INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM IN THE SLAVIC CORE OF THE CIS:

TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops
Workshop 18 Comparing Transformations: The Institutional Paradigm
Lien Verpoest
The post-communist transition in Central and Eastern Europe has been unfolding for more than a decade
now. The implosion of the Soviet Regime sparked a renewed attention for Central and Eastern European
area studies, matching the focus on Soviet studies in the heydays of the Cold War. A favourable
consequence of the heightened attention was a disciplinary widening and deepening of the research
field. Not only did the implosion of the Soviet Union revive old ideas - like the controversy between the
slavophiles and the zapadniki (Walicki 1989, Devlin 1999), the idea of pan-slavism, or Russias ambiguous
relations with Western Europe (Neumann 1996, 1997) but it also brought about a strong impetus to
interpret the Post-Soviet Areas external relations from the perspective of IR theory. (Balmaceda 2001;
Bunce 1999; Daniels 1999; Motyl 1997)1. One could say that from 1991 onwards, area studies (Sovietology)
and international relations theory finally started to converge together and merged into the discipline of
post-Sovietology (Pursiainen 2000, Hanson 2003, Motyl 1993).
This widening and deepening of the research was a direct consequence of the widening and deepening of
the Newly Independent States relations with the countries surrounding them. Freed of the foreign policy
directives of the once so isolationist Soviet bloc, the newly independent states have over the past decade
developed bilateral and multilateral ties with both West and East, thereby turning the geopolitical postSoviet entity into a significantly more complex picture than before (Tsimburskiy 1999, Kortunov 1993,
Tsygankov 2003). Yet the transition although in a decisive stage has not yet been finalised, especially
in the CIS member states. The post-Soviet space resembles an ever-changing, ever-developing organism; a
complex structure of countries as interdependent elements whose relations are largely determined by
their function in the whole, despite their current independent status. Notwithstanding, several
developments along distinct lines can be observed.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central Europe has made an unambiguous Western choice by bidding for
EU membership and striving to become part of the Euro-Atlantic security structures. Its integration with
Western Europe is currently becoming reality; the bulk of the Central European states will join the European
Union on the 1st of May 2004. The Central European states rapid accession to the EU can be attributed to
the radical economic transition, political democratisation, and especially the determined and consistent
assertion of its European identity by both the leaders nd the population of the countries.
A different and more complicated picture emerges in Eastern Europe. Degrees of democratisation and
market reform, let alone of institutional reform, vary among the Soviet successor states (Linz & Stepan 1996,
Pivovarov & Fursov 1999). Different views on national identity and minority issues, regionalisation and
Europeanisation, as well as the economic interdependence among the newly independent states, complicate
matters further (White 2001a: 215; White 2001b; Aron 1998). Also in their foreign policy, the former Soviet
states are following different trajectories. Taras Kuzio distinguishes three groups: the countries who have
made a pro-European choice (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), the Westernisers (Ukraine, Georgia,
Azerbaidzhan and Moldova), and the Russophiles (Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tadzhikistan (Kuzio 2000a, 2000b).
The establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 8 December 1991 entangled the
geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet space even more as it conjoined different countries with divergent
1 For example, Margarita Balmaceda applied Stephen Walts alliance theory of balancing and bandwagoning in her book on the
Ukrainian-Russian-Central European security Triangle (Balmaceda 2001). Also Valerie Bunces book on subversive institutions in
which she advocates a rapprochement of comparative politics and area studies serves illustrates this (Bunce 1999).

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

policy goals into one organisation. Some member states (e.g. Ukraine2) perceived the CIS as an elegant
solution to bring about a civilised divorce (Kubicek 1999). Other members (e.g. Russia and Belarus) on the
other hand saw its main purpose in co-ordinating the economic and security policies among the Soviet
successor states3, especially because of the complex economic interdependence of the region. Tellingly,
Russia envisioned the CIS-construction as the ultimate framework to re-assert her leading role in the postSoviet region. Ten years along the road of putative CIS integration, institutional development of the CIS has
stalled, and integration efforts have dissipated over the CIS area (Malgin 2002, Sakwa & Webber 1999). The
members of the CIS have become involved in a host of other sub-regional initiatives like the GUUAM, the
Eurasian Economic Community, the Union between Russia and Belarus, and the Common Economic Zone4
(Penner 2003).
Geopolitical Pluralism in the Slavic Core of the CIS
In view of all these developments, one can assert that the post-communist transition led to a significantly
heterogeneous political landscape in the post-Soviet space. The past decade has witnessed the evolution
from a unitary Soviet state to an area containing a variety of foreign policy goals ranging from EU
membership to regional integration. In late 1997, Zatulin and Migranian recognised in an article that
geopolitical pluralism5 had arrived in the former USSR (Zatulin & Migranian 1997: 1-2; Kubicek 2000).
Geopolitical pluralism can be observed in different levels of state and society: the divergent policy
preferences of the former Soviet states, in different political models on which the newly independent states
based themselves during transition or diversity in economic transition and trade links. Also, the divergent
foreign policy preferences epitomise the path of development these countries have embarked upon6.
This paper will focus on how geopolitical pluralism is reflected in the institutional change of certain newly
independent states. The analysis of state institutions is crucial in the study of post-Soviet transition. It is in
the institutional design that lie determinants for domestic and international state behaviour (Goodin 1996;
Lijphart & Waisman 1996). The most conspicuous motivation for scrutinising state institutions is the fact that
their divergent development corroborates geopolitical pluralism in the post-Soviet states.
All post-communist states faced the challenge of building new state institutions and reorganising existing
state administrations. The enlargement process of the EU and its accompanying screening procedures has
clearly demonstrated that whereas most Central European states have successfully carried out their reforms,
some countries are left in the periphery of the European Union (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). The latter
two are often branded as the future outsider states.
In this paper, I intend to situate these two former Union Republics Ukraine and Belarus - between socalled organisational fields on the European continent: the European Union and the Commonwealth of
Independent States. Belarus and Ukraine each have experienced their own political and institutional
transition. There are similarities and differences in the democratic development, the institutional build-up
and the reorganisation of their administrations. The disparate institutional development and apparent
divergence in foreign policy preferences can therefore lead to the question whether the institutions and state
administration in these countries have been drafted to the liking of the EU or of the CIS-co-operation
structure. More specifically, the main aim is to identify the mechanisms within the political institutions of Ukraine
and Belarus that generate isomorphism toward the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States,
and the rationale behind the divergent foreign policy orientations in the Slavic Core of the CIS.

2 Ukraines status within the CIS is rather contradictory: although it was one of the three signatories (together with Russia and
Belarus) of the Belavezhe Treaty of 8 December 1991 that founded the CIS, Ukraine never ratified this Treaty and therefore never
became and actual member. (Mandelbaum 1998)
3 This co-ordinating role was initially mainly taken up by Russia. See Andreyev 2000, Tkatchenko & Petermann 2002, Starostin 1992.
4 The recently established Common Economic Zone counts Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan among its members, whereas
the Eurasian Economic Community coalesces Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tadzhikistan.
5 The term was first asserted by Brzezinski in 1994, and was purposefully supported by the West, with the objective of weakening
Russias leading role in the CIS.
6 The three different trajectories pointed out by Taras Kuzio (European, westernising, and Russophile) illustrate these different paths
(Kuzio 2000b).

Lien Verpoest

New Institutionalism: Balancing Consolidation and Innovation

The study of geopolitical pluralism and isomorphism bears upon institutionalist theories. Given the fact
that the proposed cases are not considered to be fully-fledged democracies but are more often called
emerging democracies, semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian systems, one cannot but confront the
particularity of the cases and more in general, the theoretical problems that the post-communist transition
have brought about.
Many scholars acknowledge the importance of using the toolboxes of western political science to analyse
political processes even in non-western societies (Shugart 20037, Ostrow 2000, Pursiainen 2000). They stress
that:
It is in just such other states that institutional design is important to study and in which its effects can be discerned. Institutions either succeed or
fail in providing a means for managing conflict. Humans can design, change, and manipulate them. But humans cannot readily control political
culture. Given the unstable environment in post-communist states, the choice of institutional design for a legislature holds important and often
overlooked consequences for the ability of that essential democratic institution to manage, to channel, and to overcome conflict. Moreover, an
institutionalist approach is particularly fruitful for comparing such legislatures and the policy processes in them (Ostrow 2000: 17).

Therefore, theories of institutionalism and applying western political models could prove very useful,
even when the political, historical and cultural context differs from the traditional western pattern. On the
other hand, applying western theoretical models to the post-Soviet area does not imply systematic
insensitivity to the historical and cultural factors that distinguish these countries from the rest of the
European continent. Interests, preferences and behaviour of institutions are situationally defined. During
transition, different approaches to designing institutions resulted in different forms of behaviour (Ostrow:
5). Factors like the Empire and Soviet legacy or the Slavic identity also partially determined the design.
One therefore should not just focus on snapshots, but look at the broader picture.
The theoretical framework applied here departs from a new-institutionalist perspective, starting from the
basic premise that political thinking has its roots in the analysis and design of institutions.
It was James March and Johan Olsen who gave the new institutionalism its name in 1984 with their article
in the American Political Science Review: The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political
Life8. They criticised the behaviouralists by asserting that contemporary political science tended to
portray () political phenomena as the aggregate consequences of individual behaviour, action as the
result of choices based on calculated self-interest, (.) and decision making and the allocation of
resources as the central foci of political life (March & Olsen 1984: 734). Historical institutionalists like
Skocpol and Rueschemeyer brought the state back in by presenting it as an autonomous organisational
structure that, although influenced by society, shaped political processes9. Also the functionalist approach
to history as being efficient in reaching appropriate outcomes, and moving towards some kind of
equilibrium, was countered. March and Olsen painted a more realistic picture of political processes in
history as less smooth and lacking the functionality claimed by the behaviouralists (Peters 1999: 17).
This approach implied a renewed focus on formal institutions; the officially recognised political
structures within a state system. Therefore an institution is defined here as a formal organisation that
determines behaviour, interests, and belief-systems and that structures relations between different groups in the
national community and international order, and is complemented by Remingtons remark that They
generate patterns in behaviour by creating incentives of varying strength(Smith & Remington 2001: 7).
The Void of Explaining Institutional Change
One of the definite strong points of new institutionalism is its interdisciplinarity. New institutionalist
approaches can be found not only in political science, but also in economic, sociological and even historical
In a lecture on The Comparative Politics of Institutions and Policymaking, Oslo 28 July 1 August 2003.
March&Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life- Am. Pol. Sci. Review 73, Sept.1984, pp.734-49.
9 Evans & Rueschemeyer Bringing the State Back In, 1985.
7
8

