevaluateremainingstrength
ofthe.
Ebooktitle:Analysisofthecorrodedpipelinesegmentsusinginline
Severeoperatingconditions.criticalsafetyoperations.dependabilityinremotelocations.allthesefactorsarekeyconcernsforoil&gasequipment
usedin.
Ebooktitle:Valvesforoil&gasindustriesmogas
Upstreamoil&gasoperationalexcellencechoosetheleaderinvensysisaworldleaderinupstreamoil&gasautomation,providingafullrangeof
control,safetyand.
Ebooktitle:Upstreamoil&gasinvensys|industrialautomation
Oilandgasprojectproposalsthataresubjecttothecoastalcommissionscoastaldevelopmentpermitandfederalconsistencyreviewauthority
include(1)offshore.
Ebooktitle:Oilspillpreventionandresponseca.coastalcommission
industryJointundp/worldbankenergysectormanagementassistanceprogramme(esmap)crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsand
prospectsjune2003.Ebooktitle:Crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospectsFig.1:geometricshapeofgaspipelinewallcorrosion
definedusingilidata.atthesametimetoanalyzestressstateandevaluateremainingstrengthofthe.Ebooktitle:Analysisofthecorrodedpipeline
segmentsusinginlineSevereoperatingconditions.criticalsafetyoperations.dependabilityinremotelocations.allthesefactorsarekeyconcernsfor
oil&gasequipmentusedin.Ebooktitle:Valvesforoil&gasindustriesmogasUpstreamoil&gasoperationalexcellencechoosetheleaderinvensys
isaworldleaderinupstreamoil&gasautomation,providingafullrangeofcontrol,safetyand.Ebooktitle:Upstreamoil&gasinvensys|industrial
HereiwillexplainaboutAnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGas.ManypeoplehavetalkedaboutRiskanalysisforoil&gaspipelines:a
sustainability.Inthisarticleyouwillknowthat1.introduction.oil&gas(o&g)arethemajorsourceofworldsfuelconsumption.mostoftheo&gis
transportedfromonelocationtoanotherthroughpipelines..
Fig4distributionofcausesofoilpipelinefailuresinthends,19992005(source:pipelineoilspillpreventionandremediationinnds,nnpc,2007).Oil
andgaspipelinespreparedforunitedstatesgeologicalsurveypasadenacaandcaliforniageologicalsurveysacramentocaundercontractto.Read
moreonAnalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas
2003.ReadmoreonOilandgaspipelinesuniversityofcoloradoboulder
Itisuncertainwhenthefirstcrudeoilpipelinewasbuilt.creditforthedevelopmentofpipelinetransportisdisputedwithcompetingclaimsforvladimir
shukhov.
1introductionoil&gas(o&g)arethemajorsourceofworldsfuelconsumptionmostoftheo&gistransportedfromonelocationtoanotherthrough
pipelines.Availableonlinewww.jocpr.comjournalofchemicalandpharmaceuticalresearch20146(6):12481254researcharticleissn:09757384.
Azerbaijan'sprovencrudeoilreserveswereestimatedat7billionbarrelsinjanuary2014accordingtotheoil&gasjournal(ogj).in2013azerbaijan
produced.ReadmoreonRiskanalysisforoil&gaspipelines:asustainability
,Aspoisanetworkofscientistsandothers,havinganinterestindeterminingthedateandimpactofthepeakanddeclineoftheworld'sproductionof
oilandgas.
Pipelines
http://www.aer.ca/rulesandregulations/bytopic/pipelinesDecember07,2014
About415000kilometresofCanadasoilandgaspipelinesoperatesolelywithinAlbertasboundariesandfallunderthejurisdictionoftheAER.
About415000kilometresofCanada
soilandgaspipelinesoperatesolelywithinAlberta
sboundariesandfallunderthejurisdictionoftheAER.
CertainrateregulatedgastransmissionpipelinesfallunderthejurisdictionoftheAlbertaUtilitiesCommission,forwhichtheAERconductsfield
inspectionsandprovidesincidentresponse.OilandgaspipelinesthatcrossprovincialorfederalbordersareregulatedbytheNationalEnergy
Board.
TheAERensuresthatthedesign,construction,operation,andmaintenanceincludingdiscontinuationandabandonmentofregulatedpipelines
complieswithAlberta
sPipelineAct,PipelineRegulation,andapplicableCanadianStandardsAssociation(CSA)standards.TheAER'spipeline
inspectionprogramconsiderspipelinefluidcharacteristics,location,linesize,failurehistory,andthecompany
scompliancehistory.Pipelineswith
greaterpotentialrisksaregivenahigherinspectionpriority.
TheAERalsoconductscomprehensiveincidentinvestigationsafterseriousincidentsoccurtodeterminethecauseofapipelinefailureandwhatcan
bedonetopreventasimilarsituationinthefuture.
Report2013B:PipelinePerformanceinAlberta,1990
2012isacomprehensiveanalysisofpipelinedataforAlbertaonamountsandtypes,incident
statistics,andincidentrates.
PleaseseethePipelineSafetyReviewwebpageforthereport,video,feedback,aswellasorganizationalresponses.
ComplianceAssurance
Manual005:PipelineInspectionsidentifiesnoncomplianceevents.Noncompliancewiththerequirementsmayresultinthelicenseeofthepipelineor
dutyholderreceivingaresponsefromtheAERinaccordancewiththeprocessesdescribedinDirective019:ComplianceAssurance.
BelowisadditionalinformationrelatedtopipelineregulationinAlberta.
http://allgoebook.rhcloud.com/analysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas/December07,2014
...gasflowrate,cloud...Oilandgaspipelinespreparedforunitedstatesgeologicalsurveypasadenacaand...,Pipelinefailureanalysis...
Readarticlethatrelatedaboutanalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas.HerewewilldiscussaboutAnalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoil
andgas.Fig4distributionofcausesofoilpipelinefailuresinthends,19992005(source:pipelineoilspillpreventionandremediationinnds,nnpc,
2007).Naturalresourcesdefensecouncil4charpenier,ad,jabergerson,andhlmaclean,(2009),understandingtheanadianoilsandsindustrys
greenhousegas.Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustryinstrumentationformeasuringkeyparameters(eg,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,flame
temperature,.
industryFig.1:geometricshapeofgaspipelinewallcorrosiondefinedusingilidata.atthesametimetoanalyzestressstateandevaluateremaining
strengthofthe.Ebooktitle:AnalysisofthecorrodedpipelinesegmentsusinginlineSevereoperatingconditions.criticalsafetyoperations.
dependabilityinremotelocations.allthesefactorsarekeyconcernsforoil&gasequipmentusedin.Ebooktitle:Valvesforoil&gasindustries
mogas
http://journaleconomica.rhcloud.com/news/analysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas/December07,2014
AnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGas.InthisAnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGasebookyoucanreadallinformation
inthispdf.in...
AnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGasInthisAnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGasebookyoucanreadallinformationin
thispdf.inthisebookyouwillalsolearnaboutAnalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas.Fig4distributionofcausesofoilpipelinefailuresin
thends,19992005(source:pipelineoilspillpreventionandremediationinnds,nnpc,2007).Naturalresourcesdefensecouncil4charpenier,ad,ja
bergerson,andhlmaclean,(2009),understandingtheanadianoilsandsindustrysgreenhousegas.
DocumentPreview
Download
greenhousegas.
Ebooktitle:Ghgemissionfactorsforhighcarbonintensitycrudeoils
Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustry
Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustryinstrumentationformeasuringkeyparameters(e.g.,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,flametemperature,.
Ebooktitle:Technologiesfortheoilandgasindustry
2003.
Ebooktitle:Crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospects
Analysisofthecorrodedpipelinesegmentsusinginline
Fig.1:geometricshapeofgaspipelinewallcorrosiondefinedusingilidata.atthesametimetoanalyzestressstateandevaluateremainingstrength
ofthe.
Ebooktitle:Analysisofthecorrodedpipelinesegmentsusinginline
Severeoperatingconditions.criticalsafetyoperations.dependabilityinremotelocations.allthesefactorsarekeyconcernsforoil&gasequipment
usedin.
Ebooktitle:Valvesforoil&gasindustriesmogas
Upstreamoil&gasoperationalexcellencechoosetheleaderinvensysisaworldleaderinupstreamoil&gasautomation,providingafullrangeof
control,safetyand.
Ebooktitle:Upstreamoil&gasinvensys|industrialautomation
Oilandgasprojectproposalsthataresubjecttothecoastalcommissionscoastaldevelopmentpermitandfederalconsistencyreviewauthority
include(1)offshore.
Ebooktitle:Oilspillpreventionandresponseca.coastalcommission
greenhousegas.Ebooktitle:GhgemissionfactorsforhighcarbonintensitycrudeoilsTechnologiesfortheoilandgasindustryinstrumentationfor
measuringkeyparameters(e.g.,gasflowrate,clouddiffusion,flametemperature,.Ebooktitle:TechnologiesfortheoilandgasindustryJoint
undp/worldbankenergysectormanagementassistanceprogramme(esmap)crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospectsjune
2003.Ebooktitle:Crossborderoilandgaspipelines:problemsandprospectsFig.1:geometricshapeofgaspipelinewallcorrosiondefinedusingili
data.atthesametimetoanalyzestressstateandevaluateremainingstrengthofthe.Ebooktitle:Analysisofthecorrodedpipelinesegmentsusing
inlineSevereoperatingconditions.criticalsafetyoperations.dependabilityinremotelocations.allthesefactorsarekeyconcernsforoil&gas
equipmentusedin.Ebooktitle:Valvesforoil&gasindustriesmogasUpstreamoil&gasoperationalexcellencechoosetheleaderinvensysisa
worldleaderinupstreamoil&gasautomation,providingafullrangeofcontrol,safetyand.Ebooktitle:Upstreamoil&gasinvensys|industrial
HereiwillexplainaboutAnalysisOfOilPipelineFailuresInTheOilAndGas.ManypeoplehavetalkedaboutRiskanalysisforoil&gaspipelines:a
sustainability.Inthisarticleyouwillknowthat1.introduction.oil&gas(o&g)arethemajorsourceofworldsfuelconsumption.mostoftheo&gis
transportedfromonelocationtoanotherthroughpipelines..
Fig4distributionofcausesofoilpipelinefailuresinthends,19992005(source:pipelineoilspillpreventionandremediationinnds,nnpc,2007).Oil
andgaspipelinespreparedforunitedstatesgeologicalsurveypasadenacaandcaliforniageologicalsurveysacramentocaundercontractto.Read
moreonAnalysisofoilpipelinefailuresintheoilandgas
2003.ReadmoreonOilandgaspipelinesuniversityofcoloradoboulder
Itisuncertainwhenthefirstcrudeoilpipelinewasbuilt.creditforthedevelopmentofpipelinetransportisdisputedwithcompetingclaimsforvladimir
shukhov.
1introductionoil&gas(o&g)arethemajorsourceofworldsfuelconsumptionmostoftheo&gistransportedfromonelocationtoanotherthrough
pipelines.Availableonlinewww.jocpr.comjournalofchemicalandpharmaceuticalresearch20146(6):12481254researcharticleissn:09757384.
Azerbaijan'sprovencrudeoilreserveswereestimatedat7billionbarrelsinjanuary2014accordingtotheoil&gasjournal(ogj).in2013azerbaijan
produced.ReadmoreonRiskanalysisforoil&gaspipelines:asustainability
,Aspoisanetworkofscientistsandothers,havinganinterestindeterminingthedateandimpactofthepeakanddeclineoftheworld'sproductionof
oilandgas.
OilandGasAccidents,OilandGasLaw
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/oilandgasaccidents.htmlDecember07,2014
...mishapswhileraisingpipeline,oilrigand...thefatalityrateamongoilandgasextraction...ifthereisaproductfailureusingPropanevsNatural
Gas.
