(A.e. Lawson) The Neurological Basis of Learning

THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF LEARNING, DEVELOPMENT AND
DISCOVERY
Science & Technology Education Library

VOLUME 18
SERIES EDITOR
William W. Cobern, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, USA
FOUNDING EDITOR
Ken Tobin, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
EDITORIAL BOARD
Henry Brown-Acquay, University College of Education of Winneba, Ghana
Mariona Espinet, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
Gurol Irzik, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey
Olugbemiro Jegede, The Open University, Hong Kong
Reuven Lazarowitz, Technion, Haifa, Israel
Lilia Reyes Herrera, Universidad Autnoma de Columbia, Bogota, Colombia
Marrisa Rollnick, College of Science, Johannesburg, South Africa
Svein Sjberg, University of Oslo, Norway
Hsiao-lin Tuan, National Changhua University of Education, Taiwan
SCOPE
The book series Science & Technology Education Library provides a publication forum
for scholarship in science and technology education. It aims to publish innovative books
which are at the forefront of the field. Monographs as well as collections of papers will
be published.
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
The Neurological Basis of

Learning, Development and
Discovery
Implications for Science and Mathematics Instruction
by
ANTON E. LAWSON
School of Life Sciences,
Arizona State University, U.S.A.
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TO
MATT, BOB, BETSY and KRISTINA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
ix
Acknowledgements
xv
1
CHAPTER 1
How Do People Learn?
CHAPTER 2
The Neurological Basis of Self-Regulation
27
CHAPTER 3
Brain Maturation, Intellectual Development and

Descriptive Concept Construction
57
Brain Maturation, Intellectual Development and

Theoretical Concept Construction
79
Creative Thinking, Analogy and a Neural Model of

Analogical Reasoning
99
CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 5
CHAPTER 6
The Role of Analogies and Reasoning Skill in Theoretical

Concept Construction and Change
119
Intellectual Development During the College Years:

Is There a Fifth Stage?
135
CHAPTER 8
What Kinds of Scientific Concepts Exist?
159
CHAPTER 9
Psychological and Neurological Models of Scientific

Discovery
183
CHAPTER 7
CHAPTER 10 Rejecting Nature of Science Misconceptions By Preservice

Teachers
211
CHAPTER 11 Implications for The Nature of Knowledge and Instruction
225
References
261
Index
277
PREFACE
A goal of mine ever since becoming an educational researcher has been to help
construct a sound theory to guide instructional practice. For far too long, educational
practice has suffered because we have lacked firm instructional guidelines, which in my
view should be based on sound psychological theory, which in turn should be based on
sound neurological theory. In other words, teachers need to know how to teach and that
"how-to-teach" should be based solidly on how people learn and how their brains
function. As you will see in this book, my answer to the question of how people learn is
that we all learn by spontaneously generating and testing ideas. Idea generating
involves analogies and testing requires comparing predicted consequences with actual
consequences. We learn this way because the brain is essentially an idea generating and
testing machine. But there is more to it than this. The very process of generating and
testing ideas results not only in the construction of ideas that work (i.e., the learning of
useful declarative knowledge), but also in improved skill in learning (i.e., the
development of improved procedural knowledge). Thus, to teach most effectively,
teachers should allow their students to participate in the idea generation and testing
process because doing so allows them to not only construct "connected" and useful
declarative knowledge (where "connected" refers specifically to organized neuron
hierarchies called outstars), but also to develop "learning-to-learn" skills (where
"learning-to-learn" skills refer to general rules/guidelines that are likely located in the
prefrontal cortex).
My interest in the neurological basis of instruction can be traced to a 1967 book
written by my biologist father, the late Chester Lawson, titled Brain Mechanisms and
Human Learning published by Houghton Mifflin. Although the book was written while
I was still in high school, in subsequent years my father and I had many long
conversations about brain structure and function, learning and development, and what it
all meant for education. In fact, in that book, my father briefly outlined a theory of
instruction that has subsequently been called the learning cycle. That instructional
theory was put into practice by my father, by Robert Karplus and by others who worked
on the Science Curriculum Improvement Study during the 1970s. My mathematician
brother David Lawson has also boosted my interest in such issues. David worked on
NASA's Space Station Program and is an expert in neural modeling. His help has been
invaluable in sorting out the nuances of neural models and their educational
implications.
Given this background, Chapter 1 begins by briefly exploring empiricism,
innatism and constructivism as alternative explanations of learning. Empiricism claims
learning results from the internalization of patterns that exist in the external world.
Innatism claims that such patterns are internal in origin. Constructivism views learning
as a process in which spontaneously generated ideas are tested through the derivation of
expectations. The initial ideas are retained or rejected depending upon the extent that
their expectations match future observations in an assumed-to-exist external world.
Piaget's brand of constructivism with its theory of self-regulation is discussed as an
explanation for development and learning. Piaget's self-regulation theory is based on
biological analogies, largely on Waddington's theory of genetic assimilation. Genetic
assimilation is described and used to explain psychological-level phenomena,
specifically the development of proportional reasoning skill during adolescence. In
spite of the value of self-regulation theory, an important theoretical weakness exists as
the theory is based on biological analogies rather than on brain structure and function.
Brain structure and function are discussed in Chapter 2 to hopefully eliminate this
weakness.
Chapter 2 explains visual and auditory information processing in terms of basic
brain structure and function. In brief, a hypothetico-predictive pattern is identified in
both visual and auditory processing. Steven Grossberg's neural modeling principles of
learning, perception, cognition, and motor control are presented as the basis for
construction of a neurological model of sensory-motor problem solving. The pattern of
problem solving is assumed to be universal, thus is sought in the higher-order shift from
the child's use of an additive strategy to the adolescent's use of a proportions strategy to
solve Suarez and Rhonheimer's Pouring Water Task. Neurological principles involved
in this shift and in the psychological process of self-regulation are discussed, as are
educational implications. The conclusion is drawn that reasoning is hypotheticopredictive in form because that is the way the brain works.
Many adolescents fail when attempting to solve descriptive concept
construction tasks that include exemplars and non-exemplars of the concepts to be
constructed. Chapter 3 describes an experiment that tested the hypothesis that failure is
caused by lack of developmentally derived, hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill. To
test this developmental hypothesis, individually administered training sessions
presented a series of seven descriptive concept construction tasks to students (ages five
to fourteen years). The sessions introduced the hypothetico-predictive reasoning pattern
presumably needed to test task features. If the developmental hypothesis is correct, then
the brief training should not be successful because developmental deficiencies in
reasoning presumably cannot be remedied by brief training. Results revealed that none
of the five and six-year-olds, approximately half of the seven-year-olds, and virtually all
of the students eight years and older responded successfully to the brief training.
Therefore, the results contradicted the developmental hypothesis, at least for students
older than seven years. Previous research indicates that the brain's frontal lobes undergo
a pronounced growth spurt from about four to seven years of age. In fact, performance
of normal six-year-olds and adults with frontal lobe damage on tasks such as the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, a task similar to the present descriptive concept
construction tasks, has been found to be identical. Consequently, the present results
support the hypothesis that the striking improvement in task performance found at age
seven is linked to maturation of the frontal lobes. A neural network of the role the
frontal lobes play in task performance is presented. The advance in reasoning that
xi
presumably results from effective operation of the frontal lobes is seen as a fundamental
advance in intellectual development because it enables children to employ hypotheticopredictive reasoning to change their "minds" when confronted with contradictory
evidence regarding features of perceptible objects, a reasoning pattern necessary for
descriptive concept construction. Presumably, a further qualitative advance in
intellectual development occurs when some students derive an analogous, but more
advanced pattern of reasoning, and apply it to derive an effective problem-solving
strategy to solve the descriptive concept construction tasks when training is not
provided.
Chapter 4 describes an experiment testing the hypothesis that an early
adolescent brain growth plateau and spurt influences the development of higher-level
hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill and that the development of such reasoning skill
influences one's ability to construct theoretical concepts. In theory, frontal lobe
maturation during early adolescence allows for improvements in one's abilities to
coordinate task-relevant information and inhibit task-irrelevant information, which
along with both physical and social experience, influence the development of reasoning
skill and one's ability to reject misconceptions and accept scientific conceptions. A
sample of 210 students ages 13 to 16 years enrolled in four Korean secondary schools
were administered four measures of frontal lobe activity, a test of reasoning skill, and a
test of air-pressure concepts derived from kinetic-molecular theory. Fourteen lessons
designed to teach the theoretical concepts were then taught. The concepts test was readministered following instruction. As predicted, among the 13 and 14-year-olds,
performance on the frontal lobe measures remained similar, or decreased. Performance
then improved considerably among the 15 and 16-year-olds. Also as predicted, the
measures of frontal lobe activity correlated highly with reasoning skill. In turn,
prefrontal lobe function and reasoning skill predicted concept gains and posttest
concept performance. A principal components analysis found two main components,
which were interpreted as representing and inhibiting components. Theoretical concept
construction was interpreted as a process involving both the representation of taskrelevant information (i.e., constructing mental representations of new scientific
concepts) and the inhibition of task-irrelevant information (i.e., the rejection of
previously-acquired misconceptions).
Chapter 5 presents a model of creative and critical thinking in which people use
analogical reasoning to link planes of thought and generate new ideas that are then
tested by employing hypothetico-predictive reasoning. The chapter then extends the
basic neural modeling principles introduced in Chapter 2 to provide a neural level
explanation of why analogies play such a crucial role in science and why they greatly
increase the rate of learning and can, in fact, make classroom learning and retention
possible. In terms of memory, the key point is that lasting learning results when a match
occurs between sensory input from new objects, events, or situations and past memory
records of similar objects, events, or situations. When such a match occurs, an adaptive
resonance is set up in which the synaptic strengths of neurons increase), thus a record of
the new input is formed in longterm memory. Neuron systems called outstars and
instars presumably enable this to occur. Analogies greatly facilitate learning and
xii
retention because they activate outstars (i.e., the cells that are sampling the to-belearned pattern) and cause the neural activity to grow exponentially by forming
feedback loops. This increased activity boosts synaptic strengths, thus causes storage
and retention in long -term memory.
In Chapter 6, two hypotheses about theoretical concept construction, conceptual
change and application are tested. College biology students classified at different levels
of reasoning skill were first taught two theoretical concepts (molecular polarity and
bonding) to explain the mixing of dye with water, but not with oil, when all three were
shaken in a container. The students were then tested in a context in which they applied
the concepts in an attempt to explain the gradual spread of blue dye in standing water.
Next students were taught another theoretical concept (diffusion), with and without the
use of physical analogies. They were retested to see which students acquired the
concept of diffusion and which students changed from exclusive use of the polarity and
bonding concepts (i.e., misconceptions) to the scientifically more appropriate use of the
diffusion concept to explain the dye's gradual spread. As predicted, the
experimental/analogy group scored significantly higher than the control group on a
posttest question that required the definition of diffusion. Also as predicted, reasoning
skill level was significantly related to a change from the application of the polarity and
bonding concepts to the application of the diffusion concept to explain the dye's gradual
spread. Thus, the results support the hypotheses that physical analogies are helpful in
theoretical concept construction and that higher-order, hypothetico-predictive reasoning
skill facilitates conceptual change and successful concept application.
Chapter 7 describes research aimed at testing the hypothesis that two general
developmentally based levels of causal hypothesis-testing skill exist. The first
hypothesized level (i.e., Level 4, which corresponds generally to Piaget's formal
operational stage) presumably involves skill associated with testing causal hypotheses
involving observable causal agents, while the second level (i.e., Level 5, which
corresponds to a fifth, post-formal stage) presumably involves skill associated with
testing causal hypotheses involving unobservable entities. To test this fifth-stage
hypothesis, a hypothesis-testing skill test was developed and administered to a large
sample of college students both at the start and at the end of a biology course in which
several hypotheses at both causal levels were generated and tested. The predicted
positive relationship between causal hypothesis-testing skill and performance on a
transfer problem involving the test of a causal hypothesis involving unobservable
entities was found. The predicted positive relationship between causal hypothesistesting skill and course performance was also found.
Scientific concepts can be classified as descriptive (e.g., concepts such as
predator and organism with directly observable exemplars) or theoretical (e.g., concepts
such as atom and gene without directly observable exemplars). Understanding
descriptive and theoretical concepts has been linked to students' developmental stages,
presumably because the procedural knowledge structures (i.e., reasoning patterns) that
define developmental stages are needed for concept construction. Chapter 8 describes
research that extends prior theory and research by postulating the existence of an
xiii
intermediate class of concepts called hypothetical (e.g., concepts such as subduction

and evolution with exemplars that can not in practice be observed due to limits on the
normal observational time frame). To test the hypothesis that three kinds of scientific
concepts exist, we constructed and administered a test of the concepts introduced in a
college biology course. As predicted, descriptive concept questions were significantly
easier than hypothetical concept questions, than were theoretical concept questions.
Further, because concept construction presumably depends in part on reasoning skill,
students at differing reasoning skill levels (Levels 3, 4 and 5, where Level 5 is
conceptualized as 'post-formal' in which hypotheses involving unseen entities can be
tested) were predicted to vary in the extent to which they succeeded on the concepts
test. As predicted, a significant relationship (p < 0.001) was found between conceptual
knowledge and reasoning skill level. This result replicates previous research, therefore
provides additional support for the hypothesis that procedural knowledge skills
associated with intellectual development play an important role in declarative
knowledge acquisition, i.e., in concept construction. The result also supports the
hypothesis that intellectual development continues beyond the 'formal' stage during the
college years, at least for some students.
Chapter 9 considers the nature of scientific discovery. In 1610, Galileo Galilei
discovered Jupiter's moons with the aid of a new more powerful telescope of his
invention. Analysis of his report reveals that his discovery involved the use of at least
three cycles of hypothetico-predictive reasoning. Galileo first used hypotheticopredictive reasoning to generate and reject a fixed-star hypothesis. He then generated
and rejected an ad hoc astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis. Finally, he generated,
tested, and accepted a moon hypothesis. Galileo's reasoning is modeled in terms of
Piaget's self-regulation theory, Grossberg's theory of neurological activity, Levine &
Prueitt's neural network model and Kosslyn & Koenig's model of visual processing.
Given that hypothetico-predictive reasoning has played a role in other important
scientific discoveries, the question is asked whether it plays a role in all scientific
discoveries. In other words, is hypothetico-predictive reasoning the essence of the
scientific method? Possible alternative scientific methods, such as Baconian induction
and combinatorial analysis, are explored and rejected as viable alternatives. The "logic"
of scientific discovery and educational implications are discussed.
Instructional attempts to provoke preservice science teachers to reject nature-ofscience (NOS) misconceptions and construct more appropriate NOS conceptions have
been successful only for some. Chapter 10 describes a study that asked, why do some
preservice teachers make substantial NOS gains, while others do not? Support was
found for the hypothesis that making NOS gains as a consequence of instruction
requires prior development of Stage 5 reasoning skill, which some preservice teachers
lack. In theory, science is an enterprise in which scientists often use Stage 5 reasoning
to test alternative hypotheses regarding unobservable theoretical entities. Thus, anyone
lacking Stage 5 reasoning skill should be unable to assimilate this aspect of the nature
of science and should be unable to reject previously constructed NOS misconceptions
as a consequence of relatively brief instruction. As predicted, the study found the
predicted positive relationship between reasoning skill (Levels 3, 4 and 5) and NOS
xiv
gains as a consequence of instruction. Preservice teachers who lack Stage 5 reasoning

skill can be expected to find it difficult to teach science as a process of inquiry when
they become teachers.
Chapter 11 begins with a brief summary of the neurological principles and
research introduced in the previous chapters and with their key instructional
implications. The chapter then offers a resolution to the current debate between
constructivists and realists regarding the epistemological status of human knowledge.
As we have seen, knowledge acquisition follows a hypothetico-predictive form in
which self-generated ideas/representations are tested by comparing expected and
observed outcomes. Ideas may be retained or rejected, but cannot be proved or
disproved. Therefore, absolute Truth about any and all ideas, including the idea that the
external world exists, is unattainable. Yet learning at all levels above the sensory-motor
requires that one assume the independent existence of the external world because only
then can the behavior of the objects in that world be used to test subsequent higherorder ideas. In the final analysis, ideas - including scientific hypotheses and theories stand or fall, not due to social negotiation, but due to their ability to predict future
events. Although this knowledge construction process has limitations, its use
nevertheless results in increasingly useful mental representations about an assumed to
exist external world as evidenced by technological progress that is undeniably based on
sound scientific theory. An important instructional implication is that instruction should
become committed to helping students understand the crucial role that hypotheses,
predictions and evidence play in learning. Further, instruction that allows, indeed
demands, that students participate in this knowledge construction process enables them
to undergo self-regulation and develop both general procedural knowledge structures
(i.e., reasoning skills) and domain-specific concepts and conceptual systems. Examples
of effective instruction are provided.
As you will see, this book includes fairly detailed accounts of specific research
studies. The studies provide examples of how hypothetico-predictive research can be
conducted and reported in science and mathematics education. In my view, too few
such studies are designed and written in this hypothetico-predictive manner, and suffer
as a consequence. In fact, in my view the entire field suffers as a consequence. Thus, a
secondary goal of this book is to encourage other researchers to adopt the hypotheticopredictive approach to their research and writing.
xv
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank William Cobern, Series Editor, for asking me to write this
book, Michel Lokhorst, Publishing Editor of Kluwer Academic Publishers, for his
expert help in seeing the project to completion, Irene van den Reydt of Kluwer's Social
Sciences Unit for helping with the review process, Chula Eslamieh for her help in
preparing the final manuscript, and two anonomous reviewers for their many helpful
comments. Thanks also to Anne Rowsey, Laural Casler and Cameo Hill of the Arizona
State University Life Sciences Visualization Laboratory for their graphic illustration
work that appears in the book and to several colleagues who have contributed to the
ideas and research presented. These include John Alcock, Souheir Alkoury, William
Baker, Russell Benford, Margaret Burton, Brian Clark, Erin Cramer-Meldrum, Lisa
DiDonato, Roy Doyle, Kathleen Falconer, Bart James, Margaret Johnson, Lawrence
Kellerman, Yong-Ju Kwon, David Lawson, Christine McElrath, Birgit Musheno,
Ronald Rutowski, Jeffery Sequist, Jan Snyder, Michael Verdi, Warren Wollman and
Steven Woodward.
An additional thank you is due to the National Science Foundation (USA) under
grant No. DUE 0084434 and to the editors and publishers of the articles appearing
below as several of the chapters contain material based on those articles:
Lawson, A.E. & Wollman, W.T. (1976). Encouraging the transition from concrete to formal cognitive
functioning - an experiment. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 13(5), 413-430.
Lawson, A.E. (1982). Evolution, equilibration, and instruction. The American Biology Teacher, 44(7), 394405.
Lawson, A.E. (1986). A neurological model of problem solving and intellectual development. Journal of
Research in Science Teaching, 23(6), 503-522.
Lawson, A.E., McElrath, C.B., Burton, M.S., James, B.D., Doyle, R.P., Woodward, S.L., Kellerman, L. &
Snyder, J.D. (1991). Hypothetico-deductive reasoning and concept acquisition: Testing a constructivist
hypothesis. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 28(10), 953-970.
Lawson, A.E. (1993). Deductive reasoning, brain maturation, and science concept acquisition: Are they
linked? Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30(9), 1029-1052.
Lawson, D.I. & Lawson, A.E. (1993). Neural principles of memory and a neural theory of analogical insight.
Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30(10), 1327-1348.
Lawson, A.E., Baker, W.P., DiDonato, L., Verdi, M.P. & Johnson, M.A. (1993). The role of physical
analogues of molecular interactions and hypothetico-deductive reasoning in conceptual change.
Lawson, A.E. (1999). What should students learn about the nature of science and how should we teach it?
Journal of College Science Teaching, 28(6), 401-411.
Musheno, B.V., & Lawson, A.E. (1999). Effects of learning cycle and traditional text on comprehension of
science concepts by students at differing reasoning levels. Journal of Research in Science Teaching,
36(1), 23-37.
Kwon, Yong-Ju & Lawson, A.E. (2000). Linking brain growth with scientific reasoning ability and
conceptual change during adolescence. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37(1), 44-62.
xvi
Lawson, A.E. (2000). The generality of hypothetico-deductive reasoning: Making scientific thinking explicit.
The American Biology Teacher, 62(7), 482-495.
Lawson, A.E., Clark, B., Cramer-Meldrum, E., Falconer, K.A., Kwon, Y.J., & Sequist, J.M. (2000). The
development of reasoning skills in college biology: Do two levels of general hypothesis-testing skills
exist? Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37(1), 81-101.
Lawson, A.E., Alkhoury, S., Benford, R., Clark, B. & Falconer, K.A. (2000). What kinds of scientific
concepts exist? Concept construction and intellectual development in college biology. Journal of
Lawson, A.E. (2000). How do humans acquire knowledge? And what does that imply about the nature of
knowledge? Science & Education, 9(6), 577-598.
Lawson, A.E. (2001). Promoting creative and critical thinking in college biology. Bioscene: Journal of
College Biology Teaching, 27(1), 13-24.
Lawson, A.E. (2002). What does Galileo's discovery of Jupiter's moons tell us about the process of scientific
discovery? Science & Education, 11, 1-24.
Anton E. Lawson
Department of Biology
Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ, USA 85287-1501
September, 2002
anton.lawson@asu.edu
CHAPTER 1
HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?
1. INTRODUCTION
Years ago while teaching junior high school math and science, two events
occurred that made a lasting impression. The first occurred during an eighth grade
math class. We had just completed a chapter on equivalent fractions and the students
did extremely well on the chapter test. As I recall, the test average was close to 90%.
The next chapter introduced proportions. Due to the students' considerable success
on the previous chapter and due to the similarity of topics, I was dumbfounded when
on this chapter test, the test average dropped below 50%. What could have caused
such a huge drop in achievement? The second event occurred during a seventh grade
science class. I cannot recall the exact topic, but I will never forget the student. I was
asking the class a question about something that we had discussed only the day
before. When I called on a red-haired boy named Tim, he was initially at a loss for
words. So I rephrased the question and asked again. Again Tim was at a loss for
words. This surprised me because the question and its answer seemed, to me at least,
rather straightforward, and Tim was a bright student. So I pressed on. Again I
rephrased the question. Surely, I thought, Tim would respond correctly. Tim did
respond. But his response was not correct. So I gave him some additional hints and
tried again. But this time before he could answer, tears welled up in his eyes and he
started crying uncontrollably. I was shocked by his tears and needless to say, have
never again been so persistent in putting a student on the spot. However, in my
defence, I was so certain that I could get Tim to understand and respond correctly
that it did not dawn on me that I would fail. What could have gone wrong?
Perhaps you, like me, have often been amazed when alert and reasonably bright
students repeatedly do not understand what we tell them, in spite of having told them
over and over again, often using what we believe to the most articulate and clear
presentations possible, sometimes even with the best technological aids. If this sounds
familiar, then this book is for you. The central pedagogical questions raised are these:
Why does telling not work? Given that telling does not work, what does work? And
given that we can find something that does work, why, in both psychological and
neurological terms, does that something work? In short, the primary goal is to explicate
a theory of development, learning and scientific discovery with implications for
teaching mathematics and science. The theory will be grounded in what is currently
known about brain structure and function. In a sense, the intent is to help teachers better
CHAPTER
understand effective teaching methods as well as provide both psychological and

neurological level explanations for why those methods work.
We begin with a brief look at three alternative views of how people learn. This will
be followed by a discussion of initial implications for higher-order cognition and for
math and science instruction. Chapter 2 will introduce neural network theory with the
intent of explaining learning in neurological terms. Subsequent chapters will expand on
these and related ideas in the context of math and science instruction and in the context
of scientific discovery.
2. EMPIRICISM, INNATISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM
An early answer to the question of how people learn, known as empiricism, claims
that knowledge is derived directly from sensory experience. Although there are
alternative forms of empiricism espoused by philosophers such as Aristotle, Berkeley,
Hume and Locke of Great Britain, and by Ernst Mach and the logical positivists of
Austria, the critical point of the empiricist doctrine is that the ultimate source of
knowledge is the external world. Thus, the essence of learning is the internalization of
representations of the external world gained primarily through keen observation.
Innatism in its various forms stands in stark opposition to empiricism. Innatism's basic
claim is that knowledge comes from within. Plato, for example, argued for the existence
of innate ideas that "unfold" with the passage of time. For a more modern innatist view
see, for example, Chomsky and Foder (in Piattelli-Palerini, 1980). A third alternative,
sometimes referred to as constructivism, argues that learning involves a complex
interaction of the learner and the environment in which contradicted self-generated
behaviors play a key role (cf., Piaget, 1971a; Von Glasersfeld, 1995; Fosnot, 1996).1
What are we to make of these widely divergent positions? Consider the following
examples.
Van Senden (in Hebb, 1949) reported research with congenitally blind adolescents
who had gained sight following surgery. Initially these newly sighted adolescents could
not visually distinguish a key from a book when both lay on a table in front of them.
They were also unable to report seeing any difference between a square and a circle.
Only after considerable experience with the objects, including touching and holding
them, were they able to "see" the differences. In a related experiment, microelectrodes
were inserted into a cat's brain (Von Foerster, 1984). The cat was then placed in a cage
with a lever that dispensed food when pressed, but only when a tone of 1000 h2 was
produced. In other words, to obtain food the cat had to press the lever while the tone
was sounding. Initially the electrodes indicated no neural activity due to the tone.
However, the cat eventually learned to press the lever at the correct time. And from that
point on, the microelectrodes showed significant neural activity when the tone sounded.
1 A philosophical examination of alternative forms of constructivism can be found in Matthews (1998). Discussion of some of these
alternatives will be saved for Chapter 11. For now it suffices to say that the present account rejects extreme forms of constructivism that
in turn reject or downplay the importance of the external world in knowledge acquisition.
In other words, the cat was "deaf" to the tone until the tone was of some consequence to
the cat! In more general terms, it appears that a stimulus is not a stimulus unless some
prior "mental structure" exists that allows its assimilation.
What about the innatist position? Consider another experiment with cats. In this
experiment one group was reared in a normal environment. Not surprisingly, cells in the
cats' brains became electrically active when the cats were shown objects with vertical
lines. Another group was reared to the same age in an artificial environment that lacked
vertical lines. Amazingly, the corresponding cells of these cats showed no comparable
activity when they were shown identical objects. Thus, in this case at least, it would
seem that the mere passage of time is not sufficient for the cat's brain cells to become
"operational," i.e., for their mental structures to "unfold."
Next, consider a human infant learning to orient his bottle to suck milk. Jean Piaget
made several observations of his son Laurent from seven to nine months of age. Piaget
(1954, p. 31) reports as follows:
From 0:7 (0) until 0:9 (4) Laurent is subjected to a series of tests, either before the meal
or at any other time, to see if he can turn the bottle over and find the nipple when he
does not see it. The experiment yields absolutely constant results; if Laurent sees the
nipple he brings it to his mouth, but if he does not see it he makes no attempt to turn
the bottle over. The object, therefore, has no reverse side or, to put it differently, it is not
three-dimensional. Nevertheless Laurent expects to see the nipple appear and evidently
in this hope he assiduously sucks the wrong end of the bottle.
Laurent's initial behavior consists of lifting and sucking whether the nipple is
properly oriented or not. Apparently Laurent does not notice the difference between the
bottom of the bottle and the top and/or he does not know how to modify his behaviour
to account for presentation of the bottom. Thanks to his father, Laurent has a problem.
Let's return to Piaget's experiment to see how the problem was solved.
On the sixth day when the bottom ofthe bottle is given to Laurent".... he looks at it,
sucks it (hence tries to suck glass!), rejects it, examines it again, sucks it again, etc.,
four or five times in succession" (p.127). Piaget then holds the bottle out in front of
Laurent and allows him to simultaneously look at both ends. Laurent's glare oscillates
between the bottle top and bottom. Nevertheless, when the bottom is again presented,
he still tries to suck the wrong end. The bottom of the bottle is given to Laurent on the
11th, 17th, and 21st days of the experiment. Each time Laurent simply lifts and sucks
the wrong end. But on the 30th day, Laurent "...no longer tries to suck the glass as
before, but pushes the bottle away, crying" (p. 128). Interestingly, when the bottle is
moved a little farther away, "...he looks at both ends very attentively and stops crying"
(p. 128). Finally, two months and ten days after the start of the experiment when the
bottom of the bottle is presented, Laurent is successful in first flipping it over as he
"...immediately displaces the wrong end with a quick stroke of the hand, while looking
beforehand in the direction of the nipple. He therefore obviously knows that the
extremity he seeks is at the reverse end of the object" (pp. 163-164).
Lastly, consider a problem faced by my younger son when he was a 14-month old
child playing with the toy shown in Figure 1. Typically he would pick up the cylinder
CHAPTER 1
sitting at the top left and hunt for a hole to drop it in. At first, he was unable to locate
the correct hole even though it was directly below where he had just picked up the
cylinder. Even, if by chance, he happened to find the correct hole, he was unable to
orient the cylinder to make it fit. Nevertheless, with my help, he achieved some success.
When he placed the cylinder above the correct hole, I gently pushed the object so that it
would fit. Then, when he let go, the cylinder dropped out of sight. He was delighted.
Success! Next, he picked up the rectangular solid. Which hole do you think he tried to
drop it in? Should he drop it into the hole below the rectangular solid? He did not even
consider that hole even though (to us) it clearly is the correct choice. Instead, he tried
repeatedly to drop it into the round hole. Presumably this was because that behavior
(placing an object above the round hole and letting go) had previously led to success. In
other words, he responded to the new situation by using his previously successful
behavior. Of course when the rectangular object was placed over the round hole, it did
not fit. Hence, his previously successful behavior was no longer successful. Instead it
was "contradicted." Further, only after numerous contradictions was he willing to try
another hole. I tried showing him which holes the various objects would go into, but to
no avail. He had to try it himself - he had to act - to behave. In other words, the child
learned from his behaviours. Only after repeated incorrect behaviors and contradictions
did he find the correct holes.
The previous examples suggest that knowledge acquisition is not merely a matter of
direct recording of sensory impressions, nor is the mere passage of time sufficient for
innate structures to become functional. Rather, acquiring new knowledge appears to

involve a complex "construction" process in which initially undifferentiated sensory
impressions, properties of the developing organism's brain and the organism's
unsuccessful (i.e., contradicted) behaviors interact in a dynamic and changing
environment.
3.
AN EXPLORATION INTO KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION
To provide an additional insight into the knowledge construction process, take a

few minutes to try the task presented in Figure 2. You will need a mirror. Once you
have a mirror, place the figure down in front of it so that you can look into the mirror at
the reflected figure. Read and follow the figure's reflected directions. Look only in the
mirror - no fair peeking directly at your hand. When finished, read on.
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How did you do? If you are like most people, the task proved rather difficult and
frustrating. Of course, this should come as no surprise. After all, you have spent a
lifetime writing and drawing without a mirror. So what does this mirror-drawing task
reveal about learning?
I think it reveals the basic knowledge construction pattern depicted in Figure 3 and
described as follows: First, the reflected images are "assimilated" by specific mental
structures that are currently part of your long-term memory. Assimilation is an
immediate, automatic and subconscious process. The activated mental structure then
drives behavior that, in the past, has been linked to a specific consequence (i.e., an
actual outcome of that behavior when used in the prior contexts). Thus, when the
structure is used to drive behavior in the present context, the behavior is linked to those
prior consequences. In this sense, the behavior carries with it an expectation, a
prediction, i.e., what you expect/predict you will see as a consequence of the behavior.
All is well if the behavior is successful - that is if the actual outcome matches the
expected outcome. However, if unsuccessful, that is if the actual outcome does not
match the expectation/prediction (e.g., you move your hand down and to the right and
you expect to see a line drawn up and to the left, but instead you see one drawn up and
to the right), contradiction results. This contradiction then drives a subconscious search
for another mental structure and perhaps drives a closer inspection of the figure until
either another structure is found that works (in the sense that it drives successful, noncontradicted behavior), or you become so frustrated that you quit. In which case, your
mental structures will not undergo the necessary change/accommodation. In other
words, you won't learn to draw successfully in a mirror.
The above process can be contrasted with one in which the learner first looks at a
reflected image. But not being certain how to draw the image, s/he looks again and
again. With each additional look, the learner gathers more and more information about
the image until s/he is confident that s/he can draw it successfully. Finally, at this point,
the learner acts and successfully draws the reflected image. In contrast with the trialand-error process depicted in Figure 2, this view of learning can be characterized as
inductive. Which process best characterizes your efforts at mirror drawing?
Quite obviously, mirror drawing is a sensory-motor task that need not involve
language. Nevertheless, if we were try to verbalize the steps involved in one attempt to
draw a diagonal line, they may go something like this:
If...I have assimilated the present situation correctly, (initial idea)
and...I move my hand down and to the right, (behavior)
then...I should see a diagonal line go up and to the left. (expectation)
But...the actual line goes up and to the right! (actual outcome)
Therefore...I have not assimilated the situation correctly. I need to try something else.
(conclusion)
The important point is that the mind does not seem to work the way you might
think. In other words, the mind does not prompt you to look, look again, and look still
again until you somehow derive a successful behaviour from the environment in some
sort of inductivist manner. Rather, the mind seems to prompt you to look and as a
consequence of this initial look, the mind generates an initial idea that then drives
behavior. Hopefully the behavior is successful. But sometimes it is not. In other words,
you tried something and found it in error. So the contradicted behavior then prompts the
mind to generate another idea and so on until eventually the resulting behavior is not
contracted. In short, we learn from our mistakes - from what some would call trail and
error.
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4. IS THE IF/THEN/THEREFORE PATTERN ALSO AT WORK

IN PRACTICAL PROBLEM SOLVING?
Can we find this pattern of If/then/Therefore thinking in cases of everyday problem
solving? Consider a personal example that we might call the case of the unlit barbecue.
Before I arrived home one evening, my wife had lit the gas barbecue in the backyard
and put some meat on for dinner. Upon arriving, she asked me to check the meat. When
doing so, I noticed that the barbecue was no longer lit. It was windy so I suspected that
the wind had blown out the flames - as it had a few times before. So I tried to relight the
barbecue by striking a match and inserting its flame into a small "lighting" hole just
above one of the unlit burners. But the barbecue did not relight. I tried a second, and
then a third match. But it still did not relight. At this point, I suspected that the tank
might be out of gas. So I lifted the tank and sure enough it lifted easily - as though it
were empty. I then checked the lever-like gas gauge and it was pointed at empty. So it
seemed that the barbecue was no longer lit, not because the wind had blown out its
flames, but because its tank was out of gas.
What pattern of thinking was guiding this learning? Retrospectively, it would seem
that thinking was initiated by a causal question, i.e., why was the barbecue no longer
lit? In response to this question, my reconstructed thinking goes like this:
If...the wind had blown out the flames, (wind hypothesis)

and...a match is used to relight the barbecue, (test condition)
then...the barbecue should relight. (expected result)
But...when the first match was tried, the barbecue did not relight. (observed result)
Therefore...either the wind hypothesis is wrong or something is wrong with the test.
Perhaps the match flame went out before it could ignite the escaping gas. This seems
plausible as the wind had blown out several matches in the past. So retain the wind
hypothesis and try again. (conclusion)
Thus,
if...the wind had blown out the flames,
and...a second match is used to relight the barbecue,
then...the barbecue should relight.
But...when the second match was used, the barbecue still did not relight.
Therefore...once again, either the wind hypothesis is wrong or something is wrong with
the test. Although it appeared as though the inserted match flame reached the unlit
burner, perhaps it nevertheless did get blown out. So again retain the wind hypothesis
and repeat the experiment. But this time closely watch the match flame to see if it does
in fact reach its destination.
Thus,
if...the wind had blown out the flames,
and...a third match is used to relight the barbecue while closely watching the flame,
then...the flame should reach its destination and barbecue should relight.
But...when the third match was used while closely watching the flame, the flame
appeared to reach its destination, but the barbecue still did not relight.
Therefore...apparently there was nothing wrong with the test. Instead the wind
hypothesis is probably wrong and another hypothesis is needed.
Perhaps the tank was out of gas. Thus,
if...the tank is out of gas, (empty-tank hypothesis)
and...the tank is lifted,
then...it should feel light and should lift easily.
And...when the tank was lifted, it did feel light and did lift easily.
Therefore...the empty tank hypothesis is supported.
Further,
if...the tank is out of gas,
and...the gas gauge is checked,
then...it should be pointed at empty.
And...it was pointed at empty.
Therefore...the empty-tank hypothesis is supported once again.
5. THE ELEMENTS OF LEARNING
The introspective analysis suggests that learning (i.e., knowledge construction)

involves the generation and test of ideas and takes the form of several If/then/Therefore
arguments that can be called hypothetico-predictive (or hypothetico-deductive if you
prefer). However, notice that the attainment of evidence contradicting the initial wind
explanation (i.e., hypothesis) did not immediately lead to its rejection. This is because
the failure of an observed result to match an expected result can arise from one of two
sources - a faulty explanation or a faulty test. Consequently, before a plausible
explanation is rejected, one has to be reasonably sure that the test was not faulty.
In short, learning seems to involve the following elements:
1. Making an Initial Puzzling Observation - In this case, the puzzling observation
is that the barbecue is no longer lit. The observation is puzzling because it is
unexpected (i.e., I would not expect my wife to be trying to cook meat on an unlit
grill). Unexpected observations are cognitively motivating in the sense that they
require an explanation. Of course in this instance, motivation can also come from
one's hunger and/or a desire to keep one's wife happy.
2. Raising a Causal Question - Why is the barbecue no longer lit? In this case, the
causal follows more or less automatically from the puzzling observation.
However, in other instances, generating a clear statement of the causal question
may be much more difficult.
3. Generating a Possible Cause (an explanation) - In this case the initial
explanation (i.e., hypothesis) was that the barbecue was no longer lit because the
10
4.
5.
6.
7.
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wind had blown out its flames. The process of explanation/hypothesis generation
is seen as one involving analogies, analogical transfer, analogical reasoning i.e.,
borrowing ideas that have been found to "work" in one or more past related
contexts and using them as possible explanations/solutions/hypotheses in the
present context (cf., Biela, 1993; Bruner, 1962; Dreistadt, 1968; Finke, Ward &
Smith, 1992; Gentner, 1989; Hestenes, 1992; Hoffman, 1980; Hofstadter, 1981;
Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986; Johnson, 1987; Koestler, 1964;
Wong, 1993). Presumably the wind explanation was based on one or more
previous experiences in which the wind had blown out flames of one sort or
another including the barbecue's flames. Presumably the empty-tank explanation
was similarly generated. In other words, a similar experience was recalled (e.g., a
car's gas empty tank led to a failure of its engine to start) and used this as the
source of the empty-tank explanation used in the present context.
Supposing that the Explanation Under Consideration is Correct and Generating
a Prediction - This supposition is necessary so that the tentative explanation can
be tested and perhaps be found incorrect. A test requires imagining relevant
condition(s) that along with the explanation allows the generation of an
expected/predicted result (i.e., a prediction). This aspect of the learning process
is reminiscent ofAnderson's If/and/then production systems (e.g., Anderson,
1983). Importantly, the generation of a prediction (sometimes referred to as
deduction) is by no means always automatic. People often generate explanations
that they fail to test either because they do not want to or because they cannot
derive/deduce a testable prediction.
Conducting the Imagined Test - The imagined test must be conducted so that its
expected/predicted result can be compared with the observed result of the actual
test.
Comparing Expected and Observed Results - This comparison allows one to
draw a conclusion. A good match means that the tested explanation is supported,
but not proven. While a poor match means that something is wrong with the
explanation, the test, or with both. In the case of a good match, the explanation
has not been "proven" correct with certainty because one or more un-stated and
perhaps un-imagined alternative explanations may give rise to the same
prediction under this test condition (e.g., Hempel, 1966; Salmon, 1995).
Similarly, a poor match cannot "disprove" or falsify an explanation in any
ultimate sense. A poor match cannot be said to falsify with certainty because the
failure to achieve a good match may be the fault of the test condition(s) rather
than the fault of the explanation (e.g., Hempel, 1966; Salmon, 1995).
Recycling the Procedure - The procedure must be recycled until an explanation
is generated, which when tested, is supported on one or more occasions. In the
present example, the initial conclusion was that the test of the wind hypothesis
was faulty. Yet on repeated attempts and a closer inspection of the test, the wind
hypothesis was rejected, which allowed the generation, test, and support of the
empty-tank hypothesis.
11
In this case at least, learning required feedback from the external world (albeit
filtered through sense receptors). Thus, the fact that the barbecue would not relight, in
spite of repeated attempts, was the key sensory evidence that eventually led to rejection
of the wind hypothesis. And only after the wind hypothesis was rejected, was the
alternative empty-tank hypothesis generated and tested.
6. TWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

Cognitive science distinguishes two types of knowledge that can be constructed,
declarative and procedural, also referred to as figurative and operative (e.g., Piaget,
1970). The distinction is essentially between knowing that (e.g., I know that London is
the capital of the United Kingdom, and animals inhale oxygen and expel carbon
dioxide) and knowing how (e.g., I know how to ride a bicycle, to count, to conduct a
controlled experiment). According to Anderson (1980): "Declarative knowledge
comprises the facts that we know; procedural knowledge comprises the skills we know
how to perform" (p. 222). Declarative knowledge is explicit in the sense that we
generally know that we have it and when it was acquired. The word "learning" is often
used in conjunction with the acquisition/construction of declarative knowledge (e.g., I
just learned that Joe and Diane got married last Thursday) and its conscious
recollection depends on the functional integrity of the medial temporal lobe (Squire &
Zola-Morgan, 1991). On the other hand, procedural knowledge, which is expressed
through performance, is often implicit in the sense that we may not be conscious that
we have it or precisely when it was acquired. The word "development" is often used in
conjunction with the acquisition/construction of procedural knowledge (e.g., Ralph has
developed considerable golfing skill during the past few years; some students are better
at solving math problems than others). Importantly, storage and recollection of
procedural knowledge is independent of the medial temporal lobe, thus depends on
other brain systems such as the neostriatum (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991).
As we have seen, the acquisition/construction of declarative knowledge (e.g., the
cause of the unlit barbecue is a lack of gas) depends in part on one's ability to generate
and test ideas and reject those that lead to contradicted predictions. Thus, as one gains
skill in generating and testing ideas, declarative knowledge acquisition/construction
becomes easier. This view is consistent with Piaget's when he claimed that "learning is
subordinated to development" (Piaget, 1964, p. 184), a view supported by numerous
studies that have found that, following instruction, students who lack reasoning skill do
more poorly on measures of conceptual understanding than their more skilled peers
(e.g., Cavallo, 1996; Lawson et al., 2000; Shayer & Adey, 1993). But all of this is
getting us somewhat ahead of the story. Let's first discuss Piaget's brand of
constructivism in some detail before we consider what might be taking place inside the
brain in neurological terms.
12
CHAPTER 1
7. PIAGET'S CONSTRUCTIVISM
Bringuier: In fact, there's a single word for the whole of your work - a word I once
heard you use; it's "constructivism."
Piaget: Yes, that's exactly right. Knowledge is neither a copy of the object nor taking
consciousness of a priori forms predetermined in the subject; it's a perpetual
construction made by exchanges between the organism and the environment, from the
biological point of view, and between thought and its object, from the cognitive point of
view. (Bringuier, 1980, p. 110)
Because Piaget was one of the first and foremost investigators attempting to answer
epistemological questions by scientific means, his brand of constructivism with its selfregulation theory deserves special consideration. Piaget began his professional studies
as a biologist. So, not surprisingly, his psychological views were inspired by biological
theories, particularly those of embryology, development, and evolution. In fact, Piaget's
thinking was firmly grounded in the assumption that intelligence is itself a biological
adaptation. Thus, he believed that the same principles apply to biological evolution and
to intellectual development. As Piaget put it: "Intelligence is an adaptation to the
external environment just like every other biological adaptation" (Bringuier 1980, p.
114). In other words, Piaget's basic assumption is that intellectual development can be
understood in the same, or analogous, terms as the evolutionary acquisition of a hard
protective shell, strong leg muscles, or keen vision.
In Piaget's view there are at least two biological theories that should be considered
to explain the evolutionary development, hence, by analogy, there at least two
psychological theories that should be considered to explain intellectual development.
The biological theories are neo-Darwinism and genetic assimilation. Piaget (1952)
referred to the respective psychological theories as pragmatism and self-regulation
(sometimes equilibration).
Neo-Darwinism (neo because Darwin knew nothing ofthe mechanics of genetics or
mutations at the time he wrote Origin of Species) proposes that evolution occurs
through the natural selection of already-existing genetic variations initially produced by
spontaneous mutations. In other words, mutations in the genome cause changes in
observable characteristics that are then selectively evaluated by the environment
(Figure 4). Pragmatism, the psychological analogue to neo-Darwinism, claims that
random, non-directional changes in mental structures occur. A new mental structure
then drives a new behavior. The new behavior is either successful and retained or
unsuccessful and relinquished. Thus, new mental structures are internal in origin but the
environment plays an active role by selecting only the appropriate structures for
retention.
13
7.1 How Do Limnaea Snails Adapt to Changing Environments?

The validity of neo-Darwinism as an explanation for organic evolution is
undisputed among modern biologists, yet many readily acknowledge that natural
selection is by no means the final word. There are a number of instances of biological
14
CHAPTER 1
adaptation that cannot be explained solely terms of natural selection. Piaget himself
investigated the adaptation of a variety of aquatic snails to wave-pounded and calm
environments in which changes in shell shape cannot be explained solely in terms of
after-the-fact natural selection (Piaget, 1929a;1929b). We will consider these data in
some detail.
Snails of the genus Limnaea are found in almost all European lakes including those
in Switzerland where Piaget made his initial observations. The snails are famous for
their variability in shell shape. Those living in calm waters are elongated while those
living on wave-battered shorelines have a contracted, more globular, shape (Figure 5).
Piaget found that offspring of the elongated form, when reared in laboratory
conditions simulating the wave-battered shoreline, developed the contracted form. The
contracted form is due to a contraction of the columellar muscle that holds the snails
more firmly to the bottom whenever a wave threatens to dislodge them. As a
consequence of muscle contraction, the shell develops the contracted form as it grows.
Thus, in the lab the contracted shell form is a phenotypic change. However, when the
eggs of the contracted form were taken to the laboratory and reared in calm conditions,
the offspring retained the contacted phenotype through several generations. This means
that the phenotypic change has become genetically fixed. Therefore, we have an
15
excellent example of a characteristic that can be acquired in the course of a lifetime that
has become genetically fixed.
Can this phenomenon be explained by neo-Darwinian theory? Piaget argues that it
cannot because in the past when the elongated forms moved into wave-battered
environments there would have been no need for natural selection of the contracted
form to make it a genotypic trait (Piaget, 1952; 1975; 1978). In fact, natural selection
for snails having the contracted genotype would presumably be impossible because
there would have been nothing to select. In wave-battered environments, all of the
snails with either genotype would be contracted! How then could the contracted
phenotype have become incorporated into the genome?
7.2 Waddington's Theory of Genetic Assimilation

The generally accepted answer to this question among evolutionary biologists
draws heavily on the work of C. H. Waddington and his theory of genetic assimilation
(Waddington, 1966). Although Waddington's theory allows for the assimilation of genes
insuring the inheritance of initially acquired characteristics, it does so through natural
selection, but not of the relatively simple sort envisioned by Darwin. In this sense,
genetic assimilation represents a differentiation of neo-Darwinism rather than a
contradiction to it. Genetic assimilation involves the natural selection of individuals
with a tendency to develop certain beneficial characteristics. As such, genetic
assimilation is a widely accepted theory of gene modification that appears as matter of
course in modern textbooks of evolutionary biology. To understand genetic
assimilation, we first need to consider embryological development and Waddington's
concept of canalization.
Canalization. The fertilized egg is a single cell. As egg cell divides, the resulting
cells differentiate into a myriad of cell types such as skin, brain, and muscle cells. The
developing embryo has a remarkable ability to buffer itself against environmental
disturbances to insure that "correct" cell types are produced. This is evidenced even
before the first cell divides. For example, the egg cell contains definite regions of
cytoplasm. When an egg cell is centrifuged, the cytoplasmic regions are displaced. But
if the egg is then left alone, the regions gradually move back to their original locations.
This self-righting (self-regulating) tendency is also found in eggs cut in half. Identical
human twins are produced by one egg cell that divides such that each twin arises from
what one might expect to produce only half of an individual.
The term Waddington gave to the developing organism's ability to withstand
perturbations to the normal course of development was canalization. As Waddington
(1966) described it:
The region of an early egg that develops into a brain or a limb or any other organ
follows some particular pathway of change. What we have found now is that these
pathways are 'canalized,' in the sense that the developing system has a built in tendency
to stick to the path, and is quite difficult to divert from it by any influence, whether an
16
CHAPTER 1
external one like an abnormal temperature or an internal one like the presence of a few
abnormal genes. Even if the developing system is forcibly made abnormal - for
instance, by cutting part of it away - it still tends to return to the canalized pathway and
finish up as a normal adult. (p. 48)
Waddington pointed out that canalization is not complete. The developing system
will not always end up as a properly formed adult. Yet the important point is that it has
the tendency toward self-regulation, toward a final end product, even in the face of
considerable variance in the paths taken. Waddington likened canalization to a ball
rolling downhill with several radiating canals (Figure 6). As the ball rolls, internal
(genetic) or external (environmental) factors can deflect it into one or another canal
with the ball ending up at the bottom of only one canal. Waddington called the system
of radiating canals the epigenetic landscape. To describe the development of an entire
organism, a large number of epigenetic landscapes would be required - one for each
characteristic.
Suppose, for example, an epigenetic landscape were constructed to represent the

development of an individual's sex. The landscape would contain two canals, thus
would dictate one of two end points - male or female. Genetic factors operate to deflect
the ball into one canal. Thus, the normal adult ends up male or female (but not
somewhere in between) despite intrusions at intermediate points that cause the ball to
roll part way up the side of one canal. The environment might also cause the ball to be
deflected into the other canal. Presumably this occurs in the marine worm Bonellia
where the environment determines the individual's sex, but canalization usually insures
17
a male or female - not an intersex. Figure 7 shows the female and male Bonellia worms.
The larvae are free-swimming. If a larva settles down alone, it develops into a female.
If, however, it lands on the proboscis of a female, it develops into a dwarf male.
According to Waddington, organisms vary in their ability to respond to

environmental pressures due to differences in their epigenetic landscapes (e.g., the
degree of canalization, the heights of thresholds, the number of alternative canals).
Some individuals have well-canalized landscapes with few alternatives, hence are
relatively unresponsive to environmental pressures. Compare the two epigenetic
landscapes shown for the two first-generation individuals in Figures 8(A) and 8(B).
Both have well-canalized landscapes with two alternatives, yet the threshold in early
development of landscape H is higher than that in landscape L. Hence, an
18
CHAPTER 1
environmental pressure, depicted by the non-shaded arrow, will most likely fail to force
the ball over the high threshold in H to produce the developmental modification (WA).
On the other hand, in landscape L with its lower threshold, the same environmental
pressure is more likely to push the ball over the threshold into another canal, thus
produce the modification.
19
Because of such differences, individuals vary in their ability to respond to

environmental pressures. Some may acquire beneficial modifications, while others may
acquire non-beneficial modifications, and still others may not change. Of course,
individuals that acquire beneficial modifications have a better chance of survival and
will be more likely to leave offspring. On the other hand, the poor responders are likely
to die out. Hence landscape L with its ability to respond in a beneficial way is selected.
As shown, the population becomes one in which all members have landscape L. At this
point only the slightest genetic mutation (shaded arrow) will now push the ball over the
threshold into the new canal. Once this happens the organism will develop the welladapted phenotype WA with or without the environmental pressure. In a sense, the
selection for landscape L has put the developmental machine on hair trigger. Thus,
several gene mutations, which appear random in terms of molecular structure, are likely
to produce the well-adapted phenotype. Therefore, such mutations are not random in
their adaptive effect. Instead, they produce positive modifications in the genome. The
end result is that beneficial characteristics initially acquired in response to specific
environmental pressures become assimilated into the genome.
Although Waddington (1975) has stated that Piaget's studies of Limnaea represent
one of the most thorough and interesting examples of genetic assimilation in naturally
occurring populations, the biological literature is replete with additional natural and
experimental examples (e.g., Clausen, Keck, & Hiesey, 1948; Waddington, 1959;
Rendel, 1967; Futuyma, 1979).
8. PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-REGULATION2
Figure 9 explicates psychological self-regulation as a process analogous to genetic
assimilation. The analogue of the changing genotype during evolution is one's
developing mental structures. The epigenetic landscape (itself shaped by the genes)
corresponds to one's predisposition to acquire new behaviors determined by what
Piaget (1971a, p. 22) has called "assimilation schemata." The phenotype corresponds to
2 The following discussion of psychological self-regulation differs in subtle ways from Piaget's conception. Piaget's conception of
self-regulation is based upon his theory of biological phenocopy (see Piaget 1975, pp. 216-217; Piaget 1978. pp. 78-83; and
Bringuier 1980, p. 113). As far as I am aware, phenocopy theory has not received favor among biologists. Therefore, the
present discussion will be confined to self-regulation's relationship to genetic assimilation.
20
CHAPTER 1
overt behaviors. Thus, Figure 9(A) represents a situation in which the individual with
assimilation schemata H is unresponsive to pressures imposed by experience and does
not develop a new mental structure (WA). Interaction with the environment does not
produce "disequilibrium" or subsequent mental accommodation. The individual is not
"developmentally ready" because the assimilation schemata available are inadequate to
assimilate the new experience. Presumably the available assimilation schemata are built
up by the interplay between the individual's powers of coordination and the data of
experience.
21
Figure 9(B) on the other hand, represents an individual with assimilation schemata
L able to respond to environmental pressures and acquire a new behavior. However, the
newly acquired behavior has not yet been assimilated into a mental structure (i.e., the
mental structure remains PA). The new behavior and the person's previous ways of
thinking have not yet been integrated. The result is mental disequilibrium. With
removal of environmental pressure, the individual is apt to revert to previous
inappropriate behaviors just as the offspring of genetically elongated but phenotypically
contracted snails will develop into the elongated form if reared in a calm environment.
In the classroom students may be able to correctly solve a proportions problem if
the teacher is there to suggest the procedure or if the problem is similar enough to ones
previously solved. But if left on their own, use of the proportions strategy may never
occur to the students because they have failed to comprehend why it was successful in
the first place (i.e., it has never been integrated with previous thinking). Thus, Figure
9(B) represents a state of disequilibrium because a mismatch exists between the poorly
adapted mental structure and the only occasionally successful behavior.
Finally Figure 9(C) represents the restoration of equilibrium through a spontaneous,
internal, yet directional, reorganization of a mental structure allowing the complete
assimilation of the new behavior pattern into an accommodated mental structure. Thus,
psychological assimilation corresponds to the entire process of the incorporation of new
well-adapted behavior patterns (phenotypes) into one's mental structure (the genome)
by way of a spontaneous accommodation of mental structure (the mutation). Hence,
one does not have assimilation without accommodation. Piaget was fond of quoting the
child who, when asked about the number of checkers in two rows of unequal length,
responded correctly and reported, "Once you know, you know forever." Here is a child
with an accommodated mental structure who had completely assimilated the notion of
conservation of number.
9. INSTRUCTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The instructional importance self-regulation theory can be stated simply. If one
adopts the pragmatic approach to education, then one is forced to wait until
22
CHAPTER 1
spontaneous and non-directional reorganizations of mental structures occur before

learning can take place. The process is internal and not amenable to environmentalinstructional shaping. The teacher is relegated to the relatively unimportant position of
simply telling a student when his ideas are right or wrong and cannot shape the
direction of the student's thinking.
But if one adopts self-regulation theory, then the teacher is not placed in a position
of sitting idly by waiting for change to occur. Rather, the teacher knowledgeable of
developmental pathways can produce the environmental pressures that place students
into positions in which they can spontaneously reorganize their thinking along the path
toward more complex and better-adapted thought processes. The teacher can be an
instigator of disequilibrium and can provide pieces of the intellectual puzzle for the
students to put together. Of course the ultimate mental reorganization will have to be
accomplished by the students but the teacher is far from passive. He or she can set the
process on hair trigger just as the directional natural selection of Waddington sets the
genome on hair trigger.
The key point is that external knowledge (that presented by the teacher) can become
internalized if the teacher accepts the notion that self-regulation is the route to that
internalization. This means that students should 1) be prompted to engage their
previous ways of thinking about the situation to discover inadequacies, and 2) be given
ample opportunities to think through the situation to allow the appropriate mental
reorganization (accommodation), which in turn allows successful assimilation of the
new situation.
Let's consider how this might play out in the classroom. Many high school students
and even a significant fraction of college students employ an additive strategy to solve
the proportionality problem shown in Figure 10. As you can see, the problem involves
two plastic cylinders equal in height but unequal in diameter. The students note that
water from the wide cylinder at the fourth mark rises to the sixth mark when poured
into the narrow cylinder. When asked to predict how high water at the sixth mark in the
wide cylinder will rise when poured into the narrow cylinder, many students respond by
predicting mark 8, "Because it raised 2 marks last time so it will raise 2 marks again."
23
How can these additive students learn to use a proportions strategy? According to
self-regulation theory, they must first discover the error of their previous thinking. In
this case this they can simply pour the water into the narrow cylinder and discover that
the water rises to mark 9 - instead of mark 8 as predicted. Even without pouring, the
error can be discovered through a thought experiment. Suppose the water is poured
from mark 6 in the narrow cylinder into the empty wide cylinder. Students using the
additive strategy will predict a rise to mark 4 (i.e., 6 - 2 = 4). Suppose water is now
poured from mark 4 in the narrow cylinder into the empty wide cylinder. Using the
additive strategy students now predict a rise to mark 2 (i.e., 4 - 2 = 2). Finally, suppose
that water is poured from mark 2 in the narrow cylinder into the empty wide cylinder.
Use of the additive strategy leads one to predict a rise to mark 0 (i.e., 2 - 2 = 0). The
water disappears! Of course additive students see the absurdity of the situation and are
forced into mental disequilibrium. A more formal explication of the students' reasoning
may look something like this:
If...the difference in waters levels is always 2 marks, (initial strategy)
and...water at mark 2 in the narrow cylinder is poured into the wide cylinder,
then...it should rise to mark 0 (i.e., 2 - 2 = 0). In other words, the water should
disappear.
But...water cannot disappear merely by pouring it from one cylinder to another.
Therefore...the difference in water levels must not always be 2 marks.
At this point, the students are prepared for step 2, introduction of the "correct" way
to think through the problem. Keep in mind, however, that according to the analogy, the
students themselves must undergo a mental reorganization to appreciate your
suggestions and assimilate the new strategy. This will not happen immediately. Rather,
experience suggests that this requires considerable time and a repeated experience with
the same strategy in a number of novel contexts (cf., Lawson & Lawson, 1979;
Wollman & Lawson, 1978). The fact that the use of a variety of novel contexts is
helpful (perhaps even necessary) is an argument in favor of breaking down traditional
subject matter distinctions. For example, in a biology course one should not hesitate to
present problems that involve proportions in comparing prices at the supermarket,
altering recipes in cooking, comparing the rotations of coupled gears, balancing
weights on a balance beam, estimating the frog population size in a pond, comparing
the relative rates of diffusion of chemicals, and estimating gas mileage. If the range of
problems types were confined to traditional biology subject matter, many students
would fail to undergo the necessary mental reorganization and internalize the
proportions strategy, hence learning and transfer would be limited.
Although the previous example dealt with proportional reasoning (an aspect of
logico-mathematical knowledge), self-regulation theory also deals with causal
relationships. As Piaget (1975, p. 212) points out, "Now it is essential to note that this
tendency to replace exogenous knowledge by endogenous reconstructions is not
confined to the logico-mathematical realm but is found throughout the development of
24
CHAPTER 1
physical causality." Minstrell (1980) provides a lovely classroom example of using the
theory to help students acquire physical understanding. Minstrell was trying to teach his
high school physics students about the forces that keep a book "at rest" on a table.
Before simply telling the students that the book remains at rest due to the presence of
the equal and opposite forces of gravity (downward) and the table (upward), Minstrell
asked his students what forces they thought were acting on the book. Many of the
students believed that air pressing in from all sides kept the book from moving. Others
imagined a combination of gravity and air pressure pushing downward. A few students
also thought that wind or wind currents "probably from the side" could affect the book.
The most significant omission seemed to be the students' failure to anticipate the table's
upward force. Although some students did anticipate both downward and upward
forces, most believed that the downward force must total more than the upward force
"or the object would float away."
After the crucial first step of identifying the students' initial misconceptions,
Minstrell then took the class through a carefully planned sequence of demonstrations
and discussions designed to provoke disequilibrium and initial mental reorganization,
stopping along the way to poll the students for their current views. The key
demonstrations included piling one book after another on a student's outstretched arm
and hanging a book from a spring. The student's obvious expenditure of energy to keep
the books up led some to admit the upward force. When students lifted the book
already supported by the spring, the initial response was surprise at the ease at which it
could be raised. "Oh my gosh! There is definitely a force by the spring." Although
Minstrell admits that the series of demonstrations was not convincing to all, in the end
about 90% of his students voiced the belief that there must be an upward force to keep
the book at rest. Of course, instruction did not stop there. Nevertheless, the majority of
Minstrell's students were well on the way to the appropriate mental accommodation.
In short, the teacher who takes self-regulation theory to heart becomes a poser of
questions, a provider of hints, a provider of materials, a laboratory participant, a class
chairman and secretary. He/she gathers the class together and solicits data gathered and
their meaning. Most importantly, the teacher is not a teller. He/she is a facilitator and
director of learning. If materials are well chosen, good questions are posed, timely ideas
are suggested, and students are prompted to think through questions, alternatives
answers, and data, then much can be done to encourage the acquisition of more
adaptive mental structures.
In spite of the value of self-regulation theory for instruction, an important
theoretical weakness exists in its origins. As discussed, the theory is based on biological
analogies and on Piaget's belief that biological and intellectual development can be
understood on the same or at least on analogous terms. Although analogies can be
suggestive, they remain just that - suggestive. Further, no matter how suggestive
Piaget's analogy may seem, the fact of the matter is that to understand classroom
learning, intellectual development, and scientific discovery, we need to consider the
organ in which that learning, development, and discovery actually take place. In other
25
words, we need to consider what might be happening in the brain as knowledge is

constructed. Hence, understanding the neurological basis of self-regulation will be the
primary aim of Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 2
THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REGULATION
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 argued that learning and development are constructive processes involving
complex interactions within the maturing organism, its behaviors, and the environment.
Piaget's theory of self-regulation explains much of what goes on during knowledge
construction. However, as pointed out, Piaget's theory is based largely on evolutionary
and developmental analogies, rather than on neural anatomy and physiology. Thus, the
goal of the present chapter is to provide a more solid theoretical footing by exploring
brain structure and function and their relationship to self-regulation. A considerable
amount of progress has been made during the past 30 or so years in the related fields of
neural physiology and neural modeling that allows us to begin to connect psychological
phenomena with its neurological substrate. We begin with a discussion of how the brain
processes visual input.
2. HOW DOES THE BRAIN PROCESS VISUAL INPUT?

