Duncan Association Of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro A.

Tecson, petitioner
vs. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., respondent
September 19, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Tecson was hired on Oct. 25, 1995 by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,
Inc. as a medical representative. He was assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines SurCamarines Norte sales area. Upon his employment, Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he
agreed, among others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any
existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing
drug companies; and if management found that such relationship posed a possible conflict of interest,
to resign from the company.
On September, 1998 Tecson married Bettsy, an employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm Astra
Pharmaceuticals as the branch coordinator. The relationship, including the subsequent marriage,
dismayed Glaxo. On January 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had
given rise to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his wife's possible
resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they preferred to retain his services owing to his
good performance. Yet no resolution came to pass. In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer to
Glaxo's milk division, but his application was denied in view of Glaxo's "least-movement-possible" policy.
Then in November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales
area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson sought Glaxos
reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo,
however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the
transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
On Nov. 15, 2000, the Natl. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxos policy was
valid. Glaxo's policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor
companies, and affirming Glaxo's right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory. This decision was
assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals and the Court, but for nothing.
ISSUE:
1)Whether or Not Glaxos policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies
is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
(2) Whether Tecson was constructively dismissed.
RULING:
The record shows that Tecson was cognizant about the policy imposed by Glaxo company, upon signing
the contract, he voluntarily set his hands to follow the said policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships w/
and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the
employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave
him time to resolve the conflict . Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because
of his satisfactory performance and suggested that his wife would be the one to resign instead. Glaxo
likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the
problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson
to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court did not terminate
Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusan del
Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecsons
family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

STAR PAPER CORPORATION vs. SIMBOL

FACTS: Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged in trading principally
of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department
while
Sebastian
Chua
is
its
Managing
Director.
(a) The respondents were all regular employees of the company;
(b) On October 27, 1993, Simbol was hired by the company. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company. He married her on June 27, 1998. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that
should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated
in 1995. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998.

(c) On February 5, 1997, Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee
whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them pursuant to the aforementioned
company policy. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
(d) Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view
of an illegal company policy.
(e) On July 29, 1994, Estrella was hired by the company. She met Luisito Zuniga, also a co-worker,
whom petitioners claimed to be a married man who got Estrella impregnated. The company allegedly
could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
(f) Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who misrepresented himself as a
married but a separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not
separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy.
(g) On November 30, 1999, Estrella met an accident and had to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days as
advised by the doctor of the Orthopaedic Hospital. On December 21, 1999 but she found out that her
name was on hold at the gate. She was directed to the personnel office and handed a memorandum
that stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. Estrella was asked to submit an
explanation but she was dismissed nonetheless. She resigned because she was in dire need of money
and resignation could give her the thirteenth month pay.
On May 31, 2001, Labor Arbiter Del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On January, 11,
2002, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. On August 8, 2002, NLRC denied the respondents
Motion for Reconsideration through a Resolution.
On August 3, 2004, the CA reversed the NLRC decision and declared that:
(a) The petitioners dismissal from employment was illegal:
(b) The private respondents are ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; and
(c) The private respondents are to pay petitioners attorneys fees amounting to 10% of the award and
the cost of the suit.
ISSUE: Whether the subject 1995 policy/regulation is violative of the constitutional rights towards
marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code

HELD: YES. These courts find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the
employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that
spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that the
absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment
to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus,
they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business
require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable
policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse. This is known as the
bona fide occupational qualification exception. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification,
the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably
related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to
properly perform the duties of the job.We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the
case at bar. Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or
more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is
lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the
questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law. It
is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit
for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to
show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. The failure
of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot
prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes
of married persons working together in one company. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present
undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an
invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents
Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.
As to respondent Estrella, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their ruling on the singular
fact that her resignation letter was written in her own handwriting. Both ruled that her
resignation was voluntary and thus valid. The respondent court failed to categorically rule
whether Estrella voluntarily resigned but ordered that she be reinstated along with Simbol and
Comia. Estrella avers that she went back to work on December 21, 1999 but was dismissed
due to her alleged immoral conduct. At first, she did not want to sign the termination papers

but she was forced to tender her resignation letter in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.
The contention of petitioners that Estrella was pressured to resign because she got
impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as
immoral is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she
would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal
and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is
compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the
intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Thus, it is
illogical for Estrella to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Given the lack of
sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrellas
dismissal is declared illegal.