OilandGasworkersaresubjecttosomeofthemosthazardousindustrialconditionsintheUS.Seriousinjuriesandfatalitiesoccurtoooftenfroman
oilaccidentorgasaccident.Oilandgasattorneysensurethatgasandoilcompaniesareheldaccountableforoildrillingaccidentsandoilfield
accidents.Whenanoilandgasworkerisinjured,theseverityanddurationofinjuriesarefarworsethaninotherindustrysectors,andrecoverytimes
oftentaketwiceaslong.Oilandgasaccidentstypicallyoccurforthefollowingreasons:Giventheamountofpeopleemployedbythegasandoil
industryandthedangerousnatureofoilandgasdrilling,itisalmostinevitablethataccidentswilloccur.Oilandgasaccidentscaninvolveexplosions,
mishapswhileraisingpipeline,oilrigandderricksafetyviolationsandotherincidents,including:Hydraulicfracturing(alsocalledfracking),whichis
usedtoextractnaturalgasfromrockformations,isthoughttobelinkedtocancerandotherserious,chronicillnesses.Itisimportanttoseekadvice
fromoilandgasattorneysbecausedeterminingliabilitycanoftenbedifficult,andWorker'sCompensationmaynotcoveralltheexpensesassociated
withlongtermseriousinjuries.Anoilandgaslawyercanreviewyouremploymentdocumentsthoroughlytodetermineanyindemnificationclauses
thatmaywaivetheliabilityoftheemployer,contractororotherthirdparty.In2006,almostahalfmillionpeopleintheUSwereworkinginjobsrelated
totheoilandgasindustryandthegasextractionindustryemployedabout400,000workersonbothoffshoreandlanddrillingandworkoverrigs,
comprisingthelargestpartoftheUSminingindustry.Theoilandgasindustryisgrowingbutatthesametimeincreasesinoilandgasactivity
correlatewithanincreaseintherateoffataloccupationalinjuries,particularlywheninexperiencedworkersarenotsufficientlytrainedinsafetyand
precautionarymeasures.Themostcommontypesofinjuriesareburns,braininjury,spinalinjuryandfractures.From20002009,pipelineaccidents
accountedfor2,554significantincidents,161fatalities,and576injuriesintheUS.Therearenearly500,000milesofoilandgastransmission
pipelinesthatcrisscrosstheUS.Theselinesoftencarryhazardousmaterialswiththepotentialtocausepublicinjuryandenvironmentaldamagein
ruralandurbanareas.AccordingtoaninvestigationintheAustinAmericanStatesman,from19842000pipelinerelatedfatalitiesoccurredinmore
than40states.AccordingtotheBureauofLaborStatistics,about600oilfieldandrigworkersdiedonthejobbetween2002and2007.Duringthat
period,thenumberofdeathsperyearrosebyaround70percent,from72victimsin2002to125in2006andapreliminarycountof120in
2007.During20032007,thefatalityrateamongoilandgasextractionworkerswasnearlyeighttimesthatforallU.S.workers.Drillingoilandgas
wellsindustrieshadarateof4casesofnonfatalinjuriesandillnessesper100equivalentfulltimeworkers.Therateforinjuriesandillnessesbysize
ofbusinesswas:Nearlyhalfofallfatalinjurieswereattributedtohighwaymotorvehiclecrashesandworkersbeingstruckbymachineryorequipment.
Gasexplosioninjuries,fires,chemicalburnsanddangerousfallsorfallingobjectsorequipmentworkersareoftenhitontheheadorbackbytoolsor
equipmentarejustafewofthedangersoccurringonaregularbasisintheoilandgasindustry.Thehighestnumbersofoilandgasextraction
occupationalfatalitiesoccurredinTexas(38percent),Louisiana(12percent),Oklahoma(11percent),Wyoming(8percent),andNewMexico(5
percent).Amongthestateswheremostofthefatalitiesoccurred,NewMexico(45.2per100,000)andWyoming(58.5per100,000)hadthehighest
averageannualfatalityrates,comparedwithOklahoma(33.3per100,000),Louisiana(29.2per100,000),andTexas(25.3per100,000).Currently,
thereisamajorboominthenaturalgassectorintheUS,resultinginahugeneedforworkersinRockyMountainstateslikeWyoming,andthenew
Mackenziegasprojectisexpectedtoemploythousandsofworkers.Butwithmoreemployment,higherfatalityratesarelikelytooccur.Theoiland
gasindustryisrifewithinexperiencedworkerswhoworklongerworkinghours(moreovertime),andmanyrigsincludeolderequipmentwithfewer
safeguards.Accordingtoarecentreport,"AssaultonAmerica:ADecadeofPetroleumCompanyDisaster,Pollution,andProfit",from2000to2010,
theoilandgasindustryaccountedforhundredsofdeaths,explosions,fires,seeps,andspills.Thisreport,whichincludesafullListofOilDisasters
fromJanuary2000June2010,demonstratesthattheBPincidentisnotisolatedbutanindustrypatternthatplacesprofitaheadofcommunities,
localeconomies,andtheenvironment.Inthisvideo,TimWarman,NationalWildlifeFoundation,discusseshowtheoilandgasindustrymustbeheld
moreaccountablebyremovingtheliabilitycap.Oilcompaniesmaketrillionsofdollarsinrevenuemorethanenoughtocoveroilandgasaccident
lawsuits.Gasexplosionscanalsooccurinthehometheycanbecausedadefectiveproductorcombinationofdefectiveproductsorminimalorno
publicorconsumerinformationonthesafehandlinganduseofpropaneornaturalgas.Approximately26millionpeopleusepropane:itisalsovery
dangerous.Morethan100millionpeopleusenaturalgas.YouarefourtimesmorelikelytobeinvolvedinafireorexplosionusingPropane(LPGas)
vsNaturalGas(Methane).Youare13timesmorelikelytobeseverelyinjuredorburnedwithPropanevs.NaturalGas.Youaremorethan100times
morelikelytobekilledorseverelyinjuredifthereisaproductfailureusingPropanevsNaturalGas.April2:Sevenworkerswerekilledinafireat
TesoroCorp'sWashingtonoilrefinery..Federalinvestigatorssaythevictimswerelikelyengulfedin"afirewall"thatignitedwithinseconds.April19:A
workerwaskilledatMotiva'soilrefineryinPortArthur,Texasinaconstructioncraneaccident.Motivanowhastwofatalitiessince2007atthis
refinerywhileithasbeenattemptingtoexpandproduction.April20:PossiblytheworstenvironmentaldisasterinU.S.history,BP'sDeepwaterHorizon
OilSpillstemmedfromanexplosionthatkilled11rigworkersandinjured17.OnJan11,2011,theWhiteHouseoilspillcommission'sfinalreporton
theoildisastercontainedrecommendationsincludingraisingtheliabilitycapfordrillersandcreatinganindependentsafetyagency.Thepanelmade
thefollowingrecommendations:TexasOilandGasproductionisboomingandisexpectedtoreachanalltimehighby2016,mainlyduetoTexasoil
andgasdrilling.Greaterproductionmeansagreaterincreaseinjobs,butrapiddevelopmentparticularlyinSouthTexasoilandgasmeansthat
moreworkersaresubjecttoinjury.Texasoilandgaslawyersareincreasinglyseeingmoreaccidentandinjuryclaimsasoilandgascompanies
increasetheirrigs,oftenwithunskilledwelldrillingandwellmaintenanceworkers.Combinedwiththephysicaldemandsofthejobandlongshifts
(roughnecksoftenwork72hourshifts),workplaceaccidentsareboundtooccur.Furthermore,somecompaniesareinsuchahurrytoincrease
productionthattheymayfailtodisregardOSHAsafetystandardsorfailtoproperlymaintainequipment.Commoncausesofoilandgasaccidents
includeinadequatesafetytraininganddisregardforsafetymeasures,defectiveequipmentandimproperlymaintainedequipment.Whileinjuriesare
coveredbyWorkersCompensation,theTexaslawofoilandgasensuresthatcompaniesandcontractorsareheldresponsibleshouldnegligence
occur.OSHAsafetystandardsprotectdrillingrigworkersbothonshoreandoffshore,butcompaniesoftendisregardrulesandregulations.Federal
statisticscount1,300drillingriginjuriesintheGulfofMexicofrom20062010,and41workerfatalities.(ElevendeathsweretheresultoftheBP
DeepwaterHorizonexplosionand15deathsattheTexasrefineryexplosioninTexasCity.)AccordingtotheBureauofLaborStatistics,in2008
Texashadmorefatalitiesintheoilandgasextractionindustry(41)thananyotherstate.TheEagleFordShale,agasbasinextendingthrough30
countiesincludingHood,Johnson,Parker,Tarrant,andWiseCountiesisoneofthelargestoilandgasreserveseverfoundinTexas.The
formationproducesfromvariousdepthsbetween4,000and12,000feetandisbenefitingfromhighliquidsyieldsacrossmuchoftheplay.Thestate
ofTexasreportedthatnaturalgasproductionattheEagleFordshalehasincreasedtenfoldfrom2009to2010.Alongwithoilandgasprices,
controversialEagleFordShaledrillingmethods,i.e.,HydroFrackingandhorizontaldrilling,haveresultedinarapidexpansionofoilandgas
companies(morethan24oilandgascompaniesarecurrentlyintheEagleFordShalePatch).AccordingtoMarkSundland,drillingmanagerfor
AnadarkoPetroleum,horizontal/directionaldrillingandhydraulicfracturinghasputEagleFordinaclassbyitself.Hydrofrackingalsoposespublic
healthconcerns.Environmentalgroupsareconcernedthatthefrackingwatermaypollutedrinkingwater.Frackingrequiresmillionsofgallonsof
chemicallytreatedwaterthatismixedwithsand,toblastthroughtheshale,whichthenreleasesgasoroil.Evenonewellcanrequiremillionsof
gallonsofwater.TheEPAhasinvestigatedfrackingseffectsondrinkingwaterinotherpartsoftheUSandisnowlookingattheEagleFord
Shale.Withthisoilandgasboomcomesanincreaseinworkers,someofwhomareunskilledanduntrainedinsafetyprocedures.(RecentlyOSHA
openedaninvestigationfollowingaSept2011accidentwheretwopeoplewerehospitalizedafteranoilrigexplosionontheEagleFordShale.)Most
oilandgasinjuriesareavoidableyetsafetyisoftensecondarytooilandgasprofits.In2008,31yearoldLarryMullinsJr.,anemployeeatNabors
DrillingUSA,wasworkingonadrillsitelocationandwascrushedbyoilfieldequipmentbeingpositionedbyatandemtruckinarigmoveinWise
County,Texas.InApril2010,theMullinsfamilysettledanoilfieldaccidentlawsuitfor$9.5milliondollars.In2007theUsumacintajackupoilrigwas
positionedovertheKab101platform.Strongwindsforcedthejackupofflocation,causingittocollidewiththeKab101platformandrupturethe
platform'sproductiontree.Twentytwoworkerslosttheirlivesasaresultoftheemergencyevacuationinstormforceconditions.Theleaking
hydrocarbonsignitedtwice,causingmajorfiredamagetoboththeUsumacintaandtheKab10.In1998anemployeeofMarineDrillingCompanywas
workingonanoffshorejackuprigwhenapieceofequipmentseveredhishand.AlawsuitwasfiledagainstMarDril,Inc,StormDrillingCompany
FreeportMcMoranandDirectionalWirelineServices,andanoutofcourtsettlementfortheoffshoredrillingrigaccidentwasreached.Oilandgas
accidentsgenerallyoccuratworksiteswheretheemployerand/oremployeeisnegligent,thereforeinjuriesanddeatharecoveredbyworkers'
compensation.Butifathirdpartyisinvolved(i.e.,someoneorsomeotherentity,suchasadefectiveproduct,notassociatedwithyouremployer)a
claimwilllikelyexistandyoushouldgetadvicefromagasandoilattorneywhoisexperiencedwiththefollowing:Ifyouoralovedonehassustained
anoilandgasinjury,youshouldseeklegalhelp.Anoilandgasattorneycanreviewyouraccidentagainstsafetyregulationstohelpuncoverwhat
happened,andwhoisresponsible,toensurethatyouobtainsuitablecompensationforyourworkplaceaccidentinjuries.Ifyouoralovedonehas
suffereddamagesinthiscase,pleaseclickthelinkbelowandyourcomplaintwillbesenttoalawyerwhomayevaluateyourclaimatnocostor
obligation.
StressEngineeringServices
http://www.stress.com/capabilities/pipelines/December07,2014
...Oil&GasNews&Media...StressEngineeringhelpsoperatorsacrossthecontinentexpandpipeline...Frompipelinefailureanalysistointegrity
management...
ThepipelineinfrastructureofNorthAmericaisnotonlybeingexpandedaggressively,butisagingatthesametime.StressEngineeringhelps
operatorsacrossthecontinentexpandpipelinenetworkssafely,repairthemeffectively,andreducefailurerelateddowntimesignificantly.From
pipelinefailureanalysistointegritymanagementchallenges,weknowhowtosolvepipelineproblems.
Oursystemassignmentsarediverse:Highpressureinterstategaspipelines.Oilandhydrocarbonproductspipelines.Localdistribution(LDC)gas
lines.Weboundtheproblem,definingitsparameters,interpolatingbetweenstresspoints.Weuseadvancedfiniteelementanalysisandmodeling,
materialsengineering,bursttesting,fieldinstrumentation,andmonitoringexpertisetohelpourcustomersguardagainstcatastrophicfailureand
maintainmechanicalintegrity.
Weevaluatepipelinefailureorthepotentialforfailure,determiningforourcustomersthesafelimitsofprospectiveoperations.Weanalyze
mechanicaldamagefromgougestodents,definethesafestconditions,identifyroadblockstolongtermoperation,andhelpensuretheyare
accountedforbeforeinstallationorrepair.
Aboveall,weareanexperienced,handsontechnologicalandproblemsolvingresourcefortransportationinfrastructureoperators,notjustinHigh
ConsequenceAreas(HCAs),butinwideopenspacesacrossthecontinent.
RegulatoryBasicsforOilPipelinesFederalEnergy...
http://www.ferc.gov/help/pubrefrm/oilratemaking.pdfDecember07,2014
FERCTariffsandMarketDevelopment(CentralGroup)Analyzesoilpipelinetariffandratechangefilings.AdvisesCommissiononfilings,initial
decisions,
AOPLWorkshop
RegulatoryBasicsforOilPipelines
September16,2009
DiscussionOutline
PartI:Whoregulatesoilpipelines?
PartII:Proceduresforfilingtariffs.
PartIII:Thetwomajorratesettingmethodologies.
PartI
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission
Thefederalauthority
responsiblefor
regulatingoilpipelines
FERC
Introduction
Alsoregulatestheelectric,hydro,gasindustries.
PartoftheExecutiveBranch.
Anindependentagency.
ExtensiveCongressionaloversight.
Fundedbythefeeschargedtotheentitiesitregulates
Asof2009,regulated141oilpipelines.