How the brain spontaneously processes visual input is the most thoroughly
researched and understood area of brain research. In general, that research aims to
develop and test neural network models that have become known as parallel distributed
processing or connectionist models. As reviewed by Kosslyn & Koenig (1995), the
ability to visually recognize objects requires participation of the six major brain areas
shown in Figure 1.
How do these six areas function to identify objects? First, sensory input from the
eyes produces a pattern of electrical activity in an area referred to as the visual buffer,
located in the occipital lobe at the back of the brain. This pattern of electrical activity
produces a spatially organized image within the visual buffer (e.g., Daniel &
Whitteridge, 1961; Tootell et al., 1982). Next, a smaller region within the occipital lobe,
called the attention window, performs detailed processing (Possner, 1988; Treisman &
Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Gormican, 1988). The activity pattern in the attention window
is then simultaneously sent along two pathways on each side of the brain, one that runs
down to the lower temporal lobe, and one that runs up to the parietal lobe. The lower
temporal lobe, or ventral subsystem, analyses object properties, such as shape, color and
texture, while the upper parietal lobe, or dorsal subsystem, analyses spatial properties,
such as size and location (e.g., Desimone & Ungerleider, 1989; Farah, 1990; Haxby et
27
28
CHAPTER 2
al., 1991; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). Patterns of
activity within the lower temporal lobe are matched to patterns stored in visual memory
(e.g., Desimone et al., 1984; Desimone & Ungerleider, 1989; Miyashita & Chang, 1988).
If a good match is found, the object is recognized. Otherwise, it is not. The dorsal
subsystem of the parietal lobes encodes input used to guide movements such as those of
the eyes or limbs. The neurons in that region fire just before movement, or register the
consequences of movements (e.g., Andersen, 1987).
Outputs from the ventral and dorsal subsystems come together in what Kosslyn and
Koenig call associative memory. Associative memory is located primarily in the
hippocampus, the limbic thalamus and the basal forebrain (Miskin, 1978; Miskin &
Appenzeller, 1987). The ventral and dorsal subsystem outputs are matched to patterns
stored in associative memory. If a good match between output from visual memory and
the pattern in associative memory is obtained, then the observer knows the object's name,
categories to which it belongs, sounds it makes and so on. But if a good match is not
obtained, the object remains unrecognized and additional sensory input must be
obtained.
Importantly, the search for additional sensory input is far from random. Rather,
stored patterns are used to make a second hypothesis about what is being observed, and
this hypothesis leads to new observations and to further encoding. In the words of
29
Kosslyn and Koenig, when additional input is sought, "One actively seeks new
information that will bear on the hypothesis... The first step in this process is to look up
relevant information in associative memory" (p. 57). Information search involves activity
in the prefrontal lobes in an area referred to as working memory. Activating working
memory causes an attention shift of the eyes to a location where an informative
component should be located. Once attention is shifted, the new visual input is processed
in turn. The new input is then matched to shape and spatial patterns stored in the ventral
and dorsal subsystems and kept active in working memory. Again in Kosslyn & Koenig's
words, "The matching shape and spatial properties may in fact correspond to the
hypothesized part. If so, enough information may have accumulated in associative
memory to identify the object. If not, this cycle is repeated until enough information has
been gathered to identify the object or to reject the first hypothesis, formulate a new one,
and test it" (p. 58).
For example, suppose Joe, who is extremely myopic, is rooting around the bathroom
and spots one end of an object that appears to be a shampoo tube. In other words, the nature
of the object and its location prompt the spontaneous generation of a shampoo-tube
hypothesis. Based on this initial hypothesis, as well as knowledge of shampoo tubes stored
in associative memory, when Joe looks at the other end of the object, he expects to find a
cap. Thus he shifts his gaze to the other end. And upon seeing the expected cap, he
concludes that the object is in fact a shampoo tube. Or suppose you observe what your brain
tells you is a puddle of water in the road ahead. Thanks to connections in associative
memory, you know that water is wet. Thus, when you continue driving, you expect that your
tires will splash through the puddle and get wet. But upon reaching the puddle, it disappears
and your tires stay dry. Therefore, your brain rejects the puddle hypothesis and generates
another one, perhaps a mirage hypothesis. The pattern of information processing involved
in these examples can be summarized as follows:
If... the object is a shampoo tube, (shampoo-tube hypothesis)
and... Joe looks at the other end of the object, (imagined test)
then... he should find a cap. (predicted result)
And... upon looking at the other end (actual test), he does find a cap. (observed result)
Therefore... the hypothesis is supported; the object is most likely a shampoo-tube.
(conclusion)
And for the second example:
If... the object is a puddle of water, (puddle hypothesis)
and... you continue driving toward it, (imagined test)
then... your tires should splash through the puddle and they should get wet. (predicted
result)
But... upon reaching the puddle (actual test), it disappears and your tires do not get wet.
(observed result)
30
CHAPTER
Therefore... the hypothesis is not supported; the object was probably not a puddle of
water. (conclusion)
In other words, as one seeks to identify objects, the brain generates and tests stored
patterns selected from memory. Kosslyn and Koenig even speak of these stored patterns
as hypotheses (although we should keep in mind that the term "hypothesis" is being used
here its broadest sense and not as it is generally used in the sciences - to refer to a
possible cause of some puzzling observation).
Thus, brain activity during visual processing utilizes an If/then/Therefore pattern that
can be characterized as hypothetico-predictive. One looks at part of an unknown object
and the brain spontaneously and immediately generates an idea of what it is - a
hypothesis. Thanks to links in associative memory, the hypothesis carries implied
consequences (i.e., expectations/predictions). Consequently, to test the validity of the
hypothesis, one can carry out a simple behavior to see if the prediction does in fact
follow. If it does, one has support for the hypothesis. If it does not, then the hypothesis is
not supported and the cycle repeats. Of course this is the same hypothetico-predictive
pattern that we saw previously in the mirror drawing.
3. IS AUDITORY INPUT PROCESSED IN THE SAME
HYPOTHETICO-PREDICTIVE WAY?
The visual system is only one of several of the brain's information processing
systems. Is information processed in a similar hypothetico-predictive manner in other
brain systems? Unfortunately, less is known about other systems, but the answer appears
to be yes. For example, with respect to understanding the meaning of individual spoken
words, Kosslyn & Koenig (1995) state: "Similar computational analyses can be
performed for visual object identification and spoken word identification, which will
lead us to infer analogous sets of processing subsystems." (p. 213)
After providing details of their hypothesized word identification subsystem, Kosslyn
& Koenig (1995) offer the following summary of what presumably happens when verbal
input is inadequate to provide an initial match with verbal representations in associative
memory:
...if the input is so degraded that there is no good match in the pattern activation subsystem,
or there are several potential matches, the best-matching word will be sent to associative
memory and treated as a hypothesis. The categorical look-up subsystem then accesses a
description of distinctive properties of the sound of the word, which is used to prime the
auditory pattern activation subsystem and to guide the auditory window to select additional
properties represented in the auditory buffer. These properties are then encoded into the
preprocessing subsystem and then the pattern activation subsystem, where they are included
in the match process; this information is integrated with that extracted from the whole word,
and serves to implicate a specific representation. This top-down search process is repeated
until a single representation is matched, just as in vision. (pp. 237-238)
31
For our purposes, the details of this hypothesized word recognition subsystem are not
important. Rather, what is important is that word recognition, like visual recognition,
presumably involves brain activity in which hypotheses arise spontaneously,
immediately, unconsciously and before any other activity. In other words, the brain does
not make several observations before it generates a hypothesis of what it thinks is out
there. The brain does not appear to operate in some sort of enumerative inductivist
manner in which several observations are needed prior to hypothesis generation. Instead,
while processing sensory information, the brain seems to function in a way that can be
characterized as hypothetico-predictive.
There is good reason in terms of human evolution why this would be so. If you were
a primitive person and you look into the brush and see stripes, it would certainly be
advantageous to get out of there quickly as the odds of being attacked by the tiger are
high. And anyone programmed to look, look again, and look still again before generating
the tiger hypothesis would most likely not survive long enough to pass on his plodding
inductivist genes to the next generation.
The next section will introduce key structures involved in neural signaling so that we
can begin to understand what takes place at the level of neurons and neural systems
during information processing and cognition.
4. KEY STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN NEURAL SIGNALING

Figure 2 is a side view of the human brain showing the spinal cord, brain stem, and
cerebral cortex. In general, the cortex is divided into a frontal portion containing neurons
that control motor output and a rear portion that receives sensory input.
32
CHAPTER 2
The thalamus is a relay center at the top of the brain stem that transfers signals from
the sense receptors to the sensory cortex. All sensory inputs, with the exception of smell,
pass through one of 29 thalamic regions on the way to the cortex. One of the most
important regions is the lateral geniculate nucleus, the relay station of the optic tract
from the retina to the visual cortex (see Figure 3).
At the center of the brain stem from just below the thalamus down to the medulla
(lowest segment of the brain stem) is the reticular formation. As we will see, the reticular
formation plays a key role in neural networks by serving as a source of nonspecific
arousal. Located in the inner surface of the deep cleft between the two brain hemispheres
lies the hypothalamus. The hypothalamus appears to be the source of specific drive
dipoles such as fear-relief and hunger-satisfaction, which also play a key role in the
neural networks that will be developed.
5. NEURON SIGNALS AND LAYERS

The basic unit of the functioning nervous system is the nerve cell or neuron.
Although there are many types of neurons, they all share characteristics exemplified by
pyramid cells found in the cerebral cortex (shown in Figure 4).
33
Pyramid cells consist of four basic parts, a cell body, and a set of dendrites, an axon
or axons, and a set of terminal knobs. The dendrites and the cell body receive electrical
signals from axons of other neurons. The axons, which may branch, conduct signals
away from the cell body. When stimulated by incoming signals, the terminal knobs open
small packets of chemical transmitter that, if released in sufficient quantity, cause the
signal to pass across the gap (synapse) to the next neuron.
A non-firing neuron has a slightly negative potential across its cell membrane
(approximately -70mV), which is termed its resting potential. Incoming signals, which
can be either excitatory or inhibitory, modify the resting potential in an additive fashion
and induce what is referred to as the cell's generating potential. When the generating
potential exceeds a certain threshold, a spike or action potential is generated in the cell
body and travels down the axons. The action potential travels at a constant velocity with
amplitude of up to about 50 Mv. Signals are emitted in bursts of varying frequency
depending upon the amount of neuron depolarization. Presumably all of the information
in the signal depends on burst frequency.
Importantly, neurons are arranged in layers. Consider, for example, the neuron layers
in the visual system. An initial layer of photoreceptors in the retina receives light.
Excitation of retinal cells fires signals along the optic nerve to a layer of neurons located
in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN). Cells of the LGN then process the signals and
relay them to a third layer of cells in the visual cortex at the back of the brain. From the
visual cortex, signals are transmitted back to the LGN and to additional neuron layers for
further processing. The signals that are sent back to the LGN play a significant role by
allowing the system to compare incoming signals with expectations acquired from prior
34
CHAPTER 2
learning. More will be said about this crucial comparison later (also see Grossberg, 1982
especially pp. 8-15 as well as several of Grossberg's and his colleagues' more recent
publications available at http://cns-web.bu.edu). An excellent discussion of the neural
anatomy relevant to learning and memory can also be found in Miskin & Appenzeller
(1987).
6. NETWORK MODELING PRINCIPLES

Table 1 (after Grossberg, 1982) lists crucial components and variables of neurons
and layers of neurons as well as their physiological and psychological interpretation
within neural network theory.
Consider the
neuron in a collection of interacting neurons. The average
generating potential of the
neuron at node
is signified by
the stimulus or
short-term memory (STM) trace. This activity can be sustained by a feedback loop.
Thus STM is the property of any neuron where activity is sustained for a specific
period of time. STM is not a single undetermined location in the brain into which a
limited amount of information can be input and stored temporarily as has been a
common hypothesis in cognitive psychology.
35
represents the signal that propagates along the axon

from node
to synapse
knob
The signal is a function of the activity
at node
The final extremely
important neural variable is the synaptic strength,
of knob
is the average rate
of transmitter release at the synapse. In other words,
represents the ease with which
signals traveling down can cause
to fire. If the signals cause the knob to release a
lot of transmitter (a large value for
then signals are sent across the synapse and the
next cell in line
fires. If the signals do not cause the knob to release much transmitter
(a small value for
then signals will not cause
to fire. Increases in
represent
modification of knobs that allow transmission of signals among neurons. Thus
becomes the location of long-term changes in systems of neurons i.e., the long-term
memory (LTM) of the system. In other words, learning can be understood as a
biochemical modification of synaptic strengths. Consequently, as was the case for STM,
neural network theory makes LTM a property of neuron connections rather than a single
location in the brain.
6.1 Equations of Neural Activity and Learning

Grossberg (1982) has proposed equations describing the basic interaction of the
variables mentioned above. Of particular significance are equations describing changes
in
and in
i.e., changes in short term memory (activity) and changes in long term
memory (learning). In general, these equations, for a network with n nodes, are of the
form:
Where the overdot represents a time derivative and i, j,= 1, 2,....n.

The equations identify factors that drive a change in activity of
and a
change in rate of transmitter release at knob
Equation (1) is referred to as
the activity equation of because it identifies factors that cause changes in STM, while
equation (2) is referred to as the learning equation because it identifies factors that cause
changes in LTM.
First consider equation (1), the activity equation. As mentioned,
represents the
initial level of activity of nodes
represents a passive decay constant inherent in any
dissipative system. The sign is negative indicating a drop in activity of across time due
to the product of and
In other words, if receives no additional input or feedback
from itself, activity stops.
represents inputs
to the nodes from prior cells in
the system mediated by their respective synaptic strengths
The positive sign
36
CHAPTER
indicates that these signals increase the activity of cells

Inputs are additive, hence
their summation is called for.
represents inhibitory node-node interactions of the
network, hence the negative sign. Recall that inputs to neurons can be excitatory or
inhibitory. Lastly,
represents inputs to
from sources outside the network (i.e.,
neurons other than those in layer
Equation (2), the learning equation, identifies factors that modify the synaptic strengths
of knobs
represents the initial synaptic strength.
is a decay constant thus
is a
forgetting or decay term.
is the learning term as it drives increases in
is the
signal that has passed from node to knob
The prime reflects the fact that the initial
signal,
may be slightly altered as it passes down
represents the activity level of
post-synaptic nodes that exceeds the firing threshold. Only activity above threshold can
cause changes in
In short, the learning term indicates that for information to be stored in
LTM, two events must occur simultaneously. First, signals must be received at
Second,
nodes
must receive inputs from other sources that cause the nodes to fire. When these
two events drive activity at above a specified constant of decay, the
increase, i.e., the
network learns.
7. HOW DOES EXPERIENCE STRENGTHEN CONNECTIONS?

Learning occurs when synaptic strengths
increase, that is, when transmitter release
rate increases make signal transmission from one neuron to the next easier. Hence learning
is, in effect, an increase in the number of "operative" connections among neurons. Thus, in
order to have a "mental structure" become more complex, transmitter release rates must
increase at a number of knobs so that the signals can be easily transmitted across synapses
that were previously there, but inoperative. This view reveals a sense in which innatism is
correct. If one equates mental structures with already present but inoperative synapses, then
mental structures are present prior to any specific experience. But the view also reveals why
experience is necessary to "strengthen" some of the connections to make them operative.
How does experience strengthen connections? Consider Pavlov's classical conditioning
experiment in which a dog is stimulated to salivate by the sound of a bell. As you may
recall, when Pavlov first rang the bell, the dog, as expected, did not salivate. However,
upon repeated simultaneous presentation of food, which did initially cause salivation, and
bell ringing, the ringing alone eventually caused salivation. In Pavlovian terms, the food is
the unconditioned stimulus (US). Salivation upon presentation of the food is the
unconditioned response (UCR). And the bell is the conditioned stimulus (CS). In general
terms, Pavlov's experiment showed that when a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a bell) is
repeatedly paired with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food), the conditioned stimulus
alone will eventually evoke the unconditioned response (e.g., salivation). How can the
unconditioned stimulus do this?
Figure 5 shows a simple neural network capable of explaining classical conditioning.
Although the network is depicted as just three cells A, B, and C, each cell represents many
neurons of the type A, B and C. Initial food presentation causes cell C to fire. This creates a
37
signal down its axon that, because of prior learning (i.e., a relatively large
causes the
signal to be transmitted to cell B. Thus cell B fires and the dog salivates. At the outset, bellringing causes cell A to fire and send signals toward cell B. However, when the signal
reaches knob
its synaptic strength
is not large enough to cause B to fire. So the
dog does not salivate. However, when the bell and the food are paired, cell A learns to fire
cell B according the learning equation. Cell A firing results in a large
and the
appearance of food results in a large
Thus the product
is sufficiently
large to drive an increase in
to the point at which it alone causes node
to fire and
evoke salivation. Food is no longer needed. The dog has learned to salivate at the ringing of
a bell. The key theoretical point is that learning is driven by simultaneous activity of preand post synaptic neurons, in this case activity of cells A and B.
8. A NEURAL EXPLANATION OF LAURENT'S LEARNING
8.1 The Basic Pattern

Can network principles also explain human learning? For example, can they explain
how Laurent learned to flip his bottle to suck milk? Modeling such simple learning will
provide a framework to understand neural events that may be involved in more advanced
learning.
As you recall from Chapter 1, Laurent's initial behavior consisted of lifting and
sucking whether the bottle's nipple was oriented properly or not. Apparently Laurent did
not notice the difference between the bottle's top and bottom. Nor did he know how to
modify his behavior when the bottom was presented. In order to construct a neural model
of Laurent's learning, we need to be clear on just what new behavior Laurent must
acquire. At the outset Laurent knew how to flip the bottle to orient it properly for sucking
provided the nipple was visible. He also knew how to bring the bottle to his mouth and
CHAPTER 2
38
to suck. What he lacked was the ability to flip the bottle prior to lifting and sucking
when only the bottom was visible. How was this behavior acquired?
Laurent's behavior, although relatively simple, follows a basic pattern. That pattern
consists of:
1. initially successful behavior driven in part by a response to an external stimulus and
in part by an internal drive, in this case hunger;
2. contradiction of the behavior when misapplied beyond the situation in which it was
acquired; contradiction consists of a mismatch between what the behavior leads one
to expect and what actually happens; in this case Laurent sucked glass when he
expected to suck milk; Of course Laurent behavior is sensory motor, not verbal, in
nature. Nevertheless, we can verbally characterize his behavior to this point in the
following way:
If...what I see is my bottle, (initial idea)
and...I lift and suck, (behavior)
then...I should suck milk. (expectation)
But...I do not suck milk. Instead I am sucking glass! (what actually happens)
Therefore...something is wrong, either with my initial idea or with my behavior. I
cannot tell which. So I am frustrated (conclusion)
3. as shown above, the contradiction between expectation and what actually happens
leads to frustration (reminiscent of Piaget's concept of disequilibrium) and, in neural
modeling terms, leads to an eventual shutting down of the internal drive and to
stopping the behavior;
4. nonspecific arousal now causes the one to attend more closely to the external
stimulus that initially provoked the behavior;
5. attention, once aroused, allows one to notice previously ignored cues and/or
relationships among the cues, which in turn allows one to couple those cues with
modified behavior and to deal successfully with the new situation; in this case a new
procedure and a better differentiated bottle resulted.
8.2 The Neural Network

Figure 6 depicts a neural network (after Grossberg, 1982, Chapter 6) that might drive
this learning. In general,
represents the
conditioned stimulus among possible
stimuli that excites cell population
in the sensory cortex. Input to
has already
passed through prior layers of neurons, specifically the retina and the lateral geniculate
nucleus, as in this specific case
represents the undifferentiated pattern of visual
inputs from Laurent's bottle (i.e., either the top or the bottom). In response to
sends signals to another layer of neurons in the motor cortex,
(Brodmann area 4,
Albus, 1981, pp. 89-90) as well as to all populations of arousal cells for specific drives
(probably located in the hypothalamus, Grossman, 1967). Because in this case hunger is
the drive of interest,
will be generally limited to arousal of the cell populations that
increase the hunger drive,
and those that decrease the hunger drive,
(see
39
Grossberg, pp. 259-262 for a discussion of the pairing of cue with appropriate drives).
Populations
and
then send signals to
Finally, and only when excited by
signals from
and by excitatory signals from
fires and sends signals to M (the
motor cells controlling the behavioral response). The motor cells then release the
conditioned response, the lifting and sucking of the bottle.
Notice that these events cause the synaptic weights at the

layer and at the
layer to increase because pre- and postsynaptic activity occurs at both layers, thus
conditioning the behavior of lifting and sucking to the appearance of the bottle when the
child is hungry. Therefore, this network can explain the initiation of Laurent's behavior.
How can it explain the behavior's termination upon satisfaction of the hunger drive?
8.3 Stopping Feeding Due to Satisfaction

Intake of food gradually reduces the activity of
cells, which in turn causes a
"rebound" or activation of
cells, which in turn inhibits activity at
thereby
stopping the motor response. But how does the satisfaction of hunger at
generate a
rebound of activity at
The simplest version of the neural rebound mechanism,
referred to as a dipole, is shown in Figure 7.
40
CHAPTER 2
An internally generated and persistent input, I, stimulates both the

and the
channels. This input will drive the rebound at
when the hunger-derived input H is
shut off. When Laurent is hungry, the sum of inputs I + H create a signal along
(i.e.,
from
to
A smaller signal is also set along
by I alone. At the synaptic knobs
(the knob connecting
to
and
(the knob connecting
to
transmitter is
produced at a fixed rate but is used more rapidly at
than at
Signals emitted by
exceed those emitted by
Because these signals compete subtractively at
and
only the output from
is positive, hence it produces a positive incentive motivation that
drives feeding behavior.
When hunger is reduced and the hunger drive stops, the network exhibits a rebound
due to the relative depletion of transmitter at
This occurs because input I to both
and
is the same but signals leaving
are now stronger than those leaving
(due
to varying levels of transmitter). Thus, the subtractive effect causes a firing of
that,
due to its inhibitory effect on
stops feeding behavior.
41
8.4 Stopping Feeding Behavior Due to Frustration

A mechanism to stop feeding while the hunger drive persists is also needed. Again
the dipole is involved. A nonspecific orienting arousal source (OA) is also required (see
Figure 7). In general, unexpected feedback to the sense receptors causes a decrease in
input to
to
and to
to the point at which activity at
falls below threshold
and the motor behavior stops. A decrease in activity at
also causes a decrease in
inhibitory output to the nonspecific orienting arousal cells, OA (probably located in the
reticular formation). With inhibition shut down, the orienting arousal cells fire and
provoke a motor response of cue search. Simply put, unexpected events are arousing.
Once the maladaptive behavior is extinguished, attention can be focused on the situation
and the problem solver, Laurent in this case, is free to attend to previously ignored cues.
Recall Laurent's behavior on the 30th day of Piaget's experiment. Laurent "....no longer
tries to suck the glass as before, but pushes the bottle away, crying." (p. 128). Further,
when the bottle is moved a little farther away,".... he looks at both ends very attentively
and stops crying." (p. 128). A key question then is this: How do unexpected events cause
a decrease in input to
8.5 Matching Input with Expectations: Adaptive Resonance

A detailed answer to the previous question lies beyond the scope of the present chapter.
In general, however, it can be shown that the suppression of specific input and the
activation of nonspecific arousal depend on the layer-like configuration of neurons and
feedback expectancies.
Consider a pattern of sensory representations to the visual system (i.e. the retina). The
retina consists of a layer of retinal cells,
each with activity,
at every time t due to inputs
from an external source. At every time t, the input
drives an activity pattern
across the layer. From the retina, the
activity pattern is sent to the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) where it excites another layer
of cells
and also sends inhibitory signals to the nonspecific arousal source
(see Figure 8). Thus, nonspecific arousal is initially turned off by the input.
Following Grossberg, the field of excitation in the LGN is be referred to as
Now
suppose that, due to prior experience, the activity pattern,
at
causes another
pattern
at
to fire.
may be the next pattern to follow
in a sequence of events
previously recorded and
is another layer of cells, which, in this case, is in the visual
cortex.
constitutes an expectation of what will occur when
excites cells in the
LGN. Suppose further that the pattern
at
is now fed back to the LGN to be
compared with the retinal input following
This would allow the two patterns to be
compared. The present is, in effect, compared with the future (i.e., the expectation). If
the two patterns match, then you see what you expect to see. This allows an
uninterrupted processing of input and a continued quenching of nonspecific arousal.
Grossberg refers to the match of input with expectations as adaptive resonance.
42
CHAPTER
Following Grossberg, the field of excitation in the LGN is be referred to as

Now
suppose that, due to prior experience, the activity pattern,
at
causes another
pattern
at
to fire. may be the next pattern to follow
in a sequence of events
previously recorded and
is another layer of cells, which, in this case, is in the visual
cortex.
constitutes an expectation of what will occur when
excites cells in the
LGN. Suppose further that the pattern
at
is now fed back to the LGN to be
compared with the retinal input following
This would allow the two patterns to be
compared. The present is, in effect, compared with the future (i.e., the expectation). If
the two patterns match, then you see what you expect to see. This allows an
uninterrupted processing of input and a continued quenching of nonspecific arousal.
Grossberg refers to the match of input with expectations as adaptive resonance.
But suppose the new input to
does not match the expected pattern
from
Mismatch occurs and this causes activity at
to be turned off, which in turn shuts off
the inhibitory output to the nonspecific arousal source. This turns on nonspecific arousal
and initiates an internal search for a new pattern at
that will match
If no match is
found, new cells will be used to record the new neural sensory input to which the subject
is now attending.
43
8.6 Why Are So Many Contradictions Necessary?

The previous discussion can explain the shutting down of contradicted behavior even
in the presence of a continued hunger drive. But why did it take so many contradictions
to shut down that behavior? The answer probably lies in the fact that, on many trials,
Laurent's behavior was in fact not contradicted. The behavior was successful prior to the
start of Piaget's experiment. Further, it was successful on many trials during the
experiment when Laurent was allowed to feed in his normal way. Thus, on these trials
the synaptic strengths of
and
increased when fired by
(the top of the bottle).
On the other hand, when the behavior was contradicted, the sensory representation of the
bottle's bottom
active at
during the
rebound was conditioned to
So the
to
(either directly to
or via
was smaller than when
net feedback from
behavior was always successful. As Piaget's experiment continued, the
projections to
became stronger until they finally, on the 30th day, dominated the
projections and Laurent stopped lifting and sucking when the bottom was presented. At
last, his incorrect behavior was extinguished and he is free to build new connections.
Laurent must now learn to flip the bottle when the bottom is visible. The bottom is
the important cue to be linked with flipping. According to the theory, to provoke this
learning the neural activity in the cells responsible for the recognizing the bottom of the
bottle must be sustained in STM while the motor act of flipping occurs. Nonspecific
arousal serves as the source drive to provoke a variety of behaviors (e.g., turning and
flipping the bottle), thus when Laurent hits on the act of flipping while he is either
paying attention to the relevant visual cues or while they are still active in STM, the
required learning can take place.
Again consider Figure 7. In this case
represents the excitation pattern in the
sensory cortex provoked by looking at the bottle's bottom. If this pattern remains active
in STM while flipping the bottle (see Grossberg, pp. 247-250 for mechanisms), the
synaptic strengths of the pattern playing at the nonspecific orienting arousal center
(firing due to nonspecific arousal) are strengthened. The sensory pattern from
plus
the nonspecific arousal provides pre and postsynaptic activity that drives increases in the
This in turn fires the
pathway. Thus
the cells responsible for bottle
flipping, receive inputs from
(the bottom of the bottle) and from the orienting arousal
source that both drive increases in synaptic strengths. In other words, the network allows
the child to link, or condition, the sight of the bottle's bottom with the behavioral
response of flipping. Of course, flipping when the bottom is seen is the behavior to be
acquired. Further, when the behavior is performed, it results in the sight of the nipple,
which of course had been conditioned to the act of lifting and sucking. Thus, bottle
flipping becomes linked to lifting and sucking. With each repetition of the above
sequence, the appropriate synaptic strengths increase until the act takes place with
considerable ease.
Thus, Laurent solves his problem and the network has become more complex by
strengthening specific synaptic connections. As with Pavlov's dog, complexity of the
neural networks (mental structures) increases. Importantly this increase has not been due
44
CHAPTER
to the unfolding of some innate ideas, unless one considers prewired synaptic
connections as innate ideas.
9. CAN NEURAL NETWORKS EXPLAIN
HIGHER LEVELS OF LEARNING?
The percentage of students who successfully use advanced reasoning strategies
increase gradually with age (cf., Lawson, Karplus & Adi, 1978). These advances can not
be attributed solely to direct teaching because either the increases come well after direct
teaching has been attempted (e.g., proportional reasoning), or they come without any
direct teaching at all, as is the case of correlational reasoning (e.g., Lawson & Bealer,
1984). For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict our discussion to proportional reasoning
problems because they seem to evoke the most consistent and smallest class of student
responses. Let's further restrict the discussion to just one problem of proportional
reasoning, the Suarez & Rhonheimer (1974) Pouring Water Task introduced in Chapter
1.
The Pouring Water Task, as adapted by Lawson, Karplus & Adi (1978), requires
students to predict how high water will rise when poured from one cylinder to another.
As you may recall, students are first shown that water at mark 4 in a wide cylinder rises
to mark 6 when poured into a narrow cylinder. They are then asked to predict how high
water at mark 6 in the wide cylinder will rise when poured into the empty narrow
cylinder. Responses vary but typically fall into one of four categories:
1. additive strategy, e.g., water rose from 4 to 6 (4+2=6); therefore, it will rise
from 6 to 8 (6+2=8);
2. qualitative guess, e.g., the water will rise to about 10;
3. additive proportions strategy, e.g., the water will rise to 9 because the ratio is
2 to 3 and 2+2+2=6 in narrow and 3+3+3=9 in the wide;
4. proportions strategy, e.g., 2/3 = 4/6 = 6/x, x = 9.
Again, for simplicity, the discussion will be limited to just two strategies, the additive
strategy and the proportions strategy as they reflect the most naive and sophisticated
strategies respectively.
Given the typical naive response of the child to the task is 8, by use of the additive
strategy, and the typical sophisticated response of the adolescent is 9, by use of the
proportions strategy, the central question becomes: How does the shift from use of the
additive strategy to use of the proportions strategy during adolescence come about? The
present hypothesis is that it comes about in basically the same way that Laurent learned
to flip his bottle.
The child responding to the task with the additive strategy is like Laurent responding to
the bottle's bottom by lifting and sucking. To the naive problem solver, the Pouring Water
Task presents problem cues, just as the bottle presented cues to Laurent. The difficulty is
45
that these cues set off the wrong response - the additive response. In other words, by
analogy with the neural network involved in Laurent's shift in behavior, we assume that the
problem cues
plus some internal drive to solve the task, combine to evoke the UCR,
the additive response controlled by some
in the motor cortex.
For children, say below age 10-11 years, responding to quantitative problems by use
of addition and/or subtraction is indeed a common strategy and, in many instances, leads
to success. Many children know how to multiply and divide and many can solve
textbook proportions problems. Yet use of the proportions strategy (which, of course,
utilizes multiplication and/or division) seldom occurs to them just as it did not occur to
Laurent to flip his bottle before lifting and sucking (at least during the first 29 days).
Laurent's initial behavior had been successful in the past and he had no reason to believe
it would not continue to be successful. Indeed many children who use the additive
strategy are quite certain that they have solved the problem correctly.
How then do additive reasoners come to recognize the limitations of their thinking?
And once they do, how do they learn to deploy the correct proportions strategy? The
steps in that process are seen as follows:
1. indiscriminate use of the additive strategy to solve additive and multiplicative
problems;
2. contradictory and unexpected (i.e. negative) feedback following use of the additive
strategy when used to solve multiplicative problems;
3. contradiction eventually leads to termination of use of the additive strategy in a
knee-jerk fashion;
4. initiation of nonspecific orienting arousal provoking an external search for problem
cues and an internal search through memory for successful strategies that can be
linked to those cues;
5. selection of cues and the discovery of a new strategy that is successful in that it
receives positive feedback when used; and
6. the acquisition of an internal strategy monitoring system to check for consistency or
contradiction. The system presumably facilitates the matching of problem cues with
appropriate strategies in future situations. Let us consider each step in turn.
9.1 Starting and Stopping Problem-Solving Behavior

A hypothesized minimal neural network (analogous to that previously derived to
account for Laurent's behavior) that may account for some of the characteristics of the
problem solving behavior in question is shown in Figure 9. Figure 9 assumes that some
problem-solving drive (P) exists and functions to stimulate arousal cells
Although
the physical basis of specific drives such as hunger and fear are well known, the very
existence of a "problem-solving drive" is speculative. Let
represent problem cues
from the Pouring Water Task, which initially evoke use of the additive strategy. Specific
problem cues of the task fire
cells in the sensory cortex that in turn send that pattern
of activity to arousal cells, which are also being stimulated by the hypothesized
46
CHAPTER
problem-solving drive P to arousal cells

Due to prior conditioning, this activity
feeds to
(also activated by
which in this case represents neural activity to initiate
the motor response of addition.
Thus, problem cues
from the Pouring Water Task are initially conditioned to
additive behavior. The key cue may be that the water previously rose "2 more" marks
when poured into the narrow cylinder (an absolute difference). Other cues, such as the
relative difference of the water levels (narrow cylinder = 1 1/2 x the height of the wide
cylinder) are ignored. Just as Laurent's feeding behavior was terminated by satisfaction
of the hunger drive, the student's problem solving behavior is terminated by reduction of
the problem solving drive P when a solution has been generated. When input from P
stops, the tonic input I to both
and to
causes a rebound at
This rebound
then quickly inhibits
activity to stop problem solving behavior.
9.2 Contradicting the Additive Strategy

A student using the additive strategy to response with 8 to the Pouring Water Task
fully expects that the answer is correct just as Laurent expected to get milk when he
sucked the bottom of his bottle. As we saw in the case of Laurent, the unexpected
feedback from obtaining an incorrect answer eventually stops the conditioned motor
response in similar situations and turns on nonspecific arousal. In turn, nonspecific
arousal causes a closer inspection of problem cues and a search for a more effective
strategy.
47
What form can this contradiction take? Certainly missing problems on a math test
could be one form. Yet that feedback normally occurs well after the act of problem
solving, thus most likely would lose effectiveness in focusing student attention on the
problem. More effective feedback would be to have the student actually pour the water
following his prediction of eight. The water rise to mark nine would present immediate
contradictory feedback that should produce the desired effect. A crucial point, however,
is that a single contradiction no matter its source, is probably not sufficient to the cause
of shutting down of the additive strategy. Recall that it took Laurent many trials before
he stopped bringing the bottle's bottom to his mouth and sucking. A possible reason for
this is that the student's use of the additive strategy does not always lead to contradiction.
In many problem situations, addition/subtraction are the correct operations. Further, even
if they are not correct, the student may not discover they are wrong for many days, if
ever.
Thus sensory task cues from additive problems
to the
channel
linked to the additive strategy
would continue to be strengthened in some situations.
In situations where use of the additive strategy leads to contradictions the sensory task
cues from proportions problems
leads to
thus the
channel
would be conditioned. As students who use the additive strategy meet continued
contradictions the
projections to
would become stronger than the
projections
to
until they eventually dominate and the student no longer responds unthinkingly
with an additive strategy to quantitative problems of this sort.
9.3 Arousal and the Search for a Better Strategy
Only when the unthinking use of the additive strategy has been extinguished and
nonspecific arousal is sufficient, can the sort of problem inspection and strategy search
occur that will lead to successful conditioning of the
input to the proportions strategy.
How might this occur?
Again consider the example of Laurent learning to flip his bottle prior to lifting and
sucking. What seems to be required in the case of proportional reasoning is to link
input (multiplicative cues from proportions problems) to the
motor response of the
proportion strategy. In other words, input
at
must match
feedback. This would
not appear difficult as it seems to simply require that it occur to the student to use
multiplication/division instead of addition/subtraction in the presence of
input and
nonspecific arousal (see Figure 7). But this is not the entire story. A student so
conditioned may respond to additive problems with a proportions strategy if s/he is not
sufficiently aware of the problem cues that suggest which strategy to use!
9.4 Feedback and Monitoring Problem-Solving Behavior
How then do we solve the problem of reliably matching cues with strategies? This of
course is a central question. The proposed answer is as follows. When confronted with a
48
CHAPTER 2
quantitative problem certain key words or concrete referents are conditioned to strategies
(as stated above). For example, the word "twice" suggests a multiplicative relationship.
The word "more" suggests an additive relationship. However, because these cues are not
always reliable, what the problem solver must do is initiate the use of a strategy to
determine its consequences, or probable consequences if carried out completely, and then
compare those consequences with other known information about the problem situation.
If this leads to an internal contradiction, then that strategy must be incorrect and another
strategy must be tried. Internal contradiction means that an adaptive resonance has not
been found between input and expectations. This leads to an immediate termination of
the
input, which in turn drives a rebound at
to terminate use of that strategy
and to provoke excitation of nonspecific arousal. Nonspecific arousal then provokes a
search through LTM for another strategy.
As mentioned, in the Pouring Water Task, use of the additive strategy leads to the
prediction that water at mark 2 in the narrow cylinder should rise to mark 0 when poured
into the wide cylinder. The water disappears! Of course this is impossible, therefore, the
additive strategy must be wrong (i.e., it has led to contradictory feedback), i.e.,
If...the difference in waters levels is always 2 marks, (initial idea)
and...water at mark 2 in the narrow cylinder is poured into the wide cylinder, (behavioral
test)
then...it should rise to mark 0 (i.e., 2 - 2 = 0). In other words, the water should disappear.
(prediction)
But...water does not disappear when poured from one cylinder to another (what actually
happens)
Therefore...the difference in water levels must not always be 2 marks. (conclusion)
Or consider the following problem: John is 6 years old and his sister Linda is 8 years
old. When John is twice as old as he is now, how old will Linda be? The word "twice"
may suggest that you should multiply 6 x 2 = 12 to get John's age. Consequently, you
should also multiply 8 x 2 = 16 to get Linda's age (many students do this following a
lesson on proportions). But this of course is wrong because we all know that Linda
cannot age at a rate faster than John. Therefore, if one internally monitors his/her
tentative solution, an internal contradiction results that shuts down S input to
and
supporting the additive strategy. Hence, the additive strategy is rejected as it fails
to obtain an adaptive resonance. LTM is then searched until another strategy is found that
no longer generates internal contradictions. Thus, internal monitoring is utilized to match
problem cues to problem strategies. This monitoring presumably takes place when
students have learned a variety of solution strategies and are left on their own to match
strategies with cues.
To summarize, advanced problem solvers appear to have at their disposal the memory
record of a variety of problem cues, a variety of problem strategies, and a general mode
of operation. That general mode tells the problem solver to try the available strategies
until s/he finds one that does not produce contradictions. Consequently, the key
49
difference between the additive reasoning child and the proportional reasoning
adolescent is not the strategies they possess. Both types of individuals are capable of
using both types of strategies. Rather the key difference appears to be that the child
unthinkingly initiates a strategy and then fails to internally check its consequences for
consistency with other known data (e.g., water does not disappear when poured from one
container to another). On the other hand, the adolescent unthinkingly initiates a strategy
and (this is new) checks its results for possible contradictions. If contradictions are
found, (if an adaptive resonance is not found), a new strategy is tried until no
contradictions are discovered. This key difference may arise because adolescents (at least
some of them) have gradually become aware of the fallacy of automatically "jumping to
conclusions" while their younger counterparts have not. Thus, a novel behavior has
emerged (developed) not by direct assimilation of environmental input, nor has it
developed by the maturation of innate structures. Rather, it has developed from by the
novel combination of already present, but previously unlinked, problem-solving
behaviors and problem cues.

The proposed theory of neural processing makes it clear why the normal curriculum
is insufficient to provoke many students to acquire the skills needed to deal successfully
with problems of the Pouring Water type. Students learn algorithmic strategies but they
are seldom confronted with the diversity of problems needed to provoke the sort of close
inspection of problem cues necessary to link cues with strategies and tentative results
with implied consequences.
In short, what is acquired in school lessons is often insufficient. This statement is
reminiscent of Piaget's position regarding the role of teaching in intellectual
development. Piaget long insisted that normal teaching practices are insufficient because
they seldom, if ever, provoke the necessary contradictions and accommodations (cf.,
Piaget 1964). Unfortunately, as mentioned, Piaget's theory of psychological selfregulation is based upon evolutionary and developmental analogies rather than on
neurological networks. The present theory, although most certainly too simplistic to
account for the details of advanced reasoning, nevertheless, suggests neurological
mechanisms that may be involved in important aspects of learning and development.
Consider the child's initial use of the additive strategy in a knee-jerk fashion as an
instance of the immediate assimilation and processing of input by previously acquired
mental structures (strategies). This is the Piagetian state of equilibrium. The individual is
satisfied by his/her response and not intellectually aroused. But suppose repeated
attempts at using that strategy lead to contradiction. At the neurological level this could
speculatively be interpreted as the
channel being weakened and the
channel being strengthened until it dominates and nonspecific-orienting arousal is turned
on and searching behavior is initiated to acquire an appropriate response to solve the
problem. This is the state of disequilibrium. Finally through the internal trial and error
50
CHAPTER
search behavior (see Grossberg, 1982, pp. 14-15) and/or a closer inspection of the
phenomena, a successful behavior pattern is acquired, i.e., new neural connections are
formed by increases in the synaptic strengths of the pathways from the input stimulus to
the output response. This constitutes an accommodation of mental structures, the
acquisition of more complex behavior, and resolution of the problem. In Piagetian terms
it restores equilibrium, but at a more sophisticated, emergent level.
Having suggested a sequence of events involved in the successful emergence of
proportional reasoning, it becomes possible to identify why some students never acquire
the ability. First, if prerequisite strategies and knowledge are not in place they cannot be
utilized. By analogy, Laurent already knew how to flip his bottle. That was not the
problem. Rather, the problem was to connect the flipping with the appearance of the
bottom of the bottle. Likewise the problem for most adolescents is not that they do not
know how to multiply and divide or have not memorized that the "product of the means
equals the product of the extremes." Rather the problem is that they have failed to link
the appropriate operations with the appropriate problem cues. Second, the student must
be confronted with many diverse problem-solving opportunities that provide the
necessary contradictions to his/her use of the additive strategy. Without feedback and
contradiction the necessary arousal will not occur. Therefore, even if students are told to
use "proportions" to solve the problems, they are likely to fail to do so in transfer
situations because use of the old incorrect strategy has not been extinguished.
The previous discussion, although related most directly to the gradual acquisition of
proportional reasoning, does not necessarily preclude its direct teaching. As mentioned,
with respect to the Pouring Water Task, direct contradiction of the additive strategy can
be obtained simply by pouring the water from the wide to the narrow cylinder and noting
the rise to 9th mark instead of the 8th mark. Other problems with similar contradictory
feedback can be utilized. One would expect this type of instruction to be very effective,
yet teachers and curriculum developers must continue to remind themselves of the
remaining limiting factor, namely the student. No matter how potentially interesting the
material may seem to the teacher, it is the student that must be aroused by the
contradictory feedback to relinquish an incorrect strategy and begin the search for a new
one. Sufficient arousal may be difficult to achieve in the classroom setting particularly if
the problems bare little resemblance to problems of personal importance. Further,
short-term direct teaching is probably insufficient to promote the development of the
internal monitoring system needed to match problem cues to solution strategies in novel
situations. Long-term efforts appear necessary for this sort of development.
Another extremely important educational implication follows from Grossberg's
learning equation. Recall that learning is understood in terms of increases in the synaptic
strengths of knobs. According to the learning equation, learning occurs when the total
activity exceeds a certain threshold and total activity is a function of both pre- and
respectively). The level of pre-synaptic activity is
postsynaptic activity (i.e.,
and
a function of current inputs, while the level of postsynaptic activity is a function of prior
learning. Thus, it follows that there are two ways of learning, i.e., of storing new
information into long-term memory. The first way is to boost pre-synaptic activity to
51
such a high level that it alone reaches threshold. This could be done, for example, by
reciting a list of words over and over again until they get "burned in", i.e., get
memorized. I did this in a high school English class when I memorized passages from
Chaucer's Beowulf - passages that to me were meaningless. Nevertheless, I can still
recite some of those passages today. Another way to boost pre-synaptic activity is to
emotionally boost overall arousal by, for example, yelling "fire" while sitting in a packed
movie theater. The emotional boost also will "burn in" memories.
The second way to learn is to connect the new input with something that is already
known. The new input boosts the pre-synaptic activity, while the prior learning boosts
the post-synaptic activity. So together they reach threshold and cause a change in
transmitter release rate. This sort of learning can take place without such a massive
amount of effort spent in boosting the new input. Further, the new learning is not
meaningless because it is connected to what one already knows. So learning is easier and
it is meaningful. Further, like a folder that you file in the correct place in a filing cabinet,
instead of piling it carelessly on a shelf where it gets buried under subsequent folders,
the new knowledge can be easily retrieved and used in the future. Consequently, it is far
more effective when one teaches in ways that take what students already know into
account and build on, connect with, that knowledge. Without making such connections
students will not know how the new knowledge fits with, or perhaps does not fit with,
prior conceptions. Thus, little long-term retention occurs and/or students may acquire
conflicting conceptions and not even know it (e.g., Lawson & Thompson, 1988).
More will be said about this very important aspect of learning in Chapter 5 when the
usefulness of analogies is discussed. But for now, consider the text passages that appear in
Tables 2 and 3 (from Musheno & Lawson, 1999). Take a few minutes to read each passage
before reading on.
Does Cooperation Ever Replace Competition in Nature?

Organisms compete for food, water, and space, and defend themselves from others who
might want to make a meal of them. Is life always competitive or do species ever work
together? Consider two examples:
In the lowlands of Mexico and Central America, the bull's horn acacia tree grows. To protect
itself from being eaten, the tree grows large thorns at the base of its leaves. At the very tip of
each leaflet, the tree produces small orange bead-like structures, which are filled with oils
and proteins. Scientists could find no purpose for the orange beads until they made an
interesting observation. They found that a certain type of ant uses the acacia tree for its
home. The ants, which live in the thorns of the tree, use the mysterious orange beads for
food.
The ants do not harm the tree, but they do aggressively attack anything that touches it. They
attack other insects that land on the leaves or branches and if a large animal even brushes
52
CHAPTER
against the tree, they swarm and attack with painful, burning bites. The ants even chew up
and destroy plants that grow near their tree. With the help of the ants, animals eat the acacia's
tender leaves and neighboring plants quickly outgrow the damaged trees. These particular
ants are found only in acacia trees.
Here, the acacia tree and ants depend on each other. Both benefit; neither is harmed.
Teaming up gives both an advantage. This kind of cooperation is known as mutualism. Is the
next example also mutualism?
In Africa, a bird known as the oxpecker eats ticks as the main part of its diet. But the
oxpecker has a very interesting manner of collecting its meals. Each bird will choose a large
grazing animal, such as a zebra, and set up house on the zebra's back. The bird picks off all
the ticks it can find, and the zebra allows the oxpecker to hitch a ride as long as it chooses.
In this relationship, the bird has a steady food supply, and the zebra is kept tick free.
In both examples, the species have a close, long-term, cooperative relationship. Thus they
are both examples of mutualism. Consider another example:
In Tanzania, a heron-like bird called the cattle egret follows cape buffaloes and other large
grass eating mammals. The birds gather at the buffaloes' feet, sometimes even perching on
the grazers' back. As the buffaloes walk and graze, they scare up small mice and insects,
which become the egrets' food supply. Egrets that follow the buffaloes find a better food
supply than they could on their own. The buffalos do not benefit from the egrets' presence,
but do not seem to be bothered by the egrets, either. The egret and buffalo have a close, longterm relationship. However, in this case only the egret benefits. The buffalo is not affected.
This type of association, which benefits one species and does not affect the other, is called
commensalism.
Does the next example represent mutualism, commensalism, or something different?
Mistletoe, the leafy green plant many Americans traditionally hang in doorways during the
Christmas season, does not grow on the ground like most plants. Mistletoe grows only on the
branches of trees such as oaks, or mesquite trees here in Arizona. The mistletoe has a special
type of root that burrows into the tree and taps into the tree's sap supply. The sap provides
nutrition for the mistletoe, which can then grow larger, sinking new "roots" into the three
branches as its need for food grows. As the mesquite tree gives up more of its sap to support
the mistletoe, it will be harmed because it loses valuable water and nutrients. Again this is
example shows a close, long-term relationship between two species. Here, the mistletoe
benefits, but the mesquite tree is harmed. When one species benefits and the other is
harmed, the relationship is known as parasitism. In this example, the mistletoe is the
parasite.
Mutualism, commensalism and parasitism all involve close, long-term relationships between
two species. The relationship can be between plants, between animals, or between plants and
animals. Collectively, the close, long-term relationships are called symbiosis. This word
comes from the Greek language: bios means life and sym means together, so the word
symbiosis translates into life together.
Symbiosis
Symbiosis is a term that means a close, long-term relationship between organisms of two
different species. The relationship can be between plants, between animals, or between
plants and animals. The word "symbiosis" word comes from the Greek language: bios means
life and sym means together, so the word symbiosis translates into life together.
In nature, relationships between species are usually competitive, with plants and animals
battling for food, water and space to live, as well as defending themselves from other species
that might want to make a meal of them. Symbiosis represents a different, noncompetitive
type of relationship between two species, which involves cooperation and dependence. it is
found in three distinct forms called mutualism, commensalism and parasitism. In mutualism,
the close, long-term relationship is beneficial to both species. In commensalism, the
relationship benefits one species and the other species is neither harmed nor benefits. In the
third form, parasitism, one species benefits ate the expense of the other species, which is
harmed in the process.
A good example of mutualism between a plant and an animal species can be found in the
lowlands of Mexico and Central America, where the bull's horn acacia tree grows. To help
protect itself from being eaten, the tree grows large thorns at the base of its leaves. At the
very tip of each leaflet, the tree produces small orange bead-like structures, which are filled
with oils and proteins. Scientists could find no purpose for the orange beads until they made
an interesting observation. They found that a certain type of ant uses the acacia tree for its
home. The ants, which live in the thorns of the tree, use the mysterious orange beads for
food.
The ants do not harm the tree, but they do aggressively attack anything that touches it. They
attack other insects that land on the leaves or branches and if a large animal even brushes
against the tree, they swarm and attack with painful, burning bites. The ants even chew up
and destroy plants that grow near their tree. With the help of the ants, animals eat the acacia's
tender leaves and neighboring plants quickly outgrow the damaged trees. These particular
ants are found only in acacia trees.
In another example of mutualism, in this case between two species of animals, an African
bird known as the oxpecker eats ticks as the main part of its diet. But the oxpecker has a
very interesting manner of collecting its meals. Each bird will choose a large grazing animal,
such as a zebra, and set up house on the zebra's back. The bird picks off all the ticks it can
find, and the zebra allows the oxpecker to hitch a ride as long as it chooses. In this
relationship, the bird has a steady food supply, and the zebra is kept tick free.
Commensalism is much more rare than mutualism or parasitism as it is hard to find cases
where one of the species is not affected at all by the relationship. One good example of
commensalism, again between two species of animals, is found in Tanzania, where a heronlike bird called the cattle egret follows cape buffaloes and other large grass-eating mammals.
The birds gather at the buffaloes' feet, sometimes even perching on the grazer's back. As the
buffaloes walk and graze, they scare up small mice and insects, which become the egret's
food supply. Egrets that follow the buffaloes find a better food supply than they could on
their own. The buffalos do not benefit from the egrets' presence, but do not seem to be
bothered by the egrets, either.
53
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CHAPTER
Parasitism is the final form of symbiosis. There are many examples of this type of
relationship to be found in nature. For example, mistletoe, the leafy green plant many
Americans traditionally hang in doorways during the Christmas season, does not grow on the
ground like most plants. Mistletoe grows only on the branches of trees such as oaks, or
mesquite trees here in Arizona. The mistletoe has a special type of root that burrows into the
tree and taps into the tree's sap supply. The sap provides nutrition for the mistletoe, which
can then grow larger, sinking new "roots" into the three branches as its need for food grows.
As the mesquite tree gives up more of its sap to support the mistletoe, it will be harmed
because it loses valuable water and nutrients.
As you found out, each passage introduces four new biological terms: symbiosis,
mutualism, commensalism, and parasitism. The passage in Table 2 introduces the
examples first and the new terms second (i.e., in a "learning cycle" format). Also the
new terms are introduced in a "bottom-up" manner. In other words, in terms of the
conceptual hierarchy, the less inclusive (lower-order) concepts of mutualism,
commensalism and parasitism are introduced before the more inclusive "higherorder" symbiosis concept. On the other hand, the passage in Table 3 introduces the
new terms in a more "traditional" top-down manner with symbiosis coming first.
Also notice that the new terms are introduced prior to the examples (i.e., terms first,
examples second).
According to what we have learned about what it takes to provoke learning (i.e.,
to increase the synaptic strengths of knobs), which passage should work best in terms
of concept construction and retention? In theory, the learning cycle passage should
work best. Presumably the level of pre-synaptic activity provoked by both passages
would be the same. But the relevant post-synaptic activity should be higher for
students reading the learning cycle passage. This is because when the new terms
appear for students reading that passage, they have just read about the phenomena to
which the new terms are supposed to be "linked." So thanks to this just-activated,
and still active, post-synaptic activity, the combination of pre- and post-synaptic
activity reaches threshold and the relevant synaptic strengths increase. Therefore,
learning occurs as described by Grossberg's learning equation.
However, for students reading the traditional passage, the terms come before the
examples. Thus, the pre-synaptic activity provoked by the new terms is not matched
at the correct time by the relevant post-synaptic activity provoked by the examples.
Consequently, learning does not easily take place. In other words, when introduced, a
new term has no where to "attach." Hence, when the activity boosted by reading a
new term decays, as described by Grossberg's activity equation, the new term has not
"attached" and is forgotten. In fact, prior to providing the reader with a relevant
example, the traditional passage introduces additional new terms that also have no
"points of attachment."
As expected, Musheno & Lawson (1999) found that ninth and tenth grade
students who read the learning cycle passage scored significantly higher on a posttest
of concept comprehension than those who read the traditional passage. More
55
generally, Grossberg's activity and learning equations imply that all learning contexts
(e.g., labs, lectures, discussions) that employ the learning cycle approach should be
more effective than "traditional" term-first, top-down approaches (i.e., Lawson,
Abraham & Renner, 1989). For example, who among us has not suffered through the
occasional lecture in which the speaker strung together several unfamiliar words, that
although easy to hear, were, nevertheless, meaningless. Consequently, we quickly
become "lost" - some of us even fall asleep. The problem here is not a lack of presynaptic activity. Instead, the problem is a lack of post-synaptic activity, thus a loss
of attention, comprehension, learning and retention.
CHAPTER 3
BRAIN MATURATION, INTELLECTUAL

DEVELOPMENT AND DESCRIPTIVE
CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
Thus far we have found the pattern of hypothetico-predictive reasoning at work in
our attempts to draw in a mirror, in the behavior of Piaget's son Laurent learning to
orient his bottle to suck milk, in the case of the unlit barbecue, in both visual and
auditory information processing, and in the solution of a proportions problem by
adolescents. Is the same pattern at work in students' reasoning during descriptive
concept construction? Consider for example the creatures called Mellinarks in the first
row of Figure 7. Why do you suppose these are Mellinarks while the creatures in the
second row are not Mellinarks? In other words, what makes a Mellinark a Mellinark?
Can you use the information in the figure to find out? If so, which creatures in row three
are Mellinarks? How do you know? In other words, how do you define a Mellinark and
how did you arrive at that definition? What were the steps in your reasoning? Take a
few minutes to try to answer these questions before reading on.
To gain insight into the reasoning used by students to solve the Mellinark Task,
several students tried the task and told us about their reasoning. Consider, for example,
the following remarks of a student who identified creatures one, two, and six in row
three as Mellinarks (Lawson, McElrath, Burton, James, Doyle, Woodward, Kellerman
& Snyder, 1991, p. 967):
Number one, two, and six are Mellinarks.
OK, how did you figure that out?
Um. Well, the first thing I started looking for was just overall shape, whether it's
straight, looks like a dumbbell, but this doesn't really work, because some of these (row
two) are similar in overall body shape. So I ruled that out. Well, then I said, all of these
are spotted (row one). But some of these (row two) are spotted and these aren't
Mellinarks, so that can't be the only thing. So I looked back at these (row one) and
noticed that they all have a tail. But some of these have a tail (row two), so that can't be
the only thing either. And so then I was sort of confused and had to look back, and
think about what else it was. Then I saw the big dot. So all of these (row one) have all
three things, but none of these (row two) have all three.
57
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According to the student, she first generated the idea that overall shape is a critical
feature. But as she tells us, this idea was quickly rejected because some of the creatures
in row two are similar in overall shape. Thus, at the outset, the student may have
reasoned like this:
If...overall shape is a critical feature of Mellinarks, (descriptive hypothesis)
and...I look closely at the non-Mellinarks in row two, (behavioral test)
then...none should be similar in overall shape to the Mellinarks in row one. (prediction)
But...some of the non-Mellinarks in row two are similar in overall shape, (observed
result)
Therefore..."I ruled that out," i.e., I concluded that my initial idea was wrong.
(conclusion)
Of course this is the same pattern of reasoning that we have seen before. Some
logicians call this pattern "reasoning to a contradiction" or "reductio absurdum" (e.g.,
Ambrose & Lazerowitz, 1948). And as we can see in the remainder of the student's
comments, the pattern appears to have been recycled until all contradictions were
eliminated. So after rejecting her initial descriptive hypothesis, the student seems to
have quickly generated others (e.g., spots are the key feature, a tail is the key feature)
and presumably tested them in the same fashion until she eventually found a
combination of features (spots, tail, big dot) that led to predictions that were not
contradicted, i.e.,
If...Mellinarks are creatures that have spots, a tail, and one big dot, (descriptive
hypothesis)
and...I check out all the creatures in rows one and two, (test)
then...all those in row one should have all three "things" and none in row two should
have all three "things." (prediction)
And...this is what I see. (observed result)
and six in row three have all three "things" so they are Mellinarks). (conclusion)
Did you also conclude that creatures one, two, and six of row three are Mellinarks?
If so, did your reasoning look something like the above? How do you suppose a sample
of high school students would do on a series of Mellinark-type tasks? Would they also
use this reasoning pattern? Or would they use something else and run into difficulties?
To find out, Lawson, et al. (1991) administered a series of Mellinark-type tasks to 314
high school students. Interestingly, not only did many students experience difficulties,
their performance was highly correlated with performance on a measure of scientific
and mathematical reasoning (i.e., developmental level).
Difficulties experienced by students who presumably failed to employ cycles of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning to solve the tasks were exemplified by the following
discussion with a student following her failed attempt:
BRAIN MATURATION AND DESCRIPTIVE CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION
59
Suppose I define a Mellinark as being a creature with a tail. How could I test that
idea? Is there any information here that would tell me if that idea is right or wrong?
...Um...you could um...huh...a...just look to see if the other creatures have the same
tails...or, I mean...you know...characteristics of the creatures...with the tails and the points
and the dots and stuff to see if they are...you know...all the same or close to...and
then...um...heh...I don't know...heh.
OK, let's look at the second row. We know that none of these are Mellinarks. So what would
you expect about these with regard to tails? I mean, if it's true that Mellinarks are creatures
with tails then what would you expect to find in row two with regard to tails?
Um...they would a...they would be some different kind of creature with tails...I don't
know...they would um...I don't know...they would just...they don't have the dots on `em.
And then...um...they are more... 1 don't know.
OK. Let's go back. Once again, I'm going to say that Mellinarks are creatures with tails and
I look down here (row two) and I see that this non-Mellinark has a tail. See that tail right
there?
Yeah
And I know that is not a Mellinark. So I would conclude from that my definition must be
wrong.
Yeah...well they could have classified 'em wrong. It could have been a mistake. These
would have been up with the other Mellinarks.
Although this sort of response and the quantitative data reported by Lawson et al.
(1991) reveal clear difficulties by many high school students, a question remains as to
the cause(s) of the difficulties. Perhaps the difficulties stem from students' lack of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill. Suppose like Piaget (e.g., Piaget, 1964), we
assume that such reasoning skill is the product of intellectual development (i.e., the
product of physical and social experience, neural maturation and self-regulation). If this
is true, then brief verbal training in the use of such reasoning should not be successful in
provoking students to solve Mellinark-type tasks. In other words, the training should
fail because, in theory, the necessary reasoning skill results from the long-term process
of intellectual development, not from short-term training.
Consequently, research was initiated in which six Mellinark-type tasks were
constructed and a brief verbal training session was used to point out potentially relevant
features (i.e., provide descriptive hypotheses to be tested) and to explain to students
how to use cycles of If/then/Therefore reasoning to test those features and solve the
tasks. More specifically, the reasoning guiding the research can be stated as follows:
If...the difficulties experienced high school students are caused by lack developmentally
derived, hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill needed to construct descriptive
concepts, (developmental hypothesis)
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CHAPTER
and...students are given brief verbal training in how to use such reasoning to solve a
series of Mellinark-type tasks, (planned test)
then...when given an additional non-trained task, they should fail, (prediction)
2. METHOD
2.1 Research Design