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

comparative analysis. Although all try to contrive a comprehensive view on institutions, different
applications of institutionalism each focus on expounding a specific aspect of the institution10. Yet many
applications struggle to come to terms with the aspect of institutional change. The specific questions of why
institutions change, how this process develops and whether certain models of institutional change can be
distinguished, have been largely ignored and left unanswered.
Some have attempted to confront this topic. Normative institutionalism tried to identify stimuli for
institutional change and asserted that this takes place through a process of learning and adaptation
(Olsen&Peters: 1996, March&Olsen: 1989). Yet particularly sociological institutionalism and more
specifically organisational analysis11 succeeded in illustrating the explanatory potential of institutional theory
in an area in which it has been relatively silent: the analysis of organisational change (Powell&DiMaggio
1991: 1). More specifically, the theory of institutional isomorphism might provide an innovative model for
studying processes of institutional change in the post-communist area12.
Innovation through Adaptation: Institutional Isomorphism
A part of the sociological institutionalist approach, institutional isomorphism was first put forward by
Walter Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio in their 1983 article The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organisational Fields13. In this article, they describe institutional change as institutions
or organisations becoming increasingly similar (isomorphism). Powell and DiMaggio argue that the causes
of bureaucratisation and rationalisation have changed. They contend that organisational change occurs as
the result of processes that make organisations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient
(Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 147). The most important goal here is not efficiency but legitimacy of the
organisations. They stress the actors belief that legitimacy stems from conforming and adapting to the
general rules and norms; isomorphism14. In reality, this conformity might lead to legitimacy, but does not
automatically bring more efficiency.
Similar processes of isomorphism can be witnessed in the post-communist transition of Central and Eastern
Europe. The gradual demise of the Soviet institutions created a certain void that called for institutional
reinterpretation and redefinition. The newly independent states had to decide on which further path of
development to embark, how exactly to pull through the necessary economic and political reforms, based on
which values, and which state system. Their looking East and West for inspiration for reforms revealed
isomorphic tendencies e.g. the future enlargement of the European Union, which encompassed the required
adaptation of the candidate member states institutions and political structures to the European Unions
acquis communautaire.
In this paper, the process of institutional change will be analysed in two countries (Ukraine & Belarus) 15 that
are part of the Slavic Core of the CIS from the theoretical perspective of institutional isomorphism. More
specifically, I seek to analyse how isomorphism surfaces through different stages in the institutions of the
three selected countries. Consequently, the issue of geopolitical pluralism in these countries will be
addressed by exploring the causal mechanisms of isomorphism.
In order to avoid a too general assessment of the processes of change and institutional dynamics, I focus on
one specific aspect that might foster institutional isomorphism; foreign policy vis--vis the EU and CIS
organisational fields. I therefore concentrate on the institutions that shape and implement foreign policy: the
Presidential Administration (defining function), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (executive function), and the
Parliament (reflective function).
Like the decisive moment of institutional creation (historical institutionalism), explaining the interaction between institutions and
individuals (rational choice institutionalism), or the aspect of institutional design (empirical institutionalism).
11 It should be noted, however, that organisational analysis does not specify any clear distinctions between the concept of institution
and that of organisation but rather prefer to slide from one noun to the other (Scott 1994, in Peters 1999). Yet other disciplines in
institutional analysis also fail to make this distinction.
12 The interdisciplinary perspective of sociological institutionalism allows us to apply some of their very innovative ideas on
institutional change to the research on political institutions.
13 American Sociological Review 48 (2), 1983.
14 And indirectly, efficiency stems from legitimacy (Kyvelidis 2000:2).
15 In my PhD research however, all three countries of the Slavic Core of the CIS are studied; Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is
not included here in order to limit the contents of this paper to a reasonable length.
10

Lien Verpoest

Two important and distinct stages describe institutional isomorphism. The first stage comprises the
institutional definition towards an organisational field as a result of the activities of a diverse set of
organisations. The homogenisation of institutions on the periphery of the filed vis--vis the field makes up the
second stage (Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 148). These main tenets of isomorphism will serve as the basic
framework through which institutional change in Belarus and Ukraine will be studied in this paper16.
Stage One: Institutional Definition Towards Organisational Fields
Institutional reform emerges out of the institutional definition towards organisational fields. An organisational
field consists of organisations that constitute a recognised area of institutional life, e.g. regulatory agencies, a
legal system, or a supranational organisation. The interaction of countries in the periphery with these
organisational fields could uncover dynamics that can shed light on the origins of institutional change
(DiMaggio 1991: 267).
A first crucial step in analysing the processes of institutional change that lead to isomorphism is therefore to
examine the institutional definition of the selected countries towards the organisational fields surrounding them. The
supranational structures of the European Union on the one hand and the Commonwealth of Independent
States on the other constitute two organisational fields that can influence the institutional structures of
Ukraine and Belarus17. This institutional definition can initially be assessed by reviewing official documents
and reports that reveal the foreign policy strategies towards the organisational fields. This will be
complemented by analysing specific initiatives of institutional definition signalling rapprochement with the
EU or CIS departing from four basic organisational characteristics. These characteristics contribute to
deepening the interrelations between the different parts of the organised whole (=the field), resulting
eventually in isomorphism. The four organisational characteristics are:
(1) an increased interaction among organisations in the field
(2) the emergence of sharply defined interorganisational structures of dominance and coalition
(3) an increase in information load with which institutions and organisations in the field must contend
(4) the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organisations that they are involved in a common
enterprise
(Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 148)

In the following section, the institutional definition of Ukraine and Belarus towards the CIS and the EU
will be assessed.
Institutional Change in Ukraine
During the period of 1986-1991 the USSR underwent profound societal changes. The old Soviet paradigms
lost ground to Gorbachevs innovative concepts of perestroika and glasnost. Although Gorbachev never
intended to completely abandon the Soviet system and merely aimed for a brushed up approach to
Lenins original ideas, the process of change that was initiated by Gorbachev Perestroika policy proved to
be irreversible and resulted in the break-up of the Soviet Union. Although the Ukrainian nomenklatura
might have been somewhat reluctant in abandoning the Soviet Union, the popular mobilisation was high
and the citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was clearly enthusiastic about the changes going on;
90.3%18 voted for Ukraines independence at the referendum of 1 December 1991 (DAnieri, Kravchuk &
Kuzio 1999). Nevertheless, the geographical variation on the votes for independence uncovered serious
ethnic and political cleavages in Ukrainian society19; after the implosion of the USSR, many Russians

16 This analysis will be based on official documents, strategies, reports and a wide selection of academic literature. Fieldwork (elite
interviews) is planned in autumn 2004, yet could not be included in this paper due to time constraints.
17 It should be noted that both countries are part of the latter organisational field.
18 84.1% of the voters took part in the referendum.
19 Votes in the different Ukrainian provinces showed a striking dichotomy between a clearly enthusiastic, pro-independence Western
Ukraine (where more than 90% voted for independence) and the South-Eastern regions (where the vote for independence was
between 50-70%, with Simferopol regions votes being less than 50%).

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

suddenly found themselves living in a new republic, outside their homeland Russia. Moreover, people
ceased to identify themselves as Soviet citizens but on the contrary stressed their own nationality.
Therefore not surprisingly, the first years of transition in Ukraine focused primarily on nation building to
sort out the former Soviet and new national identities of the Newly Independent States. This focus is
characteristic not only of Ukraine but the whole post-Soviet region (Kuzio 1999:1). A serious time
constraint plays a role in the prioritisation of state and more importantly nation building in Central and
Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, state building developed over the centuries, from the Middle Ages
until 1789. This process of state building was followed by the rise of nationalism and nation building in
the 19th-20th centuries (Kuzio 1999:6). The western European countries therefore had about nine centuries
to develop a notion of stateness and nationality and generate a political and ethnic community that turned
into a fully-fledged state. Eastern neighbours like Ukraine largely missed out on this organic
development. Taras Kuzio is therefore quite right in pointing out that unlike the West, post-Soviet
Ukraine had little choice but to undertake a quadruple transition simultaneously; not only
democratisation and marketisation, but also state and nation building.
Confronted with the huge task of a quadruple transition, post-Sovietologists like Alexander Motyl
advocate the idea of post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine adopting nation and state building before
launching into democratisation a marketisation. He argues that a strong national identity () facilitates
marketisation by raising the tolerance threshold of the population (Motyl 1995, in Kuzio 1999) In this
light, the idea of prioritising nation building is a plausible one, especially in Ukraine, where a complicated
and multi-faceted national identity caused cleavages in society. The first Ukrainian president Leonid
Kravchuk acknowledged this risk and a major part of his tenure concentrated on strengthening Ukraines
national identity as a first step in Ukraines quadruple transition. Nevertheless, one should not ignore
institutional change, because institutions generate and implement specific policies that contribute to the
further development of the country. Moreover, a weak state and underdeveloped institutions can threaten
democratisation (Kuzio 1999:10). Therefore I want to assess how the post-Soviet transition took place on
the institutional level.
Chaos after Independence and Institutional Fragmentation
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union are sometimes considered
to be critical junctures (Pierson 2000a, 2000b) in the history of Eastern Europe. Critical junctures in the
history of a certain country normally cause major change in institutions that usually follow a path
dependent process of development and therefore exhibit relative institutional stability. Profound societal
change however shakes up this stability and gives hope for serious institutional restructuring, or even the
creation of new institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996, Lindner & Rittberger 2003, Thelen 1999). It remains to be
seen if the break-up of the Soviet Union proved to be such a critical juncture for the institutions in
Ukraine.
The only institutional structure that remained in place after the demise of the Soviet Union was the
parliament (Verkhovna Rada)20. The Rada was the location where most of the debate and discussion about
Ukrainian independence took place. Since parliament was the forum for discussing change one would
expect it to be drastically reformed itself, but actually little structural change took place. One of the
reasons suggested for this was that the fact that the above-mentioned quadruple transition had to take
place simultaneously (with a focus on strengthening national identity), and this left little time for the
newly independent states to reach even temporary institutional solutions to one set of challenges before
they were forced to cope with the next set. (Kuzio 1999:12). Other factors which complicated matters
further were the legacy of Soviet institutions and the chaos surrounding Ukrainian independence (DAnieri 1999:
84).

20 Actually, the Rada was the only institution that already existed during Soviet times (Verkhovna Rada URSR): the institution of
presidency had to be created after 1991, and many other government institutions had to be renamed or seriously restructured.