FERCdepartmentsimportanttooilpipelineindustry:
OfficeofEnergyMarkets&Reliability
OfficeofEnforcement
OfficeofAdministrativeLitigation
FERC
OrganizationalChart
FERC
CommissionersasofSept.2009
JonSuedeenPhilipMarc
KellyMoellerSpitzer
Wellinghoff
ChairmanDRR
D
FERC
Commissioners
AppointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof
theSenate.
Serve5YearTerms.
Equalvoteonregulatorymatters.
Nomorethan3Commissionersofthesame
politicalparty.
ERC
F
OfficeofEnergyMarkets&Reliability
PrincipaladvisortotheCommissiononregulatory
issues.
Overseesenergymarketstructureandperformance.
Oversightofcomplianceofmarketparticipantswiththe
Commission'srules.
Conductsanalyticalstudiesofenergymarkets.
OEMRDivisionKeytoOilPipelines:
DivisionofTariffsandMarketDevelopment(CentralGroup)
1of6divisionsunderOEMR
FERC
TariffsandMarketDevelopment(CentralGroup)
Analyzesoilpipelinetariffandratechangefilings.
AdvisesCommissiononfilings,initialdecisions,
rehearings,complaints,&declaratoryorders.
Directscompaniestoperformoilpipelinestatutory
depreciationstudies.
Analyzesoilpipelinemarketbasedrateapplications.
Oftenassistspipelinesincomplyingwithregulations
(e.g.ensuringtariffsmeetallofthepertinent
requirements).
FERC
OfficeofEnforcement
Overseescomplianceofmarketparticipantswiththe
Commissionsrulesformarketactivity.
Reportsonthestateoftheenergymarkets,analyzing
marketactivitiesandtrends.
AdvisestheCommissiononaccountingandfinancial
mattersaffectingenergymarkets.
OverseescompliancewiththeUniformSystemof
Accounts.
OEDivisionsKeytoOilPipelines:
DivisionofFinancialRegulation
DivisionofAudits
FERC
OE:DivisionofFinancialRegulation
ProvidesguidancetotheCommissionconcerningits
financialaccounting
Reviewsneworproposedaccountingstandards
madebyauthoritativeaccountingbodiesto
determineeffectonregulatedindustries.
Preparesandcoordinatesnecessaryrevisions
and/oramendmentstotheCommissionsUniform
SystemofAccounts.
AdministersfinancialformsNos.1,2,2A,6,3Q,
6Q,etc.
FERC
FormNo.6
WhatistheForm6?
RequiredAnnualReportofOilPipelineCompanieswhoare
regulatedbytheFederalEnergyRegulatoryCommissionassetforth
intheInterstateCommerceAct
WhousestheForm6?
FERCandOtherRegulatoryCommissions,Shippers,Carriers,AOPL,
BureauofEconomicAnalysis
PurposeoftheForm6:
Tocollectcomprehensivefinancialandoperationalinformation
aboutoilpipelinecompaniessubjecttothejurisdictionoftheFERC
GeneralCorporateInformation
FinancialStatements
PlantStatisticalData
AllowedCostofService(Page700)
FilingDates
YearEnd(Form6)April18th
Quarterly(Form6Q)(70daysafterthequarterends)
FERC
OE:DivisionofAudits
Performsfinancialandoperationalauditsofindustry
participants.
Performsauditsonarandombasis.
AuthoritytoauditallFERCregulationrelatedrecords
RepresentstheCommissionandexplainsandadvocates
itslegalandpolicypositions.
AdvisestheCommissiononcompliancerelatedmatters.
ERC
F
OfficesInvolvedinRateCases
OfficeofAdministrativeLitigation(OAL)
Resolvesdisputesthroughsettlement.
Litigatesunresolvedissuesathearing.
CommissionStaffandlawyersrepresentthepublicinterest.
OfficeofAdministrativeLawJudges(OALJ)
ResolvescontestedcasesasdirectedbytheCommission,
eitherthroughimpartialhearinganddecisionorthrough
negotiatedsettlement.
Conductsfairandimpartialinvestigationsasdirectedby
theCommission.
Performsvariousalternativedisputeresolution(ADR)as
directedbytheCommission.
PartII
RateSettingProcedures
InitialRates
IndexedRates
GrandfatheredRates
SettlementRates
MarketBasedRates
CostofServiceRates
RateSettingProcedures
Introduction
Whereareregulationspertainingtooilpipelineslocated?
CodeofFederalRegulations,Title18ConservationofPowerand
WaterRecourses(CFR18)
FERC&DOEregulations:VolumeI,parts1to399.
Chapterspertinenttooilpipelines:
SubchapterPRegulationsundertheInterstateCommerceAct
(ICA),Parts340350
SubchapterQAccountsundertheICA,Parts351352
SubchapterRApprovedForms,ICA,Parts356357
Whereareregulationsspecifictotarifffilingslocated?
18C.F.R.340
Tariffsmustbefiled30dayspriortotakingeffect,18C.F.R.341.2
Neitherthefilingdatenortheeffectivedatearecountedinthe30
days
Shortnoticeexception
Tariffmustbeformattedinconformancewithregulations,18C.F.R.
341.3
TariffRateTypes
InitialRates(18C.F.R.342.2)
Acarriermustjustifyaninitialrateforanewserviceby:
a)Filingacostofservicetosupportsuchrate,or
b)Filingaswornaffidavitthattherateisagreedtoby
atleastonenonaffiliatedshipperwhointendsto
usetheserviceinquestion(anegotiatedrate).
TariffRateTypes
IndexedRates18C.F.R.342.3
Aratemaybechanged,atanytime,toalevelnotto
exceedtheceilinglevel.
Thecurrentperiodceilinglevelequalstheproductofthe
previousindexyearsceilinglevelandthemostrecent
indexpublishedbytheCommission.
IndexpublishedpriortoJune1ofeachyear.
ariffRateTypes
T
GrandfatheredRates
Section1803(a)oftheEnergyPolicyActof1992
(EPAct)deemsjustandreasonableanyrateineffect
forthe365dayperiodendingonthedateofthe
enactmentofthisActiftherateineffecthasnot
beensubjecttoprotest,investigationorcomplaintduring
suchperiod.
Agrandfatheredratecanbechallengedif:
asubstantialchangehasoccurredafterOctober24,
1992,intheeconomiccircumstancesoftheoil
pipelinewhichwereabasisfortherate,or
asubstantialchangehasoccurredafterOctober24,
1992,inthenatureoftheservicesprovidedwhich
werethebasisoftherate.
TariffRateTypes
SettlementRates18C.F.R.342.4
Acarriermaychangearatewithoutregardtotheceiling
leveliftheproposedchangehasbeenagreedto,in
writing,byeachpersonwho,onthedayofthefilingof
theproposedratechange,isusingtheservicecovered
bytherate.
TariffRateTypes
MarketBasedRates18C.F.R.342.3
Carriermustdemonstratethatitlackssignificantmarket
powerintheintheoriginmarketandthedestination
market.
Filingrequirementsestablishedin18C.F.R.348.
Thesefilingrequirementsrequirearelativelylengthy
application.
Iftheapplicationisapproved,thecarriermaysetrates
atwhateverlevelthemarketwillbear.
ChrisLyonsandIwillbegivingapresentationdiscussing
marketbasedratesinsignificantdepthatXX
TariffRateTypes
CostofServiceRates18C.F.R.342.4
Carriermustshowthatthereisasubstantialdivergence
betweentheactualcostsexperiencedbythecarrierand
therateresultingfromtheapplicationoftheindexsuch
thattherateattheceilinglevelwouldprecludethe
carrierfrombeingabletochargeajustandreasonable
ratewithinthemeaningintheInterstateCommerceAct.
Filingrequirementsestablishedin18C.F.R.346
Moreoncostbasedratestocome
PARTIII
CostofServiceRates
CostofService
Introduction
TypesofCostofServiceMethodologies:
DepreciatedOriginalCost(DOC)
TrendedOriginalCost(TOC)
COSMethodologyPrescribedbytheCommission:The
OpinionNo.154BCostofServiceMethodology
IssuedJune,1985
UtilizesaTOCratebase
Hasbeenmodifiedandclarifiedbysubsequent
decisions.
CostofService
DepreciatedOriginalCost
OperatingExpenses
+ReturnofRateBase(Depreciation)
+ReturnonRateBase
+AmortizationofAllowanceforFundsUsed
DuringConstruction(AFUDC)
+IncomeTaxAllowance
=CostofService(RevenueRequirement)
CostofService
OperatingExpenses
SalariesandWages
MaterialsandSupplies
OutsideServices
FuelandPower
PensionsandBenefits
Insurance
OilLossesandShortages
TaxesotherthanIncomeTaxes
AllocatedOverhead
AllocatedOverhead
Forpipelinesthataresubsidiariesofalarger
corporation,allocatedoverheadcanrepresenta
significantcomponentoftheCOS.
TheCommissiongenerallyusesathreefactor
approachconsistingofrevenue,plantandpayrollto
allocateoverhead.
Otherapproachesarepermissible.
Thecriticalissueisthattheallocationmethodology
matchcostwithcausation.
CostofService
Depreciation
DepreciationExample:
BeginningofYear1RateBase=1000
EstimatedLife=20years
Year1DepreciationExpense=(1000/20)=50
GroupMethodofDepreciation:anumberofsimilaror
relatedassetsareincludedinagrouptowhichasingle
compositedepreciationrateisapplied.
CostofService
RateBase
CarrierPropertyinService
AccumulatedDepreciation
+AllowanceforFundsUsedDuringConstruction
(AFUDC)
AccumulatedAmortizationofAFUDC
+WorkingCapitalAllowance
AccumulatedDeferredIncomeTaxes(ADIT)
=DOCRateBase
CostofService
AccumulatedDeferredIncomeTax
CalculationofADITYear1Year2Year3Year4
TaxDepreciation33.333.333.3
BookDepreciation25.025.025.025.0
TimingDifference8.38.38.3(25.0)
DeferredIncomeTaxes4.24.24.2(12.5)
ADIT4.28.312.5
Assumptions
Property100
BookDepreciation25%
TaxDepreciation33%
IncomeTaxRate50%
Equity%100%
ROE10%
CostofService
ReturnonRateBase
Debt%xCostofDebt
+Equity%xNominalEquityRateofReturn
=WeightedCostofCapital
AverageDOCRateBase
xWeightedCostofCapital
=ReturnonDOCRateBase
CostofService
AllowanceforFundsUsedDuringConstruction
AverageMonthlyConstructionWorkinProgress(CWIP)
Balance
xWeightedCostofCapital
=AFUDC
AverageAFUDCBalance
xUsefulLifeFactor
=AmortizationofAFUDC
CostofService
IncomeTaxAllowance
EquityPortionofReturnonDOCRateBase
+AmortizationofEquityAFUDC
=TaxableElementsofReturn
xNettoTaxMultiplier
=IncomeTaxAllowance
IncomeTaxRate*
(1.0IncomeTaxRate)
=NettoTaxMultiplier
*Generallybasedonthestatutorymarginaltaxrateforcorporations
CostofService
DOCRecap
OperatingExpenses
+ReturnofRateBase(Depreciation)
+ReturnonRateBase
+AmortizationofAllowanceforFundsUsed
DuringConstruction(AFUDC)
+IncomeTaxAllowance
=CostofService(RevenueRequirement)
CostofService
TrendedOriginalCost(TOC)
VariationofDOC.
StoresinflationadjustmentinRateBaseandrecoversas
DeferredReturnoverlifeofassets.
AppliesRealReturnonEquity(ROE)1/toequity
portionofRateBaseandCostofDebt(COD)todebt
portionofRateBase.
TrendsportionofRateBasefundedbyequitytoreflect
inflationasmeasuredbytheCPIU.
CostofService
NominalEquityRateofReturn
TOC
InflationRateBase
DOC
CostofReal
RateTOC
Service
ofCostof
ReturnService
CostofService
Calculation&AmortizationofDeferredReturn
TrendingBase(EquityRateBase)
xInflationFactor
=DeferredReturn
DeferredReturn
xUsefulLifeAmortizationFactor
=AmortizationofDeferredReturn
CostofService
OpinionNo.154B
IssuedJuneof1985.
Adoptsthetrendedoriginalcostratebase(TOC)
foroilpipelineswishingtoestablishorchangetheir
tariffratesbyfilingacostofservice.
Providesforatransitionfromthepreviousvaluation
ratebasemethodology,referredtoasthestarting
ratebase,(SRB).
Advocatesuseofthepipelinesactualcapital
structure.
Casebycasedeterminationofmanyissues.
*FERCOpinionNo.154B,asmodifiedandclarifiedbysubsequentdecisions
CostofService
StartingRateBase
Intendedtoprovidetransitionfrompriormethodology.
OnetimecalculationasofDecember31,1983.
SRBFormula:
(Debt%xNetOriginalCost)
+(Equity%xNetReproductionCostNew)
=StartingRateBase
StartingRateBase(SRB)
DOCRateBase
=SRBWriteUp
CostofService
StartingRateBaseWriteUp
SRBWriteUpisincludedinOpinionNo.154B
RateBase.
SRBWriteUpisamortized.
AmortizationofSRBWriteUpisexcludedfrom
CostofService.
CarriersReturnOnRateBaseincludesareturn
ontheunamortizedSRB.
SRBWriteUpisincludedinTrendingBasewhen
computingDeferredReturn.