Prior to subject selection, a few pilot training sessions were conducted. Student
responses led us to suspect that at least some eighth grade students (12-14 years of age)
would respond successfully. Therefore, the first training sessions were conducted with
eighth graders. If the eighth graders were successful, then a younger sample of students
would be chosen to see if they would also be successful, and so on until a sample was
found that did not succeed. On the other hand, if the eighth graders did not respond
successfully, then an older sample would be chosen and so on until, if possible, a
sample was found that was successful.
2.2 Subjects
Subjects (Ss) were 175 students (88 males and 87 females) enrolled in two
elementary schools and junior high school in a suburban community in the southwest
USA. Grades and student ages were as follows: kindergarten (n = 70, 5.3 to 7.0 years,
mean = 6.4); grade 1 (n = 30, 6.8 to 7.9 years, mean = 7.5); grade 2 (n = 30, 7.9 to 8.9
years, mean = 8.4); grade 4 (n = 15, 8.4 to 10.3 years, mean = 9.4.); grade 6 (n = 15,
10.4 to 11.9, mean = 11.5); grade 8 (n= 15, 12.4 to 14.4 years, mean = 13.4).
2.3
Brief Verbal Training
Ss were individually trained in quiet locations near their classrooms. One goal of
the training was to determine the extent to which Ss could utilize the
If/then/Therefore reasoning pattern presumably necessary for successful concept
construction. The reasoning pattern was introduced repeatedly during the training
when Ss experienced difficulty. Another intent was to reveal the relevant task
features: 1) the nature of the creature's sides, 2) the presence of little spots, 3) tails,
4) a big spot, or 5) some combination of the above. The cumulative effect of the
training was evaluated on the seventh and final task - the Mellinark Task. Thus, no
training was given on the Mellinark Task but was given, if necessary, on some or all of
the preceding tasks. Each training session took approximately 15-20 minutes.
61
2.4 Descriptive Concept Construction Tasks

Seven descriptive concept construction tasks patterned after the "creature cards" of
the Elementary Science Study (1974) were developed. Each task consisted of three
rows of figures (creatures) drawn on an 8 1/2 x 11-inch sheet of paper. The verbal
introduction given to each student as s/he was shown the first task went as follows:
The figures that I have drawn in the first row are all called Shlooms because they
have something(s) in common. The figures in the second row are not Shlooms because
they do not have that something(s). Based on this information, try to figure out which of
the figures in the third row are Shlooms.
Take a few minutes at this time to solve each task in Figures 1-6 to obtain a sense of
the reasoning necessary for success
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CHAPTER
63
2.1 Specific Task Training

Initially many Ss matched creatures based upon overall shape. For example, on
Task 1 many Ss identified creatures one and three in the third row as Shlooms "because
they look like creatures one and two of row one." And creature number two of row
three was identified as a non-Shloom "because it looks like creature four from row
two." Typically, Ss using this matching strategy did not know whether creatures four
and five in row three were Shlooms. Many unsuccessful Ss continued to utilize this
matching strategy on subsequent tasks even after the relevant feature(s) and the correct
strategy were provided. More specifically, training on Task 1 (if necessary) proceeded
by experimenter statements as follows:
Notice that all of the creatures in row one have curvy sides. Notice also that none of the
creatures in row two have curvy sides. Instead their sides are straight. So if we say that
creatures with curvy sides are Shlooms, then creatures one, three, and five in row three
must be Shlooms.
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CHAPTER 3
Hence, Ss were alerted to the fact that they should pay attention to the nature of the
sides (i.e., curvy or straight). Task 1 was not used to introduce the If/then/Therefore
reasoning pattern. Consequently when Task 2 was presented, Ss would do one of four
things:
1. persevere with the matching strategy (e.g., creature two in row three is a Thomp
because it looks like creature four in row one, and creature four in row three is a
Thomp because it looks like creature three in row one);
2. persevere with the idea that a curvy side is relevant and conclude that creatures
one and four (the ones with the curvy sides) are Thomps;
3. notice the general abundance of spots on the creatures in row one and
immediately conclude that Thomps are creatures with spots. Although this third
approach leads to a successful identification of creatures one, three and four in
row three as Thomps, it does not constitute totally effective reasoning because
other possibly relevant features have not been eliminated. Thus, Ss using this
strategy obtained the correct answer by guessing. Provided that their initial
hypothesis was correct, they were successful. However, if their initial hypothesis
was incorrect they were unsuccessful because they did not employ the reasoning
pattern necessary to test and reject it;
4. use hypothetico-predictive reasoning to, for example, a) reject the idea that type
of sides is relevant (because both types of sides are present in rows one and two),
b) generate the alternative idea that the presence or absence of spots is relevant,
c) confirm this idea by noting that all of the Thomps in row one, but none of the
non-Thomps in row two have spots, and d) therefore conclude that creatures one,
three and four of row three are Thomps.
If an S did 1) or 2) above s/he was corrected by the experimenter pointing out the
relevant features of the creatures and verbally presenting the argument embodied in 4)
above as follows:
The Slooms had curvy sides so it is reasonable to think that the Thomps may also have
curvy sides. But if curvy sides were the key feature, then all of the creatures in row one
should be curvy. But notice that these two creatures (numbers two and four) have
straight sides and they are Thomps. So this means that something other than curvy sides
must be important. Notice also that if curvy sides were the key feature, then none of the
creatures in row two should have curvy sides. But these two creatures have curvy sides
(numbers two and five in row two) and they are not Thomps. So again there must be
something other than curvy sides that is important to be a Thomp.
This verbal argument, of course, amounts to training and assumes that Ss capable of
such hypothetico-predictive reasoning will assimilate the verbal training and will apply
the reasoning to solve subsequent tasks (cf., Lawson, 1987). Whereas Ss incapable of
such reasoning will not assimilate the words and should persevere with their initially
incorrect approach, i.e., 1), 2), or 3) above. Of course, it was difficult to tell when an S
was simply guessing - approach 3) above - or was, in fact, using the reasoning of
65
approach 4). Consequently, whenever an S obtained the correct answer, the reasoning
pattern was verbally presented whether the S verbalized it or not.
The training continued through the first six tasks by repetition of this verbal
presentation when necessary. Thus, by the time Ss reached the seventh task, they may
have heard a presentation of the reasoning pattern on five separate occasions (Tasks 26). Ss had also been presented all of the relevant features. Finally, the Mellinark Task,
Task 7 was given with no coaching as a final assessment of the Ss' ability to use the
reasoning pattern to construct the descriptive concept of Mellinark.
2.2 Scoring
Performance on each task was recorded by noting which creatures in row three
were identified as Shlooms, Thomps, Bloops, etc. prior to training on that task. Ss were
considered successful on the Mellinark Task if they identified creature one, two and six
in row three as Mellinarks.
3. GENERAL RESULTS, AN INITIAL CONCLUSION AND
KEY QUESTIONS RAISED
All 15 eighth graders immediately understood the training and successfully
identified creatures one, two, and six in row three as Mellinarks. The sixth graders were
equally successful as all 15 showed no difficulty and all correctly identified the
Mellinarks in row three. The fourth graders also showed little difficulty and all 15 were
successful. The second graders exhibited some difficulties (discussed in more detail
below). Nevertheless, the first five were successful on the Mellinark Task. The sixth
student was unsuccessful as he identified creatures one, two, four and six as Mellinarks.
Creature four was incorrectly identified as a Mellinark "because it looks like Mellinark
4 in the first row." The remaining 24-second graders were successful. Therefore, the
results thus far clearly contradict the studies' working hypothesis that older students'
difficulties stem from a lack of developmentally-derived, hypothetico-predictive
reasoning skill needed to construct descriptive concepts.
Although most of the kindergartners (27/30) easily identified creature features,
none appeared to understand the reasoning and none (0/30) solved the Mellinark Task.
Needless to say, the success of virtually all of the older Ss coupled with the failure of
all of the kindergartners is striking and prompted the selection and training of the
sample of first graders of intermediate age. Approximately one half (14/30) of the first
graders were successful on the Mellinark Task.
Figure 8 displays Mellinark Task results as a function of age in months for the
kindergarten, first and second graders. The solid dots represent successful performance.
The open dots represent unsuccessful performance. The relationship between age and
success is dramatic. None of the 30 Ss younger than 84 months (seven years) were
successful. Fourteen of 30 of the Ss age 84 to 95 months (the seven-year-olds) were
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CHAPTER 3
successful, predominantly the older ones, and virtually all of the Ss (29/30) from age 96
to 107 months (the eight-year-olds) were successful.
Two aspects of these results are striking. First, many Ss much younger than those
who took part in the Lawson et al. (1991) study were easily trained to solve Mellinarktype tasks. Second, the positive effect of the training dropped dramatically at precisely
age seven. Age seven is of considerable interest because it is precisely at this age that
many previous investigators have found profound advances in intellectual development
(e.g., Cole & Cole, 1989). Indeed, Piaget cites age seven as the transition age between
the preoperational and concrete operational stages of development (e.g., Piaget &
Inhelder, 1969, p. 96). Thus, we are left with two results in need of explanation. Why,
given that Ss in second grade and up appear able to use the needed hypotheticopredictive reasoning, did many of the high school students in the Lawson et al. (1991)
67
study experience difficulties? And what caused such an abrupt drop in performance at
age seven? Let's consider the specific tasks results in greater detail to see if they will
help us answer these questions.
4. SPECIFIC TASK RESULTS
Table 1 shows the kindergarten, first and second graders performance on each of
the seven tasks. The numbers represent the percentage of Ss at each grade that, prior
to training on that task, was successful at identifying the correct creatures in row
three for each task. The percentages not only reveal a clear relationship between age
and performance on all tasks, but also show that some of the six-year-olds were
successful on some of the one-feature tasks (i.e., Tasks 1-4).
A finding that does not show up in Table 1 or in Figure 8 is the younger Ss' clear
preference for the matching strategy. Indeed for the six-year-olds on the one-feature
tasks, matching led to some success (7% on Task 1 to 40% on Task 2). The likelihood
of successful matching/guessing the correct features on Tasks 5-7 was, of course, much
less because these tasks involved combinations of features. Note that success for the
six-year-olds dropped to 0% on Tasks 5 and 7. One six-year-old did select the correct
creatures on Task 6 and then on Task 7 guessed that Mellinarks were creatures that
were curvy and had a tail. This led her to incorrectly conclude that creatures one, two,
four and five of row three were Mellinarks. When asked about the possible relevance of
creature four in row two (a non-Mellinark that is curvy and has a tail) she was unable to
use this information to conclude that her initial idea must be wrong. Indeed, it is
precisely this conclusion that none of the unsuccessful Ss drew. The point is that the use
of hypothetico-predictive reasoning appears necessary for drawing such a conclusion
(e.g., If...Mellinarks are curvy creatures with tails, and...I check out the non-Mellinarks
in row two, then...none of them should be curvy and have a tail. But... creature four in
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row two is curvy and has a tail. Therefore...my curvy-creatures-with-a-tail idea must be
wrong).
Thus, it appears that the younger students failed because they did not use this
reasoning pattern and the older Ss succeeded because they did. Therefore, the
hypothesis that the difficulties of the initial sample of high school students stem from a
lack of hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill needed to construct descriptive concepts
is not supported. Indeed, it seems that virtually all students all the way down to the
second grade could use hypothetico-predictive reasoning to construct descriptive
concepts once that reasoning pattern had been briefly introduced. For example, when
an eight-year-old was questioned about his correct answer on Task 6 that creatures one,
three, and four of row three were Gloms, he remarked: "It couldn't be strings because
these guys (row two numbers one and three) have strings and it couldn't be straight
sides because of this one (number two row one)." Then, when he proceeded to the final
task, Task 7, he used hypothetico-predictive reasoning to check his ideas: "I think its
big dot, little dots, and tail...Oh wait! (he looks at the second row)...OK, none of them
in the second row have all these so it's one, two and six."
4.1 Why Did the Kindergartners Fail ?
Given that virtually all Ss from kindergarten to eighth grade initiated the Mellinark
task with incorrect/incomplete hypotheses (e.g., Mellinarks are creatures with tails), the
central question becomes: Why could the older Ss successfully use hypotheticopredictive reasoning to reject/modify their initial hypotheses, while the kindergartners
could not? At least three possibilities come to mind:
1. Perhaps kindergartners are unable to generate combinations of features to be

tested. In other words, perhaps they are unable to form conjunctive concepts.
2. Perhaps kindergartners do not yet understand the "logic" of falsification, thus

when contradictory evidence is gathered, it makes no "cognitive" impact.
3. Perhaps once an initial idea has been generated, it is held so firmly that
kindergartners are unable to entertain alternative possibilities.
Can Kindergarteners Form Conjunctive Concepts? Let's first consider the
hypothesis that the kindergartners failed because they were unable to form conjunctive
concepts (e.g., perhaps a Mellinark is a creature with a tail and a dot). If this is true,
then they should have been successful on the one-feature tasks (i.e., Tasks 1-4) and they
should have failed the two and three feature tasks (i.e., Tasks 5-7). Notice in Table 1
that the kindergartners did show some success on Tasks 1-4. Also notice the substantial
decrease in success from Task 4 (the last one-feature task) to Task 5 (the first twofeature task), a decrease from 33% to 0%. Further, the percentages went up
substantially for the seven and eight-year-olds on Task 6 after those that failed Task 5
received training, but the six-year-olds' performance on Task 6 did not go up. On Task
69
6, 40% of the seven-year-olds were successful on this two-feature task, 50% of eightyear-olds were successful but only one of the six-year-olds (3%) was successful. The
percentages increased again on Task 7 (the only three-feature task) for the seven and
eight-year-olds to 47% and 97% respectively but not for the six-year-olds (0%). Thus, it
appears that task complexity in terms of number of relevant features was an initial
source of difficulty for many Ss. And after training, task complexity may have
continued to be a source of difficulty for the younger Ss, but not for the older Ss.
Is the ability to combine features actually limiting performance of the
kindergartners? A closer inspection of the data for the six-year-olds reveals that 9 of
them (33%) did in fact combine features on Tasks 6 and 7. For example, one six-yearold concluded that creature number three in row three was a Glom, "Because it has
little dots, one big dot and a string (i.e., a tail) like creature number five in row one."
Thus, for her, as well as several of her peers, the problem was not that she could not
generate and combine features, but that she failed to test these combinations once
generated. Thus, the conclusion appears to be that the primary factor limiting the
kindergartners' performance was not their inability to generate features or combinations
of features (i.e., to form conjunctive concepts), but was their failure to test the
combinations once generated.
As a further check on this tentative conclusion, another sample of 15 kindergarten
Ss was selected and individually administered the seven tasks in a more direct manner.
Instead of requiring that Ss generate and test their own ideas, they were told precisely
what the key feature(s) were and they were then merely asked to select the correct
creatures from row three. For example, the verbal instructions for Task 1 proceeded as
follows:
These creatures (row one) are calls Shlooms because they all have curvy sides (the
curvy sides were pointed out). Notice that none of these in row two have curvy sides.
All their sides are straight, so they are not Shlooms. Which of the creatures in row three
do you think are Shlooms?
The verbal instructions for Tasks 5, 6 and 7 (the two and three feature tasks) were
slightly more complicated. For example, for the Trugs Task the following remarks were
also included:
So Trugs are creatures with straight sides and little dots. Notice that none of these in
row two are Trugs because none of them have both straight sides and little dots. The
first one has little dots, but no straight sides, so it's not a Trug. The fifth one has straight
sides, but no little dots so it's also not a Trug. So you have to have both straight sides
and little dots to be a Trug. Now you see if you can pick out the Trugs in row three.
Instructions for the Mellinark Task were similar except that Ss were shown the three
features that had to be combined to make a Mellinark.
Success rates on the one feature tasks (Tasks 1-4) were 93.3%, 100.0%, 93.3% and
93.3% respectively. Success rates on the two feature tasks (Tasks 5 and 6) and the one
three-feature task (Task 7) were 46.6%, 73.3% and 66.6% respectively. These results
indicate that these five and six-year-olds were generally, but not completely, successful
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at forming conjunctive concepts. Thus, again it appears that the failure of the six-yearolds in the initial sample to solve the Mellinark Task (i.e., 0% success rate) is probably
not due to an inability to form conjunctive concepts (i.e., note the 66.6% success rate
on the Mellinark Task when five-year-olds were given direct instruction). Although a
few five-year-olds exhibited difficulties such as these, the important point is that over
all, the clear majority was able to form conjunctive concepts. Therefore, the hypothesis
that they failed due to an inability to form conjuctive concepts is not supported.
Do Kindergartners Understand the "Logic" of Falsification? The second
hypothesis for the kindergartners' failure proposes that they do not yet understand the
"logic" of falsification, thus when contradictory evidence is gathered, it makes no
"cognitive" impact. In this sense Piaget might be correct in claiming that the shift from
the preoperational stage to the concrete operational stage involves the acquisition of
new "logical" operations. To test this hypothesis an additional sample of kindergartners
was administered a logic-of-falsification task. If the lack-of-logic hypothesis is correct,
then the kindergartners should fail the task.
During the task, Ss were shown eight cards with either a triangle or a square on one
side and either green dots or blue dots on the other side (e.g., Lawson, 1990). They
were then told the following conditional rule: If a card has a triangle on one side (p),
then it has green dots on the other side (q), i.e.,
Ss were told to state whether or
not each card, once turned over to reveal the other side, broke the rule. The cards, in
order of presentation were:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
triangle then green dots (i.e., p then q)

green dots then triangle (i.e., q then p)
square then green dots (i.e., not p then q)
green dots then square (i.e., q then not p)
triangle then blue dots (i.e., p then not q)
blue dots then triangle (i.e., not q then p)
square then blue dots (i.e., not p then not q)
blue dots then square (i.e., not q then not p)
The percentage of Ss who thought that the respective cards broke the rule were: a.
16%, b. 12%, c. 44%, d. 56%, e. 88%, f. 73%, g. 48%, and h. 44%. None of the Ss
responded correctly to all cards (i.e., only cards e and f logically break the rule), but
most of them did state that cards e and f broke the rule (i.e., 88% and 73%
respectively). In other words, most of the Ss understood that the rule
had been
broken (i.e., falsified) when p and not q occurred and when not q and p occurred.
Therefore, the lack-of-logic hypothesis is not supported.
The fact that many Ss thought that cards other than e and f broke the rule indicates
some confusion on their part. However, this confusion does not appear to be the reason
for failure on the concept construction tasks because similar confusion has been found
on this task even among high school and college Ss who would have no trouble
responding successfully to the brief instruction on the tasks (Lawson, 1990). This
71
means that the failure of the younger Ss on the concept construction tasks appears not
to be due to their inability to recognize contradictory evidence when directly presented.
In other words, the six-year-olds' failure is not due to a lack of logic, or due to a failure
to form conjunctive concepts.1
Are Kindergartners Unable to Entertain Alternative Possibilities? The third
hypothesis listed above suggests that the kindergartners' failure was due to the fact that
they held so firmly to their initial ideas that they were unable to entertain alternative
possibilities. This sort of failure represents a "perseveration" error i.e., the S perseveres
with a previous idea in spite of the presentation of contradictory evidence. When
administered the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, perseveration errors occur among
young children (below seven years in age) and among adults with frontal lobe brain
damage. Perseveration errors on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task occur when Ss fail to
shift from, say, a previously successful sorting of cards based upon color, to another
feature (e.g., shape) even when the experimenter repeatedly tells the S that the selection
is in error. Perseveration errors continue in the face of contradictory evidence. In a
sense, contradictory evidence has no impact on the Ss' reasoning consequently they do
not generate and test other ideas. In other words, they do not employ the necessary
hypothetico-predictive reasoning for task success.
Dempster (1992) reviewed a considerable amount of research that implicates
children's failure to suppress misleading or irrelevant information as a major sort of
difficulty in performance on a variety of interference sensitive tasks such as the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, measures of field independence, conservation tasks,
selective attention tasks, and the Brown-Peterson task. Dempster's review provides
considerable support for two points crucial to a possible explanation for the present
results. First, research by Luria (1973) and several associates is cited in which Luria
concludes:
1 Another hypothesis for the difference in performance between the six and eight-year-olds deserves
mention. According to Pascual-Leone (1969, 1970), mental capacity increases with age. Presumably sixyear-olds have a mental capacity of 2 units (i.e., they can simultaneously process 2 discrete units of
information). By the time a child is eight years old his/her mental capacity has increased to 3 units. This
increase is presumed to be independent of factors such as degree of field independence (Globerson, 1985)
and social class (Globerson, 1983). If the reasoning involved in solving the concept acquisition tasks
requires the child to simultaneously process 3 units of information (i.e., 1. If a tail makes a creature a
Mellinark, and 2, this creature [creature one in row two] is not a Mellinark, but it has a tail, then 3. The
presence of a tail is not sufficient to make a Mellinark.), and if our six-year-olds only have a mental
capacity of 2 units, then we have a "lack of sufficient mental capacity" explanation for their failure. The
problem with this explanation is that it should also hold for the logically similar evaluation task (i.e., 1. If
a card has a triangle on one side, then it has green dots on the other side, and 2. I turn over the triangle
card and find blue dots, so a card exists with a triangle and blue dots. Therefore 3. The rule has been
broken). In both situations, the logic involves these steps (i.e., 1.
2. p and not q. 3. not
not q.).
The fact that most of the six-year-olds who took the evaluation task were able to generate this three-step
argument argues against the mental capacity explanation.
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..it must also be noted that the prefrontal regions of the cortex do not mature until very
late in ontogeny, and not until the child has reached the age of four to seven years do
they become prepared for action. ...the rate of increase in area of the frontal regions of
the brain rises sharply by the age of three and a half to four years, and this is followed
by a second jump towards the age of seven to eight, (pp. 87-88)
Second, adult patients with frontal lobe damage make significantly more errors and
make significantly fewer shifts (i.e., greater numbers of perserverative errors) on the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task than do adult patients with damage to other parts of the
brain. As Dempster points out, a comparison of the mean number of perserverative
errors of adult patients with frontal lesions (Heaton, 1981) with normal six-year-old
children reveals that they perform in a similar manner (Chelune & Baer, 1986). Hence,
the second graders' success and the kindergartners' failure on the present tasks could be
due to degree of frontal lobe maturation. In other words, the frontal lobes may play a
key role in successful task performance; and the frontal lobes are not sufficiently
operational until seven to eight years of age.
The frontal lobes are the seat of several of the brains "higher" executive functions
such as extracting information from other brain systems and anticipating, selecting
goals, experimenting and monitoring information to produce novel responses (cf., Stuss
& Benson, 1986). Thus, if it can be demonstrated that the present tasks involve similar
cognitive demands (i.e., like those of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task - the WCST),
then this frontal-lobes hypothesis will have gained support. Levine & Pruiett (1989)
provide a detailed neural network and computer simulation of frontal lobe function on
the WCST. Can this network also be applied to the present tasks?
5.
THE LEVINE-PRUIETT NEURAL NETWORK
Figure 9 depicts the neural network, isomorphic to the Levine and Prueitt network
that may be operative in the present concept construction tasks. Task 3, the Bloops
Task, has been selected as the example task. The network includes a field of nodes
referred to as
that codes input features. The features in the WCST are color (red,
yellow, blue, green), shape (circle, square, triangle, cross) and number of figures
(1,2,3,4). In the Bloops Task the features that must be coded are number of tails (0 or
1), number of spots (0 or many), and type of border (straight or curvy). Nodes in field
code the template cards in the Levine and Pruiett network. The template cards in the
WCST show one red triangle, two green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue
circles. The template cards serve as sources of ideas about what the relevant feature
might be upon which to base the sorting of the response cards (e.g., sort by the color
red, sort by the shape circle). The figures in row one of the Bloops Task serve the same
role in that they contain the relevant features that can be induced as the basis for sorting
the creatures in row three into categories of Bloops and non-Bloops (e.g.,
It's a
Bloop if it has one tail;
It's a Bloop if it has spots;
It's a Bloop if it has straight
sides). Thus, possible categories at
on the Bloops Task are groups of, say, all
creatures with a tail, all creatures with spots, all creatures with straight sides.
73
The network also includes a habit node and a bias node as shown in the figure.
These nodes correspond to each of the subfields in
Habit nodes detect how often
prior classifications have correctly and incorrectly been made. On the WCST this
means, for instance, how many times a sorting based on color has been reinforced by a
"correct" or "incorrect" response from the examiner. In the present series of concept
acquisition tasks the habit node detects how many times a prior classification has been
made based upon say, type of border, as in Task 1, or presence of spots as in Task 2. In
other words, if, for example, the presence of spots has been the relevant feature on
previous tasks, then the "habit" of classifying based upon this feature is strengthened. It
should be noted that most of the Ss in the present study began Task 1 using the
matching strategy based on overall shape presumably because shape matching had been
reinforced numerous times in their pasts. Of considerable importance is the fact that
many of the younger Ss persevered with this shape matching strategy throughout the
interview, while all of the many eight-year-olds who initially considered only shape
were able to give it up.
The bias nodes are affected both by activity in the habit nodes and by
reinforcement. In the WCST, the experimenter gives positive or negative reinforcement
as he/she responds to the S's sorting with the statement of "right" or "wrong."
Reinforcement on the concept acquisition tasks comes in the form of the creatures in
row two and from the experimenter when he/she suggests alternative strategies for task
solution. Suppose, for example, that an S, armed with the idea that the presence of spots
is a relevant feature based upon his/her previous experience with Task 2, inspects the
creatures in row one and notes that the first, third and fourth Bloops have spots. The
presence of these three spotted Bloops then reinforces the idea that the presence of
spots is the relevant criterion. Of course, the first row also contains negative
reinforcement in the form of creatures two and five that do not have spots.
Nevertheless, if the positive reinforcement signal is too great, or if negative signal is too
weak, the habit will prevail (i.e., the S exhibits persrveration errors as he/she fails to
switch from previous ways of classifying the creatures). Note also that row two contains
creatures that may serve as positive reinforcement (unspotted creatures two and three)
or negative reinforcement (spotted creatures one and four).
The Zij's and Zji's between
and
represent synaptic strengths of the neuron
connections between the two nodes (i.e., in both directions). These are large when node
(e.g., the creatures that one is attending to, such as creature one of row one in the
Bloops Task with spots) contains a feature that is active at (e.g., the presence of spots
is the key feature). Attentional gating from bias nodes increases some to signals.
If, for instance, the "It's a Bloop if it has spots" bias is high and the "It's a Bloop if it
has a tail" bias is low, then attending to creature one of row one that contains spots and
one tail will excite the "It's a Bloop if it has spots" node at more than it will excite
the "It's a Bloop if it has a tail" node. When a creature is paid attention to, the proposal
category whose activity is largest in response to the input creature is chosen as the
one matched. A match signal corresponding to the shared feature(s) is sent to the habit
and bias nodes. These signals either increase or decrease the activity of the bias node
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CHAPTER
depending upon whether the creature is in row one (is a Bloop) or in row two (not a
Bloop). In other words, if one initiates the idea that the presence of spots is the relevant
feature and attends to creature one of row one that has many spots and is a Bloop, then
signals to the habit and bias nodes increase. On the other hand, if one attends to
creature one of row two that has many spots but is not a Bloop, then the signals
decrease.
Additional details of the network, including equations that the various signals obey
can be found in Levine & Prueitt (1989). For our purposes the one remaining key
variable is reinforcement R that activates the bias nodes. As shown in Figure 9, this
reinforcement can take on the value
or
where is parameter assumed to be
relatively high in normal adults and relatively low in adults with frontal lobe damage.
This is to say that the reinforcement arrow (either + or -) from the reinforcement locus
to the bias node corresponds to the role of the frontal lobes in task performance. Thus
75
in the present study the value for our six-year-olds is assumed to be relatively low
because their frontal lobes are not yet sufficiently operational. Whereas the value for
the eight-year-olds is relatively high because their frontal lobes are assumed to be
operational. In brief, the failure of adults with frontal lobe damage to shift from sorting
cards on the WCST based upon, say, a color criterion to a shape criterion is explained
by the failure of the reinforcement locus in the frontal lobes to send sufficiently strong
signals (either + or -) to the bias node to sufficiently alter the activity of the bias node.
Without sufficiently strong signals the currently active bias will continue to control
behavior. It is possible that the six-year-olds in the present study failed to shift their
classification criteria for the same reason.
Levine & Pruiett (1989) cite a number of experimental and anatomical findings
(e.g., Mishkin, Malamut & Bachevalier, 1984; Mishkin & Appenzeller, 1987; Ulinski,
1980; Nauta, 1971) in support of the distinctions made in their neural network. They
also report results of a simulation of normal and frontally damaged persons on the
WCST in which was the only parameter altered. For normal persons was set at 4.
To simulate frontal damage was set at 1.5. Results of the simulations were nearly
identical to previously reported results with actual normal and frontally damaged
persons. Therefore, the results provide support for the accuracy of their network and,
by inference, for the network presented in Figure 9.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The basic argument advanced is that the ability to evaluate evidence that is either
supportive of or contradictory to proposals regarding the relevant features of objects
encountered in one's environment is central to the process of descriptive concept
construction. Further, it may be that it is not until seven years of age that the frontal
lobes are mature enough to attend to contradictory evidence with sufficient regard to
prompt the evaluation and possible alteration of one's initial ideas. In other words,
hypothetico-predictive arguments in descriptive contexts carry little or no force when
the child initially believes that tails are the key feature. However, when the frontal lobes
mature sufficiently to allow contradictory evidence to be attended to and evaluated, a
powerful pattern of verbal hypothetico-predictive argumentation becomes available to
the child, a pattern that could well warrant the designation as a new stage of intellectual
development because it allows for the personal construction of descriptive concepts.
The tentative conclusion then is that the stage of intellectual development, which
beings at seven years of age (Piaget called it concrete operational), involves use of a
verbally-mediated, hypothetico-predictive reasoning pattern to test the relevance of
alternative features of objects, events, and situations in the child's environment to
construct descriptive concepts. Reasoning at this stage is initiated with what the child
directly perceives in his/her environment, e.g., the child is able to actually see the tiny
spots, tails, etc. on the creatures in the Mellinark Task. In this sense the representations
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CHAPTER 3
the child uses to initiate reasoning are empirical in origin and the concepts that are
proposed and tested are descriptive in nature.
Of course later in life, particularly in science, many entities and processes are
proposed and tested that are explanatory in nature. For example, it is well known that
adult salmon return to the stream of their birth to spawn. This observation raises a very
interesting causal question. Namely: How do salmon locate the stream of their birth
prior to spawning? (i.e., What causes salmon to end up in their home stream?) Because
the salmon will not tell you how they do it, nor can one find the answer by merely
watching salmon as they head upstream, answering a causal question of this sort
requires that one generate and test alternative causal, as opposed to descriptive,
hypotheses. Causal hypothesis generation requires the use of analogy (borrowing
explanations) as opposed to direct observation (Hanson, 1958; pp. 8S-86 refers to the
process as abduction, i.e., abducting/stealing/borrowing ideas from one context for use
in another context). Regardless of how causal hypotheses are generated, once
generated, they must be tested using the same hypothetico-predictive reasoning pattern,
which in this case might go something like this:
If...salmon navigate by using their eyes in a way analogous to the way humans often
navigate, (sight hypothesis)
and...some returning salmon are blindfolded, (planned test)
then...they should not be as successful at finding their home stream as non-blindfolded
salmon. (prediction)
But... both groups of salmon are equally successful. (observed result)
Therefore...the sight hypothesis is not supported. We need to generate and test another
causal hypothesis. (conclusion)
Thus, we have identified at least two levels of hypothetico-predictive reasoning. On
the lower level, reasoning is initiated by empirical representations, by the direct
perception of environmental stimuli. This level of reasoning is used to test descriptive
hypotheses and to construct descriptive concepts. On the higher level, reasoning is
initiated by abductively generated hypothetical representations, by analogies, and is
used to test causal hypotheses and presumably to construct causal concepts (more will
said about this in subsequent chapters, particularly in Chapter 8).
Having differentiated at least two levels of hypothetico-predictive reasoning, we
may finally be in a position to explain why Lawson et al. (1991) found such a high
correlation between high school students' performance on a test of
scientific/mathematical reasoning and performance on the Mellinark-type tasks. As
mentioned, the problem for the unsuccessful high school students was not that they
lacked skill in use of the lower-level reasoning needed to test descriptive hypotheses.
We know this because students all the way down to second grade were easily prompted
to use the lower-level reasoning to solve the descriptive tasks. Instead the problem for
the high school students seems to have been that some lack skill in use of higher-level
reasoning to test alternative problem-solving strategies (e.g., a matching strategy versus
77
use the lower-order, hypothetico-predictive reasoning). In other words, successful

performance on the creature card tasks, when left on your own as the high school
students were, appears to require that one try out and test a number of abductivelygenerated strategies. Thus, if students lack skill in this higher-level reasoning, they will
have difficulty in solving the tasks whenever their first "hypothesis" about what strategy
the task calls for is wrong.
In support of this tentative explanation, consider the remarks of a third student cited
in Lawson et al. (1991, pp. 965-966). This student initially generated the matching
strategy, found it unsatisfactory, but was unable, on her own, to reject it and derive a
successful strategy:
To me this is mind-boggling. I don't relate much to this. I'll say number four is a
Mellinark...number three...number one is not a Mellinark. There is no rhyme or reason
to this to me, absolutely none.
Well let's just take them on at a time. You said four is a Mellinark.
I guess because it compares to this (number four row one). And that's the only reason,
the circle fits in the middle, and this (number three, row three) relates because it's a
rounded figure...and some of these (row one) are, but some of these (row two) aren't.
This (number one, row three) is more of a jagged effect, so I would say it's not a
Mellinark. These are more straight line. This has a tail on it. I can't even relate to that. I
can't figure out what you are getting at because you see some of both ideas in both of
them. Because I can't reason on it, I don't like guessing either.
Well, some people have looked at it this way. Say, for example, that all of these (row
one) have tails. If a Mellinark is a creature with a tail, then you would expect that none
of them in row two would have a tail, but some of them do. So the idea is that a
Mellinark is just a creature with a tail must be wrong.
Uh huh.
So there must be some other reason for being a Mellinark.

Yeah, that's what I was looking for - some similar point. If they were all more of a
rounder effect, and they were more of a jagged effect or straight lines. But I could not
see that -I could not see what you were getting at.
Well, suppose you look for combinations of features. For example, these all have tails
and a big dot.
Well, that's true. Maybe the big dot plus a tail is what the Mellinark is. Ah! OK, that
makes a little more sense.
OK, go with that idea for a minute. Does that pan out?
Yeah, I think it does - you get your dot, tail and your Mellinark...or your dots. Is that
what you are saying? Your dots, with the big dot and with the tail. Because you don't
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see all three on any of these (row two) that I can see. OK...so if you put all three
combinations, then I would say one, two, and six (row three). So you had to give me
that idea, but after I looked I thought, ah! Heh! heh! heh! But I don't think I could sit
here and figure that out. OK.
This response implies that the older, untrained students can identify task features
and can use the necessary hypothetico-predictive reasoning to test these features. But
they cannot use hypothetico-predictive reasoning to generate and test alternative
problem-solving strategies. Thus, just like kindergarten students who perseverate on
incorrect task features, many high school students perseverate on an initially generated
and incorrect strategy.
In conclusion, the creature card tasks appear to require use of two levels of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning for solution. Use of the higher-level reasoning appears
necessary when students must solve the tasks on their own and when their initial
problem-solving strategy is in error and must be rejected. However, only the lowerlevel reasoning is necessary when the correct strategy is provided through brief
training. The Lawson et al. (1991) results, coupled with the present results, imply that
many high school students are not skilled in use of the higher-level reasoning, whereas
virtually all elementary school students are skilled in use of the lower-level reasoning,
reasoning that appears to emerge at age seven as a consequence of the acquisition of
language and the maturation of the brain's frontal lobes. Of course the possibility exists
that another spurt of brain maturation is necessary for use of the higher-level reasoning
(see Chapters 4 and 5).
7.
INSTRUCTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
At this point, only tentative instructional implications can be drawn. One might
suspect, however, that classroom introduction of several creature task tasks, followed
by discussion of the reasoning pattern used to solve them might be an effective way to
help unskilled junior high school and high school students begin to understand and use
(via analogy) the same pattern of reasoning employed at the higher level to test causal
hypotheses and problem-solving strategies. Effective instruction along these lines
would seem to require that the teacher clearly point out how the reasoning pattern in
both situations is the same but that reasoning in the two situations is initiated by
different sorts of ideas (i.e., observationally-generated descriptive hypotheses versus
abductively-generated causal hypotheses/strategies). The intended result of such
instruction would be that older students would become more conscious of the use of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning at this higher level. Such increased consciousness
should pay off in terms of increased skill in testing causal hypotheses, in testing
alternative problem-solving strategies and presumably in increased understanding of
higher-level scientific and mathematical concepts.
CHAPTER 4
BRAIN MATURATION, INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THEORETICAL
CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
The development of hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill used to construct

descriptive concepts appears to be linked to frontal lobe maturation at age seven (see
Chapter 3). Likewise, the development of higher-level, hypothetico-predictive
reasoning, which presumably is used to construct theoretical concepts, may also be
linked to further maturation of the brain's frontal lobes during early adolescence. In
theory, the construction of theoretical concepts involves higher-level, hypotheticopredictive reasoning when such reasoning is used to construct arguments to reject
previously constructed misconceptions and accept more appropriate theoretical
conceptions. In other words, such reasoning skill is needed to undergo the necessary
conceptual change. This chapter will discuss research designed to test the hypothesis
that frontal lobe maturation during early adolescence influences the development of
higher-level, hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill and that the development of such
reasoning skill influences one's ability to construct theoretical concepts.
2. RELATED RESEARCH ON BRAIN MATURATION
Based on measured increases in brain weight and skull circumference, Epstein

(1974a; 1974b; 1978) concluded that brain growth during childhood and adolescence
occurs in a series of plateaus and spurts. With respect to early adolescence, Epstein
& Toepfer (1978) state... "in perhaps 85% of all youngsters between ages 12 and 14,
the brain virtually ceases to grow" (p. 657). According to Epstein and Toepfer, the
early adolescent plateau, which coincides with the onset of puberty, is followed by a
spurt from age 14 to 16. The plateau and subsequent spurt appear to be related to
learning ability. For example, Epstein & Toepfer cite data establishing a peak in fluid
intelligence around age 11 (presumably when the brain is growing) followed by dip
around age 13 to 13.5 (presumably when the brain has stopped growing). Further,
they claim that overall brain growth coincides with the four classical stages of
Piaget's developmental theory (i.e., sensory-motor, preoperational, concrete
operational, and formal operational). In their words, "These brain growth periods
may turn out to be the biological basis of the Piaget stages" (p. 657). More recent
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electroencephalographic data reported by Hudspeth & Pribram (1990) tend to

corroborate the link between developmental stages and brain growth. Interestingly,
these data show five cycles (i.e., spurts and plateaus) over the first 21 years of
postnatal development with the last starting at about 17 years of age suggesting the
possibility of a fifth developmental stage (see Chapters 7, 8 and 10).
Although the maximum number of neurons is probably present at birth, existing
neurons in the frontal lobes continue to grow throughout adolescence and perhaps
even into early adulthood (Schad & Van Groenigen, 1961). More specifically,
Blinkov & Glezer (1968) found that pyramidal neurons (see Chapter 2) in the frontal
lobes increase more in length and width during adolescence than do neurons in the
pre-motor and sensory-motor areas. Dendrites of the frontal pyramidal neurons also
continue to grow after birth. Dendrites, which are relatively rudimentary in
newborns, continue to grow throughout the teenage years resulting in increases in
total dendrite length and in number of branches (Schad & Van Groenigen, 1961).
Increases in frontal lobe neuron myelinization also continue during the teenage years.
In contrast, myelinization of the sensory-motor cortex is mostly complete by age two
(Yakoblev & Lecours, 1967). Also, spurts of electroencephalographic activity during
adolescence are centered in the frontal lobes (Thatcher et al., 1987). Therefore, it
seems reasonable to suspect that the age 14 to 16 brain growth spurt occurs primarily
in the frontal lobes.
Research has yet to establish a clear link between the apparent age 14 - 16 brain
growth spurt and frontal lobe activity. Nevertheless, published data on children's and
adolescents' ability to inhibit previously relevant, but currently irrelevant, cues to
correctly sort cards in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (i.e., Heaton, Chelune, Tally,
Kay & Curtiss, 1993) are suggestive of such a link. Several neurological studies,
many dealing with patients with frontal lobe damage, have established the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task as a valid measure of frontal lobe activity (e.g., Knight &
Grabowecky, 1995; Luria, 1980; Milner, 1963; Milner, 1964; Shimamura,
Gershberg, Jurica, Mangels & Knight, 1992; Weinberger, Berman & Illowsky, 1988;
Weinberger, Berman & Zec, 1986). Analysis of the Heaton et al. data shows that
inhibiting ability (i.e., one's ability to disregard/inhibit potentially misleading cues),
as measured by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, increases with age with the
exception of a rather pronounced performance dip from age 10 to about 13 years - a
time period that coincides with the onset of puberty (Cole & Cole, 1989). Could this
dip be caused by a lack of frontal lobe growth during this age period? Could the dip
be linked to other cognitive abilities that are also centered in the frontal lobes, such
one's ability to plan a series of moves to reach a goal, one's ability to find a simple
pattern embedded in a complex background, and one's ability to mentally coordinate
separate bits of information?
Assuming that the apparent age 12-14 plateau and age 14-16 spurt can be linked
to such frontal lobe activities, can they also be linked to students' reasoning skill and
to their ability to construct scientific and mathematical concepts? Previous studies
are suggestive of such links. For example, Lawson, Karplus & Adi (1978) found
BRAIN MATURATION AND THEORETICAL CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION
81
little or no difference between sixth graders (mean age = 12.9 years) and eighth
graders (mean age = 14.3 years) use of proportional and probabilistic reasoning. But
they found huge advances in the use of proportional and probabilistic reasoning from
the eighth graders to tenth graders (mean age 16.1 years). Also in a sample of 6,130
Korean students, Hwang, Park & Kim (1989) found generally similar performances
on measures of proportional, combinatorial, probabilistic and correlational reasoning
among 12, 13 and 14-year-olds (i.e., an average of only 3.8% increase in the number
of successful responses across this age span). However, they found substantial
performance increases by the 15-year-olds (i.e., an average of 15.2% increase in the
number of successful responses). Further, several studies have established a clear
link between reasoning skill and concept learning (e.g., Baker, 1994; Choi & Hur,
1987; Johnson & Lawson, 1998; Kim & Kwon, 1994; Lawson & Renner, 1975;
Lawson, 1985; Robinson & Niaz, 1991; Ward & Herron, 1980). Analysis of the
Heaton et al. data and these education studies suggest that the early adolescent brain
growth plateau and spurt may impact several important cognitive abilities and what
students may or may not learn as a consequence of instruction.
Frontal lobe maturation during early adolescence is accompanied by increases in
neuron myelination. Increased myelination increases signal transmission rate. Thus, it
seems reasonable to suspect that increased signal transmission rate in turn increases the
amount of information that can be processed during any time period before signal decay
causes a loss of that information (see Grossberg's activity equation introduced in
Chapter 2). Hence, one's ability to mentally represent information (i.e., one's
representing ability) can be expected to increase during early adolescence. Representing
ability presumably includes one's ability to disembed relevant task information from
background noise, one's ability to plan a series of steps to reach a goal, and one's
working memory. In the context of theoretical concept construction, the ability to
represent task-relevant information presumably is crucial.
Further, increased signal transmission rate due to increased myelinization can be
expected to increase signal frequency, hence signal strength. If increased myelination
occurs in the axons that transmit signals from the frontal lobes responsible for the
positive and negative reinforcement to bias nodes (as depicted in the Levine-Pruiett
neural network introduced in Chapter 3), then increases in one's ability to inhibit taskirrelevant information can also be expected to increase during early adolescence. In the
context of conceptual change, task-irrelevant information represents prior
misconceptions that must be inhibited prior to engaging in internal and/or external
hypothetico-predictive arguments that may cause the misconceptions to be rejected. In
other words, if a person is so certain that their prior conceptions are correct, they may
be unwilling/unable to subject them to hypothetico-predictive tests, hence will not
undergo conceptual change. On the other hand, once a new conception is seen as at
least plausible then the student is in a position to engage in hypothetico-predictive
argumentation that may result in conceptual change. Figure 1 summarizes the key
theoretical relationships just described.
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CHAPTER
2.1 Research Design and Predictions
As a test of the theoretical relationships summarized by Figure 1, an identical

series of 14 inquiry lessons was taught to eight groups of students ranging in age
from 13.1 to 16.9 years - an age range in which growth of the frontal lobes
presumably plateaus and then spurts. Prior to instruction, measures associated with
frontal lobe activity (i.e., inhibiting, planning, and disembedding abilities and mental
capacity) were administered to all students, as was a test of scientific reasoning skill.
A test of theoretical concepts understanding (i.e., air pressure concepts derived from
kinetic-molecular theory) was administered before and after instruction. The
following argument summarizes the alternative hypotheses tested and their predicted
results:
If...frontal lobe maturation during early adolescence influences the development of
higher-order reasoning skill and the development of higher-order reasoning skill
influences one's ability to construct theoretical concepts, (frontal-lobe-maturation
hypothesis)
and...frontal lobe activities and reasoning skill are measured in students ranging in
age from 13.1 to 16.9 years and the students are taught a series of identical lessons
involving theoretical concepts, (planned test)
then...the measures should show performance plateaus among the 13 and the 14year-old students that should be followed by performance spurts among the older
students. Further, instruction should be equally ineffective among the 13 and 14
year-olds but should become increasingly effective among the 15 and 16-year-olds.
(predictions)
On the other hand,
83
if...increases in reasoning skill and learning ability depend only on environmental

influences (e.g., increases in declarative knowledge due to schooling or simply to
increases in general life experiences), which presumably increase linearly with age,
(experience hypothesis)
then...no performance plateaus and/or spurts should be found and instruction should
be increasingly effective across age in a linear fashion. (predictions)
3. METHOD
3.1 Sample
Two hundred six volunteer students (107 females and 99 males) ranging from
13.1 to 16.9 years of age from two junior high schools and two senior high schools in
Korea participated in the study. One junior and one senior high school were located
in city of approximately 100,000 people. The other junior and senior high schools
were located in a city of approximately two million people. Each student was
enrolled in one of eight all male or all female eighth-grade through eleventh-grade
science classes.
3.2 Instruments
Inhibiting Ability. The individually administered Wisconsin Card Sorting Task WCST (Heaton et al., 1993) was used to measure inhibiting ability. Testing of each
student took about 10 minutes. The WCST consists of four stimulus cards and 128
response cards (see Figure 2). The first stimulus card shows one red triangle. The
second shows two green stars. The third shows three yellow crosses. And the fourth
shows four blue circles. The 128 response cards have different shapes (crosses,
circles, triangles, or stars), colors (red, yellow, blue, or green) and number of figures
(one, two, three, or four). The student is given the 128 response cards and asked to
match each card to one of the four stimulus cards. After each attempted match, the
student is told whether the match is correct or incorrect, but not told the matching
principle (i.e., match by color, match by shape, match by number).
More specifically, the first matching principle was match by color. All other
attempted matches were called incorrect. Once the student made ten consecutive
correct color matches, the sorting principle was secretly shifted to shape. If the
student continued to incorrectly match by color in spite of negative feedback from
the interviewer, he/she is said to have committed a perseveration error (i.e., an
incorrect response in card sorting in the face of negative feedback). After ten
consecutive correct responses to shape, the principle was shifted to number and then
back to color. This procedure continued until the student successfully completed six
matching categories or until all 128 cards had been used. Because this test was quite
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time consuming, five interviewers were used to administer the test. Interviewer
training included verbal explanations and practical examples on presenting the test
directions, on recording student responses, on giving feedback, and on making
appropriate category shifts. The training session lasted about two hours. Inter-rater
reliability 0.93 based on records of sample student responses.
Scoring. The number of perseveration errors for each category was summed to
obtain a total number for each student. Data analyses were then run using these
numbers. Note however that inhibiting ability is inversely correlated with the number
of perseveration errors. Thus, students who make fewer perseveration errors are
assumed to have more inhibiting ability.
Planning Ability. Planning ability was assessed by the individually administered
Tower of London Test. Testing of each student took about 20 minutes. The test
requires planning in terms of means-ends analysis to successively solve a set of
increasingly difficult tasks (Krikorian, Bartok, & Gay, 1994; Shallice, 1982). To
solve each task, students must plan and execute a series of moves with success being
defined in terms of task completion within a minimum number of moves. Test
materials consist of a board with three vertical wooden sticks of varying heights and
three moveable balls. The balls, colored red, green, and blue, can be slid up and
down the sticks. The first stick can hold all three balls. The second stick can hold
two balls. And the third stick could hold just one ball. From the initial ball positions,
the student is asked to move one ball at a time from stick to stick, in a prescribed
number of moves to achieve a certain predetermined goal (e.g., order the balls, green
over blue over red on the long stick in five moves). The test requires students to plan
a series of sub-goals as they must not only anticipate and visualize the end goal, but
each step to that goal must also be mapped in the proper sequence.
Krikorian et al. (1994) developed a set of tasks appropriate for students in grades
one through eight. Because the present study tested students in grades eight through
85
eleven, the Krikorian et al. test was modified to include five additional tasks of
increasing difficulty for a total of 12 tasks, two of which were practice. Each student
was tested individually by one of five trained interviewers. Training included verbal
explanations and practice on presenting test directions, on recording student
responses, on checking time limits, and on giving feedback. The training session took
about two hours. Inter-rater reliability was 0.95 for a sample of student responses.
Scoring. The easiest of the scored tasks required four moves and the most
difficult required seven. Three trials were allowed for each task. Students were given
one minute to reach the goal position per trial. Three points were awarded if the goal
position was achieved in the prescribed number of moves and within the time limit
on the first trial. Two points were awarded for a successful performance on the
second trial. And one point was awarded for a successful performance on the third
trial. If the student failed all three trials, a score of 0 was awarded. A student's total
score was the sum of points earned on all 10 tasks. Thus a maximum of 30 points
was possible. In a pilot test of 30 9th-grade students, a Chronbach
reliability
coefficient of 0.61 was obtained.
Disembedding Ability. The group administered Group Embedded Figures Test
(Dumsha, Minard & McWilliams, 1973; Thompson, Pitts & Gipe, 1983; Witkin,
Moore, Goodenough & Cox, 1977; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971) was used
to assess disembedding ability. The test requires students to locate and outline simple
figures concealed in complex and potentially misleading backgrounds.
Disembedding ability improves with age during childhood and adolescence, but one's
ability relative to one's peers remains relatively constant across age (Witkin, et al.
1971; Witkin, et al. 1977). The Korean version of the Group Embedded Figures Test
used in the present study consists of 16 figures in each of two sections (Jeon & Jang,
1995). Students were given 10 minutes for each section. Ahn (1995) reported a
Cronbach's reliability coefficient of 0.70 when the test was used with a sample of
Korean secondary students similar to those in the present study.
Mental Capacity. The group administered Figural Intersection Test developed by
Pascual-Leone & Smith (1969) was used to assess mental capacity. The test took
about 15 minutes to complete. Mental capacity is defined by Pascual-Leone (1970)
as the size of one's central computing space or working memory. According to
Pascual-Leone, mental capacity increases from e + 1 at three years of age to about e
+ 7 at 15 years; where e represents the mental effort or energy required to attend to
specific easily understood and remembered questions posed by given tasks and the
number represents the maximum number of "schemes" that can be successfully
coordinated at a given time to solve the task. The Figural Intersection Test has been
used to assess the mental capacity of students in various studies (e.g., de Ribaupierre
& Pascual-Leone, 1979; Globerson, 1983; Niaz & Lawson, 1985; Pascual-Leone,
1970; Pascual-Leone & Ijaz, 1989).
Scoring. The test used in the present study consists of 32 items with from two to
eight overlapping figures. For each item, the student is asked to mark a point
indicating the area of intersection of the overlapping figures. No time limit is given
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to complete the test. A maximum score of 32 points was possible. A Cronbach's

reliability coefficient of 0.88 was obtained in a sample of Korean secondary school
students similar to those of the present study was 0.88 (Ahn, 1995).
Validity of the above described instruments as measures of frontal lobe activity
have been established primarily through multiple reports of frontal lobe damage
leading to striking deficits in performance on these and similar instruments:
inhibiting ability (e.g., Milner, 1963; 1964; Weinberger, Berman & Illowski, 1988;
Weinberger, Berman & Zec, 1986); planning ability (e.g., Baker et al., 1996; Black
& Strub, 1976; Fuster, 1989; Luria & Tsvetkova, 1964; Luria, 1973; Stuss &
Benson, 1986); dissembedding ability (Cicerone et al., 1983; Dempster, 1992;
Knight & Grabowecky, 1995; Kolb & Whishaw, 1996; Teuber, 1972); working
memory (e.g., Baur & Fuster, 1976; Fuster, 1973; Goldman-Rakic, 1990; GoldmanRakic & Friedman, 1991; McCarthy et al., 1995).
Reasoning Skill. A 14-item group administered test was used to assess reasoning
skill. The test took about 50 minutes to complete. The test is a modified version of
Lawson's Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning (Lawson, 1978; 1987; 1992). The
modified test contains 8 of the original 12 items. The original items were based on
Piagetian tasks and involve the identification and control of variables, and
proportional, probabilistic, correlational and combinatorial reasoning (Inhelder &
Piaget, 1958; Karplus & Lavatelli, 1969; Piaget & Inhelder, 1962; Suarez &
Rhonheimer, 1974). Two of the additional items on the modified test involve
proportional and combinatorial reasoning and came from Lawson, Carlson, Sullivan,
Wilcox & Wollman (1976). The four remaining items came from Lawson, Clark,
Cramer-Meldrum, Falconer, Sequist & Kwon (2000). Two of these involve water
rise in an inverted cylinder after the cylinder had been placed over a burning candle
sitting in water. The other two involve changes in the appearance of red onion cells
when bathed in salt water. These four items require students to use hypotheticodeductive reasoning to reject hypotheses involving theoretical entities. For example,
the burning-candle items ask students to propose an experiment to test and allow one
to reject the hypothesis that water rises in the inverted cylinder because the carbon
dioxide produced by the flame rapidly dissolves in the water.
Scoring. All items required students to respond to a question or make a prediction
in writing and to either explain how they obtained their answer, or in the case of
quantitative problems, to show their calculations. Items were judged correct (a score
of 1) if the correct answer plus an adequate explanation or set of calculations was
present. Incorrect answers were scored 0. A Cronbach's reliability coefficient of
0.75 was obtained in a pilot study of 37 10th-grade students. Validity of the test has
been established through numerous studies (e.g., Lawson, 1978; 1979; 1980a;
1980b; 1982; 1983; Lawson & Weser, 1990).
Test of Air Pressure Concepts. The researchers constructed a group-administered
test to assess students' understanding of air pressure concepts. The test was
administered before and after instruction. The test, which took about 20 minutes to
complete, consists of six short-answer essay items concerning the causes of: 1) a
87
milk shake rising up a straw when you "suck," 2) water rising in a cylinder inverted
over a burning candle sitting in a pan of water, 3) a collapsing soda can submerged in
cool water, 4) a peeled, hard-boiled egg entering a bottle that previously contained a
burning piece of paper, 5) a rising hot air balloon and, 6) air entering your lungs. For
example, Item 1 read: When drinking a milk shake with a straw, you can "suck" the
milk shake into your mouth through the straw. How does "sucking" on the straw
cause the milk shake to move up the straw? And Item 5 read: When you heat a hotair balloon from below, the balloon rises. Explain why heating causes the balloon to
rise.
Scoring. Correct written responses were awarded 2 points each for a total of 12
possible points. Partially correct responses were awarded 1 point. Incorrect
responses received 0 points. Content validity and item clarity were established
through content-expert analysis prior to administration. A Cronbach's reliability
coefficient of 0.69 was obtained in a pilot study of 37 l0th-grade students.
3.3 Instructional Treatment
Instructional treatment consisted of 14 two-hour, inquiry-based lessons using the

learning cycle method of instruction (Lawson, Abraham & Renner, 1989). The same
instructor (Yong-Ju Kwon) taught all lessons, Lesson 1 introduced students to the
hypothetico-predictive pattern of scientific research (i.e., causal question
alternative hypotheses
planned tests
predicted results
actual tests
observed results
conclusion), through use of examples of prior scientific research.
Once the research pattern was introduced, students were challenged to apply the
pattern in the context of earthworm responses to various stimuli.
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Lessons 2-4 provided students with an opportunity to apply hypotheticopredictive reasoning to generate and test hypotheses about why empty soda cans
collapse when submerged in cool water. Following the test of several studentgenerated hypotheses, the instructor introduced relevant postulates of kineticmolecular theory to explain the cause of greater air pressure outside the can, thus its
collapse. Students were then challenged to apply the introduced concepts to predict
and explain what will happen to air-filled balloons when cooled.
During lessons 5-7 students explored what happens when burning pieces of paper
are dropped into bottles and then peeled hard-boiled eggs are placed on the bottle
openings. Based on their observations, students raised causal questions (e.g., What
causes the eggs to move into the bottles?) and then generated and tested alternative
hypotheses. The relevant postulates of kinetic-molecular theory were applied to
explain the phenomenon. Students were then challenged to apply the theory to
remove the eggs from the bottles and to explain what they did and why it worked.
Lessons 8-10 allowed students to explore what happens when an inverted
cylinder is placed over a burning candle sitting upright in a pan of water. Students
generated and tested several hypotheses in response to the question: What causes
water to rise in the inverted cylinder? Again following student hypothesis testing,
relevant concepts of kinetic-molecular theory were applied to derive an explanation
consistent with the students' observations.
During lessons 11-12 students explored the causes of liquids (e.g., milk shakes)
moving up straws when students "sucked" on the straws. After again using air
pressure concepts derived from kinetic-molecular theory to explain liquid movement,
students were challenged to explain how syringes can be used to "draw" blood
samples.
Lessons 13-14 challenged students to explore and explain how air passes into and
out of one's lungs during breathing. Again relevant air pressure concepts were
employed.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Frontal Lobe Activity Across Age

Figure 3 shows student performance on the four measures of frontal lobe activity
across student age groups. As shown at the upper left, inhibiting ability decreased
from age group 13 to 14 and then improved linearly from age group 14 to 16.
Overall group differences were statistically significant
p < 0.01). To
determine which specific age groups differed in inhibiting ability, a post hoc test
(Tukey's test) was conducted. The test showed that the difference between age
groups 14 and 16 was statistically significant (p < 0.01). Planning ability, shown at
the upper right, decreased from age group 13 to 14, then improved dramatically in
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age group 15, and then only slightly in age group 16. Overall improvements with age
were not statistically significant
p > 0.25). The lower left shows that
disembedding ability increased in a generally linear, but not significant, fashion
across all age groups
p > 0.10). Finally, the lower right shows that
mental capacity decreased from age group 13 to 14 and then increased linearly from
age group 14 to 16. Overall group differences were statistically significant
4.06, p < 0.01). The post hoc Tukey's test showed that mental capacity differences
between ages 14 and 16, and 13 and 16 were statistically significant (p < 0.01).
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4.2 Reasoning Skill Across Age

As shown in Figure 4, reasoning skill increased across age. A slight increase in
rate of improvement can be seen after age 14. Overall age-group improvements were
statistically significant
p < 0.01). Tukey's test revealed statistically
significant differences between ages 13 and 15, 13 and 16, 14 and 15, and 14 and 16
(p < 0.05), but not between age 13 and 14.
4.3 Predicting Reasoning Skill

Table 2a shows the results of a stepwise multiple regression analysis used to
determine which of the frontal lobe variables and age best predicts reasoning skill.
Collectively, the variables explained 56.1 % of the variance in reasoning skill
= 30.63, p < 0.001). As shown, inhibiting ability explained the largest percent of
total variance (29.3 %) followed by planning ability (14.9 %), age (8.8%),
disembedding ability (2.1%), and mental capacity (1.0 %).
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4.4 Theoretical Concept Construction Across Age

Figure 5 shows student performance on the test of air pressure concepts across
age groups. Pretest mean scores, posttest mean scores, and mean gain scores (i.e.,
posttest minus pretest scores) are shown. As you can see, both pretest and posttest
mean scores improved with age. Both main effects were statistically significant
p < 0.001 and
p < 0.001, respectively). Age-wise
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improvement in mean gain scores was also statistically significant

p<
0.01). The gain scores for the 13 and 14-year-old groups were nearly identical (3.5
and 3.6 points respectively), while the 15-year-olds showed somewhat greater gains
(4.5 points) and the 16-year-olds showed still greater gains (5.3 points). Tukey's test
showed that the gains between ages 13 and 16, and 14 and 16 were statistically
significant (p < 0.05). Importantly, the difference between age 13 and age 14 gains
was not statistically significant.
4.5 Predicting Concept Gains and Posttest Performance

