ESPIONAGE

Contents
1

Agent handling

1.1

Human intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2

Case ocer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3

Agents, spotting, and recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.5

Communications Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.6

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.8

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Asset (intelligence)

2.1

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Black bag operation

3.1

Use by the FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.2

Use by the CIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.3

Use by other governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.4

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.5

References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.6

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Black operation

4.1

Etymology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.2

Reported examples of black operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.4

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Clandestine cell system

5.1

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.1.1

Provisional Irish Republican Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.1.2

World War II French Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.1.3

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.2

Parallel organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.3

External support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ii

CONTENTS
5.4

Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.5

Classic models for cell system operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

5.5.1

Operations under ocial cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

5.5.2

Clandestine presence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

5.5.3

Fault-tolerant cellular structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

Non-traditional models, exemplied by al-Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

5.6.1

Infrastructure cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

5.6.2

Operational cells . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

5.6.3

Indirect support networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

5.6.4

A possible countermeasure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

5.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5.9

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5.6

Clandestine HUMINT

16

6.1

Legal aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

6.2

Major HUMINT organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

6.3

Penetrations of foreign targets by people loyal to their own country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

6.3.1

Clandestine Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

6.3.2

Dangled Mole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Human sources who changed allegiance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6.4.1

Recruitment through Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6.4.2

Recruitment through Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6.4.3

Recruitment through Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

6.4.4

Recruitment through Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

Recruit Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

6.5.1

Mole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

6.5.2

Double Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

6.5.3

Multiply Turned Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

6.6.1

Couriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

6.6.2

Safehouses and Other Meeting Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

6.6.3

Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

6.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

6.8

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

6.4

6.5

6.6

Clandestine HUMINT and covert action

28

7.1

Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

7.1.1

United Kingdom prewar operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

7.1.2

United States background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

Surging additional capability for the Second World War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

7.2.1

30

7.2

United Kingdom World War II Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONTENTS
7.2.2

United States World War II operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

7.2.3

USSR World War II Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

7.2.4

German World War II Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

Separate functions during peacetime? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

7.3.1

UK postwar change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

7.3.2

US postwar change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

7.4

Controversies remain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

7.5

Current operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.1

US doctrine and operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.2

Afghanistan and US doctrinal conict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.3

Joint UK-US operations in Operation Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

7.5.4

Russian operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

7.5.5

Israeli operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

7.5.6

French operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

7.3

7.6
8

Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques

38

8.1

Sta and Skills in a Clandestine HUMINT Operations Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

8.1.1

Station under diplomatic cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

8.1.2

Stations under ocial but nondiplomatic cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

8.1.3

Stations under non-ocial cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

8.1.4

Support services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

8.2

Basic agent recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

8.3

Basic agent operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.1

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.2

Continued testing during operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.3

Operating the agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

8.3.4

Agent communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

8.3.5

Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Special clandestine services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

8.4.1

Agents of inuence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

8.4.2

Strategic deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

8.5

Direct action services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

8.6

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

8.7

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

8.4

iii

Concealment device

49

9.1

Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.1

Ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.2

Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.3

Candles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.4

Cans and jars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

iv

CONTENTS
9.1.5

Coins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

9.1.6

Diversion safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.1.7

Electrical outlet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.1.8

Painting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.1.9

Computers and consumer electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

9.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

10 Cryptography

51

10.1 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

10.2 History of cryptography and cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

10.2.1 Classic cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

10.2.2 Computer era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

10.3 Modern cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

10.3.1 Symmetric-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

10.3.2 Public-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

10.3.3 Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

10.3.4 Cryptographic primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

10.3.5 Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

10.4 Legal issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.1 Prohibitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.2 Export controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.3 NSA involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

10.4.4 Digital rights management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

10.4.5 Forced disclosure of encryption keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

10.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

10.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

10.7 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

10.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

11 Cut-out (espionage)

64

11.1 Outside espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

11.2 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

11.3 References

64

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12 Dead drop

65

12.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

12.2 Modern techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

12.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

12.4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

12.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

12.6 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

CONTENTS

13 Denial and deception

67

13.1 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

13.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

14 Direct action (military)

69

14.1 Risk factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

14.2 Operational techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.2.1 Inltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.2.2 Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.2.3 Exltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.3 Examples of direct action missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.3.1 Norwegian and SOE attacks on German heavy water production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

14.3.2 Prisoner of war rescue raids in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.3 Israeli raid on Soviet radar used by Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.4 Attempted prisoner of war rescue in North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.5 US prisoner in Panama rescued by Delta Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

14.3.6 Killing of Osama bin Laden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

14.3.7 Physical destruction of propaganda facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

14.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

15 Eavesdropping
15.1 Etymology

74
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

15.2 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

15.3 References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

15.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

15.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

16 Espionage

76

16.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

16.1.1 Ancient history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

16.1.2 Arabia during Muhammads era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

16.1.3 Modern history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

16.2 Targets of espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

16.3 Methods and terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

16.3.1 Technology and techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

16.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

16.5 Industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

16.6 Agents in espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

16.7 Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

16.8 Use against non-spies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

16.9 Espionage laws in the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

16.9.1 Government intelligence laws and its distinction from espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

vi

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16.10Military conicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

16.11List of famous spies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

16.11.1 World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

16.11.2 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

16.11.3 Post World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

16.12Spy ction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

16.12.1 World War II: 19391945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.12.2 Cold War era: 19451991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.13See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.14References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

16.15Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

16.16External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

17 False ag

88

17.1 Use in warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

17.1.1 Naval warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

17.1.2 Air warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

17.1.3 Land warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

17.2 As pretexts for war . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.1 Russo-Swedish War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.2 Second Sino-Japanese War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.3 World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.2.4 Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

17.3 As a tactic to undermine political opponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

17.3.1 Reichstag re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

17.3.2 Project TP-Ajax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

17.3.3 2008 Kurcha incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

17.4 Pseudo-operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

17.5 Espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

17.6 Civilian usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.6.1 Businesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.6.2 Political campaigning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.6.3 Ideological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.7 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.7.1 Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

17.7.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

17.8 Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

18 Field agent

97

18.1 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

18.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

CONTENTS

vii

19 Industrial espionage

98

19.1 Competitive intelligence and economic or industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

19.2 Forms of economic and industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

19.3 Target industries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

19.4 Information theft and sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.5 Agents and the process of collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.6 Use of computers and the Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.6.1 Personal computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

19.6.2 The Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

19.6.3 Opportunities for sabotage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.6.4 Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.6.5 Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.7 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.7.1 Origins of industrial espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
19.7.2 The 20th Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
19.7.3 The legacy of Cold War espionage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
19.8 Notable cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
19.8.1 France and the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
19.8.2 Volkswagen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
19.8.3 Hilton and Starwood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.8.4 GhostNet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.8.5 Google and Operation Aurora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.8.6 CyberSitter and Green Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.8.7 USA v. Lan Lee, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.8.8 Dongxiao Yue and Chordiant Software, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
19.9 Concerns of national governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.9.1 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.9.2 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.9.3 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.9.4 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.10See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.11References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19.12Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
19.13External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
20 Intelligence assessment

108

20.1 Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

20.2 Target-centric intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
20.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
20.4 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
20.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

viii

CONTENTS

21 Intelligence cycle management

112

21.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

21.1.1 Intelligence dened . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
21.1.2 Management of the intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
21.1.3 Planning and direction overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21.2.1 National/strategic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21.2.2 Military/operational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
21.3 Intelligence architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
21.3.1 Budgeting

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

21.3.2 Policy factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

21.3.3 Balancing law enforcement and national security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
21.3.4 Public versus private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
21.4 Collection planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
21.4.1 CCIRM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
21.5 Issuance of orders and requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
21.5.1 Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
21.6 Other topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
21.6.1 Political misuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
21.6.2 Clandestine intelligence versus covert action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
21.7 Failures in the intelligence cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
21.8 Other cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
21.8.1 Boyd OODA Loop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
21.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
22 Interrogation

120

22.1 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

22.1.1 Suggestibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
22.1.2 Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
22.1.3 Good cop/bad cop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
22.1.4 Pride-and-ego down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
22.1.5 Reid technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
22.1.6 Mind-altering drugs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
22.1.7 Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
22.2 Around the world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
22.2.1 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
22.2.2 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
22.2.3 Inquisition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
22.3 Resistance training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
22.4 Movement for increased recording of interrogations in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
22.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
22.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

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ix

22.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

23 Non-ocial cover

125

23.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

23.2 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
23.3 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
23.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
23.5 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
24 Numbers station

127

24.1 Suspected origins and use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

24.1.1 Identifying and locating

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

24.2 The Atencin spy case evidence

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

24.3 Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

24.4 Transmission technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
24.5 Interfering with numbers stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
24.5.1 Documented instances of interference to broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
24.5.2 Attempted jamming of numbers stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
24.6 Classication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
24.7 Recordings

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

24.8 References in mass media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

24.9 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
24.10References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

24.11Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

24.12External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
25 Ocial cover

134

25.1 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

25.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
26 One-way voice link

135

26.1 Historical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

26.2 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
27 Resident spy

136

27.1 Types of resident spies

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

27.2 Comparison of illegal and legal resident spies

27.3 References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

27.3.1 Cross-reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

27.3.2 Sources used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
27.4 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
28 Special reconnaissance

138

28.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

CONTENTS
28.2 A spectrum of reconnaissance capabilities: LRS and SR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
28.3 Appropriate missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
28.3.1 Intelligence related missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
28.3.2 Oensive missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
28.4 Operational techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
28.4.1 Inltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
28.4.2 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
28.4.3 Exltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
28.5 SR Communications-Electronics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
28.6 Reporting during and after the mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
28.7 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
28.8 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
28.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
28.10External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

29 Steganography

150

29.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

29.2 Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
29.2.1 Physical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
29.2.2 Digital messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
29.2.3 Network

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

29.2.4 Printed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

29.2.5 Using puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
29.3 Additional terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
29.4 Countermeasures and detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
29.5 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.5.1 Use in modern printers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.5.2 Example from modern practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.5.3 Alleged use by intelligence services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.5.4 Distributed steganography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.5.5 Online challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.6 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.7 Citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
29.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
29.9 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
30 Surveillance

157

30.1 Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

30.1.1 Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
30.1.2 Telephones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
30.1.3 Cameras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
30.1.4 Social network analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

CONTENTS

xi

30.1.5 Biometric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

30.1.6 Aerial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
30.1.7 Data mining and proling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
30.1.8 Corporate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
30.1.9 Human operatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
30.1.10 Satellite imagery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
30.1.11 Identication and credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
30.1.12 RFID and geolocation devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
30.1.13 Human Microchips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
30.1.14 Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
30.1.15 Postal services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
30.2 Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
30.2.1 Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
30.2.2 Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
30.3 Counter-surveillance, inverse surveillance, sousveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
30.4 Popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
30.4.1 In literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
30.4.2 In music . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
30.4.3 Onscreen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
30.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
30.5.1 United States government

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

30.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

30.7 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
30.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
30.8.1 General information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
30.8.2 Historical information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
30.8.3 Legal resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
30.9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
30.9.1 Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
30.9.2 Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
30.9.3 Content license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

Chapter 1

Agent handling
In intelligence organizations, agent handling is the management of agents, principal agents, and agent networks
(called assets) by intelligence ocers typically known
as case ocers.

If principles of intelligence tradecraft have not been

strictly observed, it is also possible that compromised
agents can reveal information that exposes other members of the network. In the real world of espionage, human lapses are very much the norm, and violations of the
principles of tradecraft are common. It is for this reason
that agents are ideally trained to resist interrogation for a
dened period of time.

1.1 Human intelligence

If an agent is able to resist interrogation for a dened peA primary purpose of intelligence organizations is to pen- riod of time, the odds that other members of the network
etrate a target with a human agent, or a network of hu- can be alerted to the compromise improve.
man agents. Such agents can either inltrate the target,
or be recruited in place. Case ocers are professionally trained employees of intelligence organizations that
manage human agents and human agent networks. Intel- 1.2 Case ocer
ligence that derives from such human sources is known
A case ocer is an intelligence ocer who is a
as HUMINT.
trained specialist in the management of agents and agent
Sometimes, agent handling is done indirectly, through
networks.[1] Case ocers manage human agents, and huprincipal agents that serve as proxies for case ocers.
man intelligence networks. Case ocers spot potenIt is not uncommon, for example, for a case ocer to
tial agents, recruit prospective agents, and train agents
manage a number of principal agents, who in turn hanin tradecraft. Case ocers emphasize those elements of
dle agent networks, which are preferably organized in a
tradecraft which enable the agent to acquire needed incellular fashion. In such a case, the principal agent can
formation, as well as to enable the case ocer to comserve as a cut-out for the case ocer, buering him or
municate with and supervise the agent. Most of all, case
her from direct contact with the agent network.
ocers train agents in methods of avoiding detection by
Utilizing a principal agent as a cut-out, and ensuring that host nation counter-intelligence organizations.
the human agent network is organized in a cellular fashion, can provide some protection for other agents in the
network, as well as for the principal agent, and for the 1.3 Agents, spotting, and recruitcase ocer in the event that an agent in the network is
ment
compromised. Assuming that standard principles of intelligence tradecraft have been strictly observed by the
principal agent and the agents in the network, compro- By denition, an agent acts on behalf of another,
mised agents will not be able to identify the case ocer, whether another individual, an organization, or a foreign
nor the other members of the network. Ideally, agents government. Agents can be considered either witting or
may work side by side in the same oce, and conduct unwitting, and in some cases, willing or unwilling. Agents
their clandestine collection activities with such discipline, typically work under the direction of a principal agent or
that they will not realize that they are both engaged in es- a case ocer. When agents work alone, and are not mempionage, much less members of the same network.
bers of an agent network, they are termed singletons.
Since an agent can sometimes identify his or her principal
agent, however, or reveal information under interrogation
that can lead to the identication of a principal agent, the
protection provided by cellular network organization can
be time-sensitive.

The identication of potential agents is termed agent

spotting (also termed talent spotting). Identifying potential agents, and investigating the details of their personal and professional lives, involves the granular verication of their bona des. Such activities can include
1

CHAPTER 1. AGENT HANDLING

uncovering personal details that leave potential agents

vulnerable to coercion, blackmail, or other inducements,
such as sexual approaches.
Approaches to potential agents can be multitudinous and
considerable time can pass before the potential agent is
maneuvered into a position where a recruitment pitch
can be hazarded.

1.4 Training
Agent training often includes techniques of tradecraft such as clandestine communications, including
cryptography, the use of one-time pads, the construction of concealment devices, and the employment of
dead drops. Other elements of tradecraft include elicitation, surveillance and countersurveillance, photography
and the emplacement of audio devices, sensors, or other
transmitters. Case ocers generally train agents one at a
time, in isolation, including only those elements of tradecraft needed to penetrate the target at hand. Case ocers
will also teach agents how to develop cover for status,
and cover for action, meaning how to establish credible
pretexts for their presence and behavior while engaged in
collection activities. A well-trained and competent agent
can conduct his or her clandestine tasks while under close
surveillance, and still evade detection. More advanced
agent training can include resistance to interrogation.

1.5 Communications Method

Random e-mail IDs

1.6 See also

Category:Spies by role
Motives for spying

1.7 References
[1] case ocer, thefreedictionary.com, retrieved 4 March
2009

1.8 External links

Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins,
Thomas Patrick Carroll, Syllabus, 5 September
2006 24 October 2006many good denitions
with historic examples and timely discussion of
problems; in outline form.

Chapter 2

Asset (intelligence)
In intelligence, assets are persons within organizations or
countries that are being spied upon who provide information for an outside spy. They are sometimes referred to as
agents, and in law enforcement parlance, as condential
informants, or 'CI' for short.
There are dierent categories of assets, including people
that:
Willingly work for a foreign government for ideological reasons such as being against their government,
but live in a country that doesn't allow political opposition. They may elect to work with a foreign power
to change their own country because there are few
other ways available.
Work for monetary gain. Intelligence services often
pay good wages to people in important positions that
are willing to betray secrets.
Have been blackmailed and are forced into their
role.
Do not even know they are being used. Assets can
be loyal to their country, but may still provide a foreign agent with information through failures in information safety such as using insecure computers
or not following proper OPSEC procedures during
day-to-day chatting.

2.1 See also

Vetting

Chapter 3

Black bag operation

This article is about the espionage technique. For the 3.2 Use by the CIA
cryptanalysis technique, see black-bag cryptanalysis. For
the ctional character, see Black Bag. For the disposable The CIA has used black-bag operations to steal cryptogbag used to contain garbage, see black bag (container).
raphy and other secrets from foreign government oces
outside the United States. The practice dates back at least
Black bag operations (or black bag jobs) are covert or as far as 1916.[2]
clandestine entries into structures to obtain information
for human intelligence operations.[1] This usually entails
breaking and entering into denied areas. Some of the tactics, techniques and procedures associated with black bag 3.3 Use by other governments
operations are: lock picking, safe cracking, key impressions, ngerprinting, photography, electronic surveillance The British, Israeli, Russian, and other intelligence agen(including audio and video surveillance), mail manipula- cies are known to use black-bag operations to steal setion (aps and seals), forgery, and a host of other related crets. When the technique is used to obtain codes it may
skills. The term black bag refers to the little black bag be called Black-bag cryptanalysis.
in which burglars carry their tools.[2] The CIA remains
responsible for conducting these highly classied operations overseas, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) performs the exact same function inside the U.S. 3.4 See also
and its territories.[2]
Black operation
COINTELPRO

3.1 Use by the FBI

3.5 References

In black bag operations, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents illegally entered oces of targeted individuals and organizations, and photographed information found in their records. This practice was used by the
FBI from 1942 until 1967. In July 1966, FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover ordered the practice discontinued.[3] The
use of black bag jobs by the FBI was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court on 19 June
1972 in the Plamondon case, United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297. The FBI still carries out numerous black bag entry-and-search missions, in which the
search is covert and the target of the investigation is not
informed that the search took place. If the investigation
involves a criminal matter a judicial warrant is required;
in national security cases the operation must be approved
by a secret body called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.[4]

[1] Tallinn government surveillance cameras reveal black

bag operation. Intelnews. 16 December 2008. Retrieved
3 December 2012.
[2] The CIA Code Thief Who Came in from the Cold.
matthewald.com. Retrieved 3 December 2012.
[3] Federal Bureau of Investigation - Freedom of Information
Privacy Act
[4] Rood, Justin (15 June 2007). FBI to Boost Black Bag
Search Ops. ABC News. Retrieved 3 December 2012.

Peter Wright. Spy Catcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Ocer. Penguin USA,
1987. ISBN 0-670-82055-5.
4

3.6. EXTERNAL LINKS

3.6 External links

Warrantless Surreptitious Entries: FBI Black Bag
Break-ins And Microphone Installations
11 Terms Used by Spies at HowStuWorks article explaining espionage terminology

Chapter 4

Black operation
Black op and Black ops redirect here. For other
meanings, see Black Ops (disambiguation).

1970s. CIA Director General Michael Hayden explained why he released the documents, saying that
they provided a glimpse of a very dierent time
and a very dierent agency.[9]

A black operation or black op is a covert operation by a

government, a government agency, or a military organization. This can include activities by private companies
or groups. Key features of a black operation are that it is
clandestine, .. overtones, and it is not attributable to the
organization carrying it out.[1] The main dierence between a black operation and one that is merely clandestine is that a black operation involves a signicant degree
of deception, to conceal who is behind it or to make it
appear that some other entity is responsible ("false ag"
operations).[2][3]

In May 2007 ABC News, and later the Daily

Telegraph, reported that United States president
George W. Bush had authorized the CIA to undertake black operations in Iran in order to promote
regime change as well as to sabotage Irans nuclear
program.[10][11] ABC News was subsequently criticized for reporting the secret operation, with 2008
presidential candidate Mitt Romney saying he was
shocked to see the ABC News report regarding
covert action in Iran, but ABC said the CIA and the
Bush Administration knew of their plans to publish
the information and raised no objections.[12]

A single such activity may be called a black bag

operation";[1] that term is primarily used for covert or
clandestine surreptitious entries into structures to obtain
information for human intelligence operations.[4] Such
operations are known to have been carried out by the
FBI,[5] the Central Intelligence Agency,[6] Mossad, MI6,
MSS, Research and Analysis Wing and the intelligence
services of other nations.[4]

4.3 References
[1] Smith, Jr., W. Thomas (2003). Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency. New York, NY: Facts on File,
Inc. p. 31. ISBN 0-8160-4666-2.

4.1 Etymology

[2] Popular Electronics, Volume 6, Issue 26. Zi-Davis Publishing Co., Inc. 1974, p. 267. There are three classications into which the intelligence community ocially
divides clandestine broadcast stations. A black operation
is one in which there is a major element of deception.

Black may be used as a generic term for any government activity that is hidden or secret. For example, some
activities by military and intel agencies are funded by a
classied "black budget, of which the details, and sometimes even the total, are hidden from the public and from
most congressional oversight.[7][8]

[3] Djang, Chu, From Loss to Renewal: A Tale of Life Experience at Ninety, Authors Choice Press, Lincoln, Nebraska,
p. 54. "(A black operation was) an operation in which the
sources of propaganda were disguised or mispresented in
one way or another so as not to be attributed to the people
who really engineered it.

4.2 Reported examples of black operations

[4] Tallinn government surveillance cameras reveal black

bag operation. Intelnews. December 16, 2008. Retrieved 3 December 2012.

In 2007 the Central Intelligence Agency declassied secret records detailing illegal domestic surveillance, assassination plots, kidnapping, and inltration and penetration of other black operations undertaken by the CIA from the 1950s to the early

[5] Rood, Justin (June 15, 2007). FBI to Boost Black Bag
Search Ops. ABC News. Retrieved 3 December 2012.
[6] The CIA Code Thief Who Came in from the Cold.
matthewald.com. Retrieved 3 December 2012.

4.4. EXTERNAL LINKS

[7] Dirty Secrets Of The Black Budget"". Business Week.

February 27, 2006. Retrieved June 12, 2012.
[8] Shachtman, Noah (February 1, 2010). Pentagons Black
Budget Tops $56 Billion. Wired. Retrieved June 12,
2012.
[9] Tisdall, Simon (June 22, 2007). CIA to release cold war
'black les". The Guardian. Retrieved June 7, 2012.
[10] Ross, Brian; Esposito, Richard (May 22, 2007). Bush
Authorizes New Covert Action Against Iran. ABC News.
Retrieved June 7, 2012.
[11] Shipman, Tim (May 27, 2007). Bush sanctions 'black
ops against Iran. The Telegraph. Retrieved June 7, 2012.
[12] Montopoli, Brian (May 23, 2007). ABC News Comes
Under Fire For Iran Report. CBS News. Retrieved January 26, 2014.

4.4 External links

Chapter 5

Clandestine cell system

Sleeper cell redirects here. For other uses, see Sleeper going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th
cell (disambiguation).
century, but has little external control. Its doctrine and organization have changed over time, given factors such as
the independence of 26 of Irelands 32 counties, the conA clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a
group of people in such a way that it can more eectively tinued British control of Northern Ireland and the simple
passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking
resist penetration by an opposing organization. Depend[1]
ing on the groups philosophy, its operational area, the and technology.
communications technologies available, and the nature of
the mission, it can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization. It is also a method used
by criminal organizations, undercover operatives, and unconventional warfare (UW) led by special forces. Historically, clandestine organizations have avoided electronic
communications, because signals intelligence is a strength
of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organizations.

Ocially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as

British security forces became more eective, changed
to a semiautonomous model for its operational and certain of its support cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence,
cover and security).[2] Its leadership sees itself as guiding and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typically of 2-5 people, tend to be built by people with an
existing personal relationship. British counterinsurgents
could fairly easily understand the command structure, but
In the context of tradecraft, covert and clandestine are not the workings of the operational cells.
not synonymous. As noted in the denition (which has The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper
been used by the United States and NATO since World cells, so new ad hoc organizations may appear for any
War II) in a covert operation the identity of the sponsor is specic operation.
concealed, while in a clandestine operation the operation
itself is concealed. Put dierently, clandestine means
hidden, while covert means deniable. The adversary
is aware that a covert activity is happening, but does not 5.1.2 World War II French Resistance
know who is doing it, and certainly not their sponsorship. Clandestine activities, however, if successful, are In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted
completely unknown to the adversary, and their function, into occupied France to lead unconventional warfare
such as espionage, would be neutralized if there was any units.[3][4] They would be composed of two ocers, one
awareness of the activity. Saying a "covert cell structure American or British, and the other French, the latter
is tantamount to tautology, because the point of the cell preferably from the area into which they landed. The
structure is that its details are completely hidden from the third member of the team was a radio operator.
opposition.
Especially through the French member, they would conA sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of tact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask
sleeper agents that lies dormant until it receives orders them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a subor decides to act.
cell). If the team mission were sabotage, reconnaissance,
or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units.
If the team was to carry out direct action, often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals
5.1 History
had military experience, it would be necessary to assemble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the
5.1.1 Provisional Irish Republican Army leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known afAs opposed to the French Resistance, the modern liation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations.
8

5.3. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

5.1.3

National Front for the Liberation of 5.3

South Vietnam

Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from

earlier anticolonial groups ghting the French, as well as
anti-Japanese guerillas during World War II.[5] Its command, control, and communication techniques derived
from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups.
The group had extensive support from North Vietnam,
and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel
political and military structures, often overlapping. See
Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics.

External support

Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to security, support from the outside. This can range from
leaders, trainers and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assistance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt
activities (such as the NLF spokesmen in Hanoi).
External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups
in Iraq, for example, do receive assistance from Iran, but
this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and
may even be limited to factions of that government. Early
US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the
Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and
United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conict
escalated, the US participation became overt.
Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (guerrilla
operations) and foreign internal defense (FID) (counterinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organization.
In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN)
leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Under Operation White Star, US personnel gave covert FID
assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, became overt in 1961, and ceased operations in 1962.

A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure

was top-down

5.4 Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics

The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who operated quite closely, and engaging in the sort of self- While dierent kinds of insurgency dier in where they
criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist place clandestine or covert cells, when certain types of inorganizations.
surgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized.
Cells still may be used for leadership security, but, if overt
violence by organized units becomes signicant, cells are
less important. In Maos three-stage doctrine,[7] cells are
5.2 Parallel organizations
still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas,
but, as the insurgency creates full-time military units in
The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The
chosen to have parallel political and military organiza- Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model.
tions. In the case of the NLF, other than some individuals
When considering where cells exist with respect to the
with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organizaexisting government, the type of insurgency needs to be
tion could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After
considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual
the war ended, surviving NLF ocials held high oce.
100-20, which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] DrawIn the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Fin, be- ing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps
came increasingly overt, and then a full participant in pol- ocer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell
itics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt system, although his descriptions also encompass types of
political/social service and covert military wings.
insurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present,
The overt political/socialcovert military split avoided the there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist
inexibility of a completely secret organization. Once an insurgencies.
active insurgency began, the secrecy could limit freedom
of action, distort information about goals and ideals, and
restrict communication within the insurgency.[6] In a split
organization, the public issues can be addressed overtly,
while military actions were kept covert and intelligence
functions stay clandestine.

1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reects a principally indigenous insurgency, initially with limited
goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to
grow from people with social, cultural or family ties.
The insurgents resent a government that has failed to

10

CHAPTER 5. CLANDESTINE CELL SYSTEM

recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups
who perceive that the government has denied their
rights and interests and work to establish or restore
them. They seldom seek to overthrow the government or control the whole society; however, they frequently attempt to withdraw from government control through autonomy or semiautonomy. The Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in
Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency.
al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they
become strong enough in a given area, they may
change to the mass-oriented form.

revolution[11] and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban

model) insurgency. This model involves a single,
armed cell which emerges in the midst of degenerating government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus
around which mass popular support rallies. The insurgents use this support to establish control and
erect new institutions.
4. Mass-oriented: where the subversive and covertcell systems work from within the government, the
mass-oriented builds a government completely outside the existing one, with the intention of replacing it. Such insurgents patiently construct a base of
passive and active political supporters, while simultaneously building a large armed element of guerrilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted campaign of increasing violence to destroy the government and its institutions from the outside. They have
a well-developed ideology and carefully determine
their objectives. They are highly organized and effectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mobilize forces for a direct political and military challenge to the government. The revolution that produced the Peoples Republic of China, the American
Revolution, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru
are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once established, this type of insurgency is extremely dicult to defeat because of its great depth of organization.

2. Subversive: Usually driven by an organization that

contains at least some of the governing elite, some
being sympathizers already in place, and others who
penetrate the government. When they use violence,
it has a specic purpose, such as coercing voters,
intimidating ocials, and disrupting and discrediting the government. Typically, there is a political
arm (such as Sinn Fin or the National Liberation
Front) that directs the military in planning carefully
coordinated violence. Employment of violence is
designed to show the system to be incompetent and
to provoke the government to an excessively violent
response which further undermines its legitimacy.
The Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, is another example of subversion. Nazi members of parliament
and street ghters were hardly clandestine, but the
overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control
of the nation was hidden. A subversive insurgency
is suited to a more permissive political environment 5.5 Classic models for cell system
which allows the insurgents to use both legal and iloperations
legal methods to accomplish their goals. Eective
government resistance may convert this to a criticalDierent kinds of cell organizations have been used for
cell model.
dierent purposes. This section focuses on clandestine
3. Critical-cell: Critical cell is useful when the po- cells, as would be used for espionage, sabotage, or the
litical climate becomes less permissive than one organization for unconventional warfare. When unconthat allowed shadow cells. While other cell types ventional warfare starts using overt units, the cell systry to form intelligence cells within the govern- tem tends to be used only for sensitive leadership and
ment, this type sets up "shadow government" cells intelligence roles.[7] The examples here will use CIA
that can seize power once the system is destroyed cryptonyms as a naming convention used to identify
both by external means and the internal subversion. members of the cell system. Cryptonyms begin with a
This model ts the classic coup d'etat,[10] and of- two-letter country or subject name (e.g., AL), followed
ten tries to minimize violence. Variants include with an arbitrary word. It is considered elegant to have the
the Sandinista takeover of an existing government code merge with the other letters to form a pronounceable
weakened by external popular revolution. Insur- word.
gents also seek to inltrate the governments institutions, but their object is to destroy the system from
within. Clandestine cells form inside the govern- 5.5.1 Operations under ocial cover
ment. The use of violence remains covert until
the government is so weakened that the insurgencys Station BERRY operates, for country B, in target counsuperior organization seizes power, supported by try BE. It has three case ocers and several support ofthe armed force. One variation of this pattern is cers. Espionage operation run by case ocers under
when the insurgent leadership permits the popu- diplomatic cover, they would have to with the basic relar revolution to destroy the existing government, cruiting methods described in this article. Case ocer
then emerges to direct the formation of a new gov- BETTY runs the local agents BEN and BEATLE. Case
ernment. Another variation is seen in the Cuban ocer BESSIE runs BENSON and BEAGLE.

5.5. CLASSIC MODELS FOR CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONS

Representative diplomatic-cover station and networks

Some recruits, due to the sensitivity of their position or

their personalities not being appropriate for cell leadership, might not enter cells but be run as singletons, perhaps by other than the recruiting case ocer. Asset
BARD is a dierent sort of highly sensitive singleton,
who is a joint asset of the country B, and the country identied by prex AR. ARNOLD is a case ocer from the
country AR embassy, who knows only the case ocer
BERTRAM and the security ocer BEST. ARNOLD
does not know the station chief of BERRY or any of its
other personnel. Other than BELL and BEST, the Station
personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized
to be in the Station, and who is known for his piano playing at embassy parties. He is covered as Cultural Attache,
in a country that has very few pianos. Only the personnel
involved with BARD know that ARNOLD is other than
another friendly diplomat.
In contrast, BESSIE and BETTY know one another, and
procedures exist for their taking over each others assets
in the event one of the two is disabled.
Some recruits, however, would be qualied to recruit
their own subcell, as BEATLE has done. BESSIE knows
the identity of BEATLE-1 and BEATLE-2, since he had
them checked by headquarters counterintelligence before
they were recruited. Note that a cryptonym does not imply anything about its designee, such as gender.

5.5.2

Clandestine presence

The diagram of initial team presence shows that two

teams, ALAN and ALICE, have successfully entered an
area of operation, the country coded AL, but are only
aware of a pool of potential recruits, and have not yet actually recruited anyone. They communicate with one another only through headquarters, so compromise of one
team will not aect the other.

11

Initial team presence by 2 separate clandestine teams with no ofcial cover

team, ALBERT, recruits ALLOVER. When ALPINE

recruited two subcell members, they would be referred
to as ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2.
ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach ALISTAIR, but they are aware of at least some of other team
members identity should ALISTAIR be unavailable, and
they would accept a message from ALBERT. Most often,
the identity (and location) of the radio operator may not
be shared. ALPINE and ALTITUDE, however, do not
know one another. They do not know any of the members of team ALICE.
The legitimacy of the subcell structure came from the recruitment process, originally by the case ocer and then
by the cell leaders. Sometimes, the cell leader would propose subcell member names to the case ocer, so the
case ocer could have a headquarters name check run
before bringing the individual into the subcell. In principle, however, the subcell members would know ALPINE,
and sometimes the other members of the ALPINE cell
if they needed to work together; if ALPINE-1 and
ALPINE-2 had independent assignments, they might not
know each other. ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 certainly
would not know ALISTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE
or ALLOVER cells.
As the networks grow, a subcell leader might create his
own cell, so ALPINE-2 might become the leader of the
ALIMONY cell.

5.5.3 Fault-tolerant cellular structures

Modern communications theory has introduced methods

to increase fault tolerance in cell organizations. In the
past, if cell members only knew the cell leader, and the
leader was neutralized, the cell was cut o from the rest
of the organization. Game theory and graph theory have
Assume that in team ALAN, ALISTAIR is one of the of- been applied to the study of optimal covert network decers with local contacts, might recruit two cell leaders, sign (see Lindelauf, R.H.A. et al. 2009. The inuence
ALPINE and ALTITUDE. The other local ocer in the of secrecy on the communication structure of covert net-

12

CHAPTER 5. CLANDESTINE CELL SYSTEM

model). Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even
while it provides enhanced security). Even while cell
members are trained as replaceable units, vetting of
members occurs during the invited training period under
the observation of the core group.[13]

Clandestine teams have built initial subcells

works. Social Networks 31: 126-137).

If a traditional cell had independent communications with
the foreign support organization, headquarters might be
able to arrange its reconnection. Another method is to
have impersonal communications side links between
cells, such as a pair of dead drops, one for Team ALAN
to leave lost contact messages to be retrieved by Team
ALICE, and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave
messages for Team ALAN.
These links, to be used only on losing contact, do not
guarantee a contact. When a team nds a message in
its emergency drop, it might do no more than send an
alert message to headquarters. Headquarters might determine, through SIGINT or other sources, that the enemy
had captured the leadership and the entire team, and order the other team not to attempt contact. If headquarters
can have reasonable condence that there is a communications failure or partial compromise, it might send a new
contact to the survivors.

Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal

leadership core. Supercially, this might be likened to a
Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters,
but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while structures in other non-western cultures builds on close personal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involving family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are
thus extremely hard to inltrate; inltration has a serious
chance only outside the in-group. Still, it may be possible
for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or,
in rare cases, by compromising a member.
The core group is logically a ring, but is superimposed
on an inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological authority. Each member of the core forms another hub and
spoke system (see infrastructure cells), the spokes leading
to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core
group member, and possibly to operational groups which
the headquarters support. Note that in this organization,
there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation
may rejoin at various points.

When the cut-o team has electronic communications,

such as the Internet, it has a much better chance of eluding
surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by
using a dead drop that can be under physical surveillance.
Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

5.6 Non-traditional models, exemplied by al-Qaeda

Due to cultural dierences, assuming the al-Qaeda
Training Manual[12] is authentic, eastern cell structures
may dier from the Western mode. Al-Qaidas minimal
core group, only accounting for the leadership, can also
be viewed topologically as a ring or chain network, with
each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy.
Such networks function by having their sub-networks
provide information and other forms of support (the
many-to-one model), while the core group supplies truth and decisions/directions (the one-to-many

Osama, in this model, has the main responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on
propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the
propaganda cell. The other members of the core each
command one or more infrastructure cells.
While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit
exibility and the ability to scale the organization. This
in-group, while sharing tight cultural and ideological values, is not committed to a bureaucratic process.
Members of the core group are under what could be
termed 'positive control'long relationships and similar
mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there
are distinct roles, and position (structural, nancial, spiritual) determines authority, thus making the core group a

5.6. NON-TRADITIONAL MODELS, EXEMPLIFIED BY AL-QAEDA

hierarchy topologically.[13]
In the rst example of the core, each member knows how
to reach two other members, and also knows the member(s) he considers his ideological superior. Solid lines
show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the
rst level of ideological respect, and dotted blue arrows
show a second level of ideological respect.

13

trusted to some extent, but they may not know the contents of their messages or the actual identity of sender
and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance
among type and size of message, security, and technology
available, may memorize messages, carry audio or video
recordings, or hand-carry computer media.

If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would reconstitute itself. While dierent members have an individual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all
members, the core would reconstitute itself with Richard
as most respected.
Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached
directly only by members of the core group. Members of
outer cells and support systems might know him only as
the Commander, or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda,
Osama bin Ladens face is recognizable worldwide, but
only a few people know where he was or even how to
contact him.
Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training

These cells are socially embedded (less so than the

core group, however), structurally embedded, functionAny clandestine or covert service, especially a non- ally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and
national one, needs a variety of technical and adminis- knowledge base-specic (there does not seem to be a
great deal of cross-training, or lateral mobility in the orgatrative functions. Some of these services include:[13]
nization). Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture
of positive and negative control (do this, do these sorts
1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency
of things, dont do that).[13]
2. Apartments and hiding places
The leaders of military cells are responsible for training

5.6.1

Infrastructure cells

3. Communication means
4. Transportation means
5. Information
6. Arms and ammunition
7. Transport

them, and, when an operation is scheduled, selecting the

operational commander, giving him the basic objective
and arranging whatever support is needed, and then release him from tight control to execute the meeting. Depending on the specic case, the military leaders might
have direct, possibly one-way, communications with their
cells, or they might have to give Kim the messages to be
transmitted, by means that Anton and Hassan have no
need to know.

Other functions include psychological operations, train- Note that Anton does not have a direct connection to
ing, and nance.
Kim. Under normal circumstances, he sacrices eciency for security, by passing communications requests
[14]
A national intelligence service
has a support organization to deal with services such as nance, logistics, fa- through Hassan. The security structure also means that
cilities (e.g., safehouses), information technology, com- Hassan does not know the members of Antons cells, and
munications, training, weapons and explosives, medical Kim may know only ways to communicate with them but
services, etc. Transportation alone is a huge function, in- not their identity.
Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure communications and one for propaganda. To send out a propaganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim
were compromised, the core group might have signicant
Some of these functions, such as nance, are far harder to problems with any sort of outside communications.
operate in remote areas, such as the FATA of Pakistan, Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell systhan in cities with large numbers of ocial and unocial tems that regularly report to a headquarters. The apparent
nancial institutions, and the communications to support al-Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide
them. If the nancial oce is distant from the remote on their nal dates and means of attack exhibit an operheadquarters, there is a need for couriers, who must be ational pattern, but not a periodicity that could easily be
cluding the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion,
and, where appropriate, using private vehicles. Finance
includes the need to transfer money without coming under the suspicion of nancial security organizations.

14

CHAPTER 5. CLANDESTINE CELL SYSTEM

used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warning center. Such lists depend on seeing a local pattern to
give a specic warning.[15]
Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet
established operational cells. These subordinates can be
considered sleepers, but not necessarily with a sleeper
cell.

5.6.2

Operational cells

For each mission are created one or more operational

cells. If the al-Qaeda signature of multiple concurrent
attacks is used, there may be an operational cell for each
target location. It will depend on the operation if they
will need any support cells in the operational area. For
example, it may be more secure to have a local cell build
bombs, which will be delivered by cells coming from outside the area.
Operational cells are not created, but instead 'seeded'
utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance
(both groups are 'vetted' by being trained under the observation of the core group, which dramatically restricts
the opportunity for passing o walk-ins under false ag).
Categorization of operational cells appears to be by capabilities, region, and then task/operation. Operational cells
are composed of members whose worldview has been
rmly testednecessary to front-load, because such cells
are dispersed back to their own local control (or negative controlproscribed behaviorwith positive control
only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or
support).[13]
If operational cells routinely are released curved dotted
lines on link to military cells to select their nal operational
parameters, they use a dierent paradigm than governmental clandestine or covert operations. On a number of
cases, US special operations forces had to wait for Presidential authorization to make an attack, or even move to
staging areas. Admittedly, a country would have to face
the consequences of an inappropriate attack, so it may
tend to be overcautious, where a terror network would
merely shrug at the world being upset. Assuming that the
al-Qaeda operational technique is not to use positive control, their operations may be more random, but also more
unpredictable for counterterror forces. If their cells truly
need constant control, there are communications links
that might be detected by SIGINT, and if their command
can be disrupted, the eld units could not function. Since
there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out
of synchronization with other activities, the lack of positive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell
organization.
The operational cells need to have continuous internal
communication; there is a commander, who may be in
touch with infrastructure cells or, less likely from a security standpoint with the core group.

Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

Al-Qaedas approach, which even diers from that of earlier terrorist organizations, may be very viable for their
goals:
Cells are redundant and distributed, making them
dicult to roll up
Cells are coordinated, not under command &
controlthis autonomy and local control makes
them exible, and enhances security
Trust and comcon internally to the cell provide redundancy of potential command (a failure of Palestinian operations in the past), and well as a shared
knowledgebase (which may mean, over time, that
cross training emerges inside a cell, providing redundancy of most critical skills and knowledge).[13]

5.6.3 Indirect support networks

In the above graphic, note the indirect support network
controlled by Richards subcell.
While Al-Qaida has elements of the organization designed to support the structure, but such elements are insucient in meeting the needs of such an organization,
and for security reasons there would be redundant and
secondary-/tertiary-networks that are unaware of their
connection to Al-Qaida. These networks, primarily related to fundraising and nancial activities, as well as
technology providers, are in a use relationship with AlQaidamanaged through cut-outs or individuals that do
not inform them of the nature of activities, and that may
have a cover pretext sucient to deect questions or
inquiry.[13]

5.6.4 A possible countermeasure

In 2002, U.S. News & World Report said that American
intelligence is beginning to acquire a suciently critical mass of intelligence on al-Qaida indicating, Once
thought nearly impossible to penetrate, al Qaeda is proving no tougher a target than the KGB or the Maa--closed

5.9. EXTERNAL LINKS

societies that took the U.S. government years to get inside. We're getting names, the dierent camps they
trained at, the hierarchy, the inghting, says an intelligence ocial. Its very promising.[16] The report also
said that the collected data has allowed the recruiting of
informants.
Writing in the U.S. Army journal Military Review, David
W. Pendall suggested that a catch-and-release program
for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts
or, perhaps more important, create distrust in the cell
leaders of these individuals in the future. The author
noted the press release describing Ramzi Binalshibs cooperation with the United States are sure to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely
limits the further trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large. The captor would determine when to
name names and when to remain silent.[17] Indeed, once
intelligence learns the name and characteristics of an atlarge adversary, as well as some sensitive information that
would plausibly be known to him, a news release could be
issued to talk about his cooperation. Such a method could
not be used too often, but, used carefully, could disturb
the critical trust networks. The greatest uncertainty might
be associated with throwing doubt onto a key member of
an operational cell that has gone autonomous.

5.7 See also

Leaderless resistance
Lone wolf (terrorism)

5.8 References
[1] Leahy, Kevin C. (2005). The Impact of Technology on
the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of
Insurgent Groups (PDF). Retrieved 2007-12-04.
[2] Irish Republican Army. The Green Book. Archived
from the original on 2007-06-16. Retrieved 2007-12-04.
[3] Hall, Roger (1964). You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger. Bantam Books.
[4] Hogan, David W. (1992). Chapter 3: Special Operations
in the European Theater. U.S. Army Special Operations
in World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army
Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-42.
[5] Pike, Douglas (1970). Viet Cong: Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.
MIT Press.
[6] US Department of the Army (December 2006). FM 324: Counterinsurgency (PDF).
[7] Mao, Zedong (1967). On Protracted War. Foreign Language Press, Beijing.

15

[8] US Department of the Army (20 February 2003). FM 307 (formerly FM 100-20): Stability Operations and Support Operations.
[9] Nyberg, Eric N. (1991). Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery. US Marine Corps University Command and Sta
College.
[10] Luttwak, Edward (1968). Coup d'etat: A Practical Handbook. Harvard University Press.
[11] Guevara, Ernesto Che (1961). On Guerilla Warfare.
Praeger.
[12] al-Qaeda training manual (PDF). US Southern District
Court, US New York City Attorneys Oce, entered as
evidence in Africa embassy bombings.
[13] Decision Support Systems, Inc. (2001-12-31). Hunting
the Sleepers: Tracking al-Qaidas Covert Operatives
(PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-17.
[14] US Central Intelligence Agency. Support to Mission:
Who We Are. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
[15] Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana. Modeling Terrorist Networks - Complex Systems at the Mid-Range
(PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-02.
[16] Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002). Run and Gun:
Al Qaeda arrests and intelligence hauls bring new energy
to the war on terrorism. U.S. News & World Report.
[17] Pendall, David W. (JanuaryFebruary 2004). EectsBased Operations and the Exercise of National Power.
Military Review (United States Army Combined Arms
Center). Find the article by going through the Military
Review directories

5.9 External links

An Introduction To Terrorist Organisational Structures

Chapter 6

Clandestine HUMINT
This article is a subset article under Human Intelligence. For a
complete hierarchical list of articles, see the intelligence cycle management hierarchy. Concepts here
also are intimately associated with
counterintelligence.
This article
deals with the what of clandestine
HUMINT, and is a prerequisite for
the how in the Clandestine HUMINT
operational techniques article.

HUMINT is in a constant battle with counterintelligence,

and the relationship can become very blurry, as one side
tries to turn agents of the other into reporting to the
other side. Recruiters can run false ag operations, where
a citizen of country A believes they are providing intelligence to country B, when they are actually providing it to
country C.

Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines,

espionage usually involves accessing the place where the
desired information is stored, or accessing the people
who know the information and will divulge it through
some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence
Clandestine HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence) is intel- of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people to whom
ligence collected from human sources using clandestine he was selling information.
espionage methods. These sources consist of people
working in a variety of roles within the intelligence com- This article does not cover military units that penetrate
munity. Examples include the classic spy (known by deep between enemy lines, but generally in uniform,
professionals as an asset or agent), who collects intel- to conduct special reconnaissance. Such military units
ligence, couriers and related personnel, who handle an can be on the border of the line, in international law,
intelligence organizations (ideally) secure communica- which denes them as spies, if they conduct informations, and support personnel, such as access agents, who tion in civilian clothes. In some circumstances, the unimay arrange the contact between the potential spy and formed personnel may act in support to the actual agents,
the case ocer who recruits them. The recruiter and su- providing communications, transportation, nancial, and
pervising agent may not necessarily be the same individ- other support. Yet another discipline is covert operations,
ual. Large espionage networks may be composed of mul- where personnel, uniformed or not, may conduct raids,
tiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. sabotage, assassinations, propaganda (i.e., psychological
Espionage networks are typically organized as a cell sys- operations), etc.
tem, in which each clandestine operator knows the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case ocer, and
an emergency method (which may not necessarily involve 6.1 Legal aspects
another person) to contact higher levels if the case ocer
or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people Blacks Law Dictionary (1990) denes espionage as:
in other cells.
"...gathering, transmitting, or losing...information related
Espionage involves a human being obtaining (i.e., us- to the national defense.
ing human intelligence (HUMINT) methods) informa- In the UK, Under the 1911 Act, a person commits the
tion that is considered secret or condential without the oence of 'spying' if he, for any purpose prejudicial to the
permission of the holder of the information. Espionage safety or interests of the State;
is inherently clandestine, and the legitimate holder of the
information may change plans or take other countermea(a) approaches, inspects, passes over or is in
sures once it is known that the information is in unauthothe neighbourhood of, or enters any prohibited
rized hands. See the articles such Clandestine HUMINT
place,
operational techniques and Clandestine HUMINT asset
(b) makes any sketch, plan, model, or note
recruiting for discussions of the tradecraft used to collect this information.
which is calculated to be or might be or is in16

6.3. PENETRATIONS OF FOREIGN TARGETS BY PEOPLE LOYAL TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY

17

tended to be directly or indirectly useful to an

enemy; or

6.3 Penetrations of foreign targets

by people loyal to their own
country

(c) obtains, collects, records, or publishes, or

communicates to any other person any secret
ocial code word, or pass word, or any sketch,
plan, model, article, or note, or other document
which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an
enemy. [Note: an enemy apparently means a
potential enemy, so could theoretically include
all foreign governments]

Not all clandestine human sources change their loyalties

to the country to which they were born, or owed their rst
allegiance. In this section we are talking of the classical
and actually rare spy, who really is a loyal citizen of
country A but obtains information from country B, either
through informal means (e.g., fake news reporting) or actually going to work for country B.

The oence of spying covers all such acts

committed by any person within Her Majestys
dominions, and such acts committed elsewhere
by British Ocers or subjects. It is not necessary for the person concerned to have been
warned beforehand that they were subject to
the Ocial Secrets Act. The 1920 Act creates
further oences of doing any act preparatory
to spying, or of soliciting, inciting, seeking to
persuade, or aiding and abetting any other person to commit spying.[1]

A special case is of the Country B loyalist who controls

agents or provides other supporting or managerial functions against Country A.

6.3.1 Clandestine Reporting

Richard Sorge was a Soviet citizen (i.e., country A), who
posed as a German (country C) journalist in Tokyo, to report on Japan (country B) back to the Soviet Union. Sorge
was eventually caught and executed by the Japanese, who
generally honored his bravery. Especially in wartime,
while a country may need to execute an agent, they sometimes respect them.

It is a truism that a live captured spy has more potential

value than a dead one, since a live one can still be interrogated, or perhaps turned into a double agent. There have
been cases where countries have announced the execution
The US denes espionage towards itself as The act of ob- of people who are actually alive.
taining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an
intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be 6.3.2 Dangled Mole
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Espionage is a violation of 18 Dangled moles start out being loyal to one country B, but
United States Code 792-798 and Article 106, Uniform go to work for another service A, reporting back to their
Code of Military Justice.[2] "
original service. Such operations can become innities
of mirrors[3] as the mole may be detected and the service
by which they are employed tries to double them, which
may or may not work.
One of the best-known, and apparently most successful,
6.2 Major HUMINT organizations was the early Soviet recruitment of Kim Philby (i.e., service B), who was then dangled to the British Secret Intelligence Service (i.e., service A), for whom Philby went to
See List of intelligence agencies for a more complete list work and rose to high rank. Philby is discussed further
Espionage is usually part of an institutional eort (i.e., below.
governmental or corporate espionage), and the term is As far as is known from public sources, the only mole,
most readily associated with state spying on potential already loyal to a foreign service, who went to work for
or actual enemies, primarily for military purposes, but the CIA (i.e., in the service A role) was Karl Koecher,
this has been extended to spying involving corporations, who actually was loyal to the Czechoslovakian intelliknown specically as industrial espionage. Many nations gence service (service B1), while Czechoslovakia was a
routinely spy on both their enemies and allies, although Soviet (i.e., service B) satellite state. Koecher became a
they maintain a policy of not making comment on this. In CIA translator and a good source of information to the
addition to utilizing agencies within a government many Czechs and Soviets. While, as far as is known in pubalso employ private companies to collect information on lic sources, still loyal to his original agency, Koecher was
their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others.
ordered to report to Moscow by Oleg Kalugin, longtime

18

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

legal resident of the USSR in the US. Kalugin accused

Koecher of being a US double agent. Koecher retired
from the CIA and went to work in academia, but was
subsequently reactivated by the KGB and went to work,
part-time, for the CIA. During this period, he was discovered by the FBI, who attempted to double him against the
KGB, but the FBI considered him unreliable and eventually arrested him. The arrest was legally tainted, and
Koecher was eventually exchanged for Soviet prisoners,
both sides apparently not wanting the aair to be in a
public court.
The US used Katrina Leung as a dangled mole to the
PRC, although the true loyalty of Leung, who came to
the US on a Taiwanese passport, is not known with certainty. She may have had a long-term allegiance to the
PRC, been loyal to the US and then been turned by the
PRC, or primarily been loyal to herself.

6.4 Human sources who changed

allegiance
With the exception of penetration moles, other human
sources start out as highly trusted by their services. What
causes an individual to betray service A, typically his
country of birth? The most common shorthand for changing allegiance is MICE, an acronym for:
Money: Low salary? Greedy? Needs
money for family crisis? In debt?
Ideology: Hates his system, admires
ours?
Compromise (or coercion): Vulnerable
to blackmail? Emotional relationship
with an access agent?
Ego (or excitement): Lonely? Looking for a friend? Passed over for a promotion? Not appreciated by peers and
superiors? Seeking praise and recognition? Adventurous? Looking for personal challenge? Wants to be James
Bond? Egomaniac? Wants to prove he
can get away with it?

It examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing actual espionage subjects. Additionally,
persons knowledgeable of subjects are contacted to better understand the subjects private lives and how they are
perceived by others while conducting espionage .[4]
According to a press report about Project Slammer and
Congressional oversight of counterespionage, one fairly
basic function is observing ones own personnel for behavior that either suggests that they could be targets for
foreign HUMINT, or may already have been subverted.
News reports indicate that in hindsight, red ags were
ying but not noticed. [5] In several major penetrations
of US services, such as Aldrich Ames, the Walker ring
or Robert Hanssen, the individual showed patterns of
spending inconsistent with their salary. Some people with
changed spending may have a perfectly good reason, such
as an inheritance or even winning the lottery, but such
patterns should not be ignored.
By 1997, the Project Slammer work was being presented at public meetings of the Security Policy Advisory Board.[6] While a funding cut caused the loss of impetus in the mid-nineties, there are research data used
throughout the security community. They emphasize the
essential and multi-faceted motivational patterns underlying espionage. Future Slammer analyses will focus on
newly developing issues in espionage such as the role of
money, the new dimensions of loyalty and what seems to
be a developing trend toward economic espionage.
According to a 2008 Defense Department study, nancial incentives and external coercion have played diminishing roles in motivating Americans to spy against the
United States, but divided loyalties are increasingly evident in recent espionage cases. The study said, Two
thirds of American spies since 1990 have volunteered.
Since 1990, spying has not paid well: 80% of spies received no payment for espionage, and since 2000 it appears no one was paid. ... Oenders since 1990 are more
likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties, and therefore they are
more likely to be motivated to spy from divided loyalties. Despite this trend, the report says that the majority
(65%) of American spies are still native born.[7][8]

Sometimes more than one factor applies, as with Robert 6.4.1 Recruitment through Money
Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence agent who was a
write-in to the KGB. While he received large amounts Ames seems to have been motivated primarily by money.
of money, he apparently felt unappreciated in his own service and spying on it satised his ego.
Psychological factors can apply to people changing allegiance for reasons other than coercion or ideology. To
go beyond slogans, Project Slammer was an eort of
the Intelligence Community Sta, under the Director of
Central Intelligence, to come up with characteristics of
Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored
study of espionage.