Lien Verpoest

Ukraine inherited a quasi-state from the Soviet Union, on the ruins of which it set off to build a new,
sovereign, Ukrainian state. An important remark to be made here is that although the Ukrainian
policymakers aimed for a new state with a strong Ukrainian national identity, they did not completely
eradicate the Soviet past, at least not institutionally, because the new state was equally founded on the
inherited Soviet institutions. DAnieri noted that the government consisted of a mix of institutions that
were held over from the communist era (such as the Verkhovna Rada) because there was no time to create
new ones, and of institutions that had to be devised in great haste (such as the presidency and cabinet
system) without sufficient consideration of how they might work (DAnieri 1999: 86). This ambiguous
attitude towards institutional reform did not bode well for Ukraines future institutional development.
Because Ukraines institutions did not break with their Soviet past, they inherited to a certain extent the
Soviet inertia, a factor that contributed to institutional confusion and fragmentation. So although
Ukrainian parliament strove to adopt the function of a western legislature, it continued to work in its
previous form. Since initially there was no clear demarcation of the Radas authority and duties, it often
became involved in day-to-day affairs of the government. This phenomenon also stems from Soviet times,
since the Supreme Soviets [of the different republics], gradually accumulating power at the expense of
the Union centre in essence combined representative and executive functions (DAnieri 1999:93).
Needless to say that the vague delineation of the Radas key tasks seriously hampered decision-making
on more fundamental issues.
The chaos surrounding Ukrainian independence considerably contributed to institutional continuity as well as
institutional confusion. The implosion of the Soviet Union came unexpected. Although after 1989, the
Soviet Empire started crumbling and calls for independence in several Soviet republics (like the Baltic
states) grew louder, no-one really foresaw the August 1991 coup. It sent a shockwave through the USSR;
the local nomenklatura in the Soviet Republics (Ukraine) initially did not know how to react. Most Soviet
Republics seized the opportunity (or felt pressured) to declare independence almost immediately after the
coup, thereby effectively causing the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact that this major change took
place in such a short time span (fall 1991) left Ukraine institutionally unprepared for it, which had serious
implications for the further development of the new Ukrainian state. Because independence was
unanticipated, no-one had cared to seriously consider a structured plan for institutional reform.
Policymakers at that time therefore resorted to the old Soviet institutions for initial inspiration, thereby
unknowingly impeding true institutional renewal. In this sense, policymakers failed to validate what
could have been a critical juncture in institutional development and settled for a less spectacular form of
institutional redesigning; a hybrid of old Soviet and new elements that combined institutional continuity
(soviet-style) with institutional renewal that took inspiration from Western systems.
Another unfavourable consequence of this unstructured, limproviste redesigning of the institutions is
that there was no clear definition of their powers, tasks and responsibilities. This resulted in institutional
confusion and eventually fragmentation; certain presidential decisions21 were heavily contested by
parliament, with no-one really knowing who had the last word on important matters. The parliaments
underdeveloped and therefore weak party system and its failure to reach majorities often hindered
legislative progress, yet the vagueness of the different institutions task descriptions gave the Rada some
effective checks on the president. Unfortunately, the bickering on who had which responsibilities often
resulted in a watering down of decisions and institutional effectiveness.
The new president Leonid Kuchma failed to completely eradicate the institutional fragmentation22.
Nevertheless, the presidential switch in 1994 from Kravchuk to Kuchma did imply a shift from nation
building to state building. Where Kravchuk had mainly focused on policies of identity formation, Kuchma
did make some reforms in the government, but these reforms were too superficial and temporally
scattered to have a lasting, profound effect (Harasymiw 2002: 112). Again, an unstructured, impromptu
approach resulted in eventual failure of institutional change.

Like on nuclear and energy policy (DAnieri 1999: 95-96).

Like the other institutions, the institution of presidency was weak as well and not yet specified in a constitution. Kuchma preferred
a Russian-style presidential constitution which would provide for a strong presidency with a quasi-authoritarian executive, but
failed to secure this (Kuzio 1999: 15). Therefore, even after the Ukrainian constitution was adopted (1996), the president had to
account for his decisions to the Verkhovna Rada.
21
22

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

Ukraines Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

By the mid-90s, the institutional fragmentation and confusion eventually became Ukraines main
stumbling block in formulating its foreign policy (DAnieri 1999)23. Kuchma did not bring more clarity to
the countrys foreign policy priorities, yet it has to be said that he considerably stepped up Ukraines
foreign policy initiatives. Kravchuks presidency had cleared the way by tackling the most urgent issues
by firmly establishing Ukraines independence and redefining its ties with Russia, which included
delicate matters like the Russian-Ukrainian discussion on the division of the Black Sea Fleet, on Ukraines
Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal, and the delineation of the borders between Ukraine and Russia. Also,
Kravchuk took a distinctly pro-Western, and more importantly, pro-European stance during his
presidency. A month before he stepped down as president, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
with the European Union was signed (June 1994). Although many observers drew the conclusion from
Kuchmas presidential campaign that his policy would be more pro-Russian, this did not immediately
materialise. The partnership with the European Union remained a priority and EU (associate)
membership even became an official Ukrainian foreign policy objective by presidential decree from 11
June 1998 onwards24. Ukraines European ambitions went hand in hand with other integration initiatives
towards the West: on January, 30, Ukraine was admitted to the OSCE; in November 1995, it became
member of the Council of Europe. Simultaneously, Ukraine tried to find its place in-between the Western
(Euro-Atlantic) and Eastern security structures by signing a Charter on Distinctive Partnership with
NATO on 9 July 1997.
Ukraines continued to profess its European ambitions by issuing a Strategy for the Integration of Ukraine
into the European Union in 199825. The European Union in its turn issued a Common Strategy on the
Relations between the European Union and Ukraine on 11 December 1999, thereby making Ukraine the
second subject of a Common Strategy, after Russia. However, this does not imply that Ukraine is a top
priority for the European Union. In spite of Ukraines persistent European aspirations, the European
Union remains mum on the Ukraines prospects of even associate membership26. Yet at the same time, the
EU does not deny Ukraines important geopolitical position between the EU and Russia and its function
as a transit country bringing Russian gas and oil supplies to the EU, as was confirmed again in the Wider
Europe New Neighbours document, issued on March 11, 200327.
Institutional Aspects of Co-operation
I will now look into the institutional aspects of Ukraines relations with the EU, in order to determine
which national institutions exactly regulate relations with the European Union and which specific interinstitutional mechanisms have been set up to develop and follow up Ukraines ties with the EU.
The first cooperation mechanisms between Ukraine and the European Union were established and
specified in the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)28. The PCA provided for a
Cooperation Council to supervise the implementation of the PCA (art.85), that would meet at Ministerial
level once per year. The Cooperation Council consists of members of the Council of the European Union
and of the European Commission and members of the Ukrainian government. The Cooperation Council is
assisted by a Cooperation Committee, which functions on the senior civil servant level, and is responsible for
a.o. preparing the annual meetings of the Cooperation Council. The Cooperation Council can delegate any

23

This is not very surprising, since the four aspects of Ukraines post-Soviet transition are interdependent and influence its foreign
policy orientations toward Europe or Eurasia. Ukraines desire to return to Europe is conditioned upon the success of its
quadruple transition (Kuzio 1999: 15). Therefore, the vagueness of Ukraines well-known multi-vector foreign policy can be
attributed to a certain extent to Ukraines institutional fragmentation.
24 This presidential decree charted a priority course of action for the bodies of executive power to until 2007 to establish
preconditions necessary for Ukraine to become associate member.
25 The strategy was issued by the President in 1998, and adapted by means of decree in 2000 & 2001.
26 This led Ukrainian politicians to repeated accusations that the EU applies double standards in its enlargement process.
27 A Wider Europe New neighbourhood Action Plan is scheduled to be issued in May 2004.
28 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_ukraine.pdf

Lien Verpoest

of its powers to the Cooperation Committee, to ensure continuity between two meetings. (art.87)29. Also, a
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee was established in the PCA, consisting of members of the European
Parliament and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (art.90-91). The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee has
the right to request information on the implementation of the PCA from the Cooperation Council, and is
also entitled to make recommendations to the Cooperation Council.
The PCA thereby established a basic institutional framework for co-operation30 and entered into force in
1998. That same year, Ukraine specified which national institutions were responsible for EU integration in
its Strategy for the Integration of Ukraine into the European Union. First and foremost, the President of
Ukraine is said to exercise the management of Ukraines integration strategy. The Cabinet of Ministers
provides implementation of the Strategy; more specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall implement
measures in the field of political relations of Ukraine with the EU and coordination of activities of
executive power bodies in this field31. The coordination of intersectoral economic and social cooperation
happens under the auspices of the National Agency of Ukraine for Development and European Integration.
The Ukrainian Parliament is not mentioned in this document, yet this does not mean that this institution is
not active on the topic of European integration. The Rada is not so much involved in the implementation
of Ukraine strategy of integration, but it advises and reflects on the Strategy and its implementation.
Parliamentary hearings on the relations and cooperation between Ukraine and the EU take place on a
regular basis. The Rada formulates recommendations on Ukraines integration into the European Union to
the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Also, parliamentary hearings on the implementation of state policy of
integration of Ukraine into the EU are held, resulting in similar recommendations to different institutions.
After these hearings, the parliamentary committees on European Integration, on Foreign Affairs and on
Legal Policy were asked to follow up the stage of fulfilment of the recommendations.
Integration with the CIS?
Looking at the institutional mechanisms between Ukraine and the European Union, one might have the
impression that the EU is the linchpin of Ukrainian foreign policy. However, relations with Russia and
more generally with the CIS have gradually developed as well after overcoming the initial problems and
reluctance in the first half of the nineties32.
One should not forget that Ukraines first president Leonid Kravchuk was, along with Yeltsin of Russia
and Shushkevich of Belarus one of the founding fathers of the Belavezha Treaty that established the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Yet although Ukraine was one of the signatories of this CIS treaty,
it never ratified the Treaty - unlike Russia and Belarus. This rather ambiguous action is characteristic for
Ukraines overall policy towards the CIS. Although nominally, Ukraine participates in the CIS
institutional structures like the council of heads of state, council of ministers of foreign affairs, defence, the
interparliamentary assembly, executive committee, ) and agrees to participate in certain treaties33 and
integration initiatives, Ukraines official policy, especially over the last years, is not to participate in any
CIS integration initiatives that are not in line with Ukraines official state policy of integration into the EU.
However, Ukraines participation in overlapping CIS integration initiatives has become more a rule than
an exception. Over the past two years, Ukraine has gotten involved in both the Eurasian Economic
Community (treaty signed in May 2000, ratified in 2001) and its successor, the Common Economic Space
(2003). Especially the latter initiative caused wide protests because while Ukraines participation was
backed by President Kuchma in February 2003, the Draft Agreement was rejected by the Cabinet of
There are also different subcommittees; on trade & investment; financial and economic issues; on energy, nuclear issues,
environment, networks, science & technology, training & education; and on customs and cross-border cooperation & justice & home
affairs.
30 In contrast, the Common Strategy, that was issued in December 1999 as a follow-up to the PCA, did not bring anything new on the
institutional level of EU-Ukraine cooperation, and rather referred to the existing institutional mechanisms of cooperation as specified
in the PCA to implement the objectives enumerated in the Common Strategy. See
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/com_strat/ukraine_99.pdf
31 http://www.mfa.gov.ua/integration/
32 In the first half of the nineties, the division of the Black Sea Fleet caused some serious discussion, especially because Ukraine at
that time was focused on asserting its national identity.
33 Although Ukraine did not sign the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security in 1992.
29