CostofService
RateBaseComponents
DOCRateBase
+SRBWriteUp
AccumulatedAmortizationofSRBWriteup
+DeferredReturn
AccumulatedAmortizationofDeferredReturn
=154BTOCRateBase
CostofService
IncomeTaxAllowance
EquityPortionofReturnonTOCRateBase
+AmortizationofDeferredReturn
=Subtotal
xNettoTaxMultiplier
=IncomeTaxAllowance
CostofService
Base&TestPeriods
Abaseperiodmustconsistof12consecutivemonthsof
actualexperienceadjustedtoeliminatenonrecurring
items.Carriermayincludeappropriatenormalizing
adjustmentsinlieuofnonrecurringitems.
Atestperiodmustconsistofabaseperiodadjustedfor
changesinrevenuesandcostswhichareknownand
measurablewithreasonableaccuracyatthetimeof
filingandwhichbecomeeffectivewithinninemonths
afterthelastmonthofavailableactualexperience
utilizedinthefiling.Forgoodcauseshown,the
Commissionmayallowreasonabledeviationfromthe
prescribedtestperiod.
See18C.F.R.346.2.
CriticalTakeAwaysonCOS
Thecalculationscontainanumberofvariablesthat
functionintandem.
Someoftherequiredinputsinvolvedatagoingback
over25years.
Thehigherthequalityofthedatathemore
successfulacostbasedratefilingwillbe.
Questions?
Pipelines,FailureandSuccess,18611864
http://www.petroleumhistory.org/OilHistory/pages/Pipelines/failure.htmlDecember07,2014
Pipelines,FailureandSuccess,...(Oil&GasJournal,...AtwoinchwroughtironpipelinetocarryrefinedoilfromPlumertotheAlleghenyRiver...
AccordingtoanotationintheDerrick'sHandbookofPetroleumforDec.1861:"VictoryM.ThompsonbuilttheErieCityOilWorksatthecornerof
NinthandChestnut/WalnutStreets.Theoilwaspumpedtotherefinery,abouthalfamilefromthedepot,atwhichitwasleftbycar."Thispipeline
wasaheadofthosewhichwerelaterlaidintheproducingfields.AccordingtoanotationtreatingonpipelinesintheDerrick'sHandbookofPetroleum
forFeb.19,1863:"Barows[Barrows]&Co.ofTarrFarmhaveforsometimebeenconveyingoilfromthe[Densmorewells]totheirrefinery,a
distanceof800to1000feetbythismeansandtheplanwassaidtoworkadmirably."Thispipelinewasactuallylaidinthefallof1862underthe
directionofJamesHutchinson,engineer(somesourcesstatethatthenamewasHutchings).Itoperatedbysiphon,asatisfactorymethodforshort
distances.TheBarrowsrefinerywassouthoftheDensmorewells,justoverthelineintheadjacentBloodFarm.Atwoinchcastironpipeline
conceivedbytheHutchinsonandFosterCompanywasreportedasfollows:"Atwoinchironpipewaslaidin1863fromtheTarrFarmtothe
HumboldtrefineryatPlumer,anoillinedistanceoftwoandahalfmiles.Theoilwasforcedthroughthisbypowerfulpumps"(DerrickHandbookof
Petroleum,Feb.19,1863).This1863linehadtoclimbabout500feettogetovertheridgeontheeastsideofthevalleyseparatingPlumerfromthe
flatsofTarrFarm.Threepumpswereutilizedontheroute,oneontheTarrFarmflatsandtheothertwoontheTarrFarmflankoftheridge(west
flank).Theprojectorsfoundthatthepumpsandthecastironpipescouldnothandlethejob.Thiswasattributedtopoorpipes,leakyleadjointsthat
cameunjointedandfaultypumpmachinery(Giddens,1938).Theaffairwasreferredtoasbeingan"experimental"project.Theteamsters,however,
foresawthisexperimentasthebeginningoftheend,athreattotheircontrolofthehaulingofoil,andtheytoreuptheillfittingpipes.Inspiteofthe
problemswhichledtofailureofthe1863line,itwasfeltthatthiseffortatTarrFarmshowedthatapipelinewithpumpswasafeasiblemannerof
transportingcrudeoil,atleasttheoretically.Theadvanceofthepipelineindustrydependedoncorrectingtheobviousproblems,andtheywerebyno
meansinsurmountable.Hutchinsonkeptongoingatfullspeedafterthe1863TarrFarmPlumermechanicalfailureandputdownathreemilefour
inchcastironpipelineonthewestsideofOilCreekfromtheShermanwellarea(northPioneer)upstreamtotheOilCreekRRdepotatMillerFarm.
Thiswasdonein186364underthenameoftheWesternTransportationCompany.Tall10inchdiameterairchamberswerecastintothepipes
every100feetto"equalizepressure"(Redwood,1913),butthepumpsjarredtheleadsocketedjointslooseandmuchoilwaslost.Theairchambers
whichjuttedupfromthepipemadeitlooklike"anornamentalironfence"(Oil&GasJournal,Derrick,1934).Theteamstersfinallydugitupandtore
itupandthepiecesofthedemolishedlinelaidalongthecreekbankforseveralyears.Inthewinterof186364HutchinsonandCompany,regardless
ofthedestructivestanceoftheteamsters,laidanotherlinemadeofthreeinchcastironpipes(fiveinchaccordingtoA.M.Johnson,1956,and
McLaurin,1896)fromtheprolificNoblewellontheeastsideofOilCreekupstreamtoShafferfarmonthewestside,adistanceofaboutthreemiles
(Giddens,1938).AnewlyconstructeddepotandterminaloftheOilCreekRailroadwastheobjectiveatShaffer.McLaurin(1896)statesthatthisill
fatedlinewaslaidviaapipelinechartergrantedbytheLegislaturetotheWesternTransportationCompanyin1864.Thischarterwastobecome
immenselyimportantintheannalsofpipelinedevelopmentandhistory.However,inpopulartermsofthedaythiswasthepipelinethatborethe
reputationofleaking"likeafiftycentumbrella".AtwoinchwroughtironpipelinetocarryrefinedoilfromPlumertotheAlleghenyRiver(threemiles)
wasconceivedandlaidbyarefineratPlumerin186364.Itwassaidtobesuccessful(McLaurin,1896).Tosumuptheseearlypipelinesthrough
1864,onlythreeweresuccessful:the1861linefromadepottoarefineryinthecityofErie,a1000footsiphonlinewhichcarriedoilfromawelltoa
nearbyrefineryinOilCreekValley,andatwoinchlinewhichcarriedrefinedproductfromPlumertotheAlleghenyRiver.Itissaidthattheshort
siphonlinewouldnothaveworkedoveragreaterdistance,hencewasnotusedinothercircumstances(Johnson,1956).
MITIGATIONMEASURESOFOILPIPELINESINCASEOFPOWERFAILURE
http://www.arpapress.com/Volumes/Vol12Issue2/IJRRAS_12_2_16.pdfDecember07,2014
MITIGATIONMEASURESOFOILPIPELINES...aspressureandgasflowrate,...downorpowerfailureatanintermediatelocation,...
IJRRAS12(2)August2012www.arpapress.com/Volumes/Vol12Issue2/IJRRAS_12_2_16.pdf
MITIGATIONMEASURESOFOILPIPELINES
INCASEOFPOWERFAILURE
YsairM.Fadul1,*,JingGong2&FanZhang2
1
DepartmentofMechanicalEngineering,CollegeofEngineering,SudanUniversityofScienceandTechnology,
ChinaUniversityofPetroleum,Beijing,China
2
DepartmentofOil&GasStorageandTransportation,CollegeofMechanicalandTransportationEngineering,
ChinaUniversityofPetroleum,Beijing,China
*Email:fadulmahm@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
Thisworkistoinvestigatetheoperationsatvariousupsetconditionsduetopowerfailureofthe1506kmHeglig
Portsudanpipeline.Asimulator,developedattheDepartmentofOil/GasStorage&Transportation,China
UniversityofPetroleumBeijing,cansimulatetheexistinglongdistancewaxycrudepipeline,exactlyasitis
configuredinthefield.FornonNewtonianflow,thefluidrheologicalconsistency,K(Pa.sn)andtheflowbehaviour
indexnareevaluatedexperimentally.Thosetwoparameterswererequiredtobeintroducedintothesoftwareto
assesstheireffectsonsurgescenarios.
Somesurgecasesoflossofcommunicationwerereviewed.Consequently,itisofgreatimportantthattheoperator
shouldreviewsomepracticalmitigationmeasuresaswellasthecapacityofSCADA(SupervisoryControlandData
Acquisition)systemtoensurethatthesystemhasresourcestoaccommodatenormalandabnormaloperations.
KeyWords:simulator,nonNewtonian,rheologicalproperties,surge,SCADA.
1.INTRODUCTION
Thereisageneralconcernregardingthepipelinetransportationofthewaxycrudeoilsattemperaturesbelowthe
pourpointandatvariousscenariosofoperations.Moreimportantly,thisstudyisofpracticalsignificanceinsafe
designandoperationofpipeliningthewaxycrudes,ithelpsnotonlyminimizingmanyriskswhichmightencounter
inthelongdistanceoilpipeliningsystemsbutalsohandlingtheexpectedproblemsariseswhenpumpingthewaxy
crudes.
Apressuresurgemayproduceevengreaterconsequences.Excessivesurgemaymoveapipeoffitssupportsor
ruptureapipeline,leadingtosignificantrepairorreplacementcosts.Intheworstscenario,amajorpipelinefailure
maycauseinjurestopeopleandrequireamassivecleanup.Specifically,unexpectedpowerfailureorshutdown
scenariosmayleadtogreatchangesoftransportationmaterials,operatingparametersorequipmentsofpump
stations;whichinturnswillinducesurgeinoiltransferpipeline.Toconductadynamicsurgeanalysis,asimulator
hasbeendeveloped.Inaddition,asetofinputdataisusedtodescribethespecificpipelinesystemanditsoperation.
InChina,themostcomplicatedlongdistancecrudeoilpipelinetechnicallyandoperationallyistheChinaWest
CrudeOilPipeline.TheshearandthermalhistoryofthreePPDbeneficiatedwaxycrudeoilstransportedthrough
thispipelineweresimulatedbyusingastirredvesselandwiththeenergydissipationofviscousflowastheshear
simulationparameter.Thecomparisonsofflowpropertiesofthecrudeoilsobtainedfromfieldtestswith
experimentalsimulationshowthatthegelpointsandviscositiesfromsimulationareinagreementwiththefield
data.[1]
Basedonthecharacteristicmethod,JingGongandWang[2]establishedanumericalcalculationandsimulatedthe
pressurevariationprocess,whenavalveattheterminalstationwasaccidentallyclosedinaproductpipeline.Further
researchcombiningtheboundaryconditionofreliefsystemwascarriedout.
BruceandGerald[3]havefoundthatintegratingdataanalysis,safetydevicesandcontrollertrainingwerethebest
toolstocontrolsurge.
Anindya,etal.[4]conductedanumericalsimulationtoanalyzetransientsingasflowandpressureinahorizontal
straightpipe.Thenumericalresultsshowedthatdependinguponthepipedimensionsandoperatingvariablessuch
aspressureandgasflowrate,transienteffectsinthepipelinemaylastforalongtimeand/oroversignificantlength
ofpipe.Thesimulationspredictedaninitialsurgeingasflowrategreaterthanthefinalsteadystatevalueifthe
pressuredropacrossthepipeisincreased.
Anorientationvisit[5]toHegligCentralProcessingUnitwasdonebytheauthor,itwaswellstatedthattwoPour
PointDepressants(PPD)ProductswhichweresuggestedbyChinesepartnerhadprovidedacceptablevaluesofpour
pointandviscositywithaslightdifference.But,fieldtestwasstronglysuggestedtoverifylaboratoryresultsaswell
astodeterminethetrueeffectsofdifferentblendsintherealpipeline.Ontheotherhand,Dafan&Zheming[6]
investigatedthevariationoftherheologicalpropertiesofDaQingwaxycrudewiththeirthermalhistoryandtheir
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IJRRAS12(1)July2012Fadul&al.MitigationMeasuresofOilPipelines
timeeffect.Theyfound,experimentally,thatsuchpropertieswereverysensitivetoheattreatment.Also,itwas
denotedthat,thestructuralstrengthofDaQingcrudevariedwithheattreatment.
MoreexperimentalworkshadbeendoneattheLaboratoryofOilRheology,ChinaUniversityofPetroleum,Beijing.
IthasbeenquiteclearthatDaQingwaxycrudeissimilartoSudanwaxycrude.However,thebestheattreatment
temperatureforDaQingcrudeoilwas60Candreheatingthecrudewasfoundtobeofgreatimportance.Whereas,
heatingtheNileBlendupto90Cwasquiteacceptable.Nevertheless,stillheatingto80Cmaybeconsideredfor
operatingcostreductionregardlessofothershortcomings.
2.MATERIALSANDMETHODS
Themajorpurposeofthecurrentworkwastofurtherinvestigatetheproblemsencounteredpipelinetransportation
oftheNileblendincaseofunexpectedpowerfailure.Thisresearchwas,mainly,adoptingmethodstoutilizea
softwaresimulatorandcarryoutlaboratorytechniquesthatarecapableofprovidingessentialdataandanalyses
necessaryforassessingtheimportantmitigationmeasuresforsafeoperationsofHegligPortsudanpipeline.