6.4.2 Recruitment through Ideology

Among the most important moles, a senior ocer already
in place when he started reporting, for ideological reasons, to service B (actually two Bs, SIS and CIA), was
Col. Oleg Penkovsky [9]

6.5. RECRUIT TYPES

6.4.3

Recruitment through Compromise

19
Leaves and goes to B

Recruitment can be done through personal relationships,

Philip Agee is an example of a US CIA ocer who came
from casual sex and blackmail to friendship or romance
to the belief that he was working on behalf of an ideology
he had come to hate. Eventually, he resigned, and clandestinely went to Cuba, telling their intelligence service
6.4.4 Recruitment through Ego
everything he knew, with the stated goal [11] of damaging
the CIA. Agee claims the CIA was satised with his work
Personnel in sensitive positions, who have diculty getand did not want him to leave, although the author, John
ting along with peers, may become risks for being comBarrow, claims that he was close to being discharged for
promised with an approach based on ego. William
improper personal conduct .[12]
Kampiles, a low-level worker in the CIA Watch Center, sold, for a small sum, the critical operations man- Soviet, and now Russian, doctrine has some interesting
ual on the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite. To an inter- insights that might well be useful to the West. For examviewer, Kampiles suggested that if someone had noted ple, rather than use the term defector, which has a neghis problemconstant conicts with supervisors and ative connotation, they use the Russian word dobrozhelaco-workersand brought in outside counseling, he might tel, well-wisher, as used here virtually the equivalent of
walk-in. This term has a positive connotation, and may
not have stolen the KH-11 manual.[5]
reect how the service views such people, as described
by Ivan Serov, [13] former chief of GRU (Soviet military
intelligence)
6.5 Recruit Types
While the term well-wisher may be positive, in Serovs
view, he does not assume a well-wisher has value to oer.
6.5.1 Mole
The majority actually turn out to be oering material of
Other than the dangled moles described above, moles no signicant value. The rst task is to determine if they
start out as loyal to their own country A. They may or are random sympathizers who fail to understand the subject they propose to discuss, or are active provocations
may not be a trained intelligence ocer.
being run by foreign counterintelligence.
Note that some intelligence professionals reserve the term
mole to refer to enemy personnel that personally know Provocateurs obtain some value if they can simply idenimportant things about enemy intelligence operations, tify the intelligence ocers in an embassy, so the initial
technology, or military plans. A person such as a clerk interviews are, unless there is a strong reason to the conor courier (e.g., Jack Dunlap, who photographed many trary, conducted by low-level sta. Serov points out that
documents but was not really in a position to explore en- even if some walk-ins have no material of value, Some
emy thinking), is more generically an asset. To be clear, are ideologically close to us and genuinely and unselshly
anxious to help us; some are in sympathy with the Soviet
all moles are assets, but not all assets are moles.
Union but want at the same time to supplement their inAnother special case is a deep cover or sleeper mole, come; and some, though not in accord with our ideas and
who may enter a service, possibly at a young age, but def- views, are still ready to collaborate honestly with us for
initely not reporting or doing anything that would attract nancial reasons. A genuine sympathizer without usesuspicion, until reaching a senior position. Kim Philby is ful material still may become useful as an access agent,
an example of an agent actively recruited by the British courier, or support agent.
Secret Intelligence Service while he was already committed to Communism. Philby, at rst, concentrated on do- Other walk-ins simply are trying to get money, either for
ing a good job for the British, so he could rise in trust and nonsense information or for real information with which
authority .[10] Philby was motivated by ideology before he they have been entrusted. Physical walk-ins are not the
only kind of volunteer well-wisher, who may commujoined SIS.
nicate through the mail, by telephone, or direct contact.
If, for example, contact is made with someone who really is an intelligence ocer, there is immediate reason
Defector
to believe the person does have intelligence contacts
An individual may want to leave their service at once, but further investigation is necessary to see if they are
perhaps from high-level disgust, or low-level risk of hav- real or if they are provocateurs from counterintelligence.
ing been discovered in nancial irregularities and is just A provocateur can be from the local agency, or even from
ahead of arrest. Even so, the defector certainly brings a third country false-ag provocation.
knowledge with him, and may be able to bring documents Persons wanting to make money usually produce a large
or other materials of value.
quantity of documents and talk much and willingly about
Starts in A

themselves, trying to make a favorable impression. Extortioners and blackmailers usually act impudent, making

20

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

their oer in the form of an ultimatum and even resorting found dead under mysterious circumstances, had believed
to open threats.
they had been recruited by Wilson, under the pretense
that he was still a CIA executive. According to Epstein,
Wilson maintained a close association with two of the
Defector in place
agencys top executives-Thomas G. Clines, the director
of training for the clandestine services, and Theodore G.
Another method is to directly recruit an intelligence of- Shackley, who held the No. 2 position in the espionage
cer (or terrorist member) from within the ranks of the branch. Both of these men sat in on meetings that Wiladversary service (terrorist group) and having that ocer son held with his operatives and weapon suppliers and, by
(terrorist) maintain their normal duties while spying on doing so, helped further the illusion that his activities had
their parent service (organization); this is also referred to the sanction of the CIA an illusion crucial to keeping
as recruiting an agent or defector in place.[14]
his false ag attractive.[15] Wilson was involved in thenbanned arms sales to Libya, and it is unclear who actually
Starts in A
sponsored these sales.
Stays working in A but reporting to B
He was in Libya in 1982, but came to the Dominican Republic in 1982, where he was arrested for illegal arms
As mentioned, Oleg Penkovsky was a key US-British sales, and sentenced, in 1984, to 52 years in prison. He
agent, apparently detected through Soviet counterintel- was 55 years old at the time.
ligence work. Adolf Tolkachev, an electronic engineer
Continuing Freedom of Information Act and other reworking on Soviet radar, was another defector in place for
search by his attorney caused a federal judge to throw
the US, who was exposed by the CIA defector, Edward
out the conviction,[16] on the basis that prosecutors deLee Howard, who ed to the KGB before being arrested.
liberately deceived the court, in the words of the judge,
Penkovsky and Tolkachev, both motivated by ideology,
America will not defeat Libyan terrorism by doublewere executed by the Soviets.
crossing a part-time, informal government agent.
To give a sense of the innity of mirrors involved in
agent work, Howard was exposed by an apparent Soviet walk-in defector, Vitaly Yurchenko, who walked into 6.5.2 Double Agent
the US Embassy in Rome and defected to the United
States. While Yurchenko also identied Ronald Pel- The rst thing to consider about a double agent is that he
ton as a Soviet defector-in-place working in the NSA, is, at least minimally, a trained intelligence asset. He may
Yurchenko himself re-defected back to the USSR within not be a full case ocer of the other side, but he may, at
a few months. It is possible that Yurchenko was acting as least, have been an agent of theirs. They had some reaa double agent, sent by the Soviets to sacrice less impor- son to trust him. Like all other intelligence operations,
tant Soviet assets in order to protect the more important double agent cases are run to protect and enhance the national security. They serve this purpose principally by
CIA defectors in place, e.g. Aldrich Ames.
providing current counterintelligence about hostile intelligence and security services and about clandestine subFalse Flag Penetrator
versive activities. The service and ocer considering a
double agent possibility must weigh net national advanA special case of a mole is a false ag recruitment of a tage thoughtfully, never forgetting that a double agent is,
penetrator:
in eect, a condoned channel of communication with the
enemy .[17]
Starts in C
Before even considering double agent operations, a serBelieves being recruited by A
vice has to consider its own resources. Managing that
agent will take skill and sophistication, both at the loActually is recruited by B and sends false inforcal/case ocer and central levels. Complexity goes up
mation to C
astronomically when the service cannot put physical conFalse ag recruitments, admittedly for covert action trols on its doubles, as did the Double Cross System in
rather than pure HUMINT, were reported [15] as a tech- WWII. In the Double Cross System, the double agents
nique used by Edwin P. Wilson, who left CIA in 1971, were motivated by coercion: they knew they would be exand then went to work for a Navy HUMINT unit, Task ecuted if they did not cooperate. Few of them were highly
Force 157 until 1976, when he went private.[16] During trained intelligence ocers, but opportunists to start.
his time working for CIA, he was both ocially and unocially involved in arms sales. His assignments sometimes required him to establish and use front companies to gain access to information and to support CIA operations here and abroad commercially.[16] Three men,

For predictive purposes the most important clue imbedded in the origins of an operation is the agents original
or primary aliation, whether it was formed voluntarily
or not, the length of its duration, and its intensity. The
eects of years of clandestine association with the adver-

6.5. RECRUIT TYPES

sary are deep and subtle; the Service B case ocer working with a double agent of service A is characterized by
an ethnicity or religion may nd those bonds run deep,
even if the agent hates the government of A. The service
B ocer may care deeply for the double.
Another result of lengthy prior clandestine service is that
the agent may be hard to control in most operations the
case ocers superior training and experience give him
so decided an edge over the agent that recognition of this
superiority makes the agent more tractable. But add to
the fact that the experienced double agent may have been
in the business longer than his U.S. control his further advantage in having gained a rst-hand comparative knowledge of the workings of at least two disparate services,
and it is obvious that the case ocers margin of superiority diminishes, vanishes, or even is reversed.
One facet of the eorts to control a double agent operation is to ensure that the double agent is protected from
discovery by the parent intelligence service; this is especially true in circumstances where the double agent is a
defector-in-place.
Double agent operations must be carefully planned, executed, and above all, reported. One of the problems with
double agent operations in the US, run by the FBI, is that
the FBI culture has been very decentralized to the eld
oce level. This is, perhaps, an overreaction to the extremely centralized culture under J. Edgar Hoover. Prior
to 9/11, information in one eld oce, which might reveal problems in a HUMINT operation, is not necessarily
shared with other oces. FBI Director Robert Mueller
cited the changes since 9/11: We then centralized coordination of our counterterrorism program. Unlike before, when investigations were managed primarily by individual eld oces, the Counterterrorism Division at
Headquarters now has the authority and the responsibility to direct and coordinate counterterrorism investigations throughout the country. This fundamental change
has improved our ability to coordinate our operations here
and abroad, and it has clearly established accountability
at Headquarters for the development and success of our
Counterterrorism Program. [18]
The amount of detail and administrative backstopping
seems unbearable at times in such matters. But since penetrations are always in short supply, and defectors can tell
less and less of what we need to know as time goes on, because of their cut-o dates, double agents will continue
to be part of the scene .[19] "
Services functioning abroad-and particularly those operating in areas where the police powers are in neutral or
hostile handsneed professional subtlety as well. The
agent handlers must have full knowledge of [the agents]
past (and especially of any prior intelligence associations), a solid grasp of his behavior pattern (both as an
individual and as a member of a national grouping), and
rapport in the relationship with him.[17] Case ocers
must know the agents area and have a nuanced under-

21
standing of his language; this is an extremely unwise situation for using interpreters, since the case ocer needs to
sense the emotional content of the agents communication
and match it with the details of the information owing in
both directions. Depending on whether the operation is
being run in ones own country, an allied country, or hostile territory, the case ocer needs to know the relevant
laws. Even in friendly territory, the case ocer needs
both liaison with, and knowledge of, the routine law enforcement and security units in the area, so the operation
is not blown because an ordinary policeman gets suspicious and brings the agent in for questioning.
If at all possible, the service running the double agent
have complete control of communications, which, in
practice, need to be by electronic means or dead drop.
Meetings between the double and his Service A handler
are extremely risky. Even text communication can have
patterns of grammar or word choice, known to the agent
and his original service, that can hide a warning of capture, by the use of a seemingly ordinary word. Some controlling services may paraphrase the doubles text to hide
such warnings, but run into the possibility of being detected by sophisticated analysis of the doubles normal
choice of words.
Basic Double agent
Starts in A
Recruited by B
Defects and tells B all he knows (defector)
operates in place (Agent doubled in
place) and continues to tell B about
A
Redoubled Agent
A service discovering an adversary agent, who entered
ones own service either as a penetrator or an asset in place
may oer him employment as a double. His agreement,
obtained under open or implied duress, is unlikely, however, to be accompanied by a genuine switch of loyalties.
The so-called redoubled agent whose duplicity in doubling for another service has been detected by his original
sponsor and who has been persuaded to reverse his aections again -also belongs to this dubious class. Many detected and doubled agents degenerate into what are sometimes called piston agents or mailmen, who change
their attitudes with their visas as they shunt from side to
side.[17]
Operations based on them are little more than unauthorized liaison with the enemy, and usually time-wasting
exercises in futility. A notable exception is the detected
and unwillingly doubled agent who is relieved to be found
out in his enforced service to the adversary.[17]

22

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

False ag double agent

Starts in A
Assigned to C
B creates a situation where agent believes he is
talking to C, when actually receiving B disinformation

(A may also send disinformation directly through Y, since B should assume A doesn't know line of communication Y is compromised)
Passive provocateur
Passive provocations are variants involving false-ag recruiting.

Active provocateur
There can be active and passive provocation agents. A
double agent may serve as a means through which a
provocation can be mounted against a person, an organization, an intelligence or security service, or any afliated group to induce action to its own disadvantage.
The provocation might be aimed at identifying members
of the other service, at diverting it to less important objectives, at tying up or wasting its assets and facilities, at
sowing dissension within its ranks, at inserting false data
into its les to mislead it, at building up in it a tainted le
for a specic purpose, at forcing it to surface an activity
it wanted to keep hidden, or at bringing public discredit
on it, making it look like an organization of idiots. The
Soviets and some of the Satellite services, the Poles in
particular, are extremely adept in the art of conspiratorial
provocation. All kinds of mechanisms have been used to
mount provocation operations; the double agent is only
one of them.[17]
An active provocateur is sent by Service A to Service B
to tell B that he works for A but wants to switch sides. Or
he may be a talk-in rather than a walk-in. In any event,
the signicant information that he is withholding, in compliance with As orders, is the fact that his oer is being
made at As instigation. He is also very likely to conceal one channel of communication with A-for example,
a second secret writing system. Such side-commo enables A to keep in full touch while sending through the
divulged communications channel only messages meant
for adversary eyes. The provocateur may also conceal his
true sponsor, claiming for example (and truthfully) to represent an A1 service (allied with A) whereas his actual
control is the A-a fact which the Soviets conceal from the
Satellite as carefully as from us.[17]
Starts in A and is actually loyal to A
Goes to B, says he works for A, but wants to
switch sides. Gives B access to his communications channel with A (channel Y)
Keeps second communications channel, X with
A, about which B knows nothing
Reports operational techniques of
B to A via X
Provides disinformation from A,
via X, which he disseminates to B

In Country C, Service A surveys the intelligence terrain through the eyes of Service B (a species of mirrorreading) and selects those citizens whose access to
sources and other qualications make them most attractive to B. Service A ocers, posing as service B ocers,
recruit the citizens of country C. At some point, service A
then exposes these individuals, and complains to country
C that country B is subverting its citizens.
The stake-out has a far better chance of success in areas
like Africa, where intelligence exploitation of local resources is far less intensive, than in Europe, where persons with valuable access are likely to have been approached repeatedly by recruiting services during the
postwar years.[17]
A does an analysis of C and determines what
targets would be attractive to B
A then recruits citizens of C, which A believes
will be more loyal to B
The A recruit, a citizen of C, volunteers to B
A can then expose Bs penetration of C, hurting
B-C relations.
This may be extremely dicult to accomplish, and even if
accomplished the real diculty is maintaining control of
this turned asset. Controlling an enemy agent who has
been turned is a many-faceted and complex exercise that
essentially boils down to making certain that the agents
new-found loyalty remains consistent, which means determining whether the doubled agents turning is genuine or false. However, this process can be quite convoluted and fraught with uncertainty and suspicion.[14]
Where it concerns terrorist groups, a terrorist who betrays
his organization can be thought of and run as a doubleagent against the terrorists parent organization in much
the same fashion as an intelligence ocer from a foreign
intelligence service. Therefore, for sake of ease, wherever
double-agents are discussed the methodologies generally
apply to activities conducted against terrorist groups as
well.[14]
Fake double agent
Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves
rather than a service are not double agents because they

6.5. RECRUIT TYPES

23

are not agents. Almost certainly motivated by money, it the large landings came at Normandy, deception operais unlikely they can maintain the deception for very long. tions continued, convincing the Germans that Operation
They may be uncovered by a headquarters check, as they Neptune at Normandy was a feint, so that they held back
their strategic reserves. By the time it became apparmay well have tried the same game elsewhere.
ent that Normandy was indeed the main invasions, the
strategic reserves had been under heavy air attack, and
the lodgment was suciently strong that the reduced reUnwitting double agent
serves could not push it back.
Witting is a term of intelligence art that indicates that
There are other benets to analyzing the exchange of inone is not only aware of a fact or piece of information, but
formation between the double agent and his original seralso aware of its connection to intelligence activities. An
vice, such as learning the priorities of service A through
unwitting double agent thinks that he is still working for
the information requests they are sending to an individhis own Service A, but Service B has somehow managed
ual they believe is working for them. If the requests all
what, in communications security, is called a man-in-theturn out to be for information that service A could not use
middle attack. Service A believes it is in contact with its
against B, and this becomes a pattern, service A may have
own agent, and the agent believes he is communicating
realized their agent has been turned.
with his true control. This is extremely dicult to conSince maintaining control over double agents is tricky at
tinue for more than a very brief period of time.
best, it is not hard to see how problematic this methodolCreating an unwitting double agent is extremely rare. The
ogy can become. The potential for multiple turnings of
manipulative skill required to deceive an agent into thinkagents and perhaps worse, the turning of ones own ining that he is serving his team when in fact he is damaging
telligence ocers (especially those working within counits interests is plainly of the highest order.
terintelligence itself), poses a serious risk to any intelligence service wishing to employ these techniques. This
may be the reason that triple-agent operations appear not
6.5.3 Multiply Turned Agent
to have been undertaken by U.S. counterintelligence in
A triple agent can be a double agent that decides his true some espionage cases that have come to light in recent
loyalty is to his original service, or could always have been years, particularly among those involving high-level penloyal to his service but is part of an active provocation of etrations. Although the arrest and prosecution of Aldrich
your service. If managing a double agent is hard, agents Ames of the CIA and Robert Hanssen of the FBI, both of
that turned again (i.e., tripled) or another time after that whom were senior counterintelligence ocers in their reare far more dicult, but in some rare cases, worthwhile. spective agencies who volunteered to spy for the Russians,
hardly qualies as conclusive evidence that triple-agent
Any service B controlling, or believing it controls, a dou- operations were not attempted throughout the commuble agent, must constantly evaluate the information that nity writ large, these two cases suggest that neutralization
agent is providing on service A. While service A may operations may be the preferred method of handling adhave been willing to sacrice meaningful information, or versary double agent operations vice the more aggressive
even other human assets, to help an intended penetration exploitation of these potential triple-agent sources.[14]
agent establish his bona des, at some point, service A
may start providing useless or misleading information as
part of the goal of service A. In the WWII Double Cross Triple agent
System ,[20] another way the British controllers (i.e., serStarts out working for B
vice B in this example) kept the Nazis believing in their
agent, was that the British let true information ow, but
Volunteers to be a defector-in-place for A
too late for the Germans to act on it. The double agent
Discovered by B
might send information indicating that a lucrative target
was in range of a German submarine, but, by the time the
Oers his communications with A to B, so B
information reaches the Germans, they conrm the report
may gain operational data about A and send
was true because the ship is now docked in a safe port
disinformation to A
that would have been a logical destination on the course
reported by the agent .[21] While the Double Cross Sys- A concern with triple agents, of course, is if they have
tem actively handled the double agent, the information changed loyalties twice, why not a third or even more
sent to the Germans was part of the overall Operation times? Consider a variant where the agent remains funBodyguard deception program of the London Control- damentally loyal to B:
ling Section. Bodyguard was meant to convince the Germans that the Allies planned their main invasion at one of
several places, none of which were Normandy. As long Quadruple agent
as the Germans found those deceptions credible, which
Starts out working for B
they did, they reinforced the other locations. Even when

24

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

Volunteers to be a defector-in-place for A.
Works out a signal by which he can inform A
that B has discovered and is controlling him

6.6 Support Services

6.6.1 Couriers

Discovered by B
Oers his communications with A to B.
B actually gets disinformation
about As operational techniques
A learns what B wants to know,
such as potential vulnerabilities of
A, which A will then correct

A courier has no responsibilities other than clandestine

communications. Any involvement of the courier in activities that may draw attention from counterintelligence
is unwise. For example, if there is a political party,
friendship society, or other organization that would be
considered favorable to Service B, couriers, under no circumstances, should be identied with them.

Courier work is among those things that consist of hours

of boredom punctuated with moments of sheer terror.
Keeping a courier, who is not a member of your service
Successes such as the British Double Cross System or the and/or has diplomatic cover, is challenging.
German Operation North Pole show that these types of Occasionally, it may be practical to transfer a courier
operations are indeed feasible. Therefore, despite the ob- to other, more challenging duties. Once that transfer is
viously very risky and extremely complex nature of dou- made, however, the individual should never be reassigned
ble agent operations, the potentially quite lucrative intel- to courier duty, as the probability of that person having
ligence windfall the disruption or deception of an ad- become known to counterintelligence is much higher.
versary service makes them an inseparable component
There may be occasions where diplomats, or even memof exploitation operations .[14]
bers of diplomats families who have diplomatic immuIf a double agent wants to come home to Service A, how nity, may serve as couriers. Their value in the diplomatic
can he oer a better way to redeem himself than recruit- service must be weighed against the near certainty that if
ing the Service B case ocer that was running his double discovered, they will be expelled as persona non grata.
agent case, essentially redoubling the direction of the opDrivers, especially those trained to receive car tosses, are
eration? If the case ocer refuses, that is apt to be the
a variant of couriers, and to which the same constraints
end of the operation. If the attempt fails, of course, the
apply. Using persons with diplomatic immunity may be
whole operation has to be terminated. A creative agent
slightly more sensible in the case of drivers, since their
can tell his case oce, even if he had not been tripled, that
cars are usually immune to search. On the other hand,
he had been loyal all along, and the case ocer would, at
a diplomatic car will have distinctive license plates and
best, be revealed as a fool.
may be under surveillance whenever it leaves diplomatic
Occasionally a service runs a double agent whom it premises. Counterintelligence services may take the risk,
knows to be under the control of the other service and given the potential reward, of putting electronic tracking
therefore has little ability to manipulate or even one who devices on diplomatic vehicles.
it knows has been successfully redoubled. The question
why a service sometimes does this is a valid one. One
reason for us is humanitarian: when the other service has 6.6.2 Safehouses and Other Meeting
gained physical control of the agent by apprehending him
Places
in a denied area, we often continue the operation even
though we know that he has been doubled back because
Safehouses may not be literal stand-alone houses. Indeed,
we want to keep him alive if we can.
in an urban area, the anonymity of an apartment house or
Another reason might be a desire to determine how the oce building may give greater security.
other service conducts its double agent operations or what
it uses for operational build-up or deception material and In more rural areas, houses may indeed be needed. This
from what level it is disseminated. There might be other is especially the case if the country team needs storage of
advantages, such as deceiving the opposition as to the ser- bulky supplies (e.g., weapons, sabotage materials, propavices own capabilities, skills, intentions, etc. Perhaps the ganda), printing presses, etc.
service might want to continue running the known redou- In general, communications, as well as equipment clearly
bled agent in order to conceal other operations. It might associated with clandestine operations, should be portable
want to tie up the facilities of the opposition. It might and not xed in a safehouse used for meetings. If this is
use the redoubled agent as an adjunct in a provocation done, there is a chance that a counterintelligence search
being run against the opposition elsewhere. Running a of the premises might not turn up anything incriminating.
known redoubled agent is like playing poker against a pro- On the other hand, things that must be carried around
fessional who has marked the cards but who presumably is may be discovered if a person or vehicle is searched.
unaware that you can read the backs as well as he can.[17] The safehouse should have emergency communications

6.6. SUPPORT SERVICES

so that it can be reached to call o a meeting or to warn
of surveillance or an impending raid, preferably with a
wrong-number dialogue or other deniable communications method.

25
Additional requirements for bank reporting were in the
PATRIOT act, and intended to help catch terrorists
preparing for operations. It is not clear, however, if terrorist operations will involve highly visible cash transactions. The 9/11 operations cells were reported to have
required somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 in
operating funds, and there were indeed wire transfers in
the $100,000 range. Still, the question remains if a relatively small expenditure, compared with the enormous
amounts in the illegal drug trade, will draw counterintelligence/counterterrorist attention.

It is a dicult call as to whether a safehouse should have

destruction facilities. Modern forensic laboratories can
reconstruct papers that are merely burned or shredded,
although shredders are no longer exotic items, especially
if the safehouse serves a mundane oce function. More
denitive destruction capabilities will conrm the clandestine use of the premises, but they may be a reasonable
protection if the safehouse is being overrun and critical Wire transfers and bank deposits go through formal
communications or other security material is in jeopardy. value transfer systems where there is reporting to government. Especially terrorist groups, however, have access
to informal value transfer systems (IVTS), where there is
no reporting, although FinCEN has been suggesting indi6.6.3 Finance
rect means of detecting the operation of IVTS.[22]
Industrialized nations, with complex nancial systems,
have a variety of reporting systems about money transfer, from which counterintelligence potentially can derive patterns of operations and warnings of operations in
progress. Money laundering refers to methods for getting
cash in and out of the nancial system without it being
noticed by nancial counterintelligence.

For clandestine networks where the case ocers are under non-ocial cover, handling large sums of cash is more
dicult and may justify resorting to IVTS. When the
cover is under a proprietary (owned by the intelligence
agency) aviation company, it can be relatively simple to
hide large bundles of cash, and make direct payments.

The need for money, and challenge of concealing its

transfer, will vary with the purpose of the clandestine system. If it is operated by a case ocer under diplomatic
cover, and the money is for small payments to agent(s),
the embassy can easily get cash, and the amounts paid
may not draw suspicion. If, however, there will be large
payments to an agent, getting the money still is not a
problem for the embassy, but there starts to be a concern
that the agent may draw attention to himself by extensive
spending.

Formal Value Transfer Systems

The question remains if sudden wealth is likely to be

detected. More extensive bank reporting, partially as a
result of the US PATRIOT Act and other reporting requirements of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the latter established before 9/11, may
make receiving payments easier to catch.

detectives. There is a conict of interest and lack of law

enforcement training when bank employees are asked to
monitor the legality of their customers acts. Stay aware
of the status of court tests of legislation and regulation
in this area, as well as new legislation. While it is possible to teach many investigative skills, every experienced

In the US, nancial transactions begin with mutual identication between the customer and the nancial institution. Although there are many Internet frauds involving
fake nancial institutions or criminals masquerading as a
nancial institution (i.e., phishing), the more dicult requirement is for the prospective customer to show acceptable identication to the bank. For basic relationships,
a government-issued identication document, such as a
US security systems, about which the most public infor- passport or drivers license, usually suces. For foreign
nationals, their countrys equivalent may be accepted, almation is known, usually include a credit check as part
of a security clearance, and excessive debt is a matter of though it may be harder to verify.
concern. It may be the case that refusing to clear peo- Going beyond the basics becomes much more dicult.
ple with known nancial problems has stopped a poten- Were the relationship one that involved classied intial penetration, but, in reality, the problem may well be at formation, there would be an extensive personal histhe other side. Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen, and John tory questionnaire, ngerprint check, name search with
Walker all spent more money than could be explained by law enforcement and intelligence, and, depending on the
their salaries, but their conspicuous spending did not draw clearance level, additional investigations.
attention; they were detected because variously through Credit bureaus and other nancial information services
investigations of leaks that threw suspicion on their ac- may be helpful, although the accuracy of some of these
cess to information. Suspicion did fall on Jack Dunlap, is questionable. There are Federal requirements to check
who had his security clearance revoked and committed names against lists of possible terrorists, nancial crimsuicide. Perhaps Dunlap was more obvious as a low-level inals and money launderers, etc. In many respects, we
courier and driver than the others, while the others were have a problem where nancial institution employees,
ocers in more responsible positions.
without law enforcement training, are being asked to be

26

CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE HUMINT

and successful investigator speaks of instinct, which takes Another means of transferring assets is through commeryears to develop.
cial shipment of conventional goods, but with an articially low invoice price, so the receiver can sell them and
recover disbursed funds through prot on sales.
Money Laundering and subverting formal value
transfer systems
Money laundering is more associated with domestic
crime than with clandestine operations, and is less likely
to be involved in clandestine operations. Nevertheless, a
brief mention of its potential benets are in order. The
basic principle of money laundering is that someone is in
a business that has large cash income, such as drug sales
or gambling. The receiving organization needs to nd a
way that these get into usable bank accounts, so they can
be accessed for large purchases.
The most common way to do money laundering is to nd
a legal business that naturally receives much of its income in cash. These could include hair and beauty shops,
small groceries, and, ironically, laundries and dry cleaners. The legal business, or more likely multiple businesses, receive the illegal cash as well as normal receipts,
and draw amounts that do not attract suspicion. Periodically, the launderer may have the cash-receiving rm buy
something for him, or, less commonly, to write a large
check that goes into his legal account. Care is taken that
the amounts in the legal accounts do not hit the limits that
cause automatic reporting.

Informal value transfer systems

[22]

Informal value transfer systems (IVTS) , however, exist in a number of cultures, and bypass regular nancial
channels and their monitoring systems (see nancial intelligence). These are known by regional and cultural names
including:

6.7 References
[1] UK Security Service (MI5). Espionage and the Law
(– SCHOLAR SEARCH ).
[2] US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01.
[3] Condon, Richard (1964). An innity of mirrors. Random
House.
[4] Intelligence Community Sta (1990-04-12). Project
Slammer Interim Progress Report. Slammer 1990. Retrieved 2007-11-04.
[5] Stein, Je (1994-07-05). The Moles Manual. New
York Times. Retrieved 2007-11-04.
[6] Security Policy Advisory Board (1997-12-12). Security
Policy Advisory Board Meeting Minutes. SPAB 1997.
Retrieved 2007-11-04.
[7] Herbig, Katherine L. (2008-03-01).
Changes in
Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007 (PDF). Defense Personnel Security Research Center, with
Counterintelligence Field Activity. Retrieved 2008-0407.
[8] Shane, Scott (2008-04-20). A Spys Motivation: For
Love of Another Country. The New York Times. Retrieved 2008-04-20.
[9] Schecter, Jerrold L.; Deriabin, Peter S. (1992). The Spy
Who Saved the World: How a Soviet Colonel Changed the
Course of the Cold War. Scribner. ISBN 0-684-19068-0.
Schecter 1992.

hawala (Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan)

[10] Philby, Kim (1968). My Silent War. Macgibbon & Kee

Ltd.

hundi (India)

[11] Agee, Philip (1975). Inside the Company. Penguin Books.

ISBN 0-14-004007-2. Agee 1975.

While details dier by culture and specic participants, [12] Barron, John (1983). KGB Today: The Hidden Hand.
Readers Digest Assn. ISBN 0-88349-164-8.
the systems work in a comparable manner. To transfer
value, party 1 gives money (or other valuta) to IVTS agent [13] Serov, Ivan A.. Work with Walk-Ins (–
SCHOLAR SEARCH
1-A. This agent calls, faxes, or otherwise communicates
). Studies in Intelligence. CIA-Serov.
the amount and recipient of the funds to be transferred,
to IVTS agent 2-A, who will deliver the funds to party [14] Gleghorn, Todd E. (September 2003). Exposing the
Seams: the Impetus for Reforming US Counterintelli2. All the systems work because they are valuable to the
gence (PDF). Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved
culture, and failure to carry out the agreement can invite
2007-11-02.
savage retribution.
Reconciliation can work in a number of ways. There [15] Edwin Wilson: The CIAs Great Gatsby. Parade.
September 18, 1993. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
can be physical transfer of cash or valuables. There can
be wire transfers in third and fourth countries, countries [16] Hughes, Lynn N. (October 27, 2003). Opinion on Conwithout strong reporting requirements, which the IVTS
viction [US District Court, Southern District of Texas]"
(PDF). Hughes 2003. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
agents can verify.

6.8. EXTERNAL LINKS

[17] Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995). Observations on

the Double Agent (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). Studies
in Intelligence. Retrieved 2007-11-03.
[18] Mueller, Robert (2004-04-14). Statement of Robert S.
Mueller, III, Director, FBI Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
[19] Matschulat, Austin B. (2 July 1996). Coordination
and Cooperation in Counerintelligence (–
SCHOLAR SEARCH
). Studies in Intelligence. Retrieved 200711-03.
[20] Masterman, J. C. (1982). The Double-Cross System in
the War of 19391945. Ballantine, 1982. ISBN 0-34529743-1.
[21] Brown, Anthony Cave (1975). Bodyguard of Lies: The
Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day. HarperCollins.
ISBN 0-06-010551-8.
[22] United States Department of the Treasury, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (March 2003). Informal
Value Transfer Systems, FinCEN Advisory Issue 33
(PDF).

6.8 External links

Why the West can't inltrate al-Qaida by Craig
Whitlock of the Washington Post March 20, 2008

27

Chapter 7

Clandestine HUMINT and covert action

National governments deal in both intelligence and military special operations functions that either should be
completely secret (i.e., clandestine: the existence of
which is not known outside the relevant government circles), or simply cannot be linked to the sponsor (i.e.,
covert: it is known that sabotage is taking place, but
its sponsor is unknown). It is a continuing and unsolved question for governments whether clandestine intelligence collection and covert action should be under the
same agency. The arguments for doing so include having
centralized functions for monitoring covert action and
clandestine HUMINT and making sure they do not conict, as well as avoiding duplication in common services
such as cover identity support, counterespionage, and secret communications. The arguments against doing so
suggest that the management of the two activities takes a
quite dierent mindset and skills, in part because clandestine collection almost always is on a slower timeline
than covert action.

7.1 Historical background

During the Second World War, the United States Oce
of Strategic Services (OSS; the predecessor to the Central
Intelligence Agency and to part of United States Army
Special Forces) worked closely with the British Secret
Intelligence Service (SIS), Special Operations Executive
(SOE), and Political Warfare Executive (PWE). The latter two organizations were wartime, and their functions
were merged back into SIS after the war.
The U.S. has generally followed the British model of a
single civilian agency with close cooperation with military
intelligence and military special operations forces. Many
countries follow this model, but there are often calls to
reorganize it, splitting o various functions into independent agencies. Historically, since the British clandestine
intelligence, in recognizable form, goes back to the First
World War, and their Second World War covert operations organization preceded U.S. entry into the war, it
makes sense to present them rst. There has always been
a close relationship between the U.K. and U.S. organizations.

7.1.1 United Kingdom prewar operations

Prior to World War II, the British covert action function was in Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS). SIS also had the clandestine HUMINT responsibilities. Indeed, the United Kingdom had a recognizable
HUMINT function, obvious less formal than the 20th
century versions, going back to Sir Francis Walsingham
in 1583.[1][2]

7.1.2 United States background

The American system tends to require more legal formalism than the British, so it became necessary to dene
covert action. As a practical denition, covert action is
something of which the target is aware, but either does not
know, or cannot prove, who is inuencing political, military, scientic, or economic factors in the target country.
Plausible deniability is another way to say that the sponsor cannot be proven. Clandestine actions, in contrast,
are actions of which the target remains unaware, such as
espionage. .[3]
In the years immediately preceding the Second World
War, the U.S. had no standing clandestine HUMINT or
covert action organizations. There were certainly examples of both, such as Marine Major Earl Ellis' series of
visits, in the 1920s, to Japanese islands in the Pacic. Ellis, who died under mysterious circumstances while on
duty, created the basic plan for U.S. island hopping
operations in the Pacic Theater of the Second World
War.[4]
Used wisely, a covert action, also called special activities in the military budget, can deliver a stronger
message than diplomacy, and cause full-scale war to be
avoided. This was the original concept of George Kennan, which followed the Second World War and became
the basic policy of the U.S. in 1947:

28

[5]

Political warfare is the logical application of

Clausewitzs doctrine in time of peace. In
broadest denition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nations com-

7.2. SURGING ADDITIONAL CAPABILITY FOR THE SECOND WORLD WAR

mand, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and
covert. They range from such overt actions as
political alliances, economic measures ..., and
white propaganda to such covert operations
as clandestine support of friendly foreign elements, black psychological warfare and even
encouragement of underground resistance in
hostile states.
Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are
two major types of political warfare--one overt
and the other covert. Both, from their basic
nature, should be directed and coordinated by
the Department of State. Overt operations are,
of course, the traditional policy activities of
any foreign oce enjoying positive leadership,
whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert operations are traditional
in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.
Having assumed greater international responsibilities than ever before in our history and
having been engaged by the full might of the
Kremlins political warfare, we cannot aord
to leave unmobilized our resources for covert
political warfare. We cannot aord in the future, in perhaps more serious political crises, to
scramble into impromptu covert operations...
The principle of Kennans proposal was regarded favorably by all of the agencies discussing it, but none wanted
control due to the potential embarrassment of having an
operation compromised. As the junior agency, CIA lost
the bureaucratic ght, and received, In 1948 National Security Council Directive 10/2 formed, from some interim
organizations, the Oce of Policy Coordination, responsible for covert operations. .[6] The Oce of Special Operations had been autonomously doing clandestine intelligence gathering, and, in 1952, Director of Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith joined the two to form the
euphemistically named Directorate of Plans.
In the US more than in other countries, there is a continuing battle between military and intelligence organizations, with dierent oversight procedures, about who
should control covert action. Far from being avoided as
it was in 1948, organizations actively want authority over
it.
Both among intelligence and special operations organizations, there are a variety of views of whether covert and
clandestine activities should be in the same organization.
Those that argue for complete separation tend to be from
the clandestine side, and distrustful of the ability of covert
action organizations to maintain the appropriate level of
secrecy. On the other hand, there have been cases where
covert and clandestine organizations, unaware of one another, approach the same target in dierent ways, with

29

both failing due to interference. As an example, OSS

attempted to steal or copy a codebook from the World
War II Japanese embassy in Lisbon, Portugal. [7] Their
actions were discovered, and the Japanese changed the
code. Unfortunately, the clandestine communications intelligence organization had broken the code and were routinely reading trac in it. The OSS action required them
to start all over again in cryptanalyzing the new system.
There is no consensus on whether it is, or is not, advisable
to intermingle espionage and covert action organizations,
even at the headquarters level. There is much more argument for doing so at headquarters, possibly not as one
unit but with regular consultation. Certain services, such
as name checks, communications, cover identities, and
technical support may reasonably be combined, although
the requirements of a particular eld network should be
held on a need-to-know basis.
If the OSS operatives in Lisbon had asked permission for
their proposed operation against the Japanese, their operation would not have been approved. They might have
guessed the reason, but would not have known. On the
other hand, if headquarters approval is necessary for every action, some eeting opportunities may be missed.
Further, if the communications used to contact headquarters are compromised, the enemy could learn about all
upcoming operations.

7.2 Surging additional capability

for the Second World War
During World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States all
formed ad hoc organizations for unconventional warfare
(UW), psychological operations and direct action (DA)
functions. Other countries, such as occupied France,
formed related units under their governments in exile.
There was close cooperation between the US and UK special operations, counterintelligence, and deception organizations. Cooperation was less tight between the more
sensitive clandestine intelligence gatherers.

Rough US-UK wartime equivalents

None of these new organizations continued to function, in

the same form, after World War II ended. Many of their
personnel, techniques, and operations continued, but in
reorganized form during ocial peace, and very real Cold
War.

30

7.2.1

CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

United Kingdom World War II Op- ity; to prevent duplication, wasted eort, crossing of operational wires, friction, and consequent insecurity; and
erations

to tailor the size of the covert action sta to the greatly

The Ministry of Economic Warfare was a wartime op- reduced scale of peacetime needs. The peacetime condieration responsible for UW/DA, economic warfare, and tion also added a new factor which greatly increased the
[9]
psychological operations. It contained the Special Oper- importance of consolidation.
ations Executive (SOE) and Political Warfare Executive. Before World War II, paramilitary and covert action caWhile Section D of SIS became the nucleus of SOE, in pabilities were the responsibility of the variously named
World War II, the British separated the unconventional Organs of State Security.
warfare from SIS, putting it into SOE .[8] It has been the
conventional wisdom that this is the basic British doctrine, but, as with so many things in the clandestine and 7.2.2 United States World War II operacovert worlds, it is not that straightforward .[9]
tions
Prior to World War II, the US had no standing paramilitary or espionage services. Missions were taken on a caseby-case basis, such as Major Earl Hancock Ellis' survey
of potential Japanese bases in Micronesia .[4]
During World War II, the US Oce of Strategic Services
contained both a secret intelligence (SI) (i.e., clandestine intelligence) and several covert operations branches,
including operational groups (OG), maritime units,
morale [psychological] operations and special operations (SO).
World War II wartime & permanent UK

7.2.3 USSR World War II Operations

SOE conducted competent training in parachuting, sabotage, irregular warfare, etc. It could check language
and marksmanship skills, as well as examining clothing
and personal eects for anything that could reveal British
manufacture, SOE trained agents in the distinguishing
uniforms, insignia, and decorations of the Germans, But
it could not teach them the organization, modus operandi,
and psychology of the German intelligence and security
services; and it did not call upon the MI-5 and MI-6 experts who did know the subject...[9] those services also
were reluctant to provide SOE with access to their own
sensitive sources. While isolating SOE from the clandestine services provided some mutual passive security, it
also failed to provide proactive counterintelligence.

After Operation Barbarossa, Soviet Partisans arose spontaneously, from cut-o regular troops, and from ordinary
citizens. Such a spontaneous uprising against an invader
is accepted in international law, under the Third Geneva
Convention.

The consequences of this shortcoming are evident in the

German counterintelligence coups in France, Belgium,
and Holland...While the Security Service maintained an
extensive name index, the Registry (partially destroyed
by German bombing, but otherwise irreplaceable), SOE
apparently did not maintain a counterintelligence index
against which prospective eld recruits could be checked.
SOE received help from the British police, but not the
security experts.

Nazi Germany had multiple and poorly coordinated organizations, not surprisingly given Adolf Hitler's tendency
to duplicate functions and cause bureaucratic conict, so
he was the only person with the full picture. It was common to have a military, a Party, and a state organization
with the same function, which was true, to a lesser extent,
in the Soviet Union.

At the end of the war the Foreign Oce and the Chiefs
of Sta agreed to return the responsibility for covert operations to the jurisdiction of the Secret Intelligence Service. There were three reasons for the change: to ensure
that secret intelligence and special operations were the responsibility of a single organization under a single author-

A Central Command of the Partisan Movement formed,

and various behind-the-lines groups were formed by the
Organs of State Security and the Red Army. SMERSH
was primarily under NKVD control but acted as military
counterintelligence.

7.2.4 German World War II Operations

Military intelligence/counterintelligence, the Abwehr,

ran some clandestine intelligence, but so did the Ausland
(foreign) Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the intelligence service
of the party organization, the Schutzstael (SS). The
Venlo Incident was run by the Gestapo, an internal State
organization. The direct action Brandenburgers started
out as an Abwehr organization, but eventually reported
to OKH, the Army high command.

7.3. SEPARATE FUNCTIONS DURING PEACETIME?

7.3 Separate functions

peacetime?

during

There is an enormous dierence in DA/UW during an

overt war and in peacetime. The covert operations conducted during the war did not have to be unattributable.
On the contrary; saboteurs, for example, in order to avoid
precipitating reprisals on the local population, would
leave behind evidence which tended to indicate that [external] agents were responsible. Security and secrecy
were important, but only tactically important. It was important that the [enemy] should not know the identities
and homes of the resistance workers, but it never mattered at all that the [enemy] should know that operations
were directed from outside occupied territory (i.e., the
operations were covert, not clandestine). Publicizing the
external support, in fact, helped the underground in its
recruiting.

7.3.1

UK postwar change

In time of peace ... governments cannot acknowledge

the fact that they are undertaking clandestine operations,
there has been dveloped a whole new, delicate technique, the technique of nonattributability. A successful
nonattributable operation is a long, tedious, touchy, and
complicated aair which, the British recognized, not only
requires background intelligence but, more importantly,
cannot be undertaken except by experienced case ocers.

31
could call on SAS, outside contractors, or other UK military personnel.
UK Military Special Forces
It was at this stage that the relationship with the SAS, seconded and retired, as well as a number of 'private' specialist companies became ever more important and by 1987 a
Special Forces Directorate was formed to coordinate the
activities of the SAS and SBS and ensure closer collaboration with the SIS.[1]
United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) was formed in
1987 to draw together the Armys Special Air Service
(SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron Royal Marines
(SBS), which was renamed the Special Boat Service at
the same time, into a unied command, based around the
former Director SAS who was given the additional title
of Director Special Forces. The Directorate has been expanded by the creation of the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment and the
Special Forces Support Group.
Current SIS paramilitary capabilities

Britain certainly uses military special operations forces

directly, but, by 2003, they had a working relationship
with SIS to assist the General Support Branch (GSB).
GSB is a coordinating rather than an operational branch,
which allows it to call upon 22 Special Air Service Regiment (especially its Counter-Revolutionary Wing), the
Thus the SOE-SIS disharmony and its consequences led RAF S&D ight, and M Troop (counter-terror) of the
the British to a rm postwar convictionthat a single ser- Special Boat Service (SBS).[1]
vice should be responsible for all clandestine and covert RAF S&D pilots are qualied to y special operations
activity undertaken by the nation.
versions of the C-130 Hercules and Puma helicopter.
Although the British special operations organization was
independent of MI6 from 1940 to the end of the war, MI6
had the responsibility for these operations before that period and has had it since, and second, that the record
of the wartime SOE, although it scored some brilliant
successes, was over all not such as to inspire emulation.
Some of its most conspicuous failures are directly traceable to its separation from the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS or MI6) and the British Security Service (MI5).[9]

SIS can also call on the Special Reconnaissance Regiment, which absorbed 14 Intelligence Company as well
as Intelligence Corps and Royal Military Police personnel, including female ocers.

7.3.2 US postwar change

Immediately after World War II, a number of groups were

broken up, and bureaucratically housed in an assortment
of interim organizations. The OSS was broken up shortly
SOE abolished; partial reabsorption by SIS
after World War II, on September 20, 1945, with funcWhile SOE was abolished after World War II, SIS, in tions scattering into a series of interim organizations:
1946, absorbed selected SOE personnel and organiza OSS X-2 (counterintelligence) and
tions, to form a new SIS section called the Directorate of
Secret Intelligence (i.e., clandestine
War Planning (D/WP). D/WP had the SIS general charHUMINT) went into the Strategic
ter for special operations, and liaison with UK and allied
Services Unit (SSU) of the (then) War
special operations forces. D/WP, however, was replaced,
Department. The covert action and black
in 1953, by the Special Political Action Section (SPA),
propaganda functions, however, split o
known [1] as the jolly fun tricks department, and operated until being shut down in the mid-seventies. SPA
in 1948.

32

CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

Paramilitary direct action (DA) and
psychological operations were in a series
of interim organizations, becoming the
Oce of Policy Coordination (OPC) in
1948.
Research and Analysis went to the Department of State.

Even before the OPC split, the SSU was an organizational

anomaly, since it reported to the Oce of the Assistant
Secretary of War, rather than G-2, the Intelligence Directorate of the Army Sta.[10]
In January 1946, President Truman, who was concerned
with building up a Gestapo [11] and distrusted William
Donovan, head of the OSS, created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which was the direct precursor to the
CIA.[10] The assets of the SSU, which now constituted
a streamlined nucleus of clandestine intelligence was
transferred to the CIG in mid-1946 and reconstituted as
the Oce of Special Operations (OSO).
CIA (1947)
The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency as the successor to the OSS and Americas rst peacetime intelligence agency.

The United States should provide itself with the organization and the means
of supporting foreign resistance movements in guerrilla warfare to the advantage of United States national security
during peace and war.
Guerrilla warfare should be supported
under policy direction of NSC.
Agencies for conducting guerrilla warfare can be established by adding to the
CIAs special operations functions the responsibility for supporting foreign resistance movements and by authorizing the
Joint Chiefs of Sta to engage in the conduct of such operations. Primary interest in guerrilla warfare should be that of
CIA in peacetime and [Department of
Defense] in wartime.
"A separate guerrilla warfare school and
corps should not be established[emphasis
added]. Instead, [Department of Defense], in coordination with State Department and CIA, should select personnel, give them necessary training in established Army schools, supplemented by
courses in other military and State Department schools.

The Act also merged the Department of War and the

Department of the Navy into a single National Military
Establishment, which was later renamed the Department Korean War Paramilitary Operations
of Defense in 1949. (OPC, however, remained outside
When the Korean War broke out in 1950, United States
the Department of Defense).
Army Special Forces were not yet operational. ParamilThe Act also formalized several national security insti- itary functions in Korea suered from bureaucratic intutions, including the National Security Council (NSC), ghting between the Armys G-2 intelligence division,
the modern Joint Chiefs of Sta, and the Oce of Emer- and CIA. A heavily redacted history of CIA operations in
gency Preparedness (OEP), the precursor to the Federal Korea [14] indicates that the agency used US Far East Air
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Force resources, eventually designated Flight B of the
Fifth Air Force. This unit provided air support for both
military and CIA special operations. When CIA guerilOPC, OSO and interim covert solutions 1948-1951
las were attacked in 1951-1952, the air unit had to adapt
U.S. covert psychological operations and paramilitary ac- frequently changing schedules. According to the CIA history, The US Air Force-CIA relationship during the war
tions organizations, formerly in the OSS, went into a unit
called the Oce of Special Projects, and then renamed was particularly protable, close, and cordial.
the Oce of Policy Coordination (OPC) from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until the two were merged
in 1951. OPC was created in 1948 by the National Security Council under a document called NSC 10/2. The
OPCs directors included representatives of the State and
Defense departments and the CIA. It was largely administered and supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency
.[12]
While State and the intelligence community wanted to
avoid covert operations, there was a quite dierent perspective among the Joint Chiefs of Sta. On 17 August
1948, JCS memorandum 1807/1 went to the Secretary of
Defense.[13] Its recommendations included:

Unconventional warfare, but not HUMINT, worked

smoothly with the Army. Korea had been divided into
CIA and Army regions, with the CIA in the extreme
northeast, and the Army in the West.
In addition to its own resources, the Eighth US Army
Korea (EUSAK) G-3 Operations Division had approximately 8,000 South Korean guerillas, who formed as a
leve en masse. The Army guerillas, however, had no
bases on the Korean mainland, and their island support
bases were largely wiped out by 1952. CIA advisors
worked with the Army guerillas between January and
April 1952, and the history treats the relationship as cooperative.

7.3. SEPARATE FUNCTIONS DURING PEACETIME?

During the Korean War, United Nations Partisan Forces
Korea operated on islands and behind enemy lines. These
forces were also known as the 8086th Army Unit, and
then as the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, FECLD-K 8240th AU. These troops directed North
Koreas partisans in raids, harassment of supply lines and
the rescue of downed pilots. Since the initial Special
Forces unit, 10 Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated on 19 June 1952, but the Korean War broke out on
June 25, 1950, Army Special Forces did not operate as a
unit in that war. Experience gained in that war, however,
inuenced the development of Special Forces doctrine.

33
After the end of the war, the US Army created a PWD.
While there had been pressure to put PWD under the
newly revitalized Intelligence Division, McClure was
strongly opposed.
A great part of my diculty in carrying out
what I felt was my mission was with G-2. The
G 2s all felt that they had a monopoly on intelligence and were reluctant in the earlier stages
to give any of that intelligence to Psychological
Warfare knowing that it would be broadcast or
used in print.[13]
There was also a sensitivity about providing intelligence
to units working behind enemy lines and subject to capture. McClure believed that PWD either should report to
Operations, or, as was eventually done, as a special sta
for the Chief of Sta.
While McClure himself was a psychological operations
specialist, his work with OSS had made him appreciative
of UW. Since no other Army agency seemed interested
in the UW mission, McClure was granted sta authority
over UW, with a mission to:

General US ow from wartime OSS to 1952

formulate and develop psychological warfare

and special operations plans for the Army in
consonance with established policy and to recommend policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in
these elds.

While General Charles A. Willoughby, intelligence ofcer (G-2) at Douglas MacArthur's headquarters asked
CIA, in the absence of an Army HUMINT function, to
establish special reconnaissance (SR) teams. This worked
until the ceasere talks began, but the CIA history speaks OPCW had three major divisions:
of severe conict with G-2 over support resources and
security. There was a continuing tension over CIA pro Psychological Warfare
viding tactical support to EUSAK, and carrying out its
Requirements
national-level missions. The Army and CIA never worked
Special Operations. The latter was parout eective counterintelligence cooperation.
ticularly signicant, because it formulated plans for creation of the US Armys
rst formal unconventional warfare capaPWD and the Creation of US Army Special Forces
bility: Special Forces.
After World War II, the regular Army had a largesse of
ocers that had successfully run large UW operations, McClure brought ocers with World War II or Korean
without any doctrine to guide them. The Army also had War experience in UW or long-range penetration, instrong psychological operations capabilities, and a new cluding COL Aaron Bank, LTC Russell Volckmann, and
CPT Donald Blackburn. Bank had been assigned to the
Army Sta element was created to manage them.
During World War II, the Psychological Warfare Divi- OSS and fought with the French Maquis. Volckmann
sion (PWD) of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expe- and Blackburn had both been guerillas in the Philippines,
ditionary Force (SHAEF) was created to conduct overt and Volckman had also led UW in Korea. McClure saw
psychological warfare against German troops in Europe. one of his responsibilities as selling UW, in spite of
A joint UK-US organization, it was commanded by US resistance from the Army and CIA. He was able to reBrigadier-General Robert A. McClure .[15] McClure had cruit qualied personnel from the Ranger units that had
commanded psychological operations in North Africa, been disbanded in Korea. With personnel spaces availagain under the command of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and able from disbanding the Ranger companies in Korea, the
enjoyed his condence. SHAEF PWDs sta came from Army activated Special Forces in early 1952.
the US Oce of War Information (OWI), the US OSS, Special Forces, both in their original form and as a comand the British PWE.
ponent of the current United States Special Operations

34

CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

Command, have provided the nucleus of US paramilitary The Cold War CIA takes shape
capabilities, both under direct military, CIA, and joint
control. Some Special Forces personnel left the Army In 1952, the OPC and OSO, along with assorted supand went to work as CIA employees.
port oces, were merged to what was originally called
The US Special Forces was established out of several spe- the Directorate of Plans, then, more honestly, the Dicial operations units that were active during World War II. rectorate of Operations. It has recently been reorganized
Formally, its lineage comes from the 1st Special Service into the National Clandestine Service.
Force (Devils Brigade), but that unit was more a Special
Reconnaissance (SR) and Direct Action (DA) command,
which operated in uniform without augmentation by local
soldiers.
Some of the Oce of Strategic Services units have much
more similarity, in mission, with the original Army Special Forces mission, Unconventional Warfare (UW), or
acting as cadre to train and lead guerillas in occupied
countries. The Special Forces motto, de oppresso liber
(Latin: To free from oppression) reects this historical
mission of guerilla warfare against an occupier. Specically, the 3-man Operation Jedburgh units provided leadership to French Resistance units. The larger OSS Operational Groups (OG) were more associated with SR/DA
missions, although they did work with Resistance units.
COL Aaron Bank, commander of the rst Special Forces
group, served in OSS during World War II. Other OSS
guerilla units included Detachment 101 in Burma, under the China-Burma-India Theater, which, among other
missions, screened the larger Ranger unit, Merrills Marauders

7.4 Controversies remain

While the US has consolidated clandestine operations,

there is still an argument as to what level of covert operation should be under military control, especially in military theaters of operations. In the Kennedy Administration, National Security Action Memorandum 57 spoke
to paramilitary operations, which can be clandestine only
until there are survivors, or at least evidence, from combat
operations [17] following a study by an interagency committee, the Department of Defense will normally receive
responsibility for overt paramilitary operations. Where
such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable,
it may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the
normal capabilities of the agency. Any large paramilitary
operation wholly or partly covert which requires signicant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of
military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled
stocks and/or military experiences of a kind and level peDouglas MacArthur did not want the OSS to operate culiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary rein his South West Pacic theater of operations ,[16] so sponsibility of the Department of Defense with the CIA
paramilitary operations there were at rst ad hoc, formed in a supporting role.
by Filipinos, with Americans who refused to surrender.
Before long, however, the CIA was training Cuban guerilWhile Fil-American guerilla operations in the Japaneselas. Part of the reason the Bay of Pigs Invasion operation
occupied Philippines are not part of the direct lineage of
failed was disagreement between senior military people
Army Special Forces, some of the early Special Forces
and the CIA paramilitary sta about what was necessary
leadership were involved in advising and creating the
for an invasion to work; there were also pure political ismodern organization.
sues that helped doom it.
US Army Special Forces (SF) are, along with psychoThings were a little clearer when the military was putting
logical operations detachments and Rangers, the oldcovert advisors into Laos and then Vietnam. The Military
est of the post-World War II Army units in the curAssistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation
rent United States Special Operations Command (USGroup (MACV-SOG), commanded by a military ocer
SOCOM). Their original mission was to train and lead
with a CIA deputy, did conduct both covert DA misUnconventional Warfare (UW) forces, or a guerilla force
sions and sometimes-clandestine SR, and tried but failed
in an occupied nation. 10th Special Forces Group was the
to put clandestine espionage/SR teams into North Vietrst deployed unit, intended to operate UW forces behind
nam [18] .[19] MACV-SOG had additional challenges, as
enemy lines in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of
it was only informally under the command of the MACV
Western Europe. As the US become involved in Southcommander. Its real chain of command went to the Speeast Asia, it was realized that specialists trained to lead
cial Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Aairs
guerillas also could help defend against hostile guerillas,
(SACSA) in the Pentagon,[18] and then to the Joint Chiefs
so SF acquired the additional mission of Foreign Internal
of Sta, and either the National Security Council or less
Defense (FID), working with Host Nation (HN) forces
formal White House decisionmakers.
in a spectrum of counterguerilla activities from indirect
During the Nixon Administration, paramilitary operasupport to combat command.
tions were assumed to be assigned to the CIA unless
the President ordered a dierent command structure, after review by the "Forty Committee" .[20] Covert actions
were dened not to include direct combat by the armed

7.5. CURRENT OPERATIONS

35

forces of the US, or cover & deception for the armed There is the potential for conict between the NCS, DCS,
forces.
and USSOCOM, especially the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC), as well as an organization, originally called the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA). ISA
changes its (classied) ocial name every two years and
7.5 Current operations
its code names approximately every 6 months.[6]
Dierent countries have dierent legal and political constraints on covert operations, and whether they are carried
out by military special operations under military command (in or out of uniform), by military special operations personnel under the command of an intelligence
agency, or by paramilitary personnel under intelligence
command. The United Kingdom does have not a rigid a
legal separation between the two, but also does not appear
to have a major bureaucratic conict between the intelligence community and military special operations. While
the legalities also may not be as strict for Russia, there is
a historical conict among the security organizations and
the military, and among dierent security agencies such
as the FSB and OMON.

The transference of covert operations from the CIA to the

military has serious implications, which extend beyond
whether the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelligence is in charge. When the CIA undertakes
a covert action, under the provision of the HughesRyan
Act, as amended by the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980 that reduced the number of legislators that needed
to be notied, that action must be justied by a presidential nding provided to Congress; however, there are
no comparable procedures for approving military special
operators on very similar missions.