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

Ministers and contested by the Minister for Economy and European Integration V. Khoroshkovskiy and
the Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Gryshchenko. They branded participation in the Common Economic
Space inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine, which prohibits any supranational body to be
allowed to impose its rule over Ukraine. Again, this is a case of institutional confusion where the
authority on decision-making has not been adequately determined34.
On the other hand, Ukraines involvement in the GUUAM initiative is significant. The GUUAM was
established in 1997 as a loose cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova (Uzbekistan
joined in 1999), in an effort to counterbalance Russias dominance in the CIS region. The GUUAM
organisation mainly exists on paper and little concrete action has been taken so far. Yet however
undeveloped this initiative is, Ukraines participation in this subregional initiative confirms Ukraines
general reluctance to get too entangled in CIS integration. It seems that Ukraine wants to limit its ties to
the CIS to an economic and symbolic level (hence the involvement in the Eurasian Economic Community
and Common Economic Space)35, whereas politically, Ukraine decidedly looks west. In this sense, Ukraine
could be perceived as bandwagoning with the West on the system level, while balancing against Russia at
the regional CIS-level (Splidsboel-Hansen 2000: 92).
The fact that Ukraine maintains a multi-vector policy and participates in diverse cooperation projects
ranging from the PCA with the European Union, the Common Economic Space with certain CIS members
and the (anti-Russian) GUUAM with other CIS member states, might make it difficult to determine
Ukraines foreign policy orientation, priorities and main interests. Yet a look at the institutional
cooperation brings clarity. Despite the contradictory nature of Ukraines foreign policy behaviour,
Splidsboel Hansens observation seems to be confirmed on the level of institutional definition.
Institutionally, Ukraine profiles itself clearly towards the European Union. They have issued a Strategy
for Integration into the European Union, have a dynamic institutional representation to the EU,
established a National Agency for Development and European Integration, a Minister for European
integration36, and a parliamentary committee for European integration. Moreover, they have established
cooperation structures with the EU in the framework of the PCA; a Cooperation Council, Cooperation
Committee, Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and numerous subcommittees on specific issues of
cooperation.
The institutional definition towards the CIS on the other hand by no means lives up to this level: Ukraine
has no specific agencies, ministers or parliamentary committees aimed at CIS integration. Ukraine does
have representations to the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly and Executive Committee, and participates
in the bi-annual meetings of the Council of Heads of States, Council of Foreign Ministers etc, yet its
participation is marked by a general reluctance and conditioned by the fact that integration efforts cannot
contradict the constitutional provisions that no organisation can assert supranational powers over
Ukraine37. Add to this the widely known fact that the integration in the framework of the CIS lacks the
momentum that European integration for example has, and that the bi-annual meetings on different levels
are more considered a talking shop to foster bilateral relations with the other CIS member states, and one
can come to the conclusion that Ukraines motivation and institutional definition towards the CIS is not of
the same level as its more enthusiastic institutional profiling towards the European Union.
All the institutional cooperation structures and foreign policy initiatives are listed in the following table to
give a general overview and in order to make a provisional assessment of Ukraines institutional
definition towards the two organisational fields: the European Union and the CIS.
34 This shows some similarities with Soviet times, where . although Ukraine had its own institutions, they focused not on the
separation of powers but on the monopoly of power in the Communist party. The problem in Ukraine (.) proved to be moving
from a system in which power is monopolised to one in which it is divided. In Ukraine, the situation has evolved in such a way that
power is divided, but the powers of the various organs are not defined. The various organs can check each other effectively, but
almost no duties are clearly held for one branch and beyond the reach of others. Therefore (.) effective policymaking is nearly
impossible. (DAnieri 1999: 92-93).
35 One could add that Ukraines relations with Russia, the leading country in the CIS, are also mainly economic and also symbolic:
hence the year of Ukraine in Russia and the year of Russia in Ukraine, organised in respectively 2002 and 2003.
36 Mikola Ivanovich Derkach, who is Minister of Economy and Questions of European Integration.
37 Strangely enough, Ukraines President Kuchma was voted Chair of the CIS Council of Heads of State for 2003. This decision is
especially surprising since Ukraine never ratified the CIS Treaty. The fact that these decisions clearly do not go by the book leads us
to consider this move a predominantly symbolic one.

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Table 1: Systematic assessment of institutional definition: Ukraine

Institutional Definition & Foreign Policy Initiatives
UKRAINE
Org. characteristics
EU
CIS
reluctant member of CIS, yet participation in
1) increased interaction among
Declared intention of becoming (associate)
CIS integration process and some subregional
organisations in the field
member of EU
initiatives (EvrAzES, CES)
Institutional definition:
MFA: Department for European Integration,
Institutional definition:
MFA: NR, no specific departments for CIS
Section for EU Affairs
Verkhovna Rada: NR, idem
Verkhovna Rada: Committee on issues of
European Integration
2)

emergence of interorganisational structures

Participation in CIS instit. structures:

PCA 1994, into force 1998

-

Cooperation Council
Cooperation Committee
Parliamentary Cooperation Committee
Subcommittees

3)

increase in information load

Official documents & speeches:

Strategy for the Integration of Ukraine into
the European Union
numerous documents, speeches and reports
asserting European ambitions of Ukraine

4)

development of mutual
awareness of being involved
in a common enterprise

Intention of becoming member state of EU,

initiatives from EU side: Common Strategy,
Wider Europe/New Neighbours Initiative
(bandwagoning)

Council of Heads of States / Governments

Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs,
Defence, )
Interparliamentary Assembly CIS

Official documents: NR.

no specific strategies towards CIS region.
Only treaties: CIS founding Charter(1991),
Yalta Charter of GUUAM (1997), Treaty
founding Eurasian Economic Community (2000),
Pact on Common Economic Space (Sept 2003)
NR; Reluctant CIS member, limited
participation
founding member of GUUAM
(balancing)

NR: not relevant

Institutional Change in Belarus?

Budding National Identity
The transition in Belarus initially did not differ substantially from Ukraine: popular mobilisation in the
form of the Belarusian Popular Front, and a rather reluctant nomenklatura. From the mid-80s onwards, a
cautious national consciousness arose. The Belarusian intelligentsia, mainly based in Minsk, were
influenced by the perestroika developments in Russia and in 1989, the Belarusian Popular Front was
founded, led by Zyanon Pazniak. This group aimed for national revival in Belarus. They focused on three
issues that dominated the Belarusian period of perestroika; mobilisation of the people to demonstrate
and protest after the discovery of mass graves in Kurapaty, which turned out to be a execution place of
the Soviet NKVD38, an investigation into the governments cover up of the Chernobyl disaster, of which
70% of the radio-active fallout feel on Belarusian territory, and the language issue in Belarus39. Also, in
1990, the members of the Belarusian Popular Front and 7 other democrats formed a Democratic
Opposition Group in the Supreme Council of the BSSR.
The Belarusian Popular Front -and other groupings that criticised the ruling regime- had one thing in
common: they were actively aiming to establish a Belarusian identity. For this, they looked back in time to
two periods of (semi-) independence, namely when Belarus was part of the Great Duchy of Lithuania, and
the short period of Independence in 1918. After 1991, they used symbols of that time as the new symbols

38 The Kurapaty issue surfaced in June 1988. In the spirit of glasnost, the Belarusian archaeologist Zyanon Paznyak published an
article about an alleged mass grave containing the bodies of thousands of victims of Stalins terror near Minsk, in Kurapaty. The
news caused a public outcry and many mass demonstrations followed.
39 Russification had become so omnipresent that only one third of the Belarusians spoke their native language in daily life. The
intelligentsia tried to save the Belarusian language by reintroducing it in education, party, state, and local government. In January
1990, a law on Languages was adopted, establishing Belarusian as the language of the republic.

11

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

of the independent Belarusian state, for example the white-red-white flag of 1918, and the coat of arms
(Pahonya) of the Great Duchy of Lithuania40.
A Wary Government
The nomenklatura of the Belarusian Soviet Republic on the other hand showed reluctance for change.
They couldnt avoid elections for the Supreme Soviet of the Belarusian SSR taking place on March 4 1990
through a new system which consisted partly of members elected in the 350 territorial districts, and partly
of members delegated by social organisations like veteran groups etc. Yet the nomenklatura did
everything in their power to obstruct the BPFs way to the parliament and to sustain a communist status
quo. They succeeded by using their monopoly on the mass media for smear campaigns against the BPF;
86% of the deputies elected for parliament were communists, and only 25 members were members of the
Belarusian Popular Front41. The soviet-style institutions continued to exist, and the political situation did
not change in the following 3 years (1991-1993).
The nomenklatura also strongly supported the continuation of a revised USSR in an All-Union
referendum of March 1991. Nevertheless, the putsch in Russia42, the subsequent declaration of
independence of Russia and other republics, made change unavoidable in Belarus. Independence was
declared 25 August 1991, and Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich stated that he and his cabinet had
suspended their Communist party membership and, in a change of heart, condemned the attempted
putsch and the solidarity of the Belarusian party leadership with the putschists (Zaprudnik 1993: 163). But
even now, changes were only superficial. At the beginning of 1992, the opposition called for dissolution of
the Supreme Soviet, stating that the two-year old parliament had exhausted its intellectual ability and
political will and had become bogged down along the road to a market economy and democracy
(Zaprudnik 1993: 164). The opposition called for a referendum on new elections for the parliament, which
was rejected twice by the conservative, predominantly communist parliament.
The reform minded intelligentsia was considerably weakened by differing views and clashing
personalities. Also, their message of a new democratic state with strong Belarusian national identity
didnt really catch on in the traditional, Soviet-minded countryside of Belarus43. The historian David
Marples describes the first years of independence in Belarus as following: The Country was led by an
elite, opposed by another elite, while the general masses, conditioned to Soviet rule, were reduced to
passive onlookers44. All of this considerably slowed down democratic progress and institutional reform.
The internal quarrelling among the reformers facilitated it for the conservative communist elite to
dominate the main political institutions until 1994 and preserve the status quo. The composition of the
government, whose top level mainly consisted of members of the Central Committee, remained unaltered
until 1994. Belova remarks about this that this explains why during the first three years of Belarusian
independence all government actions were naturally directed towards the reinforcement of government
autonomy and the enlargement of the competencies of the executive body in relation to the legislature
(Belova 2003: 54-55). Consequently, it is not surprising that the (communist-dominated) Supreme Soviet
did not introduce any innovative political reforms in its five-year term (1990-1995). Instead of institutional
change, the Belarusian transition marked its first years with institutional continuity.