ThecrudesampletobestudiedwasbroughtbythePipelineScienceResearchInstituteofChinaNationalPetroleum
Corporation(CNPC),LangFang.Thesamplewastoowaxy,refertotable1&2.Duetohighsolidification
temperature,highviscosityatlowtemperatureandhighyieldstrength,noveloiltransportingtechnologymethods
havetobestudiedanddeveloped.
Table1Themainphysicalpropertiesofthecrudesample
Thewaxcontent(approximately)23%byweight
TheWaxAppearanceTemperature57C
Averageinlettemperature60C
Heatcapacity2100J/kg.C
Fluiddensity843kg/m3
Theviscosityat28Cand10s1101mPa.s
Thekinematicviscosityat28Cand10s10.12m2/s
Table2ThebasevalueforcontrolsetpointsofHegligPortsudanpipeline
Minimumsuctionpressurestation#1490kPa
Minimumsuctionpressureatallotherstations280kPa
Max.Allowableoperatingpressure(MAOP)under9724kPa
normalcondition
Max.Allowableoperatingpressureunderupsetcondition9724+10%(9724)=10696kPa
Dischargepressurecontroller97241%(9724)=9627kPa
Dischargepressureshutdownhigh(DPSH)9724+5%(9724)=10210kPawith30secdelay
Dischargepressureshutdownhighhigh(DPSHH)9724+7.5%(9724)=10453kPawithnodelay
Intheexperimentalsetupcarriedoutatthelaboratoryofrheology,ChinaUniversityofPetroleumBeijing,the
viscometerVT500withaPhoenixP2circulatorhasbeenselectedasthemaindevice.TheviscometerVT500isa
combinationofviscometer(VT)withapowersupplyVS500withDOSbasedapplication.APhoenixP2circulator
wasusedastemperaturecontroller.Themeasurementshavebeencarriedoutatdifferentheattreatmentandshear
conditions.Dependingonthosemeasurements,thevaluesofthefluidrheologicalconsistency,K(Pa.sn)andthe
flowbehaviourindexnwereintroducedintothesoftware.
3.RESULTSANDDISCUSSION
Thepredictionofpressuresurgesisofeconomicimportanceinpipelinetransportationwherethepressuremustbe
maintainedwithinnarrowlimitstopreventdamageofpipeand/ordevices.
Inthecurrentwork,themaincauseofthepressuresurgeswastheunexpectedpowerfailure.Whenthepumpshuts
downorpowerfailureatanintermediatelocation,e.g.atstation#3,therotationalinertiaofthemotorpumpsystem
continuestotransferenergytotheliquiduntilthepumpheadhasdecreasedtozero.Thepumpimpellerrotatesas
theflowcontinuesthroughthepump.Therotationalinertiaofthemotorpumpsystemandtheefficiencyofenergy
transferfromtheimpellertothefluidbothcontributetodeterminetherateofrundown(theratethemotorand
pumpslowdownwhentheelectricalenergyisdisconnected).
Theoutcomeofthiscasestudy,fig.1&Fig.2indicatedthattowhatextentthemitigationmeasuresshouldbetaken
tokeeptheMAOPwithinthelimit.However,themaximumvaluedisplayedatstation#1,10.6MPa,issafewhen
comparedtotheMAOP(MaximumAllowableOperatingPressure)underabnormalcondition,i.e.10.696MPa.
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Fig.1Thetransient.
Fig.2Maximum&MinimumPressureCurves.
Thepowerfailureatstation#3cancauselargepressuresurges.Alowpressuresurgetravelsdownstreamasthe
pumpheaddecreases.Theflowrateandvelocitydownstreamdecreaseasthenewpressuregradientisestablished.
Pumpshutdownsalsoaffecttheflowupstreamofthethirdstation;i.e.ahighpressuretravelsupstreamastheflow
velocitydecreases,fig.3aandfig.3b.
289
Fig.3aTransientCurvesatthe2ndStation.
Fig.3bTransientCurvesatthe2ndStation(Modified).
Sincetheaccidentofsurgeherehappensasaresultofapowerfailureatstation#3;thereforeaneffectivemeanof
mitigationshouldbetaken.Thiscanbedonebytwolevelsofcontrols.Firstly,theoilcanbereleasedbymeansof
PRV(PressureReliefValve).Asthetimegoestheamountofoilreleasedfromthelineisincreasedtokeepthe
pressurewithintheallowablelimits.Secondly,byconsideringasimilarcaseinwhichthedegreeofopeningofthe
adjustingvalvesshouldbeset,separately,toalowvalueattheupstreamofthestation.Incontrary,theadjusting
valvesatthedownstreamstationsaretobekepttohighervalues.
Themostsuccessfulmitigationmeasureconsideredisthebypassreliefvalves,whicharebettertobesubstitutedby
highintegritypressuresensors.Ingeneral,therewerenosurgepressureviolationsifreliefbypasswereused,andthe
290
pipelinewasabletoestablishasteadystateflowrate.Inadditiontohardwarecontrolinthesesituations,the
operatorneedsacomparativelylowcostmethodforsimulatingsurgepressureswhileworkingoffline.
4.WHATWOULDHAPPENTOHEGLIGPIPELINEINTHEABSENCEOFSCADA
TheworstconditionofthesubcaseswaswhenSCADAisoutofserviceandthePRVs(PressureRelieveValves)
werenotinplacewhilepumpingthechemicallyuntreatedsample.Themaximumpressureatstations#3,#4,and#6
were12,12,and9.6MPa,respectively.AlossofcommunicationwithPRVswastakenplacewhenHeglig
PortsudanPipelinewassimulatedwithoutSCADA,thereforeacceptablemeansofminimizingtheupsetsituations
shouldbeprovidedassuggestedbelow.However,withPRVsandSCADAinservice,abetterquickresponseto
mitigationisprovidedwhichresultsinreducingthemaximumpressurerecordedatstations#4and#5totheirlimit
of6and6.6MPa,respectively.Othermodifiedsetpointscanbeshownintable3.
Ontheotherhand,withoutPRVstheroleofSCADAwasobviousincreatingsignalstootherpumpcontrolstrying
tomaintainthepressurestotheirsetpointswhilesurgeaccidentwashappening;significantreductioninthe
maximumlimitsofpressureweremaintainedattheterminalstation,i.e.thesurgeaccidentstartpoint.The
maximumpressurerecordedatstations#4,#6,and#7were11.4,5.4and7.8MPa,respectively.Thosevaluescanbe
comparedto12,9.6,14.4MPa,respectively,whenSCADAwasoutofservice.Again,thepurposeofgettingoptimal
surgecontrolmeasureswasaccomplishedthroughadjustingthereliefsystemontimeasamajoroutcomeofthe
simulator.
Nevertheless,surgegeneratedbypowercutoffcouldbemoredestructiveandtheinducedsurgepressurewouldbe
muchhigher,socontrollingsurgeofthiskindisindispensable.Testloopingforrheologicalinvestigationsand/or
computerprogrammingforgraphicalsimulationswerefewmethodstoassessthepossiblemitigationmeasures.
However,inimplementingthis,severalissuessuchasvariousfailurescenariosandcontrolmeasuresshouldbe
lookedintoseriouslyassuggestedabove.
Table3TheModifiedSetpointsatVariousPumpStations
I.St.#1St.#2St.#3St.#4St.#5St.#6St.#7
Parameter
PressureInlet0.280.280.280.280.284.47
Adjusting
Outlet9.609.606.906.906.96.90
PressureInlet2.42.42.42.42.45.24
Releasing
Outlet10.809.209.79.709.709.70
PressureInlet0.200.200.200.200.20
Shutdown
Outlet11.209.409.79.8010.209.80
HighInlet0.0390.0390.0390.0390.039
Pressure
Open/CloseOutlet11.4010.99.910.0010.4010.1
FlowRate
(+Inlet)(Outlet)+206666330
Note:TheModifiedSetPointsareindicatedwithBold.Variousfailureconditionsandcontrolmeasuresbyvirtueof
acomputersimulatorinitsfullversionhavetobeconsideredinmoredetails.
5.CONCLUSIONS
InparallelwithSCADAsystemimplementation,asimulatorworkingonofflinebasisisofgreatinterestintermsof
safety,costandproductivity.However,thesuggestedmitigationmeasureswereprovedtobemorepracticaltool
controlforsophisticatedsystemssuchasHegligPortsudanpipeline.
6.ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Asfarastheexperimentalworksareconcerned,theauthorsshouldmentionthePipelineSc.ResearchInst.of
CNPC,LangFangPipelineInstitute,teachersandstudentsattheLaboratoryofOilRheology,
291
ChinaUniversityofPetroleum,Beijing.Also,ourutmostgratitudetoXudongSun,thedirectoroftheInternational
Office&hisstaffwhosesincerityandencouragementwewillneverforget.
7.APPENDICES
7.1THEGENERALFEATUREOFTHESIMULATOR:ThefigurebelowshowstheMainMenusoftheInput
DataofthesimulatorwhichdesignedanddevelopedattheDepartmentofOil/GasStorage&Transportation,China
UniversityofPetroleumBeijing,
7.2HEGLIGPORTSUDANCRUDEOILPIPELINE.:
Theconstructionofthe1540kilometerexportpipelinetoPortSudanisthemostimportantachievementofGNPOC
forthedevelopmentofthewholeSudanfamousbasinandindeedthecountryasawhole.(Note:TheGreaterNile
PetroleumOperatingCompany(GNPOC)consortiumcomprisesChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation(CNPC),
292
MalaysiasPetronas,SudansSudapet,andIndiasOilandNationalGasCorporation(ONGC).ONGCacquiredits
interestfromCanadasTalismaninMarch2003.)
Below,amapwhichshowstheSEVENpumpstations,startingfromthefirststationatHegligandtheterminalat
Portsudan.PartsoftheroutethroughthenortherndesertandtheRedSeaHillswerenotoriouslyrockyanddifficult
toexcavate.Thepipehasbeenexposedtofluctuatingextremesofheatandcoldinthedesertatmosphere.Better
qualitypipewasusedinthesesectionstosurvivethethermalstressesofexpansionandcontraction.
Thepressureinsidethepipesishighestnearthepumpstations,andthesesectionsalsousedthestrongestpipes.
Also,thepipelinewasexposedtogroundmovement,fromflooderosion,forexample,aswellasorganisedattacks.
Breakscouldoccuranywhere,andsafetyfeaturesweredonesuccessfullyallalongtheroutebytheGNPOCunder
supervisionoftheSudanMinistryofEnergy&Mining.
8.REFERENCES
[1].LINGXiao,ZHANGJinjun,LIHongying,etal.Simulationofpipeliningpourspointdepressant
beneficiatedwaxycrudeoilthroughChinaWestCrudeOilPipeline,The7thInternationalPipeline
Conference.CalgaryAlberta,2008.
[2].JINGGongandW.Wang,ControllingSurgeDueToAccidentialShutOffFastClosingValueAtTerminal
StationofanOilPipeline,InternationalOil&GasConferenceandExhibitioninChina,57December2006,
Beijing.
[3].BrucePhillipsandGeraldT,Moreland,LiquidsPipelineControl,MultifacetedProgramReducesReportable
OverpressureIncidence,PipelineandGasJournalOnline,June2002.
[4].AnindyaHati,NishithVerma,andRajChhabra,"TransientAnalysisofGasFlowinastraightPipeline,"The
CanadianJournalofChemicalEngineering,Vol.79,Feb.2001.
[5].YsairM.Fadul.:"AnOrientationVisitReportHeglig"SudanUniversityofScience&Technology,Sep2000.
[6].GongJing,YanDafan,ZhangWeidong:"SurgeControlinaComplexOilPipelineSystem,aStudyon
DagingTielingCrudeOilPipeline,"Oil/GasStorage&Transportationjournal,Vol.13,No.6,Dec.1994.
[7].Wardhaugh,L.T.,Boger,D.V.,andTonner,S.P.,"RheologyofWaxyCrudeOils,"SPE17625,SPE
InternationalMeetingonPetroleumEngineering,Tianjin,China,November14,1988.
293
GAILpipelinefireduetocollectivefailure:Oilministryprobereport
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/20140910/news/53770208_1_gailpipelinefirepipelineroutepngrbDecember07,2014
...yearwasaresultacollectivefailureofthesystem,anoil...corrosionrateinthepipeline,"the...naturalgaspipelinein...
GAIL'sTatipakaKondapallipipeline,whichwasbuiltin2001tomovedrynaturalgastoLancoPowerPlant,transportedgasasalsowaterand
condensatecomingfromONGC'swells.Waterandcondensatecorrodedthepipeline,leadingtogasandcondensateleakingtosurfacewherea
lightingofastoveledtoablastandsubsequentfireonJune27.
NEWDELHI:ThedevastatingfireatstaterunGAILIndiaLtd'spipelineinAndhraPradeshthatkilled22personsinJunethisyearwasaresulta
collectivefailureofthesystem,anoilministryprobehasconcluded.
Aninquirycommittee,headedbytheministry'sJointSecretary(Refineries)RajeshKumarSingh,initsreportblamed"inadequatesystems/approach"
fortheaccident.
TheagreementbetweenproducerONGCandtransporterGAILdoesnotprovideforthequalityofgastobesuppliedasisthecaseinseveral
marginalandisolatedfieldsinKrishnaGodavariandCaurveybasinsasalsoGujaratandNorthEast.
Puttingseparatorstostripgasofliquidsbeforetransportationmaynotbeeconomicallyviableatallplacesduetosmallquantitiesoffuelbeing
producedfromthesefields.