7.5.2 Afghanistan and US doctrinal conict

In the US, dierent oversight programs and legal authorities apply to operations under Department of Defense and
The early ghting in Afghanistan, with the defeat of regintelligence community control.
ular Taliban forces by special operators with substantial
air support, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
known for a commitment to force transformation, was re7.5.1 US doctrine and operations
ported to be upset with the roles assigned to the CIA and
The US has consolidated espionage, as well as small to USSOCOM. The rule had been that military special
paramilitary and information operations into the National operators were not permitted to enter the country until
Clandestine Service (NCS), formerly the CIA Direc- the CIA had prepared the area for them in terms of contorate of Operations. More recently, the United States tacts and landing sites.
Department of Defense consolidated its global espionage Rumsfeld viewed the dichotomization of the operation
assets into the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) un- as an impediment to its rapidity and ultimate success.
der the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The CIA Further, he saw a potential for impairment to future ophas some responsibility for direct action (DA) and erations. Therefore, Rumsfeld used the glittering success
unconventional warfare (UW), when such operations are of SOFs in Afghanistan as persuasive evidence in his arof any appreciable size, are the responsibility of the mil- gument that SOFs could control their own missions. This
itary. NCS contains a Special Operations Group (SOG), was part of his greater plan to transform the military and,
with a strength of several hundred and concentrates on in eect, wrest control of covert operations away from
exibility. It can take advantage of CIA relationships the CIA without having to endure any corresponding inwith foreign intelligence services, and is less regulated telligence oversight. emphasis added [6]
than the military.[6]
Military organizations perform HUMINT that is directly
related to their mission, such as local informants in a
peacekeeping or occupation assignment. If a military unit
obtains a HUMINT asset of national interest, the National
Clandestine Service (NCS) or the Defense Clandestine
Service (DCS) should oversee it. There may be special
cases, especially related to USSOCOM, where they may
run assets directly related to operations, but the national
agencies are to be informed.

7.5.3 Joint UK-US operations in Operation Desert Storm

GEN Norman Schwarzkopf, commanding the coalition

forces in 1990-1991, was known as a critic of special operations forces. When the Great SCUD Hunt became
a signicant problem, the ranking British ocer, LTG
Peter de la Billire, sent SAS units into Iraq before conThe CIA charter for Support of Military Operations, ventional ground units had entered that country. De la
however, is intended to avoid conict. [21] The reference Billiere had spent a good deal of his career in SAS and
cited preceded the formation of the NCS. Since USSO- other British special operations units.
COM and NCS often exchange personnel, especially in Under Israeli pressure to send its own SOF teams into
paramilitary operations, the conict may be more theo- western Iraq, and the realization that British SAS were alretical than practical.
ready hunting Scuds, US Secretary of Defense Dick Ch-

36

CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION

eney proposed using US SR teams as well as SAS .[22]

While Schwarzkopf was known to be a general opponent
of SOF, Cheney approved the use of US SOF to hunt
for the launchers.[23] On February 7, US SR teams joined
British teams in the hunt for mobile Scud launchers .[24]
Open sources contain relatively little operational information about U.S. SOF activities in western Iraq. Some basic elements have emerged, however. Operating at night,
Air Force MH-53J Pave Low and Army MH-47E helicopters would ferry SOF ground teams and their specially equipped four-wheel-drive vehicles from bases in
Saudi Arabia to Iraq .[25] The SOF personnel would patrol
during the night and hide during the day. When targets
were discovered, Air Force Special Operations Combat
Controllers accompanying the ground forces would communicate over secure radios to AWACS battle sta, who
would direct attack aircraft against the targets.

7.5.4

Russian operations

Recent Russian doctrine can only be inferred from Soviet practice, unconventional warfare, and some special
reconnaissance, seems to be subordinated to major military commands. Spetsnaz special operations forces are
under the GRU, although units are attached to major
commands.[26]

7.5.5

Israeli operations

7.6 References
[1] SIS Paramilitary/Covert Action Sections. 2004-06-01.
Retrieved 2007-12-08.
[2] Secret Intelligence Service MI6 - UK Intelligence Agencies. 2004-01-17. Retrieved 2007-12-08.
[3] Manget, Frederic F. (1996), Intelligence and the Rise
of Judicial Intervention: Another System of Oversight,
Studies in Intelligence
[4] Ellis, Earl H. (23 July 1921), Advanced Base Operations
in Micronesia, retrieved 2007-11-01
[5] Kennan, George F. (May 4, 1948). Policy Planning Sta
Memorandum: The inauguration of organized political
warfare. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945
1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment.
[6] John,Jessica Ryane (2006-01-30). A Dierence with (or
without) Distinction: Evading Congressional Oversight
of Covert Action through the Use of Special Operations
Forces (PDF). George Washington University.
[7] Kahn, David (1996). The Codebreakers - The Story of
Secret Writing. Scribners. ISBN 0-684-83130-9. Kahn.
[8] Secret Intelligence Service MI6. Retrieved 2007-12-08.
[9] Rice, Albert E. (18 September 1995), Intelligence and
Covert Action (– SCHOLAR SEARCH ), Studies in
Intelligence, retrieved 2007-11-18
[10] Finnegan, John Patrick (1998). Chapter 7: The Cold
War and Korea. Army Lineage Series, Military Intelligence. United States Army Center of Military History.
CMH Pub 60-13.

Israel has both clandestine collection and some covert ac[11] Taylor, Karen M. (2003). Identifying the Traitor among
tion in the Mossad, although their larger paramilitary opUs: The Rhetoric of Espionage and Secrecy (PDF). Unierations are assigned to what they call reconnaissance
versity of Pittsburgh. Retrieved 2007-12-08.
units, the premier one being Sayeret Matkal[27]
[12] Berger, D. H, The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as

To retaliate for the Munich massacre at the 1972 Summer

a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by
Olympics, Mossad set up Operation Wrath of God, to asthe United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951,
sassinate militants believed responsible. For some time,
Marine Corps Command and Sta College
the operation was successful, although eventually killed
an innocent individual who had been incorrectly identi- [13] Paddock, Alfred H. Jr (1982). US Army Special Warfare:
Its Origins. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare,
ed; see the Lillehammer aair.
1941-1952 (PDF). National Defense University Press.

7.5.6

French operations

[14] Central Intelligence Agency (17 July 1968), Clandestine

Services History: The Secret War in Korea 1950-1952
(PDF), retrieved 2007-12-06

The Directorate-General for External Security [15] Paddock, Alfred H. Jr., Major General Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare, re(DGSE)[28] is responsible for intelligence analysis
trieved 2007-12-09
and clandestine collection, but also has an operations
division and an action service within it, the Division [16] Finnegan, John Patrick (1998). Chapter 6: World War
Action. The Sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, a covert
II Intelligence in the Field. Military Intelligence. Army
action against Greenpeace, was an example of no service
Lineage Series. United States Army Center of Military
being perfect.
History.
Note that the French worked closely with Operation Jed- [17] Kennedy, John F. (1961-06-28), National Security Action
burgh during World War II. Some 3-man Jedburgh teams
Memorandum No. 57: Responsibility for Paramilitary Ophad a French, US, and UK member.
erations, retrieved 2007-11-21

7.6. REFERENCES

[18] Kelley, Danny M. II (2005), The Misuse of the Studies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Vietnam, U.S. Army Command and General Sta College,
retrieved 2007-11-21
[19] Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (1999). The Secret War Against
Hanoi. HarperCollins.
[20] Nixon, Richard M. (February 17, 1980), National Security
Decision Memorandum 40: Responsibility for the Conduct,
Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations
[21] Central Intelligence Agency, Support to Military Operations, 2002 Annual Report, retrieved 2007-12-19
[22] Gordon, Michael R.; Trainor, Bernard E. (1995). The
Generals War: The Inside Story of the Conict in the Gulf.
Little, Brown and Company.
[23] Rosenau, William (2000), Special Operations Forces and
Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and
the Persian Gulf War. U.S. Air Ground Operations Against
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1966-1972 (PDF), RAND Corporation, retrieved 2007-11-11
[24] Ripley, Tim, Scud Hunting: Counter-force Operations
against Theatre Ballistic Missiles (PDF), Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University, retrieved 2007-11-11
[25] Waller, Douglas C. (1994). The Commandos: The Inside
Story of Americas Secret Soldiers. Dell Publishing.
[26] Suvorov, Viktor (1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of
The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-67168917-7.
[27] Tucker, Jonathan B. (March 2003), Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience1,
Journal of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Institute)
[28] DGSE - General Directorate for External Security; Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure, Federation of
American Scientists

37

Chapter 8

Clandestine HUMINT operational

techniques
The Clandestine HUMINT page deals with the functions of that discipline, including espionage and active
counterintelligence. This page deals with Clandestine
HUMINT operational techniques, also called tradecraft. It applies to clandestine operations for espionage,
and for a clandestine phase prior to direct action (DA)
or unconventional warfare (UW). Clandestine HUMINT
sources may also act as local guides for special reconnaissance (SR).
Many of the techniques here are important in
counterintelligence.
Defensive counterintelligence
personnel need to know them to recognize espionage,
sabotage, etc. in process. Oensive counterintelligence
specialists may actually use them against foreign intelligence services (FIS). While DA and UW can be
conducted by national military or paramilitary organizations, al-Qaeda and similar non-state militant groups
appear to use considerably dierent clandestine cell
system structure, for command, control, and operations,
than do national forces. Cell systems are evolving to
more decentralized models, sometimes because they are
enabled by new forms of electronic communications.

try, there may be signicant, or very few, restrictions

on domestic HUMINT. The most basic question will be
whether criminal prosecution, or stopping operations, is
the goal. Typically, criminal prosecution will be the primary goal against drug and slavery groups, with breaking up their operations the secondary goal. These priorities, however, are apt to reverse in dealing with terrorist
groups.
If there are separate organizations with diplomatic and
nonocial cover, there may be two chiefs. Suciently
large stations may have several independent, compartmented groups.

8.1.1 Station under diplomatic cover

Nations vary as to how well hidden they choose to have
all, part, or none of their intelligence personnel under the
guise of diplomatic immunity. Frequently, at least one
individual is known to the host country, so there can be
a deniable channel of communications. If the nations are
allies, many of the intelligence personnel may be known
and actively cooperating.

This page deals primarily with ones own assets. See

double agent for additional information adversary sources Certain diplomatic titles were often assumed to be cover
jobs. With the United Kingdom, "passport control ofthat a country has turned to its own side.
cer" was, much of the time, an intelligence position.[1]
Today, it may be confusing that some passport control
actually control passports. With other countries,
8.1 Sta and Skills in a Clandes- ocers
cultural attach" was often a cover job, although, again,
tine HUMINT Operations Sta- it might be legitimate. An intelligence ocer covered as
a cultural attach might still do some cultural things.

tion

This description is based around the foreign intelligence

service, of country B, operating in and against country
A. It may also include operations against non-state organizations operating in country B, with or without country
B support. It may also involve oensive counterintelligence against country D assets operating in country B.
The basic structure here can be pertinent to a domestic
service operating against a non-national group within its
borders. Depending on the legal structure of the coun38

Chief of station or rezident. There may

also be multiple chiefs if country B
has both military and civilian human intelligence. Fairly recently, the US consolidated military and civilian into the
National Clandestine Service. Russia
still probably separates GRU military and
SVR civilian, and the KGB, the USSRera predecessor of the SVR, ran both illegal and legal residencies.

8.1. STAFF AND SKILLS IN A CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONS STATION

Operations Ocer, also called case ofcer: interacts with local assets or leaders of local agent subnetwork. Israels
Mossad refers to these as katsas.
Collection Management Ocer (aka Reports Ocer,Intelligence Ocer): does
preliminary report categorization and organization. May be the administrative
chief.
Communications and encryption personnel
Drivers and guards
Operational Targeting Ocer: not always used. May be more focused on
access agents and recruiting, handing o
recruited agents to case ocers. Might
make the decision to use non-HUMINT
collection, such as SIGINT based in the
embassy.
Technical collection specialists (e.g., the US Special Collection Service, a joint NSACIA operation)

8.1.2

Stations under ocial but nondiplomatic cover

An intermediate approach has the ocers clearly working for their country, but without diplomatic immunity
and with a cover role that does not immediately suggest
intelligence aliation. For example, the Soviet GRU
covered some intelligence ocers under the TASS news
agency, or as part of a trade or technical mission, or even
as diplomats. The last might seem surprising, but this was
under a GRU assumptions that military attaches would
always be assumed to be intelligence ocers, but that
members of the civilian part of an embassy might actually
be diplomats rather than intelligence ocers.[2]

39

A journalist.
A member of the civilian government,
such as a Member of Parliament.[3]
An example of civilian cover for an American ocer involved a German refugee, with the pseudonym Stephan
Haller, who had widely ranging interests and special
skills in mathematics and physics, as well as native language skill. His overt role, in 1949, was directing a program that paid subsidies to German scientists, part of a
larger program of denying German talent to the Soviets.
Initially, he was based in Pforzheim, (West) Germany.[4]
After two years in Pforzheim, he had a well-established
cover, and had been collecting political and scientic intelligence to the scientists, and also Germans that he knew
in political circles before emigrating. In 1951, he moved
to Berlin, directing overall operations against scientic
targets in the East Zone of Germany, while still managing the subsidy program. His new work included encouraging defection of key craftsmen working for the Soviets.
He was considered a master craftsman,
He did not grow careless or conceited
with success. Here remained a meticulous
craftsman. Before he debriefed a source, he
mastered the subject to be discussed. His
agents were made comfortable not only by
his cigars and beer but also by the easy
ow of communication. And he did not
end until he had every last scrap of useful information. He never failed, moreover, to remain alert for operational leads-potential agents, counterintelligence indicators, propaganda possibilities. When Haller
was nished, there were no more questions
to be asked. And though he groaned over
the chore of putting it on paper, his reporting became thorough-and more than thorough,
illuminating-for he rarely failed to make interpretive comments.

It was easier, of course, for the socialist USSR to assign

people to state agencies. Western sensitivities tend to be 8.1.3 Stations under non-ocial cover
much greater about using, for example, journalistic cover.
The US has been emphatic in prohibiting any relationship According to Victor Suvorov, the Soviet reaction to losing networks operated from diplomatic missions, after the
between intelligence and the Peace Corps.
countries in which those embassies were overrun in the
US military intelligence doctrine forbids a HUMINT speSecond World War, was to emphasize illegal (i.e., what
cialist to pose as:
the US calls non-ocial cover) stations (i.e., residencies)
for HUMINT networks. The illegal residencies were pre A doctor, medic, or any other type of
ferred to be in safe locations, perhaps of allies such as the
medical personnel.
United States, Great Britain and Canada.
Any member of the International ComSoviet operations were tightly compartmented, with strict
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or its afneed-to-know an absolute rule. Undercover residencies
liates. Such a ruse is a violation of treaty
support illegals, but only on instructions from the Centre
obligations.
without having any idea for whom they are working. All
A chaplain or clergyman.

operations in support of illegals are worked out in such

40

CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

a way that the ocers of the GRU undercover residency that are self-organizing and have preexisting ties, making
do not have one crumb of information which is not neces- them virtually impossible to inltrate, has survived the
sary. Operations are planned in such a way that there is no GRU and is common in terrorist networks.
possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions of the undercover residency. A lesson learned from
Other agents recruited by residencies are
the loss of espionage networks was to keep them small,
gradually organised into agent groups of three
subdividing them, with independent reporting to Center,
to ve men each. Usually, agents working in
when more agents were recruited.[5]
one particular eld of espionage are put together in one group. Sometimes a group consists of agents who for various reasons are
Moving new agents into illegal residencies
known to each other. Let us suppose that one
agent recruits two others. ... Thus to a certain
Suvorov explained that new agents were separated from
extent the members of agent groups are comocial Soviet institutions only after the agent has completely isolated from Soviet diplomatic reprepromised himself, by giving Soviet Intelligence a signifsentation. The agent group is in contact with
icant quantity of secret material, that is, made it imposthe undercover residency for a period of time,
sible for himself to go to the police. The separated agent
then gradually the system of contact with the
comes in three guises: the separated acting agent, the
residency comes to an end and orders begin to
agent group and the agent residency.
be received directly from Moscow. By various
channels the group sends it material directly
to Moscow. Finally the contact with Moscow
Separated acting agent The most resources are debecomes permanent and stable and the agent
voted to the agents that provide the most important magroup is entirely separated from the residency.
terial. Once the central headquarters assesses the agents
With gradual changes in personnel at the resiinformation as highly valuable, the doctrine is to stop,
dency, like the resident himself, the cipher oftemporarily, obtaining new material, and improving his
cers and the operational ocers with whom
security and education in espionage tradecraft. The trainthere was once direct contact, nobody outside
ing is preferably done in a third country, from which he
the Centre will know of the existence of this
might or might not be moved to the Soviet Union. His
particular group. Should it happen that operatabsence typically would be covered by taking a vacation
ing conditions become dicult, or that the emor holiday.
bassy is blockaded or closed down, the group
will be able to continue its activities in the same
Thence he will go back to his own country,
way as before.[5]
but as an independently acting agent. He will
be run exclusively by the Centre, in concrete
terms the head of a section, even, in special
Agent residency When the GRU attaches one or more
cases, the head of a directorate and in extreme
illegals (i.e., Soviet ocer under an assumed identity), the
cases the deputy head of the GRU or the head
residency changes from an agent residency into an illegal
himself. The running of such an agent is thus
residency. This process of increasing the numbers and
carried out exactly as the running of illegals is.
the gradual self-generation of independent organisations
continues endlessly. Suvorov uses a medical metaphor
Agent group The next category of agent, less valuable of quarantine designed to contain infection to describe
than a separated acting agent but still of importance, was separating agents for improved security.
the agent group, which migrated from diplomatic or civil- The GRU kept certain ocers immediately ready to go
ian contact, to the in-country illegal rezidentura (resident into illegal status, should the host nation intensify secuand infrastructure), to direct communications with the rity.
Center. The leader of such a group is called, in Soviet
terminology, a gropovod, and is conceptually the only
These ocers are in possession of previmember of the group that communicates with Moscow.
ously prepared documents and equipment, and
In reality, clandestine communications personnel may be
gold, diamonds and other valuables which will
aware of the direct contact, but newer electronics allow
be of use to them in their illegal activities will
the leader to manage his or her only communications.
have been hidden in secret hiding-places beSuvorov makes the important point that A group automatically organises itself. The GRU obviously considers family groups containing the head of the family and
his wife and children to be more secure and stable. The
members of such a group may work in completely different elds of espionage. The pattern of having groups

forehand. In case of war actually breaking

out, these ocers will unobtrusively disappear
from their embassies. The Soviet government
will register a protest and will for a short time
refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomats of the aggressive country. Then it will

8.1. STAFF AND SKILLS IN A CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONS STATION

capitulate, the exchange will take place and
the newly edged illegals will remain behind
in safe houses and ats. Afterwards they will
gradually, by using the system of secret rendezvous, begin to establish the system of contacts with agents and agent groups which have
recently been subordinated to the undercover
residency. Now they all form a new illegal residency. The new illegals never mix and never
enter into contact with the old ones who have
been working in the country for a long time.
This plainly makes life more secure for both
parties.[5]
Again, Suvorov emphasizes that the process of forming
new illegal residencies was the Soviet doctrine for imposing compartmentation. Western countries, especially
those in danger of invasion, have a related approach, the
stay-behind network. The US military denition, used by
most NATO countries, is
Agent or agent organization established in
a given country to be activated in the event of
hostile overrun or other circumstances under
which normal access would be denied.[6]

41

the larger the possibility it may be detected by counterintelligence organizations. Beyond the station chief, the
most likely person to be associated with the station, not
as a case ocer, is a communicator, especially if highly
specialized secure communication methods are used.

8.1.4 Support services

Some clandestine services may have additional capabilities for operations or support. Key operational agents of
inuence are apt to be run as singletons, although political considerations may require communication through
cutouts. Useful idiots can be run by diplomatic case ofcers, since there is no particular secrecy about their existence or loyalty. Valuable volunteers, depending on the
size of the volunteer group, may work either with case
ocers, or operations ocers brought clandestinely into
the area of operations.
Transportation, Inltration, exltration, logistics
Proprietaries, which can be large businesses (e.g., the
CIA proprietary airlines such as Air America, which, in
the interest of cover, often had the latest aircraft and ew
commercial as well as secret cargo), often are not controlled from the local area, but by headquarters. Especially when the proprietary is a multinational company,
and has some commercial business of its own, central
control makes the most sense.

In such an approach, both clandestine intelligence and

covert operations personnel live normal lives, perhaps
carrying out regular military or government functions, but
have prepared documentation of assumed identities, safehouses, secure communications, etc.
In looking at internal as well as external assets, remember
the fundamental rule of clandestine operations: the more
secure, the less ecient. Because espionage operations
A representative illegal residency
need rigorous security, they are always inecient they
take a lot of time, energy, and money. Proprietaries can
Vilyam Genrikhovich Fisher, usually better known by
be an exception, but, even though they make money, they
his alias, Rudolf Abel, was a Soviet intelligence ocer
can require additional capital to be able to expand in the
who came to the US under the false identity of a US
same way a comparable private business would do so.[7]
citizen, Emil Robert Goldfus, who had died in infancy
but was used by the USSR to create an elaborate legend for Fisher. On coming to the US, entering through Volunteer and proprietary support
Canada, Fisher/Abel took over the control of several existing Soviet HUMINT assets, and also recruited new asSayanim are Jews living outside Israel as foreign citizens
sets. Key assets for whom he was the case ocer in- that volunteer to provide assistance to the Mossad. This
cluded Lona Cohen and Morris Cohen, who were not assistance includes facilitating medical care, money, lodirect intelligence collectors but couriers for a number gistics, and even overt intelligence gathering, yet sayanim
of agents reporting on US nuclear information, including are only paid for their expenses. No ocial number is
Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, known, but estimates put the number of sayanim in the
and Klaus Fuchs.
thousands. The existence of this large body of volunteers
His role was that of the illegal resident in the US, under
nonocial cover. Soviet practice often was to have two
rezidents, one illegal and one a diplomat under ocial
cover. He was betrayed to the US by an alcoholic assistant
who defected to the FBI.

is one reason why the Mossad operates with fewer case

ocers than fellow intelligence agencies.

Another kind of resource could include foreign oces

owned or operated by nationals of the country in question. A step farther is a proprietary, or business, not
That Fisher/Abel only had one assistant, with operational just individuals, under non-ocial cover. Both kinds of
responsibilities, is not surprising. Unless a clandestine business can provide information from recruitment, unstation has a strong cover identity, the larger the station, witting agents, or support functions. Small and medium

42

CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

aviation-related businesses have been popular US propri- struction to Moses to send spies into the land of Canaan.
etaries, including Air America and Southern Air Trans- The account of the harlot Rahab sheltering Israelite spies
port.
and betraying the city of Jericho might be the rst docu[10]
Once the service has a presence in aviation, it may be- mented instance of a safe house.
come aware of persons, in private business, civil service,
or the military, who y to destinations of interest. They
may mention it in innocent conversation, such as at the
airports restaurant or bar. They also may be assumed
to be going there, based by analysis of ight departure
times, aircraft type, duration of trip, and their passengers
or cargo.

The term is not strictly limited to houses, although many

intelligence services use rural houses for extended functions such as debrieng defectors. In a city, a safehouse
may be an apartment or house that is not known to be
associated with an intelligence service.

Another usage refers to mailing addresses (postal and

electronic) and telephone numbers, to which messages
Having routine access to an airport can reveal: Whos can be sent with a reasonable chance of not coming into
coming and going, on and o the record? Whats in the the awareness of counter-intelligence.
hangars and warehouses? What are the nances? Political connections and loyalties? Access to planes on
the ground? Flight plans?" It must be emphasized that Useful idiots
a transportation-related proprietarytruck stops, boat
Useful idiot is a term attributed to Lenin, principally in
maintenance, and other industry-specic businesses, have
Soviet use, for a person overtly supporting the interests
to operate as a real business. Occasionally, they may proof one country (e.g., the USSR) in another (e.g., a memduce a prot, and that can be confusing for headquarters
ber of the overt Communist Party of the second country).
nancial managers, provide a local but perhaps traceable
Soviet intelligence practice was to avoid such people in
[8]
source of funds, or both.
the actual clandestine operations, regarding them at most
Public relations rms have long been useful useful as distractions to the counterintelligence services.
proprietaries.[9] In a given country of operations, or
Agents of inuence, who were witting of Communist
perhaps adjacent countries that are concerned about
plans and intended to inuence their own countrys acthe actions of their neighbor, news releases placed by
tions to be consistent with Soviet goals, went to great
experienced public relations professionals can help
lengths to conceal any aliation. Witting is a term of
mold relevant opinion. Care must be taken that the
intelligence art that indicates that one is not only aware
news release does not blow back on the clandestinely
of a fact or piece of information, but also aware of its
sponsoring country.
connection to intelligence activities. the Venona project
Another viable industry for proprietaries is natural re- communications intelligence exposes that Alger Hiss and
sources exploration. If, hypothetically, a mining com- Harry Dexter White, accused of Communist sympathies,
pany operated in a country where there are both resources were indeed Soviet spies. They were Communist agents,
deposits and non-national group sanctuaries, a propri- and the Soviets certainly did not treat them as useful idetary company could get information on both, and also iots. There were communications with them, and the diprovide access and support services. If the proprietary alogues were clandestine.
began mining operations, it would naturally have access
Gus Hall also had overt Communist aliation, and it is
to explosives, which might be made available to sabotage
extremely unlikely Soviet clandestine operatives would
groups in neighboring areas.
have had anything to do with him. Still, in situations such
Use of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) is polit- as emergency exltration, Party members in a Western
ically sensitive and may require approval at the highest country might be called upon as a last desperate resort.
level of an agency. Sometimes, there is a broader policy need not to have the possibility of drawing suspicion
onto an NGO. For example, in WWII, it was occasion- 8.2 Basic agent recruiting
ally necessary to send supplies to Allied POWs, but Red
Cross parcels were never ever used for this purpose. The
decision had been made that Red Cross parcels were im- This section deals with the recruiting of human reportant to the survival of the POWs and could never be sources who do not work for a foreign intelligence service (FIS). For techniques of recruiting FIS personnel,
jeopardized.
see Counterintelligence.
In principle and best practice, all country B ocers in
country A report to an executive function in their home
Safehouses
country. In CIA terms, this might be a head of a country
Safehouse is a term of intelligence tradecraft whose desk or a regional desk. Russian practice was to refer to
origins may be lost in antiquity. The Bible is also re- Center.
plete with instances of espionage, including Yahwehs in- Actual recruiting involves a direct approach by a case o-

8.3. BASIC AGENT OPERATIONS

cer who has some existing access to the potential recruit,
an indirect approach through an access agent or proprietary, or has reason to risk a cold approach. Before the
direct recruitment, there may be a delicate period of development. For details, see Clandestine HUMINT asset
recruiting.

8.3 Basic agent operations

This section deals with the general structure of running espionage operations. A subsequent section deals
with Specialized Clandestine Functions, and another with
Support Services for both basic and specialized operations

43
Once the information is captured, it must be transmitted.
The transmission may be impersonal, as with dead drops
or car tosses. It may involve carriers. It may be electronic. If there is a need for personal meetings, the agent
must know how to request them, and also to alert the network leader or case ocer that the agent may be under
suspicion.
Teaching countersurveillance techniques to agents is a
calculated risk.[12] While it may be perfectly valid for an
agent to abort a drop or other relatively innocent action,
even at the cost of destroying valuable collected material,
it is much more dangerous to teach the agent to elude active surveillance. The ability to elude professional counterintelligence personnel following the agent, for example, may conrm the counterintelligence organizations
suspicion that they are dealing with a real agent.

The agent may join, or even create, a new network. In Still, the agent may need to have an emergency escape
the latter case, the agent may be called a lead agent or procedure if he conrms he is under surveillance, or even
a principal agent. The latter term is also refers to access if he is interrogated but released.
agents, who only help in recruiting.
Well-managed agent relationships can run for years and
even decades; there are cases where family members,
children at the time their parents were recruited, became
full members of the network. Not all agents, however, operate in networks. A Western term for agents controlled
as individuals is singleton. This term usually is reserved
for the rst or most sensitive recruitments, although specialized support personnel, such as radio operatives acting
alone, are called singletons.[11] In Soviet tradecraft, the
equivalent of a singleton is a separated acting agent. Professional intelligence ocers, such as Robert Hanssen,
may insist on being singletons, and go even farther, as
with Hanssen, refuse in-person meetings. Even as a singleton, the agent will use security measures such as secure
communications.

8.3.2 Continued testing during operations

Case ocers should constantly test their agents for

changes in motivation or possible counterintelligence
compromise. While name traces cannot be run on every person mentioned by the agent, do not be stingy
with them on persons who have familial, emotional, or
business ties with him to detect any linkages to hostile
counterintelligence.[12] Until an agent is well established
as reliable, meetings, which always must be done with
care to avoid detection, are the prime emphasis is put on
vigilance and checking-has he been planted by the local
counterintelligence, are his motives in agreeing to collaborate sincere? The need for personal meetings with such
give the opportunity to asAgents also may operate in networks, for which the classic an agent is increased, for they
[13]
sess
him
more
completely.
security structure is the cell system.
The agent may join a proprietary, although that is more An experienced US operations ocer emphasized that
eld operations personnel should report status and
likely to be for access or support agents.
progress often. Only with such reporting can a headquarters sta looking globally for penetrations, and aware of
political implications. Reporting and headquarters advice
8.3.1 Training
is critical for joint operations (i.e., with the intelligence
service of another country). Headquarters, aware of all
Before the agent actually starts to carry out assignment, joint operations with that service, can give advice from
training in tradecraft may be necessary. For security rea- a broader viewpoint, without compromising the need for
sons, this ideally will be done outside the agents own local initiative.[12] "
country, but such may not always be possible. Increasingly less desirable alternatives might be to conduct the
training away from the operational area, as in a safe house 8.3.3 Operating the agent
in a resort, and then a safe house inside the operational
area.
Even with the most sensitive agents, occasional personal
Among the rst things to be taught are communications
tradecraft, beginning with recording the material of interest. Skills here can include the operation of cameras
appropriate for espionage, methods of carrying out documents without detection, secret writing.

meetings are important in maintaining psychological control. Nevertheless, some agents, especially trained intelligence ocers like Robert Hanssen, will almost never
meet, but provide material good enough to prove their
bona des. A Soviet ocer commented, whatever an

44

CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

agents role in the intelligence net, personal contact should move. If neither is feasible, it is better to have Headquarbe made with him only when it is impossible to manage ters dispatch an ocer to a third country, either legally
without it. The number of meetings should be kept as low or illegally, for the meeting.[13]
as possible, especially with sources of valuable information.
Clandestine transfer operated by humans
Personal meetings may be held to give an
agent his next assignment and instructions for
carrying it out, to train him in tradecraft or
the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulll several of these purposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually served by a
meeting. In addition to its particular objectives
more general needs can be lled. A meeting
held for training purposes may be a means for
clarifying biographic data on the agent or his
views on various subjects. At every meeting
with an agent one should study him and obtain
new data on his potential and talents, thereby
providing a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in
him.[13]

It is a case-by-case decision whether the material exchanged should have safeguards against accessing it in
other than a precise manner. One straightforward protection method is to have the material on exposed photographic lm, in a container that does not suggest that
it contains lm and might be, innocently, opened in a
lighted room. Self-destruct devices also are possibilities,
but they conrm that the transfer involved sensitive material.

Brush pass and other physical exchange with couriers Under the general term brush pass is a wide range
of techniques in which one clandestine operative passes
a physical item to another operative.[15] Brush implies
that the two people brush past one another, typically in
a public place and preferably a crowd, where random people interfere with any visual surveillance. In a properly
executed brush pass, the agents do not even stop walking;
Agents, to varying extents, need reinforcement. Salary is at most, they may appear to bump into one another.
important and also gives a lever of compromise, although During the brief contact, a common means of executing
pressing it too hard can oend a truly ideologically mo- the exchange is for both to be carrying otherwise identical
tivated agent. Some agents benet from recognition that objects, such as a newspaper, briefcase, or magazine. The
they can never show, such as a uniform of your service, information being exchanged is in one of them. As the
or decorations from it.
two people separate, they still appear to be holding the
Agents will be more comfortable if they believe that they
will have protection, preferably exltration, if compromised. Protecting their families may be even more important. When the agent operates in a country with a
particularly brutal counterintelligence service, providing
them with a nal friend, or means for suicide, can be
comforting even if they never use it.[14]

8.3.4

Agent communications

same object in the same hand.

More challenging versions are reminiscent of passing a
baton in a relay race, and would be most commonly done
with small objects such as a photographic lm cartridge.
In this more dangerous method, the transfer is from hand
to hand, or from hand into a pocket. While this technique
obviously takes better manual dexterity and is more prone
to error, it has the countersurveillance advantage that the
operatives are not carrying anything after the transfer, and
can blend into a crowd even more easily.

This section deals with skills required of individuals, ei- A variation of the brush pass is the live letter drop, in
ther agents or support personnel. Most skills are con- which one agent follows a predened route, on foot, with
a prepared report hidden in a pocket. En route, a second
cerned with communications.
agent unknown to the rst agent picks his/her pocket and
then passes the report on unread, either to a cut-out or to
Meeting places for personal meetings
an intelligence ocer. This technique presents opportunities both for plausible deniability and for penetration by
A Soviet ocer commented, perhaps counterintuitively, hostile agents.
that it is harder to have longer meetings with agents when
the case ocer is under diplomatic cover. The reason is
that local counterintelligence is aware of the case ocer, Dead drop A dead drop is a container not easily found,
where the existence of an illegal (i.e., nonocial cover such as a magnetized box attached to a metal rack in an
in US terms) ocer may not be known to them. For out-of-sight alley. The box could be loosely buried. It
the legal ocer, here it is best either to have reliable should be possible to approach the container to ll or
safehouses or to deliver the agent discreetly to the o- empty it, and not be easily observed from a street or wincial residency building. The latter is a serious operational dow.

8.3. BASIC AGENT OPERATIONS

Typically, a clandestine collector will put espionage material, perhaps in encrypted form, into the box, and use
some prearranged signal to let a courier know that something needs to be taken out of the box and delivered to
the next point on the route to the case ocer. Such a
route might have several dead drops. In some cases, the
dead drop might be equipped with a device to destroy its
contents unless it is opened properly.

45
ratories have chemical and photographic techniques that
detect the disturbance of paper bers by the act of writing, so the invisible ink will not resist systematic forensic
analysis. Still, if its existence is not suspected, the analysis may not be done.
Microphotography Another technique, for hiding
content that will resist casual examination, is to reduce
the message to a photographic transparency or negative,
perhaps the size of the dot over the letter i in this article.
Such a technique needs both a laboratory and considerable technical skill, and is prone to damage and to accidentally falling o the paper. Still, it does have a countersurveillance value.[16]

Representative dead drop device

Signals to tell a courier, or a case ocer if there is no

intermediate courier, that the dead drop needs service can
be as simple as a piece of colored tape on a lamp post
or perhaps a set of window shades raised and lowered in
a specic pattern. While wrong number calls with a
predened apology can be used, they are more vulnerable
to surveillance if the phone in question is tapped.

Encryption Encryption, especially using a theoretically secure method, when properly executed, such as the
one-time pad,[17] is highly secure, but a counterintelligence agent seeing nonsense characters will immediately
become suspicious of the message that has been captured.
The very knowledge that a dead drop exists can cause it to
be trapped or put under surveillance, and the member of
a brush pass that carries it will be hard-pressed to explain
it.

Car tosses A car toss can take many forms, one of

which can be considered a moving dead drop. An agent
or courier can put a magnetized box inside a bumper on
a parked car.

One-time pad encryption has the absolute requirement

that the cryptographic key is used only once. Failure to
follow this rule caused a serious penetration into Soviet
espionage communications, through the Venona project
analysis.[18]

In some cases, if a car can drive slowly down a street or

driveway not easily observed, a courier can toss a message container into an open window, making the transfer
method intermediate between a brush pass and a dead
drop.

It is extremely dicult for a nonprofessional to develop a

cryptosystem, especially without computer support, that
is impervious to the attack by a professional cryptanalyst,
working for an agency with government resources, such
as the US NSA or Russian Spetssvyaz.[17] Still, when the
message is very short, the key is random or nearly random, some methods, like the Nihilist Straddling checkerboard may oer some resistance. Improvised methods
are most useful when they only have to protect the information for a very short time, such as changing the location
or time of an agent meeting scheduled in the same day.

Cars with diplomatic immunity have advantages and disadvantages for tosses. They cannot be searched if the toss
is observed, but they also are followed more easily. Diplomatic cars usually have distinctive markings or license
plates, and may be equipped with electronic tracking devices. Counterintelligence could wait until the car is out
of sight following a toss, then apprehend and interrogate
the courier, or simply keep the courier under surveillance
to discover another link in the message route.
Plain language code Less suspicious when examined,
although very limited in its ability to transfer more than
simple content, is plain language code. For example, the
Methods of protecting message content
nal attack order for the Battle of Pearl Harbor came
in a radio broadcast of the Japanese phrase, Climb
A message left in a dead drop, or dropped during an imMount Niitaka. Subsequent espionage communications
properly executed brush pass, is quite incriminating if
referred to ships as dierent types of dolls at a doll repair
counterintelligence personnel can immediately see suspishop.
cious information written on it. The ideal material for
Plain language code is most eective when used to trigger
transfer looks quite innocuous.
a preplanned operation, rather than transfer any signiAt one time, invisible ink, a subset of steganography, was
cant amount of information.
popular in espionage communications, because it was not
visible to the naked eye without development by heat or
chemicals. While computer-based steganographic tech- Steganography, covert channels, and spread specniques still are viable, modern counterintelligence labo- trum Steganography, in the broadest sense of the word,

46

CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

is a technique of hiding information in plain sight within

a larger message or messaging context. It is hard to detect
because the secret message is a very small component of
the larger amount, such as a few words hidden in a Web
graphic.

denitively terminated. This need rarely eliminates the

need for protecting the fact of espionage, the support services, and the tradecraft and tools provided.
One of the most dicult challenges is ending an emotional relationship between the case ocer and agent,
which can exist in both directions. Sometimes, an agent is
unstable, and this is a major complication; perhaps even
requiring the evacuation of the agent. More stable agents
may be happy with termination bonuses, and perhaps a
future emigration opportunity, that do not draw attention
to their own sides counterintelligence. In some instances,
an intelligence agency may issue a "burn notice, indicating to other such agencies that an individual is an unreliable source of information.

Even more sophisticated computer-dependent methods

can protect information. The information may or may not
be encrypted. In spread-spectrum communications, the
information is sent, in parallel, at very low level through a
set of frequencies. Only when the receiver knows the frequencies, the time relationship on when a given frequency
or other communications channel will carry content, and
how to extract the content, can information be recovered.
Basic spread spectrum uses a xed set of frequencies, but
the signal strength in any one frequency is too low to de- Especially in the case of non-national organizations, tertect without correlation to other frequencies.
mination can be very literal, ranging from having a trusted
Frequency-hopping spread spectrum is a related tech- operative kill the problematic agent, or, when culturally
nique, which can use the parallel transmission of true appropriate, sending the agent on a suicide mission.
spread spectrum, not using any one frequency long When the clandestine phase is preparation for a DA misenough for plausible interception. The pattern of varia- sion such as the 9/11 attacks, or the assassination attacks,
tion among channels may be generated and received using using suicide bombers, by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
cryptographic methods.
Eelam, termination of the operational cells is rather obvious. If there are support cells in the operational area,
Methods of protecting against electronic detection of they may be vulnerable, but it would be good tradecraft
to withdraw them shortly before the attack.
the fact of messaging
Avoiding detection of radio signals means minimizing
the clandestine transmitters exposure to hostile directionnding. Modern techniques generally combine several
methods:
Burst transmission or otherwise minimizing
High-gain antenna and/or directional antenna
Receiver or relay away from detectors, as,
for example, satellites.
Exploring agent information often meant a good deal of
interaction, in which the home service would clarify what
the agent reported, give new orders, etc. One approach
used in WWII was the Joan-Eleanor system, which put
the case ocer into an aircraft at high altitude. From
that altitude, there could be fast interaction in voice, so
that they get to the key issues faster than with many separately encrypted and transmitted messages.[19] The modern equivalent is a small, low probability of intercept radio transceiver, using a directional antenna aimed at an
orbiting satellite communications relay. Avoiding detection of radio communications involves all the principles
of transmission and reception security.

8.4 Special clandestine services

8.4.1 Agents of inuence
An agent of inuence, being witting or unwitting of the
goals of a foreign power B, can inuence the policy of
Country A to be consistent with the goals of Country B.
In Soviet theory, inuencing policy was one aspect of
what they termed active measures (aktivnyye meropriyatiya). Active measures have a dierent connotation than
the Western concept of direct action (DA), although Soviet active measures could include wet aairs (mokrie
dela) conducted by Department V of the KGB, wet referring to the spilling of blood.

8.4.2 Strategic deception

Intelligence organizations occasionally use live, or even

dead, persons to deceive the enemy about their intentions.
One of the best-known such operations was the British
Operation Mincemeat, in which a dead body, bearing
carefully misleading documents, was put in British uniform, and oated onto a Spanish beach. In WWII, Spanish security services, while ocially neutral, often passed
information to the Germans, which, in this case, is exactly
8.3.5 Termination
what the British wanted done. This operation was under
For any number of reasons, a human source operation the control of the Twenty Committee, part of the British
may need to be suspended for an indenite time, or strategic deception organization, the London Controlling

8.5. DIRECT ACTION SERVICES

47

Section. A related British operation in WWI was run by

a controversial military ocer, Richard Meinertzhagen,
who prepared a knapsack containing false military plans,
which the Ottoman allies of the Germans were allowed
to capture. The plans related to false British strategy for
the Sinai and Palestine Campaign, setting up a successful
surprise attack in the Battle of Beersheba and the Third
Battle of Gaza.
Active measures, however, reected a national eort to
inuence other countries to act in concert with Soviet
goals. These measures could involve state organizations
up to and including the Politburo, much as the WWII
British organization for strategic deception, the London
Controlling Section, and its US counterpart, Joint Security Control, could get direct support from the head of
government. Much of the Soviet responsibilities for active measures was focused in the KGB. Its First Chief
Directorate uses active measures such as agents of inuence, propaganda, and disinformation to promote Soviet
Russian concepts involve the full scope of grand strategy
goals.
In the present political context of Western democracies,
the sensitivity, and separation, of clandestine and open The Second Chief Directorate, whose responsibilities
contacts do not lend themselves to the process of building are now primarily in the Russian FSB, is responsible for
the recruitment of agents among foreigners stationed in
agents of inuence.
the Soviet Union. The KGB inuences these people unActive measures is not exclusively an intelligence activ- wittingly, as most regard themselves too sophisticated to
ity, and in this sense it diers from the similar American be manipulated.
concept of covert action. There are many dierences between active measures and covert action. One is the So- The second deception program is counterintelligence,
viet ability to mesh overt and covert inuence activities which aims to neutralize the eorts of foreign intelligence
through centralized coordination of party, government, services. It achieves this through the use of non-Soviet
and ostensibly private organizations dealing with foreign- double agents and Soviet double agents. Non-Soviet douers. Despite interagency coordination mechanisms, the ble agents are foreign nationals who have been turned.
United States is too pluralistic to achieve full coordina- A Soviet double agent is a Soviet with access to classition between all the overt and covert means of exercising ed information. These ocials may be used as false
[20]
inuence abroad. Other major dierences are in scope, defectors....
intensity, and importance attributed to active measures Inuence operations integrate Soviet views into leaderand covert action, and in immunity from legal and politi- ship groups. The agent of inuence may be a well- placed,
cal constraints.
trusted contact who
While deception and inuence operations could involve
the highest levels of Allied governments in WWII, it
consciously serves Soviet interests on
is worth noting that while the West generally speaks
some matters while retaining his integrity
of military deception, strategic deception operates at a
on others
higher level. A Soviet, and presumably Russian, term of
an unwitting contact who is manipulated
art, maskirovka or 'denial and deception', is much broader
to take actions that advance Soviet interthan the current Western doctrine of deception being run
ests on specic issues of common conby lower-level sta groups.
cern.
In the military, responsibility for maskirovka easily can
be at the level of a deputy chief of the General Sta, who
can call upon all levels of government.

8.5 Direct action services

Returning to KGB doctrine, presumably still present in

the SVR, Inuence operations integrate Soviet views
into foreign leadership groups. Propaganda operations
take the form of disinformation articles placed in the
foreign press. Disinformation operations are false documents designed to incite enmity toward the United
States.

There is no consensus on whether it is, or is not, advisable

to intermingle espionage and direct action organizations,
even at the headquarters level. See Clandestine HUMINT
and Covert Action for more history and detail. A terminology point: current US terminology, ignoring an occasional euphemism, has now consolidated espionage into

48

CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

the National Clandestine Services. These are part of the [11] Agent Radio Operation During World War II, Studies in
Intelligence
CIA Directorate of Operations, which has some responsibility for Direct Action (DA) and Unconventional War[12] Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995), Observations on
fare (UW), although the latter two, when of any apprethe Double Agent, Studies in Intelligence, retrieved 3
ciable size, are the responsibility of the military.
November 2007
There is much more argument for doing so at headquar[13] Bekrenev, (GRU ocer) L. K., Operational Contacts
ters, possibly not as one unit but with regular consultation.
(– SCHOLAR SEARCH ), Center for the Study of InCertain services, such as name checks, communications,
telligence, Central Intelligence Agency
cover identities, and technical support may reasonably be
combined, although the requirements of a particular eld [14] Hall, Roger (1957), You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dagger, W. W. Norton & Co.
network should be held on a need-to-know basis.
Other countries might have the functions under the same [15] Decision Support Systems, Inc. An Analysis of Al-Qaida
Tradecraft. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
organization, but run them in completely dierent networks. The only commonality they might have is emer[16] John Barron (1974), KGB: the secret work of Soviet secret
gency use of diplomatic facilities.
agents, Readers Digest Press

8.6 See also

Tradecraft
Undercover

8.7 References
[1] Paterson, Tony (25 November 2004), Berlin plaque pays
tribute to Schindler of Stourbridge"", Independent, the
(London)
[2] Rogov, (GRU ocer) A.S., Pitfalls of Civilian Cover
(– SCHOLAR SEARCH ), Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency)
[3] US Department of the Army (September 2006), FM 222.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations
(PDF), retrieved 2007-10-31
[4] Beller, Patrick R., The Life and Work of Stephan Haller,
Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency)
[5] Suvorov, Victor (1984), Chapter 6, The Practice of
Agent Work, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, MacMillan Publishing Company
[6] US Department of Defense (12 July 2007), Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms (PDF), retrieved 2007-10-01
[7] Carroll, Thomas Patrick (5 September 2006), Human Intelligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins (PDF)
[8] Prouty, L. Fisher (1973), The Secret Team: The CIA and
Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World,
Prentice-Hall, ISBN 0-13-798173-2
[9] R.F. Bennett.
[10] U.S. Department of Justice,Commission for Review of
FBI Security Programs (March 2002), A Review of FBI
Security Programs

[17] David Kahn (1974), The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, Macmillan, ISBN 0025604600
[18] National Security Agency. VENONA. Archived from
the original on 2007-10-28. Retrieved 2007-11-18.
[19] The SSTR-6 and SSTC-502 - Joan-Eleanor, 2007, retrieved 2007-11-17
[20] Edward J. Campbell. Soviet Strategic Intelligence Deception Organizations.

Chapter 9

Concealment device
Concealment devices or diversion safes are used to hide
things for the purpose of secrecy or security. They are
made from an ordinary household object such as a book,
a soda can, a candle, a can, or something as small as a
coin. The idea is that such an inconspicuous object would
not be expected to contain anything of worth.
Examples in espionage include dead drop spikes for transferring items to other people, and hollowed-out coins or
hollowed out teeth for concealing something - such as microlm or a suicide pill. Examples in smuggling include
suitcases with false bottoms for hiding contraband.

9.1.3 Candles
A new type, the hollow candle looks like a large scented
candle but is mostly hollow. The bottom comes o and
rolled papers or small objects can be placed and hidden
inside. Some of the most clever of these contraptions
looked like large, ordinary black candles with a felt base
concealing the opening. To open them, two metal needles
are poked through the felt at certain points and an electric
current passed through, causing them to open.

During World War II MI9 was responsible for creat- 9.1.4 Cans and jars
ing many concealment devices for escape aids to assist
prisoners of war to escape.
Also a new form of concealment device, mock cans of
various household chemicals or food and drinks can be
purchased. A wide variety of commonly used personal
9.1 Examples
care, household products and food containers with removable tops and bottoms are available. Valuables can
be discreetly stored inside these lookalike containers and
9.1.1 Ammunition
kept in their seemingly rightful places. Each of these diStarting in the First World War and still continuing version safes are indistinguishable from the genuine proddetection, and they may even be
today, military personnel use ammunition casings to uct, and can thus avoid
[1]
weighted
to
feel
full.
hide small amounts of critical information e.g. encryption/recognition codes or navigational grid references etc.
The hiding place is very easy to prepare: the bullet is
removed from the cartridge and the propellant powder 9.1.5
poured away. A small piece of paper with writing on it
can be stored inside. Given that ammunition can be found
everywhere in a combat zone, it is very easy to hide or discard such items because they blend in easily. Similarly,
if a soldier is captured, the enemy expects that soldiers
will have ammunition in their pockets, so little attention
is paid, beyond conscating and discarding it.

9.1.2

Coins

Books

Main article: Concealing objects in a book

Books are possibly the most common concealment devices in usage. They are easily made and can contain quite
large objects. They are also very dicult for outsiders to
spot but easy to recognize for those that are looking for a
American dollar coin used for concealment
specic book on a shelf.
49

50

CHAPTER 9. CONCEALMENT DEVICE

A hollow container, fashioned to look like an Eisenhower

dollar, is still used today to hide and send messages or lm
without being detected. Because it resembles ordinary
pocket change, it is virtually undetectable as a concealment device. If a hollow coin is suspected, it sometimes
can be easily conrmed by weighing against a normal coin
on a simple balance. However, more sophisticated hollow
coins have had their weight adjusted to match an unaltered coin by including a ring of a dense metal such as
lead inside the coin. Typically coins that have no gold or
silver content are used so as to further avoid suspicion.

goods to be concealed. Some of the more common devices used for this purpose are video players such as VHS,
DVD and Blu-ray players, computer accessories such as
DVD-ROM drives and hard disk drives, battery packs
or even a laptop computer itself. More often than not,
the majority of the components will be removed to allow
more space to conceal an item, but that will render the
device inoperable and may arouse suspicion, and it may
be of more benet to preserve the operation of the device
at the sacrice of space. Additionally, the electronic device itself may be subject to theft, thereby defeating the
Such hollow coins were created from two ordinary coins, purpose of such a concealment device.
by milling out one face and the interior of both coins (to
create a cavity), and the edges of one (so it could slide
into the other). The half coin with intact edges would 9.2 See also
also have a pin-prick size hole drilled through its face,
so the device could be opened by inserting a pin. A
Rudolph Abel
scratch may be added to help line up the faces while clos Dead drop
ing italthough it is very dicult to detect a slight misalignment by casual inspection. A device of this nature
was famously discovered by a paper boy in the "Hollow
Nickel Case". U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers was issued 9.3 References
with a hollow silver dollar containing a tiny, saxitoxinimpregnated needle,[2] to be used to commit suicide in [1] Diversion Safes at the Wayback Machine (archived February 21, 2009)
case of capture by enemy forces.

9.1.6

Diversion safe

A device whereby a safe-looking safe is left open but has a

hidden compartment (e.g., in the door) where small valuable articles can be hidden. As an alternative variant, a
safe may be stocked with some lesser valuables, with
the expectation that it will be burgled, but that the real
safe or hiding place for the important valuables will be
missed.

9.1.7

Electrical outlet

A fake electrical outlet, which can be pulled out from the

wall and which contains a hidden compartment for storage.

9.1.8

Painting

Thin objects such as papers/money can be concealed in

or behind the frame of a painting.

9.1.9

Computers and consumer electronics

Computer equipment and consumer electronics can easily be used for concealing goods and information. Usually the only tool required is a screwdriver, the device can
be opened up, have the majority of the electronic and
mechanical components removed and replaced with the

[2] Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents. Church Committee Reports 1. The Assassination Archives and Research
Center (AARC). 1975-176. p. 7. Check date values in:
|date= (help)

Chapter 10

Cryptography
Secret code redirects here. For the Aya Kamiki album,
see Secret Code.
Cryptology redirects here. For the David S. Ware album, see Cryptology (album).
Cryptography (or cryptology; from Greek

German Lorenz cipher machine, used in World War II to encrypt

very-high-level general sta messages

application more widespread.

Modern cryptography is heavily based on mathematical
theory and computer science practice; cryptographic algorithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions, making such algorithms hard to break in practice by any adversary. It is theoretically possible to break
such a system, but it is infeasible to do so by any known
practical means. These schemes are therefore termed
computationally secure; theoretical advances, e.g., improvements in integer factorization algorithms, and faster
computing technology require these solutions to be continually adapted. There exist information-theoretically
secure schemes that provably cannot be broken even with
unlimited computing poweran example is the one-time
padbut these schemes are more dicult to implement
than the best theoretically breakable but computationally
secure mechanisms.
The growth of cryptographic technology has raised a
number of legal issues in the information age. Cryptographys potential for use as a tool for espionage and sedition
has led many governments to classify it as a weapon and to
limit or even prohibit its use and export.[5] In some jurisdictions where the use of cryptography is legal, laws permit investigators to compel the disclosure of encryption
keys for documents relevant to an investigation.[6] Cryptography also plays a major role in digital rights management and piracy of digital media.[7]

krypts, hidden, secret"; and graphein, writing, or - -logia, study, respectively)[1] is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication
in the presence of third parties (called adversaries).[2]
More generally, it is about constructing and analyzing
protocols that block adversaries;[3] various aspects in
information security such as data condentiality, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation[4] are central to modern cryptography. Modern cryptography ex- 10.1 Terminology
ists at the intersection of the disciplines of mathematics,
computer science, and electrical engineering. Appli- Until modern times cryptography referred almost exclucations of cryptography include ATM cards, computer sively to encryption, which is the process of converting
passwords, and electronic commerce.
ordinary information (called plaintext) into unintelligiCryptography prior to the modern age was eectively ble text (called ciphertext).[8] Decryption is the reverse,
synonymous with encryption, the conversion of informa- in other words, moving from the unintelligible ciphertion from a readable state to apparent nonsense. The text back to plaintext. A cipher (or cypher) is a pair
originator of an encrypted message shared the decoding of algorithms that create the encryption and the reverstechnique needed to recover the original information only ing decryption. The detailed operation of a cipher is
with intended recipients, thereby precluding unwanted controlled both by the algorithm and in each instance
persons from doing the same. Since World War I and by a "key". This is a secret (ideally known only to
the advent of the computer, the methods used to carry the communicants), usually a short string of characters,
out cryptology have become increasingly complex and its which is needed to decrypt the ciphertext. Formally, a
51

52
"cryptosystem" is the ordered list of elements of nite
possible plaintexts, nite possible cyphertexts, nite possible keys, and the encryption and decryption algorithms
which correspond to each key. Keys are important both
formally and in actual practice, as ciphers without variable keys can be trivially broken with only the knowledge of the cipher used and are therefore useless (or even
counter-productive) for most purposes. Historically, ciphers were often used directly for encryption or decryption without additional procedures such as authentication
or integrity checks.

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

(attempt to) ensure secrecy in communications, such as
those of spies, military leaders, and diplomats. In recent decades, the eld has expanded beyond condentiality concerns to include techniques for message integrity checking, sender/receiver identity authentication,
digital signatures, interactive proofs and secure computation, among others.

10.2.1 Classic cryptography

In colloquial use, the term "code" is often used to mean

any method of encryption or concealment of meaning.
However, in cryptography, code has a more specic
meaning. It means the replacement of a unit of plaintext
(i.e., a meaningful word or phrase) with a code word (for
example, wallaby replaces attack at dawn). Codes
are no longer used in serious cryptographyexcept incidentally for such things as unit designations (e.g., Bronco
Flight or Operation Overlord)since properly chosen ciphers are both more practical and more secure than even
the best codes and also are better adapted to computers.
Cryptanalysis is the term used for the study of methods
for obtaining the meaning of encrypted information without access to the key normally required to do so; i.e., it is
Reconstructed ancient Greek scytale, an early cipher device
the study of how to crack encryption algorithms or their
implementations.
The earliest forms of secret writing required little more
Some use the terms cryptography and cryptology inter- than writing implements since most people could not
changeably in English, while others (including US mili- read. More literacy, or literate opponents, required actary practice generally) use cryptography to refer speci- tual cryptography. The main classical cipher types are
cally to the use and practice of cryptographic techniques transposition ciphers, which rearrange the order of letters
and cryptology to refer to the combined study of cryp- in a message (e.g., 'hello world' becomes 'ehlol owrdl' in a
tography and cryptanalysis.[9][10] English is more exible trivially simple rearrangement scheme), and substitution
than several other languages in which cryptology (done by ciphers, which systematically replace letters or groups of
cryptologists) is always used in the second sense above. letters with other letters or groups of letters (e.g., 'y at
RFC 2828 advises that steganography is sometimes in- once' becomes 'gmz bu podf' by replacing each letter with
the one following it in the Latin alphabet). Simple vercluded in cryptology.[11]
sions of either have never oered much condentiality
The study of characteristics of languages that have some
from enterprising opponents. An early substitution cipher
application in cryptography or cryptology (e.g. frequency
was the Caesar cipher, in which each letter in the plaintext
data, letter combinations, universal patterns, etc.) is
was replaced by a letter some xed number of positions
called cryptolinguistics.
further down the alphabet. Suetonius reports that Julius
Caesar used it with a shift of three to communicate with
his generals. Atbash is an example of an early Hebrew
10.2 History of cryptography and cipher. The earliest known use of cryptography is some
carved ciphertext on stone in Egypt (ca 1900 BCE), but
cryptanalysis
this may have been done for the amusement of literate
observers rather than as a way of concealing information.
Main article: History of cryptography
The Greeks of Classical times are said to have
Before the modern era, cryptography was concerned
solely with message condentiality (i.e., encryption)
conversion of messages from a comprehensible form into
an incomprehensible one and back again at the other end,
rendering it unreadable by interceptors or eavesdroppers
without secret knowledge (namely the key needed for
decryption of that message). Encryption was used to

known of ciphers (e.g., the scytale transposition cipher

claimed to have been used by the Spartan military).[12]
Steganography (i.e., hiding even the existence of a message so as to keep it condential) was also rst developed
in ancient times. An early example, from Herodotus, was
a message tattooed on a slaves shaved head and concealed under the regrown hair.[8] More modern examples of steganography include the use of invisible ink,

10.2. HISTORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CRYPTANALYSIS

53

microdots, and digital watermarks to conceal information.