Table 2b shows the results of a stepwise multiple regression analysis used to
determine which of the frontal lobe measures, age, reasoning skill, and concept
pretest scores (prior knowledge) were significant predictors of concept gains. As
shown, inhibiting ability, reasoning skill, concept pretest, age and planning ability
significantly explained 42.9% of the variance in concept gains
p<
0.001). Specifically, inhibiting ability was the best single predictor explaining 28.1%
of the variance. Reasoning skill, concept pretest, age and planning ability explained
6.9%, 5.4%, 1.4% and 1.1% of the respective unique variance. Table 2c shows
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results of stepwise multiple regression analysis in which the frontal lobe measures,
age, reasoning skill, and concept pretest score (prior knowledge), were used to
predict concept posttest performance. As shown, reasoning skill, inhibiting ability,
concept pretest, age and planning ability explained 70.7% the variance on concept
posttest performance
p < 0.001). The predictor variables explained
53.3%, 11.9%, 4.2%, 0.7% and 0.6% of the variance respectively. Respective
standardized partial-regression coefficients were 0.26, 0.42, 0.25, 0.11 and 0.09.
Each of the respective variables explained 7.0%, 17.7%, 6.1%, 1.1%, and 8.3% of
the unique variance.
4.6 Inter-correlations Among Study Variables
Table 3 shows Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients among the study
variables. As you can see, all variables correlated significantly with reasoning skill
with coefficients ranging from 0.36 for disembedding ability to 0.73 for the concepts
posttest. The correlation of reasoning skill with concept pretest was 0.57 and with
concept gains was 0.51. The four frontal lobe measures showed positive and
significant correlations with reasoning skill, with concept gains, and with concept
posttest scores. Inhibiting and planning ability showed the highest correlations with
reasoning skill (0.54); while inhibiting ability showed the highest correlation with
concept gains (0.53) and with concept posttest scores (0.55). Intercorrelations among
the frontal lobe measures were low to moderate (0.20, NS to 0.35, p < 0.01).
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4.7
CHAPTER 4
Common Components of Study Variables
Table 4 shows the results of a principal components analysis of all study variables.
The analysis was conducted with varimax rotation extracting eigenvalues greater
than one. Two principal components were extracted accounting for 29.5% and 27.2%
of the variance respectively. Inhibiting ability loaded most strongly on component 2
(0.75), while the other frontal lobe measures loaded moderately on both components.
Age loaded primarily on component 1 (0.50). Reasoning skill loaded moderately on
both components (0.70 on component 1 and 0.53 on component 2). Concept pretest
loaded heavily on component 1 (0.92), while concept gains loaded more strongly on
component 2 (0.92). Concept posttest loaded moderately on both components (0.66
on component 1 and 0.63 on component 2).
5. DISCUSSION
Figure 3 shows that inhibiting ability and mental capacity decreased from age 13
to 14 and then showed the predicted increases at ages 15 and 16 based on the frontallobe-maturation hypothesis. The pattern for planning ability is also as predicted with
the exception of the plateau between ages 15 and 16. The disembedding ability
pattern is not the predicted one based on the frontal-lobe-maturation hypothesis. But
notice that neither is the pattern the linear one predicted by the experience
hypothesis. Whether or not the apparent increase in rate of disembedding
improvement seen after age 15 is real, or merely an artifact of the present sample, is
an issue that remains for future research. Nevertheless, these results in large part
support the hypothesis that these cognitive abilities are influenced by frontal lobe
maturation.
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Figure 4 indicates that reasoning skill increases with age with the rate of increase
accelerating after age 14. As mentioned, the difference between the 13 and 14-yearolds' scores was not statistically significant. This improvement pattern, which
appears to be a "hybrid" between the predicted linear experiential pattern and the
predicted plateau/spurt maturational pattern, is consistent with the view that
reasoning improvements are a product of both neurological maturation and
experience (physical and social). Finding evidence that both neurological maturation
and experience play a role in the development of reasoning skill is consistent with
developmental theory. For example, with regard to the development of adolescent
thought, Inhelder & Piaget (1958) stated: "...this structure formation depends on
three principal factors: maturation of the nervous system, experience acquired in
interaction with the physical environment, and the influence of the social milieu" (p.
243).
Figure 5, which indicates student performance on the concept pre and posttests, and
concept gains, reveals the predicted improvements with age. Importantly, the amount of
learning as evidenced by gains shows the predicted plateau and spurt pattern as gains of
the 13 and 14-year-olds were virtually identical (3.5 and 3.6 respectively). The failure
of the 14-year-olds to outperform the 13-year-olds is similar to the result reported by
Choi & Hur (1987) who administered a test of biology, chemistry and physics concepts
to students in grades 7, 8 and 9 and found that performance dropped from 7th grade
(mean age = 12.9) to 8th grade (mean age 13.9) and then improved slightly among the
9th graders (mean age 14.8).
The multiple regression analyses shown in Tables 2b and 2c indicate that concept
gains are best predicted by inhibiting ability and by reasoning skill, while concept
posttest scores are best predicted by reasoning skill. Therefore, the hypothesis that
theoretical concept construction is in part dependent upon frontal lobe maturation is
supported. The results also add to the growing list of studies, some of which were cited
in the introduction, that have found reasoning skill to be a strong predictor of concept
construction/change.
The generally positive inter-correlations among the study variables (Table 3), as
well as the results of the principal components analysis (Table 4), suggest that the study
variables can be reduced to a smaller number of cognitive parameters. Note in Table 4
that inhibiting ability loaded primarily on component 2 while planning ability and
mental capacity loaded more strongly on component 1. Disembedding ability loaded
moderately on both components. Thus, as hypothesized, it appears that the frontal lobes
may be involved in executing two primary functions - an inhibiting function and a
representing function. The fact that reasoning skill loaded moderately on both
components suggests that reasoning involves both the inhibiting and representing
functions. In addition, concept pretest scores loaded heavily on the representing
component, while posttest scores loaded moderately on both the representing and
inhibiting component. Gains loaded heavily the inhibiting component. This suggests
that students who made substantial gains did so primarily because they were able to
inhibit irrelevant information.
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One does not have to look far to identify two "misconceptions" that need to be
inhibited to successfully conceptualize the causes of air-pressure changes. The first is
the "suction" misconception and the second is that air lacks weight. Viewed in this way,
the key instructional question becomes one of how to overcome these sorts of
misconceptions. Lessons 8-10 dealt with burning candles. The burning candle
phenomenon is interesting because it causes many students to invoke still another
misconception, namely the idea that combustion "eats" or "consumes" oxygen. When
students place an inverted cylinder over a burning candle sitting in a pan of water, they
see that the flame quickly goes out and the water rushes up into the cylinder. Thus, an
interesting question is raised: Why does water rise in the cylinder? The most common
student hypothesis is that the flame burns up the oxygen and this "lack-of-oxygen"
sucks the water up. During instruction students tested this hypothesis along with several
alternatives. Testing these alternative hypotheses requires use of some rather
sophisticated hypothetico-predictive reasoning. For example, to pit the oxygenconsumption hypothesis against an air-expansion-and-escape hypothesis, one can use
the following argument:
If...water is sucked up because oxygen is consumed,
and...water rise with one, two, and three candles is measured,
then...the height of water rise should be the same regardless of the number of burning
candles. This result is expected because there is only so much oxygen in the cylinder.
So more candles will burn up the oxygen faster; but they will not burn up more oxygen.
On the other hand,
if...the air-expansion-and-escape hypothesis is correct,
then...more candles should cause more water to rise because more candles will heat
more air, thus more will escape, which in turn will be replaced by more water when the
remaining air cools and contracts.
Once students carry out the experiment and find that more candles produce more
water rise, the oxygen-consumption hypothesis is contradicted and the air-expansionand-escape hypothesis is supported. So what does it take to get students to reject
incorrect hypotheses (some complete with misconceptions) and accept scientifically
correct hypotheses? Based on this analysis, it would seem that students have to initially
suspend (i.e., inhibit) their initial incorrect beliefs. In other words, they have to be
willing to admit that their initial ideas might be wrong and then be willing to test them.
They must then mentally represent some rather abstract/imaginary entities (i.e., moving
and colliding molecules) and then understand (assimilate) hypothetico-predictive
arguments of the If/then/Therefore form. In other words, they have to inhibit taskirrelevant information, represent task-relevant information and use cycles of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND INSTRUCTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

In conclusion, the present results provide support for the hypothesis that an early
adolescent brain growth plateau and spurt influences students' higher-level reasoning
skill and their ability to construct theoretical science concepts. In short, maturation of
the frontal lobes during early adolescence appears to be linked to students' abilities to
inhibit task-irrelevant information and mentally represent task-relevant information,
which along with both physical and social experience influences reasoning skill and
students' ability to reject intuitively derived scientific misconceptions and accept
scientific, but sometimes counter-intuitive, theoretical conceptions. This conclusion
is similar to that discussed in Chapter 3 in which an earlier brain growth spurt at age
seven was linked to students' ability to construct descriptive concepts.
Perhaps this is a good time to recall Bruner's famous dictum that "...any subject
can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage
of development" (Bruner, 1963, p. 33). At first blush, the present results and
conclusion seem to contradict this view. But note Bruner's key phrase "in some
intellectually honest form." If unlike the theoretical concept of air pressure that was
taught in the present study, we define air pressure as the force felt at one end of a
straw when someone else blows in the other end, or as the force created by the
moving blades of an electric fan, then the concept of air pressure (in this less abstract
but still intellectually honest form) becomes accessible to students at younger ages.
Thus, no contradiction with Bruner's position need exist. Indeed, consider Bruner's
follow up statement:
What is most important for teaching basic concepts is that the child be helped to pass
progressively from concrete thinking to the utilization of more conceptually adequate
modes of thought. But it is futile to attempt this by presenting formal explanations
based on logic that is distant from the child's manner of thinking and sterile in its
implications for him. (p. 38)
An approach to progressively moving from concrete/descriptive reasoning to

more abstract modes of thought that we take in a college-level biology course is to
first provide students with opportunities to generate and test causal hypotheses in
several familiar contexts and to carefully sequence those contexts so that they
progress from the familiar and observable to the less familiar and theoretical.
Preliminary results suggest that this approach produces less frustration and more
understanding. We should perhaps also mention that these college students are all
age 18 and older. Hence, they presumably have all undergone the fifth and
apparently final brain growth spurt by age 18. The extent to which this final growth
spurt may influence reasoning skill and theoretical concept construction/change is a
question that remains for future research. However, we should point out that even the
16 year-olds in the present study struggled with the theoretical concepts introduced.
In fact, their average score on the concepts posttest was only 68%. Given that the
students experienced at least 26 hours of instruction devoted to teaching those
concepts, this can hardly be considered a success.
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Chapters 7, 8 and 10 will present data suggestive of a fifth stage of intellectual

development. The data also suggest that fifth stage reasoning may be involved in
theoretical concept construction. Therefore, the practice of introducing theoretical
concepts "prematurely" is called into question. The point is that a teacher may tell
young students that theoretical constructs such as atoms exist, and that these atoms
have weight, can push down on surfaces, such as water, and so on. Perhaps some of
the young students will even believe the teacher - based on faith. However, if
instruction about atoms is scientific in the sense that it includes the reasons (i.e.,
evidence and arguments) for why scientists believe atoms exist and behave as they
do, then students must be "developmentally ready" for such instruction. Being
"developmentally ready" may mean being 18 years of age or older!
CHAPTER 5
CREATIVE THINKING, ANALOGY AND A NEURAL
MODEL OF ANALOGICAL REASONING
1. INTRODUCTION
According to Webster, to create means "to bring into existence; cause to be;
evolve from one's own thoughts or imagination" (Merriam-Webster, 1986). Scientific
creation has been described in terms of sequential phases of preparation, incubation,
illumination and F (Wallas, 1926; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995). During the creative
process, the conscious mind mulls over a question or problem only to give up and
turn it over to the subconscious. The subconscious then operates until it somehow
produces a novel combination of ideas that spontaneously erupt into consciousness to
produce the tentative answer or solution. From here the conscious mind guides a
more critical testing of the novel idea to discover whether or not its value is real or
illusionary (cf., Amsler, 1987; Boden, 1994; Koestler, 1964; McKellar, 1957;
Wallace & Gruber, 1989).
Consider for example, Koestler's (1964) version of the often-told story of
Archimedes and the golden crown. As Koestler tells the story, Hiero was given a
crown, allegedly made of pure gold. He suspected the crown was adulterated with
silver but he did not know how to tell for certain. So he asked Archimedes.
Archimedes knew the specific weights of gold and silver - their weights per unit
volume. Thus, if he could measure the crown's volume, he could determine whether
it was made of pure gold. But he did not know how to measure the volume of such an
irregularly shaped object. Clearly he could not melt down the crown and measure the
resulting liquid. Nor could he pound it into a measurable rectangular shape. With
these easy solutions blocked, Archimedes had a problem.
Using Wallas' terminology, Archimedes was engaged in the preparation phase of
creative thought. Having hit numerous dead ends, Archimedes put the problem aside.
Nevertheless, his mind was well prepared for progress as several blind alleys had
been tried and rejected. In a sense Archimedes now shunted the problem to his
subconscious to let it incubate. The next phase, illumination, presumably began while
Archimedes was about to take a bath. While lowering himself into the tub, he noticed
the water level rise. And in a flash it occurred to him that the water rise was an
indirect measure of his bodies' volume. Thus, presumably at that moment,
Archimedes "saw" how he could also measure the crown's volume - simply by
immersing it in water. And once he knew its volume, he could calculate its specific
weight to know if it were made of pure gold. Eureka! Archimedes had the solution.
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In Koestler's view, Archimedes' creative act can be understood essentially as one

of joining two planes of previously unconnected thought to reach a target solution T.
For example, Figure 1 depicts the plane of thought that contains the starting point
S and several thought paths that have unsuccessfully sought the target. Thus
presents the habitual rules that Archimedes used to measure volumes, weights, to
determine the nature of materials, and so on. But as you can see, the target T is not
contained on
Instead, it is located on - the thought plane associated with taking
a bath. Thus no amount of thinking on can reach T. Archimedes needs to shift his
thinking from to
To do this he needs a link L. As Koestler points out, the link
may have been verbal (for example, the sentence: rise in water level in the tub equals
melting down of my body); or it may have been visual in which the water-level rise
was seen to correspond to body volume and hence crown volume. Either way, the
key notion is that both planes of thought must be active in Archimedes' mind - albeit
not both on the conscious level - for the link to occur and for him to consciously
"see" the solution. Once illumination occurs, verification can take place. To do this,
Archimedes presumably thought through the steps of his newly created path from S
to T to satisfy himself that no crucial steps had been left out - that the path really led
to T. Another aspect of the verification phase is to actually put the new strategy to
work to discover if Hiero's crown had in fact been adulterated. The following
summarizes the key argument:
If...the crown is made of pure gold, (pure-gold hypothesis)
and...the crown is immersed in water and the displaced water is measured, (planned
test)
then...the crown should displace the same volume of water as displaced by a known
sample of pure gold of equal weight. (prediction)
On the other hand,
if...the crown has been adulterated by silver or by some other less dense metal,
(adulterated hypothesis)
then...it should displace a greater volume of water than displaced by a known sample
of pure gold of equal weight. (prediction)
Notice how the preparation, incubation and illumination phases of Archimedes'
thinking were creative in the sense that they brought into existence a new piece of
procedural knowledge (i.e., a procedure for measuring the volume of irregularlyshaped objects). On the other hand, the verification phase of his thinking can be
characterized as critical in the sense that once Archimedes created the new
procedure, he used it to analyze the metals in Hiero's crown. This critical thinking
produced a new piece of declarative knowledge (i.e., the crown was not pure gold).
CREATIVE THINKING
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102
1.1 Linking Thought Planes

At the heart of this model of creative and critical thinking lies the linking of two
or more previously disconnected "planes" of thought. Consequently, the issue of how
these planes are linked becomes of central importance. To see how thought planes
might be linked, let's turn to the research of two biologists. As told by Beveridge
(1950), while his family had left for a day at the circus one afternoon in 1890, Elie
Mechnikoff half-heartedly watched some transparent starfish larvae as he tossed a
few rose thorns among them. To his surprise, Mechnikoff noticed that the thorns
were quickly surrounded and dissolved by the larvae. The thorns were being
swallowed and digested. This reminded him of what happens when a splinter infects
a finger. The splinter becomes surrounded by pus, which, Mechnikoff surmised,
attacks and eats the splinter. Thus, Mechnikoffs observation of the swarming larvae
struck him as analogous to human cells swarming around a splinter. In this way the
use of an analogy helped Mechnikoff "discover" the bodies' main defense mechanism
- namely mobile white blood cells (phagocytes) that swarm around and engulf
invading microbes.
Mechnikoff s use of analogy is common in the history of science. For example,
can Charles Darwin's invention of natural selection theory also be traced to an
analogy? Consider Darwin's words:
It seemed to me probable that a careful study of domesticated animals and cultivated
plants would offer the best chance of making out this obscure problem. Nor have I been
disappointed; in this and all other perplexing cases I have invariably found that our
knowledge, imperfect though it be, of variation under domestication, afforded the best
and safest clue. (Darwin, 1898, p. 4)
Armed with this clue, Darwin tried to put the evolutionary puzzle pieces together.
His attempt involved several unsuccessful trials until September of 1838 when he
read Thomas Malthus' Essay on Population and wrote, "I came to the conclusion that
selection was the principle of change from the study of domesticated productions;
and then reading Malthus, I saw at once how to apply this principle" (quoted in
Green, 1958, pp. 257-258). Gruber & Barrett (1974) point out, Darwin had read
Malthus before, but it was not until this reading that he became conscious of the
analogical link between "artificial" selection and evolutionary change. Now that the
link had been established, Darwin began marshalling the evidence favoring his new
theory of "natural" selection.
Other examples of the use of analogy are numerous in the history of science.
Kepler borrowed the idea of the ellipse from Appolonious to describe planetary
orbits. Kekul borrowed the idea of snakes eating their tails (in a dream) to create a
molecular structure for benzene, and Coulomb borrowed Newton's ideas of
gravitational attraction to describe the electrical forces that exist at the level of subatomic particles. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the use of analogy - the act of
borrowing old ideas and applying them in new situations to invent new insights and
explanations - is sometimes called analogical reasoning, or analogical transfer (cf.,
CREATIVE THINKING
103
Biela, 1993; Boden, 1994; Bruner, 1962; Dreistadt, 1968; Fauconnier & Turner,
2002; Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992; Gentner, 1989; Hestenes, 1992; Hoffman, 1980;
Hofstadter, 1981; Hofstadter, 1995; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986;
Johnson, 1987; Koestler, 1964; Wong, 1993). Thus, often (always?) an analogy
provides the link - the L - between the thought planes so that the thinker can pass to
the second plane and arrive at the target.
2. WHY DO ANALOGIES PLAY SUCH A KEY ROLE
IN SCIENCE AND IN LEARNING?
This chapter extends the basic neural modeling principles introduced in Chapter 2
at this point to provide a foundation upon which a theory of analogical insight at the
neural level can be constructed. The intent is to provide a framework in which we
can begin to understand how analogical insight plays such a key role in creative
thought and in learning. The present position is rather complex and will be presented
in steps. First, a central question regarding human memory will be clarified. Second,
basic neural network principles will be reviewed to provide a framework for
answering the questions at the neural level. Third, the network principles will be
extended to explain why analogies play such a central role. Both visual and verbal
analogies will be modeled. Instructional implications will follow.
3. THE CENTRAL QUESTION
The central question is this: Why do some experiences find their way into longterm memory while others do not? The brief answer to this question is that the
crucial element in transferring experiences to long-term memory is the brain's ability
to find past experiences that are enough like the present ones to allow their
assimilation. If such analogous experiences can be found, then assimilation and
retention will occur. If not, then the new experiences will be forgotten.
Consider a recent experience that will more sharply delimit the question. During
a visit to a Japanese elementary school, I observed a teacher and his students as they
discussed the results of an experiment investigating seed growth. The teacher
organized the students' comments in words, symbols (some English and some
Japanese) and diagrams on the board. The students were very enthusiastic and the
teacher wrote very clearly. The experiment was familiar, but my inability to
understand spoken or written Japanese made it difficult to understand much of what
was said.
At the lesson's conclusion, we adjourned to the school principal's office for a
traditional cup of tea. At that time it occurred to me that I had observed a very good
lesson and should attempt to make a few notes, including a record of what the
teacher had written on the board. Predictably I was able to reconstruct some, but not
all, of what had been written. Interestingly, recalling the relative position of the
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major items on the board was easy. The diagram of the seeds and their container, the
numbers 1 and 2, the letters A and B, and the question mark were all easily recalled.
But recall of the shapes of the Japanese/Chinese symbols and words was impossible.
To be more specific, a symbol shaped like this "A" was recalled, but a symbol
shaped like this
was not. Why?
You may be saying to yourself that this is not the least bit surprising. Familiar
English language symbols were recalled while unfamiliar foreign language symbols
were not. Because the observer does not speak or write in Japanese, this is entirely
predictable. Agreed! This can easily be predicted based upon past experiences we
have all had trying to remember familiar and unfamiliar items. But how can this be
explained at the neural level? After all, all of the stimuli on the board were clear and
all could have easily been copied at the time. The question then is why does one
remember items that are familiar and forget items that are not? What precisely does
"familiar" mean in neurological terms? And how does familiarity facilitate transfer
into long-term memory?
4. ADAPTIVE RESONANCE: MATCHING INPUT WITH EXPECTATIONS.
As described in Chapter 2, the brain is able to process a continuous stream of
changing stimuli and constantly modify behavior accordingly. This implies that a
mechanism exists to match input with expectations from prior experience and to
select alternative expectations when a mismatch occurs. Grossberg's mechanism for
this, called adaptive resonance, was presented in Chapter 2 and is reproduced below
in Figure 2.
Let's briefly review the process by again considering visual processing. As
described, due to prior experience a pattern of activity,
plays at
and causes a
firing of pattern
at
where
could be a single neuron.
then excites a
pattern P on
The pattern P is compared with the retinal input following
Thus,
P is the expectation. P will be
in a static scene and the pattern to follow
in a
temporal sequence. If the two patterns match, then you see what you expect to see.
This allows an uninterrupted processing of input and a continued quenching of
nonspecific arousal. Importantly one is only aware of patterns that enter the
matched/resonant state. Unless resonance occurs, coding in long-term memory
(LTM) is not likely to take place. This is because only in the resonant state is there
both pre and post synaptic excitation of the cells at
(see Grossberg's learning
equation).
Now suppose the new input to
does not match the expected pattern P from
Mismatch occurs and this causes activity at
to be turned off by lateral
inhibition, which in turn shuts off the inhibitory output to the nonspecific arousal
source. This turns on nonspecific arousal and initiates an internal search for a new
pattern at
that will match
CREATIVE THINKING
105
Such a series of events explains how information is processed across time. The
important point is that stimuli are considered "familiar" if a memory record of them
exists at
such that the pattern of excitation sent back to
matches the incoming
pattern. If they do not match, the incoming stimuli are unfamiliar and orienting
arousal is turned on to allow an unconscious search for another pattern. If no such
match is obtained, (as in the case of looking at an unfamiliar Japanese symbol) then
no coding in LTM will take place unless attention is directed more closely at the
object in question. Directing careful attention at the unfamiliar object many boost
pre-synaptic activity to a high enough level to compensate for the relatively low postsynaptic activity and eventually allow a recording of the sensory input into a set of
previously uncommitted cells.
Adaptive resonance and Grossberg's learning equation explain how input patterns
find their way into LTM. This chapter extends Grossberg's theory at this point. In
general, the theory of analogical operations proposed describes specific neural
processes that greatly facilitate coding of new experiences in LTM. However, prior
to discussing of the role that analogies play, we need to take a closer look at the way
slabs of neurons function to recall and reproduce patterns.
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4.1 Outstars and Instars

Grossberg proposes outstars as the underlying neural mechanism for reproduction
and recall of patterns. An outstar is a neuron whose cell body lies in one slab of
interconnected neurons with a set of synaptic knobs that connect it to a set of cell
bodies embedded in a lower slab of neurons (see Figure 3). In theory, outstars are the
fundamental functional unit able to learn and reproduce a pattern (a concept).
Understanding how outstars accomplish this is central to understanding how
analogies enhance learning.
The outstar shown in Figure 3 is actively firing impulses down its axons to a
lower slab of neurons that is simultaneously receiving a pattern of input from a still
lower slab of neurons, or perhaps from the environment (e.g., a pattern of visual
input on the retina). In the figure, the darkened neurons on the input slab represent
active neurons, the more the cell body is darkened the more active it is (i.e., the more
input it is receiving hence the more frequently it is firing). When the outstar
is
firing and the signals
from the outstar are reaching the input slab at the same time
that the pattern on the lower slab of neurons is firing, the synaptic strengths
will
grow according to the learning equation. A very important consequence of this
change in synaptic strengths is that when the pattern of activity on the input slab is
gone, the outstar can reproduce the pattern whenever it fires again. When the outstar
fires repeatedly, synapses with high synaptic strength will cause their associated cells
CREATIVE THINKING
107
on the original input slab to become very active, and cells with low synaptic strength
will be less active, just as they were when the input slab was first being sampled by
the outstar. In this manner the pattern will reappear (see Figure 4).
Slabs of neurons are not only connected via axons from higher slabs, as depicted
in Figures 3 and 4, the neuron cell bodies on the input slab also have axons that
connect them to the cell bodies of higher slabs. As depicted in Figure 5, a pattern of
activity on a lower slab is mirrored by the rate of transmitter release in the synapses
leading to the active cell bodies on the higher slab. Thus, when the pattern is active
on the lower slab and when the cell body on the higher slab (the outstar) is active,
these synaptic strengths will increase in a fashion that mirrors that pattern of activity
on the lower slab. Consequently, if the pattern appears again, the outstar will fire. In
this sense the outstar has "remembered" the pattern. Importantly, a sufficient period
of time is needed for the outstar (the neuron on the higher slab) to learn the pattern.
We shall see later that analogy plays a key role by reducing this period of time thus
making learning likely when it would otherwise not occur.
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The activity depicted in Figure 5 is of such functional importance that Grossberg

has given it a name, the instar. The instar is actually the set of synaptic weights
associated with the synaptic knobs connected to a neuron. If a pattern fires a neuron
repeatedly, then that pattern will reappear as part of the instar of that neuron.
To summarize, the synaptic strengths of outstars align themselves to an input.
Outstars are then able to reproduce the input. If a collection of outstars are not
aligned to an input, then that input cannot be reproduced unless presented again.
Thus, it will not be remembered. The important point is this. If outstars are not
present, then a pattern cannot be reproduced, thus not remembered. In the initial
example of the Japanese classroom, the Japanese symbols could not be reproduced
because outstars necessary to reproduce them did not exist. In short, outstars must be
present for recall to occur.
Having said this one must keep in mind that input patterns, such as those on the
retina are never exactly the same. We do not look the same when we awake as we
remember looking before going to bed, but we do "recognize" ourselves
nevertheless. Grossberg's theory of adaptive resonance shows how this can be
accomplished. It is a method by which slabs of neurons can interact with each other
to find a "best fit." Suppose that slab 1 is presented with an image. That image will
have several features, i.e., it will consist of several patterns. Each pattern (or feature)
CREATIVE THINKING
109
that has been learned will trigger outstars in slab 2. Outstars triggered in slab 2 will
in turn fire back on slab 1. Patterns that have been correctly triggered will reproduce
the pattern that triggered them. If all is correct, or close enough, then a best fit has
been found. If a pattern does not match, then a search for different outstars
associated with a different pattern begins. Grossberg's theory of adaptive resonance
includes a detailed description of this search for a best fit.
4.2 Outstars as a Mechanism for Chunking
Prior to discussing of the role of analogy in facilitating learning one more
neurological mechanism needs to be in place. That mechanism deals with the wellknown psychological phenomenon of chunking. Chunking has an interesting place in
the literature of psychology. Miller's magic number 7, plus or minus 2, refers to the
fact that it is almost universally true that people can recall only seven unrelated units
of data, if they do not resort to various memory tricks or aids (Miller, 1956). This
may explain why telephone numbers are seven digits long. Clearly, however, we all
form concepts that contain far more information than seven "units." Thus, a mental
process must occur in which previously unrelated units of input are grouped or
"chunked" together to produce higher-order chunks (units of thought/concepts). This
implied process is known as chunking (Simon, 1974).
Consider for example, the term ecosystem. As you may know, an ecosystem
consists of a biological community plus its abiotic (non-living) environmental
components. In turn, a biological community consists of producers, consumers, and
decomposers; while the abiotic components consist of factors such a amount of
rainfall, temperature, substrate type, and so on. Each of these subcomponents can in
turn be further subdivided. Producers, for example might include grasses, bushes,
Pine trees, and the like. Thus, the term ecosystem subsumes a far greater number of
discrete units or chunks than seven. The term ecosystem itself is a concept. Thus, for
those who "understand" the term, it occupies but one chunk in long-term memory.
The result of chunking (i.e., of higher-order concept formation) is extremely
important. Chunking reduces the load on mental capacity and simultaneously opens
up additional mental capacity that can then be occupied by additional concepts. This
in turn allows one to construct still more complex and inclusive concepts (i.e.,
concepts that subsume greater numbers of subordinate concepts). To turn back to the
Mellinarks introduced in Chapter 3, once we all know what a Mellinark is, we no
longer have to refer to them as "creatures within an enclosed membrane that may be
curved or straight, with one large dot and several smaller dots inside and with one
tail." Use of the term Mellinark to subsume all of this information greatly facilitates
thinking and communication when both parties have constructed the concept.
Grossberg hypothesizes that outstars are the anatomical/functional unit that
makes chunking (i.e., concept formation) possible. Outstars sampling a lower slab
can group a set of neurons that are firing at the same time. To do this they must
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merely fire at a rate high enough to allow the synaptic strengths at its synapses to
mirror the activity of the neurons being grouped (or chunked). For adaptive
resonance to occur the neurons being chunked must fire outstars. In this sense, the
purpose of outstars is to form a chunk, and later, to identify and reproduce the chunk
once formed.
An architecture called On-Center, Off-Surround (OCOS) plays an important part
in chunking. OCOS is sometimes referred to as winner-take-all architecture. In an
OCOS architecture active cells excite nearby cells and inhibit those that are farther
away. Because OCOS cells excite nearby cells, cells close together will excite each
other. "Hot spots" of active cells close together result and then inhibit cells further
away. The cells within the hot spots sample the lower slab and become outstars that
learn the pattern that is active on that lower slab. Thus, the cells in a pattern in the
lower slab become the cells that will excite a hot spot on the higher slab, and the
cells in the hot spot become outstars that learn the pattern.
Chunking can be either temporal or spatial. For example, a spoken word is the
sequential chunk of neural activity needed to produce the word. A heard word is the
sequential pattern of sounds that have been identified as that word. The OCOS
architecture can force a winner (a hot spot) on the higher sampling slab and thus
force chunking to occur in either the spatial or the temporal case.
If outstars are indeed the biological mechanism that is the basis for chunking,
then Miller's magic number 7 must have some physical relationship to the outstar
architecture. What might this be? There are probably physical limits associated with
the activity of cells, their rates of decay, and the spread of axonal trees. This is
speculation but only so many hot spots can exist on a slab so some limit must exist,
and an excited neuron can continue to fire for only a certain length of time.
Constraints such as these should force a physical limit on the size of a chunk.
Therefore, the brain contains outstars that form chunks. Someone who
"understands" the term ecosystem has formed an ecosystem chuck - has a set of
ecosystem outstars. In other words, that person has an ensemble of cells somewhere
in his/her brain that fire when the term ecosystem is heard, is read, is written, and so
on. Recent research with monkeys by Wallis, Anderson & Miller (2001) has shown
that abstract rules reside in single neurons, in this case in neurons located in the
prefrontal cortex. Echoing the point made above about the importance of chunking,
Wallis et al. stated:
The capacity for abstraction is an important component of cognition; it frees an
organism from specific associations and gives it the ability to generalize and develop
overarching concepts and principles, (p. 956)
The finding that abstract concepts and principles/rules reside in single neurons, or
in ensembles of neurons, thanks to chunking is important and perhaps surprising. The
next section will discuss the neural basis for analogy and how analogies help in the
construction of chunks.
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5. THE NEURAL BASIS FOR ANALOGY
An analogy consists of objects, events or situations that share features (or patterns)
in common, that is, they are in one or more ways similar. Shared features have a
significant neural impact. Presumably similar features have a similar impact. The
heart of the argument will be the claim that chunks with shared, or similar, features
reinforce each other, and do so in a very significant manner, by forming feedback
loops. Mathematically it can be shown that these feedback loops cause the activity of
the sampling outstars (i.e., the cells that are sampling the new to-be-learned patterns),
to grow exponentially as the feedback loop is forming. Such a rapid increase in cell
activity is significant for two reasons. First, it causes rapid sampling and rapid
sampling means fast learning (or just learning period, as slow learning and no
learning are often synonymous). Second, exponential growth of activity is very
important because cells on an OCOS slab compete with each other and those that
become active first quench less active cells. The following example will be used to
explicate these points.
5.1 Analogies Facilitate Learning
When I was a seventh grader, my math teacher introduced the word

perpendicular and the symbol
to refer to two lines that intersect at a 90 degree
angle. The teacher wanted us to remember the word and the symbol and of course the
meaning. So when he introduced the word and the symbol, he also introduced the
words pup-in-da-cooler. Presumably he intuitively believed that introduction of these
similar sounding words and the images they would evoke in our minds would aid
recall. The words not only brought out a few laughs from the students, they also
worked extremely well. To this day, I cannot think of the word perpendicular or the
symbol
without pup-in-da-cooler following close behind. The words
perpendicular and pup-in-da-cooler are very similar. The letters are similar, of
course, and so are the chunks. We shall focus on each of these facts as they make the
example analogous to analogies that share similarities at different levels.
We assume that the word pup is an already acquired chunk in LTM, and the word
perp represents a to-be-learned chunk. We will explain why having pup as an active
chunk in LTM will speed the learning of perp. The example will similarly show that
pup-in-da-cooler speeds the learning of perp-in-dic-ular because they share common
features.
Basic auditory features (or patterns) are called phonemes. However, it will
simplify the discussion to assume that letters are the basic auditory patterns, the
phonemes. One must merely replace the letter with phoneme to provide a more
technically correct version of the following discussion. In brief, when perpendicular
is spoken, much of the neural activity present in the STM of the words pup-in-dacooler remains active because the two words sound the same. The shared features
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remain active and cause chunking to occur, which makes it possible to quickly learn
the word perpendicular.
How do shared features cause chunking of new input to occur? Consider Figure
6. The word pup is heard. As shown, this presents input to slab 1. In turn, this input
activates the chunk for pup in LTM on slab 2. At the same time, the sound perp
creates activity on slab 1 as well as a hot spot of activity on slab 2. Thus, we have an
outstar representing the chunk pup feeding the beginning and ending letters p that
remain active on slab 1. These letters begin to form a portion of an instar connected
to the hot spot on slab 2. The hot spot will chunk perp and will create a feedback
loop from pup to perp and back again (see Figure 7). This feedback loop will greatly
increase the activity of the neuron perp. This increased activity will then make it
much easier for the chunk (the outstar) perp to form.
CREATIVE THINKING
113
Neurons on slab 2 chunk each of the syllables pup, in, da, coo, and ler. There is
also a still higher slab 3. And on slab 3 there is a neuron chunking the five syllables
pup-in-da-coo-ler, At the same time on slab 2, feedback loops are causing (aiding)
the formation of the chunks perp, in, di, cu, ler. Also on slab 3, a neuron is beginning
to chunk the syllables perp-in-di-cu-ler. Multiple feedback loops are forming
between these neurons on slab 3, thus speeding the chunking of the word
perpendicular (see Figure 8).
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5.2 An Emergent, Self-Organizing System

How the symbol
is learned has not yet been explained. This section will do
so and show that the shared features that exist between pup-in-da-cooler and
perpendicular are responsible for the creation of an emergent neural control system
that greatly increases the speed at which
is learned. The section begins with two
alternative configurations to the emergent neural control system. Then the control
system itself will be introduced. Why the neural control system is such an
improvement over the alternatives, and why it greatly increases the rate of learning
will be explained. This will be followed by a mathematical demonstration that the
control system induces an exponential learning rate.
Figure 9 depicts the first alternative. Here perp represents the word perpendicular
to be associated with the recall of
A and C each represent a neuron (i.e., in the
OCOS architecture a small group of neurons that mutually excite each other). A is the
neuron, or group of neurons, that are active in the auditory neural subsystem when
the word perpendicular is spoken. This group of neurons either chunks or will chunk
the word. C is a neuron that will sample the area of the visual system that contains
the symbol
C is the neuron that will chunk the symbol if the learning is
successful.
Excitation of neurons A and C results in the association of the word perpendicular

with the symbol
In turn, the word perpendicular will cause the recall of the
symbol. The activity of A can be considered chunking enhancement. This is because
C is a sampling cell and its activity results in the formation of a chunk, a set of
features that are grouped together. Activity of A will help increase the sampling rate
of C, thus, the ability of C to chunk. The problem with this configuration is that the
activity of cell C is dependent solely of the activity of A. Thus, unless A is extremely
active, or repeated many times, the learning that cell C is attempting will not take
place.
CREATIVE THINKING
115
Figure 10 shows an extension of Figure 9. In this configuration two words pup

and perp activate the neuron C. Thus, C will be excited twice as much as in the
previous case
This configuration is an
improvement over that shown in Figure 9, but still does not allow for large scale
boosts in neural activity.
Figure 11 shows an emergent self-organizing neural control system that can cause
large scale boosts in neural activity. In fact, it can cause the sampling rate of C to
increase exponentially. As shown, neurons A and B form a feedback loop. This
feedback loop is powerful because the sampling rate of C will initially grow
exponentially. Presumably this is the neural mechanism that an analogy produces.
Because neurons A and B of the control structure form a feedback loop, as A and B
fire, each will increase the rate at which the other fires. A increases the firing rate
of B and B increases the firing rate
of A. Thus, the sampling rate of C will
initially grow exponentially.
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In the architecture presented in Figure 11, the signal

down the axon leaving A
travels to both B and C. Thus,
In the same fashion
Thus, an
increase in
and
will also result in an increase in
and
The signals to
C from A and B are a by-product of this architecture. The feedback loop from A to B
and back again to A emerges when the organism is presented with data that cause A
and B to fire at the same time. As a by-product, other regions are also flooded with
neural excitation. The neurons chunking pup and perp are such an A and B. If the
region they flood is a winner-take-all region, then a C will emerge, will become
strongly excited, and will learn the symbol
Perp will be associated with
and
if C's axonal tree also reaches the auditory cortex, then
will be associated with
perp.
5.3 The Control System Drives the Learning of the Symbol
The control system drives the learning. In other words, the control system
determines the rate at which learning occurs. To understand why the analogy controls
the learning rate, notice in the sampling rate equation (equation [5] in the appendix)
that, even if
is small, if
is large, then d/dt
the sampling rate of C,
will also be large. This is interesting because
will be large if the association
between A and B is strong. Thus, the analogy, the signals between A and B, drive the
learning of the symbol
The shared features within the input data pup-in-da-cooler and perpendicular
cause the control system (the neurons A and B and the feedback loop they form) to
arise. The letter A represents the neuron chunking the word pup-in-da-cooler. B
represents the neuron chunking perpendicular. The system arose because the shared
features caused the chunking to occur. As mentioned, a major reason chunking
occurred was because the shared features caused an exponential growth in neural
activity. This rapid rise in activity allowed the chunks to form. Thus, the input data,
the neural ability to chunk and the exponential growth associated with feedback
causes the control system to emerge. In this sense, the analogy caused the control
system to arise.
6. SUMMARY
The two examples, forgetting the Japanese symbol

and learning the word
perpendicular and its mathematical symbol, have natural explanations within a
hierarchical neural network. The explanation for the first example used a hierarchical
network with two slabs. The second example used a hierarchical network with three
slabs. The first network explained why the Japanese symbol could not easily be
recalled. The first slab of this network was a slab of neurons activated by line
segments tilted (or oriented) in a specific direction. The second slab consisted of
CREATIVE THINKING
117
cells (outstars) that chunked neurons in the first slab. If there is a neuron on the
second slab that has chunked the neurons on the first slab activated by the Japanese
symbol, then that symbol can be recalled by activating that neuron. If no neuron has
chunked the Japanese symbol, it cannot be recalled unless pre-synaptic activity
associated with the symbol receives a considerable boost.
The second example was presented in Figure 7. The first slab of the three-slab
network consisted of cells activated by phonemes, sounds that are building blocks of
speech much as oriented lines can be used as building blocks for line images. The
second slab chunks neurons active on the first slab. The third slab chunks neurons
active on the second slab. Chunks on slab 2 become syllables such as pup and perp.
Chunks on slab 3 become words such as pupindacooler and perpendicular. The
second example demonstrated that similar activity on the first slab (activity such as
that created by the p sounds in the words pup and perp) creates feedback loops
between elements on the second slab (between the neurons chunking pup and perp).
Similar activity on the second slab (in and ler appear in both pupindacooler and
perpendicular) can create feedback loops between neurons on the third slab. Each of
these feedback loops greatly increases the neural postsynaptic activity, thus increases
the ability to chunk and therefore to learn. In addition, the neurons on slab 3 become
the emergent neural control system.
How can our knowledge of the role of analogy help learners recall information
such as the Japanese symbol
To the extent that the brain is a hierarchical neural
network, and if instars and outstars play the important role that we suppose, then the
proposed neural mechanisms (the emergent feedback loops and the resultant neural
control system) give a neurological explanation of how and why analogous data
increases learning. The proposed neurological explanation implies that the search for
an analogy greatly facilitates learning. How, for example, could an analogy be used
to help one learn a symbol such as the Japanese symbol
Obviously, the correct
approach is to try to imagine something like the symbol. For example, the symbol
might remind you of a tripod with an equals sign. Activation of these similar images
already stored in LTM greatly increases postsynaptic neural activity; thus, according
the Grossberg's learning equation, allows for storage of the new input in LTM. Of
course, one may not be able to generate a satisfactory analogy, image, or set of
images, in which case one would have to resort to the more tedious task of describing
the symbol i.e., it has three vertical lines attached to a horizontal line, etc. Provided
patterns for these terms exist in memory at
this procedure will work, but it
requires considerable effort to describe all the relevant variables. This effort is in fact
a method for maintaining relevant portions of the image in STM so that chunking can
occur. We have a neurological account of why a picture is worth a thousand words.
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The images are far superior because the relevant features are already linked in the
analogous image.
The pup-in-da-cooler example also demonstrated how analogy/similarity speeds
learning by incorporating relevant features shared by new ideas with those already
known. In the same manner, the use of analogy can presumably help learners
comprehend non-observable theoretical concepts such as the biological concept of
natural selection from Darwinian theory. The key insight for Darwin occurred when
he "saw" the inherent analogy between the familiar (to him) artificial selection and
the unfamiliar processes that presumably occurs hi nature. Learners may not be
familiar with the process of artificial selection, but they can participate in classroom
simulations of the process (e.g., Stebbins & Allen, 1975) to provide such familiarity.
Consequently, when the process of natural selection is introduced as the mechanism
of organic charge, which is analogous to the simulated process, the appropriate
feedback loops between the familiar and unfamiliar will form and the desired
learning will take place.
In short, the present theory argues that analogical operations are basic to learning
and the retention of what is learned. Hence, an active topic for educational research
should be the identification of specific analogies for specific concepts and the
exploration and evaluation of then- limitations and most effective use. The next
chapter will provide an example of just such research.
CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF ANALOGIES AND REASONING SKILL

IN THEORETICAL CONCEPT CONSTRUCTION
AND CHANGE
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes an experiment designed to address two related
instructional questions: (1) What factors facilitate the construction of theoretical
concepts? (2) What factors enable students to discard scientifically inappropriate
explanations (misconceptions) in favor of more scientifically appropriate ones?
Answers will be sought in the context of introductory college biology and will
concern the concepts of molecular polarity, bonding and diffusion. Such concepts are
defined as theoretical, as opposed to descriptive, because they relate to imagined,
unseen entities and processes that have been hypothesized to exist on the atomic and
molecular levels to explain observable phenomena such as the spread of blue dye in
water, but not in oil, or the detection of an odor at the opposite end of a room.
Two hypotheses will be tested. Based on the theoretical rationale advanced in
Chapter 5, the first proposes that analogies assist in theoretical concept construction.
In brief, concept construction requires that students "disembed" patterns from
experience. However, patterns that must be disembedded for theoretical concepts, by
definition, cannot be directly experienced. For example, one cannot see molecules
colliding with and sticking on to or bouncing off of each other. Therefore, analogous
observational-level experiences that embody the patterns should help students
experience and disembed the theoretical patterns.
The use of analogies as instructional aids has been of increasing interest and the
subject of a small, but growing, number of studies (e.g., Brown & Clement, 1989;
Clement, 1989; Gabel & Samuel, 1986; Halpern, Hansen & Riefo, 1990; Flick,
1991; Friedel, Gabel & Samual, 1990; Dupin, 1989; Gilbert, 1989; Jardine &
Morgan, 1987; Klauer, 1989; Stavy, 1991; Webb, 1985; Simons, 1984). Some of
these studies have provided support for the foregoing analogy hypothesis, yet others
have not. In a literature review, Duit (1990) summarized the studies as follows:
The studies on analogical reasoning available so far reveal failure nearly as often as
success. When summarizing these findings it can be stated that analogies may be of
help in the learning process - if analogical reasoning really happens. (p. 27)
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Duit speculates that two conditions are necessary for successful analogical
transfer. First, the analogue domain should be familiar to students, and second, the
analogue should be in a domain in which the students do not hold misconceptions.
Following Duit's first condition, the present study will employ a familiar
analogue domain. However, the study will not follow Duit's second condition.
Instead, it will employ a domain in which misconceptions are likely to occur so that a
second hypothesis can be tested. That second hypothesis proposes that a change from
the use of an inappropriate or incomplete theoretical concept to explain an event, to
use of a more appropriate and complete set of theoretical concepts, is dependent in
part on the higher-level, hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill introduced and
discussed in Chapter 4. Such reasoning skill is seen as necessary to decide which of
two or more theoretical concepts should be used to explain a specific phenomenon.
For example, to explain the spread of dye in water, two alternative hypotheses (based
on different sets of concepts) may come to mind. Perhaps the dye spreads because
the water and dye molecules form molecular bonds due to their polarity (one set of
concepts). Or perhaps the dye spreads due to random collisions with water molecules
that result in a net motion from an area of high dye concentration to areas of low dye
concentration (another set of concepts). Which, if either, or both, of these hypotheses
is correct? To decide, a student might employ hypothetico-predictive reasoning such
as the following:
If...the dye spreads solely because the dye and water molecules are polar molecules
thus form molecular bonds, (polar-molecules hypothesis)
and...some dye is gently dropped into an unshaken container of water, (planned test)
then...the dye should not spread - presumably because in this case there is
insufficient motion to distribute the dye molecules among the water molecules.
(prediction)
But...the dye does spread. (observed result)
Therefore...the polar-molecules hypothesis is not supported. (conclusion)
However,
if...the dye spreads due to random molecular collisions with water molecules,
(random-motion hypothesis)
then...the dye should spread - presumably because there are random molecular
collisions that distribute the dye molecules among the water molecules. (prediction)
And...the dye does spread. (observed result)
Therefore...the random-motion hypothesis is supported. (conclusion)
The hypothesis that hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill is involved in
theoretical concept construction and conceptual change has been tested on at least
three previous occasions. Lawson & Thompson (1988) found some support for the
hypothesis as reasoning skill was significantly related to the number of
THE ROLE OF ANALOGIES
121
misconceptions that seventh grade students held following instruction on genetics

and natural selection. That study, however, did not measure pre- to post-instruction
change. Lawson & Weser (1990) did measure pre- to post-instruction change among
college students and found that less-skilled reasoners were initially more likely to
hold a variety of non-scientific beliefs about life (e.g., special creation, vitalism,
orthogenesis) and were less likely to change some, but not all, of those beliefs. In the
third study, Lawson & Worsnop (1992) found that the more skilled reasoners in a
sample of high school students were less likely to hold pre-instruction
misconceptions regarding evolution and special creation. But reasoning skill was not
related to change in beliefs.
The Lawson & Weser (1990) and the Lawson & Worsnop (1992) studies
investigated conceptual change in the potentially emotionally charged context of
evolution. Thus, the extent to which some students were emotionally committed to
special creation may have contributed to their lack of conceptual change to evolution
and to the failure of the results to more clearly support the hypothesis. Consequently,
the present study attempts to test the reasoning-skill hypothesis in a non-emotionally
charged context that may allow for a better test of the hypothesis.
Students were first taught two theoretical concepts (molecular polarity and
bonding) in the context of blue dye mixing with water, but not with oil, when all
three were shaken in a container. The students were then tested in a potentially
misleading context in which they could be expected to misapply these concepts. This
misleading context asked students to explain the gradual spread of blue dye in a
container of standing water - a context that also requires use of the diffusion concept.
Hence, the exclusive use of the concepts of molecular polarity and bonding in this
context (omitting mention of diffusion) represents a type of scientific
"misconception." Here a misconception is defined as a concept, or set of concepts,
that scientific research indicates is an inappropriate or incomplete explanation for a
particular phenomenon. This definition does not imply that the concept(s) may not be
appropriate to explain some other phenomena.
Students were then taught another theoretical concept (diffusion) and were
retested in the same context to see which students, if any, changed from the exclusive
use of the bonding explanation to the additional and more scientifically appropriate
use of the diffusion concept to explain the spread of the blue dye in the container of
standing water. The analogies and reasoning-skill hypotheses led to the prediction
that students introduced to the familiar physical analogies, and those who are more
skilled reasoners would be more likely to undergo conceptual change and correctly
apply the diffusion concept, i.e.:
If...analogical and higher-level, hypothetico-predictive reasoning are utilized in
theoretical concept construction and conceptual change, (analogies and reasoning-skill
hypotheses)
and...students of differing reasoning levels are (a) taught two theoretical concepts; (b)
are initially tested in a context in which they misapply the concepts; (c) taught another
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CHAPTER
theoretical concept with and without the use of physical analogies, and (d) retested,
(planned test)
then...(1)the more skilled reasoners and the students instructed with physical analogies
should exhibit fewer misconceptions on the retest; and (2) the more skilled reasoners
should be more likely to undergo conceptual change. (prediction)
2. METHOD
2.1 Subjects
Subjects (Ss) were 77 students, ranging in age from 18.1 to 44.8 years (X=31.9
years), enrolled in four laboratory sections and two lecture sections of an
introductory non-majors biology course at a large, suburban community college.
2.2 Reasoning Skill
Reasoning skill (developmental level) was assessed by use of the Classroom Test
of Scientific Reasoning (Lawson, 1978; Lawson, 1987). The test includes twelve
items involving conservation of weight, volume displacement, control of variables,
and proportional, probabilistic, combinatorial and correlational reasoning posed in a
multiple-choice format using diagrams to illustrate problem contexts. Split-half
reliability of the test was 0.55 for the present sample.
Ss who scored from 0-4 were classified at the lower level corresponding
generally to Piaget's concrete operational stage and to the use of hypotheticopredictive reasoning to test descriptive hypotheses as discussed in Chapter 3, e.g.:
If...overall shape is a critical feature of Mellinarks, (descriptive hypothesis)
and...I look closely at the non-Mellinarks in row two, (proposed test)
then...none should be similar in overall shape to the Mellinarks in row one.
(prediction)
But...some of the non-Mellinarks in row two are similar in overall shape. (observed
result)
Therefore..."I ruled that out," i.e., I concluded that my initial idea was wrong.
(conclusion)
Because reasoning at this level is presumably preceded by two still lower levels
(i.e., the sensory-motor and preoperational stages within Piagetian theory), this lower
level will be designated as Level 3. Ss who scored from 5-8 were classified as
transitional reasoners and those who scored from 9-12 were classified at the higher
level, designated Level 4, a level that corresponds generally to Piaget's formal
123
operational stage (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) and to use of hypothetico-predictive
reasoning to successfully test causal hypotheses, e.g.:
If...differences in swing speeds are caused by differences in the amount of weight
hanging on pendulums, (causal hypothesis)
and...the weights of two pendulums are varied, while holding other possible causes
constant, (proposed test)
then...pendulum swing speed should vary. (prediction)
But...when the proposed test is carried out the swing speed does not vary. (observed
result)
Therefore...differences in swing speeds are probably not caused by weight
differences, i.e., the weight hypothesis is probably wrong. (conclusion)
Note that because the study involves college students, all over 18 years in age
and all who have presumably undergone the final brain growth spurt discussed in
Chapter 4, the word "level," as opposed to the word "stage," is used to characterize
reasoning differences.
2.3 Experimental Design
A modified Solomon four-group design was employed (Campbell & Stanley,
1966) that included initial instruction of all Ss during a lecture/demonstration
session. The intent of this initial instruction was to introduce the terms molecular
polarity and bonding in a way such that Ss would associate the terms with the
spread of blue dye in water. This association was expected to lead Ss to attempt to
apply the concepts to explain a perceptually similar but conceptually different
phenomenon, hence render their exclusive use a misconception.
Following this bonding instruction, one half of the Ss in each of the four
laboratory sections were randomly administered a Dye Question concerning the
spread of blue dye in standing water (see below). Two laboratory sections then
became the experimental groups (the analogy groups) that received instruction on the
diffusion concept utilizing one verbal analogy and two physical analogies. The
remaining two sections became control groups that were given identical instruction
minus the two physical analogies. Following these treatments, all Ss were readministered the Dye Question and a Diffusion Question (see below) in a counterbalanced order. Thus, the four groups were:
Analogy Group 1 (n=15) - bonding instruction Dye Question
diffusion
instruction using one verbal and two physical analogies
Dye Question
Diffusion Question
Analogy Group 2 (n=17) - bonding instruction
diffusion instruction using one
verbal and two physical analogies.
Diffusion Question
Dye Question
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Control Group 1 (n=23) - bonding instruction

Dye Question
diffusion
instruction using one verbal but no physical analogies
Dye Question
Diffusion Question
Control Group 2 (n=22) - bonding instruction
diffusion instruction using one
verbal but no physical analogies
Diffusion Question
Dye Question
2.4 Bonding Instruction
During a lecture/demonstration session, all Ss were shown a bottle containing
layers of oil and water to which some blue dye was added. The instructor then shook
the bottle and pointed out that the blue dye remained throughout the water layer, but
not throughout the oil layer. To explain this result, Ss were told that the water and
dye molecules were polar molecules (i.e., contained segments that were positively or
negatively charged), but that the oil molecules were not, hence the dye bonded
(formed molecular connections) with the water molecules but not with the oil
molecules. Therefore, the dye remained spread throughout the water layer but not the
oil layer.
2.5 Dye Question
The following Dye Question (after Westbrook & Marek, 1991) was randomly
administered to one half of the analogy and control group Ss after the initial bonding
instruction, but prior to instruction on the diffusion concept:
A large container is full of clear water. Several drops of a dark blue dye are dropped on
the surface of the water. The dye begins to spread throughout the water. Eventually the
water in the container changes from clear to light blue. In a paragraph, explain why the
dark blue dye spreads to change the color of the water to a uniform light blue. If
possible, give your explanation in terms of interacting molecules.
2.6 Diffusion Instruction

The term diffusion was introduced to all four groups during laboratory sessions.
The same instructor taught all sessions. Ss first observed a change in the appearance
of red onion cells exposed to various concentrations of salt water. They then
advanced alternative hypotheses (i.e., explanations) for the reduction or expansion of
the onion cells' boundaries.
By making model cells with dialysis tubing, Ss investigated factors that affected
the movement of molecules in and out of cells and attempted to test their alternative
hypotheses. The model cells were filled and suspended in solutions of different-sized
125
molecules (starch, glucose and water) in varying concentrations. Molecular

movement into or out of the model cells was measured by weight change of the
model cells. Based on their alternative hypotheses and experimental designs, students
generated predicted results. Students then compared predicted and observed weight
changes to test their hypotheses.
During the ensuing discussion, the instructor introduced the term diffusion to
refer to the process by which the molecules moved. Diffusion was defined as the net
movement of molecules from an area of high molecular concentration to areas of low
concentration due to the collisions that result from the mixing of two or more types
of randomly moving molecules. The diffusion of water molecules through a cell
membrane (a special case of diffusion known as osmosis) was discussed and was
likened to Mexican jumping beans moving through holes in a wire cage. The
movement of perfume molecules through air was mentioned as another example of
diffusion. Hence, all Ss were provided with two phenomena that could be explained
in part by molecular diffusion, one with a verbal analogy, and one with a familiar
example.
At this point, both analogy groups were presented with two physical analogies for
the diffusion process. For the first analogy, Ss placed equal amounts of large and
small marbles in a jar in two layers, put on the lid and then shook the jar for one
minute. For the second analogy, Ss repeated the procedure with large beans and
millet. For both analogies, Ss observed that after shaking the different-sized objects
were evenly distributed throughout the jar, presumably like the different types of
molecules involved in the onion and model cell experiments. Total instructional time
for all four groups was three hours. Time not spent on the physical analogies by the
control groups was spent in additional experimentation and discussion.
2.7 Diffusion Question
To assess their understanding of the term diffusion, all Ss responded to the

following Diffusion Question within seven days of the diffusion instruction:
Explain what is meant by the term diffusion. Provide an example.
The Dye Question was also administered at this time.