AnauditbypipelinesregulatorPNGRBinAugust2011toodidnotmakeanyobservationinconnectiontocompositionofgasandassociatedissues.
Thereportsaidtherewas"noevidenceofanyefforts"byNagpurbasedPetroleumandExplosivesSafetyOrganisation(PESO)toenforceputtingup
ofGasDehydrationUnittodrainoutwaterandliquids.
ThepipelinewasalsoauditedbyOISDandtherehasbeennoobservationonwetgascontent.
Thereportsaiditwasdifficulttoestablishindividualculpability.
Besidesinstallationofdehydrationfacilityforremovalofwaterandcondensatepriortofeedingnaturalgasinthepipeline,itrecommendedthrough
inspectionofthepipelinesandputtingupofleakdetectionsystem.
Also,patrollingusingmoderngadgetsshouldbecarriedoutinthepipelineroute.
Italsorecommendedthat"GAILshouldcompleteaninternalenquiryofmanagerialfailuresatdifferentlevelsandfixresponsibilityforthelapses
pointedoutherein."
"Comprehensiveprocedureshallbedevelopedforrepairofpipelineincaseofleak,"itsaid,addingGAILmustdeveloppropersupervisoryandcontrol
systemsformaintainingthehealthofpipelines.
ThestategovernmentonitspartdidnotactonGAIL'srepresentationsforremovalofencroachmentalongthepipelineroute.
"GAILhasapparentlyfloutedthedeclarationtothestatutoryauthorityaswellasthedeclareddesignbasisbynotprovidingGDUatTatipakaand
Mori.AbsenceofGDUcontributedtoincreasingtheinternalcorrosionrateinthepipeline,"thereportsaid.
Wetgascontainsfreewater,carbondioxideandsulphurwhichinducedinternalcorrosioninthepipeline.
Thepanelsaidtheexplosion,followedbyamajorfire,wasduetoleakageofcondensateandgaswhichwasprobablycontinuingfromthenight
beforetheincident.Thecondensateformedvapourcloudwithgaspockets,andtriggeredamajorfirewhenateavendorlightedthestove.
AnOverviewofCorrosionMechanismsandMitigationStrategiesforOilandGasPipelines
http://www.hindawi.com/journals/isrn/2012/570143/December07,2014
AdvancesinAssetManagement...Internalcorrosionisthelargestcauseofpipelinefailureinoilandgas...Astudyoftheinfluenceofgasflowrate
on...
ProductionPlanningDepartment,OverallForgePtyLtd,70RWHenryDrive,EttamogahnearAlbury,P.O.Box5275,Albury,NSW2640,Australia
Effectivemanagementofassetsintheoilandgasindustryisvitalinensuringequipmentavailability,increasedoutput,reducedmaintenancecost,
andminimalnonproductivetime(NPT).Duetothehighcostofassetsusedinoilandgasproduction,thereisaneedtoenhanceperformance
throughgoodassetsmanagementtechniques.ThisinvolvestheminimizationofNPTwhichaccountsforabout2030%ofoperationtimeneeded
fromexplorationtoproduction.Corrosioncontributestoabout25%offailuresexperiencedinoilandgasproductionindustry,whilemorethan50%of
thisfailureisassociatedwithsweetandsourcorrosionsinpipelines.Thismajorriskinoilandgasproductionrequirestheunderstandingofthefailure
mechanismandproceduresforassessmentandcontrol.Forreducedpipelinefailureandenhancedlifecycle,corrosionexpertsshouldunderstand
themechanismsofcorrosion,theriskassessmentcriteria,andmitigationstrategies.Thispaperexploresexistingresearchinpipelinecorrosion,in
ordertoshowthemechanisms,theriskassessmentmethodologies,andtheframeworkformitigation.Thepapershowsthatcorrosioninpipelinesis
combatedatallstagesofoilandgasproductionbyincorporatingfielddatainformationfrompreviousfieldsintothenewfieldsdevelopmentprocess.
Theoilandgasindustryisanassetintensivebusinesswithcapitalassetsrangingfromdrillingrigs,offshoreplatformsandwellsintheupstream
segment,topipeline,liquefiednaturalgas(LNG)terminals,andrefineriesinthemidstreamanddownstreamsegments.Theseassetsarecomplex
andrequireenormouscapitaltoacquire.Ananalysisofthefivemajoroilandgascompanies(BP,Shell,ConocoPhillips,Exxonmobil,andTotal)
showsthatplant,property,andequipmentonaverageaccountsfor51%ofthetotalassetswithavalueofover$100billion[1].Consideringthehuge
investmentinassets,oilandgascompaniesarealwaysunderimmensepressuretoproperlymanagethem.Toachievethisinvolvestheuseof
differentoptimizationstrategiesthatisaimedatcostreductionandimprovedassetsreliability[2].
Duetothegrowthinthedemandofoilandgasaroundtheworld,companiesaredevelopingnewtechniquestoreachnewreservoirsintheoffshore
andonshorearena[3].Thisisputtingpressureonmostofthefacilitieswiththeattendantcostofmaintenancesoaring[1].Thecontinuousutilization
andtheageingoffacilitieshaveresultedinrecordfailuresintheoilandgasplants.Researchshowsthatbetween1980and2006,50%ofEuropean,
majorhazardsoflosscontainmenteventsarisingfromtechnicalplantsfailureswereprimarilyduetoageingplantsmechanismcausedbycorrosion,
erosion,andfatigue[4,5].
AstudyshowsthatcorrosioncostinUSroseabove1$trillionin2012accountingforabout6.2%ofGDPhence,thelargestsingleexpenseinthe
economy[6].Intheoilandgascompany,corrosionaccountsforover25%ofassetsfailure[7]andisfoundtobeprevalentineverystageofthe
productioncycle.Oxygenwhichplaysadominantroleincorrosionisnormallypresentinproducingformationwater.Duringdrillingoperation,drilling
mudcancorrodethewellcasing,drillingequipment,pipeline,andtheenvironment.WaterandCOproducedorinjectedforsecondaryrecoverycan
causeseverecorrosionofcompletionstrings,whiletheacidsusedtoreduceformationdamagearoundthewellortoremovescalecanattackmetals
[8].Theformationwaterandinjectedwaterusedfortheoilrecoveryareapotentialsourceofpipelinecorrosionduringtransportationoftheoilfrom
thewellstotheloadingterminals.Mechanicalstaticequipmentlikevalves,tanks,vessels,separators,andsofortharesusceptibletoadifferentkind
ofcorrosionhowever,pipelinesaremorepronetocorrosionduetothepresenceofCO,HS,HO,bacteria,sand,andsoforthinthefluid.
Owingtotheincreasingcostofpipelinecorrosionmanagementintheoilandgasindustries[1],operatorsarebecomingmoreconcernedabout
corrosionmanagementplanningatallphasesofproduction.Corrosioninformationfromexistingfielddataisbeingincorporatedintodesign
informationfornewoilandgasfield[9,10]inabidtodevelopappropriatecorrosionmanagementmethodologiesthatwillenhancethedesignlifeof
thepipelinesandoptimizeproduction.ToreducetheriskofmicrobiologicallyinfluencedCorrosion(MIC)andotherassociatedcorrosionslikestress
corrosioncracking(SCC),hydrostatictestingofcarbonsteelpipesshouldbecarriedoutinsuchamannerthatenhancesthefuturepipelineservice
conditionsbyusingtherightsourceofwater,ensuringproperdegreeoffiltration,ensuringlimitedexposureperiodtotemperatureandeliminatingair
packets[11].ThoughbacteriainthebiofilmareresponsibleforpittingofapipelineinaMIChowever,theimpactoftheflowvelocityoftheconstituent
fluidinfluencesthemasstransferratetherebyaffectingthebiofilmformation,hence,inhibitingtheactivitiesofsulphatereducingbacteria,(SRB)
presentinthefluid[12].ThisflowattributehassignificantimpactinMICinoilandgaspipeline.
ConsideringthefactthattheCOandHSinducedcorrosionratecanreachupto6mm/yrand300mm/yr,respectively,[13]inoilandgaspipelines,
sophisticationininspectionandmonitoringtechniquesisthereforenecessaryforquickmitigation.Theincreasedtrendininlineinspectionandonline
dataacquisitionhashelpedinquickerdataacquisition,analysis,anddecisionmakingregardingcorrosioninpipelines.Theenhancedresearch
knowledgeofthebehaviourofthesecorrodents(COandHS,aceticacid,etc.)atdifferentoperatingconditions[1417]hasgivenrisetonumerous
mechanistic,statistical,andempiricalmodels[1823]whichhavecontributedimmenselyintheinspectionandmonitoring,selectionofinhibitors,and
materialsselectionforpipelinesdesign.
Sincecorrosionisadominantfactorcontributingtofailuresandleaksinpipelines[24],toaidindustryexpertsinmanagingtheintegrityofpipelines
thereforeinvolvesalayoutofthedevelopmentsinthemanagementstrategies.Thisinvolvestherecognitionoftheconditionscontributingtothe
corrosionincidentandidentifyingeffectivemeasuresthatcanbetakentomitigateagainstthem.Tofacilitatebestpracticesinpipelineintegrity
managementtherefore,requiresaframeworkthatutilizesgoodpoliciesandproceduresininspection,datacollection,andinterpretationforcorrosion
control.
Corrosionisanaturallyoccurringphenomenacommonlydefinedasthedeteriorationofasubstance(usuallymetal)oritspropertiesbecauseofa
reactionwithitsenvironment[25].CorrosionofmaterialsisinevitableduetothefundamentalneedofloweringofGibbsenergy[26].Everymaterialis
tryingtoachievealowerenergystatehencetheabilitytocorrodeinordertogettoalowenergyoxidestate.Thoughthisisthecasewithall
materials,themajorfocusofexpertshowever,istoachieveanequilibriumpositionbetweenthematerialsandtheenvironmenttherebycontrolling
corrosion.
Moderncorrosionsciencehasitsrootsinelectrochemistryandmetallurgy.Whereaselectrochemistrycontributestotheunderstandingofmaterials
viacorrosion,metallurgyprovidesinformationaboutthebehaviourofthematerialandtheiralloyshenceprovideamediumforcombatingthe
degradationonthem.Thetypeofcorrosionmechanismanditsrateofattackdependonthenatureoftheenvironment(air,soil,water,etc.)inwhich
thecorrosiontakesplace.Whereassomeenvironmentalconditioncanhelptomitigatetherateofcorrosion,othershelptoincreaseithence,
industrialwastesandproductscaneitherbecorrosioninhibitororcatalyst.Forinstance,CO,HS,temperature,massflowrate,pH,formationwater,
andsoforthcontributeinnosmallmeasuretotherateofcorrosioninoilandgaspipeline[14,16,17,27].Theexistenceofanodiccathodicsiteson
thesurfaceofapieceofmetalimpliesthatthedifferenceinelectricalpotentialisfoundonthesurface.Thispotentialdifferencehasthetendencyof
initiatingcorrosion.Ifanoilandgaspipelinepassesthroughazoneofclaysoil(wheretheoxygenconcentrationislow)togravel(wheretheoxygen
concentrationishigh),thepartofthepipelineincontactwiththeclaybecomesanodicandsuffersdamage.Thoughthisproblemisextensively
addressedwiththecathodicprotection[26],concentrationcellmayalsobeformedwheretherearedifferencesinmetalionconcentration.
Althoughmostmetalsarecrystallineinform,theygenerallyarenotcontinuoussinglecrystalbutratherarecollectionsofsmallgrainsofdomainsof
localizedorderinwhichmicrocrystalformsastheliquidcoolsandsolidifies.Inthefinalstates,thecrystalshavedifferentorientationwithrespectto
oneanother.Theedgeofthedomainformgrainboundarieswhichareanexampleofplanardefectsinmetal.Thesedefectsareusuallysitesof
chemicalreactivity.Theboundariesarealsoweaknesses,theplaceswherestresscorrosioncrackingbegins.Themetallicsurfaceexposedtoan
aqueouselectrolyteusuallypossessessiteforoxidation(anodicreaction)thatproduceselectronsinthemetalandreduction(cathodicreaction)that
consumestheelectronsproducedbytheanodicreaction[25,26].Thesesitesmakeupacorrosioncell.Theanodicreaction(Figure1)involvesthe
dissociationofmetaltoformeithersolubleionicproductoraninsolublecompoundofmetalusuallyanoxide.Forcathodicreaction(Figure2),oxygen
gasgeneratedcouldbereducedorwaterisreducedtoproducehydrogengas.Thesimultaneousreactionoftheanodicandcathodicreactions
producestheelectrochemicalcell.
Incompletelyoxygenfreewater,thecathodicreactionthattakesplaceisthereactionofhydrogeniontoformhydrogengasasshownin(1):2H++
2eH2(g)(1)Whensignificantamountsofoxygenarepresentinthesystem,thecathodicreactionthattakesplaceisshownin(2):2H++1
2O2+2
MultiCriteriaDecisionAnalysisframeworkforrisk...
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December07,2014
toprovideatheoreticalminimumfailurerateforthelifeofthepipeline....paper,itisthedeterminationofriskoffailureofoilandgaspipelines.