In India, the 2000-year old Kamasutra of Vtsyyana
speaks of two dierent kinds of ciphers called Kautiliyam
and Mulavediya. In the Kautiliyam, the cipher letter substitutions are based on phonetic relations, such as vowels
becoming consonants. In the Mulavediya, the cipher alphabet consists of pairing letters and using the reciprocal
ones.[8]

16th-century book-shaped French cipher machine, with arms of

Henri II of France

First page of a book by Al-Kindi which discusses encryption of

messages

Ciphertexts produced by a classical cipher (and some

modern ciphers) always reveal statistical information
about the plaintext, which can often be used to break
them. After the discovery of frequency analysis, perhaps
by the Arab mathematician and polymath Al-Kindi (also
known as Alkindus) in the 9th century,[13] nearly all such
ciphers became more or less readily breakable by any informed attacker. Such classical ciphers still enjoy popularity today, though mostly as puzzles (see cryptogram).
Al-Kindi wrote a book on cryptography entitled Risalah
Istikhraj al-Mu'amma (Manuscript for the Deciphering
Cryptographic Messages), which described the rst known
use frequency analysis cryptanalysis techniques.[13][14]
Essentially all ciphers remained vulnerable to cryptanalysis using the frequency analysis technique until the development of the polyalphabetic cipher, most clearly by
Leon Battista Alberti around the year 1467, though there
is some indication that it was already known to AlKindi.[14] Albertis innovation was to use dierent ciphers (i.e., substitution alphabets) for various parts of a
message (perhaps for each successive plaintext letter at
the limit). He also invented what was probably the rst
automatic cipher device, a wheel which implemented a
partial realization of his invention. In the polyalphabetic
Vigenre cipher, encryption uses a key word, which controls letter substitution depending on which letter of the

Enciphered letter from Gabriel de Luetz d'Aramon, French Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, after 1546, with partial decipherment

key word is used. In the mid-19th century Charles Babbage showed that the Vigenre cipher was vulnerable to
Kasiski examination, but this was rst published about
ten years later by Friedrich Kasiski.[15]
Although frequency analysis can be a powerful and general technique against many ciphers, encryption has still
often been eective in practice, as many a would-be
cryptanalyst was unaware of the technique. Breaking a
message without using frequency analysis essentially required knowledge of the cipher used and perhaps of the
key involved, thus making espionage, bribery, burglary,
defection, etc., more attractive approaches to the cryptanalytically uninformed. It was nally explicitly recognized
in the 19th century that secrecy of a ciphers algorithm
is not a sensible nor practical safeguard of message security; in fact, it was further realized that any adequate
cryptographic scheme (including ciphers) should remain
secure even if the adversary fully understands the cipher
algorithm itself. Security of the key used should alone
be sucient for a good cipher to maintain condentiality under an attack. This fundamental principle was rst
explicitly stated in 1883 by Auguste Kerckhos and is
generally called Kerckhoss Principle; alternatively and
more bluntly, it was restated by Claude Shannon, the inventor of information theory and the fundamentals of the-

54

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

oretical cryptography, as Shannons Maxim'the enemy Extensive open academic research into cryptography is
knows the system'.
relatively recent; it began only in the mid-1970s. In recent
Dierent physical devices and aids have been used to times, IBM personnel designed the algorithm that became
assist with ciphers. One of the earliest may have been the Federal (i.e., US) Data Encryption Standard; WhitHellman published their key agreethe scytale of ancient Greece, a rod supposedly used by eld Die and Martin
[18]
ment
algorithm;
and
the RSA algorithm was published
the Spartans as an aid for a transposition cipher (see
in
Martin
Gardner's
Scientic
American column. Since
image above). In medieval times, other aids were inthen,
cryptography
has
become
a widely used tool in comvented such as the cipher grille, which was also used for a
munications, computer networks, and computer security
kind of steganography. With the invention of polyalphabetic ciphers came more sophisticated aids such as Al- generally. Some modern cryptographic techniques can
only keep their keys secret if certain mathematical probbertis own cipher disk, Johannes Trithemius' tabula recta
scheme, and Thomas Jeerson's multi cylinder (not pub- lems are intractable, such as the integer factorization or
the discrete logarithm problems, so there are deep conlicly known, and reinvented independently by Bazeries
around 1900). Many mechanical encryption/decryption nections with abstract mathematics. There are very few
cryptosytems that are proven to be unconditionally sedevices were invented early in the 20th century, and several patented, among them rotor machinesfamously in- cure. The one-time pad is one. There are a few important
cluding the Enigma machine used by the German govern- ones that are proven secure under certain unproven asment and military from the late 1920s and during World sumptions. For example, the infeasibility of factoring exWar II.[16] The ciphers implemented by better quality ex- tremely large integers is the basis for believing that RSA is
amples of these machine designs brought about a substan- secure, and some other systems, but even there, the proof
is usually lost due to practical considerations. There are
tial increase in cryptanalytic diculty after WWI.[17]
systems similar to RSA, such as one by Michael O. Rabin
that is provably secure provided factoring n = pq is impossible, but the more practical system RSA has never been
10.2.2 Computer era
proved secure in this sense. The discrete logarithm problem is the basis for believing some other cryptosystems
Cryptanalysis of the new mechanical devices proved to are secure, and again, there are related, less practical sysbe both dicult and laborious. In the United King- tems that are provably secure relative to the discrete log
[19]
dom, cryptanalytic eorts at Bletchley Park during WWII problem.
spurred the development of more ecient means for car- As well as being aware of cryptographic history, cryptorying out repetitious tasks. This culminated in the devel- graphic algorithm and system designers must also sensiopment of the Colossus, the worlds rst fully electronic, bly consider probable future developments while working
digital, programmable computer, which assisted in the on their designs. For instance, continuous improvements
decryption of ciphers generated by the German Armys in computer processing power have increased the scope
Lorenz SZ40/42 machine.
of brute-force attacks, so when specifying key lengths,
Just as the development of digital computers and electronics helped in cryptanalysis, it made possible much
more complex ciphers. Furthermore, computers allowed
for the encryption of any kind of data representable in
any binary format, unlike classical ciphers which only encrypted written language texts; this was new and signicant. Computer use has thus supplanted linguistic cryptography, both for cipher design and cryptanalysis. Many
computer ciphers can be characterized by their operation
on binary bit sequences (sometimes in groups or blocks),
unlike classical and mechanical schemes, which generally
manipulate traditional characters (i.e., letters and digits)
directly. However, computers have also assisted cryptanalysis, which has compensated to some extent for increased cipher complexity. Nonetheless, good modern
ciphers have stayed ahead of cryptanalysis; it is typically
the case that use of a quality cipher is very ecient (i.e.,
fast and requiring few resources, such as memory or CPU
capability), while breaking it requires an eort many orders of magnitude larger, and vastly larger than that required for any classical cipher, making cryptanalysis so
inecient and impractical as to be eectively impossible.

the required key lengths are similarly advancing.[20] The

potential eects of quantum computing are already being considered by some cryptographic system designers;
the announced imminence of small implementations of
these machines may be making the need for this preemptive caution rather more than merely speculative.[4]
Essentially, prior to the early 20th century, cryptography
was chiey concerned with linguistic and lexicographic
patterns. Since then the emphasis has shifted, and cryptography now makes extensive use of mathematics, including aspects of information theory, computational
complexity, statistics, combinatorics, abstract algebra,
number theory, and nite mathematics generally. Cryptography is also a branch of engineering, but an unusual
one since it deals with active, intelligent, and malevolent
opposition (see cryptographic engineering and security
engineering); other kinds of engineering (e.g., civil or
chemical engineering) need deal only with neutral natural
forces. There is also active research examining the relationship between cryptographic problems and quantum
physics (see quantum cryptography and quantum computer).

10.3. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY

55

10.3 Modern cryptography

The modern eld of cryptography can be divided into several areas of study. The chief ones are discussed here; see
Topics in Cryptography for more.

10.3.1

Symmetric-key cryptography

K1

K2

K3

K4

K5

Main article: Symmetric-key algorithm

Symmetric-key cryptography refers to encryption methK6

Bob
Hello
Alice!

Encrypt

6EB69570
08E03CE4

Alice
Hello
Alice!

One round (out of 8.5) of the IDEA cipher, used in some versions
of PGP for high-speed encryption of, for instance, e-mail

Secret key

Decrypt

Symmetric-key cryptography, where a single key is used for encryption and decryption

ods in which both the sender and receiver share the same
key (or, less commonly, in which their keys are dierent, but related in an easily computable way). This was
the only kind of encryption publicly known until June
1976.[18]
Symmetric key ciphers are implemented as either block
ciphers or stream ciphers. A block cipher enciphers input
in blocks of plaintext as opposed to individual characters,
the input form used by a stream cipher.

with the plaintext bit-by-bit or character-by-character,

somewhat like the one-time pad. In a stream cipher,
the output stream is created based on a hidden internal
state which changes as the cipher operates. That internal
state is initially set up using the secret key material. RC4
is a widely used stream cipher; see Category:Stream ciphers.[4] Block ciphers can be used as stream ciphers; see
Block cipher modes of operation.
Cryptographic hash functions are a third type of cryptographic algorithm. They take a message of any length
as input, and output a short, xed length hash which can
be used in (for example) a digital signature. For good
hash functions, an attacker cannot nd two messages that
produce the same hash. MD4 is a long-used hash function which is now broken; MD5, a strengthened variant of
MD4, is also widely used but broken in practice. The US
National Security Agency developed the Secure Hash Algorithm series of MD5-like hash functions: SHA-0 was
a awed algorithm that the agency withdrew; SHA-1 is
widely deployed and more secure than MD5, but cryptanalysts have identied attacks against it; the SHA-2 family improves on SHA-1, but it isn't yet widely deployed;
and the US standards authority thought it prudent from
a security perspective to develop a new standard to signicantly improve the robustness of NISTs overall hash
algorithm toolkit.[26] Thus, a hash function design competition was meant to select a new U.S. national standard,
to be called SHA-3, by 2012. The competition ended on
October 2, 2012 when the NIST announced that Keccak
would be the new SHA-3 hash algorithm.[27]

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced

Encryption Standard (AES) are block cipher designs
which have been designated cryptography standards by
the US government (though DESs designation was nally withdrawn after the AES was adopted).[21] Despite
its deprecation as an ocial standard, DES (especially
its still-approved and much more secure triple-DES variant) remains quite popular; it is used across a wide range
of applications, from ATM encryption[22] to e-mail privacy[23] and secure remote access.[24] Many other block
ciphers have been designed and released, with consider- Message authentication codes (MACs) are much like
able variation in quality. Many have been thoroughly bro- cryptographic hash functions, except that a secret key can
ken, such as FEAL.[4][25]
be used to authenticate the hash value upon receipt;[4] this
Stream ciphers, in contrast to the 'block' type, create an additional complication blocks an attack scheme against
arbitrarily long stream of key material, which is combined bare digest algorithms, and so has been thought worth the

56

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

eort.

In a groundbreaking 1976 paper, Whiteld Die and

Martin Hellman proposed the notion of public-key (also,
more generally, called asymmetric key) cryptography in
10.3.2 Public-key cryptography
which two dierent but mathematically related keys are
useda public key and a private key.[28] A public key
Main article: Public-key cryptography
system is so constructed that calculation of one key
Symmetric-key cryptosystems use the same key for en- (the 'private key') is computationally infeasible from the
other (the 'public key'), even though they are necessarily related. Instead, both keys are generated secretly,
Bob
as an interrelated pair.[29] The historian David Kahn described public-key cryptography as the most revolutionHello
ary new concept in the eld since polyalphabetic substiEncrypt
Alice!
tution emerged in the Renaissance.[30]
Alice's
public key

6EB69570
08E03CE4

Alice
Hello
Alice!

Decrypt
Alice's
private key

Public-key cryptography, where dierent keys are used for encryption and decryption

cryption and decryption of a message, though a message or group of messages may have a dierent key than
others. A signicant disadvantage of symmetric ciphers
is the key management necessary to use them securely.
Each distinct pair of communicating parties must, ideally, share a dierent key, and perhaps each ciphertext exchanged as well. The number of keys required increases
as the square of the number of network members, which
very quickly requires complex key management schemes
to keep them all consistent and secret. The diculty of
securely establishing a secret key between two communicating parties, when a secure channel does not already exist between them, also presents a chicken-and-egg problem which is a considerable practical obstacle for cryptography users in the real world.

In public-key cryptosystems, the public key may be freely

distributed, while its paired private key must remain secret. In a public-key encryption system, the public key is
used for encryption, while the private or secret key is used
for decryption. While Die and Hellman could not nd
such a system, they showed that public-key cryptography
was indeed possible by presenting the DieHellman key
exchange protocol, a solution that is now widely used in
secure communications to allow two parties to secretly
agree on a shared encryption key.[18]
Die and Hellmans publication sparked widespread academic eorts in nding a practical public-key encryption
system. This race was nally won in 1978 by Ronald
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman, whose solution
has since become known as the RSA algorithm.[31]
The DieHellman and RSA algorithms, in addition to
being the rst publicly known examples of high quality public-key algorithms, have been among the most
widely used. Others include the CramerShoup cryptosystem, ElGamal encryption, and various elliptic curve
techniques. See Category:Asymmetric-key cryptosystems.
To much surprise, a document published in 1997 by the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ),
a British intelligence organization, revealed that cryptographers at GCHQ had anticipated several academic
developments.[32] Reportedly, around 1970, James H. Ellis had conceived the principles of asymmetric key cryptography. In 1973, Cliord Cocks invented a solution
that essentially resembles the RSA algorithm.[32][33] And
in 1974, Malcolm J. Williamson is claimed to have developed the DieHellman key exchange.[34]

Padlock icon from the Firefox Web browser, which indicates that
TLS, a public-key cryptography system, is in use.

Whiteld Die and Martin Hellman, authors of the rst published paper on public-key cryptography

Public-key cryptography can also be used for implementing digital signature schemes. A digital signature is reminiscent of an ordinary signature; they both have the characteristic of being easy for a user to produce, but dicult for anyone else to forge. Digital signatures can also

10.3. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY

57

be permanently tied to the content of the message being

signed; they cannot then be 'moved' from one document
to another, for any attempt will be detectable. In digital signature schemes, there are two algorithms: one for
signing, in which a secret key is used to process the message (or a hash of the message, or both), and one for verication, in which the matching public key is used with
the message to check the validity of the signature. RSA
and DSA are two of the most popular digital signature
schemes. Digital signatures are central to the operation
of public key infrastructures and many network security
schemes (e.g., SSL/TLS, many VPNs, etc.).[25]
Public-key algorithms are most often based on the
computational complexity of hard problems, often
from number theory. For example, the hardness of
RSA is related to the integer factorization problem, while
DieHellman and DSA are related to the discrete logarithm problem. More recently, elliptic curve cryptography has developed, a system in which security is based on
number theoretic problems involving elliptic curves. Because of the diculty of the underlying problems, most
public-key algorithms involve operations such as modular
multiplication and exponentiation, which are much more
computationally expensive than the techniques used in
most block ciphers, especially with typical key sizes. As
a result, public-key cryptosystems are commonly hybrid
cryptosystems, in which a fast high-quality symmetrickey encryption algorithm is used for the message itself,
while the relevant symmetric key is sent with the message, but encrypted using a public-key algorithm. Similarly, hybrid signature schemes are often used, in which
a cryptographic hash function is computed, and only the
resulting hash is digitally signed.[4]

10.3.3

Cryptanalysis

Main article: Cryptanalysis

The goal of cryptanalysis is to nd some weakness or
insecurity in a cryptographic scheme, thus permitting its
subversion or evasion.
It is a common misconception that every encryption
method can be broken. In connection with his WWII
work at Bell Labs, Claude Shannon proved that the onetime pad cipher is unbreakable, provided the key material is truly random, never reused, kept secret from all
possible attackers, and of equal or greater length than
the message.[35] Most ciphers, apart from the one-time
pad, can be broken with enough computational eort by
brute force attack, but the amount of eort needed may
be exponentially dependent on the key size, as compared
to the eort needed to make use of the cipher. In such
cases, eective security could be achieved if it is proven
that the eort required (i.e., work factor, in Shannons
terms) is beyond the ability of any adversary. This means
it must be shown that no ecient method (as opposed to
the time-consuming brute force method) can be found to
break the cipher. Since no such proof has been found

Variants of the Enigma machine, used by Germanys military and

civil authorities from the late 1920s through World War II, implemented a complex electro-mechanical polyalphabetic cipher.
Breaking and reading of the Enigma cipher at Polands Cipher
Bureau, for 7 years before the war, and subsequent decryption
at Bletchley Park, was important to Allied victory.[8]

to date, the one-time-pad remains the only theoretically

unbreakable cipher.
There are a wide variety of cryptanalytic attacks, and
they can be classied in any of several ways. A common distinction turns on what an attacker knows and
what capabilities are available. In a ciphertext-only attack, the cryptanalyst has access only to the ciphertext
(good modern cryptosystems are usually eectively immune to ciphertext-only attacks). In a known-plaintext
attack, the cryptanalyst has access to a ciphertext and
its corresponding plaintext (or to many such pairs). In
a chosen-plaintext attack, the cryptanalyst may choose a
plaintext and learn its corresponding ciphertext (perhaps
many times); an example is gardening, used by the British
during WWII. Finally, in a chosen-ciphertext attack, the
cryptanalyst may be able to choose ciphertexts and learn
their corresponding plaintexts.[4] Also important, often
overwhelmingly so, are mistakes (generally in the design
or use of one of the protocols involved; see Cryptanalysis
of the Enigma for some historical examples of this).
Cryptanalysis of symmetric-key ciphers typically involves looking for attacks against the block ciphers or
stream ciphers that are more ecient than any attack that
could be against a perfect cipher. For example, a simple
brute force attack against DES requires one known plaintext and 255 decryptions, trying approximately half of the

58

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

work with cryptosystems or the messages they handle
(e.g., bribery, extortion, blackmail, espionage, torture, ...)
may be the most productive attacks of all.

10.3.4 Cryptographic primitives

Much of the theoretical work in cryptography concerns
cryptographic primitivesalgorithms with basic cryptographic propertiesand their relationship to other cryptographic problems. More complicated cryptographic
tools are then built from these basic primitives. These
primitives provide fundamental properties, which are
used to develop more complex tools called cryptosystems
Pozna monument (center) to Polish cryptologists whose breakor cryptographic protocols, which guarantee one or more
ing of Germany's Enigma machine ciphers, beginning in 1932,
high-level security properties. Note however, that the disaltered the course of World War II
tinction between cryptographic primitives and cryptosystems, is quite arbitrary; for example, the RSA algorithm
is sometimes considered a cryptosystem, and sometimes a
possible keys, to reach a point at which chances are better primitive. Typical examples of cryptographic primitives
than even that the key sought will have been found. But include pseudorandom functions, one-way functions, etc.
this may not be enough assurance; a linear cryptanalysis attack against DES requires 243 known plaintexts and
approximately 243 DES operations.[36] This is a consid- 10.3.5 Cryptosystems
erable improvement on brute force attacks.
Public-key algorithms are based on the computational One or more cryptographic primitives are often used
diculty of various problems. The most famous of to develop a more complex algorithm, called a cryptothese is integer factorization (e.g., the RSA algorithm graphic system, or cryptosystem. Cryptosystems (e.g.,
is based on a problem related to integer factoring), but El-Gamal encryption) are designed to provide particthe discrete logarithm problem is also important. Much ular functionality (e.g., public key encryption) while
public-key cryptanalysis concerns numerical algorithms guaranteeing certain security properties (e.g., chosenfor solving these computational problems, or some of plaintext attack (CPA) security in the random oracle
them, eciently (i.e., in a practical time). For instance, model). Cryptosystems use the properties of the underthe best known algorithms for solving the elliptic curve- lying cryptographic primitives to support the systems sebased version of discrete logarithm are much more time- curity properties. Of course, as the distinction between
consuming than the best known algorithms for factor- primitives and cryptosystems is somewhat arbitrary, a
ing, at least for problems of more or less equivalent size. sophisticated cryptosystem can be derived from a combination of several more primitive cryptosystems. In
Thus, other things being equal, to achieve an equivalent
strength of attack resistance, factoring-based encryption many cases, the cryptosystems structure involves back
and forth communication among two or more parties in
techniques must use larger keys than elliptic curve techniques. For this reason, public-key cryptosystems based space (e.g., between the sender of a secure message and
its receiver) or across time (e.g., cryptographically proon elliptic curves have become popular since their inventected backup data). Such cryptosystems are sometimes
tion in the mid-1990s.
called cryptographic protocols.
While pure cryptanalysis uses weaknesses in the algorithms themselves, other attacks on cryptosystems are Some widely known cryptosystems include RSA encrypbased on actual use of the algorithms in real devices, and tion, Schnorr signature, El-Gamal encryption, PGP, etc.
[38]
are called side-channel attacks. If a cryptanalyst has ac- More complex cryptosystems include electronic cash
cess to, for example, the amount of time the device took systems, signcryption systems, etc. Some more 'theoretproof systems,[39]
to encrypt a number of plaintexts or report an error in a ical' cryptosystems include interactive
[40]
zero-knowledge proofs), systems for secret sharpassword or PIN character, he may be able to use a timing (like[41][42]
etc.
ing,
attack to break a cipher that is otherwise resistant to analysis. An attacker might also study the pattern and length Until recently, most security properties of most crypof messages to derive valuable information; this is known tosystems were demonstrated using empirical techniques
as trac analysis[37] and can be quite useful to an alert ad- or using ad hoc reasoning. Recently, there has been conversary. Poor administration of a cryptosystem, such as siderable eort to develop formal techniques for estabpermitting too short keys, will make any system vulner- lishing the security of cryptosystems; this has been generable, regardless of other virtues. And, of course, social ally called provable security. The general idea of provable
engineering, and other attacks against the personnel who security is to give arguments about the computational dif-

10.4. LEGAL ISSUES

59

culty needed to compromise some security aspect of the 10.4.2 Export controls
cryptosystem (i.e., to any adversary).
The study of how best to implement and integrate cryp- Main article: Export of cryptography
tography in software applications is itself a distinct eld
(see Cryptographic engineering and Security engineer- In the 1990s, there were several challenges to US exing).
port regulation of cryptography. After the source code
for Philip Zimmermann's Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption program found its way onto the Internet in June
1991, a complaint by RSA Security (then called RSA
Data Security, Inc.) resulted in a lengthy criminal inves10.4 Legal issues
tigation of Zimmermann by the US Customs Service and
the FBI, though no charges were ever led.[45][46] Daniel
See also: Cryptography laws in dierent nations
J. Bernstein, then a graduate student at UC Berkeley,
brought a lawsuit against the US government challenging some aspects of the restrictions based on free speech
grounds. The 1995 case Bernstein v. United States ultimately resulted in a 1999 decision that printed source
code for cryptographic algorithms and systems was pro10.4.1 Prohibitions
tected as free speech by the United States Constitution.[47]
Cryptography has long been of interest to intelligence In 1996, thirty-nine countries signed the Wassenaar Argathering and law enforcement agencies. Secret commu- rangement, an arms control treaty that deals with the exnications may be criminal or even treasonous. Because of port of arms and dual-use technologies such as crypits facilitation of privacy, and the diminution of privacy tography. The treaty stipulated that the use of cryptogattendant on its prohibition, cryptography is also of con- raphy with short key-lengths (56-bit for symmetric ensiderable interest to civil rights supporters. Accordingly, cryption, 512-bit for RSA) would no longer be exportthere has been a history of controversial legal issues sur- controlled.[48] Cryptography exports from the US berounding cryptography, especially since the advent of in- came less strictly regulated as a consequence of a maexpensive computers has made widespread access to high jor relaxation in 2000;[49] there are no longer very many
quality cryptography possible.
restrictions on key sizes in US-exported mass-market
In some countries, even the domestic use of cryptogra- software. Since this relaxation in US export restricphy is, or has been, restricted. Until 1999, France signif- tions, and because most personal computers connected
icantly restricted the use of cryptography domestically, to the Internet include US-sourced web browsers such
though it has since relaxed many of these rules. In China as Firefox or Internet Explorer, almost every Internet
and Iran, a license is still required to use cryptography.[5] user worldwide has potential access to quality cryptogMany countries have tight restrictions on the use of cryp- raphy via their browsers (e.g., via Transport Layer Setography. Among the more restrictive are laws in Belarus, curity). The Mozilla Thunderbird and Microsoft OutKazakhstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Singapore, Tunisia, and look E-mail client programs similarly can transmit and
receive emails via TLS, and can send and receive email
Vietnam.[43]
encrypted with S/MIME. Many Internet users don't reIn the United States, cryptography is legal for domestic alize that their basic application software contains such
use, but there has been much conict over legal issues re- extensive cryptosystems. These browsers and email prolated to cryptography. One particularly important issue grams are so ubiquitous that even governments whose inhas been the export of cryptography and cryptographic tent is to regulate civilian use of cryptography generally
software and hardware. Probably because of the impor- don't nd it practical to do much to control distribution
tance of cryptanalysis in World War II and an expecta- or use of cryptography of this quality, so even when such
tion that cryptography would continue to be important laws are in force, actual enforcement is often eectively
for national security, many Western governments have, impossible.
at some point, strictly regulated export of cryptography.
After World War II, it was illegal in the US to sell or distribute encryption technology overseas; in fact, encryp10.4.3 NSA involvement
tion was designated as auxiliary military equipment and
[44]
put on the United States Munitions List. Until the development of the personal computer, asymmetric key al- See also: Clipper chip
gorithms (i.e., public key techniques), and the Internet,
this was not especially problematic. However, as the In- Another contentious issue connected to cryptography in
ternet grew and computers became more widely available, the United States is the inuence of the National Security
high-quality encryption techniques became well known Agency on cipher development and policy. The NSA was
involved with the design of DES during its development at
around the globe.

60

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

IBM and its consideration by the National Bureau of Standards as a possible Federal Standard for cryptography.[50]
DES was designed to be resistant to dierential cryptanalysis,[51] a powerful and general cryptanalytic technique known to the NSA and IBM, that became publicly known only when it was rediscovered in the late
1980s.[52] According to Steven Levy, IBM discovered
dierential cryptanalysis,[46] but kept the technique secret at the NSAs request. The technique became publicly known only when Biham and Shamir re-discovered
and announced it some years later. The entire aair illustrates the diculty of determining what resources and
knowledge an attacker might actually have.
Another instance of the NSAs involvement was the 1993
Clipper chip aair, an encryption microchip intended to
be part of the Capstone cryptography-control initiative.
Clipper was widely criticized by cryptographers for two
reasons. The cipher algorithm (called Skipjack) was then
classied (declassied in 1998, long after the Clipper initiative lapsed). The classied cipher caused concerns that
the NSA had deliberately made the cipher weak in order
to assist its intelligence eorts. The whole initiative was
also criticized based on its violation of Kerckhoss Principle, as the scheme included a special escrow key held by
the government for use by law enforcement, for example
in wiretaps.[46]

10.4.4

Digital rights management

Main article: Digital rights management

Cryptography is central to digital rights management
(DRM), a group of techniques for technologically controlling use of copyrighted material, being widely implemented and deployed at the behest of some copyright
holders. In 1998, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which criminalized all production, dissemination, and use of certain
cryptanalytic techniques and technology (now known or
later discovered); specically, those that could be used
to circumvent DRM technological schemes.[53] This had
a noticeable impact on the cryptography research community since an argument can be made that any cryptanalytic research violated, or might violate, the DMCA.
Similar statutes have since been enacted in several countries and regions, including the implementation in the EU
Copyright Directive. Similar restrictions are called for by
treaties signed by World Intellectual Property Organization member-states.
The United States Department of Justice and FBI have
not enforced the DMCA as rigorously as had been feared
by some, but the law, nonetheless, remains a controversial one. Niels Ferguson, a well-respected cryptography
researcher, has publicly stated that he will not release
some of his research into an Intel security design for
fear of prosecution under the DMCA.[54] Both Alan Cox

(longtime number 2 in Linux kernel development) and

Edward Felten (and some of his students at Princeton)
have encountered problems related to the Act. Dmitry
Sklyarov was arrested during a visit to the US from Russia, and jailed for ve months pending trial for alleged
violations of the DMCA arising from work he had done
in Russia, where the work was legal. In 2007, the cryptographic keys responsible for Blu-ray and HD DVD content scrambling were discovered and released onto the
Internet. In both cases, the MPAA sent out numerous
DMCA takedown notices, and there was a massive Internet backlash[7] triggered by the perceived impact of such
notices on fair use and free speech.

10.4.5 Forced disclosure of encryption

keys
Main article: Key disclosure law
In the United Kingdom, the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act gives UK police the powers to force suspects to decrypt les or hand over passwords that protect encryption keys. Failure to comply is an oense in
its own right, punishable on conviction by a two-year jail
sentence or up to ve years in cases involving national
security.[6] Successful prosecutions have occurred under
the Act; the rst, in 2009,[55] resulted in a term of 13
months imprisonment.[56] Similar forced disclosure laws
in Australia, Finland, France, and India compel individual suspects under investigation to hand over encryption
keys or passwords during a criminal investigation.
In the United States, the federal criminal case of United
States v. Fricosu addressed whether a search warrant can
compel a person to reveal an encryption passphrase or
password.[57] The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
argued that this is a violation of the protection from selfincrimination given by the Fifth Amendment.[58] In 2012,
the court ruled that under the All Writs Act, the defendant
was required to produce an unencrypted hard drive for the
court.[59]
In many jurisdictions, the legal status of forced disclosure
remains unclear.

10.5 See also

List of cryptographers
Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security
List of important publications in cryptography
List of multiple discoveries (see RSA)
List of unsolved problems in computer science
Outline of cryptography

10.6. REFERENCES
Global surveillance

61

Strong cryptography

[18] Die, Whiteld; Hellman, Martin (November 1976).

New Directions in Cryptography (PDF). IEEE Transactions on Information Theory. IT-22: 644654.

10.6 References

[19] Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Third Edition (Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications), 2005, by Douglas R. Stinson, Chapman and Hall/CRC

[1] Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; Jones, Henry Stuart; McKenzie, Roderick (1984). A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford University Press.
[2] Rivest, Ronald L. (1990). Cryptology. In J. Van
Leeuwen. Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science 1.
Elsevier.
[3] Bellare, Mihir; Rogaway, Phillip (21 September 2005).
Introduction. Introduction to Modern Cryptography. p.
10.
[4] Menezes, A. J.; van Oorschot, P. C.; Vanstone, S. A.
Handbook of Applied Cryptography. ISBN 0-8493-85237.

[20] Blaze, Matt; Die, Whiteeld; Rivest, Ronald L.;

Schneier, Bruce; Shimomura, Tsutomu; Thompson, Eric;
Wiener, Michael (January 1996). Minimal key lengths
for symmetric ciphers to provide adequate commercial security. Fortify. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[21] FIPS PUB 197: The ocial Advanced Encryption
Standard (PDF). Computer Security Resource Center.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[22] NCUA letter to credit unions (PDF). National Credit
Union Administration. July 2004. Retrieved 26 March
2015.

[5] Overview per country. Crypto Law Survey. February

2013. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[23] RFC 2440 - Open PGP Message Format. Internet Engineering Task Force. November 1998. Retrieved 26 March
2015.

[6] UK Data Encryption Disclosure Law Takes Eect. PC

World. 1 October 2007. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[24] Golen, Pawel (19 July 2002). SSH. WindowSecurity.

Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[7] Doctorow, Cory (2 May 2007). Digg users revolt over

AACS key. Boing Boing. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

[25] Schneier, Bruce (1996). Applied Cryptography (2nd ed.).

Wiley. ISBN 0-471-11709-9.

[8] Kahn, David (1967). The Codebreakers. ISBN 0-68483130-9.

[26] Notices. Federal Register 72 (212). 2 November 2007.

Archived 28 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine

[9] Oded Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography, Volume 1:

Basic Tools, Cambridge University Press, 2001, ISBN 0521-79172-3

[27] NIST Selects Winner of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA3) Competition. Tech Beat. National Institute of Standards and Technology. October 2, 2012. Retrieved 26
March 2015.

[10] Cryptology (denition)". Merriam-Websters Collegiate

Dictionary (11th ed.). Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 26
March 2015.
[11] RFC 2828 - Internet Security Glossary. Internet Engineering Task Force. May 2000. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
shchenko, V. V. (2002). Cryptography: an introduc[12] IA
tion. AMS Bookstore. p. 6. ISBN 0-8218-2986-6.
[13] Singh, Simon (2000). The Code Book. New York:
Anchor Books. pp. 1420. ISBN 9780385495325.
[14] Al-Kadi, Ibrahim A. (April 1992). The origins of cryptology: The Arab contributions. Cryptologia 16 (2): 97
126.
[15] Schrdel, Tobias (October 2008). Breaking Short
Vigenre Ciphers. Cryptologia 32 (4): 334337.
doi:10.1080/01611190802336097.
[16] Hakim, Joy (1995). A History of US: War, Peace and all
that Jazz. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 019-509514-6.
[17] Gannon, James (2001). Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How
Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth Century. Washington, D.C.: Brasseys. ISBN 1-57488-3674.

[28] Die, Whiteld; Hellman, Martin (8 June 1976). Multiuser cryptographic techniques. AFIPS Proceedings 45:
109112.
[29] Ralph Merkle was working on similar ideas at the time
and encountered publication delays, and Hellman has
suggested that the term used should be DieHellman
Merkle aysmmetric key cryptography.
[30] Kahn, David (Fall 1979). Cryptology Goes Public.
Foreign Aairs 58 (1): 153.
[31] Rivest, Ronald L.; Shamir, A.; Adleman, L. (1978).
A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and PublicKey Cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM
(Association for Computing Machinery) 21 (2): 120126.
Archived November 16, 2001 at the Wayback Machine
Previously released as an MIT Technical Memo in April
1977, and published in Martin Gardner's Scientic American Mathematical recreations column
[32] Wayner, Peter (24 December 1997). British Document
Outlines Early Encryption Discovery. New York Times.
Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[33] Cocks, Cliord (20 November 1973). A Note on 'NonSecret Encryption'" (PDF). CESG Research Report.

62

[34] Singh, Simon (1999). The Code Book. Doubleday. pp.

279292.
[35] Shannon, Claude; Weaver, Warren (1963). The Mathematical Theory of Communication. University of Illinois
Press. ISBN 0-252-72548-4.
[36] Junod, Pascal (2001). On the Complexity of Matsuis
Attack (PDF). Selected Areas in Cryptography.
[37] Song, Dawn; Wagner, David A.; Tian, Xuqing (2001).
Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and Timing Attacks on
SSH (PDF). Tenth USENIX Security Symposium.
[38] Brands, S. (1994). Untraceable O-line Cash in Wallets
with Observers. Advances in CryptologyProceedings
of CRYPTO (Springer-Verlag).
[39] Babai, Lszl (1985). Trading group theory for randomness. Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Symposium
on the Theory of Computing (Association for Computing
Machinery).
[40] Goldwasser, S.; Micali, S.; Racko, C. (1989). The
Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems.
SIAM Journal on Computing 18 (1): 186208.
[41] Blakley, G. (June 1979). Safeguarding cryptographic
keys. Proceedings of AFIPS 1979 48: 313317.
[42] Shamir, A. (1979). How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM (Association for Computing Machinery)
22: 612613.
[43] 6.5.1 WHAT ARE THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES OF SOME COUNTRIES?". RSA Laboratories.
Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[44] Rosenoer, Jonathan (1995). CRYPTOGRAPHY &
SPEECH. CyberLaw.
Archived December 1, 2005 at the Wayback Machine
[45] Case Closed on Zimmermann PGP Investigation. IEEE
Computer Society's Technical Committee on Security and
Privacy. 14 February 1996. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[46] Levy, Steven (2001). Crypto: How the Code Rebels
Beat the GovernmentSaving Privacy in the Digital Age.
Penguin Books. p. 56. ISBN 0-14-024432-8. OCLC
244148644 48066852 48846639.
[47] Bernstein v USDOJ. Electronic Privacy Information
Center. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 6 May 1999. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[48] DUAL-USE LIST - CATEGORY 5 PART 2 INFORMATION SECURITY"" (DOC). Wassenaar Arrangement. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[49] 6.4 UNITED STATES CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT/IMPORT LAWS. RSA Laboratories. Retrieved
26 March 2015.
[50] Schneier, Bruce (15 June 2000). The Data Encryption
Standard (DES)". Crypto-Gram. Retrieved 26 March
2015.

CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY

[51] Coppersmith, D. (May 1994). The Data Encryption

Standard (DES) and its strength against attacks (PDF).
IBM Journal of Research and Development 38 (3): 243.
doi:10.1147/rd.383.0243. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[52] Biham, E.; Shamir, A. (1991). Dierential cryptanalysis
of DES-like cryptosystems (PDF). Journal of Cryptology
(Springer-Verlag) 4 (1): 372. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[53] The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (PDF).
United States Copyright Oce. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[54] Ferguson, Niels (15 August 2001). Censorship in action:
why I don't publish my HDCP results.
Archived December 1, 2001 at the Wayback Machine
[55] Williams, Christopher (11 August 2009). Two convicted
for refusal to decrypt data. The Register. Retrieved 26
March 2015.
[56] Williams, Christopher (24 November 2009). UK jails
schizophrenic for refusal to decrypt les. The Register.
Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[57] Ingold, John (January 4, 2012). Password case reframes
Fifth Amendment rights in context of digital world. The
Denver Post. Retrieved 26 March 2015.
[58] Leyden, John (13 July 2011). US court test for rights
not to hand over crypto keys. The Register. Retrieved 26
March 2015.
[59] ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION UNDER
THE ALL WRITS ACT REQUIRING DEFENDANT
FRICOSU TO ASSIST IN THE EXECUTION OF
PREVIOUSLY ISSUED SEARCH WARRANTS
(PDF). United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. Retrieved 26 March 2015.

10.7 Further reading

Further information: Books on cryptography

Becket, B (1988). Introduction to Cryptology.

Blackwell Scientic Publications. ISBN 0-63201836-4. OCLC 16832704. Excellent coverage of
many classical ciphers and cryptography concepts
and of the modern DES and RSA systems.
Cryptography and Mathematics by Bernhard
Esslinger, 200 pages, part of the free open-source
package CrypTool, PDF download at the Wayback
Machine (archived July 22, 2011). CrypTool is
the most widespread e-learning program about
cryptography and cryptanalysis, open source.
In Code: A Mathematical Journey by Sarah Flannery
(with David Flannery). Popular account of Sarahs
award-winning project on public-key cryptography,
co-written with her father.

10.8. EXTERNAL LINKS

63

James Gannon, Stealing Secrets, Telling Lies: How

Spies and Codebreakers Helped Shape the Twentieth
Century, Washington, D.C., Brasseys, 2001, ISBN
1-57488-367-4.

Crypto Glossary and Dictionary of Technical Cryptography

Oded Goldreich, Foundations of Cryptography, in

two volumes, Cambridge University Press, 2001 and
2004.

Overview and Applications of Cryptology by the

CrypTool Team; PDF; 3.8 MBJuly 2008

Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Jonathan

Katz and Yehuda Lindell.
Alvins Secret Code by Cliord B. Hicks (childrens
novel that introduces some basic cryptography and
cryptanalysis).
Ibrahim A. Al-Kadi, The Origins of Cryptology:
the Arab Contributions, Cryptologia, vol. 16, no.
2 (April 1992), pp. 97126.
Christof Paar, Jan Pelzl, Understanding Cryptography, A Textbook for Students and Practitioners.
Springer, 2009. (Slides, online cryptography lectures and other information are available on the
companion web site.) Very accessible introduction
to practical cryptography for non-mathematicians.
Introduction to Modern Cryptography by Phillip Rogaway and Mihir Bellare, a mathematical introduction to theoretical cryptography including reductionbased security proofs. PDF download.
Johann-Christoph Woltag, 'Coded Communications
(Encryption)' in Rdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2009). *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law., giving an
overview of international law issues regarding cryptography.
Jonathan Arbib & John Dwyer, Discrete Mathematics for Cryptography, 1st Edition ISBN 978-1907934-01-8.
Stallings, William (March 2013). Cryptography and
Network Security: Principles and Practice (6th ed.).
Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0133354690.

10.8 External links

The dictionary denition of cryptography at Wiktionary
Media related to Cryptography at Wikimedia Commons

Cryptography on In Our Time at the BBC. (listen

now)

NSAs CryptoKids.

A Course in Cryptography by Raphael Pass & Abhi

Shelat - oered at Cornell in the form of lecture
notes.
Cryptocorner.com by Chuck Easttom - A generalized resource on all aspects of cryptology.
For more on the use of cryptographic elements in
ction, see: Dooley, John F., William and Marilyn
Ingersoll Professor of Computer Science, Knox College (23 August 2012). Cryptology in Fiction.
The George Fabyan Collection at the Library of
Congress has early editions of works of seventeenthcentury English literature, publications relating to
cryptography.

Chapter 11

Cut-out (espionage)
In espionage parlance, a cut-out is a mutually trusted intermediary, method or channel of communication, facilitating the exchange of information between agents.
Cutouts usually only know the source and destination of
the information to be transmitted, but are unaware of the
identities of any other persons involved in the espionage
process. Thus, a captured cutout cannot be used to identify members of an espionage cell.

11.1 Outside espionage

Some computer protocols, like Tor, use the equivalent of
cutout nodes in their communications networks. Due to
the use of multiple layers of encryption, nodes on networks like this do not usually know the ultimate sender
or receiver of the data.
In computer networking Darknets can and do have some
cut out functionality. Darknets are distinct from other distributed P2P networks as sharing is anonymous (that is,
IP addresses are not publicly shared and nodes often forward trac to other nodes). Thus, with a Darknet, users
can communicate with little fear of governmental or corporate interference.[1]
For this reason, Darknets are often associated with dissident political communications, as well as various illegal
activities. More generally, the term darknet can be used
to describe all non-commercial sites on the Internet,[2] or
to refer to all underground web communications and
technologies, most commonly those associated with illegal activity or dissent.[1]

11.2 See also

Dead drop

11.3 References
[1] Wood, Jessica (2010). A Digital Copyright Revolution
(PDF). Richmond Journal of Law and Technology 16 (4).
Retrieved 25 October 2011.

64

[2] Lasica, J. D. (2005). Darknets: Hollywoods War Against

the Digital Generation. Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley & Sons.
ISBN 0-471-68334-5.

Chapter 12

Dead drop
For a USB device used as a public dead drop, see USB into the ground or placed in a shallow stream to be redead drop.
trieved at a later time.
A dead drop or dead letter box is a method of espionage
tradecraft used to pass items between two individuals using a secret location thus not requiring them to meet directly. Using a dead drop permits a case ocer and agent
to exchange objects and information while maintaining
operational security. The method stands in contrast to
the live drop, so called because two persons meet to exchange items or information.

12.1 Overview
Spies (covert intelligence agents) and their handlers have
been known to perform dead drops using various techniques to hide items (such as money, secrets or instructions), and to signal that the drop has been made. Although the signal and location by necessity must be agreed
upon in advance, the signal may or may not be located
close to the dead drop itself, and the operatives may not
necessarily know one another, or ever meet.
The location and nature of the dead drop must enable retrieval of the hidden item without the operatives being
spotted by a member of the public, the police or other
security forcestherefore, common everyday items and
behavior are used to avoid arousing suspicion. Any hidden location could serve, although often a cut-out device
is used, such as a loose brick in a wall, a (cut-out) library
book, or a hole in a tree.

The signaling devices can include a chalk mark on a wall,

a piece of chewing-gum on a lamppost, or a newspaper
left on a park bench. Alternately, the signal can be made
from inside the agents own home, by, for example, hanging a distinctively-colored towel from a balcony, or placing a potted plant on a window sill where it is visible
to anyone on the street. Convicted CIA mole and Soviet spy Aldrich Ames left chalk marks on a mail box in
Washington, D.C. to signal his Russian handlers that he
had made a dead drop.
While the dead drop method is useful in preventing the instantaneous capture of either an operative/handler pair or
an entire espionage network, it is not foolproof. If one of
the operatives is compromised, they may reveal the location and signal for that specic dead drop. Counterintelligence can then use the signal while keeping the location
under surveillance, and may capture the other operative.

12.2 Modern techniques

See also: Short-range agent communications
On January 23, 2006, the Russian FSB accused Britain
of using wireless dead drops concealed inside hollowedout rocks to collect espionage information from agents
in Russia. According to the Russian authorities, the
agent delivering information would approach the rock and
transmit data wirelessly into it from a hand-held device,
and later his British handlers would pick up the stored
data by similar means.[1]

12.3 See also

Dead drop spike

Espionage

The dead drop spike is a concealment device similar to a

microcache. It has been used since the late 1960s to hide
money, maps, documents, microlm, and other items.
The spike is water- and mildew-proof and can be pushed
65

USB dead drop

PirateBox

66

12.4 Notes
[1] Nick Paton Walsh, The Guardian (23 January 2006).
Moscow names British 'spies in NGO row. Retrieved 8
April 2012.

12.5 References
Russians accuse 4 Britons of spying.International
Herald Tribune. January 24, 2006. News report on
Russian discovery of British wireless dead drop.
Old spying lives on in new ways. BBC. 23 January
2006.
Madrid suspects tied to e-mail ruse. International
Herald Tribune. April 28, 2006.
Military secrets missing on Ministry of Defence
computer les

12.6 Further reading

Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton, with Henry R.
Schlesinger, Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIAs
Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda, New York,
Dutton, 2008. ISBN 0-525-94980-1.

CHAPTER 12. DEAD DROP

Chapter 13

Denial and deception

Denial and deception (D&D) is a Western theoretical
framework[1] for conceiving and analyzing intelligence
techniques pertaining to secrecy and deception.[2] Originating in the 1980s, it is roughly based on the more pragmatic Soviet practices of maskirovka (which preceded
the D&D conceptualization by decades) but it has a more
theoretical approach compared to the latter.[1]
In the D&D framework, denial and deception are seen as
distinct but complementary endeavors.[2] Denial most often involves security and concealment to prevent foreign
agents, photographic surveillance, electronic monitoring,
or even the media from revealing secretive diplomatic or
military matters. Deception is the construction of a false
reality for the adversary through intentionally "leaked"
false information, false stories implanted in the media,
dummy or decoy structures or military formations, or numerous other measure.[3] For example, in the Japanese information warfare campaign that preceded the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, the D&D approach identies as
a denial measure the twice-repeated change in naval call
signs eected by the Imperial Navy between 1 November
and 1 December, but identies as a deception measure
the Japanese Foreign Oce announcement that a large
Japanese liner would sail to California on December 2 to
evacuate Japanese citizens.[4]
A denial and deception campaign is most eective when
numerous denial and deceptive eorts are coherently coordinated to advance a specic plan; however, the most
eective such operations are very complex, involving numerous persons or organizations, and this can prove exceedingly dicult. A single failed denial measure or deception can easily jeopardize an entire operation.[3]
According to Abram Shulsky, democracies, like the
United States, had diculty employing denial and deception campaigns. This is largely due to the open media of
most such societies which frequently expose any major
operations undertaken militarily or diplomatically. Also,
legal restrictions tend to hamper governments and particularly intelligence services in democratic societies. The
exception to these restrictions occurs in wartime, when
some measure of martial law is imposed and legal impediments are relaxed. Authoritarian systems of government, however, frequently employ denial and deception
campaigns both domestically and abroad to manipulate

domestic opposition and foreign governments. These operations are unhampered by legal restrictions or an open
media. Non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations,
frequently use denial and deception to inuence governments and the public opinion of target societies.[5] Other
authors illustrate the D&D topic with Operation Fortitude
and consider it one of the most successful such examples in history.[6][7][8] According to Donald C.F. Daniel
democratic societies have more qualms with deception
than they have with denial (in the technical sense used in
this article); Daniel contrasts the little public controversy
that surrounded the secretive way in which Nixons rapprochement with China was negotiated (as example of secrecy/denial that did not cause a public outrage) with the
uproar caused by the announcement of 2001 announcement of the Oce of Strategic Inuence (an institution
that had among its stated goals the planing of false stories
in the foreign press).[2]
According to United States Department of Defense denitions, military deception includes both denial and deception (as dened in the D&D framework).[9] Canadian OPSEC ocer John M. Roach notes that Deception used as a broad, general term includes the elements
of both denial and deception, each having distinct actions that are either active or passive.[10] D&D is not
the only terminology used to make this distinction; according to Roach passive deception is another technical term for denial.[10] Western writers see the Soviet
(and post-Soviet) maskirovka practices as not drawing a
sharp or signicant distinction between the two components of denial and deception.[1][10] The Islamic concepts
of kitman and taqiyya, or at least the jihadist interpretations thereof, have been seen by Westerners as the equivalents of the two components of denial and (respectively)
deception.[10][11] Since taqiyya is a word with Shiite connotations, Sunni militants sometimes prefer to use the
word iham instead, roughly with the meaning deception of unbelievers.[12] Although the Chinese deception
theory literature is vast and uses rather dierent terminology (relative to Western works), some recent surveys
have identied that "seduction" understood as convincing the enemy to make fatal mistakesis considered the
highest form of deception while confusing or denying information to the enemy are considered lesser forms.[13]

67

68

13.1 See also

Disinformation
False ag

13.2 References
[1] Hutchinson, William.
(2004) The Inuence of
Maskirovka on Contemporary Western Deception Theory and Practice. Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Information Warfare and Security. ISBN 09547096-2-4.
[2] Donald C.F. Daniel (2005). Denial and Deception. In
Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber. Transforming U.
S. Intelligence. Georgetown University Press. pp. 134
141. ISBN 1-58901-477-4.
[3] Abram Shulsky, Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception, in Strategic Denial and Deception: The TwentyFirst Century Challenge, ed. Roy Godson and James J.
Wirtz (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 1517; Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, Strategic Denial
and Deception, International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 13 (2000): 425-426.
[4] James B. Bruce and Michael Bennett (2008). Foreign
Denial and Deception. In Roger Z. George and James
B. Bruce. Analyzing Intelligence. Georgetown University
Press. p. 124. ISBN 1-58901-239-9.
[5] Ibid., 427-428.
[6] Michael I. Handel (2012). Intelligence and Deception.
In John Gooch. Military Deception and Strategic Surprise!.
Routledge. p. 127. ISBN 978-1-136-28202-7.
[7] Glenn P. Hastedt, ed. (2011). Spies, Wiretaps, and Secret Operations: A-J. ABC-CLIO. p. 305. ISBN 978-185109-807-1.
[8] H. Wentworth Eldredge (2013). Biggest Hoax of the
War. Operation FORTITUDE: The Allied deception plan
that fooled the Germans about Normandy. In Hy Rothstein and Barton Whaley. The Art and Science of Military
Deception. Artech House. p. 241. ISBN 978-1-60807551-5. Article previously published in Air Power History,
vol. 37, no. 3, Fall 1990, pp. 15-22
[9] Johnson, Mark, and Jessica Meyeraan. "Military deception: Hiding the real-showing the fake". Joint Forces Sta
College, Joint and Combined Warghting School, p. 4
[10] John M. Roach, DECEPTION: Can information superiority be achieved with or without it?, Newsletter of the
OPSEC Professionals Society, July 2012, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 7. Also published in The Canadian Army Journal
Vol. 10.3 Fall 2007, p. 117-120
[11] Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, David N. Edger
(2009). Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Georgetown University Press. p. 51. ISBN 1-58901-578-9.

CHAPTER 13. DENIAL AND DECEPTION

[12] Bassam Tibi (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and

Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam Versus Global
Jihad. Routledge. p. 145. ISBN 978-1-134-07263-7.
[13] Michael Pillsbury (2013). Chinese Deception Doctrine:
A View from Open Sources. In Hy Rothstein and Barton Whaley. The Art and Science of Military Deception.
Artech House. p. 212. ISBN 978-1-60807-551-5.

Chapter 14

Direct action (military)

For other uses, see Direct action (disambiguation).

14.1 Risk factors

In the context of special operations, direct action (DA)

consists of: Short-duration strikes and other small-scale
oensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and
which employ specialized military capabilities to seize,
destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated
targets. Direct action diers from conventional oensive
actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specic objectives.[1]

DA, conducted by special operations forces, uses a small

ground team, possibly with air and naval support, which
maintains a high degree of secrecy about the intended action. It relies on surprise and skill, rather than mass, and
has a "hit-and-run" approach:

The United States and many allied countries consider

DA one of the basic special operations missions. Some
units specialize in it, such as Rangers of the 75th Ranger
Regiment, while other units, such as US Army Special
Forces, have DA capabilities but focus more on other operations. Unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance
and direct action roles have merged through the decades
and are typically performed primarily by the same units.
For instance, while American special operations forces
were originally created for the unconventional warfare
(UW) mission and gradually added other capabilities, the
United States Navy SEALs, and the UK Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) continue to
perform a primary DA role with special reconnaissance
(SR) as original missions. SEALs, SAS, and SBS added
additional capabilities over time, responding to the needs
of modern conict. Russian Spetsnaz are DA and SR
units.
Some countries may have standing units for deniable DA
operations, and others may put together ad hoc volunteer
groups for such missions. Under the US Central Intelligence Agency's National Clandestine Service, there is a
Special Activities Division that operates without apparent
national identication. It is possible that units of the Joint
Special Operations Command or the frequently-renamed
Intelligence Support Activity may do ad hoc operations.

clandestine approach to the target

short, precise, and violent force
exltration as soon as the objective is
completed, making the teams exit as hidden as possible. Direct action is not a
suicidal attack.
If the political situation so requires, the DA team may
operate completely or partially out of proper uniform.
In some cases, which international law accepts as a legitimate ruse of war, a direct action force may inltrate
to the target area in disguise, but must make some distinguishing insignia visible before taking any combat actions. While the entire mission was not completed due to
a lack of helicopters, the DA force, in Operation Eagle
Claw, which was to make the actual attack on the occupied American Embassy in Tehran, would wear nondescript clothing until they reached the assembly point
for the attack. At that time, before using any weapons,
they would remove black coverings over American ags,
putting them in compliance with having a proper insignia
or uniform.[2][3]
In practice, any military force that operates at least partially out of proper uniform may be considered unlawful
combatants. Formally, being out of proper uniform while
approaching the target is considered a legitimate ruse of
war, rather than spying, according to the language of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.[4] This continues the
language of the Hague Convention of 1907.[5] Countries
do not always honor this legal protection, as with the Nazi
Commando Order of WWII, which was held illegal at the
Nuremberg Trials.
The status of guerrillas acting under a distinct chain of
command, wearing at least a distinctive armband or other
insignia, carrying arms openly while in combat, and com-

69

70

CHAPTER 14. DIRECT ACTION (MILITARY)

plying with the laws and customs of war is that they tech- 14.2.2 Attack
nically are legal combatants, but this, historically, is respected even less than for regular military personnel mak- To reduce their chance of detection, if the target could
ing a clandestine approach to the target.
be destroyed by demolition charges, set on a delayed fuse
so the team can exltrate before the explosion, this would
be far preferable to having to ght their way to the target,
place demolition charges, and ght their way out of the
14.2 Operational techniques
now-alerted target area.
Techniques that minimize the chance of detection during Skill with explosives and demolition, therefore, is a critical skill for DA units. They also may employ long-range
inltration, attack, and exltration are preferred.
sniper re. Properly uniformed forces that kill other
There is a blurry line between Special Reconnaissance
properly uniformed soldiers, ring from cover and never
units that never directly attack a target with their own
revealing themselves to enemy troops, are in compliance
weapons, instead directing air and missile strikes onto a
with the laws of war, but, especially if at least part of
target, and Direct Action, where the soldiers will physthat operation was conducted out of proper uniform or inically attack the target with their own resources, and
signia (e.g., by guerillas), the force is likely to be treated
possibly with other support. Some special operations
as unlawful combatants.
forces have doctrine that allowed them to attack targets
of opportunity; Soviet Spetsnaz, while on SR during a
war, were expected to attack any tactical nuclear delivery systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles, that they
14.2.3 Exltration
encountered.[6]
The team will leave the attack area using any of the means
they used to inltrate, although they will have to deal with
14.2.1 Inltration
the problem of an alerted enemy. Rather than going imDirect action teams, depending on training and resources, mediately to the means of exltration, they may have prepared a safe house or some other hiding place near the
may enter the area of operations in many ways:
target, and make a delayed exltration.
Inltration: Used when enemy troops
does not have full view of their own
lines, such that skilled soldiers can move
through their own front lines and, as a
small unit, penetrate those of the enemy.
Such movement is most often by night.
Tactical ground vehicles: The British
Special Air Service pioneered in-vehicle
SR, going back to North Africa in WWII.
In Desert Storm, US special reconnaissance forces used medium and heavy helicopters to carry in vehicles for the Scud
Hunt.
Helicopter: Using rapid disembarkation
by rope, ladder, or fast exit, at night;
Parachute: Typically by night, and using
the HALO or HAHO jump technique so
their airplane does not alert the enemy;
Boat: Across inland water or from a surface ship or even a helicopter-launched
boat
Underwater: By swimming or means
from a submarine or an oshore surface
ship. Some highly trained troops, such as
US Navy SEALs or British Special Boat
Service may parachute into open water,
go underwater, and swim to the target.