2.8 Scoring
Diffusion Question responses, as well as both initial and retest Dye Question
responses, were classified into the following categories (after Westbrook & Marek,
1991):
1. blank, irrelevant remarks or use of given terms without explanation (e.g., "Once
you take away the water the cells get smaller. You put water in again and the
cells will get back to normal size." "The molecules in the blue dye spread
126
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
CHAPTER
throughout the water. Therefore causing the water to turn blue." "The dye was
diffused through the water.")
misconception, explanation based upon various concepts not related to the
diffusion concept (e.g., "The molecules from both substances are small,
uncharged and polar which allows them to pass." "The molecules of the dark
blue dye were polar and took in clear water which made them expand and have a
shade of light blue." "The dye is able to enter the water molecules.")
partially correct conception plus misconception: some notion of the diffusion
process but combined with other causes and/or non-molecular level objects
(e.g., "Diffusion: the movement of an organism from an area of high
concentration to an area of low concentration." "This process is one type of
diffusion. The molecules of dark blue dye spread out and in the water and hook
on to the molecules of water. The molecules of blue dye are distributed evenly
throughout the water until the ratio of blue dye molecules to water molecules is
equal in an area of the container.")
descriptive conception: some notion of the diffusion process but no mention of
molecules (e.g., "Diffusion is the movement of a substance from an area of
higher concentration to a lower concentration." "The dye will not stay
concentrated in one spot, they will diffuse throughout the water. Just like if you
sprayed perfume in a corner of a room, eventually the whole room would smell
like perfume.")
partial theoretical conception: some notion of molecules moving from area of
high molecular concentration to low (e.g., "Diffusion = movement of molecules
from an area of higher concentration to the area of lower concentration."
"Random movement of the molecules of dark blue dye. The molecules
continually move through the water until they have dispersed themselves evenly."
"The color appears to be relatively even light blue because the dye molecules
disperse randomly throughout the water molecules. This is the same principle as
shaking little marbles with big marbles.")
complete theoretical conception: molecules move from area of high molecular
concentration to low due to collisions of randomly moving molecules (e.g.,
"Diffusion causes the water to turn blue. The dye is more concentrated and
moves from that higher concentration to the lower concentration as the molecules
randomly diffuse by bouncing off one another. This continues until the
concentration equalizes throughout. Thus the lighter color." "When gases or
liquid move randomly from an area of higher concentration to an area of lower
concentration, such as perfume odor when someone enters a room. The diffusion
continues until the concentrations equalize, if there are no other limitations. This
random movement happens as the molecules mix by bouncing off one another.")
Four raters independently scored each response using the above criteria and
examples. The raters had not participated in the instruction, thus had no knowledge
of Ss' identity. Further, the order in which the responses were scored was randomized
127
with respect to group membership. Inter-rater agreement was 70% for the Dye
Question and 71% for the Diffusion Question. Disagreements were resolved through
discussion among the raters.
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1 Reasoning Skill (Developmental Level)
Mean score on the Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning was 6.5, SD=2.2.
Eleven Ss (15%) scored from 0-4 and were classified as Level 3 reasoners. Fortyeight Ss (65%) scored from 5-8 and were classified as transitional reasoners, while
15 Ss (20%) scored from 9-12 and were classified as Level 4 reasoners.
3.2 Test-Retest and Order Effect
A comparison of Dye Question scores of Ss who took the initial Dye Question,
with those who did not, revealed no significant difference on the Dye Question
p=0.18) and on the Diffusion Question
p=0.62). In other
words, taking the initial Dye Question did not have a significant effect on
performance on either question following diffusion instruction, A comparison of
scores of Ss who responded to the Dye Question first with those who responded to
the Diffusion Question first also revealed no significant differences on the Dye
Question
p=0.19) or on the Diffusion Question
p=0.78).
3.3 Combined Group Responses
Table 1 shows the number and percentage of question responses in each category
for the combined analogy and control groups. Of the 35 Ss who took the initial Dye
Question, 33 (94%) responded in category one (i.e., with either a blank, irrelevant
remarks, or use of terms only with no explanation), or in category two (i.e., a
misconception). This level of response is poorer that obtained by Westbrook &
Marek (1991) who found 61% of their college sample exhibited misconceptions. The
relatively poor performance of the present sample most likely reflects the effect of
the bonding instruction, which was to provoke most Ss to respond in category two
with the bonding "misconception" (see below).
Forty two percent (31/74) of the Dye Question responses following diffusion
instruction were classified in category one or two. The remaining 58% of the Ss
invoked at least a partially correct conception of diffusion to explain the dye spread.
However, only 4 Ss (5%) invoked a complete theoretical conception of diffusion
(category six).
Responses to the Diffusion Question revealed substantially less category one and
two responses (17%) and substantially more category three through six responses.
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CHAPTER 6
This indicates that, following diffusion instruction, several of the Ss understood the
diffusion concept well enough to explain it when directly asked to do so (the
Diffusion Question), but that they did not invoke the concept of diffusion to explain
why the blue dye spread (the Dye Question). Instead many continued to invoke
alternative explanations such as chemical bonding or molecular break up.
3.4 Effect of Bonding and Diffusion Instruction on Dye Question Responses

Table 2 lists responses to the initial and retest Dye Questions categorized into the
type of alternative hypothesis (or combination of alternative hypotheses) that Ss
generated to explain the dye spread. Note that some Ss may have generated more than
one hypothesis therefore the number of alternative hypotheses generated is greater than
the number of Ss.
As shown, only 2/50 (4%) of the hypotheses that were generated on the initial test
(following bonding instruction but prior to diffusion instruction), referred to the
process of diffusion. By far the most frequent hypothesis (24/50=48%) was that
some sort of bonding of the dye and water molecules was taking place. Therefore,
the bonding instruction appears to have been very successful at provoking Ss to
apply the concepts of molecular polarity and bonding in an attempt to explain the
spread of blue dye in standing water. The next most frequent hypothesis was that the
dye molecules were breaking up, off, or down (7/50=14%).
Dye Question responses following diffusion instruction revealed a considerably
greater percentage of diffusion related hypotheses (43/111=39%). However, a
substantial percentage of alternatives to diffusion were still being proposed. Again
the most frequent alternatives were that some sort of bonding was occurring
129
(20/111=18%) or that the dye molecules were breaking apart (9/111=8%). The
anthropomorphic hypothesis that the dye molecules move "because they want to" or
"try to" was also mentioned nine times (8%).
3.5 Analogy and Control Group Comparisons
Mean scores of the analogy and control group Ss who took the initial Dye
Question were 2.00 and 2.04 respectively. This difference was not statistically
significant
p=0.78). Mean retest Dye Question scores of the respective
groups were 3.25 and 3.04. This difference was also not statistically significant
p=0.51). Mean posttest Diffusion Question scores for the respective
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groups were 4.09 and 3.31. This difference was statistically significant
p=0.007), indicating better performance by the analogy group.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of experimental and control group responses in
each of the six categories on the Diffusion Question. The most obvious group
differences can be seen at either end of the scale. At the bottom end, 6% percent of
the analogy group responses were in categories one and two compared to 29% of
control group responses. At the top end, 40% of the analogy group responses were in
categories five and six compared to only 17% of those of the control group.
131
3.6 Reasoning Skill and Performance on the Dye and Diffusion Questions
Table 3 lists mean scores and standard deviations of the Level 3, transitional and
Level 4 Ss (combined experimental and control groups) on the three questions. As
shown, mean scores of the Level 4 Ss are higher than those of the transitional Ss for
all three questions. Similarly, mean scores of the transitional Ss are higher than those
of the Level 3 Ss for all three questions. However, group differences reached
statistical significance (p<0.05) only on the retest Dye Question
p=0.03).
The fact that reasoning skill was not significantly related to performance on the
initial Dye Question is similar to the Westbrook & Marek (1991) results, but not
similar to those reported by Lawson & Weser (1990). Lawson & Weser found Level
3 college students more likely than their Level 4 classmates to hold beliefs in
biological misconceptions such as creationism, orthogenesis, the soul, nonreductionism, vitalism, and teleology.
Why was reasoning skill significantly related to performance on the retest Dye
Question but not to the other two questions? Let us first consider the retest Dye
Question and the Diffusion Question. It seems likely that the retest Dye Question was
intellectually more challenging than the Diffusion Question because a high level
response to the Diffusion Question could have resulted largely by memorization, an
intellectual activity requiring no reasoning. On the other hand, a high level response
to the retest Dye Question required Ss to not only explicate the process of diffusion,
but to also apply it to explain an event i.e., the spread of blue dye in standing water.
According to the reasoning- skill hypothesis, successful use of the diffusion concept
to explain the dye spread, especially following explicit instruction on two competing
explanations (molecular bonding versus diffusion), required Ss to use hypotheticopredictive reasoning to reject exclusive use of the bonding hypothesis and accept the
more appropriate diffusion hypothesis. Thus, the fact that reasoning skill did
correlate more highly with the retest Dye Question performance than with
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performance on the less demanding Diffusion Question supports the reasoning-skill

hypothesis.
The fact that reasoning skill correlated more highly with the retest Dye Question
than with the initial Dye Question also supports the reasoning-skill hypothesis
because competing hypotheses were much more likely to exist in the students' minds
when they responded to the retest Dye Question (following bonding and diffusion
instruction), than when they responded to the initial Dye Question (following only
bonding instruction). When Ss were asked to explain the dye spread on the initial
Dye Question it seems reasonable to assume that little doubt existed in most students'
minds that their task was to recall the teacher's explanation concerning molecular
polarity and bonding and apply it in this context (a context very similar to the one in
which the concepts of molecular polarity and bonding were introduced).
In support of this assumption, consider the following student responses: "Yes I
know this was discussed in class earlier in the semester but I can't remember the
exact words to use in order to describe the reaction...perhaps the molecules of dye
are attracted to each molecule of hydrogen." "You probably expect me to remember
the name of the process but I don't. However I can explain it. The blue dye & water
both have the same base so they are compatible. The dye will distribute evenly
throughout the water. If the blue dye was placed in oil base the dye would not
distribute."
As a further test of the reasoning-skill hypothesis, we considered only those Ss
who responded at level two (misconception) on the initial Dye Question to see who
among them changed to a diffusion explanation on the retest Dye Question (the
correct conception). The reasoning-skill hypothesis predicts that Level 4 Ss should
be more likely to change to use of the diffusion explanation than the transitional Ss,
who in turn should be more likely to change than the Level 3 Ss. The relevant data
are shown in Table 4.
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Although the numbers of Ss are small, the results in Table 4 are essentially as
predicted. None of the six Level 3 Ss (0%) changed from use of a misconception
(something other than the diffusion explanation on the initial Dye Question) to the
correct diffusion explanation, compared to four of the 21 transitional Ss (19%) and
compared to two of the five Level 4 Ss (40%). In terms of category change, the Level
3 Ss showed no gain. The transitional Ss gained an average of 0.82 categories; and
the Level 4 Ss gained an average of 1.33 categories. Finally, in terms of percentage
of Ss who gained at least one category from the initial test to the retest, 0% of the
Level 3 Ss gained at least one category compared to 48% of the transitional Ss and
67% of the Level 4 Ss.
Hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill is, in theory, related to conceptual change

because such change presumably occurs when alternative conceptions exist and a
decision concerning which conceptions to apply must be made. A conceptual change
has occurred when a person who first applies inappropriate or incomplete concepts
(e.g., molecular polarity and bonding) to explain a specific phenomenon, such as the
gradual spread of dye in standing water, later applies a more appropriate concept
(i.e., diffusion) to that same phenomenon. Similarly, when a child first explains the
rise of soda up a straw by use of the concept of suction and later rejects suction in
favor of an explanation based upon differences in air pressures on the surface of the
soda inside and outside the straw, a conceptual change has occurred.
Results of the present study support the hypothesis that physical analogies assist
in conceptual change by clarifying the nature of new theoretical concepts, but that
successful application of the new concepts involves higher-level, hypotheticopredictive reasoning skill. In the context of college genetics instruction, Baker &
Lawson (2001) also found analogies helpful in teaching theoretical concepts and that
successful application was linked to reasoning skill. Given that a goal of science
education is to enable students to successfully apply theoretical concepts to novel
situations, the present results imply that instruction should not only be designed to
help students acquire concepts, but also to help them develop skill in utilizing
higher-level, hypothetico-predictive reasoning to evaluate situations in which those
concepts may or may not be successfully applied.
The fact that less than 50% of the Level 4 students, and less than 15% of the
transitional and Level 3 students in the present study "changed their minds" from use
of the incomplete bonding explanation to use of the more complete diffusion
explanation, is not too surprising when one considers that these alternative
explanations were never explicitly contrasted and/or tested during the instructional
phases of this study. In terms of the development of reasoning skills, this was
unfortunate because considerable evidence, much of which is reviewed by Lawson,
Abraham & Renner (1989), indicates that explicitly generating and testing alternative
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hypotheses in the classroom/laboratory setting is an effective means of provoking

such development, particularly among college students.
Research discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 may also help explain the less than
perfect performance of the Level 4 students. That research suggests that there may in
fact be a fifth stage in intellectual development and that fifth-stage reasoning may aid
in the successful construction and application of theoretical concepts. Accordingly,
perhaps some of the students classified as Level 4 students in the present study had
in fact developed Stage 5 reasoning skill (the successful ones) and some of those
Level 4 students had not yet developed Stage 5 reasoning skill (the unsuccessful
ones).
CHAPTER 7
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE

COLLEGE YEARS: IS THERE A FIFTH STAGE?
1. INTRODUCTION
Following a review of several years of research into problem solving, Perkins &
Salomon (1989) concluded that, although expert performance manifests itself in
contextual ways, general cognitive skills (i.e., "habits of mind") exist. These general
cognitive skills reveal themselves primarily as strategies of looking for counter
examples to test causal knowledge claims. Although Perkins and Salomon discuss
such strategies as thinking tools of the philosopher, scientists recognize them as
components of a scientific method that has as its core the generation and test of
alternative causal hypotheses (cf., Baker & Allen, 1977; Burmester, 1952; Carey,
1998; Chamberlain, 1965; Lawson, 1995; Lewis, 1988; Moore, 1993; Platt, 1964).
Essentially, this method embodies a set of generally applicable questions that must
be raised and satisfactorily answered prior to drawing a firm conclusion about the
relative truth or falsity of any particular causal claim. The set of questions reads
more or less like this:
1. What is the central causal question in this particular context?
2. In addition to the proposed cause, what alternative causes (i.e.,
explanations/hypotheses/theories) are possible?
3. How can each possibility be tested?
4. What specific predictions follow from each possibility and its proposed test?
5. How does the evidence (either circumstantial, correlational or experimental),
once gathered, match the predictions?
6. What conclusions can be drawn based on the obtained degree of match?
Of course the development of reasoning patterns associated with these questions

has been the subject of a long line of research within developmental psychology and
within science education (for reviews see Lawson, 1985 and Lawson, 1992a; and for
more recent research within science education see for example Cavallo, 1996;
Germann, 1994; Germann & Aram, 1996; Hurst & Milkent, 1996; Johnson &
Lawson, 1998; Keys, 1994; Kuhn, 1989; Lawson, 1992b; Lawson & Thompson,
1988; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Noh & Scharmann, 1997; Shayer & Adey, 1993;
Westbrook & Rogers, 1994; Wong, 1993; Zohar, Weinberger & Tamir, 1994). The
general conclusion of such research is that reasoning patterns (the exact nature of
which is yet to be determined) do develop across adolescence, at least in some
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students, and play an important role in the ability to do science and to construct
science concepts. Research has also documented that improvements in reasoning as a
consequence of instruction, although difficult to obtain, are possible and are of
general use. Dramatic evidence of this was obtained by Shayer & Adey (1993) who
found that three years after the end of a two-year science program designed to
promote formal operational thinking positive effects were seen on the British
National examinations not only in science, but also in mathematics and in English.
Consequently, one of the goals of our department's introductory non-majors' biology
course, The Living World, is to help students develop general causal hypothesis-testing
skill by encouraging them to raise and answer the previously listed set of questions
during a series of lab and field activities. Additionally, the course lectures present
several episodes that explicate how the questions have been asked and answered by
biologists while conducting past research. In other words, the course attempts to teach
general cognitive skills essentially in the way described as the "high road" by Perkins
and Salomon, which is say that the course encourages the "deliberate and mindful
abstraction" of the question-asking and question-answering skills from a variety of
domain-specific contexts.
During a recent semester, the quizzes listed in Table 1 were administered as part of
an effort to assess the extent to which students were acquiring general, causal
hypothesis-testing skill. The quizzes were administered in lab sections following
investigations in which students generated and tested the alternative causal hypotheses
listed. Notice that each quiz asks the same questions about testing alternative causal
hypotheses.
More specifically, each quiz was designed to assess the extent to which students
could generate hypothetico-predictive arguments, complete with evidence that would
allow rejection of the alternative causal hypotheses. For example, consider the
following argument and evidence that leads to the rejection of the weight hypothesis
on the Pendulum Quiz - a quiz patterned after Inhelder & Piaget's classic pendulum
task (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, pp. 67-79):
If...differences in swing speeds are caused by differences in the amount of weight
hanging on pendulums, (weight hypothesis)
and...the weights of two pendulums are varied, while holding other possible causes
constant, (proposed test)
then...pendulum swing speed should vary. (prediction)
But...suppose that the proposed test is actually carried out and the swing speed does
not vary. (observed result)
Therefore...we would conclude that differences in swing speeds are probably not
caused by weight differences, i.e., the weight hypothesis is probably wrong.
(conclusion)
Importantly, the quizzes were administered in the order listed. This means that if
students were in fact acquiring general, causal hypothesis-testing skill during the
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE COLLEGE YEARS
137
semester, then performance should improve from quiz to quiz. Consequently, we

were surprised to find that most students responded successfully on the Pendulum
Pendulum Quiz
A swinging string with a weight on the end is called a pendulum. What causes
pendulums to swing fast or slow?
Hypothesis 1:A change in the amount of weight hanging on the end of the string will
cause a difference in the swing speed - the lighter the weight, the faster the swing.
Hypothesis 2:A change in the length of string will cause a difference in the swing speed
- the shorter the string, the faster the swing.
How could you test these hypotheses? 1. Describe your experiment. 2. What are the
predicted results of your experiment (assuming that the hypotheses are correct)? 3.
What result would show that hypothesis 1 is probably wrong? 4. What result would
show that hypothesis 2 is probably wrong?
Mealworm Quiz
A student recently placed some mealworms in a rectangular box to observe their
behavior. She noticed that the mealworms tended to group at the right end of the box.
She also noticed that the right end had some leaves in it and that the box was darker at
that end. She wondered what caused them to group at the right end.
Hypothesis 1:They went to the right end because it had leaves in it.
Hypothesis 2:They went to the right end because it was darker than the left end.
How could you test these hypotheses? 1. Describe your experiment. 2. What are the
predicted results (assuming that the hypotheses are correct)? 3. What result would show
that hypothesis 1. is probably wrong? 4. What result would show that hypothesis 2 is
probably wrong?
"A" Mountain Quiz
A recent survey of organisms on "A" Mountain revealed more grass on the north-facing
slope than on the south-facing slope. In response to the causal question, "Why is there
more grass on the north-facing slope?" a student generated the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1:Lack of moisture in the soil on the south-facing slope keeps grass from
growing there (i.e., north is better shaded from the sun's drying rays).
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CHAPTER
Hypothesis 2:The sunlight itself is too intense for good grass growth on the southfacing slope (i.e., very intense rays disrupt the grasses' ability to conduct
photosynthesis).
How could you test these hypotheses? 1. Describe your experiment(s). 2. What are the
predicted results of your experiment(s) assuming that the hypotheses are correct? 3.
What result would show that hypothesis 1 is probably wrong? 4. What result would
show that hypothesis 2 is probably wrong?
Osmosis Quiz
When a thin slice of red onion cells are bathed in salt water the red portion of each cell
appears to shrink. What causes the red portion to appear to shrink?
Hypothesis 1:Salt ions
enter the space between the cell wall and the
cell membrane and push on the cell membrane.
Hypothesis 2:Water molecules
attractive forces of the salt ions.
are charged thus leave the cell due to
Question: How could you use model cells made of dialysis tubing, a weighing devise,
and solutions such as salt water, distilled water, and glucose to test these hypotheses? 1.
Describe your experiment.
2. What are the predicted results assuming that the hypotheses are correct? 3. What
result would show that hypothesis 1 is probably wrong? 4. What result would show that
hypothesis 2 is probably wrong? [Note: These hypotheses were not intended to
"scientifically valid" in the sense that when tested they would be supported. Rather, the
intent of the quiz is to discover if students can devise tests of the hypotheses regardless
of their empirical status.]
Quiz (94%), while success on the Mealworm Quiz dropped to 82%. Performance
dropped even further to 57% on the "A" Mountain Quiz and to a dismal 18% on the
Osmosis Quiz. What might be the cause or causes of this unexpected drop in
performance?
The working hypothesis tested by the present research is that the extent to which
students successfully generate and test causal (as opposed to descriptive) hypotheses
(see Chapter 3) depends on the presence or absence of two general levels of causal
hypothesis-testing skill. The first hypothesized level involves hypothesis testing in
contexts in which the tentative causal agents can be directly observed/sensed/
measured (e.g., the long or short strings and heavy or light weights on pendulums,
the number of smelly leaves and light or dark areas at the ends of boxes), while the
second involves causal hypothesis-testing in contexts in which the tentative causal
agents are unobservable (i.e., imaginary/abstract/theoretical) such as
139
ions and charged

molecules. Thus, successful performance depends in part on
the abstractness of the hypotheses in question.
To clarify this distinction between observable and unobservable causal agents,
consider the nature of water. Students can directly observe water. At room
temperature water appears as a clear liquid. Thus, it is not hard to imagine that the
presence or absence of this clear liquid might influence mealworm behavior. In other
words, students should have little difficulty in understanding (i.e.,
assimilating/representing) the hypothesis that mealworms may have moved to the
right end of a box because of the clear liquid (called water) at that end. On the other
hand, in the Osmosis Quiz, water is no longer treated as merely as a clear liquid.
Instead it is conceived of as consisting of charged
molecules. Of course students
cannot see individual water molecules to know whether or not each really consists of
two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, much less whether or not each is charged.
Thus, the hypothesis that unseen
and
ions leave cells because of their
attraction to unseen charged
molecules should be more difficult to
assimilate/represent.
Increased difficulty in representing and reasoning about unobservable entities
may also stem from the increased complexity of the arguments needed to test their
hypothesized role(s). For example, suppose the hypothesis is generated that red
onion cells shrink when bathed in salt water because
molecules exit the cells.
Further, suppose this molecules-exiting hypothesis is pitted against an alternative that
claims that the cells just appear smaller because
and
ions push on their cell
membranes (see Table 1). The following argument and experiment using dialysis
bags, which are assumed to have properties similar to those of cell membranes, can
be used to test these alternatives:
If...cells shrink because unobservable
and
ions push on their cell membranes,
(ion-push hypothesis)
and...a dialysis bag filled with distilled water is weighed, bathed in salt water for
several minutes, and then reweighed, (proposed test)
then...the bag should appear smaller while in the salt water, but should not lose
weight. (prediction) The bag should not lose weight because the
molecules,
which presumably weigh some measurable amount, should not leave the bag.
(theoretical rationale)
But...suppose upon conducting the experiment, we find that the bag does lose weight.
(observed result)
Therefore...we would conclude that the ion-push hypothesis is probably wrong.
(conclusion)
Although this argument follows the same pattern used to test causal hypotheses
about why pendulums swing fast or slow, it also includes a theoretical rationale. The
theoretical rationale is needed to link the hypothesis and proposed test to the
prediction. In other words, the theoretical rationale is needed to explain why the
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CHAPTER 7
prediction follows. No such theoretical rationale is needed in the pendulum context

because in that context the hypothesized cause and the experiment's independent
variable are one and the same (i.e., the amount of weight hanging on the string), thus
the prediction more obviously follows.
Thus, inherent in this argument is the notion that causal hypothesis testing can be
undertaken on two qualitatively different levels with success at testing hypotheses
involving observable causal agents as a prerequisite for becoming proficient at
testing causal hypotheses involving unobservable theoretical entities. In other words,
students first become generally skilled at testing hypotheses about observable causal
agents (skill that appears comparable to that of Piaget's fourth-stage called formal
operational e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). And only then, given the necessary
developmental conditions, do they become generally skilled at testing causal
hypotheses about unobservable causal agents. Thus, a fifth, post-formal, stage of
intellectual development is proposed.
Importantly, the present developmental view sees declarative knowledge as a
necessary but insufficient condition for successful fifth-stage hypothesis testing.
Predictably, some hypothesis-testing situations appear to involve causal claims that
fall between the extremes. For example, the second hypothesis advanced to explain
the lack of grass on the south-facing slope on the "A" Mountain Quiz involves very
intense sunlight - a readily observable factor - but also involves grasses' ability to
conduct photosynthesis - a clearly unobservable process, which in theory involves
unobservable entities such as
molecules, photons, electrons and the like.
Given the proposed distinction between the observable and the unobservable, one
might wonder what influence technological advances such as the invention of
increasingly powerful electron microscopes have had on the status of concepts such
as atoms and molecules. For example, does the fact that photographs now exist
presumably showing individual atoms reduce the status of the atom concept from
theoretical to descriptive? I think not - primarily because the photographs merely
reveal images that look like little round balls. Thus, one still does not actually see
atoms. In other words, deciding whether or not the photographs actually show atoms
is still a matter of interpretation - not observation.
In summary, like William Perry's search for patterns of intellectual development
during the college years (Perry, 1970), as well as those of other developmentallybased researchers who have sought developmental advances beyond Piaget's formal
stage (e.g., Arlin, 1975; Commons, Richards & Armon, 1984; Epstein, 1986;
Kramer, 1983; Hudspeth & Pribrum, 1990; Thatcher, 1991; Thatcher, Walker &
Guidice, 1987; Riegel, 1973), the present hypothesis attempts to understand the
cognition of college students not only in terms of declarative knowledge differences,
but also in terms of general reasoning skills needed to process information, test
alternative hypotheses, and construct theoretical concepts in qualitatively more
powerful ways.
141
2. METHOD
2.1 Sample
The sample consisted of 667 undergraduate students (non-science majors)

enrolled in a course entitled The Living World taught at a major southwest university
during a recent fall semester. The students ranged in age from 15.8 years to 47.1
years (mean age = 19.64 years, SD = 3.02).
2.2 Design
The first step in testing the study's working hypothesis was the selection of a
valid measure of scientific reasoning that included items testing students' skill in
testing alternative hypotheses involving observable causal agents. Lawson's
Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning was selected for this purpose (Lawson,
1978). Because the original test does not include items explicitly assessing students'
hypothesis testing skill in contexts in which the hypotheses involve unobservable
entities, two new items that did so were invented and added (i.e., a Burning Candle
item and a Red Blood Cells item). Thus, each new item should require
developmentally more advanced reasoning skill than assessed by the original test.
The modified test was then administered to students enrolled in The Living World
at the start of the fall semester. Scores on the modified test were used to classify
student responses into four developmental levels presumably reflecting their skill in
testing both types of causal hypotheses (i.e., Level 3 = students not able to test
hypotheses involving observable causal agents, Low Level 4 = students
inconsistently able to test hypotheses involving observable causal agents, High Level
4 = students consistently able to test hypotheses involving observable causal agents,
Level 5 = students able to test hypotheses involving unobservable causal agents).
Levels 1 and 2 would correspond to the sensory-motor and preoperational stages
respectively. However, Stage 1 and 2 thinking was not assessed as all students were
assumed to have acquired at least Stage 3 reasoning skill.
The course was then taught and records kept of student performance on course
exams. The modified test was also administered at the end of the semester to assess
test-retest reliability, to measure student progress in reasoning during the semester,
and to determine whether assessed reasoning skill at the start or at the end of the
semester is the better predictor of course performance.
Next a transfer problem that, in theory, required Stage 5 hypothesis-testing skill
was constructed and also administered at the end of the semester. The problem was
considered to be a transfer problem because it was written within a context neither
discussed nor explored in the course. More specifically, the problem involved testing
a hypothesis about why balloons move forward or backward when a moving vehicle
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stops suddenly. Five multiple-choice questions assessing the declarative knowledge

presumably needed to solve the transfer problem were also constructed and
administered. Consequently, if Stage 5 reasoning skill alone is sufficient to solve the
transfer problem, then reasoning skill alone should predict success. On the other
hand, if declarative knowledge is sufficient, then it alone should predict success.
Finally, if both Stage 5 reasoning skill and declarative knowledge are necessary, then
both should predict success.
Because the course introduced a number of biological and biochemical theories
involving both observable and unobservable causal agents, a more general prediction
was also advanced: If the modified reasoning test is a valid measure of general levels
of hypothesis-testing skill, then course exam scores of the Level 3 students should be
significantly lower than those of the Level 4 students; and exam scores of the Level 4
students should be significantly lower than those of the Level 5 students. This
prediction is based on the assumption that causal hypothesis-testing skill plays a role
in theoretical concept construction. In essence, the argument is made that even
though exam items do not directly assess causal hypothesis-testing skill, such skill
nevertheless plays a role in construction and retention of such concepts because
students presumably do not come to the learning situation as "blank slates." Rather,
they often come with alternative conceptions (i.e., hypotheses) that must be modified
or replaced by scientific conceptions. Thus, concept construction often engages
hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill. On the other hand, if classification into Level
5 by performance on the modified test does not reflect a general advance in
reasoning, but instead represents the acquisition of domain-specific declarative
knowledge needed to respond successfully to the two new test items (i.e., the
Burning Candle and Red Blood Cells items), then Level 4 and Level 5 students
should perform equally well. The following argument summarizes how the
alternative hypotheses were tested:
If...two general, developmentally-based, levels of causal hypothesis-testing skill exist
i.e., Level 4 skill involving observable causal agents and Level 5 skill involving
unobservable causal agents, (fifth-stage hypothesis)
and...a sample of college students are classified as Level 4 or Level 5 reasoners
based on a test of reasoning skill and are then administered a transfer problem
presumably requiring Stage 5 hypothesis-testing skill,
then...students classified as Level 4 reasoners should not solve the problem while
students classified as Level 5 reasoners should solve the problem.
Further,
if...the fifth-stage hypothesis is correct, (fifth-stage hypothesis)
and...students classified as Level 4 or Level 5 reasoners are subjected to a biology
course in which several theoretical concepts are introduced and the students are then
tested to determine the extent to which they understand those concepts,
then...Level 4 students should demonstrate significantly less understanding than
Level 5 students.
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On the other hand,

if...two levels of causal hypothesis testing skill do not exist and instead student
performance differences on the reasoning skill test reflect differences in problemspecific declarative knowledge, (declarative-knowledge hypothesis)
and...the declarative knowledge presumably required for solution of the transfer
problem is assessed,
then...Level 4 and 5 students should perform equally well on the transfer problem;
transfer problem performance differences should correlate with declarative
knowledge differences; and Level 4 and 5 students should demonstrate similar
understanding of the theoretical concepts introduced in the biology course.
2.3 The Course
The Living World consists of three weekly 50-minute lectures (delivered by the
course professor) and one weekly two-hour lab (each taught by a graduate student
teaching assistants) each week for 15 weeks. In the order presented, course topics
included the theories of evolution and natural selection, animal behavior theory,
various physiological theories, theories of classical and molecular genetics, and
theories of photosynthesis and cellular respiration. In most cases, topics were first
explored and new terms first introduced in labs. Lectures then discussed the topics in
more detail and applied them to additional biological and non-biological contexts.
Thus, the course employed the learning cycle method of instruction (Eakin &
Karplus, 1976; Karplus, 1977; Lawson, Abraham & Renner, 1989; Renner & Marek,
1990).
2.4 Predictor Variables
Reasoning Skill Level. Hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill (i.e.,

developmental level) was assessed by a 13-item written test based on reasoning
patterns associated with causal hypothesis testing (i.e., the identification and control
of variables, correlational reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, proportional reasoning,
and combinatorial reasoning). As mentioned, the test was a modified version of
Lawson's Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning. With respect to causal hypothesis
testing, the original test includes items in which the hypothetical causal agents are for
the most part observable. For example, two items involve testing hypotheses in the
context of the pendulum task mentioned above, two other items involve fruit fly
responses to red and blue light and one item involves a light bulb's response to
pushed buttons.
Validity of the original test as a measure of general reasoning skill has been
established by several studies (e.g., Lawson, 1978; 1979; 1980a; 1980b; 1982; 1983;
1987; 1990; 1992; 1995; Lawson & Weser, 1990; Lawson, Baker, DiDonato, Verdi
& Johnson, 1993). An important aspect of the establishment of test validity, as was
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the case with many of Piaget's original tasks, was the need to demonstrate that
performance differences on the items were caused by differences in reasoning skill
and not by the presence or absence of domain-specific knowledge. In other words,
items should require only specific knowledge that students can reasonably be
presumed to have. In short, the studies have supported this presumption. The
pendulum task is an excellent example of this point because all students presumably
know what strings and weights are and what is meant by the phrase swinging back
and forth.
The modified test used in the present study contains 11 of the original items plus
two new items that are hypothesized to require Stage 5 reasoning skill because each
requires students to use hypothetico-predictive reasoning to reject causal hypotheses
involving unobservable entities (i.e., dissolving
molecules and pushing or
attracting
and
ions). Of course, testing the validity of this claim, as opposed
to the claim that the tasks merely measure the presence or absence of domainspecific declarative knowledge, is a central component of the present study. One of
the items involves water rise in an inverted cylinder after the cylinder had been
placed over a burning candle sitting in water. The other item involves changes in the
appearance of red blood cells when bathed in salt water. The two new items appear
as follows:
The Burning Candle. The figure below at the left shows a drinking glass and a
burning birthday candle stuck in a small piece of clay standing in a pan of water.
When the glass is turned upside down, put over the candle and placed in the water,
the candle quickly goes out and the water rushes up into the glass (as shown at the
right).
This observation raises an interesting question: Why does the water rush up into
the glass? Here is a possible explanation. The flame converts oxygen from the air to
carbon dioxide. Because oxygen does not dissolve very rapidly in water, but carbon
dioxide does, the newly formed carbon dioxide dissolves rapidly in the water
lowering the air pressure inside the glass. Thus, the relatively higher air pressure
outside the glass pushes the water up into the glass. a. Suppose you have the
materials mentioned above plus some matches and some dry ice (dry ice is frozen
carbon dioxide). Using these materials, describe a way to test this possible
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explanation. b. What result of your test would show that this explanation is probably
wrong?
The Red Blood Cells. A student put a drop of blood on a microscope slide and
then looked at the blood under a microscope. As you can see in the diagram below,
the magnified red blood cells look like little round balls. After adding a few drops of
salt water to the blood, the student noticed that the cells appeared smaller as shown
below.
This observation raises an interesting question: Why do the red blood cells
appear smaller? Here are two possible explanations:
I: Salt ions
push on the cell membranes and make them appear
smaller.
II: Water molecules are attracted to the salt ions so water molecules move out and
leave the cells smaller.
Suppose you have a beaker, some salt water, a very accurate weighing devise,
and some water-filled plastic bags. Suppose the plastic behaves just like red-bloodcell membranes. a. Describe an experiment using these materials to test the two
explanations. b. What result of your experiment would show that explanation I is
probably wrong? c. What result of your experiment would show that explanation II is
probably wrong?
Scoring. All test items required students to respond to a question or make a
prediction in writing and to either explain how they obtained their answer, or in the
case of quantitative problems, to show their calculations. Items were judged correct
(a score of 1) if the correct answer and an adequate explanation or set of calculations
were present. To obtain a correct score on the Burning Candle item, students had to
propose an adequate experiment and describe what experimental result would show
that the explanation was probably wrong. Two points were possible on the Red
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Blood Cells item - one for each explanation satisfactorily tested and shown to be
probably wrong.
Based on the nature of the test items and the number of each type of item, scores
of 0-3 were classified as Level 3 (i.e., students not able to test hypotheses involving
observable causal agents). Scores of 4-6 were classified as Low Level 4 (i.e.,
students inconsistently able to test hypotheses involving observable causal agents).
Scores of 7-10 were classified as High Level 4 (i.e., students consistently able to test
hypotheses involving observable causal agents). And scores of 11-13 were classified
as Level 5 (i.e., students able to test causal hypotheses involving unobservable
entities). A test-retest reliability coefficient of 0.65 was obtained by comparing
student performance on the test administered at the start of the semester with test
performance at the semester's end.
Declarative Knowledge. The declarative knowledge believed to be involved in
the Balloons Transfer Problem (see below) was measured by the following multiplechoice items, which were administered at the semester's end. No systematic attempt
was made to introduce this knowledge during the semester.
1. Which of the following objects carries the most "umph" (momentum)?

a. a pickup truck parked in your driveway
b. a pickup truck traveling at 60 miles per hour (correct answer)
c. a baseball traveling at 70 miles per hour
d. a baseball sitting on a table
2. Air is composed of
a. empty space.
b. tiny stationary molecules.
c. tiny moving and colliding molecules. (correct answer)
3. Air
a. has weight. (correct answer)
b. has no weight.
4. An air-filled balloon will fall to the floor because
a. the floor is its "natural" place.
b. static electricity will pull it down.
c. it is heavier than the surrounding air. (correct answer)
d. it is lighter than the surrounding air.
5. A helium-filled balloon will float in air because
a. its "natural" place is up.
b. static electricity will hold it up.
c. it is heavier than the surrounding air.
d. it is lighter than the surrounding air. (correct answer)
Scoring. Each question was scored as correct (1) or incorrect (0) for a 0 to 5 total score.
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2.5 Dependent Variables

The Balloons Transfer Problem. During the final laboratory period, students
watched a video. The video showed a side view of a rubber balloon hanging by a
string from the ceiling of a moving vehicle. Also shown was a floating mylar balloon
attached by a string to the vehicle's back seat. When the vehicle came to an abrupt
stop, the hanging balloon swung forward and the floating balloon swung backward.
After viewing this on the videotape, students read the following and responded in
writing:
As you could see in the video, when the vehicle stopped, the hanging balloon
went forward and the floating balloon went backward. This observation raises an
interesting question: Why did the hanging balloon go forward while the floating
balloon went backward? Here is a possible explanation. The hanging balloon is
relatively heavy; so its momentum carried it forward when the vehicle stopped. The
floating balloon, being lighter than air and having less momentum, went backward
because as the vehicle stopped, the heavier air molecules inside the vehicle rushed
forward and piled up at the front. Thus, the piled-up air molecules at the front pushed
harder on the front side of the balloon than the relatively fewer air molecules on the
balloon's backside. Thus, the balloon was pushed backward.
Suppose you have two balloons just like those shown in the video, a large airtight
chamber on wheels, and a vacuum pump (a pump that can extract air from airtight
chambers). a. Describe an experiment using these materials to test the possible
explanation. b. What result of your experiment would show that the explanation is
probably wrong?
Scoring. Responses were judged to be correct (a score of 1) or incorrect (a score
of 0). All responses were evaluated based on the criterion that a correct response
must contain the following experiment and argument: First secure the two balloons in
the chamber as they were secured in the vehicle. Next use the pump to extract air
from the chamber. Then set the chamber in motion and quickly stop it. If the
balloons behave as they did in the vehicle (i.e., the hanging balloon moves forward
and the floating balloon - which would now just rest on the seat - moves backward),
then the explanation is probably wrong. This experiment and argument do not
explicitly follow the hypothetico-predictive form. Nevertheless, the form was
presumably used, i.e.:
If...the lighter-than-air balloon went backwards when the vehicle in the videotape
stopped because air molecules piled up at the front and pushed it backwards,
(molecules-push-hypothesis)
and...the described experiment is conducted,
then...the lighter-than-air balloon should not move backwards. The lighter-than-air
balloon should not move backwards because no air molecules remain in the chamber
so they could not push it backwards. (theoretical rationale)
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But...suppose the proposed experiment is conducted and the lighter-than-air balloon

still moves backward.
Therefore...we would conclude that the explanation is probably wrong.
Inter-rater agreement with a random subset of 100 student responses was 91%.
Lecture Examinations. Three lecture exams written by the course professors were
administered during the semester. Each exam contained from 26 to 40 multiplechoice items. Exams were machine scored with scoring adjusted so that each exam
was worth 100 points for a total of 300 possible points. Table 2 contains example
exam items. Note that these items assess understanding of theoretical conceptual
systems as evolution, natural selection, combustion, energy transfer and loss within
food chains, population regulation, gene transfer and reproductive strategies.
1. Which of the following is not a component of Darwin's theory of natural selection?

a. Offspring tend to resemble their parents.
b. Environments place limits on survival and reproduction.
c. Individuals with heritable traits that enhance reproductive success leave more decedents
than individuals lacking those traits.
d. Within populations, lots of variation in traits can be observed among individuals.
e. None of the above. (correct answer)
2. The protective coloration of many insect species is a good example of
a. a vestigial trait.
b. an acquired characteristic.
c. one-step evolution.
d. an adaptation. (correct answer)
e. speciation.
3. Within a habitat, which of the following organisms would be least abundant?
a. herbivorous insects
b. plants
c. Fungi
d. eagles (correct answer)
e. termites
4. Scientists have concluded that increases in the concentration of
in the atmosphere over
the past 100 years have been caused by
a. decreased rates of plant photosynthesis due to lower light intensities.
b. increased releases of volcanic gases.
c. mobilization of long-term storage pools of carbon (fossil fuels, forests). (correct answer)
d. increased bacterial growth in contaminated soils.
e. atmospheric chemical reactions that release
from organic molecules.
5. Which of the following is a good example of a density-independent population-regulating
factor?
a. contagious disease
b. warfare and fighting
c. malnutrition
d. temperature drop to lethal levels (correct answer)
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6. In pea plants, the purple allele is dominant to the white allele. A homozygous pea plant with
purple flowers is crossed with a plant with white flowers. What percent of the offspring will
have white flowers?
a. 0% (correct answer)
b. 25%
c. 50%
d. 75%
e. 100%
7. Species vary widely in their reproductive potential. Some have many offspring while others
have few. Which of the following species would you expect to survive better under highly
competitive conditions?
a. Small egg species because they can produce more offspring so at least some would
survive.
b. Small egg species because they spend less energy producing eggs so the parents have
more time to insure their own survival.
c. Large egg species because their young would start life larger and better able to compete.
(correct answer)
d. Large egg species because parents would waste less time laying eggs and thus have more
time to secure more mates.
3. RESULTS
3.1
Reasoning Skill Level and Declarative Knowledge Performance
Figures 3a and 3b show student performance on the test of hypothesis-testing

skill administered at the start of the semester and again at the end of the semester.
Based on pretest performance, students were classified as follows: Level 3 = 66
students (11%); Low Level 4 = 198 students (34%); High Level 4 = 268 students
(46%); and Level 5 = 52 students (9%). Posttest scores improved considerably
(Dependent T = 29.6, df = 513, p < 0.001). Based on the same scoring criteria
numbers and percentages of students at each level on the posttest were as follows:
Level 3 = 12 students (2%); Low Level 4 = 71 students (11%); High Level 4 = 288
students (43%); and Level 5 = 296 students (44%).
Declarative knowledge scores were moderately high: 354 students (53%)
responded correctly to all five questions; 221 students (33%) responded correctly to
four questions; 68 students (10%) responded correctly to three questions; 13 students
(2%) responded correctly to two questions, 8 students (1%) responded correctly to
one question; and three students (<1%) responded correctly to none of the questions.
The following percentages of students responded correctly to the respective
questions: question 1 = 72%, question 2 = 95%, question 3 = 75%, question 4 =
95%, and question 5 = 97%. Overall mean score on the three lecture exams 212
points, S.D. = 66.3. This represents a 71% success rate. Success rate on the Balloons
Transfer Problem was 57%.
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3.2
151
Inter-correlations Among Study Variables
Table 3 shows Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients among the study

variables. All coefficients were significant (p < .01) with the highest coefficient
between the pre and posttest hypothesis-testing skill measures (0.65). The next
highest coefficient was between the posttest hypothesis-testing skill measure and
lecture exams (0.52). The lowest coefficient was between declarative knowledge and
performance on the Balloons Transfer Problem (0.13).
3.3 Predicting Performance on The Balloons Transfer Problem
A two-way analysis of variance with reasoning skill level (posttest) and

declarative knowledge score (0 to 5) used as predictors of performance on the
Balloons Transfer Problem (scores of 0 or 1) revealed a significant main effect
= 5.47, p < 0.001), a significant effect for reasoning skill level
p<
0.001), and a significant effect for declarative knowledge
p < 0.05).
A stepwise multiple regression analysis was conducted to determine which
predictor variable (declarative knowledge or reasoning skill level) was the better
predictor of performance on the Balloons Transfer Problem. The analysis revealed
that reasoning skill level, but not declarative knowledge, accounted for a significant
amount of variance. However, the range in scores on the declarative knowledge
measure was restricted as 643 of the 667 students (96%) responded correctly to three
or more of the items. Perhaps with a greater range, declarative knowledge would also
have been a significant predictor.
Table 4 shows relationships among reasoning skill level, declarative knowledge
and Balloons Transfer Problem performance in more detail. As you can see at the
bottom of the table, success on the Balloons Transfer Problem improved consistently
with reasoning skill level (i.e., combined column percentages are 17% success at
Level 3, 33% success and Low Level 4, 57% success at High Level 4, and 65%
success at Level 5). These percentages are shown graphically in Figure 4. The
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combined row percentages shown in the far right-hand column and in Figure 5
suggest that declarative knowledge is not as good a predictor of success on the
Balloons Transfer Problem. Although the respective combined row percentages of
33%, 50%, 15%, 43%, 59% and 47% do not show a consistent increase with amount
of declarative knowledge, only 24 students fell into the lowest three categories, thus
these percentages may not be representative.
3.4 Predicting Lecture Exam Scores
Figures 6 and 7 show the relationship between reasoning skill level (as assessed
by both pretest and posttest measures) and course performance (as determined total
scores on the three lecture exams). As you can see, the predicted relationship
between reasoning skill level and exam performance was found
p<
0.001 for the hypothesis-testing skill pretest and
p< 0.001 for the
hypothesis-testing skill posttest). Tukey's post hoc tests conducted on both the pre
and posttest showed that the mean scores of all group pairs differed significantly (p <
0.05).
Although the primary purpose of this study was not to test hypotheses about how
to promote the development of causal hypothesis-testing skill, possible causes of the
observed pre to posttest gains (Figures 3a and 3b) deserve mention. First, small pre
to posttest improvements have been traced to a test-retest effect (e.g., Lawson,
Nordland & DeVito, 1974). But our former students' relatively poor performance on
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155
4. DISCUSSION
Quizzes such as the A: Mountain and Osmosis quiz (Table 1), strongly suggests that
the substantial improvements in causal hypothesis-testing found here are difficult to
come by and not likely to have been caused by a test-retest effect. Perhaps the most
reasonable explanation for the substantial gains is that the students did in fact
became better at testing alternative causal hypotheses and that this improvement
came about because the course professors and graduate teaching assistants made a
very conscious and concerted effort to make causal hypothesis testing the central
theme of nearly every lecture and virtually all labs. Also, because previous research
on the "teachability" of reasoning skill suggests that skill develops best when
students are given repeated opportunities to test hypotheses in familiar and
observable contexts prior to attempting to do so with unobservable entities, the labs
and lectures were sequenced as such.
For example, Westbrook & Rogers (1994) found that a 6-week ninth-grade unit
on simple machines (e.g., levers, pulleys, and inclined planes) with readily
observable variables was successful in promoting Level 4 reasoning skill when
students were explicitly challenged to generate and test alternative hypotheses. Also,
Shayer & Adey (1993) found that the Thinking Science Program (Adey, Shayer &
Yates, 1989) was successful in boosting the achievement of students on the British
National examinations not only in science and mathematics but in English as well.
The Thinking Science Program is designed to develop scientific reasoning patterns
by testing causal hypotheses first in observable contexts such as pitch pipes,
shopping bags, and bouncing balls and then in unobservable contexts such as
dissolving and burning chemicals. In short, it appears that similar efforts in the
present course paid off for many students.
Results of the initial test of the studys central working hypothesis, which involved
assessing student performance on the Balloons Transfer Problem, were somewhat
equivocal. Recall that the argument was made that if Stage 5 reasoning skill alone was
sufficient to solve the transfer problem, then reasoning skill alone should predict
success. On the other hand, if declarative knowledge was sufficient, then it alone should
predict success. Finally, if both Stage 5 reasoning skill and declarative knowledge were
necessary, then both should predict success. Based on results of the stepwise multiple
regression analysis, it appears that hypothesis-testing skill, but not declarative
knowledge, significantly accounts for performance differences on the Balloons Transfer
Problem (Table 4 and Figures 4 and 5). Level 5 students were in fact more successful
than their less-skilled peers. But notice in Table 4 that only 65% of the Level 5 students
responded successfully. One might wonder why the other 35% of the Level 5 students
did not. It appears that their failure did not arise because they lacked some specific bit
of declarative knowledge because, as noted, declarative knowledge did not predict
problem success very well, particularly with the influence of hypothesis-testing skill
held constant. If Level 5 skill alone is sufficient and truly general, then success should
have been higher. But one should not expect 100% success. This is because, in theory,
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even for someone who knows in a general sense how to test Level 5 hypotheses (i.e.,
imagine some test condition that allows the generation of a specific prediction that may
in fact not happen), each hypothesis-testing context is different, thus deciding how to
test any specific Stage 5 hypothesis requires an element of creativity. In other words,
even if someone understands in a general sense what needs to be done to test a causal
hypothesis, they may not be able to come up with a good way to do so in any one
context, particularly when given limited time, as was the case here. The case of
physiologist Otto Loewi, who struggled for 17 years before he literally dreamed up a
way to test his chemical transmission hypothesis, is a classic example of this point (see
Koestler, 1964, p. 205). This interpretation seems consistent with that of Perkins &
Salomon (1989, p. 19) when they claim that general cognitive skills exist but function
in contextual ways.
Also note that 17% of the Level 3 students, 34% of the Low Level 4 students, and
57% of the High Level 4 students responded successfully to the Balloons Transfer
Problem. If Stage 5 hypothesis-testing skill is indeed necessary, then none of these
students should have been successful. Perhaps the unexpected success of these students
can at least partially be explained by the presence of overly suggestive "hints"
contained in the wording of the problem (i.e., test the explanation using an airtight
chamber on wheels and a pump that can extract air from airtight chambers).
As predicted, Level 5 students performed significantly better than Level 4 students
on the semester exams (Table 3 and Figures 6 and 7). Therefore, support has been
found for the hypothesis that the skill used in testing causal hypotheses involving
unobservable entities exists and is of general use in course performance (i.e., in
understanding theoretical concepts and in responding correctly to exam items about
such concepts). In other words, had success on the new test items (the Burning Candle
item and the Red Blood Cells item) required only declarative knowledge specific to
those items, then students classified at Level 5 would not have been more successful
than students classified at Level 4 on exams testing concept understanding in other
knowledge domains.
In conclusion, the present results provide support for the hypothesis that general,
causal hypothesis-testing skill beyond that assessed by typical sorts of Piagetianbased measures of formal stage reasoning exists and is used to test causal hypotheses
about unobservable entities. Stage 5 (post formal) skill appears to have been used by
students to succeed on the Balloons Transfer Problem and on course exams covering
a wide range of theoretical topics. Yet the distinction between Stage 4 and 5
hypothetico-predictive reasoning does not appear entirely clear cut as an element of
creativity and perhaps one or more yet to be identified factors (e.g., confidence,
internal locus of control, "emotional" intelligence as defined by Goleman, 1995) may
157
play a role in determining the extent to which such hypothesis-testing skill may or
may not be employed in novel contexts.
Evidence suggests that the presence of declarative knowledge alone is not
sufficient to produce successful hypothesis-testing performance at this theoretical
level. This is not to say that declarative knowledge is unimportant to Stage 5
performance. Nevertheless, a number of students who apparently lacked one or more
key declarative-knowledge concepts (i.e., momentum, relative density of gases,
molecular nature of gases) gave evidence of having successfully tested a hypothesis
about the cause of movement of two balloons on the Balloons Transfer Problem.
Although future research is needed to explore the role of Stage 5 hypothesistesting skill in additional contexts (e.g., Chapter 10 explores the role of Stage 5
reasoning in rejecting nature-of-science misconceptions) and is needed to identify
additional factors that play roles in determining if and when students employ such
skill, it seems reasonable to suggest that making Stage 5 hypothesis-testing skill a
central focus of college-level science instruction can be very effective, particularly
when labs and lectures are sequenced to move from the observable and familiar to
the unobservable and unfamiliar. In spite of the fact that our present sequencing of
labs and lectures seems to be relatively effective, many students continued to exhibit
difficulties in Stage 5 hypothesis testing. These difficulties included a continued
confusion between descriptive and causal questions, between hypotheses and
predictions, and between evidence (i.e., observed results) and conclusions. Clearly
additional research is needed to determine how best to design curricula to eliminate
these persistent problems.
CHAPTER 8
WHAT KINDS OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS EXIST?
1. INTRODUCTION
Following Northrop (1947), Lawson, Abraham & Renner (1989) described three
general sources of meaning and proposed three general categories of concepts (i.e.,
mental constructs that have been linked to specific terms or phrases). At the most
direct level, meaning can be derived from immediately sensed input giving rise to
color concepts such as green/red/blue, external state concepts such as hot/cold,
sharp/dull, and internal state concepts such as hunger, thirst, and tiredness. At this
level complete meanings are immediately apprehended from the internal or external
environment. Thus, a first category called concepts by apprehension can be
identified. Secondly, consider the sources of meaning for terms such as table, chair,
running, resting, taller and heavier. Meanings for these terms are derived from
objects, events, and from comparisons of objects and events. Such meanings are not
immediately apprehended. In Northrop's (1947) words: "...perceptual objects are not
immediately apprehended factors; they are postulates of common sense so
thoroughly and frequently and unconsciously verified through their deductive
consequences that only the critical realize them to be postulated rather than
immediately apprehended" (p. 93). In other words, objects such as tables and chairs
and events such as running and resting and relations such as taller and heavier are
mental constructions. Yet, we lose sight of this fact because we have gathered so
much evidence to support their postulated existence. Hence, a second class called
descriptive concepts can be identified. To understand descriptive concepts, one must
mentally construct order from environmental encounters. In short, descriptive
concepts allow us to order and describe our experiences (see Chapter 3).
The third type of concept described by Lawson et al. (1989) is also derived by
postulation and test. However, this type differs from descriptive concepts in that
defining attributes are only indirectly testable. The primary use of these concepts is
to function as explanations for events that need causes, but for which no causal agent
can be perceived. Angels and ghosts fall into this category. Common examples from
science are photons, electrons, atoms, molecules, and genes. These are called
theoretical concepts. The reason for the existence of theoretical concepts can be
found in a basic assumption that humans make about their world - events do not
occur without causes. Thus, if we perceive an event, but cannot perceive objects or
processes that caused the event, we do not conclude that the event is spontaneous and
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without cause. Instead, using analogical reasoning (see Chapters 5 and 6), we may
invent unseen objects and interactions to explain the event in perceptible causal
terms. Because theoretical concepts are imagined and function to explain the
otherwise unexplainable, they can be given whatever properties are necessary in
terms of the theory of which they are a part. Thus, they derive meaning from the
analogies upon which they are based and from the postulates of specific theories in
which they reside (Lawson, 1958; Lewis, 1980, 1988; Northrop, 1947; Suppes,
1968).
According to developmental theory, descriptive and theoretical concept
construction are linked to intellectual development because the processes depend in
part on procedural or 'operational' knowledge structures (i.e., reasoning patterns) as
well as on prior declarative knowledge structures (cf., Anderson, 1980; Fosnot,
1996; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Karplus, 1977; Kuhn, 1989; Lawson, 1995; Piaget &
Inhelder, 1969; von Glaserfeld, 1995). Development of procedural structures occurs
gradually with age because it depends not only on maturation (e.g., Epstein, 1986;
Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990; Thatcher, Walker, & Guidice, 1987) but also on
experience (both social and physical) and on the individual's self-regulatory
mechanisms. Thus, during intellectual development, concepts by apprehension come
first. Then descriptive concepts are constructed during childhood followed by the
construction of theoretical concepts during adolescence and adulthood. Of course
this sequence does not mean that children do not often believe in ghosts, Santa Claus
or the tooth fairy. Children may and often do form such beliefs. However, those
beliefs typically are formed on the basis of what they have been told by adults rather
than being constructed based on a consideration of the alternatives and the evidence.
Similarly, when an adult attempts to construct concepts in a new field of study, the
descriptive conceptual foundation must at least be partially in place before
theoretical concepts are constructed. For example, Gregor Mendel (as well as other
biologists at the time) knew that offspring tend to look like their parents and
wondered why. In Mendel's case, he described observable 'phenotypes' of parent and
offspring pea plants prior to constructing his theory of the nature and behavior of
unobservable 'genotypes.' Here the descriptive concept of phenotype comes first and
the theoretical concept of genotype comes second. In other words, one does not
invent an explanation involving unseen theoretical entities (e.g., genes) until one has
some puzzling observations to explain (e.g., Why do offspring tend look like their
parents?).
This theory of concept construction and intellectual development leads to the
prediction that students at any one age who vary in the extent to which they have
developed procedural knowledge structures (hypothetico-predictive reasoning
patterns) should vary in the extent to which they can profit from science instruction
aimed at teaching descriptive and theoretical concepts. This prediction has been
confirmed by several previous studies (e.g., Cavallo, 1996; Germann, 1994; Johnson
& Lawson, 1998; Kwon & Lawson, 2000; Lawson & Renner, 1975; Lawson &
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Thompson, 1988; Lawson & Weser, 1990; Renner & Marek, 1990; Shayer & Adey,
1993).
Note that the present theory implies that in any field of investigation, the
descriptive foundation should precede the introduction and testing of alternative
theoretical explanations. However, it does not imply that all questions of causality
should be avoided until students have developed higher-order reasoning patterns (cf.,
Metz, 1995). Rather, the view is that it is the process of generating and testing
alternative theoretical possibilities that leads to the development of higher-order
reasoning. Unfortunately, the introduction of theoretical concepts is usually not done
in this way. Instead, most textbooks introduce them as "facts" and seldom bother to
introduce the alternatives, the arguments, and the evidence used by scientists to
arrive at such "facts." Thus, students are not provided opportunities to develop
higher-level reasoning skill. Also, they are not provided opportunities to acquire
understanding of how science works.
2. A FOURTH CLASS OF CONCEPTS: HYPOTHETICAL CONCEPTS
The initial purpose of the research described in this chapter is to test the
hypothesis that in addition to concepts by apprehension, descriptive concepts, and
theoretical concepts, a fourth class of concepts exists. Like theoretical concepts, this
class of concepts lacks observable exemplars. However, unlike theoretical concepts,
such concepts could, in theory, derive meaning from observation if it were possible
for one to extend the time frame over which the necessary observations are made.
Such concepts are assumed to be more abstract than descriptive concepts, but less
abstract than theoretical concepts, consequently should be of intermediate difficulty
in terms of concept construction. The word hypothetical has been chosen to refer to
this proposed fourth class of concepts.
More specifically, the following terms, which were recently introduced to
students in an introductory college biology course, are proposed to represent
concepts that should be classified as descriptive because readily observable
exemplars exist: environmental factors, food chains, populations, nocturnal,
carnivore, stimulus and community. Further, the following terms, which were also
introduced in the course, are proposed to represent hypothetical concepts because,
even though instruction did not allow students to observe the processes/entities to
which the terms refer, if observations were made for an extended time period, the
processes/entities could in theory be observed: species (where species are defined as
organisms that share enough characteristics to mate and produce viable offspring),
limiting factors, fossils (where understanding of the process of fossilization is
implied as fossils must be distinguished from non-fossilized organic remains),
artificial selection, evolution, convergent evolution, and natural selection. And
lastly, the following introduced terms are proposed to represent theoretical concepts
because no matter how long one observes, observable exemplars cannot be seen:
162
osmosis, combustion, air pressure (in terms of colliding molecules), genes (within
the context of classical Mendelian theory), molecules (in terms kinetic-molecular
theory), photosynthesis, biogeochemical cycles.
This classification scheme does not take into account Harre's (1986) distinction
between realm 2 and realm 3 theories in which more powerful microscopes and
telescopes can cause a realm-3 theory to become a realm-2 theory. In Harre's view, a
realm-3 theory/concept becomes a realm-2 theory/concept when instruments become
powerful enough to allow us to "observe" what previously was not observable.
However, in my view once a concept is classified as theoretical (Hare's realm 3), it is
not appropriate to later reclassify it at realm 2 because regardless of instrument
resolution, the central cognitive issue remains one of interpretation not observation. For
example, in spite of the fact that powerful electron microscopes can now focus on tiny
ball-shaped objects, whether or not one interprets those ball-shaped objects as atoms, or
perhaps just very small ball-shaped molecules, depends on one's theoretical perspective,
rather than one's observational ability. Further, meaning of the term atom does not come
from observations no matter how "close" those observations become. Instead, meaning
continues to come from analogy and from the postulates of atomic-molecular theory.
In summary, the proposed concept classification scheme argues that constructing
descriptive concepts should be the easiest because meanings come from experience.
Hypothetical concepts should be of intermediate difficulty because one has to imagine
past or future events to derive meanings. And theoretical concepts should be the most
difficult to construct because their meanings cannot be derived from observation
regardless of how much time one has to do the observing. This hypothesis leads to the
prediction that when student knowledge of specific descriptive, hypothetical and
theoretical concepts is assessed, students should demonstrate significantly more
knowledge of descriptive concepts than hypothetical concepts. Similarly, they should
demonstrate significantly more knowledge of hypothetical concepts than theoretical
concepts. These predictions are shown graphically in Figure 1, as is the prediction
based on the alternative hypothesis that the introduced terms fall into only two
categories (i.e., descriptive and theoretical).
A further prediction can be stated. Because concept construction is hypothesized
to depend in part on reasoning skill, students at differing developmental levels who
receive instruction on all three kinds of concepts are predicted to vary in their ability
to demonstrate knowledge of those specific concepts. In other words, students with
less-advanced reasoning skill should demonstrate less knowledge than moreadvanced students. Presumably intellectual development proceeds from a) Level 3 - a
descriptive level similar to Piaget's concrete operations stage, to b) Level 4 - a more
advanced level similar to Piagets formal stage in which causal hypotheses can be
tested, but only when the hypothesized causal agents are observable, to c) Level 5 - a
still more advanced level in which hypotheses involving unseen theoretical entities
can be tested. Consequently, students at the descriptive level (Level 3) are predicted
to exhibit knowledge of descriptive concepts, but they should not exhibit knowledge
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of hypothetical or theoretical concepts. Further, students at Level 4 should exhibit

knowledge of descriptive and hypothetical concepts, but not of theoretical concepts.
And lastly, students at Level 5 should exhibit knowledge of all three types of
concepts. These predictions are shown graphically in Figure 2. However, students at
less-advanced developmental levels may demonstrate some knowledge of more
advanced concepts because, as will be described below, the concept assessment
measure consists of questions written at Bloom's knowledge level, a level that does
not necessarily require "understanding" as defined by Bloom (1956). The reasoning
behind the present research design can be summarized as follows:
If...three types of increasingly abstract, developmentally sequenced scientific
concepts exist, i.e., descriptive, hypothetical and theoretical, (developmentalsequence hypothesis)
and...college students classified into three corresponding developmental levels
(Levels 3, 4 and 5) receive biology instruction incorporating the three types of
concepts and are then tested for knowledge of those concepts,
then...(1) collectively the students should demonstrate significantly more knowledge
of descriptive concepts than of hypothetical concepts than of theoretical concepts;
(2) Level 3 students should demonstrate knowledge only of descriptive concepts; (3)
Level 4 students should demonstrate knowledge only of descriptive and hypothetical
concepts; and (4) Level 5 students should demonstrate knowledge of all three type of
concepts.
164
3. METHOD
3.1 Subjects
Subjects were 663 undergraduate students (non-science majors) enrolled in a
course entitled The Living World (as described in Chapter 5). Students in this
particular study ranged in age from 17.1 years to 54.2 years (mean age = 20.3 years,
SD = 3.7).
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3.2 Design
A test designed to assess students' reasoning skill level (i.e., developmental level)
was administered during the first week of the semester within regularly scheduled lab
periods. The same test was re-administered during the last week of the semester
again within regularly scheduled lab periods as part of a graded final exam. The
exam also included 105 true/false questions designed to assess knowledge of the 21
concepts listed in the introduction.
As a check on the usefulness of this researcher-developed classification scheme, a
panel consisting of 10 pre-service biology teachers (biology majors, seniors and
graduates) read the definitions of concept types that appear in the Appendix. The
panel also read the biological concept definitions that also appear in the Appendix.
They were then asked to individually classify each biological concept based on the
presented definition into either the descriptive, intermediate or theoretical category.
Then the entire panel met to discuss the classification of each concept and attempted
to reach consensus. The extent of panel consensus, as well as the relationship of their
classifications to those of the researchers, was then determined.
3.3 Instruments
Reasoning Skill Level. Reasoning skill level (developmental level) was assessed
by a group-administered test based on reasoning patterns associated with hypothesis
testing as described in Chapter 7. The same 13 items were included. However,
instead of a free response format, multiple-choice responses were provided. Thus,
the test consisted of a total of 26 multiple-choice items. For example, the response
choices for the two Burning Candle items read as follows:
1. Using some or all of these materials, how could you best test this possible
explanation?
a. Saturate the water with carbon dioxide and redo the experiment noting
amount of water rise.
b. The water rises because oxygen is consumed; so redo the experiment in
exactly the same way to show water rise due to oxygen loss.
c. Conduct a controlled experiment varying only the number of candles to see
if that makes a difference.
d. Suction is responsible for water rise; so put a balloon over the top of an
open- ended cylinder and place the cylinder over the burning candle.
e. Redo the experiment but make sure it is controlled by holding all
independent variables constant; then carefully measure amount of water rise.
2. What result of your test (mentioned above) would show that the explanation is
probably wrong?
166
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
The water rises higher than it did before.