Reliability,RiskandSafetyAle,Papazoglou&Zio(eds)
2010Taylor&FrancisGroup,London,ISBN9780415604277
MultiCriteriaDecisionAnalysisframeworkforriskmanagement
ofoilandgaspipelines
Alex.W.Dawotola,P.H.A.J.M.vanGelder&J.K.Vrijling
InterdisciplinaryResearchCenterSafetyCriticalSystems,UniversityofOldenburg,Oldenburg,Germany
ABSTRACT:Oilandgaspipelinesaresubjecttodifferentdegreesoffailureanddegradationduring
operation.Commonpipelinefailuremechanismsincludecorrosion,mechanicaldamage,thirdparty
damage,anddesignimperfections.Oneoracombinationofthesefailuremechanismscouldeventually
leadtorupture,carryinghugehuman,financial,andenvironmentalloss.Hence,theneedforreliableand
costeffectiveriskmanagementprocessesbecomesmoreimperative.Thispaperproposesadecisionbased
methodforriskmanagementofoilandgaspipelines.ThemethodisbasedonaMultiCriteriaDecision
Analysis(MCDA)framework,utilizinganAnalyticHierarchyProcess(AHP)toprioritizeoilandgas
pipelinesfordesign,construction,inspectionandmaintenance.Acasestudyapplicationonpipelinesin
Nigeriaisusedtodemonstratetheproposedmethodology.Themethodologyisanimprovementinthe
existingqualitativeriskassessmentofpipelines.Furthermore,withenhancedaccuracyinriskassessment,
considerablecostsavingsintheinspectionandmaintenanceplanningofthepipelinemaybeachieved.
1INTRODUCTIONTransmissionpipelinesarecomplexinnature,
andtheirriskanalysiscouldbesimplifiedbyusing
1.1Backgroundanhierarchicalapproach,(HuipengLi2007).
However,littlehasbeenachievedonhierarchi
Integritymaintenanceofpipelinesisamajor
calriskanalysisofpetroleumpipelines,asanaid
challengeofservicecompanies,especiallythose
todecisionanalysis,whichisrequiredinmaking
involvedinthetransmissionofoilandgas.Two
inspectionandmaintenancedecisions.Analytic
majorfactorshavebeenthedrivingforcebehind
hierarchyprocessisapromisingmethodforthis
thischallenge.Thesearetheneedtominimize
application.AHP,developedbySaatyfunda
costsofinstallation,serviceandmaintenance,
mentallyworksbyusingopinionsofexpertsin
andsecondisriskminimization.Safetyanalysis
developingprioritiesforalternativesandthecri
(orriskassessment)ofpipelinesentailsthestudy
teriausedtojudgethealternativesinasystem,
oftheprobabilityofitsfailureandanyassoci
(Saaty1980).Theoutcomeisarelativescalewhich
atedconsequencesintermsofeconomicloss,
givesmanagersarationalbasisfordecisionmaking.
humanhazards,anddegradationoftheenviron
Ithasfoundapplicationsindiverseindustries,such
ment.Pipelineleakageorburstcouldbedisas
asagriculture,(QureshandHarrison2003),oiland
trous,havingcatastrophicinfluenceonhumanand
gas,(AlKhalilletal.2005&Cagnoetal.2000),
marinelivesandhugeeconomicloss.Pipelinedis
andthepublicsector,(Dey2002).
astershavebeenrecordedinbothdevelopedand
Inthispaper,asystematicriskbasedapproach
developingcountries,includingVenezuela,UK,
toriskmanagementofoilandgaspipelinesispre
Russia,Canada,Pakistan,Nigeria,andIndia(Dey
sented.Themethodisbasedonamulticriteria
etal.2004&AlKhalilletal.2005),necessitating
decisionanalysisframework,utilizingananalytical
thedevelopmentofmoreeffectiveriskmanage
hierarchyprocesstoprioritizeoperatingpipelinefor
mentstrategies.
design,construction,inspectionandmaintenance.
Ideally,mostpipelineoperatorsensurethatdur
Theoverallobjective,subobjectives,attributesand
ingthedesignstage,safetyprovisionsarecreated
decisionalternativesarerepresentedinanhierarchy.
toprovideatheoreticalminimumfailureratefor
Threedifferentoilandgaspipelinesoperated
thelifeofthepipeline.Whileinoperation,opera
bytheNigerianNationalPetroleumCompany
torsoftenusedsubjectiveestimatetocarryout
(NNPC)havebeenusedasacasestudy.Their
theirroutinebasedmaintenance.However,sub
failurefactorsandhistoricalfailurerecordswere
jectiveriskestimateispronetoinaccuracieswith
obtainedfromliteraturesandhistoricalrecords
sometimesanunreliableoutcome.
fromthecompany.Thefailurefactorsarelisted
307
asthesubobjectivefactorsintheMCDA.They2.2.3Collectionofinformation
havebeengroupedandidentifiedasexternalRequiredfeaturesforthepipelinesaredivided
interference,corrosion,operationalerror,strucintophysicaldata,constructiondata,operational
turaldefectsandotherminorfailures.Eachsubdata,inspectiondataandFailurehistory.This
objectivefactorisfurtherdividedintoattribute(s),informationisdocumentedforthehierarchical
asappropriate.Forexample,corrosionisaanalysis.
subobjectivefactorwhichisfurtherdividedinto
externalandinternalcorrosion.Theselectedcrude2.2.4Hierarchy
oilandgaspipelinesarethedecisionalternativesThenextstepisthedevelopmentofanhierarchy
whichwillbeprioritizedfordesign,construction,(valuetree),whichconsistsofthegoaloftherisk
inspectionandmaintenance.assessment,thefailurefactorsandsubfactors,if
Inthemethodology,AHPisusedtoestimateapplicableandthedecisionvariables.
theprobabilityoffailureofpipelinesbycom
bininghistoricalfailuredataofthepipelinewith2.2.5Expertelicitation
pairwisecomparisoncarriedoutbyexperts.TheInthelaststepoftheanalyticalhierarchyprocess,
expectedvaluesofconsequencesofpipelinefaildataofthepipelinesarepresentedtoanumberof
uresareobtainedfromtypicalcostoffailures.expertswhowillcarryoutapairwisecomparison
Riskisthenestimatedbytheproductofprobofthepipelineswithrespecttoeachriskfactor.
abilityandconsequences.WebHIPREversionTheoutcomeofthecomparisonisamatrixthat
1.22(MustajokiandHmlinen2000),isusedtoranksthepipelinesinorderoflikelihoodoffail
analyzetheresultsandtocarryoutasensitivityure.Theexpertswererequiredtorankeachfactor
analysis.againstanotherusingtheSaatyscale19.Table1
Scientifically,theapproachwillbevaluabletobelowgivesanexplanationoftheSaatyscale.
oilandgascompaniesinprioritizingtheinspecForexample,iftwocriteriaarejudgedtohave
tionandmaintenanceactivitiesoftheiroilandgasthesamelevelofrisk,thepairwisecomparison
pipelines.Themethodologycouldalsoprovevaluscorewillbe1.Ascoreof9isgivenifonecrite
ableinarrivingatadesign,redesign,constructionrionisassumedtobeextremelystrongerthanthe
andmonitoringdecisions.other.Intermediatejudgmentsof2,4,6and8are
selectedwhenaconclusioncannotbereachedfrom
thescoresof1,3,5and7asdefinedinTable1.
2RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
2.2.6Consistencycheck
AHPprovidesthepossibilityofcheckingthelogi
2.1Theanalytichierarchyprocess
calconsistencyofthepairwisematrixbycalculat
AnalytichierarchyprocessisusedinthedecisioningtheConsistencyRatio(CR).AHPjudgmentis
makingtoestimatethelikelihoodofanevent,byacceptableifCRislessthan0.1.Givenaweight
establishingrelativeimportanceofeachcontributvector,
ingfactors.Theanalyticalhierarchyprocesscon
sistsofthefollowingbasicsteps:
Table1.Saatyscaleofdecisionpreference.
2.2ProceduresJudgmentExplanationScore
2.2.1Problemformulation
EquallyTwoattributescontribute1
TheultimategoaloftheAHPisdefined.Inthisequallytotheobjective
paper,itisthedeterminationofriskoffailureofModeratelySlightlyfavouroneattribute3
oilandgaspipelines.Afterthegoaldefinition,conoveranother
tributingfactorstothefailurearethenidentified.StronglyStronglyfavouroneattribute5
Ifapplicable,thesefactorsarefurtherdividedintooveranother
1or2subfactors.VerystronglyStronglyfavouroneattribute7
withdemonstratedimportance
2.2.2Selectionofdecisionalternativesoveranother
IdentificationofdecisionalternativesisveryExtremelyEvidencefavouringone9
importantintheAHP.Theconclusiononthedeciattributeoveranotherisofthe
sionalternativesistheoutcomeoftheAHP.Inthishighestpossibleorderof
paper,threeoilandgaspipelinesareselectedastheaffirmation
decisionalternatives.ThegoaloftheAHPthereIntermediateTheintermediatevaluesare2,4,
judgmentusedwhencompromiseis6,8
foreistocomparethesepipelinesriskwise,andtoneeded
rankthembasedonthelevelofriskexpected.
308
Othermeasuresofconsistencyhavebeendefined.
w1
Forexample,(MustajokiandHmlinen,2000)
w
w2Obtainedfromadecisionmatrix,
wgiveaConsistencyMeasure(CM)ofbetween
n0to1usingtheMultiAttributeValueTheory
inherentintheWebHIPREsoftware.ACMof
a11a12a1n
0.2isconsideredacceptable.
A
a21a22a2nConsistencyMeasureiscalculatedusing,
a31a32a3n
2r
ijr(i,j)
Theconsistencyofthedecisionmatrixiscalcu
CM
n(n
1)ij(1
r(i,j))(1r(i,j))
(6)
latedasfollows:
MultiplymatrixAbytheweightvectorwtogive
vector,Bwherer
i,j
a(i,k)a(k,j),k
{1,z,n}is
theextendedboundofthecomparisonmatrixele
b1menta(i,j),andr(i,j)istheinverseofr(i,j).CM
BA.w
b2where,givesanindicationofthesizeoftheextended
bregionformedbythesetoflocalpreferences,when
n
wiar
ijwjforalli,j
{1,z,n}.
b1a11w1
a12w2
a1nwn
b2a21w1
a22w2
a2nwn(1)3CASESTUDY
bna31w
a32w
a3nwn3.1Backgroundinformation
Divideeachelementofvector,BwiththecorTheAHPmethodologyofRiskManagement
respondingelementintheweightvectorwtogivehasbeenillustratedbyacasestudyofoilandgas
anewvectorpipelinesinNigeria.Asummaryofthecharacter
isticsofthepipelinesisgiveninTable3below.The
b1w1c1goaloftheresearchistoconductariskassessment
c
b2w2
c2(2)ofgivenpipelinesusingtheAHPmethodology.
bwcThisisachievedbydeterminingtherelativecon
nnn
tributionofdifferentfailurefactorstotheoverall
hmaxistheaverageoftheelementsofvectorc:pipelinefailure.Thefailurefactorsindentifiedfor
thisstudyare:corrosion,externalinterference,
1nstructuraldefects,operationalerrorandothers.We
hmax
ci
ni
1
(3)arrivedatthesefactorsbasedonliteraturereview,
thehistoricalrecordoffailuresfromcompany
database,andfeedbackfromcompanyexperts.
ConsistencyIndexisthencalculatedusing,
Lmax
n
CI
(4)
n
1Table3.Summaryoftheattributesofpipelines.
wherenisorderofthedecisionmatrixandhmaxisPipeline
obtainedfromequation(3)above.
Usingequation(4),ConsistencyRatioiscalcuAttributeELABAZ
latedas,
PrimaryserviceGasCrudeoilCrudeoil
CIYearofcommission198919962002
CR
(5)
RITypeofcoatingConcretePolykenePolykene
Length340km4km18km
whereRIistherandomindexanditsvalueisDiameter24p4p6p
obtainedfromTable2below.Designpressure100bar207bar207bar
Operatingtemperature26.8nC33.4nC33.4nC
MaterialCarbonCarbonCarbon
Table2.Randomindextable.
steelsteelsteel
n3456789
9ClimateTropicalTropicalTropical
Ageofcoating21yrs25yrs25yrs
RI0.580.91.121.241.321.411.451.49Flowrate600MCFd1380bbls1080bbls
309
Atotalofsixpipelineexpertsparticipatedmeanmethod,thegroupjudgmentforthepairwise
intheexpertjudgmentstudyonriskassessmentcomparisonisobtainedbytakingthegeometric
ofthepipelines.Theaffiliationsoftheexpertsmeanoftheindividualjudgments.GMMispar
areinthefollowingorganisations:ShellInternaticularlysuitableforaggregatinggrouppreference
tional,ChevronExploration,BJServices,Nigeriaespeciallywhereconflictingresponsescouldarise.
PetroleumDevelopmentCompany,NigeriaFornparties,thegeometricmeanofjudgments
NationalPetroleumCompany,andSBMOffshore.fromentriesforthematricesofpairwisecompari
Attributesofthepipelinesandanhistoricalfailuresoniscalculatedas:
recordssheetcontainingdefiningcharacteristics
ofthepipelinesweremadeavailabletotheexpertsNk
1/n
withaquestionnaire.aijGs
aijs,ij
/s,s
9,
k
1
3.2Constructionofhierarchy
Where:
AhierarchytreeofthethreepipelinesisconG
aijs:Thegroupjudgmentforcriterioniwithcrite
structedusingWebHIPREsoftware,version1.22.