14.3 Examples of direct action missions

14.3.1 Norwegian and SOE attacks on
German heavy water production
A series of DA missions during WWII involved Allied
sabotage of German heavy water production in Norway.
Operation Grouse successfully delivered, by parachute,
four SOE-trained Norwegian soldiers. They were intended to act as an advanced reconnaissance and guide
party for the next group of British personnel, who would
actually carry out the demolitions at the Rjukan in the
Telemark area of Norway.
Operation Freshman, the next phase, was a disastrous
failure. Two teams of Royal Engineers, carried in towed
Airspeed Horsa gliders, either were killed in crashes,
or captured, tortured, and executed under the German
Commando Order. A followup, Operation Gunnerside,
successfully parachuted in another six Norwegian soldiers. The combined teams were able to place demolition
charges in the plant and make their escape.
As is not uncommon for DA, a follow-up bombing mission completed the destruction of the plant.

14.3. EXAMPLES OF DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS

14.3.2

71

Prisoner of war rescue raids in the ternees were rescued. Two guerillas and two paratroopers
were killed, and a small number wounded.
Philippines

Afterwards, the Japanese retaliated by killing 1,500 FilThe US command had become increasingly concerned ipinos, who were not involved in the raid and rescue. The
that the Japanese intended to kill all prisoners, and al- Japanese commander was later convicted of war crimes
ready had been alerted to several killings. They exe- and hanged.
cuted multiple rescue raids. Documents and prisoner
interrogation subsequently proved that the concern was
14.3.3 Israeli raid on Soviet radar used by
fully justied.
A combination of Filipino guerillas, Alamo scouts (6th
US Army Special Reconnaissance force) and US 6th
Ranger Battalion paratroopers carried out a successful
DA raid on the Cabanatuan prison camp, destroying the
Japanese guard force and freeing the prisoners. As is frequently done in DA, the inltration was in phases: the
guerillas were already in the area, but the Alamo Scouts
came in early, and were guided to the target area by the
local ghters. Reconnaissance of the camp provided information to nalize the nal raid, which was deferred a
day due to a larger enemy presence.
The Rangers parachuted to a landing zone a distance from
the camp, aware they would need to crawl to their nal
jump-o points. Another method often used in DA was
to provide a distraction to the defenders, in this case with
a low-level pass by a ghter aircraft. The guards were
looking to the sky when the Rangers rushed the camp.

Egypt

In 1969, Israel became aware that Egypt was using an advanced Soviet radar. Originally, an air attack was planned
to destroy it. The air attack was cancelled, however, and
the mission assigned to helicopter-carried Sayeret Matkal
special operations troops, who believed they could capture the radar, and return at least signicant pieces.
In Operation Rooster 53, the raiders quickly suppressed
the local security, and then began taking apart the radar to
return critical components for technical intelligence analysis. After consultation between the ground special operations soldiers and the helicopter pilots, they packaged
the entire radar and successfully carried it as external
loads on their CH-53 helicopters, operating at the edge
of the helicopters lift capability .[7]

After the guards were neutralized, the rescue force ran 14.3.4 Attempted prisoner of war rescue in
North Vietnam
into another problem common in prisoner rescues: many
prisoners were confused or so terribly afraid that they
needed to be forcibly removed. Others were sick and un- Operation Ivory Coast was a long-range US raid, in 1970,
to rescue POWs believed to be held in the Son Tay prison
able to walk. Nevertheless, the rescue was successful.
camp. The rescue force, of 56 Army Special Forces perThe Raid at Los Baos was also a success. Prior to the atsonnel plus Air Force special operations personnel, ew
tack, Filipino guerillas had established clandestine comclandestinely from Thailand into North Vietnam, while
munications with prisoners, and had precise information
Naval aircraft conducted diversionary activities.
about the camp. This was a considerably larger operation
for a larger number of prisoners, with a much stronger Although the ground force fought a sharp engagement
Japanese presence in the area. Operations began, as is with North Vietnamese and a never-identied, probably
often typical, with reconnaissance. 11th Airbornes Pro- foreign unit, near the camp, they took no casualties (other
visional Reconnaissance Platoon jumped in and linked up than a broken ankle from a hard landing). The prisoners
with guerillas. Two days later, they marked the drop and had been moved to other camps, but the raiders successlanding zones, and then killed the gate guards, as a guer- fully exltrated.
rilla regiment encircled the camp and attacked Japanese Even though the raid failed in its specic purpose, its tacthey could see.
tical execution was near perfect. It did have a signicant
Next, a paratrooper company jumped into a marked drop strategic eect on the North Vietnamese, who became
zone, linked up with additional guerillas, killed the re- concerned about other raids behind their own lines and
reallocated signicant resources to internal security .[8]
maining guards, and secured the prisoners.
The remainder of the paratroop battalion moved, by water
using amphibious tractors, to a point 2 miles from the 14.3.5
camp. They would land and then move to the camp, and
take the prisoners onto the vehicles.
A fourth phase protected the actual escape, diverting the
remaining Japanese troops with a strong force including
artillery and tank destroyers. Additional guerrilla units
formed ambushes to stop Japanese reinforcements from
moving into the area. 2,147 former Allied POWs and in-

US prisoner in Panama rescued by

Delta Force

During the 1989 invasion of Panama, one of the many

objectives was to free Kurt Muse, an American suspected,
by the Panamanians, of working for the CIA. Operation
Acid Gambit was one of the few acknowledged operations
by the US Delta Force.[9]

72
The DA force landed on Modelo prison at night, carried
by light MH-6 special operations helicopters. AH-6 helicopter gunships suppressed potential snipers on nearby
building, while AC-130 xed-wing gunships put heavy
re into other military buildings of the complex. The
Delta operators secured the roof, and a team fought to
Muses cell, where they blew down the door and rescued
him.

CHAPTER 14. DIRECT ACTION (MILITARY)

quests to UN military headquarters from the on-scene
commander, MG Romo Dallaire, included seizing a
broadcast facility, which he considered the chief inciter
of violence. He was told such action was outside his
authority.[12]
Another multinational operation, NATO SFOR in
Bosnia was operating under peace enforcement, not
peacekeeping rules of engagement. It was cleared, in
1997, to neutralize Serb radio-television facilities.[13] It
should be noted that taking control of television falls under the mission of information operations as well as direct action.

During the exltration, one of the MH-6 helicopters

crashed, wounding everyone besides Muse.[10] Taking
cover, they signalled to one of the gunships, and were
soon retrieved by an armored personnel carrier from the
5th Infantry Division extracted Muse and the retrieval In the section Physical Destruction Operations in
team.
Task Force Eagle: The Seizure of Bosnian-Serb Radio/Television Towers, a Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL) analyst observed that after the Bosnian
14.3.6 Killing of Osama bin Laden
civil war, few broadcast media remained, but were extremely inuential. In May 1997, the North Atlantic
Main article: Death of Osama bin Laden
Council granted authority to SFOR to take actions against
any media undermining the peace accords.
On 1 May 2011, Red Squadron from the United States During the early summer of 1997, a power struggle
Navy's elite Naval Special Warfare Development Group, erupted between the rival factions of the Bosnian Serb
also known as DEVGRU, undertook a covert mission to leadership...The struggle caused a split within state televicapture al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, acting on in- sion, with journalists and editors from the Banja Luka stutelligence suggesting that he was located at a compound dio deciding to split away from [one faction] direction afin Abottabad, deep inside Pakistan. Launching the mis- ter [its leader] manipulated a broadcast on SFOR searches
sion from neighbouring Afghanistan, US helicopters ew in police stations. SFOR and OHR tried to exploit these
across Pakistani airspace at very low altitude to avoid developments to their advantage... oering to keep the
radar detection, and the DEVGRU operators were deliv- stations open if the faction reduced its inammatory proered to the courtyard of the compound, descending from paganda, but continuing to do so would result in miliropes. After a brief reght, bin Laden was located and tary action. The propaganda continued, such as accuskilled by the US forces. The forces then retreated, tak- ing SFOR of using low-intensity nuclear weapons, during bin Ladens remains with them, and they were back ing the 1995 attacks on VRS positions around Sarajevo,
in Afghan airspace before the Pakistani forces could re- Gorazde, and Majevica in 1995. In another propaganda
spond to the unknown disturbance. Bin Ladens body was piece, Serbian Radio Television (SRT) showed alternatimmediately taken to a US Navy ship and buried at sea, to ing images of WWII German Army and present-day
guard against the possibility that his grave could become NATO forces while the commentator drew the comparia shrine or a focal point for unrest. The whole opera- son, likening SFOR soldiers to a Nazi occupation force.
tion inside Pakistan was monitored from Washington in NATO ocials have expressed concerns that such venreal time by the Obama administration, and lasted for 40 omous propaganda threatens the safety of the NATO-led
minutes in total. Subsequent revelations of the success of peace operations force.
this bold and daring operation were to draw praise from
across the political spectrum and from around the world. Eventually, under the authority of the GFAP and orders
from the NATO Council and the Oce of the High Representative, SFOR seized four SRT transmission towers,
14.3.7 Physical destruction of propaganda considerably reducing the footprint of SRT. The seizure
of these towers was a physical destruction mission in that
facilities
SFOR targeted the TV transmitter towers for neutralization, which is a condition achieved by physical destrucDirect action has been used, or planned and not authotion operations...On October 1, 1997, TFE units executed
rized, against radio and television facilities used for prothe physical destruction operation, securing the Bosnianpaganda, or even for tactical coordination, in several opSerb television/radio transmitter complexes on Hill 619
erations. During the 1989 US invasion of Panama, spein Duga Njiva, Hill 562 near Ugljevik, Trebevica (near
cial operations teams removed critical components from a
Sarajevo) and Leotar. In pre-dawn raids, SFOR French,
television station, doing minimum damage. They did so,
Polish, Scandinavian and American soldiers secured the
however, a day into the operation; greater speed would
sites and immediately fortied them against anticipated
have had greater eect .[11]
resistance.
In 1994, during the Rwandan Genocide, part of the re-

14.4. REFERENCES

73

[10] The Caldwell Family.

[11] Just Cause: how well did we do? - invasion of Panama.
National Review. 1990-01-22.
[12] Ringle, Kenbg (2002-06-15). The Haunting: He
Couldn't Stop the Slaughter in Rwanda. Now He Can't
Stop the Memory. Washington Post: C01.
[13] Tulak, Arthur N. (1999-03-15). Physical Attack Information Operations in Bosnia: Counterinformation in a
Peace Enforcement Environment. Air & Space Power
Journal - Chronicles Online Journal. Retrieved 2007-1124.

TV station secured by SFOR

At Hill 619, US Engineers operating Armored Combat

Excavators (M-9 ACE) constructed protective berms for
the troops, and cleared elds of re, while other engineers
emplaced a triple-standard concertina barrier around the
site. At Hill 562, 200 Bosnian-Serb protesters staged
a 15-hour confrontation in which the protesters hurled
rocks and attacked with clubs, damaging several vehicles.

14.4 References
[1] US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01.
[2] Smith, Michael (2007). Killer Elite: The Inside Story
of Americas Most Secret Special Operations Team. New
York, New York: St. Martins Press. ISBN 0-312-362722.
[3] Beckwith, Charlie A.; Knox, Donald (2003). Delta Force:
The Armys Elite Counterterrorist Unit. Avon. ISBN 0380-80939-7.
[4] Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August
1949, Article 29. International Red Cross. Retrieved
2007-11-11.
[5] Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 29. International Red Cross. 18 October 1907. Retrieved 2007-1111.
[6] Suvorov, Viktor (1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of
The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-67168917-7.
[7] Operation Rooster Israel Captures Egyptian Radar
In War of Attrition. Retrieved 2007-11-21.
[8] Manor, Leroy J. The Son Tay Raid, November 21, 1970.
[9] Powell, Colin (March 2003). My American Journey. p.
145. ISBN 0-345-46641-1.

Chapter 15

Eavesdropping

Cardinals in the Vatican, by Henri Adolphe Laissement, 1895

A ber-optic splitter, a modern method of eavesdropping.

(the dripping of water from the eaves of a house; the

ground on which such water falls). An eavesdropper
was one who stood at the eavesdrop (where the water
fell, i.e., near the house) so as to overhear what was said
inside.[3][4]
Belly-buster hand-crank audio drill, used during the late 1950s
and early 1960s to drill holes into masonry for implanting audio
devices

15.2 Techniques

Eavesdropping is secretly listening to the private conversation of others without their consent, as dened by
Blacks Law Dictionary.[1] This is commonly thought to
be unethical and there is an old adage that eavesdroppers
seldom hear anything good of themselves... eavesdroppers always try to listen to matters that concern them.[2]

Eavesdropping can also be done over telephone lines

(wiretapping), email, instant messaging, and other methods of communication considered private. (If a message is publicly broadcast, witnessing it is not considered
eavesdropping.) VoIP communications software is also
vulnerable to electronic eavesdropping via infections such
as trojans.

15.1 Etymology

15.3 References

The verb eavesdrop was originally a back-formation

of the noun eavesdropper (a person who eavesdrops)
which was formed from the unrelated noun eavesdrop
74

[1] Garner, p. 550

[2] Ronald R. Kline (2000). Consumers in the Country. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. p. 46.

15.5. EXTERNAL LINKS

[3] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed.), Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-19-920687-2
[4] eavesdrop. Online Etymology Dictionary.

15.4 See also

Computer surveillance
ECHELON
Espionage
Fiber tapping
Katz v. United States (1967)
Keystroke logging
Magic (cryptography)
Man-in-the-middle attack
Mass surveillance
NSA warrantless surveillance controversy (December 2005 2006)
Opportunistic encryption
Privacy
Secure communication
Surveillance
Telephone tapping
Ultra

15.5 External links

The dictionary denition of eavesdropping at Wiktionary
Media related to Eavesdropping at Wikimedia
Commons

75

Chapter 16

Espionage
Spy and Secret agent redirect here. For other uses, tion.
see Spy (disambiguation) and Secret agent (disambiguation).
For other uses, see Espionage (disambiguation).
16.1
Espionage or, casually, spying involves a spy ring, government and company/rm or individual obtaining information considered secret or condential without the permission of the holder of the information.[1] Espionage is
inherently clandestine, as it is taken for granted that it is
unwelcome and in many cases illegal and punishable by
law. It is a subset of intelligence gathering, which otherwise may be conducted from public sources and using
perfectly legal and ethical means. It is crucial to distinguish espionage from "intelligence" gathering, as the latter does not necessarily involve espionage, but often collates open-source information.
Espionage is often part of an institutional eort by a government or commercial concern. However, the term is
generally associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies primarily for military purposes. Spying involving corporations is known as industrial espionage.
One of the most eective ways to gather data and information about the enemy (or potential enemy) is by inltrating the enemys ranks. This is the job of the spy
(espionage agent). Spies can bring back all sorts of information concerning the size and strength of enemy forces.
They can also nd dissidents within the enemys forces
and inuence them to defect. In times of crisis, spies can
also be used to steal technology and to sabotage the enemy in various ways. Counterintelligence operatives can
feed false information to enemy spies, protecting important domestic secrets, and preventing attempts at subversion. Nearly every country has very strict laws concerning espionage, and the penalty for being caught is often
severe. However, the benets that can be gained through
espionage are generally great enough that most governments and many large corporations make use of it to varying degrees.
Further information on clandestine HUMINT (human intelligence) information collection techniques is available,
including discussions of operational techniques, asset recruiting, and the tradecraft used to collect this informa-

History

16.1.1 Ancient history

Events involving espionage are well documented
throughout history. The ancient writings of Chinese
and Indian military strategists such as Sun-Tzu and
Chanakya contain information on deception and
subversion. Chanakyas student Chandragupta Maurya,
founder of the Maurya Empire in India, made use
of assassinations, spies and secret agents, which are
described in Chanakyas Arthasastra. The ancient
Egyptians had a thoroughly developed system for the
acquisition of intelligence, and the Hebrews used spies
as well, as in the story of Rahab. Spies were also
prevalent in the Greek and Roman empires.[2] During the
13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols relied heavily on
espionage in their conquests in Asia and Europe. Feudal
Japan often used ninja to gather intelligence. More
recently, spies played a signicant part in Elizabethan
England (see Francis Walsingham). Many modern
espionage methods were well established even then.[3]
Aztecs used Pochtecas, people in charge of commerce,
as spies and diplomats, and had diplomatic immunity.
Along with the pochteca, before a battle or war, secret
agents, quimitchin, were sent to spy amongst enemies
usually wearing the local costume and speaking the local
language, techniques similar to modern secret agents.[4]

16.1.2 Arabia during Muhammads era

Main article: List of battles of Muhammad
The Islamic Prophet Muhammad made extensive use of
spies. His rst use of spies was during the Invasion of
Hamra al-Asad. A little before Muhammad set out in the
pursuit of the departing Meccan army, he sent three spies,
all belonging to Banu Aslam, to track the departing Meccan army. Two of them met the Meccan army at Hamra
al-Asad, about eight miles from Medina. Abu Sufyan had

76

16.2. TARGETS OF ESPIONAGE

already learned about Muhammads venture to pursue the
Meccans. The two spies heard the discussion among the
Quraysh: whether they should go back and nish o the
Muslims once and for all or to continue their journey to
Mecca. Abu Sufyan was in favor of inicting a deciding
blow to the Muslims, but on the counsel of Safwan ibn
Umayyah, he decided against it and, instead, proceeded
towards Mecca.
This happened a day before the Meccans arrived at
Hamra al-Asad. Prior to their departure from Hamra
al-Asad, the Quraysh spotted the two Muslim spies, and
caught and killed them, leaving their corpses on the road.
Nothing is known about the whereabouts of the third
Muslim spy. [5][6]

77
weapons secrets. Recently, espionage agencies have targeted the illegal drug trade and terrorists. Since 2008 the
United States has charged at least 57 defendants for attempting to spy for China.[18]
Dierent intelligence services value certain intelligence
collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over
research in open sources, while the United States has
tended to emphasize technological methods such as
SIGINT and IMINT. Both Soviet political (KGB) and
military intelligence (GRU[19] ) ocers were judged by
the number of agents they recruited.

During the Expedition of 'Abdullah ibn 'Atik in Decem- 16.2 Targets of espionage
ber 624,[7] he sent one his followers to assassinate Abu
Ra' ibn Abi Al-Huqaiq for mocking Muhammad with Espionage agents are usually trained experts in a specic
his poetry and for helping the troops of the Confederates targeted eld so they can dierentiate mundane informaby providing them with money and supplies[8]
tion from targets of intrinsic value to their own organiIn the Expedition of Abdullah Ibn Unais, also known as sational development. Correct identication of the taris the sole purpose of the espionage
the Assassination of Khaled bin Sufyan, Muhammad get at its execution
[20]
operation.
sent Abdullah ibn Unais to assassinate the leader of the
Banu Lahyan tribe. Muhammad alleged that Khaled bin Broad areas of espionage targeting expertise include:[21]
Sufyan Al-Hathali, considered an attack on Madinah and
that he was inciting the people on Nakhla or Uranah to
Natural resources: strategic production identight Muslims. So Muhammad sent Abdullah ibn Uncation and assessment (food, energy, materials).
ais to assassinate him. Which he did successfully. AfAgents are usually found among bureaucrats who
ter cutting o his head at night,[9] he brought it back to
administer these resources in their own countries
Muhammad.[10][11][12][13]
Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign
Abdullah ibn Unais found Hudayr in the company of his
policies (popular, middle class, elites). Agents ofwife, when asked about his identity. Unais replied: I am
ten recruited from eld journalistic crews, exchange
an arab tribesman who has heard of you and the Army
postgraduate students and sociology researchers
you are raising to ght Muhammad, so I have come to
join your ranks.[11] Sufyan bin Khalid trusted him. Then
Strategic economic strengths (production, research,
Unais asked to talk to him privately, once, while conversmanufacture, infrastructure). Agents recruited from
ing, Abdullah ibn Unais walked a short distance with ibn
science and technology academia, commercial enKhalid, and when an opportunity came he struck him with
terprises, and more rarely from among military techhis sword and killed him. After killing ibn Khalid, he cut
nologists
o his head, brought that to Muhammad,[9]
Military capability intelligence (oensive, defensive,
During the Expedition of Al Raji in 625.[14] Some men
maneuver, naval, air, space). Agents are trained by
requested that Muhammad send instructors to teach them
special military espionage education facilities, and
Islam,[14] but the men were bribed by the two tribes of
posted to an area of operation with covert identities
Khuzaymah who wanted revenge for the assassination
to minimize prosecution
of Khalid bin Sufyan by Muhammads followers.[15] Ac Counterintelligence operations specically targetcording to William Montgomery Watt, the seven men
ing opponents intelligence services themselves,
Muhammad sent may have been spies for Muhammad
such as breaching condentiality of communicaand instructors for Arab tribes.[16] Watts claim that they
tions, and recruiting defectors or moles
were spies and not missionaries is mentioned in the Sunni
hadith collection Sahih al-Bukhari.[17]

16.3 Methods and terminology

16.1.3

Modern history

Although the news media may speak of spy satelThe Cold War involved intense espionage activity be- lites and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all
tween the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union intelligence-gathering disciplines. It is a specic form
and China and their allies, particularly related to nuclear of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking

78

CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE

(cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography, (IMINT) and research in open publications (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none
of them are considered espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are
not considered espionage. Espionage is the disclosure of
sensitive information (classied) to people who are not
cleared for that information or access to that sensitive information.
Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines,
espionage usually involves accessing the place where the
desired information is stored or accessing the people who
know the information and will divulge it through some
kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical
meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of
Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people who bought
his information.
The US denes espionage towards itself as The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an
intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of any foreign nation. Blacks Law Dictionary (1990)
denes espionage as: "... gathering, transmitting, or losing ... information related to the national defense". Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C.
792798 and Article 106a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice".[22] The United States, like most nations,
conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britains espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence
Service.

16.3.1

Numbers messaging
Non-ocial cover
Ocial cover
One-way voice link
Safe house
Side channel attack
Steganography
Surveillance
Surveillance aircraft
[23]

16.4 Organization

Technology and techniques

See also: Tradecraft and List of intelligence gathering

disciplines

Agent handling
Concealment device
Covert agent
Covert listening device
Cut-out
Cyber spying
Dead drop
False ag operations
Honeypot
Interrogation

An intelligence ocers clothing, accessories, and behavior must

be as unremarkable as possible their lives (and others) may
depend on it.

A spy is a person employed to seek out top secret information from a source. Within the United States Intelligence Community, asset is a more common usage. A
case ocer, who may have diplomatic status (i.e., ocial
cover or non-ocial cover), supports and directs the human collector. Cutouts are couriers who do not know the

16.5. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

79

agent or case ocer but transfer messages. A safe house 16.5 Industrial espionage
is a refuge for spies. Spies often seek to obtain secret
information from another source.
Main article: Industrial espionage
In larger networks the organization can be complex with
many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine Reportedly Canada is losing $12 billion[25] and German
cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case of- companies are estimated to be losing about 50 billion
cers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and to ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs[26] to industrial espionage
supervise intelligence agents, who in turn spy on targets in every year.
their countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be
a citizen of the target countryhence does not automatically commit treason when operating within it. While
16.6 Agents in espionage
the more common practice is to recruit a person already
trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes
a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity (cover In espionage jargon, an agent is the person who does
background), called a legend in tradecraft, may attempt the spying; a citizen of one country who is recruited by a
second country to spy on or work against his own country
to inltrate a target organization.
or a third country. In popular usage, this term is often
These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they erroneously applied to a member of an intelligence serget access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited af- vice who recruits and handles agents; in espionage such a
ter they get access to secrets and leave their country) or person is referred to as an intelligence ocer, intelligence
defectors in place (who get access but do not leave).
operative or case ocer. There are several types of agent
A legend is also employed for an individual who is not in use today.
an illegal agent, but is an ordinary citizen who is relocated, for example, a protected witness. Nevertheless,
Double agent, is a person who engages in clansuch a non-agent very likely will also have a case ocer
destine activity for two intelligence or security serwho will act as controller. As in most, if not all synthetic
vices (or more in joint operations), who provides
identity schemes, for whatever purpose (illegal or legal),
information about one or about each to the other,
the assistance of a controller is required.
and who wittingly withholds signicant information
Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the
organization in which they are planted, such as giving
false reports about their countrys military movements, or
about a competing companys ability to bring a product to
market. Spies may be given other roles that also require
inltration, such as sabotage.
Many governments routinely spy on their allies as well as
their enemies, although they typically maintain a policy
of not commenting on this. Governments also employ
private companies to collect information on their behalf
such as SCG International Risk, International Intelligence
Limited and others.
Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that
espionage is always directed at the most secret operations
of a target country. National and terrorist organizations
and other groups are also targets.[24] This is because governments want to retrieve information that they can use
to be proactive in protecting their nation from potential
terrorist attacks.
Communications both are necessary to espionage and
clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability
when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection
and interception capability. Agents must also transfer
money securely.[24]

from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that signicant facts
are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than
a service are not double agents because they are not
agents. The fact that doubles have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target
service in a sta or ocer capacity.[27]
Re-doubled agent, an agent who gets caught as
a double agent and is forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service.
Unwitting double agent, an agent who offers or is forced to recruit as a double or
re-doubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third party intelligence
service or his own government without
the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can
be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting
to seek allegiance with another country.
The double agent usually has knowledge
of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus
making third party recruitment dicult
or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also aect the relationship between the Operations Ocer

80

CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE

(or case ocer) and the agent if the case
is transferred by an Operational Targeting
Ocer to a new Operations Ocer, leaving the new ocer vulnerable to attack.
This type of transfer may occur when an
ocer has completed his term of service
or when his cover is blown.
Triple agent, an agent that is working
for three intelligence services.

Intelligence agent: Provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If
used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business
venture or stock portfolio. In economic intelligence,
Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills
to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign nancial activities, and develop new econometric and modeling
methodologies.[28] This may also include information of trade or tari.
Access agent: Provides access to other potential
agents by providing proling information that can
help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service.
Agent of inuence: Someone who may provide political inuence in an area of interest or may even
provide publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda. The use of the media to print
a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance.

report to a local station. A non ocial cover operative is a type of cover used by an intelligence operative and can be dubbed an Illegal[29] when working
in another country without diplomatic protection.

16.7 Law
Espionage is a crime under the legal code of many nations. The risks of espionage vary. A spy breaking the
host countrys laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even
executed. A spy breaking his/her own countrys laws can
be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason (which in the
USA and some other jurisdictions can only occur if he
or she take ups arms or aids the enemy against his or
her own country during wartime), or even executed, as
the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames
handed a stack of dossiers of U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGBocer handler, the KGB rolled up several networks,
and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames
was arrested by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), he faced life in prison; his contact, who had
diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and
taken to the airport. Amess wife was threatened with life
imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did,
and she was given a ve-year sentence. Hugh Francis
Redmond, a CIA ocer in China, spent nineteen years
in a Chinese prison for espionageand died thereas he
was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.[30]

In United States law, treason,[31] espionage,[32] and

Agent provocateur: This type of agent instigates spying[33] are separate crimes. Treason and espionage
trouble, or may provide information to gather as have graduated punishment levels.
many people as possible into one location for an arThe United States in World War I passed the Espionage
rest.
Act of 1917. Over the years, many spies, such as
Facilities agent: A facilities agent may provide ac- the Soble spy ring, Robert Lee Johnson, the Rosenberg
[34]
[35]
cess to buildings such as garages or oces used for ring, Aldrich Hazen Ames, Robert Philip Hanssen,
Jonathan Pollard, John Anthony Walker, James Hall III,
staging operations, resupply, etc.
and others have been prosecuted under this law.
Principal agent: This agent functions as a handler
for an established network of agents usually Blue
Chip.
16.8 Use against non-spies
Confusion agent: May provide misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempt to However, espionage laws are also used to prosecute nondiscredit the operations of the target in an operation. spies. In the United States, the Espionage Act of 1917
was used against socialist politician Eugene V. Debs (at
Sleeper agent: A sleeper agent is a person who is that time the act had much stricter guidelines and amongst
recruited to an intelligence service to wake up and other things banned speech against military recruiting).
perform a specic set of tasks or functions while liv- The law was later used to suppress publication of periing under cover in an area of interest. This type of odicals, for example of Father Coughlin in World War
agent is not the same as a deep cover operative, who II. In the early 21st century, the act was used to proscontinually contacts a case ocer to le intelligence ecute whistleblowers such as Thomas Andrews Drake,
reports. A sleeper agent is not in contact with any- John Kiriakou, and Edward Snowden, as well as ocials
one until activated.
who communicated with journalists for innocuous rea[36][37]
Illegal agent: This is a person who is living in an- sons, such as Stephen Jin-Woo Kim.
other country under false credentials that does not As of 2012, India and Pakistan were holding several hun-

16.10. MILITARY CONFLICTS

dred prisoners of each others country for minor violations like trespass or visa overstay, often with accusations
of espionage attached. Some of these include cases where
Pakistan and India both deny citizenship to these people,
leaving them stateless. The BBC reported in 2012 on one
such case, that of Mohammed Idrees, who was held under Indian police control for approximately 13 years for
overstaying his 15-day visa by 23 days after seeing his
ill parents in 1999. Much of the 13 years was spent in
prison waiting for a hearing, and more time was spent
homeless or living with generous families. The Indian
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties and Human Rights Law
Network both decried his treatment. The BBC attributed
some of the problems to tensions caused by the Kashmir
conict.[38]

16.9 Espionage laws in the UK

81
However, espionage and intelligence can be linked. According to the MI5 website, foreign intelligence ocers
acting in the UK under diplomatic cover may enjoy immunity from prosecution. Such persons can only be tried
for spying (or, indeed, any criminal oence) if diplomatic
immunity is waived beforehand. Those ocers operating without diplomatic cover have no such immunity from
prosecution.
There are also laws surrounding government and organisational intelligence and surveillance. Generally, the
body involved should be issued with some form of warrant or permission from the government, and should be
enacting their procedures in the interest of protecting national security or the safety of public citizens. Those
carrying out intelligence missions should act within not
only RIPA, but also the Data Protection Act and Human
Rights Act. However, there are specic spy equipment
laws and legal requirements around intelligence methods
that vary for each form of intelligence enacted.

Espionage is illegal in the UK under the Ocial Secrets

Acts of 1911 and 1920. The UK law under this legislation considers espionage as actions intend to help an 16.10 Military conicts
enemy and deliberately harm the security of the nation.
According to MI5, a person will be charged with the
crime of espionage if they, for any purpose prejudicial
to the safety or interests of the State": approaches, enters or inspects a prohibited area; makes documents such
as plans that are intended, calculated, or could directly
or indirectly be of use to an enemy; or obtains, collects,
records, or publishes, or communicates to any other person any secret ocial code word, or pass word, or any
sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document
which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be
directly or indirectly useful to an enemy. The illegality
of espionage also includes any action which may be considered 'preparatory to' spying, or encouraging or aiding
another to spy.[39]
French spy captured during the Franco-Prussian War.
An individual convicted of espionage can be imprisoned
for up to 14 years in the UK, although multiple sentences In military conicts, espionage is considered permissible
as many nations recognizes the inevitability of opposing
can be issued.
sides seeking intelligence each about the dispositions of
the other. To make the mission easier and successful, sol16.9.1 Government intelligence laws and diers or agents wear disguises to conceal their true identity
from the enemy while penetrating enemy lines for intelliits distinction from espionage
gence gathering. However, if they are caught behind enGovernment intelligence is very much distinct from es- emy lines in disguises, they are not entitled to prisoner-ofpionage, and is not illegal in the UK, providing that the war status and subject to prosecution and punishment
organisations of individuals are registered, often with the including execution.
ICO, and are acting within the restrictions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). 'Intelligence'
is considered legally as information of all sorts gathered
by a government or organisation to guide its decisions. It
includes information that may be both public and private,
obtained from many dierent public or secret sources. It
could consist entirely of information from either publicly
available or secret sources, or be a combination of the
two.[40]

The Hague Convention of 1907 addresses the status of

wartime spies, specically within Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907: CHAPTER II Spies.[41] Article 29 states that a person is considered a spy who, acts clandestinely or on false pretenses,
inltrates enemy lines with the intention of acquiring intelligence about the enemy and communicate it to the
belligerent during times of war. Soldiers who penetrates
enemy lines in proper uniforms for the purpose of ac-

82

CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE

quiring intelligence are not considered spies but are lawful 16.11 List of famous spies
combatants entitled to be treated as prisoners of war upon
capture by the enemy. Article 30 states that a spy cap- See also: Intelligence agency, Special Operations Executured behind enemy lines may only be punished follow- tive and United States government security breaches
ing a trial. However, Article 31 provides that if a spy
successfully rejoined his own military and is then captured by the enemy as a lawful combatant, he cannot be
punished for his previous acts of espionage and must be
treated as a prisoner of war. Note that this provision does
not apply to citizens who committed treason against their
own country or co-belligerents of that country and may be
captured and prosecuted at any place or any time regardless whether he rejoined the military to which he belongs
or not or during or after the war.[42][43]
The ones that are excluded from being treated as spies
while behind enemy lines are escaping prisoners of war
and downed airmen as international law distinguishes between a disguised spy and a disguised escaper.[23] It is
permissible for these groups to wear enemy uniforms or
civilian clothes in order to facilitate their escape back to
friendly lines so long as they do not attack enemy forces,
collect military intelligence, or engage in similar military operations while so disguised.[44][45] Soldiers who are
wearing enemy uniforms or civilian clothes simply for the
sake of warmth along with other purposes rather than engaging in espionage or similar military operations while
so attired is also excluded from being treated as unlawful
combatants.[23]
Saboteurs are treated as spies as they too wear disguises
behind enemy lines for the purpose of waging destruc- Howard Burnham (1915)
tion on enemys vital targets in addition to intelligence
gathering.[46][47] For example, during World War II, eight
German agents entered the U.S. in June 1942 as part of
Operation Pastorius, a sabotage mission against U.S. economic targets. Two weeks later, all were arrested in civilian clothes by the FBI thanks to two German agents betraying the mission to the U.S. Under the Hague Convention of 1907, these Germans were classied as spies and
tried by a military tribunal in Washington D.C.[48] On August 3, 1942, all eight were found guilty and sentenced to
death. Five days later, six were executed by electric chair
at the District of Columbia jail. Two who had given evidence against the others had their sentences reduced by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt to prison terms. In 1948,
they were released by President Harry S. Truman and deported to the American Zone of occupied Germany.
The U.S. codication of enemy spies is Article 106 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This provides a
mandatory death sentence if a person captured in the act
is proven to be lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in
or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any of the armed forces, or in or
about any shipyard, any manufacturing or industrial plant,
or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid
of the prosecution of the war by the United States, or
elsewhere.[49]
FBI le photo of the leader of the Duquesne Spy Ring (1941)

16.11. LIST OF FAMOUS SPIES

Reign of Elizabeth I of England
Sir Francis Walsingham
Christopher Marlowe
American Revolution
Thomas Knowlton, The First American
Spy
Nathan Hale
John Andre
James Armistead
Benjamin Tallmadge, Case agent who
organized of the Culper Spy Ring in New
York City
Napoleonic Wars
Charles-Louis Schulmeister
William Wickham
American Civil War
One of the innovations in the American Civil War was the use of proprietary
companies for intelligence collection by
the Union; see Allan Pinkerton.
Confederate Secret Service
Belle Boyd[50]
Aceh War
Dutch professor Snouck Hurgronje
world leading authority on Islam was a
proponent of espionage to quell Muslim
resistance in Aceh in the Dutch East
Indies. In his role as Colonial Advisor
on Oriental Aairs, he gathered intelligence under the name Haji Abdul
Ghaar.
He used his knowledge of Islamic and
Aceh culture to devise strategies that
signicantly helped crush the resistance
of the Aceh inhabitants and impose
Dutch colonial rule, ending the 40 year
Aceh War. Casualty estimates ranged
between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants
dead and about a million wounded.
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje
Second Boer War
Fritz Joubert Duquesne
Sidney Reilly
Russo-Japanese War
Sidney Reilly
Ho Liang-Shung
Akashi Motojiro

83

16.11.1 World War I

See also: Espionage in Norway during World War I

Fritz Joubert Duquesne

Jules C. Silber
Mata Hari
Howard Burnham
T.E. Lawrence
Sidney Reilly
11 German spies were executed in the Tower of London
during WW1.[51]
Executed :- Carl Hans Lody on 6 November 1914,
in the Miniature Rie Range.
Executed :- Carl Frederick Muller on 23 June 1915,
in Miniature Rie Range. Prepared bullets were
used by the execution party.
Executed :- Haicke Marinus Janssen & Willem Johannes Roos both executed on 30 July 1915, both in
the Tower ditch.
Executed :- Ernst Waldemar Melin on 10 September
1915, Miniature Rie Range.
Executed :- Augusto Alfredo Roggen on 17 September 1915, in Miniature Rie Range.
Executed :- Fernando Buschman on 19 October
1915, in Miniature Rie Range.
Executed :- George Traugott Breeckow, otherwise
known as Reginald Rowland or George T. Parker
on 26 October 1915, in Miniature Rie Range.
Worked with a lady called Lizzie Louise Wertheim
who was sentenced to ten years penal servitude.
Later on 17 January 1918 was certied as insane
and died in Broadmoor criminal lunatic asylum on
29 July 1920.
Executed :- Irving Guy Ries on 27 October 1915, in
Miniature Rie Range.
Executed :- Albert Mayer on 2 December 1915, in
Miniature Rie Range.
Executed :- Ludovico Hurwitz-y-Zender on 11 April
1916 in Miniature Rie Range.
Carl Hans Lody has his own grave and black headstone
in the East London Cemetery, Plaistow. The others are
buried about 150 yards away under a small memorial
stone alongside a pathway.

84

CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE

and begin employing them in April 1942.[52] Their task
was to transmit information from Nazi occupied France
back to Allied Forces. The main strategic reason was that
men in France faced a high risk of being interrogated by
Nazi troops but women were less likely to arouse suspicion. In this way they made good couriers and proved
equal to, if not more eective than, their male counterparts. Their participation in Organization and Radio Operation was also vital to the success of many operations,
including the main network between Paris and London.
See also: Clandestine HUMINT asset recruiting Love,
honeypots and recruitment

16.11.3 Post World War II

Further information: Cold War espionage

Imagined German Intelligence Ocer thanks British Forces for

giving away details of operations, (Graham & Gillies Advertising)

16.11.2

World War II

In the United States, there are seventeen[53] federal agencies that form the United States Intelligence Community.
The Central Intelligence Agency operates the National
Clandestine Service (NCS)[54] to collect human intelligence and perform Covert operations.[55] The National
Security Agency collects Signals Intelligence. Originally the CIA spearheaded the US-IC. Pursuant to the
September 11 attacks the Oce of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to promulgate
information-sharing.
Kim Philby

Ray Mawby
Informants were common in World War II. In November 1939, the German Hans Ferdinand Mayer sent what
is called the Oslo Report to inform the British of German technology and projects in an eort to undermine the 16.12 Spy ction
Nazi regime. The Rseau AGIR was a French network
developed after the fall of France that reported the start Main article: Spy ction
of construction of V-weapon installations in Occupied
France to the British.
An early example of espionage literature is Kim by the
Counterespionage included the use of turned Double English novelist Rudyard Kipling, with a description of
Cross agents to misinform Nazi Germany of impact the training of an intelligence agent in the Great Game
points during the Blitz and internment of Japanese in the between the UK and Russia in 19th century Central Asia.
US against Japans wartime spy program. Additional An even earlier work was James Fenimore Cooper's clasWWII espionage examples include Soviet spying on the sic novel, The Spy, written in 1821, about an American
US Manhattan project, the German Duquesne Spy Ring spy in New York during the Revolutionary War.
convicted in the US, and the Soviet Red Orchestra spy- During the many 20th century spy scandals, much inforing on Nazi Germany. The US lacked a specic agency mation became publicly known about national spy agenat the start of the war, but quickly formed the Oce of cies and dozens of real-life secret agents. These sensaStrategic Services (OSS).
tional stories piqued public interest in a profession largely
Spying has sometimes been considered a gentlemanly
pursuit, with recruiting focused on military ocers, or
at least on persons of the class from whom ocers are
recruited. However, the demand for male soldiers, an increase in womens rights, and the tactical advantages of
female spies led the British Special Operations Executive
(SOE) to set aside any lingering Victorian Era prejudices

o-limits to human interest news reporting, a natural consequence of the secrecy inherent to their work. To ll in
the blanks, the popular conception of the secret agent has
been formed largely by 20th and 21st century literature
and cinema. Attractive and sociable real-life agents such
as Valerie Plame nd little employment in serious ction,
however. The ctional secret agent is more often a loner,

16.13. SEE ALSO

sometimes amoralan existential hero operating outside
the everyday constraints of society. Loner spy personalities may have been a stereotype of convenience for authors who already knew how to write loner private investigator characters that sold well from the 1920s to the
present.
Johnny Fedora achieved popularity as a ctional agent of
early Cold War espionage, but James Bond is the most
commercially successful of the many spy characters created by intelligence insiders during that struggle. His
less fantastic rivals include Le Carres George Smiley and
Harry Palmer as played by Michael Caine. Most postVietnam era characters were modeled after the American, C.C. Taylor, reportedly the last sanctioned asset
of the U.S. government. Taylor, a true Double 0 agent,
worked alone and would travel as an American or Canadian tourist or businessman throughout Europe and Asia,
he was used extensively in the Middle East toward the end
of his career. Taylor received his weapons training from
Carlos Hathcock, holder of a record 93 conrmed kills
from WWII through the Viet Nam conict. According
to documents made available through the Freedom of Information Act, his operations were classied as NOC
or Non-Ocial Cover.
Jumping on the spy bandwagon, other writers also started
writing about spy ction featuring female spies as protagonists, such as The Baroness, which has more graphic action and sex, as compared to other novels featuring male
protagonists.
It also made its way into the videogame world, hence the
famous creation of Hideo Kojima, the Metal Gear Solid
Series.
Espionage has also made its way into comedy depictions.
The 1960s TV series Get Smart portrays an inept spy,
while the 1985 movie Spies Like Us depicts a pair of nonetoo-bright men sent to the Soviet Union to investigate a
missile.

16.12.1

World War II: 19391945

16.12.2

Cold War era: 19451991

Anderson, Nicholas NOC Enigma Books 2009 Post Cold War era
Ishmael Jones The Human Factor: Inside the CIAs
Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture Encounter Books
2008, rev. 2010
Michael Ross The Volunteer: The Incredible True
Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International
Terrorists McClelland & Stewart 2007, rev. 2008
Jean-Marie Thibaud, Dictionnaire Encyclopdique
International des Abrviations, Sigles et Acronymes,
Arme et armement, Gendarmerie, Police, Services
de renseignement et Services secrets franais et

85
trangers, Espionnage, Contrespionnage, Services de
secours, Organisations rvolutionnaires et terroristes,
Paris, L'Harmattan, 2015, 827 p

16.13 See also

Animals used in espionage
Chinese intelligence operations in the United States
Classied information
Clandestine operation
Covert United States foreign regime change actions
Dumpster diving
History of Soviet espionage
Human intelligence (intelligence gathering)
Intelligence assessment
Labor spies
List of cryptographers
List of intelligence agencies
List of intelligence gathering disciplines
Military intelligence
Ninja
Operation Snow White
Security clearance
Spymaster

16.14 References
[1] WHAT IS ESPIONAGE?".
[2] "Espionage in Ancient Rome". HistoryNet.
[3] Henrywotton.org.uk. Henrywotton.org.uk. Retrieved
2012-07-07.
[4] Soustelle, Jacques (2002). The Daily Life of the Aztecas.
Phoenix Press. p. 209. ISBN 1842125087.
[5] Al-Mubarakpuri, Saifur Rahman (2002), Sealed Nectar,
Dar us Salam, p. 340
[6] Ab Khall, Shawq (2003), Hamra al assad, Dar us
Salam, p. 273, ISBN 9960-897-54-0
[7] William Muir, The life of Mahomet and history of Islam
to the era of the Hegira, Volume 4, p. 14
[8] Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, p. 204. (online)

86

[9] Gabriel, Richard A. (2008), Muhammad, Islams rst

great general, University of Oklahoma Press, p. 126,
ISBN 978-0-8061-3860-2
[10] Mubarakpuri, The sealed nectar: biography of the Noble
Prophet , p. 349.

CHAPTER 16. ESPIONAGE

[27] Double Agent. cia.gov.

[28] Cia.gov
[29] Illegal Mi5.gov -How spies operate.

[11]

[30] CIA Status Improves Contractors Case for Immunity.

New America Media.

[12] Za'd Al-Ma'ad p. 2/109; Ibn Hisham p. 2/619

[31] treason

[13] Hawarey, Dr. Mosab (2010). The Journey of Prophecy;

Days of Peace and War (Arabic). Islamic Book Trust.
ISBN 9789957051648.Note: Book contains a list of battles of Muhammad in Arabic, English translation available
here

[32] espionage

[14] Mubarakpuri, The Sealed Nectar, p. 187. (online)

[15] Watt, W. Montgomery (1956). Muhammad at Medina.
Oxford University Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-0195773071.
The common version, however, is that B. Lihyan wanted
to avenge the assassination of their chief at Muhammads
instigation, and bribed two clans of the tribe of Khuzaymah to say they wanted to become Muslims and ask
Muhammad to send instructors. (online)
[16] Watt, W. Montgomery (1956). Muhammad at Medina. Oxford University Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-0-19577307-1. The common version, however, is that B. Lihyan wanted to avenge the assassination of their chief at
Muhammads instigation, and bribed two clans of the tribe
of Khuzaymah to say they wanted to become Muslims and
ask Muhammad to send instructors. (online)
[17] Kailtyn Chick, Kailtyn Chick, p. 338, Hamlet Book Publishing , 2013
[18] Arrillaga, Pauline. Chinas spying seeks secret US info.
AP, 7 May 2011.
[19] Suvorov, Victor (1987). Inside the Aquarium. Berkley.
ISBN 0-425-09474-X.
[20] US Military Intelligence Handbook. USA International
Business Publications. p. 12.
[21] US Military Intelligence Handbook. USA International
Business Publications. p. 13.
[22] US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01.
[23] Igor Primoratz (August 15, 2013). New Rules for Victims of Armed Conicts: Commentary on the Two 1977
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(Nijho Classics in International Law). Martinus Nijho
Publishers. p. 214.
[24] US Military Intelligence Handbook. USA International
Business Publications. p. 15.
[25] "Defectors say China running 1,000 spies in Canada".
CBC News. June 15, 2005.
[26] "Beijings spies cost German rms billions, says espionage
expert". The Sydney Morning Herald. July 25, 2009.

[33] spying
[34] Aldrich Ames Criminal Complaint. jya.com. Retrieved
2011-03-19.
[35] USA v. Robert Philip Hanssen: Adavit in Support
of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrant. fas.org. Retrieved 2011-03-19.
[36] Gerstein, Josh (11.3.7). Despite openness pledge, President Obama pursues leakers. politico.com. Retrieved
2011-03-19. Check date values in: |date= (help)
[37] See the article on John Kiriakou
[38] Your World: The Nowhere Man, Rupa Jha, October 21,
2012, BBC (retrieved 2012-10-20) (Program link:The
Nowhere Man)
[39] https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/espionage/
espionage-and-the-law.html
[40] https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/espionage/
what-is-espionage.html
[41] Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.. International Committee of the Red Cross.
[42] Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa Ph.D, Sasho Ripiloski
(January 19, 2011). Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law.
Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 125.
[43] Charlesworth, Lorie (2006).
2 SAS Regiment,
War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence:
Intelligence Ocials and the Natzweiler
Trial". The Journal of Intelligence History 6 (2): 41.
doi:10.1080/16161262.2006.10555131.
[44] United States of America, Practice Relating to Rule 62.
Improper Use of Flags or Military Emblems, Insignia or
Uniforms of the Adversary. International Committee of
the Red Cross.
[45] 2006 Operational Law Handbook
[46] Leslie C. Green (February 1, 2000). The Contemporary
Law Of Armed Conict 2nd Edition. Juris Publishing. p.
142. ISBN 1-929446-03-9.
[47] George P. Fletcher (September 16, 2002). Romantics at
War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism. Princeton
University Press. p. 106.

16.16. EXTERNAL LINKS

87

[48] Dr. J. H. W. Verziji (1978). International Law in Historical Perspective: The laws of war. Part IX-A. Brill Publishers. p. 143. ISBN 90-286-0148-1.

Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds.

Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security
2003 1100 pages.

[49] Article 106Spies

[50] February 21, 2001 (2001-02-21). Famous Spies in History, CNN. Archives.cnn.com. Retrieved 2012-07-07.

Knightley, Philip The Second Oldest Profession:

Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century Norton
1986

[51] Sellers, Leonard (2009). Shot in the Tower: The Story

of the Spies Executed in the Tower of London During the
First World War. Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 9781848840263.

Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient
Times to the Internet 1996 Revised edition. First
published in 1967.

[52] Special Operations Executive. Spartacus Educational.

Johnson, Robert. Spying for Empire: The Great

Game in Central and South Asia, 17571947 London: Greenhill 2006

[53] http://www.intelligence.gov/
about-the-intelligence-community/ (nota bene: They say
its 17 agencies, in fact, taking military intelligence into
consideration, its 22 agencies)
[54] Oces of CIA > Clandestine Service > Who We Are.
cia.gov. Retrieved 2010-06-18.
[55] Oces of CIA > Clandestine Service > Our Mission.
cia.gov. Retrieved 2010-06-18.
[56] http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=106805285

16.15 Further reading

Jenkins, Peter. Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professionals Guide to Surveillance Training ISBN 978-09535378-2-2
Felix, Christopher [pseudonym for James McCarger] Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading
List. US CIA. Retrieved 9/2/2012. Check date values in: |accessdate= (help) A Short Course in the Secret War, 4th Edition. Madison Books, November
19, 2001.
West, Nigel. MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service
Operations 19091945 1983
Smith Jr., W. Thomas. Encyclopedia of the Central
Intelligence Agency 2003
Richelson, Jeery T. The U.S. Intelligence Community 1999 fourth edition
Richelson, Jeery T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence
in the Twentieth Century 1977
Owen, David. Hidden Secrets: A Complete History
of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It
O'Toole, George. Honorable Treachery: A History
of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, Covert Action from
the American Revolution to the CIA 1991
Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth & K. Lee Lerner, eds. Terrorism: essential primary sources Thomas Gale 2006
ISBN 978-1-4144-0621-3

Friedman, George. Americas Secret War: Inside

the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United
States and Its Enemies 2005
Doyle, David W., A Memoir of True Men and
Traitors (2000)
Tunney, Thomas Joseph and Paul Merrick Hollister
Throttled!: The Detection of the German and Anarchist Bomb Plotters Boston: Small, Maynard & company 1919 | available on Wikisource: s:Throttled!
Beesly, Patrick. Room 40, 1982.
Burnham, Frederick Russell Taking Chances 1944
May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing Ones Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars 1984
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram
Ballantine Books 1966
Words: Matt Bolton; photographs: Matt Munro.
The Tallinn Cables: A Glimpse into Tallinns Secret History of Espionage. Lonely Planet Magazine, December 2011

16.16 External links

Interactive Rosenberg Timeline
History of an espionage in Russia

Chapter 17

False ag
False colors redirects here. For the imaging technique, gaging in battle.[5] Auxiliary cruisers operated in such a
see False-color.
fashion in both World Wars, as did Q-ships, while merchant vessels were encouraged to use false ags for proFalse ag (or black ag) describes covert operations de- tection. The 1914 Battle of Trindade was between the
auxiliary cruisers RMS Carmania and SMS Cap Trafalsigned to deceive in such a way that the operations appear
as though they are being carried out by entities, groups, gar, in which Cap Trafalgar had been altered to look like
Carmania.
or nations other than those who actually planned and executed them. Operations carried out during peace-time One of the most notable examples was in World War II
by civilian organizations, as well as covert government when the German commerce raider Kormoran, disguised
agencies, may by extension be called false ag operations as a Dutch merchant ship, surprised and sank the Ausif they seek to hide the real organization behind an op- tralian light cruiser HMAS Sydney in 1941, causing the
eration. Geraint Hughes uses the term to refer to those greatest recorded loss of life on an Australian warship.
acts carried out by military or security force personnel, Kormoran was also fatally damaged in that encounter and
which are then blamed on terrorists.[1]
its crew was captured, but it was a considerable psycho[6]
In its most modern usage, the term may also refer to those logical victory for the Germans.
events which governments are cognizant of and able to
stop but choose to allow to happen (or stand down),
as a strategy to entangle or prepare the nation for war.
Furthermore, the term false ag terrorism may even be
used in those instances when violence is carried out by
groups or organizations which, whether they know it or
not, are being supported or controlled by the victim nation. deHaven-Smith argues that the terminology has become looser in recent years due to the increasingly complex levels of duplicity and international intrigue between states.[2] Some argue that false ags are methods
used by deep states as a form of deep politics.[3]
The name false ag has its origins in naval warfare
where the use of a ag other than the belligerents true
battle ag as a ruse de guerre, before engaging the enemy, has long been accepted.[4] Such operations are also
accepted in certain circumstances in land warfare, to deceive enemies in similar ways providing that the deception is not perdious and all such deceptions are discarded
before opening re upon the enemy.

The British used a Kriegsmarine ensign in the St Nazaire

Raid and captured a German code book. The old destroyer Campbeltown, which the British planned to sacrice in the operation, was provided with cosmetic modications, cutting the ships funnels and chamfering the
edges to resemble a German Type 23 torpedo boat The
British were able to get within two miles (3 km) of
the harbour before the defences responded, where the
explosive-rigged Campbeltown and commandos successfully disabled or destroyed the key dock structures of the
port.[7][8]

17.1.2 Air warfare

In December 1922February 1923, Rules concerning the
Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air
Warfare, drafted by a commission of jurists at the Hague
regulates:[9]
Art. 3. A military aircraft must carry an exterior mark indicating its nationality and its military character.

17.1 Use in warfare

17.1.1

Art. 19. The use of false exterior marks is forbidden.

Naval warfare

This practice is accepted in naval warfare, provided the This draft was never adopted as a legally binding treaty,
false ag is lowered and the true ag raised before en- but the ICRC states in its introduction on the draft that
88

17.1. USE IN WARFARE

To a great extent, [the draft rules] correspond to the customary rules and general principles underlying treaties on
the law of war on land and at sea,[10] and as such these
two noncontroversial articles were already part of customary law.[11]

17.1.3

Land warfare

In land warfare, the use of a false ag is similar to that

of naval warfare. The most widespread assumption is
that this practice was rst established under international
humanitarian law at the trial in 1947 of the planner and
commander of Operation Greif, Otto Skorzeny, by a U.S.
military tribunal at the Dachau Trials. In this trial, the tribunal did not nd Skorzeny guilty of a crime by ordering
his men into action in American uniforms. He had passed
on to his men the warning of German legal experts, that if
they fought in American uniforms, they would be breaking the laws of war, but they probably were not doing so
just by wearing American uniforms. During the trial, a
number of arguments were advanced to substantiate this
position and the German and U.S. military seem to have
been in agreement on it. In the transcript of the trial,[12] it
is mentioned that Paragraph 43 of the Field Manual published by the War Department, United States Army, on 1
October 1940, under the title Rules of Land Warfare,
says:
National ags, insignias and uniforms as a ruse in practice it
has been authorized to make use
of these as a ruse. The foregoing
rule (Article 23 of the Annex of the
IVth Hague Convention), does not
prohibit such use, but does prohibit
their improper use. It is certainly
forbidden to make use of them during a combat. Before opening re
upon the enemy, they must be discarded.
Also The American Soldiers Handbook, was
quoted by Defense Counsel and says:
The use of the enemy ag, insignia, and uniform is permitted under some circumstances. They are
not to be used during actual ghting, and if used in order to approach the enemy without drawing
re, should be thrown away or removed as soon as ghting begins.
The outcome of the trial has been codied in the 1977
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Protocol I):
Article 37. Prohibition of perdy

89
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure, or capture an
adversary by resort to perdy. Acts inviting the
condence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international
law applicable in armed conict, with intent to
betray that condence, shall constitute perdy.
The following acts are examples of perdy:
(a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under
a ag of truce or of a surrender;
(b) The feigning of an incapacitation by
wounds or sickness;
(c) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
(d) The feigning of protected status by the use
of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United
Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties
to the conict.
2. Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses
are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but
which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conict and which are not
perdious because they do not invite the condence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouage, decoys, mock operations and disinformation.
Article 38. Recognized emblems
1. It is prohibited to make improper use of the
distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems,
signs or signals provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. It is also prohibited to
misuse deliberately in an armed conict other
internationally recognized protective emblems,
signs or signals, including the ag of truce, and
the protective emblem of cultural property.
2. It is prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as
authorized by that Organization.
Article 39. Emblems of nationality
1. It is prohibited to make use in an armed conict of the ags or military emblems, insignia
or uniforms of neutral or other States not Parties to the conict.
2. It is prohibited to make use of the ags or
military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military
operations.

90

CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

3. Nothing in this Article or in Article 37,
paragraph 1 ( d ), shall aect the existing generally recognized rules of international law applicable to espionage or to the use of ags in
the conduct of armed conict at sea.