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.March 27, 2000 Puno, J.Facts

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the
registered ownerof Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.On December 30, 1995, respondent
received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.Actions Filed:
1. BAVA applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing,
trial court denied the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has
noauthority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolitionof its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati
by ordinance.
3. MMDA filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.
Issues
1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory
andpolice powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of
subdivision roads to public traffic?
Held
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative
in nature. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It
is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative
power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by
petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers
granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
private street in a private subdivision without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is
not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
Dispositive
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed.
Balacuit v CFI
FACTS: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person,
groupof persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie
orother public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and
12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of
thesaid ticket.Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint
before theCourt of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237
on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void
andunenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of
Butuanconstitutional and valid.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid
andconstitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of
publicexhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police
power bythe local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear
that theinterest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means
adopted mustbe reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive uponindividuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest,
arbitrarily interferewith private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not
final or conclusive, butis subject to the supervision of the courts.The Court likewise ruled in the negative
as to the question of the subject ordinance being a validexercise of police power. While it is true that a
business may be regulated, it is equally true that suchregulation must be within the bounds of reason,
that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, andits provisions cannot be oppressive amounting
to an arbitrary interference with the business or callingsubject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater
have a right to manage their property in their own way,to fix what prices of admission they think most
for their own advantage, and that any person who did notapprove could stay away.The exercise of police
power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes thefundamental law of the land, or an act
of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being

unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power,
beupheld as valid.WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby
REVERSEDand SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640
unconstitutionaland, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
Facts: The present case involves consolidated cases for crime committed for violation of B.P.22 or known
as the bouncing check law. The accused of these cases asserted that B.P. 22 isa violation of
constitutional inhibition that no person shall be imprisoned for non-payment of debts, and therefore,
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the effuse punished by B.P. 22 is the non-payment of an obligation.
Held: The gravemen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of a worthless check, not the non-payment of an
obligation. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanction, the making of the worthless
check and putting them into circulation. Because of its deleterious effect onthe public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not asoffense against property but an offense
against public order. The legislature may not validly be considered as non-payment of debt ex contracts,
and anact may not be considered and punished as malum in se, but each act may be penalizedunder
police power as malum prohibitum because of the harm it cause to the public.Police power of the state
has been described as the most essential, insistent and illimitablepowers which enables it to prohibit
all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of the society.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILAFacts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of thedue
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive butalso
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and theguaranty
against self-incrimination.Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients
and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration
form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several
other amendatoryprovisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests."Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind fromoperating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to
increase "the income of the citygovernment."The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Held:
No.
Rationale:

The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners.This
particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard publicmorals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported byanything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of policepower which has
been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
4
extending as it does "to all the great public needs."It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision,
to destroy the very purpose of the state if itcould be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, publicmorals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively
put, police power is that inherent and plenarypower in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is
hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national or local, primarily rest the exerciseof the police power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations topromote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people.In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection
and other applicable constitutionalguaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or propertyof any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of
police power may be considered aseither capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due
process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the
courts.The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance
inquestion.
***
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevailover
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v. PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCORFacts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased aportion of a
building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same,and prepared
to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project. The religious elements echoed the objectionand so did the women's groups and the youth.
Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the citylegislators. The media trumpeted the protest,
describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.The contention of the petitioners is that it is
violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayande Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use
of buildings for the operation of a casino andOrdinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos.On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help
centralizeand regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of thePhilippines.The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition
for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
Held:
No
Ratio:
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:***Sec. 16.
General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powersexpressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essentialto the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, localgovernment units shall ensure and support, among other things,
the preservation and enrichmentof culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people
to a balanced ecology,encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific
andtechnological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice,promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants.There is a requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute. Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannotbe superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
It is a heresy to suggest thatthe local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power inthe first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that

cannotbe amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
TANO v. SOCRATESFacts:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of:(1)
Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled:
"
AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA
CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending to
engage in any business,trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the
articles for which a permit isrequired to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing to
check or conduct necessaryinspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from Puerto Princesa and,(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING
THECATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL
DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMSThe petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation
of Section 2, Article XIIand Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor
had the absolute authorityto determine whether or not to issue the permit.They also claim that it took
away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar asthe Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocationand entering "into contracts which
are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their businessendeavors to a successful
conclusionPublic respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the
ProvincialGovernment's power under the general welfare clause; they likewise maintained that there
was noviolation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional
Held: NORatio:
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and thepowers
granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), andunder
Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve
theexercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.***Sec. 16.
General Welfare
. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for itsefficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, amongother things,
the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology
, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliantscientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve thecomfort and
convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have
two principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of fiveyears; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the
City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities.
It
imposes
upon
the
sangguniang
bayan,
the
sangguniang
panlungsod,
and
the
sangguniangpanlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose
appropriate penaltiesfor acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms
of destructivefishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication
of rivers andlakes or of ecological imbalance."
The petition is dismissed
TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT
Facts:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators seek to declare the nullity on Memorandum Circular No.77-42 of the Board
of Transportation. Herein petitioner is a domestic corporation compoundof taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificate of Public Convenience to operatetaxicabs within the City of Manila and to any

other place in Luzon accessible to vehiculartraffic. The Memorandum issued by BOT ordered the phasing
out and replacement of old anddilapidated taxis. Now, pursuant to this policy, the Board promulgated a
regulation in theeffect that no car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi. Petitioners contend
thatprocedural due process was violated because position papers were not asked of them andbecause
there was no public hearing prior to the issuance of the regulation.
Issue:
Whether procedural due process was violated in the case at bar.
Held:
No, there was no violation of petitioners constitutional right to due process. The Boardhas a valid range
of choices for gathering information or data and is not bound to make useall of them. Moreover, previous
notice and hearing so required in judicial and quasi-judicialproceedings but not in the promulgation of
general rule