40 Although Belarus was part of the Great Duchy of Lithuania (GDL), it enjoyed greater cultural autonomy than it ever did under the
Russian Empires rule. For example, the old Belarusian vernacular was the state language used for official documents and
correspondence in the GDL.
41 Although before the elections, a polling in Minsk showed that of the respondents held a positive attitude towards the BPF.
(Zaprudnik 1993: 148).
42 The putsch was even supported by some high party officials in Belarus, notably N.I. Dzemiantsei, who was forced to resign as
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the BSSR because of his support to the coup. In: Urban & Zaprudnik, 116.
43 This is proved by the fact that in a referendum concerning the preservation of the Soviet Union on 17 March 1991, 82.7% voted to
stay in the Union, whereas only 16% favoured separation from the Soviet Empire (Zaprudnik 1993: 164-65)
44 See Marples D. (1999) Belarus: A Denationalised Nation. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 139p.

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Institutional Reversal under Lukashenka

Unlike the BPF, Alyaksandr Lukashenka did not fail to reach the Belarusian population. He appeared on
the political scene during the 1994 presidential elections and would become the initiator of some muchcontested institutional reforms. The elections followed the adoption of a new constitution that introduced
the institution of presidency. The post of president was created later than in Russia or Ukraine, but this
empowered [the president] to go ahead with his own policies, independently of the legislative will
represented by the Supreme Soviet, which had been elected while the Soviet Union still existed (Belova
2003: 58). Hence, also in this case, the institutions were not tuned to each other, resulting in institutional
fragmentation. As I will explain below, Lukashenka used the institutional confusion in Belarus to his
advantage and seized the opportunity to weaken the other institutions in order to strengthen his
institution of presidency.
A former director of a collective farm and head of a commission on corruption, Lukashenka received
45.1% of the votes in the first round of the 1994 election, and obtained a landslide victory with 80.1% of
the votes or 4.2 out of 5.2 million in the second round. From 1995 onwards President Lukashenka started
introducing reforms that also considerably diverged from what the opposition had in mind for the
democratisation of their country. First of all, Lukashenka sought to strengthen his presidential power and
redefine the countrys national identity by means of a referendum. This took place on 14 May 1995, at the
same day of Parliamentary elections45. The referendum contained 4 questions:
Table 2: The 1995 Referendum
1. Do you agree that the Russian language should have an equal status with Belarusian?
2. Do you support the proposal about the establishment of a new flag and new state symbols of the
republic of Belarus?
3. Do you support the actions of the President directed toward economic integration with Russia?
4. Do you agree with the need to introduce changes to the Constitution of Belarus anticipating the pre-term
dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in case of systematic or gross violations of the Constitution?
Sovetskaya Belorussiya 25/5/1997(but turnout only 64.8% of total electorate)

83.3%
75.1%
83.3%
77.7%

This referendum proved to be a defeat for the BPF, who had tried to awaken the national consciousness of
the people46. Lukashenka soon put the four issues voted in the referendum into action. Thus, he
eradicated the 1991 national symbols of the Belarusian State and (re-) introduced a flag and coat of arms in
typical baroque Soviet style47. By replacing the countrys nascent, yet still weak national identity by a
regressive, neo-Soviet identity, Lukashenka completely undermined the work of the intelligentsia.
Legitimising his actions with the popular support of the referendum, he moved forward to bring the
fourth topic of this referendum into reality; strengthening the institution of presidency and weakening the
other institutions in Belarus.
By June 1996, the President wanted to pull through an amended version of the Constitution through a
referendum. His main aim was to reduce the influence of parliament. The new version of the Constitution
encompassed two chambers: The House of Representatives (Palata Predstaviteley, 110 members) and the
Council of the Republic (Sovjet Respubliki, territorial representation: 64 seats), replacing the 260-seat
Supreme Soviet48. The President also demanded the right to dissolve Parliament if it failed to accept
Presidents choice of PM twice and to extend the term of office for president from 5 to 7 years. The
proposed amendments evoked a public outcry in Minsk, and the members of Parliament, led by their
Speaker Syamen Sharetski protested in every possible way. The referendum took place on 24 November,
and turned out to be a victory for Lukashenka; 70.45% of the voters accepted the altered constitution
proposed by the president. After the referendum, he dissolved the Supreme Soviet and introduced a
45 The opposition led by Paznyak reacted with heavy protest, but was silenced after being violently removed from the parliament,
were they had staged a hunger strike.
46 David Marples (1999) contributes this failure to 2 factors: the conditioning of the electorate under Soviet times, and the effective,
Soviet style propaganda of the President.
47 This neo-Sovietism was also apparent from Lukashenkas propaganda in the media, in which he presented him as the new
batjushka, as well as re-introducing typical Soviet habits like Saturdays as voluntary workdays (subbotniki) etc. For a challenging
view of Belarusian national identity, see Mihailisko K. Belarus : Retreat to Authoritarianism. In : Dawisha K., Parrott B. (eds)
Democratic Changes in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Authoritarianism and Democratization in Post-Communist Societies : 3,
Cambridge : 1997, p.227.
48 As was determined under the 1994 constitution.

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Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

bicameral parliament. The opposition practically immediately collapsed and were virtually outlawed by
Lukashenka. Not surprisingly, his referenda are often labelled as a power grab through a quasi-legal
network. Lukashenkas rule is dubbed sultanistic (Eke&Kuzio 2000), and the president received the not
so flattering epithet of the last dictator of Europe.
Institutional definition towards the EU and CIS Organisational Fields
Lukashenkas undemocratic actions did not go unnoticed in the West. The European Union expressed
great concern and urged Lukashenka to adhere to democratic principles. It did not recognise the new,
amended constitution (nor did the OSCE) and the Council of Ministers decided upon some sanctions: the
PCA, even though it was signed, was not concluded, nor was the trade part. Belarusian membership of
the Council of Europe was not supported, and bilateral relations on the ministerial level were suspended.
In 1997, diplomatic incidents deteriorated the situation even more49. Naturally, this harsh criticism from
the West had its repercussions on Belarus. With the parliament under his control, the Belarusian President
played a pivotal role in determining the domestic nd foreign policy of Belarus. Every undemocratic
action of Lukashenka that was countered by sanctions of the EU or OSCE brought Belarus one step closer
in turning its back to Western Europe and towards co-operation with the CIS. The shaping of foreign
policy and its institutional repercussions will be assessed below.
1991-1994: geopolitical pluralism
Belaruss external relations of 1991-1994 reflected the controversies of state-building discussed earlier in
this paper. They epitomised domestic political struggle, while at the same time manifesting only a vague
understanding among the then political elite of what national interests were. In the situation of a newly
independent state, some basic objectives of national foreign policy such as sovereignty, international
recognition, and prosperity were obvious. How these could best be ensured was not (Krivosheev 2003:
166). Different groups in society supported different views: the BPF chose the road to Europe, renouncing
the imperialistic Russia and its too strong political, military and cultural influence on Belarus. However,
popular support for this was weak, since the Belarusian people didnt see any harm in strong ties with
Russia. Moreover, a purely pro-European policy could never take root in Belarus, simply because Western
Europe was geographically, culturally, politically and economically too far away from Belarus.
Some centrist politicians like Stanislau Shushkevich played a much more feasible card by fusing a
moderate nationalist, pro-democratic reform approach with pragmatism; the possibility of a political
contract with the post-communist forces and a continuing close relationship with Russia. (Krivosheev
2003: 167). In practice this meant that although Shushkevich was one of the signatories of the Belavezhe
Treaty that founded the CIS, he also favoured an active role for Belarus in international organisations.
Indeed, in this period, several agreements were concluded with the West and international organisations:
a PCA and an interim agreement on trade issues were signed with the EU in 1994; in February 1992,
Belarus entered the OSCE (then still CSCE) and in September of that year, Belarus received special guest
status in the Council of Europe. That same year, Belarus also became member of the IMF, EBRD and
World Bank. In 1993, Belarus ratified the START I Treaty and also voted to accept the non-proliferation
treaty as a neutral country. In January 1995, the Belarusian government signed an agreement joining the
PfP Program of NATO. Simultaneously, Belarus maintained friendly relations with Russia. This dual
policy might have appealed to the whole Belarusian population, and also might have been the most
balanced foreign policy option for Belarus. Unfortunately, Shushkevich was only Speaker of parliament,
not aligned with any specific party. Therefore, his political influence was too limited for his policy to
become solidly rooted in Belarusian society.

49 The United States reacted with indignation when in the Spring of 1997, the First Secretary of the US Embassy was detained while
he was observing a March (opposition) on the Anniversary of Independence, and was declared persona non grata and had to leave
the country within 24 hours. The US reacted angry by expelling the Belarusian First Secretary from the US. Another diplomatic
incident occurred in 1998 when diplomatic missions in the vicinity of the presidential palace had to be abandoned because of
construction works.