17.2 As pretexts for war

17.2.1

Russo-Swedish War

In 1788, the head tailor at the Royal Swedish Opera received an order to sew a number of Russian military uniforms. These were then used by the Swedes to stage
an attack on Puumala, a Swedish outpost on the RussoSwedish border, on 27 June 1788. This caused an outrage
in Stockholm and impressed the Riksdag of the Estates,
the Swedish national assembly, who until then had refused to agree to an oensive war against Russia. The
Puumala incident allowed King Gustav III of Sweden,
who lacked the constitutional authority to initiate unprovoked hostilities without the Estates consent, to launch
the Russo-Swedish War (17881790)[13]
Alfred Naujocks

17.2.2

Second Sino-Japanese War

Japanese experts inspect the scene of the 'railway sabotage' on

South Manchurian Railway

Gleiwitz incident
The Gleiwitz incident in 1939 involved Reinhard Heydrich fabricating evidence of a Polish attack against
Germany to mobilize German public opinion for war and
to justify the war with Poland. Alfred Naujocks was a
key organiser of the operation under orders from Heydrich. It led to the deaths of Nazi concentration camp
victims who were dressed as German soldiers and then
shot by the Gestapo to make it seem that they had been
shot by Polish soldiers. This, along with other false ag
operations in Operation Himmler, would be used to mobilize support from the German population for the start
of World War II in Europe.[15]

The operation failed to convince international public

opinion of the German claims, and both Britain and
In September 1931, Japanese ocers fabricated a pretext FrancePolands alliesdeclared war two days after
for invading Manchuria by blowing up a section of rail- Germany invaded Poland.[16]
way. Though the explosion was too weak to disrupt operations on the rail line, the Japanese nevertheless used this
Mukden incident to seize Manchuria and create a puppet Winter War
government for what they termed the independent state
of Manchukuo.[14]
On November 26, 1939, the Soviet army shelled Mainila,
In 1937, in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, they based a Russian village near the Finnish border. Soviet authortheir invasion of China proper on the false claim that ities blamed Finland for the attack and used the incident
one of their soldiers had been kidnapped, initiating the as a pretext to invade Finland, starting the Winter War,
four days later.[17]
Second Sino-Japanese War.

17.2.3

World War II

17.2.4 Cold War

17.3. AS A TACTIC TO UNDERMINE POLITICAL OPPONENTS

Operation Northwoods

91

17.3.1 Reichstag re
Main article: Reichstag re
The Reichstag re was an arson attack on the Reichstag
building in Berlin on 27 February 1933. The re started
in the Session Chamber,[22] and, by the time the police
and remen arrived, the main Chamber of Deputies was
engulfed in ames. Police searched the building and
found Marinus van der Lubbe, a young Dutch council
communist and unemployed bricklayer, who had recently
arrived in Germany to carry out political activities.
The re was used as evidence by the Nazis that the
Communists were beginning a plot against the German
government. Van der Lubbe and four Communist leaders
were subsequently arrested. Adolf Hitler, who was sworn
in as Chancellor of Germany four weeks before, on 30
January, urged President Paul von Hindenburg to pass an
emergency decree to counter the ruthless confrontation
of the Communist Party of Germany".[23] With civil liberties suspended, the government instituted mass arrests
of Communists, including all of the Communist parliamentary delegates. With their bitter rival Communists
gone and their seats empty, the National Socialist German Workers Party went from being a plurality party to
the majority; subsequent elections conrmed this position
and thus allowed Hitler to consolidate his power.

Operation Northwoods memorandum (13 March 1962).[18]

Historians disagree as to whether Van der Lubbe acted

alone, as he said, to protest the condition of the German working class, or whether the arson was planned and
The planned, but never executed, 1962 Operation Northordered by the Nazis, then dominant in the government
woods plot by the U.S. Department of Defense for a
themselves, as a false ag operation.[24][25]
war with Cuba involved scenarios such as fabricating
the hijacking or shooting down of passenger and military planes, sinking a U.S. ship in the vicinity of Cuba,
burning crops, sinking a boat lled with Cuban refugees, 17.3.2 Project TP-Ajax
attacks by alleged Cuban inltrators inside the United
States, and harassment of U.S. aircraft and shipping Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'tat
and the destruction of aerial drones by aircraft disguised
as Cuban MiGs.[19] These actions would be blamed on
Cuba, and would be a pretext for an invasion of Cuba On 4 April 1953, the CIA was ordered to undermine the
and the overthrow of Fidel Castro's communist govern- government of Iran over a four-month period, as a precurment. It was authored by the Joint Chiefs of Sta, but sor to overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mosad[26]
then rejected by President John F. Kennedy. The sur- degh. One tactic used to undermine Mosaddeh was to
prise discovery of the documents relating to Operation carry out false ag attacks on mosques and key public
Northwoods was a result of the comprehensive search for gures, to be blamed on Iranian communists loyal to the
[26]
records related to the assassination of President John F. government.
Kennedy by the Assassination Records Review Board in The CIA project was code-named TP-Ajax, and the tactic
the mid-1990s.[20] Information about Operation North- of a directed campaign of bombings by Iranians posing
woods was later publicized by James Bamford.[21]
as members of the Communist party,[27] involved the
bombing of "at least" one well known Muslims house
by CIA agents posing as Communists.[27] The CIA determined that the tactic of false ag attacks added to the
positive outcome of Project TPAJAX.[26]

17.3 As a tactic to undermine political opponents

However, as "[t]he C.I.A. burned nearly all of its les on

its role in the 1953 coup in Iran, the true extent of the
tactic has been dicult for historians to discern.[28]

92

17.3.3

CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

2008 Kurcha incident

In 2008 there was a shooting against two minibuses driving along in a volatile area right on the border between
Abkhazia and the republic of Georgia. The buses were
carrying Georgians who lived in Abkhazia and wanted to
cross the border so they could go and vote in the parliamentary election that day.

forces are usually best suited to intelligence tasks; however, military provide the structure needed to back up
such pseudo-ops with military response forces. According to US military expert Lawrence Cline (2005), the
teams typically have been controlled by police services,
but this largely was due to the weaknesses in the respective military intelligence systems.

The country had been experiencing internal political turmoil for the last year, and in an attempt to calm the
situation, president Mikheil Saakashvili moved forward
both presidential and parliamentary elections. However
the presidential election in January that year was strongly
contested, with hundreds of thousands attending protest
rallies. When the parliamentary election came up in May,
the mood was still tense.
On mid day 21 May the two minibuses came under attack
with small arms and grenades, and though there were no
casualties, three people were taken to a hospital in Zugdidi, where president Saakashvili later arrived and was
lmed by TV at the patients bedside.
In his comments on TV, which dominated the news during election day, Saakashvili indicated that the attack had
been an attempt to disrupt the election, implying that it
had been Abkhaz or Russian forces who had been behind
it. This provided for a favorable opportunity for the president to focus the nations attention on an external enemy,
thereby leading attention away from his domestic critics,
as well as making use of his position as leader to rally the
Georgians around his candidates in the election.
An investigation by the United Nations Observer Mission
in Georgia found that the attackers were located on the
Georgian side of the ceasere line, about 100m from the
buses, and that although hard evidence of the attackers
identities was lacking, inconsistencies merited further investigation, particularly the suggestion that the lming of
the attack seemed anticipatory.[29]

Charlemagne Pralte of Haiti was assassinated in 1919, after

checkpoints were passed by military disguised as guerrilla ghters

The State Political Directorate (OGPU) of the Soviet

A Georgian investigative TV documentary later found Union set up such an operation from 1921 to 1926.
that camera crew from the government-friendly channel During Operation Trust, they used loose networks of
Rustavi 2 had been in position with their equipment be- White Army supporters and extended them, creating the
pseudo-"Monarchist Union of Central Russia (MUCR)
fore the shooting took place.
in order to help the OGPU identify real monarchists and
anti-Bolsheviks.

17.4 Pseudo-operations
Pseudo-operations are those in which forces of one power
disguise themselves as enemy forces. For example, a state
power may disguise teams of operatives as insurgents and,
with the aid of defectors, inltrate insurgent areas.[30] The
aim of such pseudo-operations may be to gather short or
long-term intelligence or to engage in active operations, in
particular assassinations of important enemies. However,
they usually involve both, as the risks of exposure rapidly
increase with time and intelligence gathering eventually
leads to violent confrontation. Pseudo-operations may
be directed by military or police forces, or both. Police

An example of a successful assassination was United

States Marine Sergeant Herman H. Hanneken leading a
patrol of his Haitian Gendarmerie disguised as enemy
guerrillas in 1919. The Patrol successfully passed several enemy checkpoints in order to assassinate the guerilla
leader Charlemagne Pralte near Grande-Rivire-duNord. Hanneken was awarded the Medal of Honor and
was commissioned a Second Lieutenant for his deed.
During the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s, captured Mau
Mau members who switched sides and specially trained
British troops initiated the pseudo-gang concept to successfully counter Mau Mau. In 1960 Frank Kitson, (who
was later involved in the Northern Irish conict and is now

17.5. ESPIONAGE
a retired British General), published Gangs and Countergangs, an account of his experiences with the technique
in Kenya; information included how to counter gangs and
measures of deception, including the use of defectors,
which brought the issue a wider audience.
Another example of combined police and military oversight of pseudo-operations include the Selous Scouts in
the former country Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), governed
by white minority rule until 1980. The Selous Scouts
were formed at the beginning of Operation Hurricane,
in November 1973, by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel)
Ronald Reid-Daly. As with all Special Forces in Rhodesia, by 1977 they were controlled by COMOPS (Commander, Combined Operations) Commander Lieutenant
General Peter Walls. The Selous Scouts were originally
composed of 120 members, with all ocers being white
and the highest rank initially available for black soldiers
being colour sergeant. They succeeded in turning approximately 800 insurgents who were then paid by Special Branch, ultimately reaching the number of 1,500
members. Engaging mainly in long-range reconnaissance
and surveillance missions, they increasingly turned to offensive actions, including the attempted assassination of
Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army leader Joshua
Nkomo in Zambia. This mission was nally aborted by
the Selous Scouts, and attempted again, unsuccessfully,
by the Rhodesian Special Air Service.[31]
Some oensive operations attracted international condemnation, in particular the Selous Scouts raid on a
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)
camp at Nyadzonya Pungwe, Mozambique in August
1976. ZANLA was then led by Josiah Tongogara. Using
Rhodesian trucks and armored cars disguised as Mozambique military vehicles, 84 scouts killed 1,284 people in
the camp-the camp was registered as a refugee camp by
the United Nations (UN). Even according to Reid-Daly,
most of those killed were unarmed guerrillas standing
in formation for a parade. The camp hospital was also
set ablaze by the rounds red by the Scouts, killing all
patients.[32] According to David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, who visited the camp shortly before the raid, it was
only a refugee camp that did not host any guerrillas. It
was staged for UN approval.[33]

93
operations, or the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled areas.
Pseudo Operations should be distinguished, notes Cline,
from the more common police or intelligence inltration
of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In the latter case,
inltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo
teams, on the other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually military or paramilitary. The use of
pseudo teams has been a hallmark of a number of foreign
counterinsurgency campaigns.[30]
Similar false ag tactics were also employed during the
Algerian civil war, starting in the middle of 1994. Death
squads composed of Dpartement du Renseignement et
de la Scurit (DRS) security forces disguised themselves as Islamist terrorists and committed false ag terror attacks. Such groups included the Organisation of
Young Free Algerians (OJAL) or the Secret Organisation
for the Safeguard of the Algerian Republic (OSSRA)[35]
According to Roger Faligot and Pascal Kropp (1999),
the OJAL was reminiscent of the Organization of the
French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counterterrorists created in December 1956 by the Direction de
la surveillance du territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate, or DST) whose mission was to carry out terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political
compromise.[36]

17.5 Espionage
Main article: False ag penetrator

In espionage the term false ag describes the recruiting of agents by operatives posing as representatives of a
cause the prospective agents are sympathetic to, or even
the agents own government. For example, during the
Cold War, several female West German civil servants
were tricked into stealing classied documents by agents
of the East German Stasi intelligence service, pretending
to be members of West German peace advocacy groups
(the Stasi agents were also described as "Romeos, indicating that they also used their sex appeal to manipulate
According to a 1978 study by the Directorate of Military
their targets, making this operation a combination of the
Intelligence, 68% of all insurgent deaths inside Rhodesia
false ag and "honey trap" techniques).[37]
could be attributed to the Selous Scouts, who were disThe technique can also be used to expose enemy agents in
banded in 1980.[34]
ones own service, by having someone approach the susIf the action is a police action, then these tactics would
pect and pose as an agent of the enemy. Earl Edwin Pitts,
fall within the laws of the state initiating the pseudo, but if
a 13-year veteran of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigasuch actions are taken in a civil war or during a belligerent
tion and an attorney, was caught when he was approached
military occupation then those who participate in such
by FBI agents posing as Russian agents.
actions would not be privileged belligerents. The principle of plausible deniability is usually applied for pseudo- British intelligence ocials in World War II allowed douteams. (See the above section Laws of war). Some ble agents to re-bomb a power station and a food dump
false ag operations have been described by Lawrence E. in the UK to protect their cover, according to declassied
Cline, a retired US Army intelligence ocer, as pseudo- documents. The documents stated the agents took precautions to ensure they did not cause serious damage.

94

CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

One of the documents released also stated: It should be If you could employ an associate who pretends to be
recognised that friends as well as enemies must be com- sympathetic to the unions cause to physically attack you
pletely deceived.[38]
(or even use a rearm against you), you could discredit
the unions, read the email. It went on to say that the
eort would assist in undercutting any support that the
media may be creating in favor of the unions. The press
17.6 Civilian usage
had acquired a court order to access all of Walkers emails
and Lams email was exposed. At rst, Lam vehemently
While false ag operations originate in warfare and govdenied it, but eventually admitted it and resigned.[43]
ernment, they also can occur in civilian settings among
certain factions, such as businesses, special interest
groups, religions, political ideologies and campaigns for 17.6.3 Ideological
oce.
Proponents of political or religious ideologies will sometimes use false ag tactics. This can be done to discredit
17.6.1 Businesses
or implicate rival groups, create the appearance of enemies when none exist, or create the illusion of organized
In business and marketing, similar operations are beand directed opposition when in truth, the ideology is
ing employed in some public relations campaigns (see
simply unpopular with society.
Astroturng). Telemarketing rms practice false ag
type behavior when they pretend to be a market research
rm (referred to as "sugging"). In some rare cases, members of an unsuccessful business will destroy some of their
own property to conceal an unrelated crime (e.g., safety
violations, embezzlement) but make it appear as though
the destruction was done by a rival company.

17.6.2

Political campaigning

Political campaigning has a long history of this tactic in

various forms, including in person, print media and electronically in recent years. This can involve when supporters of one candidate pose as supporters of another,
or act as straw men for their preferred candidate to debate against. This can happen with or without the candidates knowledge. The Canuck letter is an example of
one candidate creating a false document and attributing
it as coming from another candidate in order to discredit
that candidate.

A bomb threat forged by Scientology operatives

In retaliation for writing The Scandal of Scientology, some

members of the Church of Scientology stole stationery
from author Paulette Cooper's home and then used that
stationery to forge bomb threats and have them mailed
to a Scientology oce. The Guardians Oce also had
a plan for further operations to discredit Cooper known
as Operation Freakout, but several Scientology operaIn the nal days of the 1994 campaign, Governor Lawton
tives were arrested in a separate investigation and the plan
Chiles' ran a false ag operation that paid for tens of thoufailed.[44]
sands of calls to elderly voters using false organization
names. The calls purported to be from Republican groups
and told voters that Jeb Bush was against Social Security
and seniors. Chiles denied his campaign was behind the 17.7 See also
calls. After winning re-election and facing an investigation, Chiles admitted the truth in November 1995.[39]
17.7.1 Concepts
In 2006, individuals practicing false ag behavior were
discovered and outed in New Hampshire[40][41] and
New Jersey[42] after blog comments claiming to be from
supporters of a political candidate were traced to the IP
address of paid staers for that candidates opponent.
On 19 February 2011, Indiana Deputy Prosecutor Carlos
Lam sent a private email to Wisconsin Governor Scott
Walker suggesting that he run a "'false ag' operation
to counter the protests against Walkers proposed restrictions on public employees collective bargaining rights:

Agent provocateur
Black propaganda
Casus belli
Covert operation
Denial and deception
Front organization

17.8. NOTES AND REFERENCES

Joe job, a similar online concept
Mimicry
State terrorism

17.7.2

Examples

195051 Baghdad bombings where Iraqi Zionist underground members targeted the Baghdad Jewish
community
Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw (Flemish neo-Nazi
group preparing false ag attacks)
Canuck letter
Celle Hole
CIA Operation Ajax (United States overthrowing of
Mohammed Mossadeq, Prime Minister of Iran, in
1953)[27]
Gleiwitz incident aka Operation Himmler
Lavon Aair Israeli attempt to plant bombs in Western targets in Egypt, in blaming Arab elements
Marxist-Leninist Party of the Netherlands (fake
party set up by the Dutch security service)
Masada Action and Defense Movement (French
white supremacists, under the guise of a fake extremist Zionist movement, conducted bombings of
Arab targets in France in an attempt to start a war
between French Arabs and Jews.)
Operation Gladio

17.8 Notes and references

[1] Hughes, Geraint (2011): The Militarys Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal
Democracies, Letort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute,
May. p.105 http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.
mil/pdffiles/PUB1066.pdf
[2] deHaven-Smith, Lance (2013). Conspiracy Theory in
America, Austin: University of Texas Press. pp.225-226
http://utpress.utexas.edu/index.php/books/dehcon
[3] Scott, Peter Dale (2007). The Road to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America, Berkeley: University of
California Press. pp.267-268 (http://www.ucpress.edu/
book.php?isbn=9780520258716)

95

[6] Squires, Nick. "HMAS Sydney found o Australias west

coast", The Telegraph, 17 March 2008.
[7] Guinness World Records (2009), p.155
[8] Young, P (Ed) (1973) Atlas of the Second World War
(London: The Military Book Society)
[9] The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, 1922-12 to 1923-02,
this convention was never adopted (backup site)
[10] Rules concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in
Time of War and Air Warfare. Drafted by a Commission
of Jurists at the Hague, December 1922 February 1923.:
Introduction. ICRC. Retrieved December 2010.
[11] Gmez, Javier Guisndez (20 June 1998). The Law of
Air Warfare. International Review of the Red Cross 38
(323): 34763. doi:10.1017/S0020860400091075.
[12] Source: Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals. United
Nations War Crimes Commission. Vol. IX, 1949: Trial
of Otto Skorzeny and others General Military Government Court of the U.S. zone of Germany 18 August to
9 September 1947
[13] (Finnish) Mattila, Tapani (1983). Meri maamme turvana
[Sea safeguarding our country] (in Finnish). Jyvskyl:
K. J. Gummerus Osakeyhti. ISBN 951-99487-0-8. (),
p. 142.
[14] Weland, James (1994).
Misguided Intelligence:
Japanese Military Intelligence Ocers in the Manchurian
Incident, September 1931. Journal of Military History
58 (3): 445460. doi:10.2307/2944134.
[15] Bradley Lightbody, The Second World War: Ambitions to
Nemesis, Routledge, 2004, ISBN 0-415-22405-5, Google
Print, p.39
[16] Steven J. Zaloga, Poland 1939: The Birth of Blitzkrieg,
Osprey Publishing, 2002, ISBN 1-84176-408-6, p. 39
[17] Turtola, Martti (1999). Kansainvlinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla. In Leskinen, Jari;
Juutilainen, Antti. Talvisodan pikkujttilinen. pp. 44
45.
[18] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta, Justication for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)", U.S. Department of Defense, 13 March 1962. The Operation Northwoods document in PDF format on the website of the independent,
non-governmental research institute the National Security
Archive at the George Washington University Gelman Library, Washington, D.C. Direct PDF links: here and here.

[4] deHaven-Smith, Lance (2013). Conspiracy Theory in

America, Austin: University of Texas Press. p.225

[19] Excerpts from declassied 1962 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta

Memo Operation Northwoods: Justication for U.S.
Military Intervention in Cuba

[5] the use of a false ag has always been accepted as a legitimate ruse de guerre in naval warfare, the true battle
ag being run up immediately before engaging (Thomas,
Rosamund M., ed. (1993), Teaching Ethics: Government ethics, Centre for Business and Public, p. 80, ISBN
9781871891034).

[20] Horne, Douglas P., Chief Analyst for Military Records,

Assassination Records Review Board (2009). Inside the
Assassination Records Review Board: The U.S. Governments Final Attempt to Reconcile the Conicting Medical Evidence in the Assassination of JFK. self published.
ISBN 098431444X. Retrieved April 2014.

96

[21] James Bamford (2002). Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the

Ultra-Secret National Security Agency. Anchor Books. pp.
8291. ISBN 978-0-385-49907-1.
[22] Tobias, Fritz, The Reichstag Fire. New York: Putnam,
1964, pages 2628.
[23] History of the Reichstag Fire in Berlin Germany
[24] The Reichstag Fire. Holocaust Encyclopedia. United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
[25] DW Sta (27 February 2008). 75 Years Ago, Reichstag Fire Sped Hitlers Power Grab. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved 12 August 2013.
[26] Callanan, James (2009). Covert Action in the Cold War:
US Policy, intelligence and CIA operations, London: I.B.
Tauris. p.115
[27] Risen, James. Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran
A Special Report; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and
'79). The New York Times, 16 April 2000
[28] Weiner, Tim (1997). C.I.A. Destroyed Files on 1953 Iran
coup, The New York Times, 29 May.
[29] Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia (PDF). United Nations Security Council.
23 July 2008. Retrieved 21 August 2008.
[30] Cline, Lawrence E. (2005) Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from other countries, Strategic
Studies Institute.
[31] Cline (2005), p. 11.
[32] Cline (2005), quoting Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts, Weltevreden Park, South Africa:
Covos-Day Books, 1999, p. 10 (republished by Covos
Day, 2001, ISBN 978-1-919874-33-3)
[33] Cline (2005), who quotes David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: the Chimurenga War,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981, pp. 241242.
[34] Cline (2005), p. 813. For 1978 study, quotes J. K.
Cilliers, Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, London: Croom
Helm, 1985, pp. 6077. Cline also quotes Ian F. W.
Beckett, The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency 1972
1979 at selousscouts
[35] Lounis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire (2004).
Franalgrie, crimes et mensonges dEtats, (FrancoAlgeria, Crimes and Lies of the States). Editions La
Dcouverte. ISBN 2-7071-4747-8. Extract in English
with mention of the OJAL available here.
[36] Luonis Aggoun and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire, ibid., quoting Roger Faligot and Pascal KROP, DST, Police Secrte,
Flammarion, 1999, p. 174.
[37] Crawford, Angus (20 March 2009). Victims of Cold
War 'Romeo spies". BBC Online. Retrieved 10 April
2009.
[38] Britain 'bombed itself to fool Nazis". BBC. 28 February
2002. Retrieved 4 November 2008.

CHAPTER 17. FALSE FLAG

[39] http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1346&
dat=19951211&id=gZosAAAAIBAJ&sjid=
wfwDAAAAIBAJ&pg=4981,49418 Lakeland Times
1995
[40] Steele, Allison, "Bass staer in D.C. poses as blogger: Bogus posts aimed at his political opponent", Concord Monitor, 26 September 2006 (URL last accessed 24 October
2006).
[41] Saunders, Anne, Bass aide resigns after posing as opponents supporter online, The Boston Globe, 26 September
2006 (URL last accessed 24 October 2006).
[42] Miller, Jonathan, Blog Thinks Aide to Kean Posted Jabs At
Menendez, New York Times, 21 September 2006 (URL
last accessed 24 October 2006).
[43] Montopoli, Brian (25 March 2011). Indiana prosecutor
resigns for encouraging fake attack on Wisconsin governor. CBS News.
[44] United States of America v. Jane Kember, Morris Budlong, Sentencing Memorandum; pp. 2325.

Chapter 18

Field agent
In espionage, a eld agent is an agent who works in
the eld as opposed to one who works at the oce or
headquarters. A eld agent can work alone or in a group
but usually has a case ocer who is in charge.
Field agents can be undercover, and travel using fake
passports that may be under the name of a front organization or shell corporation.
Field agents are often present in ction,[1][2] though their
duties and actions can be quite dierent in reality.[3]

18.1 See also

Espionage
Agent handling
Double agent
Special agent
Non-ocial cover (NOC)

18.2 References
[1] Mazzetti, Mark; Elliott, Justin (9 December 2013). Spies
Inltrate a Fantasy Realm of Online Games. New York
Times. Retrieved 2015-03-28.
[2] Alex Garofalo (18 February 2015). "'The Americans
Creators Blend Family Drama With Espionage For A Different Kind Of Spy Show. International Business Times.
Retrieved 2015-03-28.
[3] Vaughn Sherman (2013-01-10). How Accurate Are
Bourne and Bond? Ask an Ex-CIA Ocer. The Hungton Post. Retrieved 2015-03-28.

97

Chapter 19

Industrial espionage
plication of principles and practices from military and national intelligence to the domain of global business";[5] it
is the business equivalent of open-source intelligence.
The dierence between competitive intelligence and economic or industrial espionage is not clear; one needs to
understand the legal basics to recognize how to draw the
line between the two.[6][7] Others maintain it is sometimes
quite dicult to tell the dierence between legal and illegal methods, especially if considering the ethical side of
information gathering, making the denition even more
elusive.

19.2 Forms of economic and industrial espionage

Teapot with Actresses, Vezzi porcelain factory, Venice, c. 1725.

The Vezzi brothers were involved in a series of incidents of industrial espionage. It was these actions that led to the secret of
manufacturing Meissen porcelain becoming widely known.

Industrial espionage, economic espionage or corporate espionage is a form of espionage conducted for
commercial purposes instead of purely national security.[1] Economic espionage is conducted or orchestrated
by governments and is international in scope, while industrial or corporate espionage is more often national and
occurs between companies or corporations.[2]

19.1 Competitive intelligence and

economic or industrial espionage

Economic or industrial espionage takes place in two main

forms. In short, the purpose of espionage is to gather
knowledge about (an) organization(s). It may include
the acquisition of intellectual property, such as information on industrial manufacture, ideas, techniques and processes, recipes and formulas. Or it could include sequestration of proprietary or operational information, such as
that on customer datasets, pricing, sales, marketing, research and development, policies, prospective bids, planning or marketing strategies or the changing compositions
and locations of production.[3]

It may describe activities such as theft of trade secrets,

bribery, blackmail and technological surveillance. As
well as orchestrating espionage on commercial organizations, governments can also be targets for example, to
determine the terms of a tender for a government contract
"Competitive intelligence" levels out two scenarios of deso that another tenderer can underbid.
scription as the legal and ethical activity of systematically
gathering, analyzing and managing information on industrial competitors becomes benecial.[3] It may include
activities such as examining newspaper articles, cor- 19.3 Target industries
porate publications, websites, patent lings, specialised
databases, information at trade shows and the like to de- Economic and industrial espionage is most commonly
termine information on a corporation.[4] The compila- associated with technology-heavy industries, includtion of these crucial elements is sometimes termed CIS ing computer software and hardware, biotechnology,
or CRS, a Competitive Intelligence Solution or Competi- aerospace, telecommunications, transportation and entive Response Solution. With its roots in market research, gine technology, automobiles, machine tools, energy,
competitive intelligence has been described as the ap- materials and coatings and so on. Silicon Valley is known
98

19.6. USE OF COMPUTERS AND THE INTERNET

99

priates information to advance their own interests or to

damage the company or, secondly, a competitor or foreign government seeks information to advance its own
technological or nancial interest.[11] "Moles" or trusted
insiders are generally considered the best sources for economic or industrial espionage.[12] Historically known as
a patsy, an insider can be induced, willingly or under duress to provide information. A patsy may be initially asked to hand over inconsequential information and
once compromised by committing a crime, bribed into
handing over material which is more sensitive.[13] InDuring testing, automakers commonly disguise upcoming car dividuals may leave one company to take up employmodels with camouage paint patterns, padded covers, or de- ment with another and take sensitive information with
ceptive decals.
them.[14] Such apparent behavior has been the focus of
numerous industrial espionage cases that have resulted
in legal battles.[14] Some countries hire individuals to do
to be one of the worlds most targeted areas for espionage,
spying rather than make use of their own intelligence
though any industry with information of use to competiagencies.[15] Academics, business delegates and students
[8]
tors may be a target.
are often thought to be utilized by governments in gathering information.[16] Some countries, such as Japan, have
been reported to expect students be debriefed on return19.4 Information theft and sabo- ing home.[16] A spy may follow a guided tour of a factory
then get lost.[13] A spy could be an engineer, a maintage
tenance man, a cleaner, an insurance salesman or an inspector - basically anyone who has legitimate access to
Information can make the dierence between success and the premises.[13]
failure; if a trade secret is stolen, the competitive playing
eld is leveled or even tipped in favor of a competitor. A spy may break into the premises to steal data. They may
waste paper and refuse, known as dumpAlthough a lot of information-gathering is accomplished search through
[17]
ster
diving.
Information may be compromised via unlegally through competitive intelligence, at times corpo[9] solicited requests for information, marketing surveys or
rations feel the best way to get information is to take it.
Economic or industrial espionage is a threat to any busi- use of technical support, research or software facilities.
Outsourced industrial producers may ask for information
ness whose livelihood depends on information.
outside of the agreed-upon contract.[18]
In recent years, economic or industrial espionage has
taken on an expanded denition. For instance, attempts Computers have facilitated the process of collecting into sabotage a corporation may be considered industrial formation, due to the ease of access to large amounts of
espionage; in this sense, the term takes on the wider con- information, through physical contact or via the internet.
notations of its parent word. That espionage and sabotage
(corporate or otherwise) have become more clearly associated with each other is also demonstrated by a num- 19.6 Use of computers and the Inber of proling studies, some government, some corpoternet
rate. The United States government currently has a polygraph examination entitled the Test of Espionage and
Sabotage (TES), contributing to the increasingly popu- 19.6.1 Personal computers
lar, though not consensus, notion, by those studying espionage and sabotage countermeasures, of the interrela- Computers have become key in exercising industrial estionship between the two.[10] In practice, particularly by pionage due to the enormous amount of information they
trusted insiders, they are generally considered function- contain and its ease of being copied and transmitted. The
ally identical for the purpose of informing countermea- use of computers for espionage increased rapidly in the
sures.
1990s. Information has been commonly stolen by being copied from unattended computers in oces, those
gaining unsupervised access doing so through subsidiary
19.5 Agents and the process of col- jobs, such as cleaners or repairmen. Laptops were, and
still are, a prime target, with those traveling abroad on
lection
business being warned not to leave them for any period
of time. Perpetrators of espionage have been known
Economic or industrial espionage commonly occurs in to nd many ways of conning unsuspecting individuals
one of two ways. Firstly, a dissatised employee appro- into parting, often only temporarily, from their posses-

100

CHAPTER 19. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

sions, enabling others to access and steal information.[19] 19.6.5 Distributed denial of service
A bag-op refers to the use of hotel sta to access data,
(DDoS) attack
such as through laptops, in hotel rooms. Information may
be stolen in transit, in taxis, at airport baggage counters,
The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack uses
baggage carousels, on trains and so on.[17]
compromised computer systems to orchestrate a ood of
requests on the target system, causing it to shut down
and deny service to other users.[25] It could potentially be
19.6.2 The Internet
used for economic or industrial espionage with the purpose of sabotage. This method was allegedly utilized by
The rise of the internet and computer networks has ex- Russian secret services, over a period of two weeks on a
panded the range and detail of information available cyberattack on Estonia in May 2007, in response to the
and the ease of access for the purpose of industrial removal of a Soviet era war memorial.[26]
espionage.[20] Worldwide, around 50,000 companies a
day are thought to come under cyberattack with the rate
estimated as doubling each year.[21] This type of operation is generally identied as state backed or sponsored,
because the access to personal, nancial or analytic re- 19.7 History
sources identied exceed that which could be accessed
by cybercriminals or individual hackers. Sensitive military or defense engineering or other industrial informa- 19.7.1 Origins of industrial espionage
tion may not have immediate monetary value to criminals, compared with, say, bank details. Analysis of cyberattacks suggests deep knowledge of networks, with targeted attacks, obtained by numerous individuals operating in a sustained organized way.[22]

19.6.3

Opportunities for sabotage

The rising use of the internet has also extended opportunities for industrial espionage with the aim of sabotage.
In the early 2000s, it was noticed that energy companies
were increasingly coming under attack from hackers. Energy power systems, doing jobs like monitoring power
grids or water ow, once isolated from the other computer
networks, were now being connected to the internet, leaving them more vulnerable, having historically few built-in
security features.[23] The use of these methods of industrial espionage have increasingly become a concern for
governments, due to potential attacks by terrorist groups
or hostile foreign governments.

19.6.4

Malware

One of the means of perpetrators conducting industrial

espionage is by exploiting vulnerabilities in computer
software. Malware and spyware as a tool for industrial
espionage, in transmitting digital copies of trade secrets, customer plans, future plans and contacts. Newer
forms of malware include devices which surreptitiously
switch on mobile phones camera and recording devices.
In attempts to tackle such attacks on their intellectual
property, companies are increasingly keeping important
information o network, leaving an air gap, with some
companies building Faraday cages to shield from electromagnetic or cellphone transmissions.[24]

The work of Father Francois Xavier d'Entrecolles to reveal to

Europe the manufacturing methods of Chinese porcelain in 1712,
is sometimes considered an early case of industrial espionage

Economic and industrial espionage has a long history.

The work of Father Francois Xavier d'Entrecolles in
Jingdezhen, China to reveal to Europe the manufacturing methods of Chinese porcelain in 1712 is sometimes
considered an early case of industrial espionage.[27]
Historical accounts have been written of industrial espionage between Britain and France.[28] Attributed to
Britains emergence as an industrial creditor, the second decade of the 18th century saw the emergence
of a large-scale state-sponsored eort to surreptitiously
take British industrial technology to France.[28] Witnesses
conrmed both the inveigling of tradespersons abroad
and the placing of apprentices in England.[29] Protests by
those such as iron workers in Sheeld and steel workers in Newcastle, about skilled industrial workers being
enticed abroad, led to the rst English legislation aimed
at preventing this method of economic and industrial
espionage.[30][29]

19.8. NOTABLE CASES

19.7.2

The 20th Century

101

The Soviet military was recognised as making much better use of acquired information, compared to civilian inEast-West commercial development opportunities after dustry, where their record in replicating and developing
World War I saw a rise in Soviet interest in American industrial technology was poor.[32]
and European manufacturing know-how, exploited by
Amtorg Corporation.[31] Later, with Western restrictions
on the export of items thought likely to increase military
capabilities to the USSR, Soviet industrial espionage was 19.7.3 The legacy of Cold War espionage
a well known adjunct to other spying activities up until the
1980s.[32] BYTE reported in April 1984, for example, that Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the
although the Soviets sought to develop their own micro- end of the Cold War, commentators, including the US
electronics, their technology appeared to be several years Congressional Intelligence Committee, noted a redibehind the Wests. Soviet CPUs required multiple chips rection amongst the espionage community from miland appeared to be close or exact copies of American itary to industrial targets, with Western and former
communist countries making use of underemployed
products such as the Intel 3000 and DEC LSI-11/2.[33]
spies and expanding programs directed at stealing such
information.[37][38]
Operation Brunnhilde
The legacy of Cold War spying included not just the redirection of personnel but the use of spying apparatus such
Some of these activities were directed via the East Ger- as computer databases, scanners for eavesdropping, spy
man Stasi (Ministry for State Security). One such oper- satellites, bugs and wires.[39]
ation, known as Operation Brunnhilde operated from
the mid-1950s until early 1966 and made use of spies
from many Communist Bloc countries. Through at least
20 forays, many western European industrial secrets were 19.8 Notable cases
compromised.[34] One member of the Brunnhilde ring
was a Swiss chemical engineer, Dr. Jean Paul Soupert
(also known as Air Bubble), living in Brussels. He 19.8.1 France and the United States
was described by Peter Wright in Spycatcher as having
been doubled by the Belgian Sret de l'tat.[34][35] Between 1987 and 1989, IBM and Texas Instruments
He revealed information about industrial espionage con- were thought to have been targeted by French spies with
ducted by the ring, including the fact that Russian agents the intention of helping Frances Groupe Bull.[40] In
had obtained details of Concorde's advanced electronics 1993, US aerospace companies were also thought to have
system.[36] He testied against two Kodak employees, liv- been targeted by French interests.[41] During the early
ing and working in Britain, during a trial in which they 1990s, France was described as one of the most aggreswere accused of passing information on industrial pro- sive pursuers of espionage to garner foreign industrial and
cesses to him, though they were eventually acquitted.[34] technological secrets.[40] France accused the U.S. of attempting to sabotage its high tech industrial base.[40] The
government of France has been alleged to have conducted
Soviet spetsinformatsiya system
ongoing industrial espionage against American aerodynamics and satellite companies.[42]
A secret report from the Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR (VPK), from 197980, detailed how
spetsinformatsiya (Russian: i.e. special records) could be utilised in twelve dierent military 19.8.2 Volkswagen
industrial areas. Writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Philip Hanson detailed a spetsinformatsiya sys- In 1993, car manufacturer Opel, the German divitem in which 12 industrial branch ministries formulated sion of General Motors, accused Volkswagen of indusrequests for information to aid technological development trial espionage after Opels chief of production, Jose
in their military programs. Acquisition plans were de- Ignacio Lopez, and seven other executives moved to
scribed as operating on 2 year and 5 year cycles with Volkswagen.[14] Volkswagen subsequently threatened to
about 3000 tasks under way each year. Eorts were sue for defamation, resulting in a four-year legal battle.[14]
aimed at civilian as well as military industrial targets, such The case, which was nally settled in 1997, resulted in
as in the petrochemical industries. Some information was one of the largest settlements in the history of industrial
garnered so as to compare levels of competitor to Soviet espionage, with Volkswagen agreeing to pay General Motechnological advancement. Much unclassied informa- tors $100 million and to buy at least $1 billion of car parts
tion was also gathered, blurring the boundary with com- from the company over 7 years, although it did not explicpetitive intelligence.[32]
itly apologize for Lopezs behavior.[43]

102

19.8.3

CHAPTER 19. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

Hilton and Starwood

In April 2009 the US based hospitality company

Starwood accused its rival Hilton of a massive case of
industrial espionage. After being purchased by private
equity group Blackstone, Hilton employed 10 managers
and executives from Starwood. Under intense pressure to
improve prots, Starwood accused Hilton of stealing corporate information relating to its luxury brand concepts,
used in setting up its own Denizen hotels. Specically,
former head of its luxury brands group, Ron Klein, was
accused of downloading truckloads of documents from
a laptop to his personal email account.[44]

19.8.4

GhostNet

viduals or organised criminals, the level of sophistication

of the attack was thought to have been more typical of
a nation state.[46] Some commentators speculated as to
whether the attack was part of what is thought to be a
concerted Chinese industrial espionage operation aimed
at getting high-tech information to jump-start Chinas
economy.[51] Critics pointed to what was alleged to be
a lax attitude to the intellectual property of foreign businesses in China, letting them operate but then seeking to
copy or reverse engineer their technology for the benet of Chinese national champions.[52] In Googles case,
they may have (also) been concerned about the possible
misappropriation of source code or other technology for
the benet of Chinese rival Baidu. In March 2010 Google
subsequently decided to cease oering censored results in
China, leading to the closing of its Chinese operation.

GhostNet was a vast surveillance system reported by

Canadian researchers based at the University of Toronto
in March 2009. Using targeted emails it compromised 19.8.6 CyberSitter and Green Dam
thousands of computers in governmental organisations,
enabling attackers to scan for information and transfer The US based rm CyberSitter announced in January
this back to a digital storage facility in China.[45]
2010 that it was suing the Chinese government, and other
US companies, for stealing its anti pornography software,
with the accusation that it had been incorporated into
19.8.5 Google and Operation Aurora
Chinas Green Dam program, used by the state to censor childrens internet access. CyberSitter accused Green
On 13 January 2010, Google Inc. announced that oper- Dam creators as having copied around 3000 lines of code.
ators, from within China, had hacked into their Google They were described as having done 'a sloppy job of copyChina operation, stealing intellectual property and, in ing,' with some lines of the copied code continuing to diparticular, accessing the email accounts of human rights rect people to the CyberSitter website. The attorney actactivists.[46][47] The attack was thought to have been part ing for CyberSitter maintained I don't think I have ever
of a more widespread cyber attack on companies within seen such clear-cut stealing.[53]
China which has become known as Operation Aurora.[47]
Intruders were thought to have launched a zero-day attack, exploiting a weakness in the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser, the malware used being a modication of 19.8.7 USA v. Lan Lee, et al.
the trojan Hydraq.[24] Concerned about the possibility
of hackers taking advantage of this previously unknown
The United States charged two former NetLogic Inc. enweakness in Internet Explorer, the governments of Gergineers, Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge, of committing ecomany and, subsequently France, issued warnings not to
nomic espionage against TSMC and NetLogic, Inc. A
use the browser.[48]
jury acquitted the defendants of the charges with regard
There was speculation that insiders had been involved to TSMC and deadlocked on the charges with regard to
in the attack, with some Google China employees being NetLogic. In May 2010, a federal judge dismissed all the
denied access to the companys internal networks after espionage charges against the two defendants. The judge
the companys announcement.[49][50] In February 2010, ruled that the U.S. Government presented no evidence of
computer experts from the U.S. National Security Agency espionage.[54]
claimed that the attacks on Google probably originated
from two Chinese universities associated with expertise in
computer science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the
Shandong Lanxiang Vocational School, the latter having 19.8.8 Dongxiao Yue and Chordiant Softclose links to the Chinese military.[45]
ware, Inc.
Google claimed at least 20 other companies had also been
targeted in the cyber attack, said by the London Times,
to have been part of an ambitious and sophisticated attempt to steal secrets from unwitting corporate victims
including defence contractors, nance and technology
companies.[47][46][48] Rather than being the work of indi-

In May 2010, the federal jury convicted Chordiant Software, Inc., a U.S. corporation, of stealing Dongxiao Yues
JRPC technologies and used them in a product called
Chordiant Marketing Director. Yue previously led lawsuits against Symantec Corporation for a similar theft.[55]

19.10. SEE ALSO

19.9 Concerns of national governments

19.9.1

Brazil

103
most active in the use of internet spying, up to 120 other
countries were said to be using similar techniques.[63]
The Chinese government responded to UK accusations of
economic espionage by saying that the report of such activities was 'slanderous and that the government opposed
hacking which is prohibited by law.[64]

Revelations from the Snowden documents have provided

information to the eect that the United States, notably vis--vis the NSA, has been conducting aggressive 19.9.4 Germany
economic espionage against Brazil.[56] Canadian intelligence has apparently supported U.S. economic espionage German counter-intelligence experts have maintained
the German economy is losing around 53 billion or
eorts.[57]
the equivalent of 30,000 jobs to economic espionage
yearly.[65]

19.9.2

United States

According to Edward Snowden, The National Security

Agency spies on foreign companies.[58] A recent report to
the US government, by aerospace and defense company
Northrop Grumman, describes Chinese economic espionage as comprising the single greatest threat to U.S.
technology.[22] Joe Stewart, of SecureWorks, blogging
on the 2009 cyber attack on Google, referred to a persistent campaign of 'espionage-by-malware' emanating from
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)" with both corporate and state secrets being Shanghaied over the past 5
or 6 years.[59] The Northrop Grumann report states that
the collection of US defense engineering data through cyberattack is regarded as having saved the recipient of
the information years of R&D and signicant amounts
of funding.[22] Concerns about the extent of cyberattacks
on the US emanating from China has led to the situation
being described as the dawn of a new cold cyberwar.[60]
In response to these and other reports, Amitai Etzioni
of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has
suggested that China and the United States should agree
to a policy of mutually assured restraint with respect to
cyberspace. This would involve allowing both states to
take the measures they deem necessary for their selfdefense while simultaneously agreeing to refrain from
taking oensive steps; it would also entail vetting these
commitments.[61]

19.10 See also

NSA
Business intelligence
Competitive intelligence
Cyber spying
FBI
The American Economic Espionage Act of 1996
Trade secret

19.11 References
[1] Unusual suspects: Cyber-spying grows bigger and more
boring. The Economist. 25 May 2013. Retrieved 25
May 2013.
[2] Nasheri 2005, p. 10.
[3] Nasheri 2005, p. 73.
[4] Nasheri 2005, p. 74.
[5] Walker 1996.

19.9.3

United Kingdom

[6] The Economic Espionage Act: The Rules Have Not

Changed, Competitive Intelligence Review, July/August
1998 (PDF). Retrieved 2012-02-12.

In December 2007, it was revealed that Jonathan Evans,

head of the United Kingdom's MI5, had sent out con- [7] Competitive Intelligence, Law, and Ethics: The EEA Redential letters to 300 chief executives and security chiefs
visited Again (and Hopefully for the Last Time), Comat the countrys banks, accountants and legal rms warnpetitive Intelligence Magazine, July/September 2011
ing of attacks from Chinese 'state organisations.[62] A
(PDF). Retrieved 2012-02-12.
summary was also posted on the secure website of the
Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastruc- [8] Nasheri 2005, p. 9.
ture, accessed by some of the nations 'critical infras- [9] Scalet 2003, p. 3.
tructure' companies, including 'telecoms rms, banks and
water and electricity companies.[63] One security expert [10] Department of Defense 2002.
warned about the use of 'custom trojans,' software specif- [11] Nasheri 2005, p. 7.
ically designed to hack into a particular rm and feed
back data.[63] Whilst China was identied as the country [12] Nasheri 2005, pp. 80-81.

104

CHAPTER 19. INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

[13] Palmer 1974, p. 12.

[47] Branigan 2010.

[14] Reuters 1996.

[48] Ahmed 2010.

[15] Nasheri 2005, p. 80.

[49] Beaumont 2010.

[16] Nasheri 2005, p. 88.

[50] Reuters Shanghai 2010.

[17] Nasheri 2005, p. 82.

[51] Lawson 2010.

[18] Nasheri 2005, p. 84.

[52] Rogin 2010.

[19] Boggon 1996.

[53] Newman 2010.

[20] DeWeese et al. 2009.

[54] Levine 2010.

[21] Glover 2010.

[22] DeWeese et al 2009.
[23] Piller 2002.
[24] Lohr 2010.
[25] Nasheri 2005, p. 112.
[26] Anderson 2007.
[27] Rowe & Brook 2009, p. 84.
[28] Harris 1998, p. 7.
[29] Harris 1998, p. 9.
[30] Harris 1998, p. 8.
[31] Zelchenko, Henry L. (Feb 1952). Stealing Americas
Know-How: The Story of Amtorg. American Mercury
74 (338): 7584. Retrieved 9 November 2012.
[32] Hanson 1987.
[33] Heuertz, Ruth (April 1984). Soviet Microprocessors and
Microcomputers. BYTE. p. 348. Retrieved 23 October
2013.
[34] Palmer 1974, p. 13.

[55] Dongxiau Yue, et al., v. Chordiant Software, Inc. 2010.

[56] NSA spying on Petrobras, if proven, is industrial espionage: Rousse. Reuters. 9 September 2013.
[57] CBC
News
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
brazil-canada-espionage-which-countries-are-we-spying-on-1.
1930522. Missing or empty |title= (help)
[58] Edward Snowden says NSA engages in industrial espionage - World - CBC News
[59] Stewart 2010.
[60] Navarro & Autry 2010.
[61] Etzioni, Amitai, MAR: A Model for US-China Relations, The Diplomat, 20 September 2013, .
[62] Beware Chinese cyber spys, MI5 tells rms. Daily Mail
(London). 1 December 2007. Retrieved 1 December
2007.
[63] Blakely 1 December 2007.
[64] Blakely 5 December 2007.
[65] Connolly, Kate. Germany accuses China of industrial espionage. Guardian News and Media Limited. Retrieved
22 July 2009.

[35] Wright 1987, p. 183.

[36] Wright 1987, p. 184.
[37] Nodoushani & Nodoushani 2002.
[38] Nasheri 2005, p. 53.
[39] Nasheri 2005, pp. 53-54.
[40] New York Times: Paris 1991.
[41] Jehl 1993.
[42] John A. Nolan. A Case Study in French Espionage: Renaissance Software (PDF). US Department of Energy:
Hanford.
[43] Meredith 1997.
[44] Clark 2009.
[45] Marko & Barboza 2010.
[46] Harvey 2010.

19.12 Bibliography
Ahmed, Murad (2010-01-18).
Google cyber-attack from China
'an inside job'".
The Times.
Retrieved 2010-01-22.
Anderson, Nate (2007-05-14).
Massive DDoS attacks target
Estonia; Russia accused. Ars
Technica. Retrieved 2010-04-05.
Barry, Marc; Penenberg, Adam L
(2000). Spooked: Espionage in Corporate America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing. p.
208. ISBN 978-0-7382-0593-9.
Chinese stealth ghter jet may use
US technology. The Guardian

19.12. BIBLIOGRAPHY
(London). Associated Press. 201101-23. Retrieved 2011-01-23.
BBC,
News
(2010-09-26).
Stuxnet worm hits Iran nuclear plant sta computers. BBC.
Retrieved 2010-09-27.
Beaumont, Claudine (2010-01-18).
Google China hacks 'a possible inside job'". The Daily Telegraph
(London). Retrieved 2010-01-30.
Blakely, Rhys (2007-12-01). MI5
alert on Chinas cyberspace spy
threat. The Times. Retrieved
2010-01-30.
Blakely,
Rhys (2007-12-05).
China says it is cyber-espionage
victim. The Times. Retrieved
2010-01-30.
Boggon, Steve (1996-01-01). The
spy who loved me (and my laptop)". The Independent (London).
Retrieved 2010-02-13.
Branigan, Tania (2010-01-13).
Google to end censorship in China
over cyber attacks. The Guardian
(London). Retrieved 2010-01-22.
Clark, Andrew (2009-04-17).
Starwood sues Hilton for 'stealing
trade secrets".
The Guardian
(London). Retrieved 2010-02-24.
Connolly, Kate (2009-07-22).
Germany accuses China of industrial espionage. The Guardian
(London). Retrieved 2010-01-18.
DeWeese, Steve; Krekel, Bryan;
Bakos, George; Barnet, Christopher (9 October 2009). Capability
of the Peoples Republic of Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer
Network Exploitation: Prepared for
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (PDF).
McLean, Virginia, USA: Northrop
Grumman Corporation.
Dongxiau Yue, et al., v. Chordiant
Software, Inc., No. C08-00019
JW U.S. (In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California San Jose Division. 2010-05-14).
Fink, Steven (2002). Sticky Fingers:
Managing the Global Risk of Economic Espionage. Chicago: Dearborn Trade. p. 368. ISBN 978-07931-4827-1.
Fitchett, Joseph (1995-07-19).
French Report Accuses U.S. of

105
Industrial Sabotage Campaign.
New York Times.
Retrieved
2010-02-13.
Glover,
Tony (2010-01-17).
Chinese hackers blamed for cyber
attack wave.
This is Money.
Retrieved 2010-01-31.
Guynn, Jessica (2010-01-15).
Chinese hackers pose a growing
threat to U.S. rms. Los Angeles
Times. Retrieved 2010-01-31.
Hanson, Philip (April 1987),
Soviet industrial espionage,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 43
(3): 2529
Byron, Betty (2013). The Iris
Covenant. New York: Tate Publishing. p. 454. ISBN 978-162295-014-0.
Harris, John (1998). Industrial Espionage and Technology Transfer:
Britain and France in the Eighteenth
Century. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited. p. 680. ISBN 07546-0367-9.
Harvey,
Mike (2010-01-16).
China accused of cyber attack
on Google and 'global industrial
targets". The Times. Retrieved
2010-01-30.
Helft, Miguel; Marko, John
(2010-01-13).
In Rebuke of
China, Focus Falls on Cybersecurity. New York Times. Retrieved
2010-01-30.
Javers, Eamon (2010). Broker,
Trader, Lawyer, Spy: The Secret World of Corporate Espionage.
New York: Harper Collins Business. p. 320. ISBN 978-0-06169720-3.
Jehl, Douglas (1993-04-30). U.S.
Expanding Its Eort to Halt Spying
by Allies. New York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13.
Keizer,
Gregg (2010-12-09).
Pro-WikiLeaks
cyber
army
gains strength; thousands join
DDoS attacks. Computer World.
Retrieved 2010-12-11.
Kennedy, John (2010-12-10). Is
your kid part of the Operation Payback army?". Silicon Republic.
Retrieved 2010-12-11.
Lawson, Dominic (2010-01-17).
Be afraid, China, the Google

106

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dragon stirs. The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-22.
Levine,
Dan
(2010-05-24).
Federal Judge_Trashes Novel Economic Espionage Case Federal
Judge Trashes Novel Economic
Espionage Case.
Law.com.
Retrieved 2010-12-11.
Lawson, Dominic (2010-01-17).
Be afraid, China, the Google
dragon stirs. The Times. Retrieved 2010-01-22.
Lohr,
Steve
(2010-01-18).
Companies Fight Endless War
Against Computer Attacks. New
York Times. Retrieved 2010-0122.
Marko, John; Barboza, David
(2010-02-18). 2 China Schools
Said to Be Tied to Online Attacks.
The New York Times. Retrieved
2010-04-06.
Macartney, Jan (2010-02-09).
Chinese police arrest six as hacker
training website is closed down.
The Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13.
Meredith, Robyn (1997-01-09).
VW Agrees To Pay G.M. $100
Million in Espionage Suit. New
York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-24.
Murphy, Samantha (2010-12-09).
WikiLeaks Hactivism is Not Cyberwarfare, Experts Say. Tech
News Daily. Retrieved 2010-1211.
Nasheri, Hedieh (2005). Economic
Espionage and Industrial Spying.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. p. 270. ISBN 0-521-543711.
Navarro, Peter; Autry, Greg (201001-15). Chinas war on the U.S.
economy. San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved 2010-01-31.
Newman, Alex (2010-01-07).
Communist Pirates Stealing For
Censorship?". The John Birch
Society. Retrieved 2010-01-31.
New York Times, Archive (no author) (1991-09-14). Air France
Denies Spying on Travellers. New
York Times. Retrieved 2010-02-13.
Nodoushani, Omid; Nodoushani,
Patricia A (April 2002), Industrial
Espionage: The Dark Side of the
Digital Age"", Competitiveness
Review: An International Business

Journal incorporating Journal of

Global Competitiveness 12 (2),
doi:10.1108/eb046445
Oce of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications, and Intelligence)
(2002 Fiscal Year). Annual Polygraph Report to Congress. Department of Defense. Retrieved
2010-04-03. Check date values in:
|date= (help)
Palmer, Raymond (1974), Espionage threat to British industry:
Spies don't only operate in books
and lms. They can be for real.
And their target might be your industrial secrets, Industrial Management and Data Systems 74 (7/8)
Piller,
Charles (2002-07-08).
Hackers Target Energy Industry.
Los Angeles Times.
Retrieved
2010-02-24.
Pitorri, Peter (2010). Counterespionage for American Business.
Chicago: Butterworth-Heinemann
Limited. p. 144. ISBN 978-07506-7044-9.
Reuters
(1996-05-12).
Volkswagen Sues GM for $6.6
Million, Accusing U.S. Firm of
Defamation. Los Angeles Times.
Retrieved 2010-02-24.
Shanghai, Reuters (2010-01-13).
Google probes possible inside help
on China attack. The Globe and
Mail (Toronto). Retrieved 201001-22.
Rogin,
Josh
(2010-01-14).
Chinas expansion of economic
espionage boils over. Foreign
Policy. Retrieved 2010-04-05.
Rowe, William; Brook, Timothy
(2009). Chinas Last Empire: The
Great Qing.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press. p. 368.
ISBN 0-674-03612-3.
Rustmann, F.W. Jr. (2002). CIA,
INC.: Espionage and the Craft of
Business Intelligence. Dulles, VA:
Potomac Books. p. 240. ISBN
978-1-57488-520-0.
Scalet, Sarah D (1 May 2003).
Corporate Spying: Snooping, by
Hook or by Crook (WEB PAGE).

19.13. EXTERNAL LINKS

CSO Security and Risk. Retrieved
2010-03-21.
Stewart,
Joe
(2010-01-20).
Operation Aurora: Clues in the
Code. Secureworks - The information security experts. Retrieved
2010-01-23.
Swinford, Steven (2010-12-10).
WikiLeaks hackers threaten
British Government. The Daily
Telegraph (London).
Retrieved
2010-12-11.
Walker,
Nick (1996-01-01).
Marketing:
Know your enemy. The Independent (London).
Retrieved 2010-02-13.
Winker, Ira. (1997). Corporate
Espionage: What It Is, Why Its
Happening in Your Company, What
You Must Do About It. Darby, PA:
Darby, PA. p. 240. ISBN 978-07881-6529-0.
Wright, Peter (1987). Spycatcher.
New York: Viking. p. 270. ISBN
0-521-54371-1.

19.13 External links

Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A
Model-Based Analysis
Spooky Business: Corporate Espionage Against
Nonprot Organizations
Spooky Business: U.S. Corporations Enlist ExIntelligence Agents to Spy on Nonprot Groups
Pt 2: U.S. Corporations Enlist Ex-Intelligence
Agents to Spy on Nonprot Groups
Corporate Espionage Undermines Democracy
Intelligence Online Investigative news and reporting on industrial espionage and business intelligence
(subscription and pay-per-article site)

107

Chapter 20

Intelligence assessment
This article is about evaluating sensitive state, military, The RFI may indicate in what format the requester prefers
commercial, or scientic information. For other uses, to consume the product.
see Intelligence (disambiguation).
The RFI is reviewed by a Requirements Manager, who
will then direct appropriate tasks to respond to the reIntelligence assessment is the development of forecasts quest. This will involve a review of existing material, the
of behavior or recommended courses of action to the tasking of new analytical product or the collection of new
leadership of an organization, based on a wide range of information to inform an analysis.
available information sources both overt and covert. As- New information may be collected through one or more
sessments are developed in response to requirements de- of the various collection disciplines; human source,
clared by the leadership in order to inform decision mak- electronic and communications intercept, imagery or
ing. Assessment may be carried out on behalf of a state, open sources. The nature of the RFI and the urgency
military or commercial organization with a range of avail- placed on it may indicate that some collection types are
able sources of information available to each.
unsuitable due to the time taken to collect or validate
An intelligence assessment reviews both available information and previous assessments for relevance and currency. Where additional information is required, some
collection may be directed by the analyst.

the information gathered. Intelligence gathering disciplines and the sources and methods used are often highly
classied and compartmentalized, with analysts requiring
an appropriate high level of security clearance.
The process of taking known information about situations and entities of importance to the RFI, characterizing
what is known and attempting to forecast future events
is termed all source assessment, analysis or processing. The analyst uses multiple sources to mutually corroborate, or exclude, the information collected, reaching
a conclusion along with a measure of condence around
that conclusion.