The water rises to the same as it did before.
The water rises less than it did before.
The balloon expands out.
The balloon is sucked in.
And the response choices for the two Red Blood Cells items read as follows:
1. What result of the experiment would best show that explanation I is probably
wrong?
a. the bag loses weight
b. the bag weighs the same
c. the bag appears smaller
2. What result of the experiment would best show that explanation II is probably
wrong?
a. the bag loses weight
b. the bag weighs the same
c. the bag appears smaller
Scoring. Each of the 26 questions (i.e., 13 two-part situations) required students
to select the best answer from the choices provided. Correct responses were awarded
one point. Based on the nature of the questions and the number of each question
type, scores of 0-8 were classified as Level 3 (i.e., students not able to test
hypotheses involving observable causal agents). Scores of 9-14 were classified as
Low Level 4 (i.e, students inconsistently able to test hypotheses involving observable
causal agents). Scores of 15-20 were classified as High Level 4 (i.e., students
consistently able to test hypotheses involving observable causal agents). And scores
of 21-26 were classified as Level 5 (i.e., students able to test hypotheses involving
unobservable entities). A Cronbach's reliability of 0.81 was obtained for the test
when administered at the semester's end.
Knowledge of Concepts. Five statements were constructed to assess knowledge
associated with each of the 21 concepts. The intent was to write statements that only
assessed knowledge associated with each concept and not reasoning patterns
required by more advanced levels of assessment, e.g., higher Bloom levels such as
analysis, application, evaluation and synthesis (Bloom, 1956). Even though Bloom
considers comprehension to be the lowest level of understanding, questions were not
written at this level to avoid, as much as possible, confounding what students knew
about each term with general reasoning skill that may be called into action when
attempting to answer questions at the comprehension and higher levels.
During the exam, students read each statement and decided whether it was true or
false and marked their answer sheets as such. The statements used to assess
knowledge associated with the terms carnivore, population, limiting factors, natural
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selection, genes and osmosis appear in Table 1. Test reliability as estimated by

Cronbach's
was 0.70. This rather low estimate is perhaps due in part to the
true/false nature of the items in which guessing can significantly contribute to
success or failure on any one item.
Descriptive Concept Questions

Carnivores
are animals that eat other animals. (T)
are animals that eat both plants and animals. (F)
are classified as ecological producers. (F)
must have fur. (F)
live only on land. (F)
A biological population
represents organisms of a single type living and reproducing in particular
location. (T)
refers to both living and non-living components of biological communities.
(F)
can decrease in numbers over time. (T)
can increase in numbers over time. (T)
usually contains individuals with variable characteristics. (T)
Hypothetical Concept Questions
Limiting factors
can increase in importance as population size increases. (T)
can wipe out entire populations regardless of population size. (T)
keep the reproductive potential of populations in check. (T)
can be both living and non-living environmental influences. (T)
can refer to non-biological aspects of the environment that limit population
size. (T)
According to natural selection theory, species change across time only when the
following conditions are met:
individuals with favorable characteristics produce more offspring than those
with unfavorable characteristics. (T)
environmental factors exist that limit population growth. (T)
climatic conditions change across time. (F)
characteristics acquired during individual lifetimes are passed to offspring.
(F)
favorable characteristics can be inherited. (T)
Theoretical Concept Questions
According to gene theory,
gene pairs separate independently during zygote production. (F)
during egg and sperm production genes recombine randomly. (F)
genes are located in chromosomes. (T)
an individual has at least one pair of genes for each observable characteristic.
(T)
one gene of a pair can dominate the expression of the other gene. (T) Osmosis
will not occur when membranes block diffusion. (T)
168
occurs only through living cell membranes. (F)

occurs when a dialysis bag filled with distilled water is placed in a glucose
solution. (T)
is not effected by temperature. (F)
involves random ionic and/or molecular collisions. (T)
4. RESULTS
4.1
Agreements/Disagreements Using the Concept Classification Scheme
The Appendix reports the extent to which the researcher-developed concept

classification scheme and the 10-member panel agreed on the classification of each
biological concept. In short, the researchers and the panel were in complete
agreement on all 7 of the concepts classified by the researchers as descriptive as well
as on all 7 of the theoretical concepts. Complete agreement was also found on two of
the intermediate/hypothetical concepts (i.e., evolution and convergent evolution).
However, differences of opinion existed on the remaining five concepts classified by
the researchers as intermediate/hypothetical. Only a slight difference existed for the
concept of natural selection (i.e., 9/10 of the panel members classified the concept as
intermediate). Moderate differences existed for the fossils concept (7/10 panel
members classified the concept as intermediate) and for the limiting factors concept
(6/10 panel members classified the concept as intermediate). Only 2/10 of the panel
members classified the artificial selection concept as intermediate; 3/10 classified it
as descriptive; 1/10 classified it as theoretical; and 4/10 remained undecided between
the descriptive and intermediate categories. Interestingly, all 10 of the panel
members disagreed with the researchers and classified the species concept as
descriptive.
4.2 Student Reasoning Skill Levels
Scores on the test of reasoning skill administered at the start of the semester
ranged from 3 to 24, Mean = 14.25, SD = 4.6. Scores on the test when readministered at semester's end ranged from 2 to 25, Mean = 18.24, SD = 4.54. A
dependent T-test indicated that the distributions (shown in Figure 5) differed
significantly (t = 14.99, p < 0.001).
Table 2 shows mean scores for each of the 21 sets of concept questions grouped
into the three concept categories as defined by the researchers. As shown, mean
scores among the descriptive concepts ranged from 4.85 (environmental factors) to
3.78 (food chain), among the hypothetical concepts from 4.58 (fossils) to 3.40
(natural selection), and among the theoretical concepts from 4.16 (biogeochemical
cycles) to 2.79 (combustion).
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170
Figure 6 shows overall student performance on the three concept categories using
Guilford's equation (Guilford, 1936) for determination of item difficulty when
chance success is a factor (i.e., with true/false questions chance alone may lead to a
correct response 50% of the time). Results revealed that overall student performance
on the descriptive, hypothetical and theoretical concept categories after eliminating
chance success was 81.1%, 61.4% and 46.5% respectively. A multivariate analysis of
variance with repeated measures found these overall performance differences to be
statistically significant
p < 0.001). All pair wise comparisons were
also statistically significant (p < 0.001).
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4.3 Relationship Between Reasoning Skill Level and Concept Questions

Figure 7 shows the relationship between reasoning skill level (as measured at the
semester's end) and performance on the three categories of concept questions with
chance success eliminated. The figure reveals a clear relationship between reasoning
skill level and concept performance. Multivariate analysis of variance with repeated
measures found these overall performance differences to be statistically significant
p < 0.001). All pair wise comparisons were also statistically
significant (p < 0.001).
Figure 7 also reveals that performance for students at each of the four reasoning
skill levels was higher on the descriptive concept questions than on the hypothetical
concept questions, which in turn was higher than performance on the theoretical
concept questions. Again, multivariate analysis of variance with repeated measures
found these performance differences to be statistically significant:
p<
0.001 for the Level 3 students;
p < 0.001 for the Low Level 4
students;
p < 0.001 for the High Level 4 students; and
423.36, p< 0.001 for the Level 5 students. All pair wise comparisons were
statistically significant (p < 0.001) with the exception the non-significant difference
172
between the hypothetical and theoretical concept questions for the Level 3 students
(p = 0.168).
5. DISCUSSION
The finding that the 10-member panel and the researchers were in complete
agreement on the classification of 16 of the 21 concepts suggests that the concept
classification scheme can be used consistently, particularly to classify descriptive and
theoretical concepts. All five of the classification disagreements occurred over
concepts classified by the researchers at the intermediate/hypothetical level and
concerned whether a concept should be classified as descriptive or intermediate. In
retrospect, this is not surprising as this distinction often boils down to the likelihood
of someone having the opportunity and patience to make the necessary observations.
Consequently, when the necessary observational time frame extended well beyond
the normal human lifetime, agreement was easy to reach (e.g., evolution, natural
selection). On the other hand, when the observations could possibly be made during
a single lifetime (e.g., artificial selection, limiting factors), disagreements were more
numerous. The fact that all panel members classified the species concept as
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173
descriptive while the researchers classified it as intermediate suggests that the

researchers may have misclassified this concept.
The concept classification scheme led to the prediction that students would
demonstrate significantly more knowledge of descriptive concepts than hypothetical
concepts. Similarly, they would demonstrate significantly more knowledge of
hypothetical concepts than theoretical concepts (see Figure 1). The observed results
shown in Figure 6 are essentially as predicted. Therefore, the results support the
hypothesis that these three kinds of scientific concepts exist. Importantly, in terms of
the proposed distinction between hypothetical and theoretical concepts, the pair wise
comparison between students performance on these two concept categories was also
statistically significant (p <0.001). This result lends further support to validity of this
proposed concept classification scheme.
Because concept construction presumably depends in part on hypotheticopredictive reasoning skill, students at differing reasoning skill levels were predicted
to vary in performance on the three categories of concept questions. More
specifically, Level 3 students were predicted to exhibit knowledge of descriptive
concepts, but not of hypothetical or theoretical concepts. Further, Level 4 students
were predicted to exhibit knowledge of descriptive and hypothetical concepts, but
not of theoretical concepts. And lastly, Level 5 students were predicted to exhibit
knowledge of all three types of concepts. These predictions were shown in Figure 2.
A comparison of the observed results (Figure 7) with the predicted results lends
support to the hypothesis in the sense that more skilled reasoners did in fact perform
significantly better than less skilled reasoners.
But the actual relationship was not as clear-cut as predicted. For example,
consider performance of the Level 3 students. These students were expected to
perform as well as the Level 4 and 5 students on the descriptive concepts, but they
did not. They were successful on only 41% of the descriptive concepts compared to
the 57%, 62% and 71% success rates of their more developmentally advanced peers.
Further, they were unexpectedly successful on 27% of the hypothetical questions and
20% of the theoretical questions, both of which were presumably beyond their
intellectual grasp. Similar remarks can be made about the students at the other
developmental levels. In other words, they were not as successful on some of the
concepts questions as they should have been. While on others, they were more
successful than they should have been.
How can these departures from the predictions be explained? A look back at the
concept questions suggests that the problem may stem, at least in part, from
difficulties in creating questions that assess knowledge of only one type of concept at
a time. For example, consider the set of statements designed to assess students'
knowledge of the descriptive concept of carnivore (Table 1). Notice that the third
statement mentions ecological producers. Thus, in addition to knowledge of
carnivores, identifying this statement as true or false presumably also requires
knowledge of ecological producers. An organism is a producer if it is capable of
conducting photosynthesis. Recall that photosynthesis is a concept that has been
174
classified as theoretical. Thus, the attempt to assess knowledge of the descriptive

carnivore concept may have been confounded by inclusion of a distracter that may
require knowledge of the presumably more abstract photosynthesis concept. During
construction of the concepts test, a concerted effort was made to avoid this problem.
But in hindsight, it appears that the problem was not entirely avoided. Consequently,
some of the concept questions were probably more difficult than they should have
been, which may have led to lower performance than predicted.
A related problem may stem from the psychological fact that concepts do not
stand alone (e.g., Ausubel, 1963; Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian 1978; Wandersee,
Mintzes & Novak, 1994). Rather concepts exist within complex conceptual systems
such that knowledge, and understanding, of any one descriptive concept is
"deepened" by the construction of other descriptive concepts as well as by
hypothetical and theoretical concepts. For example, Level 3 students presumably can
construct meaning of food chains given the appropriate experiences. Level 4 students
can then construct meaning of the hypothetical concept of limiting factors and in so
doing, their knowledge, and understanding, of food chains is "deepened" (e.g., biotic
limiting factors express themselves via feeding relationships within food chains).
Similarly, when Level 5 students construct knowledge of theoretical concepts such as
atoms, molecules and photosynthesis, the concepts of food chains and limiting
factors are revisited, but this time with even more precision, thus are "deepened"
even further (e.g., food chains begin with plants because they are the only organisms
capable of utilizing the energy of photons to synthesize organic "food" molecules
from inorganic molecules found in their environments; food chains are limited in
length because approximately 90% of the energy that enters each trophic level is
"lost" as heat before it can enter the next trophic level).
If the above discussion represents an accurate view of concept construction, then
perhaps we have explained why the more skilled reasoners outperformed their less
skilled peers on all three types of concept questions. But why did the Level 3
students demonstrate some success on the hypothetical and theoretical concept
questions? And why did the Level 4 students demonstrate some success on the
theoretical concept questions? Perhaps the most reasonable explanation is that in
spite of lack of any "deep" understanding of such concepts, these students
nevertheless retained some "bits" of knowledge that led to some success. For
example, consider the set of statements designed to assess knowledge of the
theoretical concept of gene (Table 1). As it turned out, student performance was
relatively high on the third, fourth, and fifth statements (72%, 78% and 90% success
respectively). This suggests that regardless of their developmental level, many
students retained these "facts" about genes. Similarly, 82% of the students responded
correctly to the statement that photosynthesis (presumably a theoretical concept)
involves light-capturing pigment molecules. And 76% responded correctly to the
statement that photosynthesis uses solar energy to combine
with
to produce
carbohydrate and
molecules.
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The implication is that understanding is by no means an all or none affair. Rather

understanding may begin with the accumulation of specific "bits" of knowledge
about abstract entities (e.g., ghosts are white, they are nocturnal) and processes, only
to proceed further with the development of more advanced reasoning skill, which is
then used to construct better understanding and/or reject prior misconceptions.)
Unfortunately, the present results suggest that the development of Stage 5 reasoning
skill, and the associated understanding of theoretical conceptual systems may be
limited to a very small percentage of students, that is unless their future course work
provokes continued intellectual development.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The present results provide support for the hypothesis that scientific concepts can
be meaningfully classified into four, not three, general categories. In addition to
previously identified apprehension, descriptive and theoretical concepts, a new class
of hypothetical concepts has been identified. Hypothetical concepts are defined as
those that, in theory, could derive meaning from observation if it were possible for
one to extend the time frame over which the necessary observations are made.
However, because in practice, such observations are either not possible or very
unlikely, meaning must be derived from one's ability to imagine past or future events
and situations. Thus, hypothetical concepts are of intermediate difficulty in terms of
knowledge acquisition and understanding.
The present results also provide support for the hypothesis that intellectual
development during the college years is not complete when students develop the
reasoning skill typically associated with Piagetian or neo-Piagetian conceptions of
formal operational thinking. Rather, as previously suggested by others, 'post-formal'
intellectual development occurs, at least for some students (e.g., Arlin, 1975; Castro
& Fernandez, 1987; Commons & Miller, 1997; Commons, Richards & Armon, 1984;
Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards & Krause, 1998; Perry, 1970; Perry, Donovan,
Kelsey, Peterson, Statkiewicz & Allen, 1986; Welfel & Davison, 1986; Yan & Arlin,
1998). Evidence has been obtained consistent with the view that some students,
perhaps less than one third (see Figure 5) develop reasoning skill associated with
hypothesis testing when the hypothesized entities are unobservable. As has been
found in previous studies, such hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill appears to
facilitate the acquisition of knowledge about, and the understanding of, scientific
concepts.
Interestingly, the conclusion that a new class of hypothetical concepts exists
seems to have been foreshadowed by philosopher C. S. Peirce over one hundred
years ago. Although Peirce was virtually unknown during his lifetime (1839-1914),
the publication of his collected papers in the 1930s led to great interest in his work
during the 1940s and 1950s. As cited in Goudge (1950), Peirce believed in the
existence of three types of hypotheses. The first type referred to facts unobserved
176
when the hypothesis was generated, but which could nevertheless have been
observed. For example, you see a broken window and a nearby baseball and generate
the hypothesis that the "flying" baseball broke the window. Peirce's second type was
hypotheses that referred to facts not only unobserved but physically incapable of
being observed. Peirce gave the following example: "Fossils are found; say, remains
like those of fishes, but far in the interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon,
we suppose the sea once washed over this land" (cited in Gould, 1950, p. 196).
Concepts associated with this type of hypothesis are what we are calling hypothetical
concepts. Lastly, Peirce's third type was hypotheses that referred to entities both
factually and theoretically incapable of being observed. Goudge cites molecules,
electrons and the luminiferous ether as examples. Clearly these are examples of what
we are calling theoretical concepts.
Because many, if not most, of the concepts that fill the syllabi of science courses
are of the hypothetical and theoretical nature, the implication seems clear. High
school and college science instructors should not only concern themselves with
introducing new terms/concepts. They should also concern themselves with
developing students' reasoning skill, with their continued intellectual development.
To do this, a careful analysis of the kinds of concepts introduced, as well as the order
and means of their introduction should become matters of concern. In introductory
biology courses this means overturning the widespread and long standing tradition of
starting courses with the theoretical concepts associated with chemistry (e.g., atomic
and molecular structures) before progressing to the more descriptive and
hypothetical concepts associated with whole organisms (e.g., Hepper, Hammon,
Kass-Simon & Kruger, 1990). Clearly a reconfigured introductory biology course
that starts with descriptive concepts and progresses to hypothetical concepts, and
then to theoretical concepts, seems in order. Such changes may not only help
students better understand concepts and promote their intellectual development, they
might also help solve the widespread problem of college student attrition from the
sciences (e.g., Rigdon & Tobias, 1991; Seymour & Hewitt, 1997; Sorensen, 1999).
CHAPTER 8
7. APPENDIX
7.1
Types of Concepts
People have ideas about how the world works. These ideas are sometimes called
concepts. We use words or phrases to refer to our ideas/concepts, which can be
classified into at least three types.
7.2 Theoretical Concepts
Have you ever used your direct senses (microscopes do not count) to actually
observe a single helium atom? Of course the answer is no. No person has ever
observed a single atom of any kind simply because atoms are much too small to see
with the naked eye. So how do we know that atoms exist? The answer is that we
really do not know in any absolute sense. Instead the idea that atoms exist was
proposed long ago and has subsequently been verified with so much indirect
evidence that people no longer doubt their existence. Nevertheless, in spite of some
recent photographs taken with very powerful electron microscopes showing what
appear to be little round balls (atoms?), no person will ever be able to use the naked
eye to directly observe an individual atom. Thus the concept of atoms (i.e., the idea
that all matter consists of tiny unseen ball-shaped objects) is classified as a
theoretical concept. The meaning of theoretical concepts comes not from direct
sensory input but from the theories from which ideas originate. Other theoretical
concepts about objects too small to see include things such as photons, electrons,
quarks and any type of process that presumably involves knowing what takes place in
terms of interacting atoms and molecules (e.g., diffusion, oxidation, glycolysis,
anaerobic respiration). Because the entities and processes upon which theoretical
concepts are based cannot be directly observed, acquiring understanding of
theoretical concepts is relatively difficult.
7.3 Descriptive Concepts
Have you ever used your direct senses to actually observe a single chair? Of
course the answer is yes. You may be sitting in one now. No two chairs are identical
in all respects. And some may be quite different from others (e.g., a baby's high chair
and a recliner). Nevertheless, all chairs share enough observable characteristics to
allow us to recognize them as chairs. And because chairs can be directly observed, if
someone does not yet know what a chair is, we can show them one. Thus the chair
concept derives meaning from direct observation of objects and is classified as a
descriptive concept. We also form descriptive concepts of directly observed events
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178
WHAT KINDS OF SCENTIFIC CONCEPTS EXIST?
(e.g., A girl is seen walking down a street. A dog is heard barking in the night.), and
of directly observed situations (e.g., A boy is sitting on top of a box. Dirt is swept
under a rug.). Other examples of descriptive concepts include eating, sleeping,
hitting, crying, cars, boats, tables, furniture, next to, below, around, shorter, heavier,
and so on. Notice that the concept of furniture is classified as descriptive in spite of
the fact that we do not see the class furniture, rather we see individual objects (tables,
chairs, sofas) that we group together in a larger class of objects that we call furniture.
Nevertheless, the class concept of furniture is still considered descriptive because we
can observe examples of its class members. Because the entities and processes upon
which descriptive concepts are based can be directly observed, acquiring
understanding of descriptive concepts is relatively easy.
7.4 Intermediate Concepts
An intermediate class of concepts exists. Do you know where dinosaurs came
from? Do you know what killed them some 65 million years ago? Do you know what
produced the Grand Canyon in Northern Arizona? And do you know how ecological
succession occurs on abandoned farmland in Georgia or why predator-prey
populations often show cyclic oscillations? Of course nobody was alive when the
dinosaurs arose, when they died, and when the Grand Canyon was carved. So direct
observation of these events by humans is not possible. And although it may be
possible for any one person to observe ecological succession and predator-prey
population oscillations, these events generally take place on time scales that extend
well beyond the normal person's experience. Thus our inability to make these sorts of
observations is limited in a fundamentally different way than in the case of
theoretical concepts. Our limitation here is not our senses but our relatively short life
span or our inability to take the time to make the necessary observations. In other
words, although we will never be able to use our senses to directly observe an atom
because it its size, presumably we could have observed where the dinosaurs came
from, what produced the Grand Canyon, and how succession occurs had we been
around long enough and at the right time. Thus ideas/concepts about events that
occur beyond the normal, or even possible, time frame of observation form an
intermediate class of concepts. Additional examples include the geologist's concepts
of plate tectonics, subduction, and orogeny and the paleontologist's concepts of
speciation, adaptive radiation and extinction. Because the entities and processes
upon which intermediate concepts are based are not directly observed, but could in
theory be directly observed if the observational time period were extended beyond
the normal, acquiring understanding of intermediate concepts is of intermediate
difficulty.
CHAPTER 8
179
7.5 An Exercise in Classifying Concepts
Here are some terms or phrases including their definitions. Please classify them
into one of the three concept classes defined above. Pay particular attention to the
definitions as the classification of any one term/phrase may differ depending upon
how it is being defined.
1. environmental factors: the observable factors surrounding an organism that may

effect its growth and development, e.g., amount of soil, number and types of
other organisms. (Researcher classification = descriptive. Panel classification
10/10 = descriptive).
2. molecule: a particle that results from the joining of two or more atoms.
(Researcher classification = theoretical. Panel classification 10/10 = theoretical).
3. food chain: a sequence of feeding relationships starting with plants, moving

through successive levels of animals; for example grass being eaten by a mouse
that is in turn eaten by a snake, that is in turn eaten by a hawk. (Researcher
classification = descriptive. Panel classification 10/10 = descriptive).
4. artificial selection: the selective breeding of organisms over several generations
for the purpose of producing offspring with certain desired characteristics.
(Researcher classification = intermediate. Panel classification 3/10 = descriptive;
2/10 = intermediate; 1/10 = theoretical; 4/10 undecided between descriptive and
intermediate).
5. air pressure: the force exerted on a surface due to the collision of unseen gas
molecules with that surface; the amount of force depends on the frequency of
collisions, the mass of the colliding molecules and their speed. (Researcher
classification = theoretical. Panel classification 10/10 = theoretical).
6. combustion: the rapid breaking apart and oxidation (i.e., addition of
molecules) of relatively complex molecules to produce heat energy and usually
light energy. (Researcher classification = theoretical. Panel classification 10/10 =
theoretical).
7. convergent evolution: the independent evolution of similar characteristics within

two or more populations of unrelated organisms as a result of living under similar
selective pressures. (Researcher classification = intermediate. Panel classification
10/10 = intermediate).
8. nocturnal: a type of animal that is active at night. (Researcher classification =
descriptive. Panel classification 10/10 = descriptive).
180
9. species: groups of organisms that may live in different locations but that share
enough characteristics such that if they were brought into contact with each other
they could mate and produce fertile offspring (i.e., fertile offspring are those that
can in turn mate and produce their own offspring). (Researcher classification =
intermediate. Panel classification 10/10 = descriptive).
10. osmosis: the diffusion of water
molecules through a selectively permeable

membrane; from a region of relative high concentration of water molecules to a
region of relatively lower concentration. (Researcher classification = theoretical.
Panel classification 10/10 = theoretical).
11. limiting factors: environmental factors that act over an extended period of time
to keep a population from living in a particular area or restrict its population size.
(Researcher classification = intermediate. Panel classification 2/10 = descriptive;
6/10 = intermediate; 2/10 = undecided between descriptive and intermediate).
12. population: a group of organisms that appear to be of the same kind living
together in a particular location. (Researcher classification = descriptive. Panel
classification 10/10 = descriptive).
13. biogeochemical cycles: pathways in which atoms and molecules such carbon
(C), oxygen
nitrogen
phosphorus (usually in the form of a phosphate
ion
and water
cycle through living and non-living components of
ecosystems. (Researcher classification = theoretical. Panel classification 10/10 =
theoretical).
14. community: all of the organisms living and interacting in a particular area.
(Researcher classification = descriptive. Panel classification 10/10 = descriptive).
15. evolution: the lengthy process by which some past species have gone extinct
while others have changed to give rise to present-day species. (Researcher
classification = intermediate. Panel classification 10/10 = intermediate).
16. natural selection: the evolutionary process in which organisms better suited to
live in a particular environment are able to survive and pass on their helpful
characteristics to subsequent generations. Natural selection is one of the most
important processes causing evolutionary change. (Researcher classification =
intermediate. Panel classification 9/10 = intermediate; 1/10 undecided between
intermediate and theoretical).
17. external stimulus: an occurrence such as a flash of light or a poke external to an

organism that provokes it to respond in some way. (Researcher classification =
CHAPTER 8
181
18. gene: a basic hereditary unit consisting of a sequence of DNA nucleotide

molecules within a chromosome. (Researcher classification = theoretical. Panel
classification 10/10 = theoretical).
19. photosynthesis: the process by which chlorophyll molecules in green plants

capture light energy and use it to combine
and
molecules together to
produce glucose (i.e.,
molecules. (Researcher classification =
theoretical. Panel classification 10/10 = theoretical).
20. carnivore: an animal that eats primarily meat. (Researcher classification =

21. fossils: the remains of once living organisms preserved in rock through a lengthy
process of fossilization (i.e., the replacement of living matter by rock-like
matter). (Researcher classification = intermediate. Panel classification 1/10 =
descriptive; 7/10 = intermediate; 2/10 = undecided between descriptive and
intermediate).
CHAPTER 9
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL MODELS
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapters 1 and 2 argued that learning is a constructive process that can be
understood at the psychological level in terms of self-regulation. Further, selfregulation can be understood in terms of the underling neural networks in which an
internally driven spontaneous process called adaptive resonance results in an
eventual match of input with expectations and the construction of more adaptive
mental structures. Can scientific discovery be understood using similar models? To
answer this question we will need to find a discovery in which the scientist has left us
with a detailed account of what took place, including what s/he was thinking during
the discovery process. As one might expect, such detailed accounts are hard to come
by. Consequently, while perusing some old books during a recent summer vacation, I
was thrilled to find just such an account. Galileo Galilei wrote the account in 1610
describing how he discovered Jupiter's moons. The purpose of this chapter is to
discuss what Galileo did during his discovery and then attempt to piece together the
steps in his reasoning. Galileo's reasoning will then be modeled in terms of selfregulation and the neurological models introduced in previous chapters. We will then
explore the "logic" and implications of the models in terms of scientific method and
science instruction.
2. GALILEO'S DISCOVERY
In 1610 in his Sidereal Messenger, Galileo Galilei reported some observations of
heavenly bodies made by a new more powerful telescope of his invention. In that
report Galileo claims to have discovered four never before seen "planets" circling
Jupiter. As he put it: "I should disclose and publish to the world the occasion of
discovering and observing four planets, never seen from the beginning of the world
up to our times." (Galilei, 1610, as translated and reprinted in Shapley, Rapport &
Wright, 1954, p. 59)
Unlike many modern scientific papers, Galileo's report is striking in the way in
which it chronologically reveals many of the steps in his discovery process. Thus, it
provides an extraordinary opportunity to gain insight into the reasoning involved in
an important scientific discovery. Galileo's key observations were made during the
nights of January 7th, 8th, 10th and 11th in 1610. What follows is a step-by-step
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184
recapitulation of that report followed by an attempt to fill in gaps with how Galileo
may have been reasoning as he interpreted his observations.
Prior to January 7th
Galileo's report begins with mention of his invention of a new more powerful
telescope:
At length, by sparing neither labor or expense, I succeeded in constructing for myself an
instrument so superior that objects seen through it appear magnified nearly a thousand
times..." (p. 58)
Thus, Galileo had at his disposal an instrument that allowed observations of nature
never before seen. Not surprisingly, he used his telescope to explore the heavens. Again
in his words:
But without paying attention to its use for terrestrial objects, I betook myself to
observations of the heavenly bodies; and first of all, I viewed the Moon as near as if it
was scarcely two semidiameters of the Earth distant. After the Moon, I frequently
observed other heavenly bodies, both fixed stars and planets, with incredible delight...
(p. 59)
At the time, stars were referred to as "fixed" because they were thought to be
embedded in a "celestial sphere," which had been postulated to exist within ancient
Greek Aristotelian theory (e.g., Holton & Roller, 1958, p. 107).
January 7th
During Galileo's initial explorations, he made a new observation on January 7th
that he deemed worthy of mention: In his words:
On the 7th day of January in the present year, 1610, in the first hour of the following
night, when I was viewing the constellations of the heavens through a telescope, the
planet Jupiter presented itself to my view, and as I had prepared for myself a very
excellent instrument, I noticed a circumstance which I had never been able to notice
before, owing to want of power in my other telescope, namely that three little stars,
small but very bright, were near the planet; and although I believed them to belong to
the number of the fixed stars, yet they made me somewhat wonder, because they
seemed to be arranged exactly in a straight line, parallel to the ecliptic, and to be
brighter than the rest of the stars equal to them in magnitude. The position of them with
reference to one another and to Jupiter was as follows: (p. 59)
(east)
(west)
January 8th
The next night Galileo made a second observation:
...when on January 8th...I found a very different state of things, for there were three
little stars all west of Jupiter, and nearer together than on the previous night, and they
were separated from one another by equal intervals, as the accompanying figure shows.
(east)
(west)
MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
At this point, although I had not turned my thoughts at all upon the approximation of
the stars to one another, yet my surprise began to be excited, how Jupiter could one day
be found to the east of all the aforementioned stars when the day before it had been
west of two of them; forthwith I became afraid lest the planet might have moved
differently from the calculation of astronomers, and so had passed those stars by its
own proper motion. (pp. 59-60)
January 9th
I, therefore waited for the next night with the most intense longing, but I was
disappointed of my hope, for the sky was covered with clouds in every direction. (p. 60)
January 10th
But on January 10th the stars appeared in the following position with regard to Jupiter,
the third, as I thought, being hidden by the planet.
(east)
(west)
When I had seen these phenomena, as I knew that corresponding changes of position
could not by any means belong to Jupiter, and as, moreover, I perceived that the stars
which I saw had always been the same, for there were no others either in front of
behind, within the great distance, along the Zodiac - at length, changing from doubt
into surprise, I discovered that the interchange of position which I saw belonged not to
Jupiter, but to the stars to which my attention had been drawn and I thought therefore
that they ought to be observed henceforward with more attention and precision. (p. 60)
January 11th
Accordingly, on January 11th I saw an arrangement of the following kind:
(east)
(west)
namely, only two stars to the east of Jupiter, the nearer of which was distant from
Jupiter three times as far as from the star to the east; and the star furthest to the east was
nearly twice as large as the other one; whereas on the previous night they had appeared
nearly of equal magnitude. I, therefore, concluded, and decided unhesitatingly, that
there are three stars in the heavens moving about Jupiter, as Venus and Mercury round
the sun; (p. 60)
January 12th and Later

...which at length was established as clear as daylight by numerous other subsequent
observations. These observations also established that there are not only three, but four,
erratic sidereal bodies performing their revolutions round Jupiter... These are my
observations upon the four Medicean planets, recently discovered for the first time by
me. (pp. 60-61)
3. GALILEO'S REASONING
Background Knowledge as a Source of Hypotheses
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CHAPTER 9
We now turn to an analysis of Galileo's report in an attempt to fill in gaps with how
Galileo may have been reasoning. Let's start by considering what Galileo initially
"brought to the table." In other words, what was Galileo's background (i.e., declarative)
knowledge? Presumably this declarative knowledge will serve as a source of
hypotheses when the need arises. Based on common knowledge at the time, it is safe to
assume that Galileo's knowledge about heavily objects included at least the following
three categories:
1. some objects - the fixed stars - are immovable because they are embedded in an
external celestial sphere;
2. some objects within the celestial sphere - the planets - orbit the sun (e.g., Earth,
Venus, Jupiter);
3. some objects - moons - orbit the planets that orbit the sun (e.g., our moon).1
Presumably these categories of heavenly objects function as "mental models" by
which observations can be "assimilated" (cf., Grossberg, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Piaget, 1985). In other words, when new objects are seen, they can be assimilated into
one of these categories. Also, if the category into which the new objects should be
assimilated is unclear, the categories function as hypotheses, i.e., as categories into
which the new objects might be placed (cf., Gregory, 1970) i.e., Observation: Three
new objects are seen. Question: What are they? Alternative Hypotheses: They might be
fixed stars. They might be planets. They might be moons. The process of using these
categories as alternative hypotheses has been referred to as analogical reasoning or
analogical transfer (see Chapter 5) in that the new observation is seen as similar to, or
analogous to, prior observations. It should be pointed out that the processes of
assimilation and hypothesis formation take place largely at the subconscious level. Also
in many cases, the analogical transfer requires more insight than shown in Galileo's
case because the "distance" between the analogous category and the target phenomenon
is greater, e.g., Darwin's use of artificial selection as an analogue for natural selection,
Kekule's use of snakes eating their tails as an analogue for the benzene ring.
Galileo's Reasoning on January 7th
Recall that concerning his January 7th observations, Galileo's stated: "I noticed a
circumstance which I had never been able to notice before, owing to want of power
in my other telescope, namely that three little stars, small but very bright, were near
the planet." This statement is important because it suggests that his new
1 I am not attempting to explain how Galileo obtained this declarative knowledge. I am simply assuming that he had it
prior to January 7th. There is however, no reason to believe that induction was involved in acquiring this declarative
knowledge. As you will see later, the argument is advanced that induction, as a psychological process, does not exist.
Rather, in my view, induction is the psychologists equivalent of the chemists phlogiston, the biologists vital force, and
the physicists suction. Phlogiston, the vital force, and a pulling force called suction do not exist and most likely neither
does induction. Indeed, the main thesis of this book is that thinking and learning is hypothetico-predictive in form.
Consequently, if we were able to discover how Galileo obtained this declarative knowledge, I believe we would find that
he obtained it in a hypothetico-predictive manner.
187
observations have been immediately assimilated by his fixed-star category (listed as

1 above). But Galileo's continued thinking led to some initial doubt that he was
really observing fixed stars as this following remark reveals:
...and although I believed them to belong to the number of the fixed stars, yet they made
me somewhat wonder, because they seemed to be arranged exactly in a straight line,
parallel to the ecliptic, and to be brighter than the rest of the stars, equal to them in
magnitude. (p. 59)
Why would this observation lead Galileo to somewhat wonder? What could
Galileo have been thinking that raised doubt? Of course we can never really know
what was on Galileo's mind. But perhaps he was reasoning along these lines:
If...the three objects are fixed stars, (fixed-star hypothesis)
and...their sizes, brightness and positions are compared to each other and to other
nearby stars, (planned test)
then...variations in size, brightness and position should be random, as is the case for
other fixed stars. (prediction)
But..."they seem to be arranged exactly in a straight line, parallel to the ecliptic, and to
be brighter than the rest of the stars." (observed result)
Therefore...the fixed star hypothesis is not supported. Or as Galileo put it, "yet they
made me somewhat wonder." (conclusion)
So Galileo's reasoning might have gone something like this: first a new
observation is made, next an initial hypothesis (they are fixed stars) is generated,
then hypothetico-predictive reasoning about the initial hypothesis occurs, i.e.,
If...they really are fixed stars, and...I do such and such, then...such and such should
be seen. But...such and such is not seen. Therefore...I have some doubt about my
initial hypothesis.
Galileo's Reasoning on January 8th
The next night Galileo made a second observation. Again in his words:
...when on January 8th, I found a very different state of things, for there were three little
stars all west of Jupiter, and nearer together than on the previous night, and they were
separated from one another by equal intervals, as the accompanying figure shows.
(east)
(west) (pp. 59-60)
The new observation puzzled Galileo and raised another question. Once again in
Galileo's words:
At this point, although I had not turned my thoughts at all upon the approximation of
the stars to one another, yet my surprise began to be excited, how Jupiter could one day
be found to the east of all the aforementioned stars when the day before it had been
west of two of them... (p. 60)
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CHAPTER 9
But why should this observation puzzle Galileo? Basically the puzzling
observation was that the stars were now closer together than before and all were west
of Jupiter, but still along a straight line. I believe that this observation was puzzling
because it was not the expected/predicted one based on the fixed-star hypothesis, i.e.:
prediction - their positions relative to each other should be the same and they should
not pass Jupiter; observation - the stars are closer together than on the previous night
and they are now all west of Jupiter. Galileo continues,
...forthwith I became afraid lest the planet might have moved differently from the
calculation of astronomers, and so had passed those stars by its own proper motion. (p.
60)
This statement suggests that Galileo has not yet rejected the fixed-star hypothesis.
Instead he has generated an ad hoc hypothesis to possibly keep the hypothesis alive.
In other words, Galileo thought that perhaps the astronomers made a mistake. He
thought that perhaps their records were wrong about how Jupiter is supposed to
move relative to the stars in the area. Let's call this the astronomers-made-a-mistake
hypothesis. How could Galileo test the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis?
Consider the following:
If...the astronomers made a mistake, (astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis)
and...I observe the next night, (planned test)
then...Jupiter should continue to move east relative to the stars, and the objects should
look like this:
(east)
O
(west)
Of course we cannot know if this is how Galileo was really reasoning, but if he
were reasoning along these lines, he would have had a very clear expectation
(prediction) to compare with the observations he hoped to make the following night.
Galileo's Reasoning on January 9th and 10th
Galileo continues:
I, therefore waited for the next night with the most intense longing, but I was
disappointed of my hope, for the sky was covered with clouds in every direction. But on
January 10th the stars appeared in the following position with regard to Jupiter, the
third, as I thought, being hidden by the planet."
(east)
(west) (p. 60)
What conclusion can be drawn from this observation in terms of the astronomersmade-a-mistake hypothesis? Consider the following argument:
If...the astronomers made a mistake, (astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis)
and...I observe the next night, (planned test)
then...Jupiter should continue to move east relative to the "stars", and the objects
should look like this:
189
(east)
(west)
(prediction)
But...the objects did not look like this, instead they looked like this:
(east)
(west)
(observed result)
Therefore...the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis is not supported.

(conclusion)
Let's return to the report to see what conclusion Galileo drew. Galileo states:
When I had seen these phenomena, as I knew that corresponding changes of position
could not by any means belong to Jupiter, and as, moreover, I perceived that the stars
which I saw had always been the same, for there were no others either in front or
behind, within the great distance, along the Zodiac - at length, changing from doubt
into surprise, I discovered that the interchange of position which I saw belonged not to
Jupiter, but to the stars to which my attention had been drawn... (p. 60)
So Galileo concluded that the astronomers had not made a mistake (i.e., the
astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis should be rejected). In other words, the
changes of position were not the result of Jupiter's motion. Instead they were due to
motions of the "stars."
Galileo's Reasoning on January 11th and Later
Having rejected the astronomers-made-a-mistake hypothesis, Galileo is left with
the task of formulating another explanation for his puzzling observations. It is not
clear exactly when he formulated a viable explanation, but the following observation
and remarks make it clear that he did not take long:
Accordingly, on January 11th I saw an arrangement of the following kind:
(east)
(west)
namely, only two stars to the east of Jupiter, the nearer of which was distant from
Jupiter three times as far as from the star to the east; and the star furthest to the east was
nearly twice as large as the other one; whereas on the previous night they had appeared
nearly of equal magnitude. I, therefore, concluded, and decided unhesitatingly, that
there are three stars in the heavens moving about Jupiter, as Venus and Mercury round
the sun. (p. 60)
Galileo's remarks make it is clear that he has "conceptualized" a situation in which

these objects are orbiting Jupiter in a way analogous to the way Venus and Mercury
orbit the sun and in the way our moon orbits Earth. Thus, he has rejected the fixed star
hypothesis and accepted an alternative in which the objects are orbiting Jupiter. How
could Galileo have arrived at such a conclusion? Consider the following:
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If...the objects are orbiting Jupiter, (moon hypothesis - presumably drawn from his
prior knowledge - his moon category)
and...I observe the objects over several nights, (planned test)
then...some nights they should appear to the east of Jupiter and some nights they
should appear to the west. Further, they should always appear along a straight line on
either side of Jupiter. (prediction)
And...this is precisely how they appeared. (observed result)
Therefore...the moon hypothesis is supported. (conclusion)
Galileo's previous statement continues as follows:
...which at length was established as clear as daylight by numerous other subsequent
observations. These observations also established that there are not only three, but four,
erratic sidereal bodies performing their revolutions round Jupiter... These are my
observations upon the four Medicean planets, recently discovered for the first time by
me. (pp. 60-61)
4. MODELING THE REASONING INVOLVED IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
4.1 Galileo's Reasoning as Hypothetico-Predictive Science
The present hypothesis about the nature of Galileo's reasoning, and more
generally about the reasoning involved in scientific discovery, is that it has as its core
an If/then/Therefore pattern. As we have seen, the pattern involves, in order: 1)
making a puzzling observation, 2) formulating a causal question, 3) formulating one
or more hypotheses, 4) using a hypothesis and an imagined test to generate expected
results/predictions, 5) making actual observations and comparing them with the
expected observations, and 6) drawing conclusions as to the extent to which the
initial hypotheses have or have not been supported. This hypothetico-predictive
reasoning pattern can be modeled by the series of boxes shown in Figure 1.
4.2
Galileo's Reasoning Within Piaget's Self-Regulation Theory
As presented in Chapter 1, Piaget describes cognition in terms of self-regulation

with its duel processes of assimilation and accommodation. Galileo's hypotheticopredictive reasoning fits nicely within Piaget's theory. In Piagetian terms, Galileo
initially assimilated his observations using his fixed-star schema (i.e., "I
noticed...that three little stars...were near the planet."). This assimilation then soon
led to a small amount of disequilibrium when his fixed- star hypothesis was initially
tested (i.e., "yet they made me somewhat wonder."). This initial disequilibrium
resulted because certain characteristics of the new "stars" differed from typical stars
191
(i.e., they were in a straight line and equidistant from one another). Disequilibrium
(i.e., they were in a straight line and equidistant from one another). Disequilibrium
then grew when subsequent observations also did not match expectations drawn from
the fixed star schema (i.e., How could Jupiter be found to the east of all the
aformentioned stars when the day before it had been west of two of them?"). But
Galileo's disequilibrium did not last long. After rejecting the ad hoc astronomer'smade-a-mistake hypothesis, Galileo rejected the fixed-star hypothesis. This rejection
then led to an accommodation as Galileo generated a new hypothesis - the moon
hypothesis - that the evidence supported. Generation and test of the moon hypothesis
enabled Galileo to assimilate all of his observations without disequilibrium. Thus,
equilibrium was restored.
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4.3 Galileo's Reasoning Within Neural Network Theory

We can go farther than Piaget's general concepts of self-regulation, assimilation
and accommodation to think about Galileo's reasoning. Chapter 2 introduced
Grossberg's neural network theory of information processing complete with an
account of activity within successive slabs of neurons within the brain. It should be
pointed out Grossberg's theory does not contradict Piaget's theory. Rather it adds to
it. The neural network theory (part of which is represented in Figure 2) can be used
to understand what might have been going on in Galileo's mind in terms of
neurological events.
193
Figure 2 depicts two successive slabs of neurons in the brain,

and
According to the theory, sensory input
(e.g., light coming from the three objects
near Jupiter on the night of January 7th) excites an electrical pattern of activity at
slab
and sends a signal to inhibit nonspecific orienting arousal (OA). The
electrical pattern
at
then excites another electrical pattern
at the next slab
of neurons at
which feeds signals back to
In the case of Galileo's initial
observations, the pattern at
corresponds to his star category and initially matches
the pattern at
So all is well both neurologically and conceptually.
But as reported, Galileo's continued thinking led to a partial mismatch (e.g., his
star category implied that stars should not be lined up along a straight lines and
should not be equidistant from each other). This partial mismatch led Galileo to
"somewhat wonder." Neurologically speaking, a mismatch (i.e., a new observation
that does not match an expectation), causes quenching of activity at
and shuts off
inhibition of OA. OA is then free to search for another pattern (i.e., another
hypothesis) to match the input. In other words, with Galileo's continued observations
and thinking, the mismatch between the patterns at
and
presumably became
so great that activity at
was quenched. Thus, inhibition of orienting arousal was
shutdown. Orienting arousal was then free to excite
leading to a search for
another pattern of activity to hopefully match the input pattern at
On the
conceptual level, Galileo's mind was now free to search for alternative hypotheses
(e.g., the planet hypothesis, the moon hypothesis) to replace the rejected fixed star
hypothesis. Once an activity pattern at
was found that actually matched the input
pattern at
orienting arousal was shut down and Galileo's search was complete.
He had "discovered" four new moons orbiting Jupiter.
4.4
Galileo's Reasoning Within the Levine/Prueitt and Kosslyn/Koenig Models
The Levine & Prueitt model introduced in Chapter 3 also seems to account for
the processes involved in hypothesis testing. Figure 3 suggests how it can be used in
the present context. As you may recall, the model includes feature nodes referred to
as
In Galileo's case, these nodes code input features (i.e., number of spots of
light, the sizes of those spots, their positions). The input can be placed into
categories (e.g., fixed stars, planets, moons) and coded by nodes in
Once again,
these categories serve as alternative hypotheses. The model also includes Habits and
Biases nodes. The Habits node detects how often prior classifications have correctly
and incorrectly been made. The Biases node is affected by activity in the habit nodes
and by reinforcement. Further details of network function can be found in Levine &
Prueitt (1989). The important point in terms of the present argument is that
information processing, whether it involves basic descriptive concept formation,
simple hypothesis testing, or the "discovery" of Jupiter's moons, is basically a
hypothetico-predictive process driven by working memory in which new input is
gathered and matched against prior categories stored in associative memory.
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Kosslyn and Koenig's model of brain function also introduced in Chapter 2

argues that the ability to visually recognize objects requires participation of the six
major brain areas as shown in Figure 4. Kosslyn and Koenig's description of system
functioning is about recognizing relatively complex objects present in the visual field
during a very brief time period - not distant spots of light seen through a telescope.
Nevertheless, the hypothetico-predictive nature of this system's functioning was
made clear in Chapter 2. And all one need do to apply the same principles to
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Galileo's case, is to extend the time frame over which observations are made observations that will either match or not match predictions, thus allowing
hypotheses to be tested.
4.5
Using Working Memory to Activate and Inhibit Input
Working memory is seated in the lateral prefrontal cortex. However, current

research suggests that working memory cannot be pinned down to a single prefrontal
region. Rather its location depends in part on the type of information being
processed. With its many projections to other brain areas, working memory plays a
crucial role in keeping representations active while it coordinates mental activity
(Friedman & Goldman-Rakic, 1994; Fuster, 1989). Following Baddeley (1995),
working memory, at least in adults, is seen as consisting of at least three components
- a visuo-spatial scratchpad, a central executive, and a phonological loop. In
Baddeley's model, the visuo-spatial scratch pad activates representations of objects
and their properties, while the phonological loop does the same for linguistic
representations. Research by Smith & Joniches (1994) and Paulesu et al. (1993)
suggest a respective right and left hemisphere specialization for the scratch pad and
loop. Working memory can be thought of as a temporary network to sustain
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information while it is processed. However, as we have seen, during reasoning, one

must pay attention to task-relevant information and inhibit task-irrelevant
information. Consequently, working memory involves more than simply allocating
attention and temporarily keeping track of it. Rather, working memory actively
selects information relevant to one's goals and actively inhibits irrelevant
information.
In terms of Galileo's reasoning and the Kosslyn/Koenig model, Figure 5 shows
the contents of working memory in terms of one cycle of hypothetico-predictive
reasoning. As you can see, in order to use hypothetico-predictive reasoning to
generate and test his moon hypothesis, Galileo has to not only allocate attention to it
and its predicted consequences, he also has to inhibit his previously generated fixedstar and astronomers-made-a-mistake hypotheses.
5. IS THERE A SCIENTIFIC METHOD?

The central conclusion that can be drawn from the forgoing analysis of Galileo's
reasoning is that his discovery of Jupiter's moons involved several cycles of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning. And based on the introduced neural models, it
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would seem that Galileo's reasoning was hypothetico-predictive in form because the
human brain is hard-wired to process input in a hypothetico-predictive fashion.
As shown in Table 1, the hypothetico-predictive reasoning pattern seen in
Galileo's discovery of Jupiter's moons can also be found in the discoveries of other
scientists. As you may recall, we also saw this hypothetico-predictive pattern in the
unlit barbecue scenario discussed in Chapter 1 and in several subsequent examples in
other chapters. To summarize, hypothetico-predictive reasoning seems to involve the
following seven elements, which are presumably coordinated in working memory in
the prefrontal lobes:
1. Making an initial puzzling observation (e.g., Three new spots of light are
observed near Jupiter.).
2. Raising a causal question (e.g., What are the spots of light? What is causing the
spots of light?).
3. Using analogical reasoning to generate one or more possible hypotheses (e.g.,
The spots of light are fixed stars. Previous astronomers made a mistake. They are
moons orbiting Jupiter.). Analogical transfer, or analogical reasoning involves
borrowing ideas that have been found to "work" in one or more past related
contexts and using them as possible solutions/hypotheses/guesses in the present
context.
4. Supposing for the sake of argument and test, that the hypothesis under
consideration is correct. This supposition is necessary so that a test can be
imagined with relevant condition(s) that along with the hypothesis allow the
generation of one or more predictions.
5. Carrying out the imagined test. The test must be performed/conducted so that its
predicted result can be compared with the observed result of the actual test.
6. Comparing predicted and observed results. This comparison allows one to draw a
conclusion. A good match means that the hypothesis is supported, but not
proven, while a poor match means that something is wrong with the hypothesis,
the test, or with both. Finding a good match between predicted and observed
results means that the hypothesis in question is supported, but not proven
because one or more unstated and perhaps un-imagined alternative hypotheses
may give rise to the same prediction under the test condition (e.g., Hempel, 1966;
Salmon, 1995). Similarly, a poor match cannot disprove or falsify a hypothesis in
any ultimate sense. This is because the failure of predicted results to match
observed results can arise from one of two sources, a faulty hypothesis or a faulty
test. Consequently, before a plausible hypothesis is rejected, one has to be
reasonably sure that its test is not faulty. And because one can never be certain
the test is perfect, one cannot reject a hypothesis with certainty. We will return to
this point below when discussing the relationship between hypothetico-predictive
reasoning and some standard rules of propositional logic.
7. Recycling the procedure. The procedure must be recycled until a hypothesis is
generated, tested, and supported on one or more occasions.
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How does blood travel in the body? Marcello Malpighi -1661

If...blood circulates by passing from arteries to veins through tiny vessels (William
Harvey's circulation theory) and...the area between the arteries and veins is examined
very closely (planned test) then...tiny connecting vessels, the postulated capillaries,
should be observed (expected result). And...in 1661, 14 years after Harvey's death
Malpighi focused his microscope at that area and "discovered" the postulated
capillaries (observed result). Therefore...this crucial aspect of Harvey's circulation
theory was supported (conclusion).
Does matter consist of indivisible atoms? John Dalton -1810
If...matter consists of indivisible particles that have specific weights and combine with
one another in specific ways (atomic-molecular theory) and...combinations of atoms are
separated into their parts (planned test), then...the ratios of weights of those parts
should be in simple whole-number ratios (prediction). And...as Dalton's experiments
and calculations with gases revealed, the ratios of weights of those parts are in simple
whole-number ratios (observed result). Therefore...atomic-molecular theory was
supported (conclusion).
What caused present-day species diversity? Charles Lyell - 1854
If...organisms changed over time (evolution theory), and...the kinds of organisms living
in the past is examined in the fossil record (planned test), then...the younger, higher
rock layers should contain more fossils of present-day species than do the older, lower
rock layers (prediction). And...when Lyell compared fossil sea shells collected from four
different rock layers, he found that the percentages of present-day species increased
from the oldest to youngest layers from 3%, to 17%, to 42% and finally to 96%
(observed result). Therefore... support for evolution theory was found (conclusion).
How are characteristics passed from parent to offspring? Gregor Mendel - 1866
If...genes for seed color and shape assort independently when pollen and eggs are
produced, and recombine randomly during fertilization (independent assortment and
random recombination claims of Mendel's theory), and...second generation plants that
presumably carry the YyRr genotype are crossed with other YyRr plants, or with
themselves (planned test), then...four types of seeds should be produced in the third
generation plants i.e., yellow-round, yellow-wrinkled, green-round, green-wrinkled, in a
9:3:3:1 ratio respectively (prediction). And...when Mendel conducted the test crosses,
he counted a total of 556 seeds. Of these, 315 were yellow-round, 101 were yellowwrinkled, 108 were green-round and 32 were green-wrinkled (observed results). These
numbers are very close to the expected 9:3:3:1 ratio. Therefore...support for these
postulates was obtained (conclusion).
What is inside atoms? Ernest Rutherford's discovery of the atomic nucleus -1907
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If...atoms consist mostly of fluid "globules" with a few tiny, solid electrons floating
about (Thomson's theory) and...an alpha-particle emitter is aimed at a thin piece of
metal foil with a photographic plate placed behind it (planned test), then...most of the
alpha particles should pass straight through the fluid part of the foil's atoms and should
strike and expose the photographic plate in a spot not much greater in diameter than the
initial beam (prediction). And...Rutherford found that the beam passed straight through
the foil, but was somewhat broadened, or "scattered." However, some of the particles
came straight back. Therefore...support for Thomson's theory was found as was
evidence that most of an atom's mass was concentrated in a minute atomic "nucleus."
This list by no means implies that doing science is simply a matter of applying a
set of rules in some knee-jerk, lock-step fashion. On the contrary, one may know
what is supposed to be done but fail none-the-less. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the
use of analogical reasoning involves a creative act dependent in part on background
declarative knowledge. Of course describing hypothesis generation in terms of
creativity and analogical reasoning does not explain why some scientists (and
science students) generate fruitful hypotheses while others do not. Clearly much
research remains to be done to better understand this process. Similarly, much
research remains to be done to understand how fruitful predictions are derived. In
addition to the research on analogy cited above, other promising lines of cognitive
research on scientific discovery can be found in Dunbar (1993), Klahr, Fay &
Dunbar (1993) and Wagman (2000).
Further, the conclusion that scientific discovery is hypothetico-predictive in
nature does not imply that scientists are aware of the hypothetico-predictive nature of
their reasoning. Indeed, as in Galileo's case, it seems likely that Galileo was very
much unaware of his reasoning. He was simply trying to explain what he was seeing.
But since Galileo's day, scientists and philosophers have collectively become more
aware of the reasoning patterns that guide scientific discovery. Indeed, many
relatively recent accounts of science place hypothesis generation and test squarely on
center stage (e.g., Baker & Allen, 1977; Carey, 1998; Chamberlain, 1965; Giere,
1997; Hempel, 1966; Lewis, 1988; Medawar, 1969; Moore, 1993; Platt, 1964;
Popper, 1965). However, these authors typically refer to scientific discovery as
hypothetico-deductive, not as hypothetico-predictive. I have chosen the phrase
hypothetico-predictive because the word deduction often connotes a rather rote
application of deductive logic, i.e., If A > B, and B > C, then it deductively follows
that A > C. In my view, seldom do scientific predictions follow so "automatically" or
"logically" from premises. Instead, like hypothesis generation, generating reasonable
predictions also involves elements of insight and creativity (e.g., Lawson, 1999;
Lawson, 2000). Therefore, the phrase hypothetico-predictive may be more
descriptive of what actually occurs during the reasoning process.
A dramatic example of the need for creative thought in prediction generation can be
seen in the research of Otto Loewi. For several years, Loewi had suspected that neural
impulses were chemically transmitted from neurons to muscles. However, he was
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unable to think of a way to test this chemical-transmission hypothesis. Finally, one

night in 1920, he literally dreamed up an experiment, complete with a prediction, that
would do the trick. When he awoke the next morning, he immediately went to his lab
and conducted the test. And to his delight, the observed results turned out just as
predicted, providing support for his chemical-transmission hypothesis and eventually
winning him a Nobel Prize (cf., Koestler 1964).
And lastly, it should be pointed out that characterizing scientific discovery as
hypothetico-predictive also does not imply that all observations that may bear on the
validity of hypotheses must be made after the hypotheses have been generated. Indeed,
occasionally observations are made and reported that only later, after a hypothesis has
been generated, are seen as supportive or not supportive of that hypothesis. For
example, a classic case is Erwin Chargaff's rules about the relative amounts of
nucleotide bases in DNA known in the 1940s (i.e., adenine equals thymine, guanine
equals cytosine). The reason (i.e., explanation) for Chargaff's rules, was not understood
until the spring of 1953 when a young James Watson searching for the structure of
DNA pushed cardboard models (analogies) of the bases together in various
combinations until he noticed that an adenine-thymine pair held together by two
hydrogen bonds was identical in shape to a guanine-cytosine pair also held together by
two hydrogen bonds. This was a key puzzle piece that enabled Watson to construct a
new and presumably better double-helical model of DNA (i.e., a puzzle piece that gave
him a new and better hypothesis). Then by reasoning in a hypothetico-predictive
fashion, Watson was finally able to explain Chargaff's rules because they were
predicted by his new model/hypothesis. In other words,
If...DNA is structured as a double helix with adenine always paired with thymine and
with guanine always paired with cytosine, (Watson's double-helix hypothesis generated
in the spring of 1953)
and...the relative amounts of the bases in DNA are determined, as Chargaff had done
in the 1940s,
then...the amount of adenine should equal the amount of thymine and the amount of
guanine should equal the amount of cytosine. (prediction derived by Watson in 1953)
Or as Watson put it, "Chargaff's rules then suddenly stood out as a consequence
of a double-helical structure for DNA." (Watson, 1968, p. 125)
So Chargaff's rules are predicted by the double-helix hypothesis. Watson was
also quick to point out that other "consequences" followed. Here is what he said
about one of them:
Even more exciting, this type of double helix suggested a replication scheme much
more satisfactory than my briefly considered like-with-like pairing. Always pairing
adenine with thymine and guanine with cytosine meant chains were complementary to
each other. Given the base sequence of one chain, that of its partner was automatically
determined. Conceptually it was thus very easy to visualize how a single chain could be
the template for the synthesis of a chain with the complementary sequence. (p. 125)
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So the double-helix hypothesis "suggested a replication scheme" in which the two

strands unzip and become templates for the synthesis of new complementary strands.
And as you may know, this consequence led to the classic 1958 Meselson and Stahl
experiment that can be summarized in the following standard hypothetico-predictive
fashion:
If...DNA replicates by adding a new strand to an old strand, (double-helix
hypothesis)
and...a test tube containing
and DNA extracted from "hybrid"
bacteria are spun in a centrifuge, (planned test)
then...three distinct DNA bands should show up with the middle band exactly
halfway between the other two. (prediction) The middle band should be exactly half
way between the other two because it, according to the hypothesis, consists of DNA
with one
strand and one
strand, thus should weigh exactly half as much as
the DNA in the bottom band and twice as much as the DNA in the top band.
(theoretical rationale)
And...the results turned out as predicted. (observed result)
Therefore...the double-helix hypothesis was supported. (conclusion)
Table 2 lists the basic elements of science as a hypothetico-predictive enterprise.
For those surprisingly few scientists who have become aware of these elements, they
have become a powerful method. Indeed, for them, the elements have become the
scientific method (e.g., Chamberlain, 1965; Feynman, 1965; Platt, 1964).
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6. DOES BACONIAN INDUCTION QUALIFY AS AN

ALTERNATIVE SCIENTIFIC METHOD?
But do other methods of doing science exist? Clearly many past scholars have
thought so and some still do. A well-known candidate proposed during Galileo's day
is Francis Bacon's method of induction first published in two volumes in 1605 and in
1620 (Bacon, 1900, revised ed.). Bacon's brand of induction is generally described
as a process in which one reasons from particulars to general conclusions. Suppose,
for example, you taste a green apple and find it sour. You taste another green apple
and find it sour as well, and so on. From these particular observations, induction
presumably is at work when you draw the general conclusion that all green apples
are sour.
Clearly research based on this "enumerative" style of induction does not fit the
pattern identified in Tables 1 and 2. Others have argued that this sort of inductive
reasoning - as opposed to a more general sort of induction defined simply as any
thought process that increases the semantic information in its initial observations or
premises (cf., Johnson-Laird, 1993, p. 60; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbet & Thagard,
1986, especially Chapter 11; and Bisanz, Bisanz & Korpan, 1994) - is of limited
value in science because the world is so complex that if one lacks a hypothesis or
theory and prediction to guide one's observations, those observations are not likely to
amount to anything of scientific value, e.g.:
A moment's reflection reveals that data collection in the absence of a hypothesis has
little or no scientific value. Suppose, for example, that one day you decide to become a
scientist and having read a standard account of the scientific method you decide to
collect some data. Where should you begin? Should you start by cataloging all the items
in your room, measuring them, weighing them...? Clearly there's enough data in your
room to keep you busy for the rest of your life. (Schick & Vaugh, 1995, p. 191)
Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a
point of view, a problem. (Popper, 1965, p. 46)
How odd it is that anyone should not see that all observation must be for or against
some view if it to be of any service. (Charles Darwin, as quoted in Schick & Vaughn,
1995, p. 191)
In sum, the maxim that data should be gathered without guidance by antecedent
hypotheses about the connections among the facts under study is self-defeating, and is
certainly not followed in scientific inquiry. On the contrary, tentative hypotheses are
needed to give direction to scientific investigation. (Hempel, 1966, p. 13)
Inductive theory provides no formal incentive for making one observation rather than
another. Any adequate account of scientific method must include a theory of incentive
or special motive. We cannot browse over the field of nature like cows at pasture.
(Medawar, 1969, p. 29)
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The fact remains that the Baconian concept of science, as an inductive science, has
nothing to do with and even contradicts today's form of science. (Malherbe, 1996, p.
75)
There are, then, no generally applicable 'rules of induction', by which hypotheses or
theories can be mechanically derived or inferred from empirical data. The transition
from data to theory requires creative imagination. Scientific hypotheses and theories are
not derived from observed facts, but invented in order to account for them. (Hempel,
1965, p. 15)
Induction, i.e., inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a
psychological, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure. (Popper,
1965, p. 53)
There is no such thing as inductive logic. (Musgrave, 1999, p. 395)
Based on the view expressed in these quotes, it should not be surprising to find
that even Bacon himself did not use enumerative induction in his attempts to do
science. According to Jevons (1969), in Bacon's attempt to discover the nature of
heat, Bacon came to the startling correct conclusion that heat is a motion of the
smaller particle of bodies. But he did so not using induction, but using hypotheticopredictive reasoning. To which Jevons added:
It seems an amazing sort of conjurer's trick to play on oneself. And yet one should not,
perhaps, blame him too much for having half-deceived himself into a belief in 'true
induction'. Plenty of others have, after all, been equally mesmerized by his eloquence,
or at least deluded by the same appearances, and they include scientists of great
distinction. (p. 71)
Clearly, we can lay Baconian induction as a scientific method to rest. In fact, if

we accept Popper and Musgrave's position, then such a cognitive process does not
even exist. In other words, human intuition may strongly suggest that such an
inductive process is at work, but upon closer inspection, we find that the mind simply
does not work that way. Rather, it would appear that the mind does not wait around
for multiple exemplars before generating an idea about what is being observed.
Indeed, had humans ever existed who actually used such a slow approach to
information processing, it seems likely that natural selection would have seen to it
that they, and their plodding inductivist genes, were eliminated, perhaps by some
predator whose avoidance required a faster mode of information processing.
6.1 Is Combinatorial Analysis a Viable Alternative?
Perhaps you are familiar with a research approach sometimes referred to as

combinatorial analysis. Chemists often use this approach when they attempt to
discover a chemical for some specific job - say cure a disease. The approach
basically amounts to modifying a complex chemical over and over again, or
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systematically forming various combinations of chemicals, until one modification or

combination happens to work.
Use of this approach can be seen in the classic research of Paul Erlich conducted
during the early 1900s in search of a cure for syphilis (De Kruif, 1926). In 1907,
knowing that arsenic was poisonous, Erlich began painstakingly modifying an
arsenic-containing compound called Atoxyl in hopes of finding a modification that
would kill the disease agent but not the patient. Each modified form was injected into
mice infected with a trypanosome (Trypanosoma equinum). Finally in 1909, on the
606th try, Erlich found a modified compound that killed the trypanosome and spared
the mouse. When compound number 606 was injected into people suffering from
syphilis - a venereal disease caused by the spirochete Treponema pallidum - the
spirochete was killed and the people were spared. Therefore, Erlich had discovered a
cure for syphilis.
Does Erlich's approach constitute an alternative scientific method? If we consider
each of the 606 chemical compounds as a random attempt at a disease cure, then it
would seem so. Certainly, Erlich's approach seems to rely more on trial and error and
on luck than on guiding hypotheses, theories and predictions. But a closer look at
Erlich's discovery of compound 606 reveals that it was in fact hypothesis driven.
During the 1880s, Erlich became fascinated with the use of dyes to stain tissues.
At first, he used his dyes on preserved tissues. But in the late 1880s, he began
injecting them into living animals. When he injected methylene blue into a rabbit's
ear, he discovered that the dye traveled through the rabbit's body until it reached and
stained only the nerve endings. This observation led Erlich to advance a hypothesis
with a bold prediction. In Erlich's mind, living tissue was really nothing more than
complex chemicals, just like his dyes. Also Erlich believed that chemical reactions
were very specific. For example, chemical A might react with chemical B, but not
with chemicals C, D, and E. So when he saw that the methylene blue stained nerve
endings and nothing else, he predicted that chemicals could be injected into infected
animals and that the chemicals would attack and kill only the infecting microbes.
Thus, the reasoning that guided Erlich's painstaking and lengthy research can be seen
as hypothetico-predictive, i.e.:
If...living tissues consist of chemical compounds and chemical reactions are
selective, (selective-chemical-reactions hypothesis)
and...an arsenic-containing chemical compound, which is known to react with and
destroy living tissue, is systematically modified and then injected into animals
infected with microbes, (planned test)
then...eventually a modified compound should be found that will interact with and
destroy the microbes and spare the infected animal (prediction).
And...compound 606 was found to do just that. (observed result)
Therefore...the selective chemical reactions hypothesis is supported. (conclusion)
Seen in this light, the chemists' approach of modifying and/or combining
chemical compounds to produce a desired effect may differ in degree from the more
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insightful use of hypothetico-predictive reasoning employed by Galileo, but it does

not differ in kind.
6.2
Are There Multiple Scientific Methods?
Having rejected combinatorial analysis as a true alternative to hypotheticopredictive science, and having rejected Baconian induction as a method at all, are we
then left with hypothetico-predictive science as the only method of doing science?
Could hypothetico-predictive reasoning be at work in all scientific discoveries?
Certainly this singular view of scientific method is not without its detractors. For
example, Eflin, Glennan & Reisch (1999) recently echoed the often- voiced view
that multiple scientific methods exist (cf., Botton & Brown, 1998; Kimball, 1967;
Lederman, 1983; Lederman, Wade & Bell, 1998; McComas, 1996; McComas,
Almazroa & Clough, 1998). Regrettably these authors do not identify what those
other methods might be.
Nola (1999) does mention several alternative scientific methods and discusses
the business of trying to decide among them. Nola seems to be arguing that it may
not be possible to decide among alternative theories of scientific method because
doing so would require one to adopt a particular scientific method to test the
alternatives. And in Nola's view, we cannot decide what testing method to use until
we know which method is the right one! This apparent paradox appears analogous to
trying to decide if an external world really exists. Elsewhere, (Lawson, 2000), I have
argued that we can never know for certain if the external world does or does not
exist. But this of no practical consequence because even the simplest of behaviors
requires that we hypothesize that it does exist and then behave accordingly. If that
subsequent behavior is successful, then we not only retain that behavior, but we also
have evidence that our initial hypothesis about the existence of an external world is
correct - in spite of our lack of proof.
The same may hold for testing alternative theories of scientific method. By
analogy, we may never know for certain which theory of scientific method is correct.
But that does not matter. Instead we proceed by hypothesizing that each in turn is
correct and then see where each gets us. For example, to test the present hypotheticopredictive theory of scientific method, we first hypothesize that this is how science is
done and then attempt to generate several predicted consequences (e.g., whenever an
important scientific discovery is made, an analysis of the scientist's reasoning will
reveal that he/she generated and tested alternative explanations during the discovery
process). We then compare our predictions with evidence. A good correspondence
between predictions and evidence would support the hypothesis. Presumably, this
approach "works" in that it has helped us understand how Galileo and a few other
scientists have made their discoveries.
Alternatively, if one adopts a Baconian theory of scientific method, one would be
obliged to use his methodology to test his theory. Consequently, one would observe
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several examples of science at work and then let enumerative induction take over in
hopes that the "true" scientific method would emerge from the examples. How might
this work? Suppose we start with a case study of Galileo's discovery of Jupiter's
moons. Do we examine Galileo's report for evidence of enumerative induction? This
may seem like the reasonable thing to do. But according to Bacon's rules, we cannot
do this because this would amount to generating the hypothesis that induction is at
work and then using this induction hypothesis to generate a prediction about what
should be seen in the report. In other words, we would be using the hypotheticopredictive method! Interestingly, Jevons (1969) argues that Bacon himself used the
hypothetico-predictive method in his own research. In short, we would find that
Bacon's inductivist theory of scientific method does not "work." Therefore, evidence
would be obtained to allow the rejection of this alternative. Other theories of
scientific method would run into similar problems.
7. THE "LOGIC" OF HYPOTHETICO-PREDICTIVE REASONING

AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
As mentioned, the hypothetico-predictive reasoning involved in scientific
discovery cannot lead to proof or disproof in any ultimate sense. Thus, one might
wonder how it relates to standard rules of conditional logic such as modus tollens
and modus ponens. Let's see how these rules apply to the case of the unlit barbecue
introduced in Chapter 1. You may recall that I had just arrived home and my wife
asked me to check the meat on our backyard barbecue. Upon doing so I discovered
that its flames had gone out. This discovery prompted a search for the cause and the
generation and test of two hypotheses, a wind hypothesis and an empty gas tank
hypothesis. The standard conditional logic of modus tollens reads as follows: p
implies q; not-q; therefore, not-p. So in the context of testing the wind hypothesis,
we get the following:
If...the wind blew out the flames, (p)
and...I stick a lighted match in the lighting hole,
then...the barbecue should relight. (q)
But...the barbecue did not relight. (not-q)
Therefore...the wind did not blow out its flames. (not-p)
However, as previously pointed out, the failure of an observed result to match a
predicted result may not stem from a faulty hypothesis. Rather the failure may stem
from a faulty test. Consequently, a more "reasonable" application of modus tollens
might read as follows:
then...the barbecue should relight (q) - assuming nothing goes wrong with the test.
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But...the barbecue did not relight. (not-q)

Therefore...most likely the wind did not blow out its flames (not-p) - unless of course
something did go wrong with the test.
Next consider the conditional logic of modus ponens, i.e., p implies q; p;
therefore q. Interestingly, this logic does not appear to apply to the barbecue
situation as the following illustrates:
then...the barbecue should relight. (q)
And...the wind did blow out the flames. (p)
Therefore...the barbecue should relight. (q)
Clearly, this argument makes no sense. The point of hypothetico-predictive
reasoning is to test an idea. On the other hand, the point of modus ponens seems to
be to generate a "logical" prediction. So once again, a standard logical rule seems to
fail to capture the essence of hypothetico-predictive reasoning. Interestingly, the
logical fallacy known as affirming the consequent seems to do a better job than
modus ponens (cf., Hempel, 1966, pp. 6-7). Affirming the consequent reads as
follows: p implies q; q; therefore p. In the context of the unlit barbecue we get the
following:
If...the tank is out of gas, (p)
and...the tank is lifted,
then...it should feel light. (q)
And...it does feel light. (q)
Therefore...the tank is out of gas. (p)
But as previously noted, drawing this conclusion represents a logical fallacy. The
conclusion is also "unreasonable" because the tank could feel light for other reasons
(i.e., alternative hypotheses exist that have not been tested and eliminated). For
example, perhaps the tank feels light but still contains a small amount of gas.
Perhaps this is why I checked the gas gauge and found it pointed at empty before I
was satisfied that the cause of the unlit barbecue was indeed an empty gas tank.
Consequently, the more reasonable conclusion that one draws from these kinds of
data is that the initial hypothesis has been supported, but one cannot be certain that it
is correct.
The following summarizes the necessary modifications.
For modus tollens:
If...p,
and...the planned test,
then...probably q. (assuming that nothing goes wrong with the test)
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But...not-q.
Therefore...probably not-p. (meaning that the hypothesis p is not supported, but not
disproved)
And for affirming the consequent:
If...p,
and...the planned test,
then...probably q. (assuming that nothing goes wrong with the test)
And...q.
Therefore...possibly p. (meaning that the hypothesis is supported, but not proven as
other hypotheses could lead to the same prediction)
Consequently, the rules of modus tollens and modus ponens do not fully capture the
essence of hypothetico-predictive reasoning. But this does not mean that humans are
unreasonable. Said another way, it would appear that our brains do not necessarily
reason with these rules of conditional logic. But this is not a bad thing because these
rules are not necessarily reasonable!
8. CONCLUSION AND INSTRUCTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Regardless of the number of scientific methods that may ultimately be identified,

the present analysis suggests that many, if not all, scientific discoveries are
hypothetico-predictive in nature. Given that several studies have found that many
secondary school and college students exhibit difficulties in reasoning in a
hypothetico-predictive manner in causal contexts (i.e., Levels 4 and 5), and that these
difficulties lead not only to difficulties in problem solving and understanding
hypothetical and theoretical science concepts, but also to difficulties in
understanding the nature of science and mathematics, more emphasis on teaching
students to reason in a hypothetico-predictive manner is urged (e.g., Cavallo, 1996;
Germann, 1994; Germann & Aram, 1996; Hurst & Milkent, 1996; Johnson &
Lawson, 1998; Keys, 1994; Kuhn, 1989; Lawson, 1992a; 1992b; Lawson, 1999;
Lawson & Thompson, 1988; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Noh & Scharmann, 1997;
Shayer & Adey, 1993; Westbrook & Rogers, 1994; Wong, 1993; Zohar, Weinberger
& Tamir, 1994).
Certainly a start could be made with an astronomy lesson in which students make
the same observations made by Galileo on the night of January 7, 1610. Students
could then attempt to explain those observations through the generation of
alternative hypotheses and predictions. Student brainstorming could then be followed
by subsequent observations in which the alternative hypotheses are tested by the
comparison of predicted and observed results. Indeed, a general pattern of
instruction could emerge in which a variety of student explorations lead to puzzling
observations. These puzzling observations would then lead to the posing of causal
questions and to the generation of alternative causal hypotheses. Then students
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would be challenged to test those alternatives through the explicit comparison of

predicted and observed results. Although the present advocacy of such a
hypothetico-predictive mode of instruction is not necessarily new (see for example
the learning cycle method of instruction initially developed by the Science
Curriculum Improvement Study, e.g., Karplus & Thier, 1967; Lawson, 1967;
Lawson, Abraham & Renner, 1989), few science curricular materials currently exist
in which these elements are explicitly included. Therefore, what curriculum
developers need to do is to design more lessons in which these elements are made
explicit.
In conclusion, the present chapter paints human reasoning and scientific
discovery in terms of cycles of hypothetico-predictive reasoning - reasoning in which
working memory accesses and sustains hypotheses from associative memory to be
tested and then actively seeks predictions and evidence that follow. In most
instances, for most people, these reasoning cycles occur without conscious awareness
on their part. And most certainly, unlike the streamlined If/then/Therefore arguments
presented in this chapter, the cycles most often occur with many fits and starts.
Nevertheless, successful hypothetico-predictive reasoning, while not necessarily
logical, is reasonable, and follows the If/then/Therefore pattern presumably because
the brain is "hard-wired" to process information in this way.
Successful reasoning also involves the inhibition of previously rejected
hypotheses and/or irrelevant information. But due to a variety of conditions,
including lack of maturation of the frontal lobes, frontal lobe damage, and lack of
relevant physical and social experience, human reasoning is not always successful.
At higher levels, failure may result from a lack of any fruitful hypotheses to test, or
more often, a premature acceptance of a pet hypothesis, often with little or no
evidence in its favor. This leads to a failure to consider alternatives and potentially
relevant evidence, or in terms of problem solving, a failure to consider and test
alternative solution strategies - a condition of perseveration often referred to as
fixation or functional fixedness in the problem-solving literature (e.g., Dominowski
& Dallob, 1995).
A recent classic example of a collective reasoning failure has been reported by
Angell (1996) in which juries have awarded plaintiffs huge sums of money based on
the claim (i.e., the hypothesis) that breast implants cause connective tissue disease.
Amazingly, these awards were made prior to the collection of any real scientific
evidence to test the hypothesis. Indeed, when that evidence was finally collected, it
turned out not to match predictions from the hypothesis. For example, in one study,
the hypothesis led to the prediction of a higher incidence of disease in women with
implants than in a comparable group of women without implants. But the evidence
revealed exactly the same disease incidence in both groups (Gabriel et al., 1994).
Examples such as this indicate that many adults do not understand the power and
importance of hypothetico-predictive reasoning (e.g., they fail to see the need to put
their pet hypotheses to the test, they fail to generate and/or consider alternative
hypotheses, they fail to understand the need to generate predictions, they confuse
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hypotheses with predictions, they do not understand how to gather and properly
analyze evidence, they confuse results with conclusions). The example also indicates
the importance of emotion in the deployment - or lack of deployment - of such
reasoning. This is an issue not dealt with in the present chapter, but one of
considerable importance nonetheless (e.g., Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996). Clearly,
an unmet educational challenge is the design and implementation of instructional
programs that enable all students to develop and successfully employ hypotheticopredictive reasoning at the highest levels.
CHAPTER 10
REJECTING NATURE OF SCIENCE
MISCONCEPTIONS BY PRESERVICE TEACHERS
1. INTRODUCTION
Past and recent calls for science curricular reform emphasize the need to teach
science as a process of creative and critical inquiry. Teaching inquiry science is seen
by many as the best way to help students develop scientific reasoning skill, construct
science concepts, and construct an understanding of the nature of science (e.g.,
American Association for the Advancement of Science [AAAS], 1928; 1989; 1990;
Educational Policies Commission, 1961; 1966; National Science Foundation, 1996;
National Research Council, 1995; National Society for the Study of Education,
1960).
Accordingly, educating preservice teachers in how to teach inquiry science is a
central goal of a senior-level teaching methods course that I have been teaching for
several years. In spite of having completed, or having almost completed, an
undergraduate major in biology, most preservice teachers (i.e., students) who enroll
in this course initially hold several misconceptions about the nature of science (i.e.,
NOS misconceptions). The NOS misconceptions are similar to those described by
McComas (1996) (e.g., hypotheses become theories which become laws;
experiments are the principle route to scientific knowledge; hypotheses can be
proved and disproved).
Fortunately, my attempts to help students overcome such NOS misconceptions
have met with some success. Others have reported similar successes (for reviews see
McComas, Clough, & Almazroa, 1998; Abd-El-Khalick, 1999). However, as is
usually the case, in spite of substantial NOS gains made by some students, others
gain little. Importantly, previous research has yet to identify student variables
consistently related to NOS gains (e.g., Billeh & Hasan, 1975; Carey & Stauss, 1969;
Carey & Stauss, 1970; Lavach, 1969; Olstad, 1969; Sharmann, 1988a; Sharmann,
1988b). Thus, when given NOS instruction, it is still not known why some students
make substantial NOS gains while others do not.
Consequently, the study described in this chapter will advance and test the
hypothesis that the ability to make substantial NOS gains as a consequence of
instruction requires that students reject NOS misconceptions, which in turn depends
on their skill in testing causal hypotheses involving unobservable theoretical entities
- previously designated as Stage 5 hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill (see
Chapters 7 and 8).
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In theory, causal hypothesis testing can be undertaken on two qualitatively
different levels. The development of skill in testing first-order causal hypotheses
(i.e., those involving observable causal agents) is seen as a prerequisite for
developing skill at testing second-order hypotheses (i.e., those involving
unobservable theoretical entities and processes such as photons, gravitons, genes,
phlogiston, N-rays, photosynthesis, DNA replication). During adolescence, some
students first develop skill at testing first-order causal hypotheses using reasoning
patterns comparable to those of Piaget's formal operational thinker (e.g., Inhelder &
Piaget, 1958). For example, following a comprehensive review of the psychological
literature, Moshman (1998, p. 972) concluded: "In fact, there is surprisingly strong
support for Piaget's 1924 proposal that formal or hypothetico-deductive reasoning deliberate deduction from propositions consciously recognized as hypothetical plays an important role in the thinking of adolescents and adults but is rarely seen
much before the age of 11 or 12." Given the necessary developmental conditions
(i.e., physical and social experience, neurological maturation, self-regulation), some
students then develop post-formal or Stage 5 reasoning skill. Importantly, because
modern science is essentially an enterprise in which scientists generate and test the
validity of unseen theoretical entities and processes (see Chapter 9), anyone lacking
Stage 5 reasoning skill should be hindered in their ability to assimilate this abstract
aspect of science and to reject prior NOS misconceptions.
More specifically, the present theory argues that advanced NOS understanding
comes about via a reflective process in which someone with Stage 5 reasoning skill
reasons through a number of examples of theoretical (i.e., Stage 5) science, and then
reflects on those examples to assimilate common NOS elements and reject prior
misconceptions. Consequently, if students lack the Stage 5 reasoning skill needed to
reason through the examples and alternative NOS misconceptions/conceptions (e.g.,
a theory is a well-supported hypothesis vs. a theory is an explanation for a broad
class of related phenomena regardless of the amount of support), they will be unable
to reject prior misconceptions and will fail to make substantial NOS gains. Of
course, some-less abstract NOS elements can be understood without Stage 5 skill
(e.g., scientists observe nature, collect data, write reports). But the present hypothesis
is that to understand science as a process of generating and testing alternative
knowledge claims about unobservable theoretical entities and processes, one must
have previously developed Stage 5 reasoning skill that allows the same.
The argument concerning how the studies' working hypothesis will be tested can
be summarized as follows:
If...prior development of Stage 5 reasoning skill is necessary to reject NOS
misconceptions and gain NOS understanding, (Stage 5 hypothesis)
and...a sample of preservice teachers found to vary in developmental level (i.e.,
Levels 3, 4 and 5) are a) administered a NOS pretest, b) subjected to inquiry
REJECTING NATURE OF SCIENCE MISCONCEPTIONS
213
instruction in which NOS elements and examples are explicitly discussed, and c)
administered a NOS posttest, (planned test)
then...students with Stage 5 reasoning skill should assimilate that instruction, should
reject prior NOS misconceptions, and should demonstrate significantly greater NOS
gains than students lacking such reasoning skill. (prediction)
On the other hand,
if...Stage 5 reasoning skill does not exist (i.e., does not represent a developmental
advance over Stage 4),
then...assessed level of reasoning skill should not correlate with NOS gains.
(prediction)
3. METHOD
3.1 Subjects
Subjects were 23 students (9 males and 14 females, mean age = 26.5 years, SD =
6.4 years) enrolled in a senior-level college course for pre-service secondary school
biology teachers called Methods of Teaching Biology taught at a major southwest
university (USA). All 23 students had completed, or were soon to complete, an
undergraduate major in biology. The biology major requires completion of 40 credits
in biology and 22 credits in supporting courses in chemistry, physics, geology,
mathematics and the history of science.
3.2 Design
The first step in testing the studies' working hypothesis was administration of a
test of students' skill in testing Stage 4 and 5 hypotheses. The test was administered
on the first day of the semester. A Likert-type survey of NOS understanding was also
administered at that time (see below). The course, which included several inquiry
lessons designed to explicate the theoretical nature of science, was then taught. The
NOS survey was then re-administered at the semester's end as part of the course final
exam. At no time during the semester did the instructor reveal to students what he
believed to be the correct responses on the NOS survey. Nor were students told that
survey would be re-administered at the end of the semester. Consequently, students
could not simply memorize the instructor's responses. Hence, student responses on
the posttest survey presumably reflected their NOS beliefs as opposed to those of the
instructor. Nevertheless, as described below, the instructor did explicitly discuss
NOS elements on several occasions within the context of specific inquiry lessons and
historical examples, and repeatedly made it clear that a course goal was the
construction of NOS understanding.
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3.3 Instruments
Reasoning Skill Level. Reasoning skill level (i.e., developmental level) was
assessed by use of the written test described and used in the study discussed in
Chapter 7. As you may recall, the test is based on reasoning patterns associated with
hypothesis testing (i.e., the identification and control of variables, correlational
reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, proportional reasoning, and combinatorial
reasoning) and includes items with both observable and unobservable causal agents.
Test scores allow students to be classified into one of four developmental levels:
Level 3 = students not able to test hypotheses involving observable causal agents;
Low Level 4 = students inconsistently able to test hypotheses involving observable
causal agents; High Level 4 = students consistently able to test hypotheses involving
observable causal agents; Level 5 = students able to test causal hypotheses involving
unobservable entities.
A split-half reliability coefficient of 0.66 was computed for the present sample.
This figure seems reasonable given the relatively few test items and the relatively
small sample size (n = 23). The study discussed in Chapter 8 found a Cronbach's
reliability of 0.81 when a 24 item multiple-choice version of the test was
administered to a sample of 663 undergraduate biology students.
NOS Misconceptions. NOS misconceptions were assessed by use of the 13-item
Likert-type survey that appears in Table 1. The 13 items focus on the meaning of
terms such as hypothesis, prediction, theory, law, proof, truth, fact, and conclusion.
Responses were used to generate a single NOS score by awarding 0 to 4 points for
each item depending upon how closely the response corresponded to the response as
indicated in the table. Thus, total NOS scores could range from 0 to 52. A percent
score was also computed for each student. To do so, responses that agreed or
strongly agreed (or disagreed or strongly disagreed) with the correct response were
used. For example, Item 3 states: A hypothesis is an educated guess of what will be
observed under certain conditions. Thus, a student who selected the "disagree"
response was awarded 1 point and a student who selected the "strongly disagree"
response was awarded 2 points. Students who were awarded 2 points on all 13 items
received a maximum of 26 points (i.e., 100%).
1=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=don't know 4=agree 5=strongly agree
1. The central goal of science is to explain natural phenomena.

Although obtaining accurate descriptions of natural phenomena plays an important role in science,
explanation is proposed as the central goal. In other words, at its core science is an attempt to
215
understand/explain the causes of natural phenomena. Knowing what happens is not enough.
Scientists want to know why things happen. Preferred response = 5.]
2.
Scientific explanations are derived from controlled observations of nature.

[Upon initial reading, this statement sounds accurate. However upon reflection, the statement is
misleading because scientific explanations (i.e., hypotheses/theories) initially come from (i.e., are
derived from) use of the creative process of analogical reasoning. Once explanations are derived
via analogical reasoning, controlled experiments may be used to test those explanations. Preferred
response =1.]
3.
A hypothesis is an educated guess of what will be observed under certain conditions.

[In the context of the methods course, a hypothesis was defined as a tentative explanation for some
puzzling phenomenon, i.e., a proposed cause. One can certainly observe the puzzling phenomenon,
but typically one does not observe its cause. For example, water rises when a cylinder is inverted
over a burning candle sitting in a pan of water. This phenomenon is puzzling and can be observed.
However, one cannot observe the cause of the water rise, which presumably is due to molecules of
hot air escaping from the cylinder and the external air's relatively greater density and pressure
pushing on the external water's surface. Preferred response =1.]
4. A conclusion is a statement of what was observed in statement number 3 above.

[A conclusion was defined in the course as a statement regarding the relative support or lack of
support for a tested hypothesis or theory. For example, suppose one advances the hypothesis that
water rises in the inverted cylinder mentioned above because
is created by combustion and
this newly created
dissolves more rapidly in water than the original
To test this hypothesis
one could compare the amount of water rise in two containers. One container would contain
saturated water while the other would contain normal water. The hypothesis leads to the prediction
that the water should rise higher in the container with normal water because the excess
would
dissolve in this water but would be "blocked" by the
saturated water in the other container.
When the experiment is conducted, we find that the water rises to the same level in both containers.
This result does not support the initial hypothesis. Therefore, the conclusion would be that the
dissolving hypothesis was not supported. In other words, one observes puzzling phenomena and
one observes experimental results, but one does not observe hypotheses and conclusions. Preferred
response = 1.]
5. Hypotheses/theories cannot be proved to be true beyond any doubt

[Because any two hypotheses or theoretical claims may lead to the same predicted result, eventual
observation of that predicted result cannot reveal which hypothesis or theoretical claim is correct.
For this reason, supportive evidence cannot prove a hypothesis or theory correct. Preferred
response = 5.]
6. Hypotheses/theories can be disproved beyond any doubt.

[Contradictory evidence can arise due to an incorrect hypothesis/theory or to a faulty test (e.g., one
in which all other variables were not held constant). Further, because it is not possible to be certain
that all other variables were in fact held constant, contradictory evidence cannot disprove a
hypothesis or theory. Preferred response = 1.]
7. To be scientific, a hypothesis must be testable.

[As discussed in Item 8 below, hypothesis testing requires the generation of a prediction and a
comparison of predicted and observed results. A good match supports the hypothesis. However, a
mismatch between predicted and observed results contradicts the hypothesis and may lead to its
rejection. Explanations that rely on supernatural powers, such as those of a God, may lie beyond the
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scope of science. Such explanations become un-testable when the supernatural entity becomes so
powerful that it can do anything hence predict everything. An explanation that predicts everything
becomes un-testable because there is no observation that could contradict a prediction. Preferred
response = 5.]
8. To be tested, a hypothesis must lead to a prediction.

[Hypothesis testing requires the generation of a prediction and a comparison of the predicted result
with the observed result. The prediction may be of the classic sort generated in controlled
experimentation. For example: If...water rises in the inverted cylinder because oxygen has been
consumed (hypothesis), and...water rise with one, two, and three candles is measured while holding
all other variables constant (controlled planned experiment), then...the height of water rise should be
the same regardless of the number of burning candles (prediction). The prediction may involve
circumstantial evidence. For example: If...O. J. Simpson killed Nichol Brown Simpson (hypothesis),
and...a sample of the blood found in O.J.'s Ford Bronco is compared with a sample of Nichol's blood
(planned test), then...the two blood samples should match (prediction). Or the prediction may
involve correlational evidence. For example: If...breast implants cause connective tissue disease
(hypothesis), and...the incidence of connective tissue disease in a sample of women with implants is
compared to the disease incidence in a matched sample of women without implant (planned test),
then...the disease incidence should be higher in the implant group than in the non-implant group
(prediction). Descriptive (i.e., generalizing hypotheses) also require predictions for their test. For
example, suppose one generates the descriptive hypothesis that all swans are white. Testing this
hypothesis requires the following reasoning and resulting prediction: If...all swans are white, and...I
observe several additional swans (planned test), then...they should all be white (prediction). Thus,
regardless of the type of hypothesis being tested and type of evidence collected, hypothesis testing
requires the generation of one or more predictions. Preferred response = 5.]
9. A hypothesis that gains support becomes a theory.
[Like hypotheses, theories are explanations of nature. Hypotheses attempt to explain a specific
observation, or a group of closely related observations. Theories attempt to explain broad classes of
related observations, hence tend to be more general, more complex, and more abstract than
hypotheses. Consequently, a hypothesis, regardless of the amount of support that may be obtained,
does not become a theory. Preferred response = 1.]
10. A theory that gains support becomes a law.
[Tested and accepted generalizations (i.e., laws) describe nature in terms of identifiable patterns
(e.g., F = ma, more candles make more water rise, the sun rises in the east and sets in the west).
Explanations (both hypotheses and theories) attempt to provide causes for such patterns. Regardless
of the amount of support that an explanation may obtain, that explanation does not become
description. Hence, theories do not become laws. Preferred response = 1.]
11. Truth is attainable via proof through repeated supporting observations.
[As mentioned in items 5 and 6 above, proof and disproof are not possible. Hence the attainment of
Truth in any ultimate sense is also not possible regardless of the number of times a supporting
observation may be made. Preferred response = 1.]
12. The central goal of science is to discover facts about nature.
[As mentioned in item 1, the central goal of science is to explain natural phenomena, not discover
facts. Given that proof and disproof are not possible, the discovery of "facts" (i.e., certainties) is not
even possible. Preferred response = 1.]
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13. Scientific statements that are just a theory are of little value.
[Scientific theories (i.e., explanations for broad classes of related phenomena) are of considerable
value. Non-tested theories guide research. Tested and accepted theories provide conceptual
coherence and may lead to useful applications. Preferred response = 1.]
3.4 NOS Instruction: The Methods Course
The methods course is part of the university's teacher preparation program.

Generally, preservice teachers take the course the semester prior to student teaching.
The course emphasizes inquiry methods, thus is neither a lecture nor a lab course in
the traditional sense. Rather, the lab is used to provoke initial explorations, which are
followed by the introduction and explication of related terms, which are then
followed by application/extension activities. In other words, the course utilizes the
learning cycle teaching method (e.g., Biological Science Curriculum Studies, 1992;
Karplus, 1974; Karplus & Thier, 1967; Kral, 1997; Lawson, Abraham, & Renner,
1989; Marek & Cavallo, 1997; Science Curriculum Improvement Study, 1970).
The first half of the course is designed with the explicit goal of teaching the NOS
elements listed in Table 2. The elements are based in large part on the theory of
scientific method introduced in Chapter 9. During the second half, students attempt
to apply this understanding to the design and delivery of inquiry lessons. The course
begins with a series of inquiries in which students generate and test
hypotheses/theories involving unobservable entities and/or processes. In this sense,
the course attempts to teach the nature of science by doing science. However, while
doing science, historical examples and key elements of the scientific process are
explicitly discussed so that attention is repeatedly focused on those elements (i.e., on
specific scientific questions, on hypotheses/theories, on their tests, and on
conclusions). In this sense, the course employs what Bell, Lederman & Abd-ElKhalick (1998) and Abd-El-Khalick (1999) call an explicit approach to NOS
instruction.
1.
2.
Science is a human activity that attempts to explain nature by raising and

answering causal questions. Science consists of its methods plus the explanations
and descriptions that have been obtained.
Basic to doing science is the generation and test of alternative explanations. A
creative process, sometimes called analogical reasoning, is used to generate
explanations. The initial generation of several alternatives reduces bias because
they make it less likely to become overly committed to any specific explanation.
Tentative explanations are tested by use of an If/then/Therefore reasoning pattern.
A test begins by supposing that the explanation under consideration is true and by
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imagining some test condition(s) that allows the derivation of one or more
predictions. Data (observed results) are then gathered and compared with the
predictions. A good match provides support for the explanation, while a poor
match contradicts the explanation and may lead to its rejection.
3. Proposed generalizations (i.e., descriptive hypotheses) and proposed explanations
are both tested by use of the If/then/Therefore reasoning pattern. However
accepted generalizations (sometimes called laws) describe nature in terms of
identifiable patterns (e.g., more candles make more water rise, the sun rises in the
east and sets in the west), while explanations (both hypotheses and theories)
attempt to provide causes for such patterns.
4.
People do science to find causes. People want to know the causes of things to
satisfy their curiosity - basic research - or so that their new knowledge can be put
to practical use - applied research.
5.
Like hypotheses, theories are explanations of nature. But while hypotheses attempt
to explain a specific observation, or a group of closely related observations,
theories attempt to explain broad classes of related observations, hence tend to be
more general, more complex, and more abstract.
6. Theory testing, like hypothesis testing, involves use of If/then/Therefore
reasoning. But because of the additional complexity, theories can seldom be tested
in their entirety. Rather, they most often are tested component by component.
Further, because of the additional abstractness, theory testing often requires the
inclusion of a theoretical rationale, which links abstract non-observable (i.e.,
theoretical) causal agents with observable experimental manipulations
(independent variables).
7. Theory testing may be further complicated when an advocate of a contradicted
theory decides to modify, rather than reject, the theory. The modification may
involve a change in a basic component, or the addition of new components.
Modifications are intended to keep the theory consistent with the evidence.
Nevertheless, theories that meet with repeated contradiction are generally
replaced, particularly when a reasonable non-contradicted alternative exists.
8. Although it is common practice to speak as though entities such as oxygen and
carbon dioxide have been "discovered" in a manner similar to the way someone
discovers a lost treasure, this practice is misleading. Instead, entities such as
oxygen and carbon dioxide, like the vital force and phlogiston, can be better
understood as conceptual inventions, albeit conceptual inventions that have been
so thoroughly tested that their existence is no longer in question.
9.
Because any two hypotheses or theoretical claims may lead to the same predicted
result, eventual observation of that predicted result can not tell you which
hypothesis or theoretical claim is correct. For this reason, supportive evidence
cannot prove a hypothesis or theory correct.
10. Contradictory evidence can arise due either to an incorrect hypothesis/theory or to
a faulty test (e.g., one in which not all other variables were held constant). Further,
because it is not possible to be certain that all other variables were in fact held
constant, contradictory evidence cannot disprove a hypothesis or theory.
11. Science and religion are fundamentally different "ways of knowing." Science asks
one to generate alternative explanations and then consult nature as a way of testing
the alternatives. Scientific conclusions, which must remain somewhat tentative,
come at the end of the process. On the other hand, religion asks that one accept a
particular explanation at the outset based on faith. Religious knowledge is
considered absolute and nature need not be consulted as a way of testing.
219
A Sample Lesson. To obtain a better sense of how NOS instruction proceeded,

consider the initial inquiry lesson based on materials contained in Gases and Airs
(Elementary Science Study, 1974; also see Peckham, 1993; and Lawson, 1999). The
lesson began with students working in teams of two. Each team set a burning candle
upright in a pan of water using a small piece of clay. A cylinder was then inverted
over the burning candle and placed in the water. Shortly after, the candle flame went
out and water rose in the cylinder. These puzzling observations raised two major
causal questions: Why did the flame go out? And why did the water rise? Students
answered the first question by assuming that the flame reduced the amount of oxygen
in the cylinder until too little remained to sustain combustion, thus the flame died.
This assumption was not challenged, so the class moved on to the second question to
which several explanations were collectively generated.
Once explanations had been generated and listed on the board, the instructor
asked students to label the list. In other words, what in the students' opinion should
this list of possible explanations be called? After a brief discussion, students agreed
that they were hypotheses - to which the instructor then offered a definition of the
term hypothesis as follows: A hypothesis is a possible explanation, a possible cause,
of a specific puzzling observation. Students were then asked to reflect on where their
hypotheses had come from. When students replied that they had been generated from
past experiences that were seen as somehow similar/analogous to the present
situation, the phrase analogical reasoning was introduced and defined as the creative
process of hypothesis generation in which causal entities and/or processes that have
been found to act in past similar situations are borrowed and used as possible casual
agents in the present situation. Students were also explicitly told that this view of
hypothesis generation is contrary to the view that hypothesis generation involves
closer observation of the phenomena that provoked the causal question(s), i.e., the
water rising in the cylinder. In other words, observations may provoke causal
questions but they are not the source of hypotheses, instead hypotheses come from
prior knowledge (see Table 2 Element 2).
Students were then told that their next task was to test the alternative hypotheses
(i.e., explanations) using If/and/then reasoning to derive one or more specific
expected results (i.e., predictions). For example, the following hypothetico-predictive
argument generates different expected results from two alternative explanations:
If...water is sucked up because oxygen is consumed, (consumed-oxygen hypothesis)
and...water rise with one, two, and three candles is measured, (planned test)
candles. (prediction) This result is predicted because there is only so much oxygen in
the cylinder. So more candles will burn up the oxygen faster; but they will not burn
up more oxygen. (theoretical rationale)
On the other hand,
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If...the water rises because some air in the cylinder was heated, expanded, some
escaped, and the remainder then cooled and contracted, (air-expansion-and-escape
hypothesis)
then...more candles should cause more water to rise because more candles will heat
more air, thus more will escape, which in turn will be replaced by more water when
the remaining air cools and contracts. (prediction)
Once derived in this fashion, the expected results were called predictions. Several
examples were provided to explicate the difference between a hypothesis (i.e., a
tentative explanation) and a prediction (i.e., a derived consequence of a hypothesis
and its planned test).
As mentioned, in addition to several lessons in which the hypothetico-predictive
reasoning pattern was used to test hypotheses, the course introduced examples from
the history of science and from contemporary science to illustrate the other NOS
elements listed in Table 2. For example, Element 9 states that supportive evidence
cannot prove that a hypothesis or theory is true. As discussed in Chapter 9, the belief
that science can prove knowledge claims true is incorrect because science tests
knowledge claims (i.e., hypotheses/theories) by setting up If/and/then arguments and
then by comparing predictions with observed results. If the predicted and observed
results match, then support, but not proof, has been found. Proof is not possible
because two or more knowledge claims may lead to the same prediction. And
because knowledge claims are the product of human imagination, they are potentially
unlimited in number. Therefore, finding support for one claim does not prove that
claim or rule out other possible claims.
This point was made to students using a number of examples including the
following: Suppose you notice that the sun crosses the sky from east to west and ask,
why? In response to this causal question, you generate the hypothesis that it does so
because the sun orbits a stationary earth. How could this stationary-earth hypothesis
be tested? Consider the following argument:
If...the sun crosses the sky from east to west because it orbits a stationary earth,
(stationary-earth hypothesis)
and...we remain in one spot and plot the sun's movements over the next five days,
(planned test)
then...each day it should rise in the east, cross the sky and set in the west.
(prediction)
And...sure enough, when the observations are made during the next five days, the sun
does just that. (observed result)
Therefore...the prediction and observed results match, so the stationary- earth
hypothesis has been supported. But it has not been proven true because an alternative
hypothesis might lead to the same prediction.
For example,
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if...the sun remains stationary while the earth rotates on an axis from west to east,
(rotating-earth hypothesis)
and...we conduct the same test, (planned test)
then...each day the sun should rise in the east, cross the sky and set in the west.
(prediction)
Note how these examples presumably require students to assimilate and use
hypothetico-predictive arguments. Note also that the hypotheses being tested are
about entities and processes that cannot be directly observed (i.e., burned up
molecules and a rotating earth). Would a student who initially does not understand
the difference between a hypothesis and a prediction, or one who believes that
hypotheses are derived directly from observations (rather than from analogies), or
one who believes that scientific knowledge claims can be proven true, be convinced
otherwise by participating in such inquiries and by being provided such examples?
According to the present hypothesis, the answer is yes, but only if that student has
previously developed Stage 5 reasoning skill. Otherwise, the arguments will "fall on
deaf ears." In other words, the present hypothesis is that many of the other NOS
elements listed in Table 2 are at a similarly abstract level, thus also require Stage 5
reasoning skill for understanding.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Reasoning Skill Level
Scores on the measure of reasoning skill ranged from 4 to 11 (mean score = 8.05,
SD = 2.2). Based on individual scores, four students were classified at Level 3, three
students were classified at Low Level 4,11 students were classified at High Level 4,
and five students were classified at Level 5.
4.2 Pre and Posttest NOS Scores
NOS scores on the pretest ranged from 18 to 35 (mean = 23.9, SD = 4.2).

Posttest scores ranged from 24 to 50 (mean = 39.4, SD = 6.3). A dependent T-test
revealed that the posttest scores were significantly higher than pretest scores (T =
42.4, df = 22, p< 0.001). Table 3 shows the percentage of students responding in
each answer category on both the pre and posttest. The table reveals that some NOS
misconceptions remained for some students. For example, the percentage of students
who agreed with Item 3: A hypothesis is an educated guess of what will be observed
under certain conditions, dropped considerably from the pre to posttest (95% to
22%). In spite of this positive shift, 22% of the students still confused hypotheses
with predictions. In other words, it would seem that these students failed to
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understand that a prediction, not a hypothesis, is an educated guess of what will be

observed under certain conditions. Similarly, 30% of the students still agreed with
Item 6: Hypotheses/theories can be disproved beyond any doubt. And in spite of the
fact that the course included several examples in which hypotheses and theories were
distinguished by differences in generality, complexity and abstractness, rather than
by degree of support, 35% of the students still agreed with Item 9: A hypothesis that
gains support becomes a theory. To summarize, it seems that although significant
gains in NOS understanding were made, misconceptions remained for a number of
students.
4.3 Relationship Between Reasoning Skill Level and Posttest NOS Performance
Figure 1 shows percent success on the NOS pretest and posttest for students at
each reasoning skill level. As shown, students at all four levels performed poorly on
the pretest. No relationship between reasoning skill level and pretest NOS
performance is apparent. However, the posttest results revealed substantial NOS
gains as well as the predicted positive relationship between reasoning skill level and
NOS performance (i.e., Level 3 = 30.8%; Low Level 4 = 51.3%; High Level 4 =
68.8%; Level 5 = 83.1%). These group differences were statistically significant
p < 0.01). Therefore, this result provides support for the hypothesis that
Stage 5 reasoning skill facilitates the rejection of NOS misconceptions and the
construction of NOS understanding. The result also supports the view that
developmental advances in reasoning skill beyond Piaget's formal stage occur, at
least among some students.
5.
CONCLUSIONS AND INSTRUCTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Preservice biology teachers who enrolled in the present methods course did so
with several NOS misconceptions. This came as no surprise given that 1) previous
studies have found similar misconceptions (e.g., Lederman, 1992; Lederman, Wade,
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& Bell, 1998; McComas, Clough & Almazora, 1998), 2) biology instructors typically
spend little time explicating the nature of science (personal observation), and 3)
many biology texts contain several NOS misconceptions (e.g., Gibbs & Lawson,
1992). However, the present methods course, with its emphasis on inquiry and its
explicit approach to teaching the nature of science, produced substantial pre to
posttest NOS gains. Importantly, the size of these gains was related to students' level
of hypothetico-predictive reasoning skill. This finding provides support for the
hypothesis that Stage 5 reasoning skill, defined as skill needed to test alternative
hypotheses involving unobservable theoretical entities, exists and helps students gain
NOS understanding, presumably by enabling them to reason through arguments and
evidence for and against alternative NOS conceptions, and eventually reject those
that are inconsistent with that evidence.
If future studies corroborate the existence of a fifth stage of intellectual
development as well as this view of the acquisition/construction of NOS
understanding, then it will follow that, in addition to attempting to improve NOS
understanding, teacher preparation programs (particularly the science and
mathematics courses in those programs) should spend increased effort in developing
Stage 5 reasoning skill. If preservice teachers graduate without Stage 5 reasoning
skill, it seems likely that they will be find it difficult to teach modern science as a
process of creative and critical inquiry.
CHAPTER 11
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATURE OF

KNOWLEDGE AND INSTRUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
Previous chapters have painted learning in terms of cycles of hypotheticopredictive reasoning. Apparently learning all the way from the sensory-motor
behaviors of infants to the novel discoveries of scientists occurs in a hypotheticopredictive fashion because this is how the brain has evolved to process information.
Piaget used the phrase self-regulation (equilibration) to refer to the process on the
psychological level. Thanks to Steven Grossberg and his theory of adaptive
resonance, we now have a neurological account of self-regulation. And thanks to
Grossberg's learning equation, we can understand why a teaching approach that
allows students to explore nature, to discover what they do not know, and to
eventually make connections with what they do know (often using analogies), makes
learning more motivating, easier, better understood, longer lasting and more
transferable. Neurologically speaking, when new input contradicts predictions (i.e.,
when an adaptive resonance is not found), arousal is turned on and an internally
driven search for a match begins. In short, disequilibrium is motivating. Further,
when the new input finally meets internal neural activity from prior learning (i.e.,
when both pre and postsynaptic neurons are active), new synaptic connections are
made, connections that are in turn connected with prior connections. Thus, just as a
folder filed in the correct cabinet with several cross references can be more easily
found and used than one piled randomly on a shelf, so too can such new connected
learning.
Outstars, introduced in Chapter 5, also have extremely important consequences
for instruction. As you recall, outstars are responsible for chunking (i.e., for concept
formation). As we have seen, neurons exist in distinct layers in the brain with
outstars of a "higher" layer sending axons down into a "lower" layer. In turn, the
neurons of the "lower" layer send axons down into a still "lower" layer, and so on.
Thus, we have a hierarchical neurological structure isomorphic with, and likely
responsible for, our conceptual hierarchies. In other words, we construct and store
our conceptual knowledge in hierarchical systems presumably because the very
neurons that store those concepts are arranged hierarchically (cf., Gazzaniga, Ivry &
Mangun, 1998, pp. 167-169).
Outstars might also be responsible for If/and/then thinking. The general rationale
for this hypothesis goes like this: Due to past hypothetico-predictive learning, you
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already have a layer of outstars that have chunked your concept of an elephant.
Suppose you now see a big, gray, floppy ear. The activity pattern provoked by this
input fires neurons on successively higher more inclusive layers until the pattern fires
your ensemble of outstars that collectively represent an elephant. Thus, thanks to
observation of the big, gray, floppy ear, your "elephant" outstars are activated. Thus,
you suspect that you are looking at part of an elephant, i.e., your mind
subconsciously generates the descriptive elephant hypothesis. Next, due to prior
connections of the elephant outstars with other elephant features (in lower slabs),
activation of the higher-slab elephant outstars in turn actives lower-slab features such
as a hose-like trunk feature, a string-like tail feature, a stump-like leg feature, and so
on. In this way, activation of the elephant outstars carries with it specific
expectations as well as the following If/and/then argument:
If...I really am looking at an elephant ear, (descriptive hypothesis)
and...I shift my attention forward, (behavioral test)
then...I should see a hose-like trunk. (prediction)
Once this prediction has been activated in a lower slab, working memory in the
prefrontal cortex can now direct an attention shift forward and allow new input to be
processed. If that new input matches the prediction, then you have support for the
elephant hypothesis:
And... I do see a hose-like truck. (observed result)
Therefore...I probably am looking at an elephant. (conclusion)
Thanks to the Levine and Pruiett model introduced in Chapter 3, we also have a
neurological explanation for why conceptual change can be so difficult. Not only
does conceptual change often involve constructing new mental representations (i.e.,
forming new outstars), it also requires overcoming previously acquired neural biases.
On the psychological level, conceptual change involves not only what has been
called "representing ability," but it also involves "inhibiting ability." Thus, for
conceptual change, we need to "represent" new conceptions and "inhibit" old
misconceptions.
Lastly, as Piaget claimed, we have found that intellectual development is partially
dependent on neurological maturation and is stage-like in the sense that sensorymotor learning precedes linguistic learning, which precedes categorical learning,
which precedes causal learning. But unlike Piaget, we have found considerable
evidence for what has been called "stage retardation" (i.e., adolescents and adults
functioning at lower levels than their age would suggest) and for the existence of a
fifth stage, a stage that appears necessary for understanding and doing modern
science, and importantly for teaching science in the investigative way advocated by
current reform documents.
IMPLICATIONS FOR KNOWLEDGE AND INSTRUCTION
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Because procedural knowledge structures play a crucial role in learning and

because the experiences of many students have failed to provoke the development of
fourth and fifth-stage reasoning skills, teachers need to select, sequence and teach the
subject matter in ways that provoke the development of more advanced reasoning
skills. Before providing examples of instruction that can provoke the development of
reasoning skill, thus insure that stage retardation does not occur, let's consider the
implications of the present hypothetico-predictive account of brain functioning and
learning for some of the alternative brands of constructivism currently found in the
literature.
2.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ALTERNATIVE BRANDS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM
Much recent debate has centered on the relative merits of alternative

constructivist positions of knowledge acquisition and epistemology. For example,
Staver (1998) in staking out an extreme version of constructivism for education
wrote: "For constructivists, observations, objects, events, data, laws, and theory do
not exist independent of observers. The lawful and certain nature of natural
phenomena are [sic] properties of us, those who describe, not of nature, what is
described. ...constructivists begin this work without first assuming an independent
reality" (p. 503). And Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer & Scott (1994) emphasized
the social aspect of constructivism when they stated: "...scientific knowledge is
symbolic in nature and socially negotiated. The objects of science are not the
phenomena of nature but constructs that are advanced by the scientific community to
interpret nature" (p. 5). Lastly, Fosnot (1996) described a theory of constructivism
that "...describes knowledge as temporary, developmental, nonobjective, internally
constructed, and socially and culturally mediated" (p. ix).
Realism stands in contrast to these constructivist views. Hwang (1996) defines a
realist as one who believes that: "...the world exists and is organized independent of
us, our language, and our methods of inquiry" (p. 345). Realist critics of
constructivism, such as Matthews (1994), have argued: "For all its faults, the
scientific tradition has prompted rationality, critical thinking and objectivity. It
instills a concern for evidence, and for having ideas judged not by personal or social
interest, but by how the world is" (p. 2.). In a similar vein, Osborne (1996)
concluded: "This [social constructivism] has led to the portrayal of science as a
process of constructing and manipulating representations which bear no necessary
relation to any ontological reality. In so doing constructivists have forgotten that it is
the world that imposes constraints on human thought, and not human thought that
imposes constraints on the world" (pp. 76-77). More recently, Matthews (1998)
summarized several key differences between realist and constructivist beliefs as
follows:
Realists believe that science aims to tell us about reality, not about our experiences; that
is knowledge claims are evaluated by reference to the world, not by reference to their
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personal, social, or national utility; that scientific methodology is normative, and

consequently distinctions can be made between good and bad science; that science is
objective in the sense of being different from personal, inner experience; that science
tries to identify and minimize the impact of non-cognitive interests (political, religious,
gender, class) in its development; that decision making in science has a central
cognitive element and is not reducible to mere sociological considerations, and so on.
(p. 166)
The hypothetico-predictive theory of brain function and learning presented in this

book implies a theoretical resolution to the debate between these sorts of
constructivist and realist positions. The present position is that focusing on
knowledge acquisition in terms of the underlying learning pattern will help resolve
the debate. In other words, understanding how humans acquire knowledge informs us
about the nature of the knowledge acquired.
2.1 Does the External World Really Exist?

First, it should be emphasized that learning is a hypothesis generation and testing
enterprise where the term hypothesis is defined in its broadest sense, i.e., any
statement under test, no matter whether it purports to describe some particular fact or
event or to express a general law or some other more complex causal proposition.
Importantly, in order to test any and all such hypotheses, each hypothesis must
initially be taken to be true.1 This may seem backwards. But according to previous
examples, this is the way learning occurs. Importantly, hypotheses include entities
such as ghosts, photons, vital forces and phlogiston. This means that we have to
suppose that these entities exist so that test conditions can be imagined and
predictions can be drawn. In the end we may decide that the entities do not exist. But
to arrive at this conclusion, we first had to assume that they do exist!
To further clarify this point, briefly consider the Needham-Spallanzani
controversy over the existence of the vital force. As you may recall, during the
1700s, John Needham, among others, believed that living things possessed a special
vital force. Further, when this force entered dead material it would spontaneously
give it life. But Lazzaro Spallanzani thought otherwise. Nevertheless, to test
Needham's vital force idea, Spallanzani had to assume that the vital force existed so
that he could reason in a hypothetico-predictive way something like this:
If...the vital force exists and acts on nonliving matter to bring it to life, (vital-force
hypothesis)
1 As discussed below (see Concluding Remarks), I am not talking here about the statistical practice of initiating research by stating a "null
hypothesis." The statistician's null hypothesis is not a hypothesis at all. Rather it is a prediction, more correctly, it is a null prediction (e.g.,
no significant difference will be found in student performance after two different instructional treatments). In my view, calling a null
prediction a null hypothesis is not only confusing it does not serve its purported purpose of making the researcher less biased. In my view,
the route to less biased research is to start with alternative hypotheses (cf., Chamberlain, 1965) - not with a confusing linguistic
convention.
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and...some bottles are heated for a few minutes and others for an hour, and some are
corked and others sealed with a flame, (Spallanzani's planned test)
then...after several days, microbes should be found in all the bottles. (prediction) All
bottles should contain microbes because the vital force should act regardless of
length of bottle heating or method of sealing. (theoretical rationale)
But...days later after conducting his experiment, all of the corked bottles were full of
microbes. The sealed bottles boiled only a short time were also teaming with
microbes. However, no microbes were in the bottles boiled for an hour and then
sealed. (observed results)
Therefore...Spallanzani concluded that Needham's vital force does not exist.
(conclusion)2
The key point is that entities such as the vital force, epicycles, heavy water, and N
rays must be assumed to exist in order to test their existence and to possibly
conclude that they do not exist after all. Awareness of this aspect of the knowledge
acquisition process is extremely important because it allows us to set aside the debate
about the existence or non-existence of the external world. In short, the debate is not
settled by concluding that the external world exists independent of an observer (the
realist position). Rather the debate is set aside by the realization that to learn at
higher levels, the learner must assume the external world's independent existence,
regardless of whether it actually exists or not. Thus, contrary to the constructivist
position advanced by Staver (1998, p. 503) in which "...constructivists begin this
work without first assuming an independent reality," to learn at higher levels one
must begin by assuming that the external world exists (and that it is knowable). In
fact, this proposition and its alternative (i.e., the external world does not exist unless it is in direct view) has already been generated and tested by every single child
during their sensory-motor stage of development. Thus as a scientist, if you fail to
make the initial assumption that the external world exists you get nowhere. Worse
yet, if you refuse to assume the independent existence of the external world, in spite
of your sensory-motor knowledge that is telling you otherwise, you could suffer
some unfortunate consequences. Suppose, for example, you find yourself in the
middle of a freeway staring down an oncoming car and fail to make the assumption.
If you do, you will likely end up dead. Clearly it pays to assume that the oncoming
car exists, even though we cannot be certain that it does.
But where does a scientist arrive if s/he assumes that the external world exists and
is knowable? The answer turns out to be somewhere short of absolute Truth (for the
reasons stated previously), but certainly closer to developing workable mental
representations of that assumed-to-exist external world than extreme social
constructivists would have us believe. This is because, in addition to our ability to
argue the merits and demerits of our various representations with others, we have our
assumed-to-exist external world against which we can test our representations, i.e.,
2 Of course we would conclude that the vital-force hypothesis was not supported.
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our hypotheses and theories. Thus, the issue amounts to whether or not science
makes progress.3 The answer is that it does, but that progress is by no means without
fits and starts and some backtracking. Convincing evidence for scientific progress
surrounds us everywhere from computers that run on electrons, to cars and airplanes
that run on exploding fossil fuels, to doctors that save lives each day with
prescriptions of antibiotics, not to mention satellites that orbit the earth, and space
ships that have gone to the moon and back. To deny that these technological
advances rest on sound scientific theory is nonsense.
An additional point should be made. It makes sense to refer to the initial mental
representations as constructions because they are not directly "given" in the context
of current learning experiences. Instead, mental representations are either culled
from past experiences stored in long-term memory or are "constructed" from basic
sensory input. For example, neurological research previously reviewed (e.g., Kosslyn
& Koenig, 1995; Mishkin and Appenzeller, 1987) makes it clear, at least with
respect to vision, complex mental representations do not arise from direct sensory
input. Rather, as shown in Figure 1, visual sensory input is processed along two
separate pathways that result in progressively more complex mental "constructions."
As shown, initial processing of visual input, which arrives from the retina by way of
the lateral geniculate body, takes place in the striate cortex. Individual neurons in the
striate cortex respond to simple elements in the visual field such as spots of color and
edges. Visual processing continues along the lower pathway, which extends down
toward the inferior temporal cortex. Along the way, a number of diverging and
converging channels "construct" broader properties of objects, such as overall shape
and color. At the lower end of the pathway neurons are sensitive to a variety of
properties and a broad expanse of the visual field, which suggests that fully
processed information about objects converge there. Also as shown in Figure 1,
spatial relationships among two or more objects are processed along an upper
cortical pathway.
2.2 A Further Thought on the Primacy of Physical Feedback

Several years ago following administration of the task shown in Figure 2, two 13year-old boys were overheard arguing. The argument went something like this. First
boy: I think the water will rise higher when the lead ball sinks because it's heavier
than the aluminum one. Second boy: No, you are wrong! They will push the water up
the same amount because both balls are the same size. Weight doesn't matter. First
boy: Yes, weight matters. My brother is a lot heavier than I am and when he gets in
the bathtub the water goes up a lot higher than when I get in!
Here the term progress is understood as science's ability to construct knowledge (i.e., mental
representations) that generates predictions that better match observations.
231
How can this dispute be settled? How do these boys, or anyone for that matter,
learn which variable, weight or volume, is key? It would seem that no amount of
social negotiation suffices. Rather what needs to be done is to perform two simple
experiments more or less as follows:
If...the amount of water rise depends on an object's weight, (weight hypothesis)
and...two objects of different weight, but equal volume, are submerged in water,
(planned test)
then...the heavier object should produce more water rise. (prediction)
But...the heavier object does not produce more water rise. (result)
Therefore...the weight hypothesis is not supported. (conclusion)
On the other hand,
if...the amount of water rise depends on an object's volume, (volume hypothesis)
and...two objects of different volume, but equal weight, are submerged in water,
(planned test)
then...the larger object should produce more water rise. (prediction)
And...the larger object does produce more water rise. (result)
Therefore...the volume hypothesis is supported. (conclusion)
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Thus, physical feedback (i.e., the water rises the same in the first experiment and
higher in the second) is the primary vehicle for resolving disputes about alternative
knowledge claims. The primacy of physical feedback in knowledge acquisition is at
odds with social constructivism in which, according to Latour & Woolgar (1979;
1986), success depends on a theory's proponents ability to 'extract compliance' from
others (cf., Slezak, 1994a; 1994b). This is not to say that social interaction may not
be helpful. But it cannot be the central means of knowledge acquisition. In fact, as
Gardner (1994) points out, the acquisition of new knowledge is typically associated
with distinctly asocial behavior. Based on detailed case studies of seven highly
creative people, Gardner concludes, "...at the time of greatest breakthrough, our
creators were in one sense very much alone. Often they had physically withdrawn
from other individuals" (p. 154). In reviewing several decades of research on the
nature and measurement of creativity, Eysenck (1994) makes much the same point
when he lists several characteristics associated with creative people such as
quarrelsomeness, lack of sociability and even outright hostility. As mentioned, this is
not to argue that social interaction cannot be helpful. It can be helpful in many ways
(e.g., in sharing and clarifying problems, in suggesting alternative hypotheses, in
suggesting possible test conditions, in criticizing conducted tests, in collecting and
analyzing results). But in the end, feedback from the physical world is the ultimate
arbitrator of which knowledge claims are accepted or rejected.
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3. THE EXISTENCE OF STAGES IN INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT
As mentioned, the present view of learning and development implies the

existence of developmental stages - although not necessarily discontinuous stages
and not necessarily as theoretically characterized by Piaget. Initially, sensed colors,
lines, and angles and the child's ability to create "undifferentiated wholes" provide
the mental representations that are either rejected or retained by virtue of their ability
to produce predictions that are either met or unmet in a world of sensory-motor
feedback (e.g., lifting the cover either does or does not reveal the ball, sucking on the
bottle either does or does not produce milk). Once such testing has created a stable
world of interacting objects, these objects, their characteristics, and their behaviors
can then be used to test the validity of mental representations at higher stages. In
other words, intellectual development is a process in which the products of one stage
must be largely in place before progress can be made on subsequent stages because
prior constructions are used to test subsequent higher-order representations. For
example, John Dalton compared predicted and observed outcomes regarding the
measurable weights of gases to test the hypothesis that unobservable atoms exist.
Gregor Mendel compared predicted and observed outcomes regarding the ratios of
observable pea plant characteristics to test the hypothesis that unobservable genes
(he called them "factors") exist. And as we have seen, Lazzaro Spallanzani compared
predicted and observed outcomes regarding the observable growth of microbes to
test the hypothesis that an unobservable vital force exists. None of these tests could
have been conducted had the scientists not previously constructed a sensory-motor
world of interacting and observable objects during their early childhoods. More will
be said about this below.
A rudimentary form of hypothetico-predictive reasoning is present at birth. We
can be fairly certain of this because the reasoning pattern can be found in nonhumans. For example, Hauser (2000) conducted a revealing experiment with rhesus
monkeys. First, a monkey was shown an eggplant - a favorite food item. In full view,
the eggplant was then placed behind a screen. A second eggplant was then placed
behind the screen. Then when the screen was lifted, the length of time the monkey
looked at the two revealed eggplants was measured, which turned out to be about one
second. Next the conditions were changed. In the initial changed condition, one
eggplant was placed behind the screen followed by a second eggplant. Then without
the monkey knowing it, the second eggplant was removed. Now when the screen was
lifted, the monkey looked at the unexpected one remaining eggplant for about three
to four seconds. The same increase in looking time occurred when a third eggplant
was secretly added and then revealed. Thus, the monkey had a clear expectation of
seeing two eggplants and when either one or three eggplants showed up
unexpectedly, the monkey was puzzled as evidenced by the increase in looking time.
In the first unexpected condition, the monkey's hypothetico-predictive "reasoning"
can be summarized like this:
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If...one eggplant is placed behind the screen,

and...another is added,
then...there should be two eggplants behind the screen (expected result prediction).
But...there is only one eggplant (unexpected result).
Therefore...I am puzzled and need to look at the puzzling situation longer.
Given that this pattern of hypothetico-predictive in humans is present at birth,
developmental changes involve changes in the contexts to which the reasoning
pattern can be applied. Let's see how this might work in somewhat more detail in
terms of stages that correspond in a general way to Piaget's well-known stages (e.g.,
Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969).
3.1 Stage 1: The Sensory-Motor Stage (birth to about 18 months)
Of course, children during the first 18 months of life do not generate verbal
hypothetico-predictive arguments. Nevertheless, their overt behavior, like monkeys,
suggests that their pre-verbal reasoning follows the hypothetico-predictive pattern.
For example, Chapter 2 discussed the processing of both visual and auditory input in
terms of the hypothetico-predictive pattern. Also consider Piaget's famous object
permanence task in which an experimenter, in full view of the infant, hides a ball
under one of two covers. Diamond (1990) has shown that infants as young as five
months will reach under the cover for the hidden ball indicating that they retain a
mental representation of the ball even though it is out of sight. Further, such
behavior suggests that the infant is reasoning in the following way:
If...the ball is still where he/she put it, even though I can no longer see it, (empirical
representation)
and...I reach under the cover where it was hidden, (behavioral test)
then...I should find the ball. (prediction)
And...I do find the ball. (result)
Therefore...I have support for the hypothesis that the ball was still where she put it.
(conclusion)
In agreement with Meltzoff (1990), the infant's representation is called empirical
because it is of an event that has been empirically experienced. That is, the infant
actually saw the ball hidden under the cover. In Chapter 2, we also saw this pattern
of information processing in Laurent's attempt to suck milk from his bottle:
If...what I see is my bottle, (empirical representation)
and...I lift and suck, (behavioral test)
then...I should suck milk. (prediction)
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But...I do not suck milk. Instead I am sucking glass! (result)

Therefore...something is wrong, either with my initial idea (i.e., my hypothesis that I
am seeing my bottle) or with my behavior. I cannot tell which. So I am frustrated.
(conclusion)
In short, the primary goal at this stage is to construct a stable world of interacting
objects by generating and testing initially undifferentiated representations about that
world in a hypothetico-predictive fashion and by comparing sensory-motor feedback
with predictions.
3.2 Stage 2: The Preoperational or "Nominal" Stage (about 18 months to 7 years)
The major achievement of Stage 2 is the acquisition of language and its use in
naming the objects, events and situations constructed during Stage 1. For example,
consider the following dialogue (from Gesell 1940, p. 55) between two children aged
four and five:
FourFiveFourFiveFourFive-
I know that Pontius Pilate is a tree.