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The (former) communists on the other hand did represent a dominant political force in parliament (with
85% of the seats) and therefore could significantly influence Belaruss foreign policy course. For the postSoviet nomenklatura, whose power base was supported by the communist party, collective farms etc, a
radical turn to the West and transition to a free market economy would signify the end of what they stood
for. So not only did they oppose a return to Europe, but presented Russia as the only viable alternative
(Krivosheev 2003: 168, Rontoyanni 2002). This pro-Russian stance sparked a lot of protest from the BPF,
but not from the wide population, who didnt mind approximation to their Russian neighbour.
1994-present: Institutional Co-operation Structures with the CIS & Union State with Russia
Foreign policy orientations became even more crucial during 1994 the presidential elections, in which
Paznyak represented the pro-Western stance, whereas both Kebich and Lukashenka favoured
approximation to Russia. After Lukashenka won, he continued the policy shift towards Russia. Since he
succeeded in weakening the other institutions in Belarus, the foreign policy of the country was mainly
determined by the president and executed by the presidential administration and the MFA, under the
watchful eye of Lukashenka himself. Lukashenka decidedly looked East, to the Commonwealth of
Independent States and more importantly to its leading member, Russia. The idea of a Union between
Russia and Belarus that was already launched by Vyacheslau Kebich in 1993 now became an official
foreign policy goal.
The integration between Belarus and the Russian Federation proceeded through different steps. On 6
January 1995, a Customs Union between Belarus and Russia was signed. On 2 April 1996, a
Commonwealth of Sovereign Republics was created. Exactly a year later, on 2 April 1997, a Union
between Belarus and Russia is established; Yeltsin and Lukashenka sign the Union Charter. In December
1999, integration between Belarus and Russia goes one step further by concluding a Treaty of the
formation of a Union State. Also, in November 2000, Lukashenka and the new Russian president Putin
agree upon a common currency (ruble) in Belarus and Russia.
The subsequent integration agreements also provided for an institutional structure to develop the Union
state between Belarus and Russia. The most important institution of the Union State is the Supreme State
Council (Vysshyy Gosudarstvennyy Sovet) that consists of the Heads of State, the Heads of government, and
the speakers of parliament50. The Highest Council is responsible for outlining the strategy of development
of the Union State, determines the competencies of the other Union State institutions, and approves the
budget of the Union State. The Union States Council of Ministers (Sovet Ministrov) comprises the Chair of
the Council, the Heads of State, the secretary of the Union State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Economy and Finance. They are responsible for developing the main policy course of the Union State that
is outlined by the Highest Council. The Council of Ministers also heads executive agencies of the Union
State. Furthermore, the Council looks upon the correct implementation of the Union agreement. A
Permanent Committee (Postoyannyy Komitet Soyuznogo Gosudarstva) is responsible for the implementation
of the Action plan between the Russian Federation and Belarus. In concreto, the Committee prepares the
documents on a common legislation and proposals on the further strategy of the Union State for the
meetings of the Council of Ministers 51. Other institutions of the Union State are a Court (Sud Soyuznogo
Gosudarstva), an Audit Office (Schetnaya Palata), and a Parliamentary Assembly (Parlamentskoe Sobranie).
The latter is a bicameral parliament that consists of a Chamber of the Union (Palata Soyuza) and a
Chamber of Representatives (Palata Predstaviteley)52. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Union State is
considered be the main representative and legislative institution of the Union State.
Apart from this considerable institutional definition towards the Union state with Russia, Belarus also
actively participates in the CIS institutional co-operation structures. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus engages
zealously in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, in the Executive Committee, and the Economic
The meetings of the council are also attended by the chair of the Council of Ministers and the Head of the Court of the Union State.
For a complete overview of the institutional structure of the Union State and the specific compositions and competencies of the
Union institutions, check www.sinfo.ru.
52 The Chamber of the Union consists of 36 members delegated from the Russian Council of the Federation and 36 members
delegated from the Belarusian Council of the Republic. The Chamber of Representatives comprises 75 deputies of the Russian
Federation and 36 deputies of the Republic of Belarus, elected on the basis of the general election law by secret vote. The Chair of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Union State is the Speaker of the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly.
50
51

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Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

Committee. The bi-annual meetings of the Council of Heads of States, and Council of Foreign Ministers
are seen by Lukashenka as an opportunity to further the former Soviet states economic, military and
political ties and overall integration, of which Lukashenka considers the Union State with Russia the
shining example.
Belarus and the European Union: A Difficult Match
On a national level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs harbours a balanced, equal approach with divisions
that deal separately with European Affairs, CIS affairs and the Union with Russia. Yet the parliament
reveals less balanced foreign policy priorities. In contrast to Ukraines Parliamentary Committee for
European Integration, the Belarusian Chamber of Representatives does not have a similar committee, but
on the other hand does have a permanent commission for international affairs and relations with the CIS.
Official documents issued by the Presidential Administration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirm
this. Documents concerning relations in the framework of the CIS and the Union State with Russia speak
in a favourable way of eastward integration53, yet the documents on relations with the EU tend to stress
the problematic aspects of the Belarus EU relation. According to the official text (Otnosheniya c
Evropeyskim Soyuzom)54, it was the European Union who failed to complete the necessary procedures that
would make the PCA and trade agreement come into force, and moreover, it was an unadequate
interpretation by the EU of the referenda organised by Lukashenka that made the EU restrict the level of
cooperation and financial and technical support to Belarus. Also the future enlargement of the EU is seen
in a negative light and the many problems and economic difficulties that will originate from it are
stressed55.
The institutional cooperation between Belarus and the European Union is practically non-existent.
Although the PCA foresaw institutional cooperation structures similar to those of the PCA with Ukraine
(Cooperation Council, Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, .), after the referenda of 1995-96 relations
were frozen and the institutional cooperation never really materialised and thus remains on a bilateral
level with the separate members states of the European Union.
Therefore, one could say that the external relations of Belarus are even more asymmetrical than those of
Ukraine. Belarus foreign policy diverges from Ukraines and gravitates to the opposite side, the
Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia, as seen through Belarus institutional definition
towards both organisational fields in table 3. Relations with the CIS and Russia are clearly well developed
and solidly supported by institutional cooperation structures, relations with the European Union are
institutionally underdeveloped and rather problematic.

Although given the recent problems between Belarus and Russia, stress is currently put on the EvrAzES structures.
See http://www.mfa.gov.by/rus, zneshnyaya palytika.
55 See also ES Belarus: Trebovaniya Vremeni in the journal Belarus v mire, No.2, 2002.
53
54

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Lien Verpoest

Table 3: Systematic assessment of institutional definition: Belarus

Institutional Definition & Foreign Policy Initiatives
BELARUS
Org. characteristics
EU
CIS
1.) increased interaction among
Until 1996: developing relations with EU:
Participation in CIS integration process and
organisations in the field
PCA & temporary trade agreement concluded
most subregional initiatives (EvrAzES, CES,
Alma-Aty Declaration)
Since 1996: NR

2.)

emergence of interorganisational structures

Institutional definition:
- MFA: NR, no specific department for EU56

Institutional definition:
- MFA: Department for Russia and the Union State,
Department for CIS and EvrAzES, Department for
countries of CIS
- Palata Predstaviteley: permanent commission for
international affairs and relations with the CIS

Until 1996: PCA & temporary trade agreement

concluded
Since 1996: NR ; PCA not ratified, sanctions

Participation in CIS instit. structures:

Council of Heads of States / Governments
Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs,
Defence, )
Interparliamentary Assembly CIS
Belarus Russia Union State:
Supreme State Council
Permanent Committee
Council of Ministers
Parliamentary Assembly,.

3.)

4.)

increase in information load

development of mutual
awareness of being involved
in a common enterprise
NR: not relevant

Official documents & speeches:

- The Enlargement of the EU and possible
consequences for Belarusian foreign trade interests
- Current Requirements of the EU-Belarus
Relation
- On the Relations with the European Union
NR

Official Documents & publications:

- Foreign Policy and economic priorities of
Belarus in the light of the Union State with the
Russian Federation
- Cooperation in the Framework of the CIS
- The Union State: Today, Yesterday, and
Tomorrow
- .
Zealous member of CIS, integration efforts
with Russia, sees common enterprise as the
instalment of neo-Soviet order

Comparative Analysis of Institutional Definition of Ukraine and Belarus

A comparison of both countries institutional definition offers some interesting insights and contrasts.
Both Ukraine and Belarus started their transition with an initial focus on nation building and establishing
a new independent state with fixed borders and a strong national identity. Although this focus is a logical
one, the heightened attention for identity formation and distinguishing themselves from e.g. their Russian
neighbours overshadowed other crucial aspects of post communist transition, most importantly
institutional change. Pro-reform parties were pre-occupied with urgent societal issues and the
(post)communist nomenklatura were mainly focused on preserving the status quo, which implied as little
institutional reforms as possible.
The biggest obstacle for institutional change right after the implosion of the USSR however did not only
lie with the political leaders of Ukraine or Belarus. The break-up of the Soviet Union was not a revolution,
nor was it a violent overturn of power. It was a gradual process of disintegration that spanned a couple of
years: it started in the mid-80s, intensified at the beginning of the 90s, culminated in the August 1991
coup, and ended with the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Although there was strong popular
mobilisation in the different Soviet republics that rallied for radical changes and reforms, and although
the political leaders of the Soviet republics went along with it (some more willing than others), this
process of disintegration never gained enough momentum for a total revolution, also because the
different defining moments of disintegration were temporally and geographically scattered over the
fifteen Soviet republics. It is therefore more reasonable to perceive the systemic change and subsequent

Although there is a Departament Evropy, but this is a department for European Affairs, mainly concerned with bilateral relations
with European Countries.

56

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Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

transition in the post-Soviet space as a long process of political and social breakdown and reconstruction
(Daniels 1999:28), or at best a stage of moderate revolutionary revival (Motyl 1997).
The problems that this evolution brought on the institutional level was the lack of a critical juncture or
punction point. Because of the absence of a radical breach with the Soviet past, both countries inherited a
quasi-state from the Soviet Union. The Soviet building wasnt torn down and rebuilt from scratch as a
democratic state. More accurately, the Soviet building was partially destroyed and the new state was
rebuilt on the ruins of the old Soviet state structure and institutions. The presence of old institutions and
the emergence of new institutions as we saw led to institutional confusion and fragmentation. These
tendencies marked the initial years of both the Ukrainian and Belarusian transitions.
The year 1994 signalled a change of course: both countries elected new leaders. This simultaneously
signalled a divergence both in the countries institutional development and in their foreign policy orientations.
In Belarus, institutional reforms were carried out by president Lukashenka. He strengthened his power
base by eliminating the pro-reform, pro-western opposition through a dissolution parliament and hand
picking the members of the new bicameral parliament. These moves and the referenda he used to
legitimise his actions are generally considered as unconstitutional. In Ukraine, it was exactly the 1996
constitution that limited the president and did not give him as much powers as the Russian or Belarusian
president. Unlike in Belarus, the president did have to account for his policy decisions to the Ukrainian
parliament, the Verkhovna Rada. In Belarus, the president deprived the opposition in parliament from a
voice by scrapping them from their posts and replacing them with more moderate and less critical
deputies, which gave him a free hand in decision making without being amenable to another institution57.
Apparently, Lukashenka did not feel any liability towards the parliament from the offset of his
presidency. The institution of presidency came relatively late in Belarus and because of this he felt
empowered to go ahead with his own policies, regardless of the legislative will represented by the
Supreme Soviet, which had been elected while the Soviet Union still existed (Belova 2003: 58).
Looking at these developments, we can say that in comparison to Belarus, where after the 1995-1996
referenda the only voice seemed to be that of Lukashenka, the institutional structures in Ukraine were
more proportioned, and the country scores a better balance between the legislative and executive
government institutions although relations between these institutions have been severely strained and
have voiced dissenting opinions over foreign policy priorities of Ukraine58.
A second divergence between Ukraine and Belarus can been seen on the level of institutional creation in
relation to their foreign policy orientations. Over the past decade, new sections were added to the existing
institutions (MFA, parliamentary committees), specifically focusing on the countrys institutional
definition supporting specific foreign policy priorities. Apart from that, also specific inter-institutional
cooperation structures were created between both countries and the organisational fields surrounding
them, respectively the EU and the CIS. Table 4, which summarises the institutional definition of Ukraine
and Belarus as it was assessed in this paper, gives an overview of the extent and targets of institutional
definition.