20.1 Process

Where sucient current information already exists, the

analysis may be tasked directly without reference to further collection.
The analysis is then communicated back to the requester
in the format directed, although subject to the constraints
on both the RFI and the methods used in the analysis, the
format may be made available for other uses as well and
disseminated accordingly. The analysis will be written
to a dened classication level with alternative versions
potentially available at a number of classication levels
for further dissemination.

The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence assessment is based on a customer requirement or need, which may be a standing requirement or
tailored to a specic circumstance or a Request for Information (RFI). The requirement is passed to the assessing agency and worked through the intelligence cycle, a
structured method for responding to the RFI.
108

20.4. FURTHER READING

109
Andrew, Christopher. For the Presidents Eyes Only:
Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from
Washington to Bush (1996)
Black, Ian and Morris, Benny Israels Secret Wars:
A History of Israels Intelligence Services (1991)
Bungert, Heike et al. eds. Secret Intelligence in the
Twentieth Century (2003) essays by scholars
Dulles, Allen W. The Craft of Intelligence: Americas Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of
Intelligence Gathering for a Free World (2006)

Target-centric intelligence cycle

20.2 Target-centric intelligence cycle

Where the subject of the assessment is clearly identiable and provisions exist to make some form of intervention against that subject, the target-centric assessment approach may be used. This approach, known as F3EA, is
complementary to the intelligence cycle and focused on
the intervention itself.
The subject for action, or target, is identied and efforts are initially made to nd the target for further development. This activity will identify where intervention
against the target will have the most benecial eects.
When the decision is made to intervene, action is taken to
x the target, conrming that the intervention will have
a high probability of success and restricting the ability of
the target to take independent action.
During the nish stage, the intervention is executed, potentially an arrest or detention or the placement of other
collection methods.
Following the intervention, exploitation of the target is
carried out, which may lead to further renement of the
process for related targets. The output from the exploit
stage will also be passed into other intelligence assessment activities.

20.3 See also

Intelligence cycle
List of intelligence gathering disciplines

Kahn, David The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient
Times to the Internet (1996), 1200 pages
Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds.
Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security
(2003), 1100 pages. 850 articles, strongest on technology
Odom, Gen. William E. Fixing Intelligence: For
a More Secure America, Second Edition (Yale Nota
Bene) (2004)
O'Toole, George. Honorable Treachery: A History
of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, Covert Action from
the American Revolution to the CIA (1991)
Owen, David. Hidden Secrets: A Complete History
of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It
(2002), popular
Richelson, Jeery T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence
in the Twentieth Century (1997)
Richelson, Jeery T. The U.S. Intelligence Community (4th ed. 1999)
Shulsky, Abram N. and Schmitt, Gary J. Silent
Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence
(3rd ed. 2002), 285 pages
West, Nigel. MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service
Operations 19091945 (1983)
West, Nigel. Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britains
Wartime Sabotage Organization (1992)
Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and
Decision (1962)
World War I

Military intelligence
Surveillance

20.4 Further reading

Surveys

Beesly, Patrick. Room 40. (1982). Covers the

breaking of German codes by RN intelligence, including the Turkish bribe, Zimmermann telegram,
and failure at Jutland.
May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing Ones Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (1984)

110

CHAPTER 20. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram

(1966)

Ambrose, Stephen E. Ikes Spies: Eisenhower and the

Intelligence Establishment (1981).

Yardley, Herbert O. American Black Chamber

(2004)

Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin. The

Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and
the Secret History of the KGB (1999)

World War II 19311945

Babington Smith, Constance. Air Spy: the Story of
Photo Intelligence in World War II (1957) - originally
published as Evidence in Camera in the UK
Beesly, Patrick. Very Special Intelligence: the Story
of the Admiraltys Operational Intelligence Centre,
19391945 (1977)
Hinsley, F. H. British Intelligence in the Second
World War (1996) (abridged version of multivolume
ocial history)

Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky. KGB:

The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin
to Gorbachev (1990).
Bogle, Lori, ed. Cold War Espionage and Spying
(2001), essays by scholars
Boiling, Graham. Secret Students on Parade: Cold
War Memories of JSSL, CRAIL, PlaneTree, 2005.
ISBN 1-84294-169-0
Dorril, Stephen. MI6: Inside the Covert World of
Her Majestys Secret Intelligence Service (2000).

Jones, R. V. Most Secret War: British Scientic Intelligence 19391945 (2009)

Dziak, John J. Chekisty: A History of the KGB

(1988)

Kahn, David. Hitlers Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (1978)

Elliott, Georey and Shukman, Harold. Secret

Classrooms. An Untold Story of the Cold War. London, St Ermins Press, Revised Edition, 2003. ISBN
1-903608-13-9

Kahn, David. Seizing the Enigma: the Race to Break

the German U-Boat Codes, 19391943 (1991)
Kitson, Simon. The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting
Espionage in Vichy France, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, (2008). ISBN 978-0-226-43893-1

Koehler, John O. Stasi: The Untold Story of the East

German Secret Police (1999)

Lewin, Ronald. The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (1982)

Persico, Joseph. Casey: The Lives and Secrets of

William J. Casey-From the OSS to the CIA (1991)

May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing Ones Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars (1984)
Smith, Richard Harris. OSS: the Secret History of
Americas First Central Intelligence Agency (2005)
Stanley, Roy M. World War II Photo Intelligence
(1981)
Stevenson, William. A Man Called Intrepid: The Incredible WWII Narrative of the Hero Whose Spy Network and Secret Diplomacy Changed the Course of
History (2009)
Wark, Wesley K. The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 19331939 (1985)
Wark, Wesley K. Cryptographic Innocence: the
Origins of Signals Intelligence in Canada in the Second World War, in: Journal of Contemporary History 22 (1987)
Cold War Era 19451991
Aldrich, Richard J. The Hidden Hand: Britain,
America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (2002).

Ostrovsky, Viktor By Way of Deception (1990)

Prados, John. Presidents Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (1996)
Rositzke, Harry. The CIAs Secret Operations: Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action (1988)
Trahair, Richard C. S. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Operations (2004), by an
Australian scholar; contains excellent historiographical introduction
Weinstein, Allen, and Alexander Vassiliev. The
Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in AmericaThe
Stalin Era (1999).

20.5 External links

Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading List
(CIA)
The Literature of Intelligence: A Bibliography of
Materials, with Essays, Reviews, and Comments by
J. Ransom Clark, Emeritus Professor of Political
Science, Muskingum College

20.5. EXTERNAL LINKS

Intelligence Online Investigative news and reporting
on intelligence activities worldwide, including secret service and industrial espionage (subscription
required).

111

Chapter 21

Intelligence cycle management

Intelligence cycle management refers to the overall acwithin a secret socio-cultural context.
tivity of guiding the intelligence cycle, which is a set
of processes used to provide decision-useful information
Intelligence errors are factual inaccura(intelligence) to leaders. The cycle consists of several
cies in analysis resulting from poor or
processes, including planning and direction (the focus of
missing data. Intelligence failure is systhis article), collection, processing and exploitation, analtemic organizational surprise resulting
ysis and production, and dissemination and integration.
from incorrect, missing, discarded, or inThe related eld of counterintelligence is tasked with imadequate hypotheses.
peding the intelligence eorts of others. Intelligence organizations are not infallible (intelligence reports are often referred to as estimates, and often include measures 21.1.2 Management of the intelligence cyof condence and reliability) but, when properly mancle
aged and tasked, can be among the most valuable tools of
management and government.
Main article: Intelligence cycle
The principles of intelligence have been discussed and One basic model of the intelligence process is called the
developed from the earliest writers on warfare[1] to the
most recent writers on technology.[2] Despite the most
powerful computers, the human mind remains at the
core of intelligence, discerning patterns and extracting
meaning from a ood of correct, incorrect, and sometimes deliberately misleading information (also known as
disinformation).

21.1 Overview
21.1.1

Intelligence dened

By intelligence we mean every sort of information

about the enemy and his countrythe basis, in short, of
The Intelligence Process or Cycle
our own plans and operations.
Carl Von Clausewitz - On War - 1832

intelligence cycle. This model can be applied[4] and,

like all basic models, it does not reect the fullness of
One study of analytic culture[3] established the following real-world operations. Intelligence is processed information. The activities of the intelligence cycle obtain and asconsensus denitions:
semble information, convert it into intelligence and make
it available to its users. The intelligence cycle comprises
Intelligence is secret state or group activve phases:
ity to understand or inuence foreign or
domestic entities.
1. Planning and Direction: Deciding what is to be
Intelligence analysis is the application of
monitored and analyzed. In intelligence usage,
individual and collective cognitive meththe determination of intelligence requirements, deods to weigh data and test hypotheses
velopment of appropriate intelligence architecture,
112

21.2. REQUIREMENTS

113
production phase, the information is converted into
intelligence.[5]

21.1.3 Planning and direction overview

The planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle
includes four major steps:
1. Identication and prioritization of intelligence requirements;
2. Development of appropriate intelligence architecture;
Relationship of Data, Information and Intelligence

preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders

and requests to information collection agencies.
2. Collection: Obtaining raw information using
a variety of collection disciplines such as human intelligence (HUMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and others.
3. Processing: Rening and analyzing the information
4. Analysis and production: The data that has been
processed is translated into a nished intelligence
product, which includes integrating, collating, evaluating, and analyzing all the data.
5. Dissemination: Providing the results of processing to consumers (including those in the intelligence
community), including the use of intelligence information in net assessment and strategic gaming.

3. Preparation of a collection plan; and

4. Issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies.[5]
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta described planning & direction in 2013 as: "...the development of intelligence
plans and the continuous management of their execution. Planning and direction activities include, but are
not limited to: the identication and prioritization of intelligence requirements; the development of concepts of
intelligence operations and architectures required to support the commanders mission; tasking subordinate intelligence elements for the collection of information or
the production of nished intelligence; submitting requests for additional capabilities to higher headquarters;
and submitting requests for collection, exploitation, or allsource production support to external, supporting intelligence entities.[5]

A distinct intelligence ocer is often entrusted with managing each level of the process.

21.2 Requirements

In some organisations, such as the UK military, these

phases are reduced to four, with the analysis and production being incorporated into the processing phase.
These phases describe the minimum process of intelligence, but several other activities also come into play.
The output of the intelligence cycle, if accepted, drives
operations, which, in turn, produces new material to enter another iteration of the intelligence cycle. Consumers
give the intelligence organization broad directions, and
the highest level sets budgets.

Leaders with specic objectives communicate their requirements for intelligence inputs to applicable agencies
or contacts. An intelligence consumer might be an infantry ocer who needs to know what is on the other side
of the next hill, a head of government who wants to know
the probability that a foreign leader will go to war over
a certain point, a corporate executive who wants to know
what his or her competitors are planning, or any person or
organization (for example, a person who wants to know
if his or her spouse is faithful).

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) describes an activity that synchronizes and integrates the
planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing,
exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support
of current and future operations. This is an integrated
intelligence and operations function.[5]
Sensors (people or systems) collect data from the operational environment during the collection phase, which
is then converted into information during the processing and exploitation phase. During the analysis and

21.2.1 National/strategic
Establishing the intelligence requirements of the policymakers ... is management of the entire intelligence cycle, from identifying the need for data to delivering an
intelligence product to a consumer, according to a report
by the U.S. Intelligence Board. It is the beginning and
the end of the cyclethe beginning because it involves
drawing up specic collection requirements and the end

114

CHAPTER 21. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE MANAGEMENT

because nished intelligence, which supports policy deci- sider either counterintelligence or covert action.[7] " The
sions, generates new requirements.
OODA loop developed by military strategist John Boyd,
The whole process depends on guidance from public discussed in the context of the Intelligence Cycle, may
ocials. Policy-makersthe president, his aides, the come somewhat closer, as OODA is action-oriented and
National Security Council, and other major departments spiraling, rather than a continuing circle.
and agencies of governmentinitiate requests for intelligence. Issue coordinators interact with these public of21.3.1 Budgeting
cials to establish their core concerns and related information requirements. These needs are then used to guide
The architectural design must then be funded. While each
collection strategies and the production of appropriate innation has its own budgeting process, the major divisions
[6]
telligence products ".
of the US process are representative:

21.2.2

Military/operational

Intelligence requirements are determined by the

commander to support his operational needs. The
commanders requirement, sometimes called essential
elements of intelligence (EEIs), initiates the intelligence
cycle. Operational and tactical intelligence always should
help the commander select an action.
Each intelligence source has dierent characteristics that
can be used, but which may also be limiting. Imagery intelligence (IMINT), for instance, may depend on weather,
satellite orbits or the ability of aircraft to elude ground defenses, and time for analysis. Other sources may take considerable time to collect the necessary information. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) depends
on having built a library of signatures of normal sensor
readings, in order that deviations will stand out.

National intelligence, often excluding

specically national-level military intelligence,
National-level military intelligence,
Military tactical intelligence,
Transnational intelligence, often involving law enforcement, for terrorism and
organized crime, and
Internal counterintelligence and antiterrorism.

Depending on the nation, at some level of detail, budgetary information will be classied, as changes in budget
indicate changes in priorities. After considerable debate,
the U.S. now publishes total budgets for the combination
of its intelligence agencies. Depending on the sensitivity
In rare cases, intelligence is taken from such extremely of a line item, it may be identied simply as classied
sensitive sources that it cannot be used without expos- activity,"not broken out, but briefed to full oversight coming the methods or persons providing such intelligence. mittees, or only revealed to a small number of ocials.
One of the strengths of the British penetration of the
German Enigma cryptosystem was that no information It should be possible to empower a committee composed
learned from it was ever used for operations, unless there of mid-level ocials (or aides to senior ocials) from the
was a plausible cover story that the Germans believed was intelligence and policy-making communities to convene
the reason for Allied victories. If, for example, the move- regularly to determine and revise priorities. The key is
ment of a ship was learned through Enigma COMINT, a to try to get policymakers to provide guidance for both
reconnaissance aircraft was sent into the same area, and collection and analysis, to communicate not just what they
allowed to be seen by the Axis, so they thought the result- want but also what they do not.
ing sinking was due to IMINT.
The CFR proposed a market constraint on consumers,
in which they could only get a certain amount of intelligence from the intelligence community, before they had
to provide additional funding.[8] A dierent constraint
21.3 Intelligence architecture
would be that an agency, to get information on a new
The intelligence cycle is only a model. Budgetary and topic, must agree to stop or reduce coverage on somepolicy direction are hierarchically above it. In reality, it thing currently being monitored for it. Even with this
is not a cycle, but a series of parallel activities. Accord- consumer-oriented model, the intelligence community iting to Arthur S. Hulnick, author of Whats Wrong with self needs to have a certain amount of resources that it
the Intelligence Cycle, Collection and analysis, which are can direct itself, for building basic intelligence and idensupposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly tifying unusual threats.
in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision-makers wait
for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the modern era, policy ofcials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather
than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to con-

It is important that intelligence ocers involved in articulating requirements represent both analysts and collectors, including those from the clandestine side. In addition, collection should be aected by the needs of policymakers and operators. All of this argues strongly against

21.3. INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

115

any organizational reforms that would isolate the collec- policy to sort out individual cases. One now exists; the
tion agencies further or increase their autonomy.
challenge is to make it work.
Especially in nations with advanced technical sensors,
there is an interaction between budgeting and technology. For example, the US has tended, in recent years,
to use billion-dollar SIGINT satellites, where France has
used swarms of microsatellites. The quantity versus
quality battle is as evident in intelligence technology as in
weapons systems. The U.S. has fought a stovepipe battle,
in which SIGINT and IMINT satellites, in a given orbit,
were launched by dierent agencies. New plans put SIGINT, MASINT, and IMINT sensors, corresponding to a
type of orbit, on common platforms.

At home, law enforcement should have priority and the

intelligence community should continue to face restraints
in what it can do vis--vis American citizens. The protection of civil liberties remains essential. National organizations intended for foreign operations, or military support, should operate within the home country only under
specic authorization and when there is no other way to
achieve the desired result ... Regardless, the ability of intelligence agencies to give law enforcement incidentally
acquired information on U.S. citizens at home or overseas ought to be continued. There should be no prohibition (other than those based on policy) on the intelligence community collecting information against foreign
persons or entities. The question of what to do with the
21.3.2 Policy factors
information, however, should be put before policymakers
[8]
Western governments tend to have creative tension among if it raises foreign policy concerns.
their law enforcement and national security organizations, President Harry S. Truman had legitimate concerns about
foreign-oriented versus domestic-oriented organizations, creating a Gestapo, so he insisted that the new CIA not
and public versus private interests. There is frequently have law enforcement or domestic authority. In an era of
a conict between clandestine intelligence and covert ac- transnational terrorism and organized crime, there may
tion, which may compete for resources in the same orga- not be clean distinctions between domestic and foreign
nization.
activities.[9]

21.3.3

Balancing law enforcement and na- 21.3.4 Public versus private

tional security

There is an opposition between law enforcement and intelligence, because the two entities are very dierent. Intelligence is oriented toward the future and seeks to inform policy-makers. It lives in an area of uncertainty
where the truth may be uncertain. Because intelligence
strives to protect its sources and methods, intelligence ofcials seek to stay out of the chain of evidence so they
will not have to testify in court. By contrast, law enforcements business is the prosecution of cases, and if law enforcement is to make a case, it must be prepared to reveal
how it knows what it knows.
The Council on Foreign Relations[8] recommended that
foreign policy ought to take precedence over law enforcement when it comes to overseas operations. The
bulk of U.S. intelligence eorts overseas are devoted to
traditional national security concerns; as a result, law enforcement must ordinarily be a secondary concern. FBI
and DEA agents operating abroad should not be allowed
to act independently of either the ambassador or the CIA
lest pursuit of evidence or individuals for prosecution
cause major foreign policy problems or complicate ongoing intelligence and diplomatic activities. (The same
should hold for any Defense Department personnel involved in intelligence activity overseas.) There are likely
to be exceptions, and a degree of case-by-case decisionmaking will be inevitable. What is needed most is a
Washington-based interagency mechanism involving ofcials from intelligence, law enforcement, and foreign

During the Cold War, national security was a federal

government monopoly. To be sure, private citizens and
corporations were involved, but there was a neat correspondence between the threat as dened and the federal
governments national security machinery that was developed to meet that threat. The war against terrorism and
homeland security will be much less a federal government monopoly. Citizens of democracies and the economy are already suering the inconvenience and higher
business costs of much tighter security. And tragically,
more ordinary citizens are likely to die from transnational
terrorism."(Treverton 2003)

Public and private interests can both complement and

conict when it comes to economic intelligence. Multination corporations usually have a form of capable intelligence capabilities in their core business. Lloyds of
London has extensive knowledge of maritime aairs. Oil
companies have extensive information on world resources
and energy demands. Investment banks can track capital
ow.
These intelligence capabilities become especially dicult when private organizations seek to use national capabilities for their private benet. Sometimes, a quid
pro quo may be involved. Secret economic information
can be collected by several means-mostly SIGINT and
HUMINT. The more sensitive reconnaissance satellites
may not be needed to get substantially correct imagery.
Earth resources satellites may give adequate, or even better detailreconnaissance satellites tend not to have the

116

CHAPTER 21. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE MANAGEMENT

multispectral scanners that are best for agricultural or

other economic information.
The private sector may already have good information
on trade policy, resources, foreign exchange, and other
economic factors. This may not be open source in the
sense of being published, but can be reliably bought from
research rms that may not have the overhead of allsource security. The intelligence agencies can use their
all-source capability for verication, rather than original
collection. Intelligence agencies, working with national
economic and diplomatic employees, can develop policy
CCIRM takes information requests and routes them to collection
alternatives for negotiators.
One subtle aspect of the role of economic intelligence
is the interdependence of the continental and world
economies. The economic health of Mexico clearly affects the United States, just as the Turkish economy is
of concern to the European Community. In a post-Cold
War environment, the roles of Russia and China are still
evolving. Japan, with a history of blurred lines between
industry and government, may regard a policy (for them)
as perfectly ethical, which would be questionable in North
America or Eastern Europe. New groupings such as the
Shanghai Cooperative Organization are principally economic. Economic measures also may be used to pressure specic countriesfor example, South Africa while
it sustained a policy of apartheid, or Sudan while there is
widespread persecution in Darfur.

21.4 Collection planning

Collection planning matches anticipated collection requirements with collection capabilities at multiple organizational levels (e.g., national, geographic theater, or specic military entities). It is a continuous process that coordinates and integrates the eorts of all collection units
and agencies. This multi-level collaboration helps identify collection gaps and redundant coverage in a timely
manner to optimize the employment of all available collection capabilities.[5]

21.4.1

CCIRM

The collection coordination intelligence requirements

management (CCIRM) system is the NATO doctrine
for intelligence collection management, although it differs from U.S. doctrine.[10] From the U.S. perspective,
CCIRM manages requests for information (RFI), rather
than the collection itself, which has caused some friction when working with U.S. collection assets. Within
NATO, requests for information owed through the chain
of command to the CCIRM manager. Where the U.S.
sees collection management as a push or proactive process, NATO sees this as pull or reactive.

elements

the force commander. Senior NATO commanders receive intelligence information in the form of briengs,
summaries, reports and other intelligence estimates. According to authors Roberto Desimone and David Charles,
Battleeld commanders receive more specic documents, entitled intelligence preparation of the battleeld
(IPB). While these reports and briengs convey critical
information, they lack the full context in which the intelligence cell assembled them. In coalition warfare, not all
sources may be identied outside that cell. Even though
the material presented gives key information and recommendations, and assumptions for these interpretations
are given, the context "...not in a strong evidential sense,
pointing exactly to the specic intelligence information
that justies these interpretations. As a result, it is not always easy for the commander to determine whether a particular interpretation has been compromised by new intelligence information, without constant interaction with
the intelligence analysts. Conversely, security constraints
may prevent the analyst from explaining exactly why a
particular command decision might compromise existing intelligence gathering operations. As a result, most
of the detailed intelligence analyses, including alternative
hypotheses and interpretations, remain in the heads of intelligence ocers who rely on individual communication
skills to present their brief and keep the commander informed when the situation changes.[11]
Experience in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrated strain between CCIRM and U.S. procedures, although the organizations learned by experience. Operation Joint Endeavor
began in 1995, with Operation Deliberate Force going to
a much higher level of combat. Operation Allied Force,
a more intense combat situation in Kosovo, began on 24
March 1999.
At the highest level of direction, rational policies, the effects of personalities, and culture can dominate the assignments given to the intelligence services.

Another aspect of analysis is the balance between current

intelligence and long-term estimates. For many years, the
culture of the intelligence community, in particular that
In NATO doctrine, CCIRM joins an intelligence analy- of the CIA, favored the estimates. However, it is in longsis (including fusion) to provide intelligence services to term analysis of familiar subjects and broad trends where

21.6. OTHER TOPICS

secret information tends to be less critical and government analysts are, for the most part, no better and often not as good as their counterparts in academia and
the private sector. Also, many estimates are likely to be
less relevant to busy policy-makers, who must focus on
the immediate. To the extent long-term estimates are
produced, it is important that they be concise, written
by individuals, and that sources justifying conclusions be
shown as they would in any academic work. If the project
is a group eort, dierences among participants need to
be sharpened and acknowledged. While it is valuable to
point out consensus, it is more important that areas of dispute be highlighted than that all agencies be pressured to
reach a conclusion that may represent a lowest common
denominator.[8]

117

21.6.1 Political misuse

There has been a great amount of political abuse of intelligence services in totalitarian states, where the use
of what the Soviets called the organs of state security would take on tasks far outside any intelligence
mission.[12]
The danger of politicization-the potential for the intelligence community to distort information or judgment in
order to please political authorities-is real. Moreover, the
danger can never be eliminated if intelligence analysts are
involved, as they must be, in the policy process. The challenge is to develop reasonable safeguards while permitting intelligence producers and policy-making consumers
to interact.[8]

21.5 Issuance of orders and re- 21.6.2 Clandestine intelligence

covert action
quests

versus

Clandestine and covert operations share many attributes,

but also have distinct dierences. They may share, for example, a technical capability for cover and forgery, and
require secret logistical support. The essence of covert
action is that its sponsor cannot be proven. One term
of art is that the sponsor has plausible deniability. In
some cases, such as sabotage, the target indeed may not
21.5.1 Prioritization
be aware of the action. Assassinations, however, are immediately known but, if the assassin escapes or is killed
Upper managers may order the collection department to in action, the sponsor may never be known to any other
focus on specic targets and, on a longer-term basis (espe- than to the sponsor.
cially for the technical collection disciplines), may prioritize the means of collection through budgeting resources See a Congressional study, Special Operations Forces
CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for
for one discipline versus another and, within a discipline, (SOF) and
[13]
Congress,
for one policy review.
one system over than another. Not only must collection
be prioritized, but the analysts need to know where to begin in what is often a ood of information.
Coordination of HUMINT and covert action
Once the intelligence eort has been planned, it can then
be directed, with orders and requests issued to intelligence collection agencies to provide specic types of intelligence inputs.

Intelligence collection priorities, while reecting both

national interests and broader policy priorities, need to
be based on other considerations. First, there must be
a demonstrated inadequacy of alternative sources. Except in rare circumstances, the intelligence community
does not need to conrm through intelligence what is already readily available. In most intelligence and operations watch centers, a television set is always tuned to the
Cable News Network. While initial news reports may be
fragmentary, this particular part of OSINT is a powerful component of warning, but not necessarily of detailed
analyses.

Experience has shown that high level government needs to

be aware of both clandestine and covert eld activities in
order to prevent them from interfering with one another,
and with secret activities that may not be in the eld.
For example, one World War II failure occurred when
Oce of Strategic Services (OSS) eld agents broke into
the Japanese Embassy in Lisbon, and stole cryptographic
materials, which allowed past communications to be read.
The net eect of this operation was disastrous, as the particular cryptosystem had been broken by cryptanalysis,
who were reading the trac parallel with the intended
recipients. The covert burglarythe Japanese did not
Collection priorities must not only be those subjects
catch the OSS team, so were not certain who committhat are policy-relevant, but also involve information
ted itcaused the Japanese to change cryptosystems, inthat the intelligence community can best (or uniquely)
validating the clandestine work of the cryptanalysts.[14] In
ascertain.[8]
World War II, the United Kingdom kept its Secret Intelligence Service principally focused on HUMINT, while the
Special Operations Executive was created for direct ac21.6 Other topics
tion and support of resistance movements. The Political
Warfare Executive also was created, for psychological

118
warfare.
HUMINT resources have been abused, even in democracies. In the case of the U.S., these abuses of resources
involved instances such as Iran-Contra and support to
the plumbers unit of the Nixon campaign and administration, as well as inltrating legal groups using a justication of force protection. British actions in Northern Ireland, and against terror groups in Gibraltar and
elsewhere, have been criticized, as have French actions
against Greenpeace. "... Contrary to widespread impressions, one problem with the clandestine services has been
a lack of initiative brought about by a fear of retroactive
discipline and a lack of high-level support. This must be
rectied if the intelligence community is to continue to
produce the human intelligence that will surely be needed
in the future.[8]

CHAPTER 21. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE MANAGEMENT

lection plan.[15]

21.7 Failures in the intelligence cycle

Main article: Failure in the intelligence cycle
Any circular cycle is as weak as its weakest component.
At one time or another, a national or organizational intelligence process has broken down, thus causing failure in
the cycle. For example, failures in the intelligence cycle
were identied in the 9/11 Commission Report.

Each of the ve main components of the cycle has, in

For a detailed discussion, see Clandestine HUMINT and dierent countries and at dierent times, failed. Policymakers have denied the services direction to work on critCovert Action.
ical matters. Intelligence services have failed to collect
critical information. The services have analyzed data incorrectly. There have been failures to disseminate intelCommon risks and resources
ligence quickly enough, or to the right decision-makers.
Clandestine collection entails many more risks than the There have been failures to protect the intelligence protechnical collection disciplines. Therefore, how and cess itself from opposing intelligence services.
when it is used must be highly selective, responding to A major problem, in several aspects of the enhanced cycarefully screened and the highest priority requirements. cle, is stovepiping or silos. In the traditional intelligence
It cannot be kept on the shelf and called upon whenever use of the term, stovepiping keeps the output of dierneeded. There must be some minimal ongoing capabil- ent collection systems separated from one another. This
ity that can be expanded in response to consumer needs. has several negative eects. For instance, it prevents one
This has become increasingly dicult for clandestine ser- discipline from cross-checking another or from sharing
vices, such as diplomats, in response to budget pressures, relevant information.
and has reduced its presence that could otherwise provide
ocial cover.
In 1996, the House Committee on Intelligence[15] recom21.8
mended that a single clandestine service should include
those components of the Defense HUMINT Service
(DHS) that undertake clandestine collection, as well. The 21.8.1
congressional concern about strategic military HUMINT,
however, may not apply to military special operations
forces or to force protection. This is not meant to preclude the service intelligence chiefs from carrying out
those clandestine collection activities specically related
to the tactical needs of their military departmental customers or eld commanders.
Clandestine HUMINT and covert action involve the only
part of governments that are required, on a routine basis, to break foreign laws. As several former DCIs have
pointed out, the clandestine services are also the DCIs
most important 'action arm,' not only running covert action programs at the direction of the president (a function whose utility we believe will continue to be important), but also in managing most the ICs liaison with foreign government leaders and security services. A House
sta report is of the opinion that analysis should be separate from both covert action and clandestine HUMINT,
or other clandestine collection that breaks foreign laws.
HUMINT is and should be part of a larger IC-wide col-

Other cycles
Boyd OODA Loop

Interactions between commanders and the Boyd loop

Military strategist John Boyd created a model of decision and action, originally for air-to-air ghter combat,
but which has proven useful in many areas of conict. His
model has four phases, which, while not usually stated in
terms of the intelligence cycle, do relate to that cycle:

21.9. REFERENCES

119

[4] US Department of Defense (12 July 2007). Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (PDF). Retrieved 2007-1001.
[5] Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence (PDF). Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC). Department of Defense. 22 June 2007. pp. GL11. Retrieved February 22,
2013.
[6] US Intelligence Board (2007). Planning and Direction.
Archived from the original on 2007-09-22. Retrieved
2007-10-22.
Interactions between the intelligence cycle and the Boyd loop

1. Observe: become aware of a threat or

opportunity.
2. Orient: put the observation into the context of other information.
3. Decide: make the best possible action
plan that can be carried out in a timely
manner.
4. Act: carry out the plan.

[7] Hulnick, Arthur S. (6 December 2006).

Whats
wrong with the Intelligence Cycle (abstract)".
Intelligence & National Security 21 (6): 959979.
doi:10.1080/02684520601046291.
[8] Council on Foreign Relations. Making Intelligence
Smarter: The Future of US Intelligence. Retrieved
2007-10-21.
[9] Treverton, Gregory F. (July 2003). Reshaping Intelligence to Share with Ourselves"". Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Treverton 2003. Retrieved 2007-1023.
[10] Wentz, Larry. Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Expe-

After the action, the actor observes again, to see the efrience, IV. Intelligence Operations. Retrieved 2007-10fects of the action. If the cycle works properly, the actor
26.
has initiative, and can orient, decide, and act even faster
in the second and subsequent iterations of the Boyd loop. [11] Desimone, Roberto; David Charles. Towards an On-

tology for Intelligence Analysis and Collection Manage-

Eventually, if the Boyd process works as intended, the

ment (PDF). Desimone 2003. Retrieved 2007-10-26.
actor will get inside the opponents loop. When the actors Boyd cycle dominates the opponents, the actor is [12] Sudoplatov, Pavel; Anatoli Sudoplatov, Jerrold L.
Schecter, Leona P. Schecter (1994). Special Tasks: The
acting repeatedly, based on reasoned choices, while the
Memoirs of an Unwanted WitnessA Soviet Spymaster.
opponent is still trying to determine what is happening.
Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-77352-2.

While Boyd treated his cycle as self-contained, it could

be extended to meet the intelligence cycle. Observation [13] Congressional Research Service (December 6, 2006).
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary
could be an output of the collection phase, while orientaOperations: Issues for Congress (PDF).
tion is an output of analysis.
Eventually, actions taken, and their results, aect the se- [14] Kahn, David (1996). The Codebreakers - The Story of
Secret Writing. Scribners. ISBN 0-684-83130-9.
nior commanders. The guidelines for the preferred decisions and actions come from the commanders, rather than [15] Sta Study, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
from the intelligence side.
House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress
(1996). IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st
Century. Retrieved 2007-10-26.

21.9 References
[1] Sun Tzu (6th Century BCE). "The Art of War". multiple
publications and translations. Check date values in: |date=
(help)
[2] Richelson, Jerey T. (2001). The Wizards of Langley:
Inside the CIAs Directorate of Science and Technology.
Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-6699-2.
[3] Johnston, Rob (2005). Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study. Center
for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
Retrieved 2007-10-29.

Chapter 22

Interrogation
For other meanings of this and similar words
(words starting Interrog...) see Interrogation
(disambiguation).

Interrogations in Jail, by Alessandro Magnasco, c. 1710

22.1.1 Suggestibility
A persons suggestibility is how willing they are to accept and act on suggestions by others. Interrogators seek
to increase a subjects suggestibility. Methods used to
increase suggestibility may include moderate sleep deprivation, exposure to constant white noise, and using
GABAergic drugs such as sodium amytal or sodium
thiopental. It should be noted that attempting to increase
a subjects suggestibility through these methods may violate local and national laws concerning the treatment of
detainees, and in some areas may be considered torture.
Sleep deprivation, exposure to white noise, and the use
of drugs may greatly inhibit a detainees ability to provide
truthful and accurate information.
A police interrogation room in Switzerland.

22.1.2 Deception
Interrogation (also called questioning) is interviewing
as commonly employed by law enforcement ocers,
military personnel, and intelligence agencies with the goal
of eliciting useful information. Interrogation may involve
a diverse array of techniques, ranging from developing a
rapport with the subject, to outright torture.

Deception can form an important part of eective interrogation. In the United States, there is no law or regulation that forbids the interrogator from lying about the
strength of their case, from making misleading statements
or from implying that the interviewee has already been
implicated in the crime by someone else. See case law on
trickery and deception (Frazier v. Cupp).[1]

22.1 Techniques

As noted above, traditionally the issue of deception is

considered from the perspective of the interrogator enSee also: Enhanced interrogation techniques
gaging in deception towards the individual being interThere are multiple techniques employed in interroga- rogated. Recently, work completed regarding eective
tion including deception, torture, increasing suggestibil- interview methods used to gather information from indiity, and the use of mind-altering drugs.
viduals who score in the medium to high range on mea120

22.1. TECHNIQUES

121

sures of psychopathology and are engaged in deception

directed towards the interrogator have appeared in the
literature.[2] [3] The importance of allowing the psychopathic interviewee to tell one lie after another and not
confront until all of the lies have been presented is essential when the goal is to use the interview to expose the
improbable statements made during the interview in future court proceedings.

watch the body language of suspects to detect deceit) has

been criticized for being dicult to apply across cultures
and eliciting false confessions from innocent people.[4]

22.1.3

Main articles: Torture and Third degree (interrogation)

The history of the state use of torture in interroga-

Good cop/bad cop

22.1.6 Mind-altering drugs

22.1.7 Torture

Main article: Good cop/bad cop

Good cop/bad cop is an interrogation technique in which

Omar Khadr pulling his hair in frustration during an interrogation by Canadian ocials, February 2003

the ocers take dierent sides. The 'bad cop' takes a negative stance on the subject. This allows for the 'good cop'
to sympathize with and defend the subject. The idea is
to get the subject to trust the 'good cop' and provide him
with the information they are looking for.

22.1.4

Pride-and-ego down

Main article: Pride-and-ego down

Pride-and-ego down is a U.S. Army term that refers to
techniques used by captors in interrogating prisoners to
encourage cooperation, usually consisting of attacking
the sources sense of personal worth and in an attempt
to redeem his pride, the source will usually involuntarily
provide pertinent information in attempting to vindicate
himself.

Half-hanging of suspected United Irishmen by government troops

in 1798

tions extends over more than 2,000 years in Europe

though it was recognized early on as the Roman imperial jurist Ulpian in the third century A.D. cautioned,
that information extracted under duress was deceptive
and untrustworthy.[5] There is no means of obtaining
the truth from those who have the strength to resist says
Ulpian, while others unable to withstand the pain will
tell any lie rather than suer it.[6]

The use of torture as an investigative technique waned

with the rise of Christianity since it was considered antithetical to Christs teachings, and in 866 Pope Nicholas
Main article: Reid technique
I banned the practice.[6] But after the 13th century many
European states such as Germany, Italy, and Spain beThe Reid technique is a trademarked interrogation tech- gan to return to physical abuse for religious inquisition,
nique widely used by law enforcement agencies in North and for secular investigations.[6] By the 18th century the
America. The technique (which requires interrogators to spreading inuence of the Enlightenment led European

22.1.5

Reid technique

122

CHAPTER 22. INTERROGATION

nations to abandon ocially state-sanctioned interroga- 22.2.1 United Kingdom

tion by torture. By 1874 Victor Hugo could plausibly
claim that torture has ceased to exist.[7] Yet in the 20th British legislation that applies to interrogation activities
century authoritarian states such as Mussolinis Fascist include:
Italy, Hitlers Third Reich, and Lenins and Stalins Soviet
Union once again resumed the practice, and on a massive
Human Rights Act 1998
scale.[7]
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
The most recent and most prominent instance of the use
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
of torture in interrogation is that of the American CIA.
After the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II,
Terrorism Act 2006
the CIA became both student and teacher of torture,
propagating torture techniques worldwide to support antiAll police ocers are trained in interview techniques durCommunist regimes during the Cold War.[8] The CIA
ing basic training, further training in detailed interviewadopted methods used by the Gestapo, KGB and North
ing or specialist interviewing is received in specialist or
Koreans from their involvement in the Korean War such
advanced courses, such as criminal investigation, fraud
as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and the use of elecinvestigation or child protection.
tric shock, and researched new ideas: so-called 'no-touch'
torture involving sensory deprivation, self-inicted pain, Military interrogation takes two forms, Tactical Quesand psychological stress.[9] The CIA taught its rened tioning or Detailed Interviewing. Tactical Questioning is
techniques of torture through police and military train- the initial screening of detainees, Detailed Interviewing
ing to American-supported regimes in the Middle East, in is the more advanced questioning of subjects.
Southeast Asia during the bloody Phoenix program, and Training for all personnel engaged in both TQ and DI
throughout Latin America during Operation Condor.[10] takes place at the Defence Intelligence and Security CenTorture also became widespread in some Asian nations tre, Chicksands.
and South Pacic nations, in Malasia, the Philippines and
elsewhere, both for interrogation and to terrorize oppo- British military personnel were found to have misused a
nents of the regime. In its pursuit of torturers across number of techniques during the detention of suspects in
the globe for the past forty years, writer Alfred Mc- Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. Investigations into
Coy notes, Amnesty International has been, in a certain these techniques resulted in the publication of policy directives that prohibited the use of hooding, stress posisense, following the trail of CIA programs.[11]
tions or wall-standing, noise, sleep deprivation and depriAfter the revelation of CIA sponsored torture in the vation of food and drink.
1970s and the subsequent outcry, the CIA largely stopped
its own interrogations under torture and throughout the During the early stages of Operation Telic in Iraq during
1980s and 1990s outsourced such interrogation through 2003 and 2004 some infantry units have been found to
renditions of prisoners to third world allies, often called have applied these techniques in contravention of standtorture-by-proxy.[12] But in the furor over the September ing orders.
11 attacks, American authorities cast aside scruples,[13] The use of torture is explicitly prohibited. However, Hulegally authorizing some forms of interrogation by torture man Rights Watch and Amnesty International have acunder euphemisms such as "enhanced interrogation"[14] cused ocers of the British Intelligence and Security Seror interrogation in depth[15] to collect intelligence on vices of being at least complicit in the extraction of inforAl Qaeda, starting in 2002.[16] Ultimately the CIA, the mation from subjects under torture by second parties.
US military, and their contract employees tortured untold thousands at Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and secret black
site prisons scattered around the globe, according to the 22.2.2 United States
Senate Intelligence Committee report on CIA torture and
the bipartisan U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee See also: U.S. Army and CIA interrogation manuals,
report[17][18] Whether these interrogations under torture Central Intelligence Agency Declassied CIA interrogation manuals, Bagram torture and prisoner abuse,
produced useful information is hotly disputed.[19]
Enhanced interrogation techniques, Pride-and-ego down
The administration of President Obama in 2009 prohiband George W. Bushs second term as President of the
ited so-called enhanced interrogation, and as of March
United States Interrogation
2012 there is no longer a nation which openly admits to deliberate abuse of prisoners for purposes of
War On Terror
interrogation.[20][21]

22.2 Around the world

During the War on Terror, torture has never been authorized or permitted for use at Guantanamo Bay detainment camp or any other U.S. Department of Defense detention/internment facility on captives, whether

22.3. RESISTANCE TRAINING

123

they are enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and unlawful 22.3 Resistance training
enemy combatants, though there have been people who
have reported being tortured at Guantanamo Bay.
Main article: Resistance to interrogation
Torture, in this context, is a war crime. Specically, a See also: Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
grave violation of the Law of Land Warfare. War crimes
are punishable under U.S. Code as well as the U.S. Code Resistance training is often a prerequisite for some milof Military Justice. There is no statute of limitations for itary personnel since prisoners of war (POWs) routinely
war crimes. Instances of criminal behavior by military, undergo interrogation.
civilian, and contract personnel of the U.S. Department
of Defense has happened and has happened with regard
to Geneva Category regarding prisoners and detainees.
for increased
Criminal behavior in this context may range from mis- 22.4 Movement
handling to abuse to torture. Military Commanders inrecording of interrogations in
vestigate rigorously any accusation of prisoner mishanthe U.S.
dling, abuse, or torture. The military continues to vigorously prosecute any such unlawful activity.
Army regulations and policy have always been clear, the Currently, there is a movement for mandatory elecof all custodial interrogations in the
torture or coercion of an enemy prisoner of war during tronic recording
[22]
United
States.
Electronic recording describes the
interrogation, or in any other circumstance, is not only
process
of
recording
interrogations from start to nish.
unlawful but also an unproductive and unreliable method
This
is
in
contrast
to
a taped or recorded confesfor gaining information. In addition, U.S. Army interrosion,
which
typically
only
includes the nal statement
gation procedures continue to stress that all detained or
of
the
suspect.
Taped
interrogation
is the traditional
captured persons will be treated as Geneva Category Enterm
for
this
process;
however,
as
analog
is becoming
emy Prisoners of War until determined otherwise by a
less
and
less
common,
statutes
and
scholars
are referduly constituted military tribunal.
ring to the process as electronically recording interU.S. Air Force General Jack L. Rives (Deputy Judge Ad- views or interrogations. Alaska,[23] Illinois,[24] Maine,[25]
vocate General) advised a U.S. government task force Minnesota,[23] and Wisconsin[26] are the only states to rethat many of the extreme methods of interrogation would quire taped interrogation. New Jerseys taping requireleave service personnel open to legal sanction in the U.S. ment started on January 1, 2006.[23][27] Massachusetts
and foreign countries.
allows jury instructions that state that the courts prefer taped interrogations.[28] Commander Neil Nelson of
the St. Paul Police Department, an expert in taped
interrogation,[29] has described taped interrogation in
Minnesota as the best thing ever rammed down our
22.2.3 Inquisition
throats.[30]
Main article: Inquisition

22.5 See also

Covert interrogation
Interrogation of Saddam Hussein
Third degree (interrogation)
Water cure (torture)

22.6 References
[1] J. D. Obenberger (October 1998). Police Deception:
The Law and the Skin Trade in the Windy City.
Inquisition torture chamber. Mmoires Historiques (1716)

[2] Perri, Frank S.; Lichtenwald, Terrance G. (2008).

The Arrogant Chameleons: Exposing Fraud Detection Homicide (PDF). Forensic Examiner. All-aboutpsychology.com. pp. 2633.

124

[3] Perri, Frank S.; Lichtenwald, Terrance G. (2010). The

Last Frontier: Myths & The Female Psychopathic
Killer (PDF). Forensic Examiner. All-about-forensicpsychology.com. pp. 19:2, 5067.
[4] Kassin, Saul; Fong, Christina (1999). "'I'm Innocent!':
Eects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception
in the Interrogation room. Law and Human Behavior 23
(5): 499516. doi:10.1023/a:1022330011811.

CHAPTER 22. INTERROGATION

[25] 223A: Recording of Interviews of Suspects in Serious

Crimes
[26] Wisconsin Supreme Court rules that all custodial interrogations of juveniles must be recorded. (In the Interest of
Jerrell C.J.) (05-3-25). at the Wayback Machine (archived
August 20, 2010) Texas Juvenile Probation Commission.
[27] New Rule 3:17 Electronic Recordation.
ciary.state.nj.us. Retrieved on 2011-03-04.

Judi-

[5] McCoy, Alfred (2007). A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Henry
Holt & Co. pp. 1617. ISBN 978-0-8050-8248-7.

[28] See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516,

53334 (Mass. 2004).

[6] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 16)

[29] Neil Nelson & Associates Home Page. Neilnelson.com.

Retrieved on 2011-03-04.

[7] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 17)

[8] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 11; 59)
[9] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 59)

[30] Wagner, Dennis (December 6, 2005). FBIs policy drawing re. The Arizona Republic. Retrieved October 16,
2013.

[10] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, pp. 18; 60107)

[11] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 11)

22.7 External links

[12] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, pp. 99, 109110)

Interrogation techniques from GlobalSecurity.org

[13] Froomkin, Dan (7 November 2005). Cheneys Dark Side

is Showing. Washington Post. Retrieved 29 March 2012.

Limits to Interrogation The Man In The Snow

White Cell, how Nguyen Tai resisted interrogation
and torture for years.

[14] Transcript of interview with CIA director Panetta.

MSNBC. 2011-05-03. Retrieved 2011-08-21. Enhanced
interrogation has always been a kind of handy euphemism
(for torture)
[15] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, p. 152)
[16] (McCoy, a Question of Torture 2007, pp. 108, 117, 120
123, 143144)
[17] Report by the Senate Armed Services Committee on Detainee Treatment. Documents.nytimes.com. Retrieved
2014-04-23.
[18] Knowlton, Brian (April 21, 2009). Report Gives New
Detail on Approval of Brutal Techniques. New York
Times. (report linked to article)
[19] Will, George (1/11/2013). Facing up to what we did in
interrogations. Washington Post. Retrieved 12 January
2013. Check date values in: |date= (help)
[20] Obama: U.S. will not torture - politics - White House |
NBC News. MSNBC. 2009-01-09. Retrieved 2014-0423.
[21] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/
16holdercnd.html
[22] New Jersey Courts. Judiciary.state.nj.us. Retrieved on
2011-03-04.
[23] Electronic Recording of Interrogations, Center for Policy
Alternatives
[24] text of the new Illinois law (SB15) requiring electronic
recording of custodial interrogations in murder case (The
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Act) at the Wayback
Machine (archived September 26, 2007)

'In the Box': Go Inside the Interrogation Room (See

what tactics police use to extract confessions from
suspects, solve crimes) from ABCNews.go.com

Chapter 23

Non-ocial cover
In espionage, agents under non-ocial cover (NOC) are
operatives who assume covert roles in organizations without ties to the government for which they work. Such
agents or operatives are typically abbreviated in espionage lingo as a NOC (pronounced knock).[1] These
agents are also known as illegals.[2] Non-ocial cover
is contrasted with ocial cover, where an agent assumes a
position at an otherwise benign department of their government, such as the diplomatic service. This provides
the agent with ocial diplomatic immunity, thus protecting them from the steep punishments normally meted out
to captured spies. Upon discovery of an ocial cover
agents secret hostile role, the host nation often declares
the agent persona non grata and orders them to leave the
country.

ocial cover: the CIA, for example, has at times been

prohibited from disguising agents as members of certain
aid organizations, or as members of the clergy.

An agent sent to spy on a foreign country might, for instance, work as a businessperson, a worker for a nonprot organization (such as a humanitarian group), or an
academic. For example, the CIA's Ishmael Jones spent
nearly two decades as a NOC.[3]

Michael Ross, a former Mossad ocer, operated as a

Mossad NOC or combatant as described in his memoir,
The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy
on the Trail of International Terrorists, Skyhorse Publishing, September 2007, ISBN 978-1-60239-132-1.

Many of the agents memorialized without names or dates

of service on the CIA Memorial Wall are assumed to
have been killed or executed in a foreign country while
serving as NOC agents. In nations with established and
well-developed spy agencies, the majority of captured
non-native NOC agents have, however, historically been
repatriated through prisoner exchanges for other captured
NOCs as a form of gentlemens agreement.

Chuck Barris made a satirical claim to have been a NOC

with 33 kills. His story was recounted in the book and
movie Confessions of a Dangerous Mind.

The degree of sophistication put into non-ocial cover

stories varies considerably. Sometimes, an agent will simply be appointed to a position in a well-established company which can provide the appropriate opportunities.
Other times, entire front companies can be established
in order to provide false identities for agents.
Examples include Air America, used by the CIA during
the Vietnam War, and Brewster Jennings & Associates,
used by the CIA in WMD investigations and made public
as a result of the Plame aair.

The journalist Udo Ulfkotte made a statement, referring

Agents under non-ocial cover do not have this safety to his past career at the German newspaper Frankfurter
net, and if captured or charged they are subject to se- Allgemeine Zeitung, that he worked as a non-ocial
[4]
vere criminal punishments, up to and including execution. cover for the Central Intelligence Agency.
Agents under non-ocial cover are also usually trained to
deny any connection with their government, thus preserving plausible deniability, but also denying them any hope
of diplomatic legal assistance or ocial acknowledgment
of their service. Sometimes, entire front companies or 23.2 Examples
strawman entities are established in order to provide false
identities for agents.
Nicholas Anderson is a real NOC who wrote an account of his service in a ctionalized autobiography (as
per British law). The original non-ction manuscript
23.1 History
breached the UK Ocial Secrets Act in 2000 and appeared in a 100 banned books list published in 2003.

Fictional examples are featured in the books Confessions

of a Dangerous Mind, Debt of Honor, Ted Bell's Pirate,
and The Eleventh Commandment; in the movies Mission:
Impossible, Spy Game, The Bourne Identity, Safe House,
and The Recruit; and the TV shows The Americans, Burn
Some countries have regulations regarding the use of non- Notice, Spooks and Covert Aairs.
125

126

23.3 References
[1] Shannon, Elaine (February 20, 1995). Spies for the New
Disorder. Time. Time, Inc. Retrieved 2008-02-19.
[2] Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques
[3] John Weisman (September 7, 2010). Tripping Over
CIAs Bureaucratic Hurdles. Washington Times. Retrieved 2010-03-19.
[4] Dr Udo Ulfkotte, journalist and author, on RT. September 29, 2014.

23.4 See also

Illegals Program
Secret identity

23.5 External links

nicholasanderson.info

CHAPTER 23. NON-OFFICIAL COVER

Chapter 24

Numbers station
A numbers station is a type of shortwave radio station
characterized by unusual broadcasts, reading out lists of
numbers or incomprehensible morse code messages.[1]
The voices are often created by speech synthesis and are
transmitted in a wide variety of languages. The voices are
usually female, although sometimes mens or childrens
voices are used. Some voices are synthesized and created
by machines; however, some stations used to have live
readers.[2] Many numbers stations went o the air due
to the end of the Cold War in 1989, but many still operate and some have even continued operations but changed
schedules and operators.

Kendall Myers with conspiracy to spy for Cuba and receiving and decoding messages broadcast from a numbers
station operated by the Cuban Intelligence Directorate to
further that conspiracy.[11][12]

The rst known use of numbers stations was during World

War I, and the rst possible listener was Anton Habsburg of Austria.[3] The numbers were most likely sent
through the use of Morse code. It is widely assumed that
these broadcasts transmit covert messages to spies. The
Czech Ministry of Interior and the Swedish Security Service have both acknowledged the use of numbers stations
by Czechoslovakia for espionage,[4][5][6] with declassied
documents proving the same. With a few exceptions,[7]
no QSL responses have been received from numbers stations by shortwave listeners who sent reception reports to
said stations, which is the expected behavior of a nonclandestine station.[8]

24.1 Suspected origins and use

It has been reported that the United States used numbers

stations to communicate encoded information to persons
in other countries.[10] There are also claims that State Department operated stations, such as KKN50 and KKN44,
used to broadcast similar numbers messages or related
trac.[13][14]

According to the notes of The Conet Project,[15][16] which

has compiled recordings of these transmissions, numbers
stations have been reported since World War I. If accurate, this would count numbers stations among the earliest
radio broadcasts.

It has long been speculated, and was argued in court in

one case, that these stations operate as a simple and foolproof method for government agencies to communicate
with spies working undercover.[17] According to this theory, the messages are encrypted with a one-time pad, to
The best known of the numbers stations was the avoid any risk of decryption by the enemy. As evidence,
"Lincolnshire Poacher", which is thought to have been numbers stations have changed details of their broadcasts
or produced special, nonscheduled broadcasts coincident
run by the British Secret Intelligence Service.[9]
with extraordinary political events, such as the August
In 2001, the United States tried the Cuban Five on the
Coup of 1991 in the Soviet Union.[18]
charge of spying for Cuba. That group had received and
decoded messages that had been broadcast from Cuban Numbers stations are also acknowledged for espionage
numbers stations.[10] Also in 2001, Ana Belen Montes, a purposes in Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton's Spy[19]
senior US Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, was ar- craft:
rested and charged with espionage. The federal prosecutors alleged that Montes was able to communicate
The one-way voice link (OWVL) dewith the Cuban Intelligence Directorate through encoded
scribed a covert communications system that
messages, with instructions being received through entransmitted messages to an agents unmodicrypted shortwave transmissions from Cuba. In 2006,
ed shortwave radio using the high-frequency
Carlos Alvarez and his wife, Elsa, were arrested and
shortwave bands between 3 and 30 MHz at a
charged with espionage. The U.S. District Court Florida
predetermined time, date, and frequency constated that defendants would receive assignments via
tained in their communications plan. The
shortwave radio transmissions.
transmissions were contained in a series of reIn June 2003, the United States similarly charged Walter

127

peated random number sequences and could

only be deciphered using the agents one-time

128

CHAPTER 24. NUMBERS STATION

pad. If proper tradecraft was practiced and instructions were precisely followed, an OWVL
transmission was considered unbreakable. [...]
As long as the agents cover could justify possessing a shortwave radio and he was not under
technical surveillance, high-frequency OWVL
was a secure and preferred system for the CIA
during the Cold War.

Others speculate that some of these stations may be related to illegal drug smuggling operations.[20] Unlike government stations, smugglers stations would need to be
lower powered and irregularly operated, to avoid location by triangulated direction nding. However, numbers
stations have transmitted with impunity for decades, so
they are generally presumed to be operated or sponsored
by governments. Additionally, numbers station transmissions in the international shortwave bands typically
transmit at high power levels that might be unavailable
to ranches, farms, or plantations in isolated drug-growing
regions.
High frequency radio signals transmitted at relatively
low power can travel around the world under ideal
propagation conditions, which are aected by local RF
noise levels, weather, season, and sunspots, and can then
be received with a properly tuned antenna of adequate
size, and a good receiver. However, spies often have
to work only with available hand-held receivers, sometimes under dicult local conditions, and in all seasons
and sunspot cycles.[10] Only very large transmitters, perhaps up to 500,000 watts, are guaranteed to get through
to nearly any basement-dwelling spy, nearly any place on
earth, nearly all of the time. Some governments may not
need a numbers station with global coverage if they only
send spies to nearby countries.

a CIA-operated transmitter in Western Europe. Penkovsky listened to these messages on

a Panasonic radiostrings of numbers read in
a dispassionate voiceand then decoded them
using a one-time pad.

24.1.1 Identifying and locating

Numbers stations are often given nicknames by enthusiasts, often reecting some distinctive element of the
station such as their interval signal. For example, the
"Lincolnshire Poacher", formerly one of the best known
numbers stations (generally thought to be run by SIS, as
its transmissions have been traced to RAF Akrotiri in
Cyprus), played the rst two bars of the folk song "The
Lincolnshire Poacher" before each string of numbers.[23]
The Atencin station was thought to be from Cuba, as a
supposed error allowed Radio Havana Cuba to be carried
on the frequency.[24]
Several articles in the radio magazine Popular Communications published in the 1980s and early 1990s described
hobbyists using portable radio direction-nding equipment to locate numbers stations in Florida and in the
Warrenton, Virginia, areas of the United States. From
the outside, they observed the stations antenna inside a
military facility, the Warrenton Training Center. The station hunter speculated that the antennas transmitter at
the facility was connected by a telephone wire pair to a
source of spoken numbers in the Washington, D.C., area.
The author said the Federal Communications Commission would not comment on public inquiries about American territory numbers stations.

According to an internal Cold War era report of the Polish Ministry of Interior, numbers stations DCF37 (3370
A 1998 article in The Daily Telegraph quoted a kHz) and DFD21 (4010 kHz) transmitted from West
[25]
spokesperson for the Department of Trade and Indus- Germany since the early 1950s.
try (the government department that, at that time, regulated radio broadcasting in the United Kingdom) as saying, These [numbers stations] are what you suppose they 24.2 The Atencin spy case eviare. People shouldn't be mystied by them. They are not
dence
for, shall we say, public consumption.[21]
On some stations, tones can be heard in the background.
In such cases, the voice may simply be an aid to tuning
to the correct frequency, with the actual coded message
being sent by modulating the tones, using a technology
such as burst transmission.