No. Pontius Pilate is not a tree at all.
Yes. It was a tree, because it says, 'He suffered under a Pontius Pilate', so it
must have been a tree.
No. I am sure Pontius Pilate was a person and not a tree.
I know he was a tree, because he suffered under a tree, a big tree.
No. He was a person, but he was a very big person.
The question here is, what object(s) are the words "Pontius Pilate" supposed to
label? The children have generated two conflicting nominal (naming) hypotheses.
The first nominal hypothesis claims that the words "Pontius Pilate" are used to label
a tree. The second claims that the words are used to label a person. Four's
hypothetico-predictive argument in favor of the first hypothesis might go something
like this:
If...Pontius Pilate is a name for a tree, (tree hypothesis)
and...we check the context in which the words "Pontius Pilate" are used, (test)
then...we should find that people suffer under Pontius Pilate. (prediction)
[Presumably the child has generated this prediction because his associative memory
links the word "under" with the word "tree."]
And...it says, 'He suffered under a Pontius Pilate'. (result)
Therefore...Pontius Pilate must have been a tree. (conclusion)
Notice that Five does not counter Four's argument with one of his own. He
merely asserts that Pontius Pilate was not a tree. Instead he was a person.
Nevertheless, Five does point out that Pontius Pilate was a very big person apparently one big enough to suffer under!
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3.3 Stage 3: The Concrete Operational or "Categorical" Stage (7 years to early

adolescence)
The acquisition of language to name objects, events and situations during Stage 2
now allows the child to apply hypothetico-predictive reasoning to a new level, the
level of seriating and classifying, i.e., creating variables and higher-order
classes/categories of unseen objects, events and situations. The observable and
named objects of Stage 2, such as tables and chairs, become the un-observable
categories, such as furniture, of Stage 3.
As you recall from Chapter 3, a series of classification tasks, including the
Mellinark Task, were administered to children ranging in age from 6 to 14 years.
Carefully sequenced instruction was then used to teach the children how to use
hypothetico-predictive reasoning to discover the relevant features, e.g.,
If...tiny spots make a creature a Mellinark, (descriptive hypothesis)
and...I look at all of non-Mellinarks in row 2, (planned test)
then...none of them should have tiny spots. (prediction)
But...some do have tiny spots. (observed result)
Therefore...tiny spots are not the key feature - or at least not the only key feature.
(conclusion)
As reported, none of the six-year-olds was able to generate and/or comprehend
this sort of argument, whereas half of the seven-year-olds were, as were virtually all
of the older children. As mentioned, the younger children's failure is most likely
related to relatively late maturation of the frontal lobes. The present position is that
Stage 3, which begins at age seven, involves use of the hypothetico-predictive
pattern to seriate and to categorize the objects, events, and situations in the child's
environment - all mediated by language. At this stage, descriptive hypotheses are
tested by comparing predictions with prior Stage 2 constructions such as "spots,"
"tails," and "curvy sides."
3.4 Stage 4: The Formal Operational or "Hypothetical" Stage (middle to late
adolescence)
At roughly age 11-12 years, some adolescents become increasingly able to use
language to apply hypothetico-predictive arguments to causal, rather than
categorical/descriptive hypotheses. Consider once again the causal question, what
causes differences in the rates at which pendulums swing? To answer this question,
one must generate and test alternative causal hypotheses (cf., Inhelder and Piaget
1958):
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If...changes in swing rates are caused by the amount of weight hanging on the end,
(causal weight hypothesis)
and...the weights are varied while holding other possible causes constant, (planned
test)
then...rate of pendulum swing should vary. (prediction)
But...the rates do not vary. (observed result)
Therefore...the weight hypothesis is not supported. (conclusion)
Clearly the reasoning pattern is the same as in the prior three stages. Thus, again
the difference between Stage 4 reasoning and prior Stage 3 reasoning is not the
pattern. Instead, the difference is what the pattern can be applied to. Stage 3
reasoning is about testing descriptive hypotheses (descriptive/generalizing
hypotheses). Stage 4 reasoning is about testing causal hypotheses. The Stage 4 causal
test above involves an experiment in which the possible cause is manipulated. In
other words, the proposed cause is the amount of weight and the experiment's
independent variable is also the amount of weight. Importantly, this variable can be
easily manipulated because weight differences can be sensed.
3.5 Stage 5: The Post-Formal or "Theoretical" Stage (late adolescence and early
adulthood)
Consider the Burning Candle Item introduced in Chapter 7. As you may recall,
the central causal question in that context was: What caused the water to rise?
Suppose a student generates the explanation that the water raised because the flame
consumed the oxygen under the cylinder. Thus the resulting vacuum "sucked" the
water up. This consumed-oxygen hypothesis can be tested using the following
hypothetico-predictive argument:
If...the water raised because the flame converts oxygen to carbon dioxide, which
dissolves more easily the oxygen thus produces a partial vacuum, which in turn
causes the water rise, (dissolving-carbon-dioxide hypothesis)
and...the height of water rise in two containers is compared - one with
saturated
water and the other with normal water, (planned test)
then...the water should rise higher in the container with normal water. (prediction)
This result is predicted because the
in the other container's water will block
from dissolving, thus the partial vacuum will not be created and the water will not
rise as high. (theoretical rationale/warrant)
But...the water rises the same in both containers. (observed result)
Therefore...the dissolving-carbon-dioxide hypothesis is not supported. (conclusion)
Although once again identical to prior reasoning in form, this argument differs in
at least two important ways. First, here the proposed cause is unseen (i.e.,
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theoretical). At Stage 4, the proposed cause was observable. And second, unlike
Stage 4 reasoning where a proposed cause and the independent variable of an
experiment designed to test it were one and the same, this is no longer the case. In
the above experiment, the independent variable is the amount of carbon dioxide in
the water, while the proposed cause is an unseen and theoretical partial vacuum
presumably created by lack of carbon dioxide molecules. Because the proposed
cause and the independent variable are not the same, a warrant (a theoretical
rationale - a warrant) must be generated to link the two so that a reasonable test can
be conducted. For these reasons, Stage 5 reasoning, called post-formal or theoretical,
is more difficult than Stage 4 reasoning, and presumably not achieved until late
adolescence, if at all (e.g., Chapters 7,8,10).
3.6 Why is Intellectual Development Stage-Like?
Based on the previous section, we can understand why intellectual development
is stage-like. In addition to probable maturational constraints (see Chapters 3 and 4),
during each stage the individual constructs something new that can be constructed
only following the previous stage because the products of that previous stage are
used in testing the possible constructions (i.e., the hypotheses) of the subsequent
stage. For example, suppose we generate the hypothesis that matter consists of tiny
invisible and indivisible particles called atoms. Like John Dalton, we can use Stage 5
reasoning to test this atomic hypothesis as follows:
If...matter consists of invisible/indivisible particles that have specific weights and
combine with one another in specific ways, (atomic hypothesis)
and...combinations of atoms (i.e., molecules) are decomposed into their parts,
(planned test)
then...the ratios of weights of those parts should be in simple whole number ratios.
(prediction)
And...the ratios of weights of those parts are in simple whole number ratios.
(observed result)
Therefore...the atomic hypothesis is supported. (conclusion)
Notice that testing the atomic hypothesis requires that we compare predicted and
observed weight ratios of decomposed molecules. As you may know, comparing
ratios involves proportional reasoning, a Stage 4 construction. Thus, this Stage 5
construction (i.e., atoms) could not have taken place without the prior Stage 4
construction of proportions.
Similarly, testing Stage 4 hypotheses requires use of prior Stage 3 constructions.
Consider Inhelder and Piaget's bending rods task (Inhelder & Piaget 1958, Chapter
3). To test the Stage 4 causal hypothesis that variation in rod thickness causes
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variation in amount of rod bend (i.e., thinner rods bend more than thicker rods), one
would reason as follows:
If...differences in rod bending is caused by rod thickness, (thickness hypothesis)
and...equal weights are hung on two rods that vary only in thickness, (planned test)
then...the thinner rod should bend more. (prediction)
And...the thinner rod does bend more. (observed result)
Therefore...the thickness hypothesis is supported. (conclusion)
Thus, in this Stage 4 argument, to test the causal thickness hypothesis (one can
directly observe/sense thickness differences), we must determine which of the two
rods bends more and which bends less. In other words, we need to have already
constructed a Stage 3 "distance" variable, which we can label as "distance of
bending." So to test a Stage 4 hypothesis, we use a prior Stage 3 construction (i.e.,
conservation of distance/length). Likewise, testing Stage 3 descriptive hypotheses
requires use of Stage 2 object-word constructs and testing Stage 2 linguistic
hypotheses require use of Stage 1 object constructs.
4. HOW DOES INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OCCUR?
How does procedural knowledge develop? Of course we have answered this
question in a general way by agreeing with Piaget that intellectual development
occurs through self-regulation, i.e., by engaging in cycles of hypothetico-predictive
reasoning and by "internalizing" not only the products of that process but by
internalizing (i.e., chunking, forming outstars) its procedures as well. This raises the
question of just what provokes this internalization. According to Piaget (1976) a
process he calls reflective abstraction is involved. Reflective abstraction progresses
from the use of spontaneous actions to the use of explicit, verbally mediated, rules to
guide behavior. Reflective abstraction occurs when the subject is prompted to reflect
first on his/her actions and later on arguments with others. Thus, the cause of
reflective abstraction is contradiction by the physical environment and verbally by
other people, as was the case of the four-year-old who believed Pontius Pilate was a
tree. The result of reflective abstraction is that the person gains declarative
knowledge and also becomes more aware of and skilled in use of the procedures used
in gaining that knowledge (i.e., the declarative knowledge gets chunked via outstars,
and so do the procedures).
This view of intellectual development helps clarify why "stage retardation"
occurs, i.e., why some students fail to develop Stage 4 and perhaps Stage 5 reasoning
skills. Suppose, for example, that many years ago two identical islands existed in the
Pacific Ocean, each inhabited by 10,000 islanders, each isolated from the outside
world, and each ruled by an all-powerful king. Whenever questions arose, the
islanders asked their king for answers. Each king provided the answers and whatever
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each king said was considered true. But one day, a foreign ship arrived at one of the
islands. Over time, a vigorous trading relationship was established between that
island and several foreign countries. Importantly, not only did the ships bring many
new goods, the sailors on them brought many new ideas. These ideas spread
throughout the island's population. Some of these new ideas contradicted the
"truths" previously handed down by the king. Soon the islanders began wondering
which ideas were actually correct and more importantly, they began wondering how
they could tell. Eventually, an upheaval took place in which the king was overthrown
and replaced by a government run by the people.
Several decades later, an anthropologist arrived on the island to study the island's
culture. As part of her study, she administered a reasoning test to the island's
teenagers and adults. Soon after, the anthropologist discovered the other island. She
was the first "outsider" to discover this island, which was still controlled by an allpowerful, truth-dispensing king. She administered the reasoning test to the teenagers
and adults on this island as well. Question: Which population of islanders do you
think did better on the reasoning test? Which population had more Stage 4 and
perhaps Stage 5 reasoners? Why?
I hope you agree that the reasoning skills of the islanders on the first island
should be better. Piaget would seem to be agreeing when he stated in 1928 that the
development of advanced reasoning occurs as a consequence of "the shock of our
thoughts coming into contact with others, which produces doubt and the desire to
prove" (Piaget, 1962, p. 204). Piaget went on to state:
The social need to share the thought of others and to communicate our own with
success is at the root of our need for verification. ...argument is therefore, the backbone
of verification. Logical reasoning is an argument which we have with ourselves, and
which produces internally the features of a real argument. (p. 204)
In other words, the growing awareness of and ability to use internalized

arguments to guide one's thinking and decision making occurs as a consequence of
attempting to engage in arguments of the same sort with others in which alternative
hypotheses are put forward and accepted or rejected as the basis of evidence and
reason as opposed to authority or emotion. Clearly, if alternative ideas do not exist,
then no external arguments ensue, and no internalization of patterns of argumentation
results.
This position seems consistent with that of Vygotsky (1962) who views speech as
social in origin and only with time does it come to have self-directive properties that
eventually result in internalized, self-directive, thought. Similarly, Luria (1961)
proposed that the progressive differentiation of language to regulate behavior occurs
in four steps. First, the child learns the meaning of words; second, language can serve
to activate behavior but not limit it; third, language can control behavior through
activation or inhibition via communication from an external source; and fourth, the
internalization of language can serve a self-regulating function through instructions
to oneself.
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4.1 Developing the Procedure of Controlled Experimentation

To obtain an understanding of how instruction can provoke the development of
procedural knowledge, consider the procedure of controlled experimentation. Young
children have little difficulty in determining when a previous test is "fair" or "not
fair" when the variables concerned are familiar (Wollman, 1977). However, they
lack a general plan of attack or general strategy to use in setting up "fair
comparisons" ahead of time and in unfamiliar situations. In other words, after a test
has been performed they may be able to state if it is fair or not. However, they are
unable to use their intuition as a general guide to behavior.
Where does their intuitive understanding come? Presumably it comes from
situations in which children make comparisons and attempt to evaluate the validity of
those comparisons. For example, suppose two children run a race. When the race is
over and one child has lost, she blames the loss on the fact that she was wearing
street shoes while her friend was wearing tennis shoes. So she claims that the race
was not "fair." In other words, intuitions come from argumentation about the truth or
falsity of statements (e.g., "I can run faster than you can." "No, you can't, I can run
faster than you"). The point is this: from environmental encounters such as this,
children develop intuitive understanding of procedures involving the control of
variables, probabilities, proportion, etc. However, these intuitions have yet to be
transformed into internally mediated learning and problem-solving procedures. Let's
discuss how this can happen with respect to controlling variables. The discussion is
based on an experiment (Lawson & Wollman, 1976) with 9- and 13-year-old
children who were initially unable to control variables in a general sense. After four
half-hour individual training sessions, these same children were clearly able to
demonstrate skill in controlling variables systematically and, in most cases,
unhesitatingly. Further, as evidence of general skill in using this procedure, their skill
transferred to new tasks, both manipulative and pencil-paper.
Session 1. The first session began by introducing the child to the intent and
format of the training. S/he was told that a number of materials would be used to
teach him/her how to perform "fair tests." The materials were familiar: three tennis
balls (two relatively bouncy and one considerably less bouncy), two square pieces of
cardboard, two square pieces of foam rubber and a table. The child was told that the
first problem was to see which ball was the bounciest. To find out, s/he would
instruct the experimenter what to do and the experimenter would carry out the
instructions.
Although each session varied somewhat, each child began by telling the
experimenter to drop two balls to see which bounced higher (height of bounce then
became the dependent variable). The experimenter would then drop two balls but
drop them from different heights (an uncontrolled experiment). The child would then
respond by saying: "That isn't fair. Drop them from the same height." On the next
trial the height would be equalized, however, one ball was dropped so that it hit the
table top, while the other hit the floor (again an uncontrolled experiment). This
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procedure was followed by continually intervening with new uncontrolled variables

(spin one ball, push one ball, let one ball hit cardboard or foam rubber). Children
were then given a verbal rule (i.e., a test is "fair" if all the factors, variables, that
might make a difference were the same for both balls, except, of course, for the
difference in the balls themselves). And each test in which these factors differed was
called an "unfair test." Following introduction of this verbal rule, several additional
examples were demonstrated and discussed. The overall intent of this first session
was to allow each child to generate his/her own testing procedures, which were then
contradicted. Presumably the contradictions forced the children to reflect on the
inadequacies of their procedures. The verbal rule was then introduced in a context in
which they could gain initial understanding.
At the onset, virtually all children demonstrated an intuitive feel for fairness and
responded by saying: drop them from the same height, make them both hit the floor,
don't spin one, etc. Also following each test, they were able to accept or reject tests
as fair or unfair. But importantly, none could state a general procedure for
performing fair tests prior to the test itself (i.e., to perform a fair test, keep all the
factors equal except the one being tested). Not even the most articulate children
responded by telling the experimenter to have "everything the same" for both balls.
Even when asked to summarize their instructions without mentioning specific
factors, they were at a loss for words. This phenomenon seems very much like the
experience of "knowing" something is true, but not being able to put it into words.
Presumably, the extension of this intuitive understanding to the point where it can be
expressed verbally and applied to monitor one's thinking constitutes the essence of
"development" (i.e., construction of the relevant outstars).
Session 2. The second session began by reminding the child of the intent of the
training and by pointing out the new materials. New materials were six metal rods of
varying size, shape, and material (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). These were placed on
the table and the child was asked to classify them in as many ways as possible. This
was done to determine his/her skill in forming the classes of size, shape, and material
and to insure that these differences in the rods were noted. The rods were then placed
into a stationary block of wood and all the factors (variables) that might affect the
amount of bending (the dependent variable) were discussed. The child was then
asked to perform "fair tests" to find out if length, thickness, shape, and material, as
well of the amount of weight hung on the rods, affects the amount of bending.
Whenever the child performed a test, s/he was asked: Is it a fair test? Why is it fair?
Can you be sure that this rod bends more than that one only because it is thinner? Is
there any other reason (an uncontrolled variable) why it might be bending more?
These questions and others were used to focus the child's attention on all the relevant
variables, to recognize ambiguous experiments, and to understand the need for a
procedure that keeps "all factors the same" except the one being tested. A number of
examples and counter-examples were discussed at length. The procedure of
controlled experimentation was of course identical to that of the first. However, the
materials, the context, differed.
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Session 3. The child was asked to experiment with an apparatus called a Whirly
Bird (Science Curriculum Improvement Study, 1970). The Whirly Bird consists of a
base that holds a post and an arm that attaches to the post. When pushed or propelled
by a wound rubber band, the arm spins around like the rotor on a helicopter. Metal
weights can be placed at various positions along the arm. The child was briefly
shown how the Whirly Bird works and was asked to find out all factors that affect the
times the arm spins before coming to rest (the dependent variable). Possible
variables included the number of times the rubber band was wound, the number of
rubber bands, the number of weights placed on the arm, the position of the weights,
how tightly the arm and post were fastened together, the angle of the base, etc.
Following exploration, the child was asked to perform "fair tests" to show that
the independent variables mentioned actually did make a difference. Again,
whenever a test was performed, children were asked questions that forced them to
reflect on their actions (e.g.: Was it a fair test? Why was it fair? Does it show that the
factor really makes a difference? Why else might the arm spin have spun more
times? Were all other factors held constant?).
The general intent of this session was similar to that of the second session as well
as the fourth and final session. The strategies underlying the questions were identical
in all sessions. The symbolic notation (the language used) remained invariant, while
transformations in imagery were gained by first using familiar materials, and then by
using unfamiliar materials. Children were given a variety of tasks and were allowed
to choose their own procedures for performing them. When mistakes were made, the
children were forced to reflect back on their procedures and were challenged to
correct them.
Session 4. Physical materials were replaced by written problems. Written
problems represented an additional step away from the concrete and towards the
abstract. Probing questions relative to children's understanding of the written
problems were asked as was done in the previous sessions. In a sense learning by
doing was replaced by learning by discussion (language alone). The following two
written problems were presented and discussed at length.
Written Problem 1. Fifty pieces of various parts of plants were placed in each of
five sealed jars of equal size under different conditions of color of light and
temperature. At the start of the experiment each jar contained 250 units of carbon
dioxide. The amount of carbon dioxide in each jar at the end of the experiment is
shown in Table 1. Which two jars would you select to make a fair comparison to find
out if temperature makes a difference in the amount of carbon dioxide used?
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Written Problem 2. An experimenter wanted to test the response of mealworms to

light and moisture. To do this he set up four boxes as shown in the Figure 1 below.
He used lamps for light sources and watered pieces of paper in the boxes for
moisture. In the center of each box he placed 20 mealworms. One day later he
returned to count the number of mealworms that had crawled to the different ends of
the boxes (see below).
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Results. The four training sessions clearly resulted in students who had
internalized the meaning of the rule: "To identify a specific cause, it alone must be
varied while other possible causes must be held constant." Importantly, they were
capable of using the rule to design and conduct controlled experiments in novel
contexts. Therefore, the results support the hypothesis that for intuitions to manifest
themselves in the form of useful linguistic rules, for intellectual development to
occur, children need: (1) a variety of problems requiring a specific procedure for
solution, (2) contradictions to their proposed procedures that force them to more
closely attend to what they are doing or not doing, and (3) terms/phrases that remain
invariant across transformations in materials - in this instance the key terms/phrases
were "fair test" and "unfair test."
This is essentially the position taken by Bruner & Kenney (1970) studying
problem-solving procedures in mathematics. They taught eight-year-olds the
mathematical procedure of factoring, the distributive and commutative properties of
addition and multiplication, and quadratic function. They summarized the process in
this way:
It begins with instrumental activity, a kind of definition of things by doing. Such
operations become represented and summarized in the form of particular images.
Finally, and with the help of symbolic notation that remains invariant across
transformations in imagery, the learner comes to grasp the formal or abstract properties
of the things he is dealing with. (p. 494)
In other words, development begins with physical experience with objects.

Physical experience provokes children with tasks and provides a mental record of
what has been done and seen. Contradictions by others, or by the physical world,
forces reflection on the procedures used to generate the results. By a closer
inspection of the procedures, i.e., by noting the differences between procedures that
produced good results and those that produced contradicted results, the child
becomes aware of what s/he should and should not do. The introduction of verbal
rules (symbolic notation) also aids in the identification of successful procedures.
Finally, additional experiences that require the same procedure are provided along
with the repetition of the symbolic notation. This allows the student to "reflectively
abstract" the procedure from the particular situations. As mentioned, recent research
indicates that such abstract procedural rules, once acquired, reside in neurons (most
likely outstars as described in Chapter 2) in the prefrontal cortex (Wallis, Anderson
& Miller, 2001).
To summarize, development is initiated by context-specific environmental
encounters that provoke self-regulation. But thanks to the process of reflective
abstraction and chunking, the brain constructs and stores abstract (i.e., general) rules
that can then be applied across a variety of novel domains to facilitate learning in
those novel domains. For example, I can still recall my seventh grade science teacher
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telling us to conduct several specific experiments and repeatedly asking if we had

conducted "controlled" experiments. At the time, I had no idea what she meant by a
"controlled" experiment. But one day several days after the experiments were
completed, I was reflecting on those experiments and on her questions when
suddenly it "clicked" (an adaptive resonance occurred and outstars formed). At that
moment, I understood what a controlled experiment was and have been able to apply
that understanding (abstract rule) ever since.
5.
DEVELOPING STAGE 5 REASONING SKILL IN THE CLASSROOM
How can teachers apply what we have learned about intellectual development in
the classroom? This section will consider a lesson designed to help students develop
Stage 5 reasoning skill as well as acquire a better understanding of kinetic-molecular
theory. The lesson turns out to be particularly interesting because it also exemplifies
several aspects of the nature of science and requires conceptual change as students
often arrive with two rather deep-seated misconceptions (i.e., flames "consume"
oxygen and a pulling force called "suction" exists).
The lesson begins with a burning candle held upright in a pan of water using a
small piece of clay. Shortly after a cylinder is inverted over the burning candle and
placed in the water, the candle flame goes out and water rises in the cylinder. These
observations raise two major causal questions, Why did the flame go out? And why
did the water rise? The generally accepted answer to the first question is that the
flame converted the oxygen in the cylinder to carbon dioxide such that too little
oxygen remained to sustain combustion, thus the flame died. The generally accepted
answer to the second question is that the flame transfers kinetic energy (motion) to
the cylinder's gas molecules. The greater kinetic energy causes the gas to expand,
which results in some escaping out the bottom. When the flame goes out, the
remaining molecules transfer some of their kinetic energy to the cylinder walls and
then to the surrounding air and water. This causes a loss of average velocity, fewer
collisions, and less gas pressure (a partial vacuum). This partial vacuum is then filled
by water rising into the cylinder until the air pressure pushing on the outside water
surface is equal to the air pressure pushing on the inside surface (Peckham, 1993).
This lesson is a particularly good way to reinforce the idea that science is an
alternative explanation generation and testing enterprise as the initial explanations
students often generate to explain why the water rises are experimentally
contradicted, hence mental disequilibrium results along with the need for
accommodation. In other words, their ideas need to be replaced. As mentioned, a
common student explanation is that oxygen is "used up," thus a partial vacuum is
created, which "sucks" water into the cylinder. Typically, students fail to realize that
when oxygen "burns" it combines with carbon producing
gas of equal volume
(hence no partial vacuum is created). Students also often fail to realize that a vacuum
cannot "suck" anything. Rather the force causing the water to rise is a push from the
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relatively greater number of air molecules hitting the water surface outside the
cylinder.
Student experiments and discussions provide an opportunity to modify these
misconceptions by introducing a more satisfactory explanation of combustion and air
pressure. An opportunity also exists to portray science as an intellectually stimulating
and challenging way of using theories, in this case kinetic-molecular theory to
explain nature (see Table 2).
1. The universe contains matter, which is composed of tiny particles (atoms am

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
combinations of atoms called molecules) and light, which consists of still smaller
particles called photons.
Atoms/molecules are in constant motion. They strike other atoms/molecules and
transfer some or all of their motion (kinetic energy) to these particles.
An energy source, such as a flame, consists of rapidly moving particles that can
transfer some, or all, of their motion to nearby particles through collisions.
Attractive forces between atoms or molecules can be broken, causing the atoms
or molecules to move apart, which in turn can cause collisions and transfers of
energy (motion).
Molecular bonds can form between atoms when they strike one another.
Temperature is a measure of the amount of motion (average kinetic energy) of
the atoms/molecules in a solid, liquid, or gas (i.e., the more motion the greater
the temperature).
Air pressure is a force exerted on a surface due to collisions of air particles (i.e.,
more particles at higher velocities = greater air pressure).
5.1 Starting the Lesson
Start the lesson by pointing out the following materials:

aluminum pie pans
birthday candles
matches
modeling clay
cylinders (open at one end)
jars (of various shapes, sizes)
beakers and/test tubes/flasks
syringes & rubber tubing
baking soda
ice
dry ice
balloons
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pH paper
Have each student select a partner. Tell each pair to pour some water into the
pan. Stand a candle in the pan using a small piece of clay for support. Then light the
candle and put a cylinder, jar, flask, or beaker over the candle so that it covers the
candle and sits in the water. Then observe what happens and repeat the procedure
several times varying several independent variables (e.g., the number of candles,
amount of water, type of cylinder) to determine their possible effects. You should
also tell students that they will not only be challenged to generate several alternative
explanations for what they observe, but they will also be challenged to design
experiments to test the alternatives. (Of particular interest is the fact that on a number
of past occasions several students - and even some teachers - believe that they have
completed the lesson when they have identified variables that affect the level of
water rise. They don't even realize that their "theoretical" task has just begun!).
5.2 Generating Alternative Hypotheses
Allow the initial exploration to proceed as long as students are making good
progress. You may need to stop them after about 30-40 minutes to discuss
observations, preliminary questions and possible explanations. During the
discussion, observations should be listed on the board and you should ask students to
state the key causal question(s). As mentioned, the most obvious causal questions
are, why did the flame go out? And why did the water rise? Alternative explanations
that students may generate to answer the second question include:
1. The oxygen is "burned up" creating a partial vacuum. So the water is "sucked" in
to replace it.
2.
gas forms by burning. When the
cools, it changes to liquid filling the
cylinder.
3. As the candle burns, it consumes
but produces an equal volume of
The
dissolves in the water more easily than the original
thus produces a
partial vacuum. The water is then "sucked" in.
4. The candle produces smoke, which collects in the cylinder and attracts (pulls) the
water up.
5. Burning converts
to
which is a smaller molecule. Thus takes up less
space creating a partial vacuum, which "sucks" the water up.
6. The candle's heat causes the air around it to expand. After the candle goes out, air
cools, air pressure is reduced, and the water is pushed in by greater air pressure
outside. (If no one proposes this explanation you will have to propose it yourself.
But make sure that you do not give students the impression that this is the
"correct" explanation. Rather it is simply an idea that a student in another class
generated, which should be tested along with the others).
249
7. Here is an explanation that I like to add to the students' list: A Wizard named
Sparky lives on campus and sucks the water up. (Sparky is the name of our
university sports mascot).
5.3 Testing the Alternatives
Now that student brainstorming has generated several possible explanations,

remind students that this is a science class. Consequently, their next task is to test the
alternatives. Also remind them that to test a possible explanation one must conduct
experiments with clearly stated expected results (predictions). You may want to
provide an example, or simply challenge students to put their heads together to see
what they can come up with. This may be an excellent time for the bell to ring so that
you they can think up experiments as a homework assignment. If you do decide to
offer an example, use the If/and/then form like this:
If...explanation 1 is correct, that is water is "sucked" in to replace the oxygen
(consumed-oxygen explanation)
and...the height that water rises with one, two , three, or more candles (all other
things being equal) is measured, (test conditions)
candles (prediction). This result is predicted presumably because there is only so
much oxygen in the cylinder to be burned. So more candles will burn up the
available oxygen faster than fewer candles, but they will not burn up more oxygen.
Hence, the water rise should be the same. Note that the assumption is made that
before they go out, more candles do not consume more oxygen than fewer candles
(theoretical rationale).
Now have students conduct their experiments and report results. Results of the
example experiment show that the number of burning candles affects the water level
(the more candles the higher the water level). Therefore, the consumed-oxygen
explanation has been contradicted. Also the water rises after the candles go out, not
while they are burning - another observation that contradicts the explanation.
Measuring the total volume of water before and after the water has risen inside
can test explanation 2, the water-created-by-burning explanation. If this explanation
is correct, then the total volume of water should increase considerably.
Students can test explanation 3, which claims that the
dissolves in the water,
in a couple of ways. One way involves a comparison of the amount of water rise in
containers with
saturated water versus normal water. The explanation leads to
the prediction that the water level should rise higher in the cylinder with normal
water. One can use dry ice (or sodium bicarbonate and acid) to produce
gas. Its
solubility in water can be tested. The pH of water shaken with
and the pH of the
water below a candle that has just gone out can be compared. Also if the explanation
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is correct, a cylinder filled with gas from the dry ice (presumably
when
inverted and placed in water should cause water to rise, but water doesn't.
Filling a cylinder with smoke and inverting it in water. Can test explanation 4, the
smoke-attracts-water explanation. If this explanation is correct, then the water should
rise.
I will leave it to you to figure out a way to test explanation 5, the
is-asmaller-molecule explanation.
Explanation 6, the heat-causes-air-expansion explanation, leads to the prediction
that bubbles should be seen escaping out the bottom of the cylinder (assuming that
the cylinder is quickly placed over the candles while the air is still expanding). It also
leads to the prediction that more candles should cause more water to rise presumably because more candles will heat more air, thus, more will escape, which
in turn will be replaced by more water. (Although one candle burning over a longer
time period releases as much energy as three candles burning a shorter time, one
candle will not raise the cylinder's air temperature as much because energy is
dissipated rather quickly).
Initially students do not take explanation 7, the Sparky-sucks explanation
seriously. So they don't bother to test it. But at my insistence, they soon come up
with the idea to conduct the experiment off campus based on the following
reasoning:
If...the water rises because Sparky sucks it up, (Sparky explanation)
and...the experiment is conducted off campus, (test condition)
then...the water should not rise. (prediction) - presumably because Sparky's powers
exist only on campus.
But...they surmise that the water does rise off campus. (observed result)
Therefore...the Sparky explanation can be rejected. (conclusion)
I reply to this argument that, because they are ASU students, Sparky travels with
them off campus. Consequently, he can still make the water rise. So their experiment
does not really contradict the Sparky explanation after all. Students then propose to
have the experiment done by telephoning a non-ASU student and asking him/her to
conduct the experiment off campus. Then when the non-ASU student finds that the
water still rises, students can conclude that the Sparky explanation can be rejected.
But Sparky's powers can travel through phone lines, I tell them, so the water should
still rise. At this point most students catch on to the game being played, which
essentially amounts to giving Sparky ever-expanding powers. And once Sparky's
powers become limitless, the Sparky explanation can no longer be tested. Thus,
continued belief in Sparky becomes a matter of faith, not evidence. In other words,
Sparky becomes a religious, god-like, entity, not a scientific (i.e., testable) entity.
This discussion is important because it clarifies this essential difference between
religion and science for many students for the first time.
5.4
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Introducing and Applying Kinetic-Molecular Theory
After all the alternatives have been tested and the results discussed, you should
carefully summarize and clarify the explanation that is most consistent with the
evidence. You can also introduce the term air pressure and the major postulates of
the kinetic-molecular theory as they pertain to the present phenomenon. You should
also discuss the common misconception of "suction" in this context. Kineticmolecular theory implies that suction (as a force that can pull/suck up water) does
not exist (i.e., the water is being pushed into the cylinder by moving particles of air
rather than being sucked by some intuitively-generated but nonexistent pulling
force).
To allow students to apply kinetic-molecular theory and the concept of air
pressure to a new situation, provide each team a piece of rubber tubing, a syringe, a
beaker and a pan of water. Instruct them to invert the beaker in the pan of water and
fill it with water in that position with the mouth of the beaker submerged. Some
students will make futile efforts to force water through the tube into the beaker
before discovering that they must extract the air through the tube. Now have them
attempt to explain why the water rose without using the word suction.
As a homework assignment, challenge students to find a way to insert a peeled,
hard-boiled egg into a bottle with an opening that is smaller in diameter than the egg.
They must not touch the egg with anything after it has been placed on the opening.
After a small amount of water in the bottle has been heated, it is only necessary to
place the smaller end of the egg over the opening of the bottle to form a seal. The
egg will be forced into the bottle by the greater air pressure outside as the air inside
cools. You may also ask students to drink a milk shake with a straw and then
challenge them to explain how the milk shake gets into their mouths.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In addition to providing students with experience in using Stage 5 theoretical
reasoning to generate and test alternative hypotheses, the candle-burning lesson
exemplifies several important elements of the nature of science (NOS) as described
in Chapters 9 and 10 (e.g., science attempts to accurately describe and explain
nature; basic to science is the generation and testing of alternative explanations; the
generation of several alternatives encourages an unbiased test as one is less likely to
be committed to any specific explanation; tentative explanations are tested by use of
hypothetico-predictive reasoning; science and religion are different "ways of
knowing.").
Although the lesson can introduce and perhaps reinforce such NOS elements,
they represent generalizations, and as such can be learned only superficially from
single-shot instruction such as the candle-burning lab, no matter how engaging it may
be. Both developmental theory and experience argue that learning about the nature of
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science and developing theoretical reasoning skill are long-term propositions, which
like learning to draw in a mirror, require repeated attempts in a variety of contexts.
For example, the preservice biology teachers from Chapter 10 experienced the
candle-burning lab as just described and then prepared lab reports in which they tried
to construct written hypothetico-predictive arguments regarding each hypothesis
tested. As expected, their written arguments were sound when the hypothesized
causal agents were observable (e.g., heated clay releases water into the cylinder;
heated water expands into the cylinder). But most arguments were faulty when the
causal agents were unobservable (e.g., oxygen molecules were consumed). Three
types of faulty arguments were common: those with missing or confused elements,
those in which predictions did not follow from hypotheses and planned tests, and
those that failed to consider alternative hypotheses (Lawson, 2002). However, on the
positive side, developing higher-order reasoning skill in "older" groups of students
such as this is considerably easier than in "younger" groups (e.g., Lawson, 1982)
presumably because the older students have not only undergone further neurological
maturation, they also have additional experiences that can enrich and broaden the
instructional experiences.
The problem of developing fifth-stage reasoning skill and nature-of-science
understanding is compounded by the fact that students often encounter misleading
statements about the nature of science, not only from television reports and
newspaper articles claiming that science has proved, or disproved, such and such, but
even from science textbook authors and teachers. Most likely you have seen textbook
authors claim that with mounting supporting evidence hypotheses become theories,
which in turn become laws, or give examples of the scientific method in which they
fail to recognize the crucial difference between hypotheses and predictions (cf.,
Gibbs & Lawson, 1992). What college student has not heard about null hypotheses.
As mentioned, the statistician's null hypothesis is not really a hypothesis. Instead it is
a prediction - a null prediction at that (e.g., no significant difference should be found
in the incidence of connective-tissue disease between women with and without breast
implants). Little wonder that many students - and the general public - are often
confused.
Another problem is that many teachers "cover" so much content that they do not
leave time for students to question and discuss issues related to the nature of science.
Also the lab is often seen as an opportunity to verify lecture topics rather than do
"real" (real to the students that is) inquiries. To help solve this problem in our nonmajors college course, we no longer try to closely articulate lecture and lab so that
when students need to take two or three weeks to answer a particularly difficult
question in lab, they can take the time to do so. Another threat to success is the
current rush to incorporate high-tech machines such as computers and videodisc
players into instructional settings. These devices may be beneficial, but only so long
as they do not replace actual hands-on, minds-on inquiries that allow students to
generate and test alternative hypotheses and theories. Indeed, we would do well to
keep firmly in mind the American Association for the Advancement of Science's
253
central teaching principle which states that: "Teaching should be consistent with the
nature of scientific inquiry" (AAAS, 1989, p. 147).
Many science courses suffer from another problem. Having been designed largely
by subject-matter experts, they are often structured to make sense from an already
knowledgeable teacher's perspective, but not necessarily from an inquiring learner's
perspective. Thus, biology courses often take a "micro-to-macro" approach, which
begins at the highly abstract and theoretical atomic and molecular levels and only
later addresses more-familiar, less-abstract topics at the organism, population and
community levels. Some recent textbooks have tried to remedy this problem by
taking a "macro-to-micro" approach. Thus they start big at the biome level and work
their way down to ecosystems, communities, populations, organisms, etc. But this
approach also fails to recognize that inquiry and concept construction progress from
the familiar and "concrete" to the unfamiliar and abstract. Students are organisms,
not biomes, so student inquiries should start at the organism level and then move
toward either progressively smaller or progressively larger levels of organization.
Indeed, here the history of science has much to offer in terms of helping us identify
"natural" routes of inquiry, routes that past scientists have taken and routes that
present students can also take - routes that should lead to scientific literacy - that is,
to students who know what science is and how to do it.
6.1 Measuring Inquiry Instruction in the Classroom
The instructional approach described in the candle-burning lesson has been

described as an inquiry approach, sometimes as a learning cycle approach, and has
consistently been found to improve student achievement (e.g., Eakin & Karplus,
1976; Karplus, 1977; Lawson, Abraham & Renner, 1989; Renner & Marek, 1990).
Recently a classroom observational instrument called The Reformed Teaching
Observational Protocol (RTOP) has been developed to quantitatively assess the
extent to which elements of inquiry/learning cycle instruction have been embedded in
lessons (Piburn, Sawada, Turley, Falconer, Benford, Bloom, & Judson, 2000). The
RTOP consists of 25 statements (see Table 3). Each statement is scored on a 0-4
"Never Occurred" to "Very Descriptive" scale. Thus, the RTOP allows observers to
rate instruction on a 0 to 100 scale reflective of the extent to which reformed/inquiry
instructional practices are used. Importantly, measured RTOP scores and student
achievement (i.e., reasoning skills, concept understanding and NOS understanding)
in a wide variety of science and mathematics courses have been found to very highly
correlated (e.g., Lawson et al., 2002). In other words, in classes that score high on
the RTOP, student achievement (i.e., the classroom average score) tends to be high,
whereas in classes with low RTOP scores, the classroom averages tend to be low.
Good teaching practices improve student achievement!
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LESSON DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The instructional strategies and activities respected students' prior knowledge and the preconceptions
inherent therein.
The lesson was designed to engage students as members of a learning community.
In this lesson, student exploration preceded formal presentation.
The lesson encouraged students to seek and value alternative modes of investigation or problem
solving.
The focus and direction of the lesson was often determined by ideas originating with students.
CONTENT
Propositional Knowledge
6. The lesson involved fundamental concepts of the subject.
7. The lesson promoted strongly coherent conceptual understanding.
8. The instructor had a solid grasp of the subject matter content inherent in the lesson.
9. Elements of abstraction (i.e., symbolic representations, theory building) were encouraged when it was
important to do so.
10. Connections with other content disciplines and/or real world phenomena were explored and valued.
Procedural Knowledge
11. Students used a variety of means (models, drawings, graphs, concrete materials, manipulatives, etc.)
to represent phenomena.
12. Students made predictions, estimations and/or hypotheses and devised means for testing them.
13. Students were actively engaged in thought-provoking activity that often involved critical assessment
of procedures.
14. Students were reflective about their learning.
8. Intellectual rigor, constructive criticism, and the challenging of ideas were valued.
CLASSROOM CULTURE
Communicative Interactions
16. Students were involved in the communication of their ideas to others using a variety of means and
media.
17. The instructor's questions triggered divergent modes of thinking.
18. There was a high proportion of student talk and a significant amount of it occurred between and
among students.
19. Student questions and comments often determined the focus and direction of classroom discourse.
20. There was a climate of respect for what others had to say.
Student/Instructor Relationships
21. Active participation of students was encouraged and valued.
255
22. Students were encouraged to generate conjectures, alternative solution strategies, and ways of
interpreting evidence.
23. In general, the instructor was patient with students.
24. The instructor acted as a resource person, working to support and enhance student investigations.
25. The metaphor "instructor as listener" was very characteristic of this classroom.
6.2 Is Scientific Thinking Natural?

According to Matthews (1994), "... Western science is not natural, is does not
automatically unfold as children either confront the world, or participate in their
culture" (p. 161). In a sense, the difficulty that many adolescents and adults
experience in using hypothetico-predictive reasoning in theoretical contexts supports
this view. Yet the main implication of this book is that at least at its roots,
hypothetico-predictive reasoning is natural. Indeed, it is way in which we all learn,
presumably because evolutionary forces (i.e., natural selection) have wired the mind
to work in this way. But this is not to say that use of the pattern at earlier stages
means that it will automatically be used at higher stages.
One might wonder how characteristic this pattern of learning is of the typical
science and mathematics classroom. Clearly, if are simply told specific "facts" (e.g.,
the phases of mitotic cell division are prophase, metaphase, anaphase and telophase;
the product of the means equals the product of the extremes) and are then asked to
recite these "facts" on tests, the learning pattern is of little or no use. However, if
instructional tasks allow students to generate and test their own ideas, then the
pattern is of considerable use. Further, whenever students encounter conceptual
change instruction (e.g., Wandersee, Mintzes & Novak, 1994) in which concepts
introduced during instruction contradict prior concepts, the pattern is also called into
use. Recall the task shown in Figure 2 and the debate between the two boys over
which variable - weight or volume - determines water displacement. Unfortunately,
most instruction seldom requires hypothetico-predictive reasoning. Thus, modifying
instruction to help students develop skill in using hypothetico-predictive reasoning at
the highest level, the level of scientific thought, is an unmet educational challenge.
Importantly, the present view of development and learning implies that progress
toward this goal will not be made by adoption of instructional approaches that do not
allow students to participate in the knowledge construction process or ignore or
denigrate the key role played by the physical world in the test of their alternative
hypotheses and theories (even though we cannot be absolutely certain that such a
world exists).
One final thought: This book has included fairly detailed accounts of specific
research studies (i.e., Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 10). Not only were the conclusions
drawn in those studies important in developing the book's central arguments, they
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also provided specific examples of how hypothetico-predictive research can be

conducted and reported in science and mathematics education. In my view, too few
such studies are designed and written in this hypothetico-predictive manner, and
suffer as a consequence (see the appendix for a well known behavioral ecologist's
view). In fact, in my view the entire field suffers as a consequence. Thus, if this book
encourages other researchers to adopt a hypothetico-predictive approach to their
research and writing, I will be pleased.
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7. APPENDIX
7.1 An Interview With A Practicing Biologist About Scientific Method and Science
Teaching
What follows is a transcription of an interview with John Alcock. Alcock is a
well-known behavioral ecologist, author of over 100 research papers and a topselling behavioral ecology textbook. Alcock clearly lays out alternative hypotheses,
expected/predicted results and their tests in a recent paper entitled "Provisional
rejection of three alternative hypotheses on the maintenance of a size dichotomy in
males of Dawson's burrowing bee, Amegilla dawsoni" (Alcock, 1996). Alcock was
interviewed to learn about his views on scientific method and how it affects his
approach to research and to science teaching (Alcock's responses appear in italics).
How do you do science? In other words, do you have a general plan of attack, a
general set of strategies, a general method that you use from one study to the next?
Yes, in terms of selection of topics I am committed to studies of insect mating
behavior. The basic technique is the standard one. I am using evolutionary theory to
come up with questions. Once I have questions, I am developing hypotheses that are
consistent with selection theory and testing them the old-fashioned way. What is the
old-fashioned way? By using them to generate predictions for which it is possible to
collect data so that we can examine the validity of the predictions. Once you have
data, how do you examine their validity? Well, by matching the expected results
against the actual ones. How do you draw conclusions from that? Or do you? Yes, in
my case the conclusions are invariably in the form of the data support or invalidate
the particular hypothesis.
How general is this technique of generating and testing hypotheses? For
example, is it limited to your field of research? I believe it is fundamental to all
science. It is the essence of what is called the scientific method. The scientific
method? Is there only one? I think, well, there is descriptive science, which is the
foundation for asking causal questions. And the kind of science which has the
greatest significance for everybody - the causal question answering science for
which this hypothesis-testing technique is, I believe, fundamental. I have never seen
any study, never had anyone explain to me how any study did not use this particular
approach, even if they claimed that there are multiple scientific approaches.
Does this method, this thinking process actually guide your research? Very selfconsciously, yes. Do you think the method applies to other professional fields, even
to non-professional aspects of one's life? I certainly do. I think you could actually
have, as E. O. Wilson has argued (Wilson, 1998), a superior economics, a far
superior sociology, a far superior women's studies, were this technique applied
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vigorously throughout. Laying out the hypotheses, thinking through the predictions
in advance, is hugely helpful.
How did you come to use this method? At this stage, I cannot recreate the steps
that led to my current firm views. But it did have something to do with thinking
through teaching biology to undergraduates. How about when you were a graduate
student at Harvard? Did you use the method then? I was definitely unaware of what I
was doing, just following through. Well, the scientific method is common sense,
logic I'd say, and not that obscure. But I wasn't self-conscious. It was intuitive and
intuitive throughout much of my early career. I only became aware of it in the past
10 to 15 years, perhaps in conjunction with teaching undergraduates. I do not know.
Do you think that other people's research would be improved by explicit use of
the method? I think it would be improved in two ways. First, it would help the
researcher be more systematic in thinking through what he or she should be looking
for. There is a tendency to think of alternative hypotheses after the fact and then try
to scramble about and hand wave your way out of the problem. Were it actually
applied rigorously in advance, it would save your self a lot of heartache and wasted
effort. Second, it would have a huge positive effect in the writing of the paper in
which it would enable you to convince your colleagues that you had done what you
set out to do. Papers that utilize something along the lines of the hypothesis,
prediction, outcome, conclusion format, are papers that are readily understood.
How good are typical college undergraduates at using this reasoning process, this
method? I think that the typical undergraduate has a intuitive grasp of it. Because so
much of life revolves around figuring out what caused this or that to happen. And
people generally do a decent job at it, of course with all sorts of interesting
exceptions. But obviously being self consciously aware of what they are doing and
the nature of the logic, the average undergraduate doesn't have a clue.
Is trying to improve their understanding and use of the method important? Sure,
this is the fundamental goal of my undergraduate biology course. How do you go
about trying to improve their reasoning and the ability to use the method? I would
say the key weapons are exam questions, sample questions, and quiz questions so
that students are forced to put a label on a hypothesis as opposed to a prediction, or
forced to look at data and say no, that is not the conclusion, that is the actual result
that was gathered to test the hypothesis with the conclusion being hypothesis
rejected, hypothesis accepted.
Do your lectures contain examples of this sort of reasoning? Yes. I write every
lecture to revolve around hypothesis, prediction, test, conclusion - every single one.
How successful have you been? I have a feeling that I reach about one third of the
students at a level that ought to be there. The next one third, I reach with
intermediate effectiveness. And the bottom one third, I definitely do not affect.
What needs to be done in your course or elsewhere to be more successful? If high
schools worked at conveying an enthusiasm for this issue, if that were to happen,
then obviously we would be way ahead; and we could move to a farther point down
the turn pike. Generously, there are maybe ten major conceptual systems in biology
259
that every student should know. And the foundation for those conceptual systems is
always the scientific method. So that should be the premier goal and understanding
the ten major conceptual systems is the secondary goal. All the other material is
information that will be entering one ear and passing out the other.
So if you were ultimately successful in an introductory undergraduate course,
does this mean that the teacher in subsequent courses could forget about this method.
No, I think it is entirely useful to keep going over it in each new context. At some
future date when the scientific method is used in disciplines other than science, then
the student could move from class to class with the beautiful result that what he/she
learned in the science class is applicable in the humanities class and vice versa.
Understanding how valid discoveries and conclusions are made ought to be of
extreme interest to any educated person.
Is there anything else you would like to add? Yes. It seems that the missing
element in all of this is getting a social and emotional context in which a student can
absorb this information. I do not know why it is compelling to me. But it is. I find it
fascinating to look at a paper and figure out what the process was, how the results
were constructed. But I know that this enthusiasm is not shared by most
undergraduates. So there has to be another tack to get them involved.
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INDEX
A
Abduction
76
Abstraction
111, 136, 240, 247, 257
Accommodation
5, 6, 20-25, 50, 191, 192, 248
Action potential
31
33, 34, 58, 81
Activity equation
Adaptation
11, 13, 148
40, 104
Adaptive resonance
43, 44
Additive strategy,
208
Affirming the consequent
49
Algorithmic strategies
9, 103, 119, 159, 186, 197, 199, 215, 217, 221
Analogical reasoning
9, 103, 119, 186
Analogical transfer
12, 24, 26, 44, 50, 78, 82, 102, 108-111, 114-117, 123-131, 162,
Analogy
197, 204
38, 39
Arousal system
1, 6, 12, 15, 19-23, 49, 50, 103, 186, 190, 191
Assimilation
20, 21
Assimilation schemata
26-28, 196, 209, 235
Associative memory
25
Attention window
75
Attentional gating
28
Auditory buffer
31, 33, 35, 116
Axon
B
26
Basal forebrain
1-7, 12, 21, 22, 28, 36-39, 42-45, 49, 50, 55, 79, 104, 137,
Behavior
143, 160, 206, 232-242, 257
73, 75
Bias node
17
Bonellia
55
Bottom-up
80, 97, 123
Brain growth spurt
29, 30
Brain stem
C
Canalization
Causal hypothesis
Causal question
235, 236, 248, 258
Cell body
Cell membrane
Central executive
15-18
80
7, 9, 80, 88, 135, 137, 190, 197, 201, 219, 220
31, 106, 107
31, 125, 129, 138
195
277
278
INDEX
29-31
Cerebral cortex
31
Chemical transmitter
109, 110
Chunking
35
Classical conditioning
85, 87, 122, 127, 141,143
Classroom Test of Scientific Reasoning
135, 136, 158
Cognitive skills
204
Combinatorial analysis
85, 143, 214
Combinatorial reasoning
159-161
Concepts by apprehension
79,
81,
120-122,
133,
226,
248,
258
Conceptual change
206-208
Conditional logic
71-73
Conjunctive concepts
25
Connectionist models
22
Conservation of number
122
Conservation of weight
2, 11, 227, 232
Constructivism
15, 36, 45-50, 58, 97, 220, 239
Contradiction
86, 122, 144, 214, 242
Control of variables
43, 81, 122, 144, 214
Correlational reasoning
99
Creative thinking
61
Creature cards
100, 101,227
Critical thinking
209, 218, 244
Curriculum
D
Darwinism
12-15
Declarative knowledge 10, 11, 83, 100, 140, 142-146, 153-157, 186, 199, 240
9, 200, 212
Deduction
80
Dendrite
Descriptive concepts
59, 68, 70, 79, 80, 98, 159-164, 169, 173-178
57, 58, 122, 217, 226, 236
Descriptive hypothesis
Developmental level
58, 122, 144, 164, 165, 174, 212, 213
79
Developmental stage
37, 80
Differentiated
Dipole
38, 39
Discovery
1, 2, 26, 45, 183, 190-193, 197-200
202, 204, 205, 208, 216
Disembedding ability
85, 94
Disequilibrium
6, 20-25, 36, 50, 190, 191, 225, 248
E
Embryological development
15
INDEX
279
Emotional boost
51
Encoding
26
Enumerative induction
202, 206
Environment
1-3, 7, 11-13, 17, 20-22, 25, 75, 95
104, 157, 165, 180, 235, 238
Environmental pressure
18-22
Epigenetic landscape
16, 19, 20
Epistemology
227
Equilibration
12, 225
Evolution
11-13, 20, 29, 121, 143, 148, 161, 168, 170, 172, 179, 180, 198
Expectation
4, 6, 36, 40, 41, 104, 188, 192, 193, 234
F
Falsification
Feedback
Fifth stage
Figural Intersection Test
Forgetting
Formal operational stage
Fourth-stage
Frontal lobe damage
Frontal lobes
Frustration
70, 73
10, 33, 34, 39, 40-51, 83, 85, 111-117, 232-235

97, 134, 224, 225
85, 87
34, 117
123
140
74, 75, 80, 86, 209
72-76, 95, 97, 209, 236
36, 97
G
31, 33
15
12, 15, 19-23
13, 15, 19, 20, 160, 198
85, 88
Generating potential
Genetic assimilation
Genome
Genotype
Group Embedded Figures Test
H
73
Habit node
26
Hippocampus
Hunger drive
37-45
30, 37
Hypothalamus
161-163, 167, 168, 173-175
Hypothetical concepts
8, 86, 200, 212
Hypothetico-deductive
Hypothetico-predictive 8, 28, 29, 57-59, 67-71, 75, 79-82, 88, 97, 120-123
132-136, 142-144, 148, 156, 172, 176, 187, 190-211, 220-228,
233-240, 252, 256, 257
280
INDEX
99-101
Illumination
Incubation
99-101
2, 202-206
Induction
Inductive science
203
Inheritance of initially acquired characteristics
15
80, 83-96, 226
Inhibiting ability
Innatism
2
Inquiry science
211
Intellectual development
11, 12, 26, 59, 70, 79, 98, 160, 162,
172, 175, 176, 226, 233, 238, 239, 245, 246
11, 79, 159
Intelligence
Internal drive
36, 44
Internalization
2, 23, 239, 240
Intuition construction
3, 4, 8, 25, 258
L
Lateral geniculate nucleus

30, 31, 37, 40
Learning
1-11, 22, 25, 26, 32-37, 42, 47, 50-55, 79-83, 95, 103-118,
142, 143, 183, 209, 218, 225-233, 243, 245, 252-258
Learning cycle
54
Learning equation
35, 51, 58, 118, 225
Level 3
122, 127, 131-133, 141, 142, 146
151, 153, 156, 162-164, 172-175, 214, 224, 225
Level 4
122, 127, 131-133, 141-146
151, 153, 155, 156, 162-164, 172-175, 214, 224, 225
Level 5
141-145, 151, 154, 155, 156, 163-166, 172-175, 214, 224, 225
Limbic thalamus
26
Limnaea
13, 14,20
Locus of control
159
Logic
2, 71-74, 98, 183, 198, 200, 203, 207, 208, 261
Logico-mathematical knowledge
25
Long-term memory (ltm)
33, 104
M
Macro-to-micro approach
253
Matching strategy
66, 67, 70, 77, 81
Mellinark Task
55, 60, 68, 69, 73, 80, 236
Memory
4, 25-33, 45, 49, 53, 81, 86, 103-105, 109, 118, 193-197, 210,
224, 228
Mental capacity
2, 82, 86-91, 95, 96, 109
Mental reorganization
23-25
INDEX
Mental structure
Misconceptions
132, 157, 174, 211-214, 224-249
Micro-to-macro approach,
Modus ponens
Modus tollens
Motor control system
Mutation
Myelinization
281
1, 4, 12, 20-22, 34
25, 79, 81, 96-97, 119-121, 128,
253
206-208
206-208
38
13, 20, 22
80, 81
Natural selection
12-15, 23, 102, 118, 121, 143, 148,
161, 167-173, 182, 186, 204, 258
208, 211-214, 219, 223, 224, 246, 252, 253
Nature of science
Neo-Darwinism
12
Neostriatum
11
Neural model
36
Neural processing
49
Neural rebound
38
Neurons
26, 29-37, 40, 80, 105-117, 190, 191, 200, 225, 230, 243
Nominal stage
233
30, 37, 40-42, 46-48, 104, 105
Nonspecific arousal
Nos misconceptions
211, 212
O
Occipital lobe
On-center, off-surround
Orienting arousal
25
110
39-42, 45, 50, 105, 192, 193
P
Parallel distributed processing

Parietal lobe
Patterns of argumentation
Perseveration
Phenocopy
Phenotype
Phonological loop
Physical experience
Planning ability
Post-formal, stage
Post-synaptic activity
25
25
240
75, 83, 84, 210
2
13-15, 19, 20, 160
195
247
84, 92
140
51, 57, 58, 105
282
INDEX
43-50
12
74
99-101, 218, 226
51, 55, 105, 117
81, 143,214
45, 49, 50, 82, 210, 242, 247
10, 100, 160, 227, 240-241
9
25, 43, 47-50, 143, 214, 238
79, 80
9, 28, 187, 188, 197, 201, 219
Pouring Water Task

Pragmatism
Preoperational stage
Preparation
Pre-synaptic activity
Probabilistic reasoning
Problem-solving
Procedural knowledge
Production systems
Proportional reasoning
Puberty
Puzzling observation
R
227
Realism
11, 59, 68, 71, 79-86, 90-98, 120, 132-135, 140-144,
Reasoning skill
152-157, 161-177, 211-227, 240, 248, 254, 256
256
Reformed Teaching Observational Protocol
81, 226
Representing ability
Resting potential
31
Reticular formation
30, 39
S
Science Curriculum Improvement Study

218
Scientific method
135, 183, 202-206, 218, 255, 257-259
11, 12, 16, 20-26, 49,
Self-regulation
59, 183, 190, 191, 212, 225, 239, 247
Sensory cortex
30, 37-42, 45
3
Sensory impressions
6, 79, 80, 122, 141, 225, 226, 228, 233, 235
Sensory-motor
Social constructivism
225
Social experience
59,98, 1 2 1 , 2 1 2
Special creation
121
Spinal cord
29
158, 213, 237, 240
Stage 4
134, 141-142, 155-157, 175, 211-227, 237-241, 248, 251
Stage 5
Stage retardation
226, 227, 240
Stimulus
32
Synapse
31, 33
Synaptic strength
33-35, 106, 107
INDEX
283
Temporal lobe
Terminal knobs
Thalamus
Theoretical concepts
134, 143, 159-164, 168, 170, 173-179
Top-down search
Tower of London Test
Transmitter release rate
Trial-and-error
11, 25
31
30
79, 82, 98, 99, 119-122,
28
84, 88
34, 51
5
3, 37, 233, 235
Undifferentiated
V
Ventral subsystem
Verification
Visual buffer
Visual memory
Visuo-spatial scratchpad
Vital force
Vitalism
25
100-101, 241
25
26
195
2, 220, 228, 229, 233
121, 132
W
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task

Working memory
73, 75, 80-84

26, 195
Science & Technology Education Library

Series editor: William W. Cobern, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, U.S.A.
Publications
1. W.-M. Roth: Authentic School Science. Knowing and Learning in Open-Inquiry
Science Laboratories. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3088-9; Pb: 0-7923-3307-1
2. L.H. Parker, L.J. Rennie and B.J. Fraser (eds.): Gender, Science and Mathematics.
Shortening the Shadow. 1996
ISBN 0-7923-3535-X; Pb: 0-7923-3582-1
3. W.-M. Roth: Designing Communities. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4703-X;Pb: 0-7923-4704-8
4. W.W. Cobern (ed.): Socio-Cultural Perspectives on Science Education. An International Dialogue. 1998
ISBN 0-7923-4987-3; Pb: 0-7923-4988-1
5. W.F. McComas(ed.): The Nature of Science in Science Education. Rationales and
Strategies. 1998
ISBN 0-7923-5080-4
6. J. Gess-Newsome and N.C. Lederman (eds.): Examining Pedagogical Content Knowledge. The Construct and its Implications for Science Education. 1999
ISBN 0-7923-5903-8
7. J. Wallace and W. Louden: Teachers Learning. Stories of Science Education.2000
ISBN 0-7923-6259-4; Pb: 0-7923-6260-8
8. D. Shorrocks-Taylor and E.W. Jenkins (eds.): Learning from Others. International
Comparisons in Education. 2000
ISBN 0-7923-6343-4
9. W.W. Cobern: Everyday Thoughts about Nature. A Worldview Investigation of
Important Concepts Students Use to Make Sense of Nature with Specific Attention
to Science. 2000
ISBN 0-7923-6344-2; Pb: 0-7923-6345-0
10. S.K. Abell (ed.): Science Teacher Education. An International Perspective. 2000
ISBN 0-7923-6455-4
11. K.M. Fisher, J.H. Wandersee and D.E. Moody: Mapping Biology Knowledge. 2000
ISBN 0-7923-6575-5
12. B. Bell and B. Cowie: Formative Assessment and Science Education. 2001
ISBN 0-7923-6768-5; Pb: 0-7923-6769-3
13. D.R.Lavoie and W.-M. Roth (eds.): Models of Science Teacher Preparation. Theory
into Practice. 2001
ISBN 0-7923-7129-1
14. S.M. Stocklmayer, M.M. Gore and C. Bryant (eds.): Science Communication in
Theory and Practice, 2001
ISBN 1-4020-0130-4; Pb: 1-4020-0131-2
ISBN 1-4020-0514-8
15. V.J. Mayer (ed.): Global Science Literacy. 2002
16. D. Psillos and H. Niedderer (eds.): Teaching and Learning in the Science Laboratory.
2002
ISBN 1-4020-1018-4
17. J.K. Gilbert, O. De Jong, R. Justi,D.F. Treagust and J.H. Van Driel (eds.): Chemical
Education: Towards Research-based Practice. 2003
ISBN 1-4020-1112-1
18. A.E. Lawson: The Neurological Basis of Learning, Development and Discovery.
Implications for Science and Mathematics Instruction. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1180-6
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LONDON

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THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF LEARNING, DEVELOPMENT AND

Science & Technology Education Library

The Neurological Basis of

KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers

MATT, BOB, BETSY and KRISTINA

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How Do People Learn?

The Neurological Basis of Self-Regulation

Brain Maturation, Intellectual Development and

Brain Maturation, Intellectual Development and

Creative Thinking, Analogy and a Neural Model of

The Role of Analogies and Reasoning Skill in Theoretical

Intellectual Development During the College Years:

What Kinds of Scientific Concepts Exist?

Psychological and Neurological Models of Scientific

CHAPTER 10 Rejecting Nature of Science Misconceptions By Preservice

CHAPTER 11 Implications for The Nature of Knowledge and Instruction

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intermediate class of concepts called hypothetical (e.g., concepts such as subduction

gains as a consequence of instruction. Preservice teachers who lack Stage 5 reasoning

understand effective teaching methods as well as provide both psychological and

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

innate structures to become functional. Rather, acquiring new knowledge appears to

AN EXPLORATION INTO KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION

To provide an additional insight into the knowledge construction process, take a

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

4. IS THE IF/THEN/THEREFORE PATTERN ALSO AT WORK

If...the wind had blown out the flames, (wind hypothesis)

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

The introspective analysis suggests that learning (i.e., knowledge construction)

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

6. TWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

7.1 How Do Limnaea Snails Adapt to Changing Environments?

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

7.2 Waddington's Theory of Genetic Assimilation

Suppose, for example, an epigenetic landscape were constructed to represent the

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

According to Waddington, organisms vary in their ability to respond to

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

Because of such differences, individuals vary in their ability to respond to

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

spontaneous and non-directional reorganizations of mental structures occur before

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

HOW DO PEOPLE LEARN?

words, we need to consider what might be happening in the brain as knowledge is

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2. HOW DOES THE BRAIN PROCESS VISUAL INPUT?

THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REGULATION

3. IS AUDITORY INPUT PROCESSED IN THE SAME

THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REGULATION

4. KEY STRUCTURES INVOLVED IN NEURAL SIGNALING

5. NEURON SIGNALS AND LAYERS

THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REGULATION

6. NETWORK MODELING PRINCIPLES

THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF SELF-REGULATION

represents the signal that propagates along the axon

6.1 Equations of Neural Activity and Learning

Where the overdot represents a time derivative and i, j,= 1, 2,....n.

indicates that these signals increase the activity of cells

7. HOW DOES EXPERIENCE STRENGTHEN CONNECTIONS?