57 A conspicuous difference between Ukraine and Belarus is that in Belarus, the constitution (March 1994) preceded the first
presidential elections (July 1994); in Ukraine, the constitution was only adopted in 1996, 2 years after Kuchma was elected.
58 Nevertheless, one should see these developments in perspective and acknowledge that both countries score relatively low on
different aspects of transition like democratisation and marketisation compared to other post-Soviet states.

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Table 4: Systematic assessment of institutional definition: Ukraine & Belarus

Institutional Definition & Foreign Policy Initiatives

EU
Org.
characteristics

CIS

Ukraine

Belarus

Ukraine

Declared intention of
becoming (associate)
member of EU

Until 1996: developing

relations with EU: PCA
& temporary trade
agreement concluded
Since 1996: NR

Institutional definition:

Institutional definition:

- MFA: Department for

European Integration,
Section for EU Affairs
- Verkhovna Rada:
Committee on issues of
European Integration

- MFA: NR, no specific

department for EU

2. emergence of
interorganisational
structures

PCA 1994, into force 1998

Until 1996: PCA &

temporary trade
agreement concluded

3. increase in
information
load

Official documents &

speeches:
- Strategy for the
Integration of Ukraine into
the European Union
- numerous documents,
speeches and reports
asserting European
ambitions of Ukraine

Official documents &

speeches:
- The Enlargement of the
EU and possible
consequences for Belarusian
foreign trade interests
- Current Requirements of
the EU-Belarus Relation
- On the Relations with the
European Union

Off. documents; NR. no

specific strategies
towards CIS region. Only
treaties: CIS founding
Charter(1991), Yalta
Charter of GUUAM
(1997), Treaty founding
Eurasian Economic
Community (2000), Pact
on Common Economic
Space (Sept 2003)

4. development
of mutual
awareness of
being involved
in a common
enterprise

Intention of becoming
member state of EU,
initiatives from EU side:
Common Strategy,
Wider Europe/New
Neighbours Initiative
(bandwagoning)

NR

NR; Reluctant CIS

member, limited
participation
founding member of
GUUAM
(balancing)

1. increased
interaction
among
organisations
in the field

- Cooperation Council
- Cooperation Committee
- Parliamentary
Cooperation Committee
- Subcommittees

Since 1996: NR ; PCA not

ratified, sanctions

reluctant member of CIS,

limited participation in
CIS integration & some
subregional initiatives
(EvrAzES, CES)
Institutional definition:
- MFA: NR, no specific
departments for CIS
- Verkhovna Rada: NR,
idem

Participation in CIS
instit. structures:
- Council of Heads of States
/ Governments
- Council of Ministers
(Foreign Affairs, Defence)
- Interparliamentary
Assembly CIS

Belarus
Participation in CIS
integration process and
most subregional
initiatives (EvrAzES,
CES, Alma-Aty
Declaration)
Institutional definition:
- MFA: Department for
Russia and the Union State,
Department for CIS and
EvrAzES, Department for
countries of CIS
- Palata Predstaviteley:
permanent commission for
international affairs and
relations with the CIS
Participation in CIS
instit. structures:
- Council of Heads of States
/ Governments
- Council of Ministers
(Foreign Affairs, Defence)
- Interparliamentary
Assembly CIS
Belarus Russia Union
State:
- Supreme State Council
- Permanent Committee
- Council of Ministers
- Parliamentary
Assembly,..
Official Documents &
publications:
- Foreign Policy and
economic priorities of
Belarus in the light of the
Union State with the
Russian Federation
- Cooperation in the
Framework of the CIS
- The Union State: Today,
Yesterday, and Tomorrow
-
Zealous member of CIS,
integration efforts with
Russia, sees common
enterprise as the
instalment of neo-Soviet
order

NR: not relevant

It is clear from this overview that Ukraine shows an active institutional dynamism towards EU integration
on every institutional level: the parliamentary (committee for EU Integration), ministerial (Minister for
Economy and EU integration, National Agency for EU Integration, special divisions for EU integration in
MFA), and presidential level (managing EU integration59), as well as through specific institutional
cooperation structures like the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council and Parliamentary Cooperation
Committee.
59

See Ukraines Strategy for Integration into the European Union, http://www.mfa.gov.ua/integration

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Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

So not only is there an increased interaction among the centre and the periphery of the EU organisational
field (i.e., between the EU and Ukraine), and can one witness a clear emergence of interorganisational
structures; there is also a significant increase in information load between Ukraine and the EU: numerous
official documents describing and clarifying Ukraines strategy of integration into the EU, its objectives
and aims have been issued. Furthermore, there is also a clear development of a mutual awareness of being
involved in a common enterprise, which is proved by Ukraines repeated affirmation of its European
ambitions on the one hand, and the EUs Common Strategy and more recent Wider Europe New
Neighbours Initiative of 2003-2004. Since Ukraine seems to fulfil all four organisational characteristics
that lead to institutional approximation to the organisational field, we can assume that some form of
institutional isomorphism is taking place.
Belarus however lacks Ukraines institutional dynamism towards the EU organisational field. If one looks
at table 4, none of the four organisational characteristics qualify for Belarus policy vis--vis the EU; there
was an increased interaction and emergence of interorganisational structures during the first years of
Belarusian independence, but all these processes have been reversed after Lukashenka became president.
The information load is limited and mostly stresses the negative aspects of the relation with the European
Union and the negative consequences of future EU enlargement. Lastly, there is absolutely no mutual
awareness of being involved in a common enterprise, since the EU has ongoing sanctions running and
Belarus in its turn continues to react defiantly against any European criticism.
As much dynamism as Belarus misses in its European policy, the more there is in its relations with the
CIS. Already since 1991, Belarus has sustained a consistently friendly and open policy towards the CIS.
This policy intensified considerably when Lukashenka became president. There is a strong interaction and
elaborate inter-institutional structure with the CIS in which Belarus takes part. One of the side-effects of CIS
integration is the enhanced cooperation with Russia in the form of a Union State. Table 3 shows the
substantial institutional definition of Belarus towards CIS and Russia both on a national (sections for CIS
& Union affairs in MFA, commission for CIS in parliament) and inter-institutional level (summits,
interparliamentary assembly, executive committee,). Moreover, numerous official documents illustrate
Belarus engagement, attachment and orientation towards the CIS organisational field, which is
reciprocated by Russia in particular and signals the mutual awareness of building an organisational
structure in the CIS region that links up all former Soviet states (except the Baltics), and for which the
Belarusian-Russian Union State60 serves as a model for closer integration.
In stark contrast to this, Ukraines relations with the CIS lack the momentum that is so obvious in the
Belarus-CIS/Russia cooperation. Although Ukraines eastward policy is not strained as Belarus relations
with the EU, it is clear that Ukraine limits its political engagement in CIS institutions to a minimum.
President Kuchma seems to share Putins attitude of using the bi-annual summits only to nurture bilateral
relations with the other member states. And although the inter-organisational structures between Ukraine
and the CIS are present, there are no particular official documents that delineate a specific strategy towards
the CIS and Ukraines reputation as a distinctly unenthusiastic member of the CIS implies that the level of
mutual awareness to be involved in a common enterprise remains low as well.
This brief comparative analysis seems to confirm the earlier assumption that Ukraine tends to bandwagon
with the West whereas it balances its relations with Russia on the CIS level (Splidsboel-Hansen 2000: 92).
Seen from an IR theory perspective, states tend to balance against strong or threatening powers by allying
against them (e.g. GUUAM vis--vis Russias dominant position in CIS), and states bandwagon by allying
with the strongest or dominant powers in the region (for Ukraine, this appears to be the EU). Given the
contrasts between Ukraine and Belarus and Belaruss close ties with the CIS region, we could state
conversely that Belarus tends to bandwagon with the CIS, whereas it (not so successfully) tends to balance
its relations with the European Union. Although applying alliance theory to this specific situation in
eastern Europe results in interesting contrasts, it does not offer us a nuanced or truly comprehensive
explanation of geopolitical pluralism that is being observed in the Slavic core of the CIS. Why does
60 Even though relations in the framework of the Union State have been particularly strained over the past month, due to an energy
dispute between Russia (Gazprom) and Belarus.

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Ukraine focus on the European Union, and why does Belarus radically look the other way? What are the
causes for such divergence in policy choices, especially since these are countries with a very similar
history? To explain these issues, it is advisable to link up the aspects of alliance theory with a further
development of the theory of institutional isomorphism.
Stage 2: Institutional Isomorphism
Looking at table 4, we can state that when a countrys institutions live up to all four characteristics,
institutional homogenisation or isomorphism is taking place. This term can best be defined as a process that
leads one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions
(Hawley 1968, qtd in Powell&DiMaggio 1983: 149), implying that organisational characteristics are modified
in the direction of increasing compatibility with environmental characteristics.
Institutional isomorphism looks at organisations competing for institutional legitimacy. When new
organisations emerge (or newly independent states), rational actors make their organisations increasingly
similar to other organisations in, or in the proximity of, an organisational field. When implementing
institutional reforms, rational actors in these institutions modify their features in order to resemble the
institutions in their organisational field (Meyer & Rowan 1983). It is clear from our comparative analysis
that this institutional redesigning is what has been happening in Belarus and Ukraine since the implosion
of the USSR. The specific institutional changes point to certain foreign policy priorities that suggest
isomorphic processes in order to obtain legitimacy vis--vis the European Union (Ukraine) and the CIS
(Belarus). Yet what remains to be explored is the divergence; what are the specific incentives for institutional
change and how can one explain variations in institutional change?
Acknowledging some shortcomings of isomorphist theory, Walter Powell pointed out some aspects in need
of theoretical refinement61, the most important one being the need for an enhanced understanding of the processes
that generate institutional change and of the sources of heterogeneity in institutional environment. Applied to this
case, this encompasses the origins and patterns of institutional change in Belarus and Ukraine and the
sources of variation in institutional change that lead to geopolitical pluralism in the Post-Soviet area.
Origins and Patterns of Institutional Change in Belarus and Ukraine
The origins and patterns of institutional change should uncover the underlying reasons that led the
institutions in Ukraine and Belarus to redesign their institutions in a way that they conform to an
organisational field (the EU or CIS) and thus become isomorphic. To identify these underlying reasons, we
can depart from 3 causal factors: coercive and mimetic isomorphic processes, and the recomposition of
organisational fields62.
Coercive isomorphism results from formal as well as informal pressures exerted on organisations by other
organisations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which
organisations function. These pressures can be experienced as force, but also as persuasion or as invitation
to join in collusion. Often organisations faced with unmanageable interdependence seek to use the greater
power of a larger system and its government to eliminate difficulties or provide for needs (Powell &
DiMaggio 1991). Belaruss strong political (and economic) dependence on Russia and the East in general
point to this pattern. Also, the recent tumultuous squabbling63 and the discours between the political
leaders of the Belarus-Russia Union (as a model of CIS integration) can be perceived a sign of coercive
isomorphism towards the CIS.
In his 1991 essay Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis (Powell & DiMaggio 1991: 183-203).
Also here, I have to limit myself within the constraints of this paper to explaining only the factors relevant to the topic of this
paper. Yet other causal factors can be normative isomorphism, unsuccessful imitation and incomplete institutionalisation. For a full
explanation on all causal mechanisms, see Verpoest L. Institutional Isomorphism in the Slavic Core of the Commonwealth of Independent
States. A Comparative Analysis of Institutional Change during the Post-Communist Transition. Leuven, 2003, 34p.
63 Putin declared on 14 August 2002 that he perceives the Union with Belarus evolving in two possible ways: either Belarus
(Lukashenka) chooses a Union State that would follow the example of European integration, or Belarus should become the 90th
subject of the Russian Federation. Lukashenka reacted furiously, yet Putin has since repeated his position several times.
61
62