Thetree(Figure1)containsinformationontheioojofissues.
rion
aijks:Judgmentofindividualk(k
1,z,N)for
goal(failureofpipeline),criteria(failurefactors)
andsubcriteria(subdivisionoffailurefactors).criterioniwithcriterionjofissues.
ThedecisionalternativesarethethreepipelinesOs:Ordeningofallcriteriaofissues.
underconsideration.Theresultofthepairwisecomparisonforthe
groupisshowninTable4below.
3.3Resultsofpairwisecomparison
3.3.1Individualexpertcomparison
Individualexpertopiniononthepairwisecompar
isonoffactorsresponsibleforpipelinefailuresare
separatelycollectedusingaquestionnairethatwas
madeavailabletoeachexpert.Theoutcomeofthe
comparisonisthepairwisematrixforthefailure
likelihoodofthepipelines,basedonthejudgment
ofeachexpert.Asexpected,theoutcomevaried
fromoneexperttoanother,sinceaconsensusvote
doesnotapplyinthiscase.
3.3.2GroupjudgmentFigure2.Distributionoffactorsresponsibleforpipe
linefailures.Thefigureshowsexternalinterferenceas
Theindividualexpertcomparisoniscombined
theleadingcauseofpipelinefailurefollowedbycorro
groupwiseusingthegeometricmeanmethodsion,withrelativelikelihoodoffailureof0.607and0.214
(GMM),(AczelandSaaty1983).Inthegeometricrespectively.
Figure3.FactorsresponsibleforfailuresofEL,ABand
AZpipelines.ThefigureshowsELasthemostvulnerable
amongthethreepipelines.Themostpronouncedfailure
factorforeachpipelineisalsoshown.Forexample,for
ELpipelineitcanbeseenthatexternalcorrosionisthe
nextmostsignificantfailurefactorafterexternalinterfer
Figure1.HierarchytreeforEL,ABandAZpipeline.ence.WhileforAZpipelineitisinternalcorrosion.
310
Table4.PairwiserankingoffailurecriteriaandlikelihoodoffailureofEL,ABandAZpipelines.
Pipeline
FactorsLikelihoodSubFactorsLikelihoodELABAZ
Externalinterference0.607Sabotage0.5250.2710.1790.076
Mechanicaldamage0.0810.0510.0190.011
Corrosion0.214Externalcorrosion0.1530.0930.0410.018
Internalcorrosion0.0610.0090.0210.031
Structuraldefects0.066Constructiondefect0.0450.0230.0140.009
Materialsdefects0.0210.0060.0070.008
Operationalerror0.069Equipmentfailure0.0500.0090.0180.024
Humanerror0.0190.0030.0070.009
Others0.0440.0440.0230.0110.010
3.4Sensitivityanalysis
Thegraphsbelow(Figures48)showthesensitiv
ityofeachofthefailurefactorstothelikelihood
offailureofthepipelines.Inthesensitivityanaly
sis,theinfluenceofchangesontheoverallmodelis
investigated.Thefinalprioritiesofthelikelihood
offailuresofthepipelinesdependgreatlyonthe
weightsattachedtothefailurecriteria.Similarly,
thelikelihoodoffailureofeachpipelineisinflu
encedbytheweightsattributedtoeachfailurecrite
rion.Hence,somechangesintherelativeweightsof
Figure4.Sensitivityofpipelinefailuretoexternal
thefailurecriteriacouldleadtosignificantchanges
interferencewhenthelikelihoodoffailureduetoexternal
inthefinalranking.Sensitivityanalysisthereforeinterferenceisincreasedby20%,from0.61to0.73.
givesgoodinformationontherobustnessofthe
model.
Thelikelihoodoffailureduetoexternalinter
ferenceisincreasedby20%toseehowthisaffects
therankingoffailuresofEL,ABandAZpipe
lines.Thischangeresultsinabout3%increaseand
10%decreaseintheweightsofELandAZpipe
linerespectively.ABpipelinehasanincreaseof
2%inweight.TheresultisdisplayedinFigure4.
SimilarlyinFigure5,a70%decreaseintheweight
ofoperationalerrorsleadstoabout3%increase
inthelikelihoodoffailureofELpipelineanda
5%decreaseintheweightofAZpipeline,withFigure5.Sensitivityofpipelinefailuretooperational
about1%decreaseintheweightofABpipeline.errorwhentheweightofoperationalerrorisdecreased
Inaddition,theweightofcorrosionandstructuralby70%.
defectisfurtherincreasedby50%and60%respec
tively,andtheweightofminorfailures(others)is
decreasedby75%tocapturethesensitivity.The
outcomesarerepresentedinFigures6to8below.
4RISKMANAGEMENTOFPIPELINES
4.1Inspectionandmaintenancestrategy
Partoftheriskmanagementstrategiesistofor
mulateanappropriateinspectionandmaintenance
strategyforthethreepipelines.Table5givessomeFigure6.Sensitivityofpipelinefailurefora50%
possiblestrategy(ies)foreachfailurefactor.increaseinthelikelihoodoffailureduetocorrosion.
311
alsobeexplainedbythepoorcoatingconditionof
thepipeline.TheresultpresentedinFigure9shows
ELpipelineasthemostvulnerablepipelineamong
thethreepipelines.Toreducethelikelihoodtoexter
nalinterferencemorepatrollingissuggested,while
efficientpipecoatingisrecommendedinorderto
reduceexternalcorrosion.
ThestudyrevealsthatABpipelineismoreliable
toexternalinterferencethanAZpipeline,but
notasliableasELpipeline.Also,oninternalcor
rosion,ABseemstobemoreliablethanELpipe
line,butbetterthanAZpipeline.OnMaterials
Figure7.Sensitivityofpipelinefailureduetostructural
defect,thethreepipelinesgenerallyhavethesame
defectwhentheweightisincreasedby60%.leveloffailureexpectation.Thesimilarityonthe
expectedfailureduetomaterialsdefectisexpected
becausethethreepipelinesareallmadeofthe
samematerial,carbonsteel.ForABpipeline,an
intelligentpiggingsurvey(IPS)isrecommendedto
reduceitshighlikelihoodtointernalcorrosion,and
regularpatrollingisalsorecommendedtoreduce
itslikelihoodtoexternalinterference.
AZpipelinehasthehighestlikelihoodofinter
nalcorrosion,equipmentfailureandhuman
error.Theinvestigationfromthepipelineoperator
confirmedthatthepipelinehassufferedpreviously
frominternalcorrosionandhumanfailure.Itishow
everinterestingtonotethatifallthefailurefactors
areconsidered,thelikelihoodoffailureofpipeline
AZismuchbetterthanthatofELandABpipe
Figure8.Sensitivityofpipelinefailurefora75%lines.Therefore,AZpipelinecanbeconsideredthe
decreaseintheweightoffailureforotherminorfailures.leastvulnerableamongthethreepipelines,asrepre
sentedinFigure9andTable4.Thisisduepartially
totheleastlikelihoodofAZpipelinetoexternal
Table5.Maintenancestrategyforpipelinefailures.interference,whichhasveryhighconsequences.To
reduceitsoperationalerror,immediatereplacement
SubFactorsMaintenancestrategyoffaultyequipmentsandretrainingofoperatorsis
recommended.Intelligentpiggingsurveyisalsorec
SabotagePatrolling
ommendedtomitigateinternalcorrosion.
MechanicaldamagePipelineMarking/Improved
RightofWay(ROW)
ExternalcorrosionPipecoating4.2Expectedfailurecost
InternalcorrosionIntelligentpiggingsurveyForthethreepipelines,theseverityoffailurewas
ConstructiondefectReconstruction/Replacement
estimatedfromhistoricalfailurecostsavailable
MaterialsdefectsReplacementofpipelines
fromdatabaseofthepipelinecompany.Inaddition,
EquipmentfailureReplacementoffaulty
equipments
HumanerrorOperatortraining
ELpipelineisundoubtedlythemostvulnerable
amongthe3pipelines,havingthehighestlikelihood
offailure.TheexpectedvulnerabilityofELpipe
linetoexternalinterferenceandexternalcorrosionis
muchhigherthanexpectedforABandAZpipelines.
ELpipelineislocatedintheNigerDeltaregionof
Nigeria,withahighlikelihoodofthirdpartyinterFigure9.Rankingofpipelinesaccordingtolikelihood
ferenceandsabotageduetotherestivenatureoftheoffailure.Likelihood:EL
0.488,AB
0.317,and
region.ThehightendencytoexternalcorrosioncouldAZ
0.196.
312
Table6.Inspectionandmaintenancestrategyforfailurefactors.
ELpipelineABpipelineAZpipeline
SeveritySeveritySeverity
LikelioffailureLikelioffailureLikelioffailure
SubFactorshood($000m)hood($000m)hood($000m)
ExternalinterferenceSabotage0.2712,2000.1798000.0761,000
Mechanicaldamage0.0511,0000.0194000.011500
CorrosionExternalcorrosion0.0933000.0411200.018120
Internalcorrosion0.0092000.021800.031100
StructuraldefectsConstructiondefect0.023800.014300.00935
Materialsdefects0.006200.007100.00815
OperationalerrorEquipmentfailure0.0098000.0184000.024400
Humanerror0.0034000.0072000.009200
Others0.0231000.011550.01055
Likelihoodofnofailure0.51200.68300.8050
Expectedfailurecost$689,560$167,095$99,145
pipelineexpertsthatparticipatedintheAHPwereThecasestudyofpetroleumpipelinesinNigeria
askedtoutilizetheirpreviousexperiencetoestirevealedsomeinterestingconclusions,which
matetheseverityoffailurebasedontheuniqueshowsthatlocationplaysasignificantroleinpipe
characteristicsofeachpipeline.lineintegrity.Similarworks(Deyetal.2004&
InTable6,thelikelihoodoffailureobtainedAlKhalilletal.2005)haveconcludedthatcor
fromtheAHPresultinTable4iscombinedwithrosionisthemostsignificantfailurecriterionof
theseverityoffailuretocalculatetheexpectedfailpetroleumpipelinesinIndiaandSaudiArabia.
urecostforeachpipeline.However,fortheNigeriancasestudy,external
Itcanbeconcludedfromtheresultsthattheinterferenceisfoundtobethemostimportant
expectedfailurecostofELpipelineismuchhigherfailurecriterion,representing60%oftheentire
thanforABandAZpipeline.Moreover,ABpipefailurecriteria.Thehighlikelihoodoffailureby
linehasahigherlikelihoodoffailureascomparedexternalinterferenceobtainedisduetotheinflu
toAZpipeline.Theexpectedfailurecostcalculaenceofsabotageactsonthepetroleumpipelines.
tionfurtherindicatesthatallocatingequalmainTherefore,increasingsecurityaroundthepipelines
tenanceresourcestothethreepipelineswillbeawouldhelptoimprovetheirreliability.
wrongandineffectivemaintenancestrategy.ThereConcentratingonmostrelevantfailurefactorsis
fore,intheallocationofmaintenanceresources,costefficientasithelpstheconcentrationofmain
ELpipeline;withthehighestexpectedfailurecosttenanceresourcesonmostrelevantfailurefactors.
shouldreceivemoreattentionthantheothertwoThemanagementwillalsofindthisapproachtobe
pipelines.Inaddition,ABpipelinewillrequirebeneficialinformulatinganinspectionandmainte
moremaintenanceresourcesthanAZpipeline.nancepolicyforthecompanysassets.Forthepipe
lines,theoutcomeofthedecisionanalysiscould
alsoproveusefulinformulatingindividualandsoci
5CONCLUSIONSetalriskacceptancecriteria(Vrijlingetal.2004).
Theparticipationofexpertswithworkingknowl
Adecisionbasedmodelhasbeenpresentedforriskedgeofthepipelinesreducesthesubjectivenature
managementofoilandgaspipelines.ThemodeloftheAHPmethod,althoughsubjectivityhasnot
usesavailabledataandstructuredexpertjudgmentbeentotallyeliminated.Infuturework,astructured
topredicttheprobabilityoffailureandseverityofexpertcalibrationtechniquewillbeappliedtofurther
failureofoilandgaspipelines.Theworkhasmadereducesubjectivity.Also,theaccuracyofthesever
auniquecontributiontotheapplicationofAnaityoffailureestimatedcouldbefurtherimproved
lytichierarchyprocessinprioritizingoilandgaswithmoredatafromthepipelineoperator.
pipelinesformaintenance.Thegeometricmean
methodisappliedtoarriveatagroupconsensus
bycombiningindividualresponsesofexpertsonACKNOWLEDGMENT
pipelinefailures.Thesoftware,WebHIPREused
wasfoundsuitabletomodelthecasestudy,andTheauthorswouldliketoacknowledgethe
toexpressthesensitivityofthefailurefactors.managementoftheNigerianNationalPetroleum
313
Company(NNPC)andNationalPetroleumDey,P.K.etal.2004,Riskbasedmaintenancemodelfor
DevelopmentCompany(NPDC)fortheirgenoffshoreoilandgaspipelines:acasestudy,Journalof
eroussupplyofdatausedinthisstudy.AlltheQualityinMaintenanceEngineering,Vol.10Number3
expertsthatparticipatedinthisresearcharealsopp.169183.
Hmlinen,R.P.2010,IntroductiontoValuetheory
appreciatedfortheirusefulcontributions.analysis,SystemAnalysisLaboratory,Helsinki
UniversityofTechnology,Finland.
Huipeng,Li.2007,HierrachialRiskAssessmentofwater
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Oil Gas Pipeline Failure Rates

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