21

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

Mimetic isomorphism on the other hand shows that uncertainty can be a powerful force that encourages
imitation. When an organisation or a state considers itself weak vis--vis its immediate environment, when
certain organisations processes are poorly understood, or their goals not so well-defined, the environment
creates a symbolic uncertainty and organisations may model themselves on other organisations64 (Powell &
DiMaggio 1983: 151). One could say for example that Ukraines uncertainty is reflected in its multi-vector
foreign policy. Although a founding member of the CIS, Ukraine exhibits a more mimetic isomorphism
towards the EU, openly modelling its institutions to European institutional structures which they esteem
more successful than their weak institutions.
Table 5 Causal mechanisms of isomorphism and hypothetical applications
Coercive Isomorphism

Pressures, dependence, cultural

expectations

e.g. Belarus dependence on Russia and

CIS organisational field in general

Mimetic Isomorphism

uncertainty , imitation
modelling institutions after
organisations perceived as more
successful

e.g. Ukraines multi-vector foreign

policy and EU ambitions

Recomposition of Organisational Fields

institutional change when

boundaries of organisational field
change due to a.o. geopolitical
reshuffling

e.g. post-communist transition after the

implosion of the Soviet Union in
general; in consequence of this, inst.
change for the three selected countries
in specific

Source: Verpoest 2003;DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Powell 1991.

The Recomposition of Organisational Fields. Another, fairly decisive factor in explaining the underlying reasons
for institutional change concerns the recomposition of organisational fields. This factor offers a reasonable
explanation for transition in Ukraine and Belarus in general. It implies a rather dramatic form of institutional
change, occurring when the boundaries of established organisational fields are rearranged as a consequence
of geopolitical reshuffling in tandem with possible political upheavals because of uncertainty of the
members of the field (Powell 1991: 200). This is particularly relevant here. The implosion of the Soviet Union
and the subsequent post-communist transition brought about a geopolitical reshuffling. This implies an
enlarged European Union and the emergence of a renewed organisational field, the CIS. Hence, during the
twelve years of transition, both the CIS and the EU experienced a recomposition of organisational fields.
When the structure of the organisational field changes in such a profound manner, states in the field can
either protect their interests by favouring a status quo (like in Belarus) or create the possibility to change the
rules and established practices, thus coming to a redefinition of the state institutions (Ukraine). The
recomposition of institutional fields can be caused not only by internal processes (like in this case the general
decay of the Soviet system) but also by exogenous shocks (Powell 1991: 201). This brings us to the second
issue to be addressed; the sources of variation in institutional change.
Heterogeneity in Institutional Change
If one looks at the cases of Belarus and Ukraine, one cannot but wonder why these countries, which have
known a very similar historical development, have such divergent foreign policy orientations. A last issue
that I would like to tackle in this paper is their heterogeneity in institutional change that eventually leads to
geopolitical pluralism.
This heterogeneity might have its roots in different organisational responses to certain defining events that
took place far back in history (their reaction to Russian Imperialisation, the Russian Revolution, the World
Wars, ), but also different responses to institutional pressures or influence. Patterns of influence for
example are felt with different force in different institutions (Scott 1991: 167-168). Influence can depend on
whether it is tied to programmatic control (e.g. the partnership and Co-operation agreements between the
64 The modelled organisation may be unaware of the modelling or may have no desire to be copied, [like the EUs reluctance vis-vis Ukraine, lv], it merely serves as a source of practices which the borrowing organisation copies (Powell & DiMaggio 1983: 151).

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Lien Verpoest

EU and Ukraine). Sources of influence can moreover be accepted with enthusiasm or actively resisted
(Ukraines positive stance towards the EU and its reluctance towards CIS integration, and Belaruss
opposite attitude) or looked upon strategically.
Next to different responses to institutional pressures and influence, the reason for institutional change can
also be attributed to a countrys historical heritage. The creation, development and change of institutions
are all history-dependent processes (Powell 1991:195). Institutions emerge at different times and under
specific circumstances. Also, certain practices within institutions will be perpetuated because of persisting
assumptions and complex interdependencies. All of this points to path dependent patterns of
development, in which initial choices preclude future options. To better understand the factors that
promote heterogeneity, one needs to recognise the complexity of institutional environments and trace the
sources of divergence by exploring these path dependent processes65(Powell 1991:191-192).
As for the cases of Belarus and Ukraine, the historical development throughout the centuries of these
countries seems almost parallel. Both countries share a common history over an impressive time span
(Subtelny 2000: 19; Zaprudnik 1993). Both were for more than two centuries part of the Russian Empire and
after that, they both became Soviet Republics for over 70 years. Under tsarism, Ukraine and Belarus, the
histories of the three East Slavic peoples (Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians) converged. This implied
that in the Russian Empire, one tsar, one senate and one Duma regulated the three countries political affairs
(including foreign policy). In the 20th century, when Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were all part of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the foreign policy was also coordinated by one central government, and first
and foremost dictated by the Communist party ideology (MID 1962, Dinerstein 1968). The different facets of
foreign policy were divided over several institutions66. Although this seemingly reflects inter-institutional
cooperation and dynamism, it were these institutions that gradually turned into a unwieldy, slow
mechanism, whose inertia seriously hindered institutional change and finally became untenable in the
eighties (Hopf 2002, Nogee & Donaldson 1983).
Yet even though the history of Belarus and Ukraine shows remarkable parallels and convergence, even on
the institutional level, these countries are now evolving in seemingly opposite directions. Certain defining
moments in these countries history might have turned out to be critical junctures that eventually determined
the current divergence between Belarus and Ukraine. Both countries enjoyed brief periods of independence.
Although their independence was overall short-lived, this still could be quite a significant factor for
explaining the divergences in foreign policy orientations. Firstly, in the 18th century, the East of what is now
Ukraine was subjugated by the Russian Empire, whereas the Western part of Ukraine came under control of
the Austrian Empire. This feat has greatly contributed to the development of Ukrainian nationalism under
the more liberal Austrian rule and it is often used as a historical argument for the European ambitions of
the current Ukrainian government. Belarus on the other hand missed out on this type of liberal rule during
that crucial 19th century in which so many countries developed a national idea and national identity.
Although these tendencies were also present in Belarus67, they were quickly smothered by Russian imperial
rule. After the Russian Revolution, both Ukraine and Belarus became independent (1918), but unlike the
other parts of the Russian Empire they were almost immediately absorbed by the consolidating Bolshevik
regime (1919) and became founding republics of the USSR (1922). However short-lived these periods of
independence were, it may have become a determinant that resurfaced in the republics after they regained
independence in 1991, and strongly influenced their foreign policy choices.

65 Path dependence constitutes the main core of historical institutionalist approach yet will also be a focus in this research. I support
the view that those works that lie at the intersection of different theoretical models often embrace a more expansive view of
institutions as a set of shared understandings (Thelen 1999: 371). Powell comments that path dependent arguments actually lead to
the most interesting observations in organisation theory. See also Krasner 1984.
66 Triska & Finley sum up the different institutions functions in the foreign policy decision process (Triska & Finley 1968: 70): the
formulation of purpose (in other words the mapping) of the foreign policy goals was mainly done by the Politburo leadership and the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The selection, confirmation, ratification and innovation of a course of action was in the hands of the
Politburo leadership and the Central Committee members and secretaries. The Foreign Ministry Departments and Administrations
(along with the KGB and the diplomatic missions abroad) were mainly responsible for information selection, collection, and interpretation, as
well as the elaboration, dissemination and implementation of the selected course of action (Triska & Finley 1968: 70-71).
67 One of the most famous personalities was Kastus Kalinouski, publisher of the clandestine newspaper Peasants Truth and the
leader of the 1863-64 uprising in Belarus, after which he imprisoned and hanged. In prison, he wrote the famous from beneath the
gallows, a letter that has become the political credo of Belarusian nationalism.

23

Institutional Change in Ukraine and Belarus

In Conclusion
In this paper, I developed a new institutionalist approach to the issue of geopolitical pluralism in Ukraine
and Belarus. More specifically, the theory of institutional isomorphism can form an innovative and
adequate conceptual framework for the analysis of institutional change in both countries. By taking up
this approach, my objective is twofold: 1) monitoring and assessing the institutional definition and foreign
policy initiatives of these countries that lead to rapprochement with the two organisational fields, and 2)
explaining origins and patterns of institutional isomorphism and sources of variation leading to
geopolitical pluralism. In doing this, I hope to contribute to institutionalist theory by applying the theory
of institutional isomorphism to systematically map, expound and explain institutional change in the
Slavic Core of the CIS. Secondly, by elaborating the weak points of the theory of institutional
isomorphism - the need for an enhanced understanding of both the sources of heterogeneity and the
processes that generate institutional change (Powell 1991: 183) I strive to make this theory a more
comprehensive framework of analysis. The confines of this paper limit an exhaustive and complete
comparative analysis of the countries institutions, their development, and the incentives for institutional
change. However, this papers offers an initial analysis which is currently being elaborated and expounded
in my PhD research.
Lien Verpoest
Institute for International & European Policy
Dept. of Political Science
University of Leuven, Belgium

24

Lien Verpoest

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