The Atencin station of Cuba became the worlds rst

numbers station to be ocially and publicly accused of
transmitting to spies. It was the centerpiece of a United
States federal court espionage trial following the arrest
of the Wasp Network of Cuban spies in 1998. The U.S.
The use of numbers stations as a method of espionage is prosecutors claimed the accused were writing down numdiscussed in Spycraft:[22]
ber codes received from Atencin, using Sony hand-held
shortwave receivers, and typing the numbers into laptop
computers to decode spying instructions. The FBI testiThe only item Penkovsky used that could
ed that they had entered a spys apartment in 1995, and
properly be called advanced tradecraft was
copied the computer decryption program for the Atenhis 'agent-receive' communications through a
cin numbers code. They used it to decode Atencin spy
one-way voice-link. These encoded messages,
messages, which the prosecutors unveiled in court.
known as OWVL, were broadcast over shortwave frequencies at predetermined times from

United States government evidence included the follow-

24.4. TRANSMISSION TECHNOLOGY

129

ing three examples of decoded Atencin messages.[10]

(Not reported whether the original clear texts were in
Spanish, although the phrasing of Day of the Woman
would indicate so.):

usually either four or ve digits or radio-alphabet letters. The groups are typically repeated, either by reading
each group twice, or by repeating the entire message as a
whole.

prioritize and continue to strengthen friendship with

Joe and Dennis [68 characters]

Some stations send more than one message during a transmission. In this case, some or all of the above process is
repeated, with dierent contents.

Under no circumstances should [agents] German

nor Castor y with BTTR or another organization on
days 24, 25, 26 and 27. [112 characters] (BTTR is
the anti-Castro airborne group Brothers to the Rescue)

Finally, after all the messages have been sent, the station will sign o in some characteristic fashion. Usually
it will simply be some form of the word end in whatever language the station uses (e.g., End of message;
End of transmission, Ende, Fini, Final, "").
Some stations, especially those thought to originate from
Congratulate all the female comrades for Interna- the former Soviet Union, end with a series of zeros,
tional Day of the Woman. [71 characters] (Probably e.g., 00000 000 000"; others end with music or other
a simple greeting for International Womens Day on sounds.[2]
8 March)
Because of the secretive nature of the messages, the
cryptographic function employed by particular stations is
At the rate of one spoken number per character per secnot publicly known, except in one (or possibly two[26] )
ond, each of these sentences takes more than a minute to
cases. It is assumed that most stations use a one-time pad
transmit.
that would make the contents of these number groups inThe moderator of an e-mail list for global numbers station distinguishable from randomly generated numbers or dighobbyists claimed, Someone on the Spooks list had al- its. In one conrmed case, West Germany did use a oneready cracked the code for a repeated transmission [from time pad for numbers transmissions.[27]
Havana to Miami] if it was received garbled. Such codebreaking is possible if a one-time pad decoding key is
used more than once.[10] If used properly, however, the 24.4 Transmission technology
code cannot be broken.

24.3 Formats

Although few numbers stations have been tracked down

by location, the technology used to transmit the numbers
has historically been clearstock shortwave transmitters
using powers from 10 kW to 100 kW.

Generally, numbers stations follow a basic format, although there are many dierences in details between sta- Amplitude modulated (AM) transmitters with
tions. Transmissions usually begin on the hour or half- optionallyvariable frequency, using class-C power
output stages with plate modulation, are the workhorses
hour.
of international shortwave broadcasting, including
The prelude, introduction, or call-up of a transmission numbers stations.
(from which stations informal nicknames are often derived) includes some kind of identier,[2] either for the Application of spectrum analysis to numbers station
signals has revealed the presence of data bursts, RTTYstation itself and/or for the intended recipient. This
can take the form of numeric or radio-alphabet code modulated subcarriers, phase-shifted carriers, and other
unusual transmitter modulations like polytones.[28]
names (e.g. Charlie India Oscar, 250 250 250, SixNiner-Zero-Oblique-Five-Four), characteristic phrases (RTTY-modulated subcarriers were also present on
commercial radio transmissions during the
(e.g. "Atencin!", Achtung!", Ready? Ready?", some U.S.[29]
)
Cold
War.
1234567890), and sometimes musical or electronic
sounds (e.g. The Lincolnshire Poacher, Magnetic The frequently reported use of high tech modulations like
Fields). Sometimes, as in the case of the Israeli radio- data bursts, in combination or in sequence with spoken
alphabet stations, the prelude can also signify the nature numbers, suggests varying transmissions for diering inor priority of the message to follow (e.g., [hypothetically] telligence operations.[30]
Charlie India Oscar-2, indicating that no message fol- For spies in the eld, low-tech spoken number translows). Often the prelude repeats for a period before the missions continue to have advantages in the 21st cenbody of the message begins.
tury. High-tech data receiving equipment is dicult to
After the prelude, there is usually an announcement of
the number of number-groups in the message,[2] the page
to be used from the one-time pad, or other pertinent information. The groups are then recited. Groups are

obtain,[31] and being caught with just a shortwave radio

has a degree of plausible deniability that no spying is being conducted whereas possessing equipment more advanced than a civilian shortwave news radio would raise

130

CHAPTER 24. NUMBERS STATION

A BBC frequency, 7325 kHz, has also been used. This
prompted a letter to the BBC from a listener in Andorra.
She wrote to the World Service Waveguide programme
complaining that her listening had been spoiled by a female voice reading out numbers in English and she asked
the announcer what this interference was. The BBC presenter laughed at the suggestion of spy activity. He had
consulted the experts at Bush House (BBC World Service headquarters) who declared that the voice was reading out nothing more sinister than snowfall gures for the
ski-slopes near the listeners home. With more research
into this case, shortwave enthusiasts are fairly sure that
this was a numbers station being broadcast on a random
frequency.[32]

Speech/Morse generator

more eyebrows and would more quickly be construed as

evidence of spying than something as harmlessly commonplace as an AM radio. Yet governments embassies,
aircraft, and ships at sea are known to possess complex
receiving equipment that could make regular use of encrypted data transmissions from the home country. These
probably include charts and photos that require more
transmitted data than can be sent eciently using spoken
numbers.

24.5.2 Attempted jamming of numbers

stations

Numbers station transmissions have often been the target of intentional jamming attempts. Despite this targeting, many numbers stations continue to broadcast unhindered. Several theories exist that aid in explaining the
inability to eectively jam the transmissions. With only
a nite number of jamming transmitters available at any
given time, it may be more ecient to block clandestine stations intended for a large audience rather than a
message intended for a single person. Another theory is
24.5 Interfering with numbers sta- that there may be a "gentlemens agreement" in place; i.e.,
We won't jam yours if you don't jam ours. In addition,
tions
the haphazard nature of some stations, e.g., not having a
xed schedule or frequency, also makes jamming more
24.5.1 Documented instances of interfer- dicult because the broadcast may go undetected.
Historical examples of jamming:
ence to broadcasts
The North Korean foreign language service Voice of Ko The YHF being jammed by the mysterious Chinese
rea began to broadcast on the Lincolnshire Poachers forMusic Station.[33]
mer frequency, 11545 kHz, in 2006, possibly to deliberately interfere with its propagation. However, Lincolnshire Poacher is broadcasting not only on one, but
24.6 Classication
on three dierent frequencies, of which the remaining
two have not been interfered and the apparent target zone
for the Lincolnshire Poacher signals originating in Cyprus Although many numbers stations have various nicknames
was the Middle East, not the Far East which is covered by which usually describe some aspect of the station itself,
these nicknames sometimes led to confusion among lisits sister station Cherry Ripe.
teners, particularly when discussing stations with simOn 27 September 2006, amateur radio transmissions in ilar traits. M. Gauman of the E.N.I.G.M.A. numthe 30 m band were aected by an English-language bers stations monitoring group[34] originally assigned a
Russian Man numbers station at 17:40 UTC.
code to each known station. Portions of the original
The late Havana Moon reported in his own publica- E.N.I.G.M.A. group moved on to other interest in 2000
tion The Numbers Factsheet in October 1990 that one and the classication of numbers stations was continparticularly dangerous station has been interfering with ued by the follow-on group ENIGMA 2000.[35] The docair to ground trac on 6577 kHz, a frequency allocated ument containing the description of each station and
to international aeronautical communications in the busy its code designation is called the ENIGMA Control
Caribbean sector. On at least one monitored transmis- List,[36] currently in its 25th edition. This classication
sion, the air trac controller at ARINC moved the pilot scheme takes the form of a letter followed by a number
to an alternate frequency as the numbers transmission was (or, in the case of some X stations, more numbers).[37]
The letter indicates the language used by the station in
totally blocking the frequency from eective use.

24.8. REFERENCES IN MASS MEDIA

question:
E indicates a station broadcasting in English.
G indicates a station broadcasting in German.
S indicates a station broadcasting in a Slavic language.
V indicates all other languages.
M is a station broadcasting in Morse code.

131

24.8 References in mass media

American television series Fringe has an episode
(season 3, episode 6) featuring a numbers station,[41]
as do the series Scandal (season 2, episode 6),
Covert Aairs (season 1, episode 2), Lost (season 1,
episode 18) and The Americans (season 1, episode
8 and season 2, episode 2), along with the podcast Welcome to Night Vale (episode 6, The Drawbridge and episode 42, Numbers).

X indicates all other transmissions such as polytones

in addition to some unexplained broadcasts which
may not actually be numbers stations.

The band Wilco named its album Yankee Hotel Foxtrot (2001) after a segment of a recorded numbers
station transmission. The recording is also sampled
in the song Poor Places on the album.[42]

There are also a few other stations with a specic

classication:[2]

The British-American action thriller The Numbers

Station, released in April 2013 and starring John Cusack and Malin kerman, features a CIA-run numbers station in the British countryside.[43]

SK Digital Mode
HM Hybrid Mode
DP Digital-Pseudo Polytone
For example, the well known, defunct Lincolnshire
Poacher station has the designation E3 (or E03), the
Cuban Atencin station has designation V2 (or V02).
The most recent station to be given a designation is the
Vietnamese language station V30.
Some stations have also been stripped of their designation
if they are discovered not to be a numbers station. This
was the case for E22 which was discovered in 2005 to be
test transmissions for All India Radio.

In Treyarch and Activision's 2010 PC/console game

Call of Duty: Black Ops, the primary character Alex
Mason is captured and programmed to understand
broadcasts from a Russian numbers station.[44]
The song 'Even Less by Porcupine Tree samples a
real numbers station at the end of the track.[45]

24.9 See also

Secret broadcast
Letter beacon

24.7 Recordings
The Conet Project: Recordings of Shortwave Numbers Stations is a four-CD set of recordings of numbers stations. It was rst released in 1997 by the
Irdial-Discs record label. Broadcast of these recordings can be heard here:

Yosemite Sam (shortwave)

UVB-76
Warrenton Training Center

24.10 References

Samples from Conet Project recordings, most idenNotes

tiably that listed as Tcp D1 3 Counting Control
Irdial are used by Scottish electronic music outt
[1] Olivia Sorrel-Dejerine (16 April 2014). The spooky
Boards of Canada on their 2002 album Geogaddi,
world of the 'numbers stations". BBC News.
most conspicuously on the track Gyroscope.[38]
Samples from the track tcp d4 11 konec konec irdial as well as tcp d2 08 the russian man d-va
northern russian voice irdial are also used by American electronic music artist Flying Lotus on his 2008
album Los Angeles.[39]
Samples from the track tcp d1 1 the swedish rhapsody irdial are used by the Alternative Rock band
Stereolab in the song Pause from their 1993 album
Transient Random-Noise Bursts with Announcements.[40]

[2] Intro to Numbers Stations. Retrieved 13 September

2014.
[3] The First Numbers Stations. The NSRIC. 30 November
2014.
[4] Lyssna p ett hemligt telegram.
http://www.
sakerhetspolisen.se/ovrigt/pressrum/aktuellt/aktuellt/
2015-01-23-lyssna-pa-ett-hemligt-telegram.html''
(in
Swedish). Skerhetspolisen.
[5] The Swedish Security Service Released Info on a Numbers Station. Retrieved 24 January 2015.

132

[6] Catinka Mannerfelt Agneskog. Spos hemliga radiotelegram (in Swedish). SvD Nyheter. Retrieved 23
January 2015.
[7] stations KKN44, BFBX and OLX Mason, Simon.
Shortwave Espionage. Retrieved 28 October 2011.
[8] Helms, Harry L. (1981). Espionage Radio Activity.
How to Tune the Secret Shortwave Spectrum. Blue Ridge
Summit, PA: TAB Books Inc. p. 52. ISBN 0830611851.
[9] E03 The LincolnShire Poacher. Retrieved 6 September
2014.
[10] Sokol, Brett (February 8, 2001). Espionage Is in the Air.
Miami New Times. Archived from the original on 200102-21.

CHAPTER 24. NUMBERS STATION

[26] In the possible case, the underlying type of encryption

might have been stated in the court record of the Atencin case when the secretly copied decryption software
was introduced into evidence.
[27] See If It Had Not Been For 15 Minutes, Chapter 7 for a
simplied explanation of decoding West German numbers
messages without a computer.
[28] Schimmel, Donald W. (1994). The Underground Frequency Guide: A Directory of Unusual, Illegal, and Covert
Radio Communications (3 ed.). Solana Beach, California:
High Text Publications, Inc. pp. 2728. ISBN 1-87870717-5.
[29] Collins, Barry W. (July 1997). The day the U.S. Army
invaded W4TLV. QST 81: 4849. ISSN 0033-4812.

[11] Rijmenants, Dirk (2013). Cuban Agent Communications (PDF). Cipher Machines & Cryptology (PDF). Retrieved 2013-12-30.

[30] NSNL 15 Voice stations. Cvni.net. 1999-07-03. Retrieved 2010-08-26.

[12] United States v. Walter Kendall Myers, United States

District Court, District of Columbia, no. xxx. (PDF).
Retrieved 2010-08-26.

[31] Even a non-standard civilian shortwave radio can be dicult to obtain in a totalitarian state. See If It Had Not Been
For 15 Minutes, chapter 6 for the problems of obtaining
a numbers station receiving radio in East Germany during
the Cold War.

[13] Helms, Harry L. (1981). Government and Military Communications. How to Tune the Secret Shortwave Spectrum. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: TAB Books Inc. p. 58.
ISBN 0830611851.
[14] Schimmel, Donald W. (1994). The Underground Frequency Guide: A Directory of Unusual, Illegal, and Covert
Radio Communications (3 ed.). Solana Beach, California:
High Text Publications, Inc. pp. 8895. ISBN 1-87870717-5.
[15] Segal, David (August 3, 2004). The Shortwave And the
Calling: For Akin Fernandez, Cryptic Messages Became
Music To His Ears. The Washington Post. p. C01.
[16] Mason 1991, pp. 56

[32] Secret Signals.

2010-08-26.

Simonmason.karoo.net.

Retrieved

[33] Chinese Music Station (WINDOWS MEDIA AUDIO).

Retrieved 2012-07-16.
[34] ENIGMA - The European Numbers Information Gathering and Monitoring Association. The NSRIC. Retrieved February 24, 2015.
[35] ENIGMA 2000.
enigma2000/''.

http://www.apul64.dsl.pipex.com/

[36] http://www.apul64.dsl.pipex.com/enigma2000/docs/
ECL.pdf

[17] Wagner, Thomas (2004). Chapter 6 So here she was

with a pillow over her head and over the radio..."". If It
Had Not Been for Fifteen Minutes... a true account of espionage and hair-raising adventure. Retrieved 30 October
2013.

[37] Friesen, Christopher (2014). Spy 'Numbers Stations still

enthrall. Radio World 38 (2): 14. ISSN 0274-8541.

[18] The Conet Project (included booklet), Irdial-Discs, p. 59.

[39] Flying Lotuss Los Angeles"". Discogs. Retrieved 25

March 2014.

[19] Wallace & Melton 2008, p. 438

[20] Secret Radio Frequencies (TXT). Retrieved 2012-0716.
[21] Pescovitz, David (1999-09-16). Counting spies. Salon.
Retrieved 2012-07-16.
[22] Wallace & Melton 2008, p. 37
[23] Mason 1991, pp. 2021
[24] William Poundstone, Big Secrets, p. 197.
[25] Bury, Jan (October 2007). From the Archives: The U.S.
and West German Agent Radio Ciphers. Cryptologia 31
(4): 343357. doi:10.1080/01611190701578104. ISSN
0161-1194.

[38] Boards of Canadas Geogaddi"". Discogs. Retrieved 9

May 2012.

[40] Stereolabs Transient Random-Noise Bursts with Announcements"". discogs. Retrieved 14 November 2014.
[41] Murray, Noel. 6955kHz Fringe. AV Club. Retrieved
October 1, 2012.
[42] Wired, 23 June 2004: Wilco Pays Up for Spycasts Retrieved 2013-02-28
[43] Matador Pictures: The Numbers Station Retrieved 201302-28
[44] Blitter and Twisted, December 1, 2010 Retrieved 201401-22
[45] Porcupine Tree - Community. Retrieved February 4,
2015.

24.12. EXTERNAL LINKS

Bibliography

133
The Numbers Stations Research and Information
Center

Mason, Simon (1991). Secret Signals The Euronumbers Mystery. Lake Geneva, WI: Tiare Publications. ISBN 0-936653-28-0. Retrieved 2013-1224.

The spooky world of the 'numbers stations", from

BBC News Magazine

Wallace, Robert; Melton, H. Keith (2008). Spycraft:

The Secret History of the CIAs Spytechs, from Communism to al-Qaeda.

Priyom website

24.11 Further reading

Havana Moon (1987). Uno, Dos, Cuatro A
Guide to the Numbers Stations (PDF). Lake Geneva,
WI: Tiare Publications. ISBN 0-936653-06-X. Retrieved 2013-12-24.
Schimmel, Donald W. (1994). 1. Numbers Stations. The Underground Frequency Guide: A Directory of Unusual, Illegal, and Covert Radio Communications (3rd ed.). Solana Beach, California:
High Text Publications, Inc. pp. 128. ISBN 1878707-17-5.
Pierce, Langley (1994). Intercepting Numbers Stations. Perth, UK: Interproducts. ISBN 0-95197834-9.
Smolinski, Chris (February 1998). Spy Numbers
Stations Have you heard them?". Popular Communications (Hicksville, NY: CQ Communications):
810. ISSN 0733-3315.
Beaumont, Paul (November 2012). Numbers Stations A Modern Perspective (Part 1)". Radio User (Poole, UK: PW Publishing Ltd): 5053.
ISSN 1748-8117.
Beaumont, Paul (January 2013). Numbers Stations
A Modern Perspective (Part 2)". Radio User
(Poole, UK: PW Publishing Ltd): 5055. ISSN
1748-8117.
Bury, Jan (October 2007). From the Archives:
The U.S. and West German Agent Radio
Ciphers.
Cryptologia 31 (4):
343357.
doi:10.1080/01611190701578104. ISSN 01611194.
Friesen, Christopher (2014-01-15). Spy 'Numbers
Stations still enthrall. Radio World 38 (2): 12, 14.
ISSN 0274-8541.

24.12 External links

ENIGMA website

Numbers stations in popular culture

Chapter 25

Ocial cover
In espionage, an ocial cover operative is one who assumes a position in an organization with diplomatic ties
to the government for which the operative works.
Ocial cover operatives are granted a set of governmental
protections, and if caught in the act of espionage, they can
request diplomatic protection from their government. In
other words, ocial cover operatives are agents ocially
recognized by their country.

25.1 See also

Non-ocial cover

25.2 References
How the CIA Works - HowStuWorks article on the
Central Intelligence Agency explaining this term.

134

Chapter 26

One-way voice link

A one-way voice link (OWVL) is typically a radio based
communication method used by spy networks to communicate with agents in the eld typically (but not exclusively) using shortwave radio frequencies.

26.2 See also

Shortwave frequencies were and are generally highly preferred for their long range, as a communications link of
1200 km is easily possible. VHF and UHF frequencies
can be used for one-way voice circuits, but are generally
not preferred as their range is at best 300 km (on at terrain). Since the 1970s infrared point-to-point communication systems have been used that oer OWVLs, but the
number of users was always limited.
This communications system often employs recorders to
transmit pre-recorded messages in real time or in burst
transmissions, which minimize the time that a spy needs
to be on the air. Voice-scrambling systems have been
selectively used for this kind of communications circuit
since the 1980s, based on operational needs.
Since personal computers became cheap and readily
available in the 2000s, time compressed voice scrambling
for one-way and bi-directional circuits is a practically free
technology.
OWVLs have existed outside of espionage, for example
the NICAM transmission system was modied in the UK
to allow for an OWVL to BBC mobile units. This OWVL
was typically used for sports events, as it was highly exible.

26.1 Historical context

During the mid- to late Cold War the STASI (the East
German intelliegence agency) used point-to-point infrared technology for 2-way voice links within the divided
city of Berlin. OWVLs were used intermittently.
OWVL transmission methods were used during the
Falklands War by UK elite forces to provide information
about suitable troop landing areas. This fact emerged in
the late 1980s when UK veterans of the war were writing
their memoirs. Argentina had access to similar technology to communicate with its military, but did not really
use it during this conict.
135

Numbers station

Chapter 27

Resident spy
In espionage, a resident spy is an agent operating within
a foreign country for extended periods of time. A base
of operations within a foreign country which a resident
spy may liaise with is known as a station in English and a
rezidentura (residency) in Russian parlance;[1][2] accordingly, what the U.S. would call a station chief, the head
spy, is known as a rezident in Russian.[1]

27.1 Types of resident spies

In the former Soviet Union and Russian nomenclature, there are two types of resident spies: legal'nye
rezidenty ( , legal resident spy) and
nelegal'nye rezidenty ( , illegal
resident spy).[1] In US parlance the same distinction is
between ocial cover and non-ocial cover.[3]

resident spies.[5] A legal resident spy has the advantage of

diplomatic status, but the disadvantage of being a known
foreigner to the host country and one of just a few ocial
diplomatic sta, whose intelligence status is thus easy for
counterintelligence agencies to discern; whereas an illegal resident spy has the advantage of being unknown as
a foreigner to the host country and one amongst millions
of the countrys ordinary citizens, but the disadvantage of
not having diplomatic immunity to fall back upon. A legal
resident spy has opportunities to meet high-level personnel of the host country as part of his/her ocial business, whereas an illegal resident spy does not. But, conversely, illegal resident spies have easier access to a wide
range of potential sources who would be put o by having
to approach and deal with an openly foreign ocial, and
indeed need not even reveal to those people what country
he/she actually works for.[6]

Furthermore: An illegal resident spy can stay in the host

country when diplomatic relations break down, whereas
legal resident spies are forced to leave with the diplomatic
mission. But a legal resident spy is easier to pay, since
his/her salary can be openly incorporated into the diplomatic payroll, whereas making arrangements to pay illegal resident spies can be dicult, sometimes involving
ruses, more expensive and complex to administer than
paying a diplomatic ocial would be, such as paying a
An illegal resident spy operates under a non-ocial cover; host country organization or corporation to allow the ilthus, he cannot claim immunity from prosecution when legal resident spy to pose as a member of its sta and be
arrested. He may operate under a false name and has doc- nominally paid by that organization/corporation.[6]
uments making him out to be an actual national or from
A legal resident spy has full and aboveboard access to
a dierent country than the one for which he is spying.[1]
embassy facilities, for secure communications, meetings,
Examples of such illegals include Rudolf Abel who opand other services; whereas an illegal resident spy has literated in the United States and Gordon Lonsdale who
tle to no access to such facilities, and communications
was born in Russia, claimed to be Canadian and operarrangements are thus more dicult and time consumated in Britain. Famous Soviet illegals include Richard
ing. An illegal resident spy will usually have a falsied
[4]
Sorge, Walter Krivitsky, Alexander Ulanovsky, and
biography; whereas a legal resident spy may suer from
Anna Chapman, who was also known as a sleeper agent.
having an ocial biography, documenting his/her diplomatic career and providing useful clues to counterintelligence services about his/her intelligence activities and
27.2 Comparison of illegal and le- connections.[6]
A legal resident spy operates in a foreign country under
ocial cover (e.g. from his countrys embassy). He is an
ocial member of the consular sta, such as a commercial, cultural or military attach. Thus he has diplomatic
immunity from prosecution and cannot be arrested by the
host country if suspected of espionage. The most the host
country can do is send him back to his home country as
persona non grata.[3]

gal resident spies

The advantages and disadvantages of legal resident spies
mostly mirror the disadvantages and advantages of illegal

27.3 References

136

27.4. FURTHER READING

27.3.1

Cross-reference

[1] Meier 2010, p. 147.

[2] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 182.
[3] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 12.
[4] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 14.
[5] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 13.
[6] Shulsky & Schmitt 2002, p. 1213.

27.3.2

Sources used

Meier, Andrew (2010). The Lost Spy. Hachette UK.

ISBN 9780297856566.
Shulsky, Abram N.; Schmitt, Gary James (2002).
Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (3rd ed.). Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN
9781574883459.

27.4 Further reading

Andrew, Christopher M.; Gordievsky, Oleg (1991).
Illegals. Comrade Kryuchkovs Instructions: Top
Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 19751985.
Stanford University Press. ISBN 9780804722285.

137

Chapter 28

Special reconnaissance
Convention of 1907,[2] or the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.[3] However, some countries do not honor
these legal protections, as was the case with the Nazi
"Commando Orders" of World War II, which were held
to be illegal at the Nuremberg Trials.

This article is a subset article under Human Intelligence. For a complete hierarchical list of
articles, see the intelligence cycle management
hierarchy.

In intelligence terms, SR is a human intelligence

(HUMINT) collection discipline. Its operational control is likely to be inside a compartmented cell of the
HUMINT, or possibly the operations, sta functions.
Since such personnel are trained for intelligence collection as well as other missions, they will usually maintain
clandestine communications to the HUMINT organization, and will be systematically prepared for debrieng.
They operate signicantly farther than the furthest forward friendly scouting and surveillance units; they may
be tens to hundreds of kilometers deeper.

US Navy SEALs conducting special reconnaissance on suspected

Al-Qaida and Taliban locations in Afghanistan, 2002.

28.1 History

While SR has been a function of armies since ancient

Special reconnaissance (SR) is conducted by small units times, specialized units with this task date from the leadof highly trained military personnel, usually from special up to World War II.
forces units or military intelligence organizations, who In 1938, the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and
operate behind enemy lines, avoiding direct combat and the War Oce both set up special reconnaissance departdetection by the enemy. As a role, SR is distinct from ments. These later formed the basis of the Special Opercommando operations, although both are often carried ations Executive (SOE), which conducted operations in
out by the same units. The SR role frequently includes: occupied Europe.
covert direction of air and missile attacks, in areas deep
behind enemy lines, placement of remotely monitored During the Winter War (193940) and the Continuation
War (194144), Finland employed several kaukopartio
sensors and preparations for other special forces. Like
other special forces, SR units may also carry out direct (long range patrol) units.
action (DA) and unconventional warfare (UW), includ- From 1941, volunteers from various countries formed,
ing guerrilla operations.
under the auspices of the British Army, the Long Range
SR was recognized as a key special operations capability Desert Group and Special Air Service, initially for service
by a former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry: in the North African Campaign.
Special Reconnaissance is the conduct of environmental
reconnaissance, target acquisition, area assessment, poststrike assessment, emplacement and recovery of sensors,
or support of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) operations.[1]

In 1942, following the onset of the Pacic War, the Allied

Intelligence Bureau, was set up in Australia. Drawing
on personnel from Australian, British, New Zealand and
other Allied forces, it included Coastwatchers and special units that undertook reconnaissance behind enemy
In international law, SR is not regarded as espionage lines.
if personnel are in uniform, according to the Hague The US Government established the Oce of Strategic
138

28.3. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS

139

Services (OSS), modelled on the British SOE, in June means of collecting technical intelligence, and usually at
1942. Following the end of the war OSS became the basis least one medical technician who can do more than basic
for the CIA.
rst aid.
During the Vietnam War, respective division and
brigades in-country trained their Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol members (now known as the Long Range
Surveillance units). However, the US Armys 5th Special Forces Group held an advanced course in the art of
patrolling for potential Army and Marine team leaders
at their Recondo School in Nha Trang, Vietnam, for the
purpose of locating enemy guerrilla and main force North
Vietnamese Army units, as well as artillery spotting, intelligence gathering, forward air control, and bomb damage
assessment.[4]

28.2 A spectrum of reconnaissance

capabilities: LRS and SR
Conventional military forces, at battalion level, will
often have scout platoons that can perform limited
reconnaissance beyond the main line of troops. For example, reorganized US Army brigade combat teams, the
new US Army Unit of Action, are gaining reconnaissance
squadrons (i.e., light battalion sized units). US Army
Battleeld Surveillance Brigades (BfSB) have specialized
Long Range Surveillance (LRS) companies.[5]
Long Range Surveillance 6-man teams (LRS) operate behind enemy lines, deep within enemy territory, forward of
battalion reconnaissance teams and cavalry scouts in their
assigned area of interest. The duration of an LRS mission
depends on equipment and supplies the team must carry,
movement distance to the objective area, and resupply
availability. LRS teams normally operate up to seven days
without resupply depending on terrain and weather.

See Special Reconnaissance organizations for national

units. All these organizations have special operations
roles, with SR often by specialists within them. Certain
organizations are tasked for response involving areas contaminated by chemicals, biological agents, or radioactivity.
Since reconnaissance is a basic military skill, special reconnaissance refers to the means of operating in the desired area, and the nature of the mission. In US Army
doctrine,[1][7] there are ve basic factors:
1. Physical distances. The area of operations may be
well beyond the forward line of troops, and require
special skills to reach the area.
2. Political considerations. Clandestine insertion also
may be a requirement. If there is a requirement to
work with local personnel, language skills and political awareness may be critical.
3. Lack of required special skills and expertise. The
most basic requirement for SR is to be able to remain unobserved, which may take special skills and
equipment. If there is a requirement to collect intelligence, skills anywhere from advanced photography
to remote sensor operation may be required.
4. Threat capabilities. This usually relates to the need
to stay clandestine, potentially against an opposing force with sophisticated intelligence capabilities.
Such capabilities may be organic to a force, or be
available from a sponsoring third country.
5. Follow-on special forces missions. This is the
concept of preparing for other functions, such
as Unconventional Warfare (UW) (i.e., guerrilla)
or Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (i.e., counterguerrilla) operations.

SR units are well armed, since they may have to defend themselves if they are detected as their exltration
support needs time to get to them.[6] During the 1991
Gulf War, British SAS and United States Army and Air
Force Special Operations Forces units were sent on SR to
nd mobile Iraqi SCUD launchers, originally to direct air
strikes onto them. When air support was delayed, how- 28.3 Appropriate missions
ever, the patrols might attack key SCUD system elements
with their organic weapons and explosives. See The Great Special forces units that perform SR are usually polySCUD Hunt.
valent, so SR missions may be intelligence gathering in
[3]
While there are obvious risks to doing so, SR-trained support of another function, such as counter-insurgency,
units can operate out of uniform. They may use motor- foreign internal defense (FID), guerrilla/unconventional
cycles, four-wheel-drive vehicles, or multiple helicopter warfare (UW), or direct action (DA).
lifts in their area of operations, or have mountaineering or
underwater capability. Most SR units are trained in advanced helicopter movement and at least basic parachuting; some SR will have HAHO and HALO advanced
parachute capability.

Other missions may deal with locating targets and planning, guiding, and evaluating attacks against them.

Target analysis could go in either place. If air or missile

strikes are delivered after the SR team leaves the AO, the
SR aspect is intelligence, but if the strikes are to be deSR will have more organic support capabilities, including livered and possibly corrected and evaluated while the SR
long-range communications, possibly SIGINT and other team is present, the SR mission is res-related.

140

28.3.1

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Intelligence related missions

Every SR mission will collect intelligence, even incidentally. Before a mission, SR teams will usually study all
available and relevant information on the area of operations (AO). On their mission, they then conrm, amplify,
correct, or refute this information.
Assessment, whether by clandestine SR or overt study
teams, is a prerequisite for other special operations missions, such as UW or FID. DA or counter-terror (CT),
usually implies clandestine SR.

Hydrographic, meteorological and geographic reconnaissance

IMINT
Basic photography[7] and sketching is usually a skill for
everyone performing SR missions. More advanced photographic technique may involve additional training or attaching specialists.
Lightweight unmanned aerial vehicles with imagery and
other intelligence collection capability are potentially
useful for SR, since small UAVs have low observability.
SR team members can be trained to use them, or specialists can be attached. The UAV may transmit what it
sees, using one or more sensors, either to the SR team or a
monitoring headquarters. Potential sensors include stabilized and highly magnied photography, low-light television, thermal imagers and imaging radar. Larger UAVs,
which could be under the operational control of the SR
team, could use additional sensors including portable
acoustic and electro-optical systems.

Mission planners may not know if a given force can

SIGINT (and EW)
move over a specic route. These variables may be
hydrographic, meteorological, and geographic. SR teams
If there is a ground SIGINT requirement deep behind encan resolve tracability or fordability, or locate obstacles
emy lines, an appropriate technical detachment may be
[7]
or barriers.
attached to the SR element. For SIGINT operations, the
MASINT sensors exist for most of these requirements. basic augmentation to United States Marine Corps Force
The SR team can emplace remotely operated weather in- Reconnaissance (Force Recon) is a 6-man detachment
strumentation. Portable devices to determine the depth from a Radio Reconnaissance Platoon. There is a SIGand bottom characteristics of waters are readily available, INT platoon within the Intelligence Company of the new
as commercial shing equipment or more sophisticated Marine Special Operations Support Group.[8]
devices for military naval operations.
Army Special Forces have the Special Operations TeamRemote-viewing MASINT sensors to determine the traf- Alpha that can operate with a SF team, or independently.
cability of a beach are experimental. Sometimes, sim- This low-level collection team typically has four men.[9]
ple observation or use of a penetrometer or weighted cone Their primary equipment is the AN/PRD-13 SOF SIGthat measures how deeply weights will sink into the sur- INT Manpack System (SSMS), with capabilities includface are needed. These however have to be done at the ing direction-nding capability from 2 MHz to 2 GHz,
actual site. Beach measurements are often assigned to and monitoring from 1 to 1400 MHz. SOT-As also have
naval SR units like the United States Navy SEALs or UK the abilities to exploit computer networks, and sophistiSpecial Boat Service.
cated communications systems.[10]
Beach and shallow water reconnaissance, immediately
before an amphibious landing is direct support to the invasion, not SR. SR would determine if a given beach is
suitable for any landing, well before the operational decision to invade.

The British 18 (UKSF) Signal Regiment provides

SIGINT[11] personnel, including from the preexisting
264 (SAS) Signals Squadron and SBS Signals Squadron
to provide specialist SIGINT, secure communications,
and information technology augmentation to operational
in
There is a blurred line between SR and direct action in units. They may be operating in counterterror roles
[12]
Iraq
in
the
joint
UK/US
TASK
FORCE
BLACK.
support of amphibious operations, when an outlying island is captured, with the primary goal of using it as a If the unit needs to conduct oensive electronic warfare,
surveillance base and for support functions. While the at- clandestinity requires that, at the very least, any ECM detack by elements of the 77th Infantry Division on Kerama vices be operated remotely, either by the SR force or,
Retto before the main battle was a large scale operation preferably, by remote electronic warfare personnel after
by SR standards, it is an early example. Operation Trudy the SR team leaves the area.[13]
Jackson, the capture of an island in the mouth of the harbor before the Battle of Inchon by a joint CIA/military
team led by Navy LT Eugene Clark, landed at Yonghung- MASINT and remote surveillance
do is much more in the SR/DA realm. Clark apparently
led numerous SR and DA operations during the Korean Passive MASINT sensors can be used tactically by the
SR mission. SR personnel also may emplace unmanned
War, some of which may still be classied.

28.3. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS

MASINT sensors like seismic, magnetic, and other personnel and vehicle detectors for subsequent remote activation, so their data transmission does not interfere with
clandestinity. Remote sensing is generally understood to
have begun with US operations against the Laotian part of
the Ho Chi Minh trail, in 1961. Under CIA direction, Lao
nationals were trained to observe and photograph trac
on the Trail.[14] This produced quite limited results, and,
in 1964, Project LEAPING LENA parachuted in teams
of Vietnamese Montagnards led by Vietnamese Special
Forces.

141
TECHINT
Capture of enemy equipment for TECHINT analysis is a
basic SR mission. Capture of enemy equipment for examination by TECHINT specialists may be a principal
part of SR patrols and larger raids, such as the World War
II Operation Biting raid on Saint-Jouin-Bruneval, France,
to capture a German Wrzburg radar. They also captured
a German radar technician.

Not atypically for such operations, a technical specialist (radar engineer Flight Sergeant C.W.H. Cox) was atThe very limited results from LEAPING LENA led to tached to the SR unit. Sometimes technical specialists
two changes. First, US-led SR teams, under Project without SR training have taken their rst parachute jump
DELTA sent in US-led teams. Second, these Army teams on TECHINT-oriented missions.
worked closely with US Air Force Forward Air ConCox told them what to take, and what that could not
trollers (FAC) which were enormously helpful in directbe moved to photograph. Cox had signicant knowling US air attacks by high-speed ghter-bombers, BARedge of British radar, and conicting reports say that the
REL ROLL in northern Laos and Operation STEEL
force was under orders to kill him rather than let him be
TIGER. While the FACs immediately helped, air-ground
captured.[18] This was suggested an after-the-action rucooperation improved signicantly with the use of remor, as Cox was a technician, and the true radar expert
mote geophysical MASINT sensors, although MASINT
that could not be captured, Don Preist, stayed oshore
had not yet been coined as a term.[15]
but in communications with the raiders.[18] Preist also had
The original sensors, a dim ancestor of todays technolo- ELINT equipment to gain information on the radar.
gies, started with air-delivered sensors under Operation
Publicising this operation helped British morale but was
Igloo White, such as air-delivered Acoubuoy and Spikepoor security. Had the force destroyed the site and re[16]
buoy acoustic sensors. These cued monitoring aircraft,
treated without any notice, the Germans might have suswhich sent the data to a processing center in Thailand,
pected what technology had been compromised. So the
from which target information was sent to the DELTA
Germans fortied their radar sites, and the British, realteams.
ising similar raids could target them, moved their radar
Closer to todays SR-emplaced sensors was the Mini- research center, TRE farther inland.[18]
Seismic Intrusion Detector (MINISID). Unlike other senA mixture of SR, DA, and seizing opportunities charsors employed along the trail it was specically designed
acterized Operation Rooster 53, originally planned as a
to be hand delivered and implanted. The MINISID
mission to locate and disable a radar. It turned into an
and its smaller version the MICROSID were personnel
opportunity to capture the radar and, ying overloaded
detection devices often used in combination with the
helicopter, bring the entire radar back to the electronic
magnetic intrusiondetector (MAGID). Combining senTECHINT analysts. The Sayeret Matkal reconnaissance
sors in this way improved the ability of individual senunit was central to this Israeli mission.
sors to detect targets and reduced false alarms. Todays
AN/GSQ-187 Improved Remote Battleeld Sensor System (I-REMBASS) is a passive acoustic sensor which Specic Data Collection
with other MASINT sensors detects vehicles and humans
on a battleeld,[17] multiple acoustic, seismic, and magSR teams may be assigned to observe and measure spenetic sensors combine modes to discriminate real targets.
cic site or enemy facility information as done for tarIt will be routine for SR units both to emplace such sengeting, but in this case for ground operations rather than
sors for regional monitoring by higher headquarters resuppression by re. Regular ground forces, for example,
mote sensing centers, but also as an improvement over
might need a road and bridge surveyed to know whether
tripwires and other improvised warnings for the patrol.
heavy vehicles can cross it. The SR may be able help
Passive acoustic sensors provide additional measure- with observation, photography, and other measurements.
ments that can be compared with signatures and used to An engineering specialist, preferably from a special opcomplement other sensors. For example, a ground search erations organization may need to augment the team.
radar may not be able to dierentiate between a tank and
SR commanders need to ensure such missions cannot be
a truck moving at the same speed. Adding acoustic inforperformed by organic reconnaissance and other elements
mation may quickly help dierentiate them.
of a maneuver force commander supported by the SR
organization, as well as other supporting reconnaissance
services such as IMINT.
For example, during the Falklands War of 1982, UK

142
Special Air Service delivered using helicopters eight 4man patrols deep into enemy-held territory up to 20 miles
(32 km) from their hide sites several weeks before the
main conventional force landings. Each man carried
equipment needed for up to 25 days due to resupply limitations (cf. the 7-day limits of conventional LRS patrols
discussed above). These patrols surveyed major centers
of enemy activity. The patrols reconnoitered Argentinian
positions at night, and then due to the lack of cover moved
to distant observation posts (OPs). Information gathered
was relayed to the eet by secure radio not impervious
from SIGINT that could locate their OPs. No common
understanding of the threat of Argentine direction nding existed, and dierent teams developed individual solutions. The value of the information and the stress on
the SR teams were tremendous. Their activities helped
the force, limited in its sensors, develop an accurate operational picture of the opposition.[7]

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Recognizability: Can the target be recognized
clearly, by SR and attack forces, under the prevailing weather, light, and in its terrain? If there are
critical points within the target, they also must be
recognizable by the means of destruction used.
Target acquisition
There are some dierences between the general and the
SR process of target acquisition: conventional units identify targets that directly aects the performance of their
mission, while SR target acquisition includes identifying enemy locations or resources of strategic signicance
with a much wider scope. Examples of dicult strategic
targets included Ho Chi Minh trail infrastructures and logistic concentrations, and the Scud hunt during Operation
Desert Storm.[19]

SR units detect, identify, and locate targets to be engaged

by lethal or nonlethal attack systems under the control
28.3.2 Oensive missions
of higher headquarters. SR also provides information
on weather, obscuring factors such as terrain masking
SR units can engage targets of opportunity, but current and camouage, friendly or civilian presence in the target
doctrine emphasizes avoiding direct engagement, con- area, and other information that will be needed in targetcentrating instead on directing air (e.g., GAPS as well as ing by independent attack systems.
CAS), artillery, and other heavy re support onto targets.
The doctrine of bringing increasingly more accurate and During Operation Desert Storm, the US senior commanpotent repower has however been evolving signicantly ders, Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf were opposed to using ground troops to search for Iraqi mosince the early days of Vietnam.[14]
bile SCUD launchers. Under Israeli pressure to send
SR units are trained in target analysis which combines its own SOF teams into western Iraq and the realizaboth engineer reconnaissance and special forces assess- tion that British SAS were already hunting SCUDs, US
ment to identify targets for subsequent attack by re Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed using US
support, conventional units, or special operations (i.e., SR teams as well as SAS.[20] The senior British odirect action or unconventional warfare behind enemy cer of the Coalition, Peter de la Billire was himself a
lines). They evaluate targets using the CARVER former SAS commander and well-disposed to use SAS.
mnemonic:[19]
While Schwarzkopf was known to generally oppose SOF,
Cheney approved the use of US SOF to hunt for the
Criticality: How important, in a strategic context, launchers.[14]
is the target? What eect will its destruction have
British teams in the
on other elements of the target system? Is it more On February 7, US SR teams joined
[21]
hunt
for
mobile
Scud
launchers.
Open sources conimportant to have real-time surveillance of the target
tain
relatively
little
operational
information
about U.S.
(e.g., a road junction) than its physical destruction?
SOF activities in western Iraq. Some basic elements
Accessibility: Can an SR team reach or sense the have emerged, however. Operating at night, Air Force
target, keep it under surveillance for the appropriate MH-53J Pave Low and Army MH-47E helicopters would
time, and then exltrate after the target is struck?
ferry SOF ground teams and their specially equipped
four-wheel-drive vehicles from bases in Saudi Arabia to
Recuperability: When the target is destroyed by re
Iraq.[22] The SOF personnel would patrol during the night
support or direct action, in the case of DA missions,
and hide during the day. When targets were discovered,
can the enemy repair, replace, or bypass it quickly
Air Force Combat Control Teams with the ground forces
using minimum resources? If so, it may not be a
would communicate over secure radios to AWACS.
viable target.
Vulnerability: do SR (including DA) and supporting
Directing re support
units have the capability to destroy the target?
Eect: Beyond pure military eect what are the political, economic, legal, and psychological eects of
destroying the target? How would the attack aect
local civilians?

SR, going back to Vietnam, was far more potent when

it directed external repower onto the target rather than
engaging it with its own weapons. Early coordination between SR and air support in Vietnam depended on vi-

28.3. APPROPRIATE MISSIONS

143

sual and voice communications, without any electronics to make the delivery precise. SR teams could throw
colored smoke grenades as a visual reference, but they
needed to be in dangerously close range to the enemy to
do so. A slightly improved method involved their directing a Forward Air Controller aircraft to re marking rockets onto the target, but the method was fraught with error.

from it he had been targeting. He passed the coordinates

to a B-52 crew, who had no way of knowing it was the
wrong position. They entered it as given, and the JDAM
ew accurately and unfortunately onto its own controllers
position.[25]

In Vietnam, the support was usually aircraft-delivered, although in some cases the target might be in range of artillery. Today, the distance to which SR teams penetrate
will usually be out of the range of artillery, but groundlaunched missiles might support them. In either case, directing any support relies on one of two basic guidance
paradigms:

Ground-aided precision strike: initial experience

Go-Onto-Target (GOT) for moving targets,

Go-Onto-Location-in-Space (GOLIS) for xed targets
For close air support, the assumption had been that
rapidly changing tactical situations, including sudden
changes in geometry between friendly forces and the target, GOT was assumed. If the attack was to be guided
from the ground, the target would be directly illuminated
with some equivalent way of putting a virtual hit me
here indication on the target, such as a laser designator.

It had long been assumed that close air support needed

direct target marking by a ground or air observer, typically with a laser. Another approach was to specify the
target in relation to a beacon. SR had laser designator capability for the GOT model, but this required they stay in
line of sight of the target possibly exposing themselves.
Another model, more precise than the smoke grenade,
was to place a radio or radar oset beacon near the target, but the SR troops still face the problem of precise
angular and distance measurement from the beacon to
the target. In the Afghanistan campaign of 2001, a new
technique was adopted, only recently believed possible:
ground-aided precision strike (GAPS).[25] To put GAPS
in practice, MG Daniel Leaf, USAF Director of Operational Requirements for Air and Space Operations said,
in 2002, If you had oered the B-1 with JDAMs in direct support of ground forces as a solution 10 years ago, I
would have laughed heartily because its not what we envisioned. The JDAMs principal guidance mechanism is
inertial, with a GPS correction option: a GOLIS model.

Oset GOLIS
A less preferred because it was much more error-prone
alternative was to put a reference point on the ground that
told the weapon hit over there in relation to my position.
A smoke grenade for instance was a reference point, but
imprecise from the air.
Oset beacons work reasonably well for direct-re helicopter and xed-wing gunships (e.g., AC-130) and for
dumb bomb drops by ghter-bombers. Oset is not as
accurate as straight-line ring, but especially when night
or weather eects limit visibility, it may be the only alternative. Oset beacons as well as passive reectors can
be used for radar attack, although it is not as accurate as
radar. Gunships typically make multiple passes with the
SR team air controller giving corrections by voice.
Oset ring is not as accurate as direct mode of re and
are normally used in poor weather conditions with the
ground commander or team leader calling misses and corrections to the aircraft. As a rule, the shorter the oset
distance, the more accurate the weapon.[23]
The early Afghanistan attempts still required voice coordination to give the bomber the coordinates.[24] This
led to one friendly re incident that killed three Special Forces soldiers and wounded 19 others. A controller
had been using a hand-held GPS receiver, whose battery failed. On replacing the battery, the unit reinitialized to show the controllers own position, not the oset

CAS and GAPS operations do not care

what color of airpower is delivering the
weapons. Certain segments of the USAF
wanted to break out the use of heavy bombers
and term it bomber CAS. However, at the
joint CAS symposium held at Eglin, the Navy
and Marine Corps were successful in not letting
the Air Force call this by a dierent name.
If heavy bombers are supporting ground
troops in the traditional CAS role, then a name
change for that aspect is not needed. [What
is being discussed, however, is a new mission:]
Precision repower called in by TACPs on the
ground [is] GAPS and [needs its own doctrine].
The situation in Afghanistan was unique; there
was not a large-standing opposing army that
was conducting maneuvers to bring repower
to bear against our forces... Airpower was
the maneuvering element that was supported
by the small re support teams on the ground.
The small ground units have been instrumental in calling in the precise air strikes [especially when Army Special Forces were augmented with Air Force combat controllers].
This emerging mission goes beyond the joint
denition of CAS.[25]

144
At rst, US Special Forces teams used COTS device,
called the Viper, which combined o-the-shelf Leica
Geosystems Viper laser rangender binoculars, with integral compass and inclinometer but no GPS, to triangulate
targets in Afghanistan. The Viper is capable of a lasing
distance from 25 meters to 4,000 meters. The unit runs
o of a commercial camera battery.

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

damage.

Reducing friendly re incidents The friendly re incident caused by human factors failures in addition to
battery replacement and reinitialization of the GPS (to
not to the target location but that of the SR team) could
have been avoided if someone on the bomber, on a comGeneral Chuck Horner, the joint air commander during mand & control aircraft, or at an operations center, had
Desert Storm, likened it to giving infantrymen a 2000 full awareness of the situation. Situational awareness in
pound hand grenade (i.e., a 2000 pound JDAM guided this case means having positive conrmation of several
bomb) from a long-range bomber loitering overhead.[26] key data:
Enhanced GAPS
In the Air Force GAPS doctrine, Army SR teams are augmented with Air Force combat controllers. While Army
SR can call in support, air force combat controllers [improved accuracy] in calling in air strikes to reduce the enemy threat and minimize the ground resistance in the battle for the Balk Valley in northern Afghanistan.
The Viper system, however, allowed communications between one team and only one aircraft. More advanced
systems allow network-centric warfare that can send the
optimal aircraft to the target, using linkages with the Joint
Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), especially the Link-16[27] variant that can send information to
ghters and Army Enhanced Position-Location Reporting System (EPLRS) terminals.
The current combined Modular Advance Reconnaissance
System (MARS) combines the Viper laser rangender,
GPS receiver, and appropriate computing and display.
The terminal controller would then transmit the coordinates via voice radio to the aircraft. Systems that give
better situation awareness are under development.

Basic re support safety In re support, the aircraft

does not just need a position to destroy the target. In
CAS operations there will always be friendly troops in
near proximity to the enemy. In order to bomb the target without killing the friendlies, the aircrew must be in
voice contact with the TACP who guides the aircraft to
the correct target. In other words, it is not enough just to
lase the target and pass the location to the aircrew while
calling GAPS. The MARS equipment provided the location of the target and the terminal controller position on
a moving map display to the aircraft would greatly benet situational awareness. After a friendly re incident,
however, deciencies in giving the bomber the precise location of the SR team became apparent.

1. Positions, and movement if any, of any friendly

forces and civilians in the area
2. Positions, and movement if any, of the target
3. Means by which the TACP identied the target and
the precision of those means, and positive verication of the TACPs identity
4. A means of communicating with the TACP, and
with the bomber if another center is controlling the
attack
5. Location, course, and speed of all aircraft that could
deliver the requested attack
6. Nature of the weapon requested, including its delivery precision
Accurate situational awareness also requires minimizing
human error in data entry. Inputting errors are fallibilities that can be removed from the system. US Air Force
Chief of Sta John P. Jumper said data is best fed directly
into a weapon and then merely conrmed by the human in
the loop. Manual data entry, particularly in the cockpit,
should be avoided wherever possible.
A radar or other electronic beacon, separate from the targeting system, meets the rst requirement. For example, the US is providing the SMP-1000 beacons to TACP
teams. It weighs approximately one pound, and the B-52
radar can detect it from 90 miles away within 1000 feet
of precision.
Another systemthe Grenadier beyond line-of-sight reporting and tracking (BRAT) -- provides more information than the simple beacon but is not man-portable. A
smaller version, the minitransmitterMTXsystem is
under development, and will not rely only on the bombers
radar but have its own GPS receiver and radio transmitter to send grid location, speed, direction, and mission
status of the aircraft and the TACP. Alternate developments also are underway.

To assist the bomber in identifying the target, the Air

Force combat controller with the SR could lase prominent
terrain features as well as the target.The aircrew could Poststrike reconnaissance
watch their aircraft on a display as it ew to the correct
target. Other possible applications of this electro-optical Poststrike reconnaissance is the distant or close visual,
viewing system could include images of the post-strike photographic, and/or electronic surveillance of a specic

28.4. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES

point or area of operational or strategic signicance that
has been attacked to measure results. SR units carry out
these missions when no other capabilities, such as conventional ground forces, local scouts and aviation, UAVs
and other systems under the control of higher headquarters, and national-level intelligence collection capabilities
cannot obtain the needed information.

Doctrinal changes resulting from new weapons

145

28.4.1 Inltration
Special reconnaissance teams, depending on training and
resources, may enter the area of operations in many ways.
They may stay behind, where the unit deliberately stays
hidden in an area that is expected to be overrun by advancing enemy forces. They may inltrate by foot, used
when the enemy does not have full view of his own lines,
such that skilled soldiers can move through their own
front lines and, as a small unit, penetrate those of the enemy. Such movement is most often by night.
They may have mechanical help on the ground, such
as tactical four-wheel-drive vehicles (e.g., dune buggies
or long-wheelbase Land Rovers) or motorcycles. The
British Special Air Service pioneered in vehicle SR, going
back to North Africa in World War II. In Desert Storm,
US SR forces used medium and heavy helicopters to carry
in vehicles for the Scud Hunt.

JDAM has brought a new dimension to the GAPS mission, requiring Rules of Engagement changes for unrestricted use.[25] Bombers and other aircraft can deliver
the JDAM precisely on known coordinates through the
weather, miles away from the target. The terminal controller will not have the delivering aircraft in sight. Different ROE that are exible enough to support JDAM US Army Special Forces units working with the Afghan
deliveries must be instituted to allow future use of this Northern Alliance did ride horses, and there may be other
pack or riding animals capabilities.
unique capability.
The decision to fully develop which system is long over- SR units can move by air. They can use a variety of
due. If GAPS is to mature, it requires a positive means helicopter techniques, using fast disembarking by rope,
for identifying the friendly ground forces to the attack- ladder, or fast exit, at night. Alternatively, they can
ing aircraft. A common system that allows the services parachute, typically by night, and using the HALO or
to talk to one another is necessary. This is the only way HAHO jump technique so their airplane does not alert
the enemy.
to ensure reduction of friendly re incidents.
Appropriately trained and equipped SR personnel can
come by sea. They can use boats across inland water or
from a surface ship or even a helicopter-launched boat.
Another option is underwater movement, by swimming or
delivery vehicle, from a submarine or an oshore surface
28.4 Operational techniques
ship. Some highly trained troops, such as United States
Navy SEALs or British Special Boat Service or Indian
Their mission is not to engage in direct combat. It may MARCOS may parachute into open water, go underwabe to observe and report, or it may include directing air ter, and swim to the target.
or artillery attacks on enemy positions. If the latter is the
case, the patrol still tries to stay covert; the idea is that the
enemy obviously knows they are being attacked, but not 28.4.2 Support
who is directing re.
While it is rare for a single man to do a special reconnaissance mission, it does happen. More commonly, the
smallest unit is a two-man sniper team. Even though
snipers teams basic mission is to shoot enemy personnel
or equipment, they are skilled in concealment and observation, and can carry out pure reconnaissance missions of
limited durations. The US Marine Corps often detaches
sniper teams organic to combat units, to establish clandestine observation posts.

Units on short missions may carry all their own supplies,

but, on longer missions, will need resupply. Typically, SR
units are used to the area of operations, and are quite comfortable with local food if necessary. Because even the
most secure radios can be detected and locatedalbeit by
technical advanced airborne or spaceborne receiversit
is good practice to make transmissions as short and precise as possible. One way of shortening messages is to
dene a set of codes, typically two-letter, for various prearranged packages of equipment. Those starting with A
might be for ammunition, F for food, and M for medical. Burst transmission is another radio security technique.

Marine Force Recon Greenside Operations are those in

which combat is not expected. US Army Special Forces
SR operations commonly are built around 12-man A detachments or 6-man split A detachments and US Army
Long Range Surveillance Teams are 6-man teams. UK When long-range or long-duration patrols need resupply,
Special Air Service operations build up from four-man a variety of techniques are used, all involving tradeos
units.
of security, resupply platform range and stealth, and the

146

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

type and amount of resupply needed. When the SR patrol

is in an area where the enemy knows there might be some
patrol activity, helicopters may make a number of quick
touchdowns, all but one simply to mislead the enemy. If
it is reasonably certain that the enemy knows some patrols
are present, but not where, the helicopters may even make
some touchdowns more likely to be observed, but leave
boobytrapped supplies.
They may need to have wounded personnel replaced,
and sometimes evacuated. In some extreme situations,
and depending strongly on the particular organization,
wounded personnel who cannot travel may be killed by
their own side, to avoid capture, with potential interrogation, perhaps under torture, and compromise of the special reconnaissance mission. Killing wounded personnel
is described as a feature of Soviet and Russian Spetsnaz
doctrine.[6] A variant described for US personnel was explained to a US forward air controller, by a MACV SOG
ocer,
If I decide that theres no way we can effect your rescue [in Cambodia], Ill order the
gunships to re at you to prevent the enemy
from getting their hands on you. I cant risk
having any of the [recon] teams compromised
if they take you alive.[15]

28.4.3 Exltration
Most of the same methods used to inltrate may be used
to exltrate. Stay-behind forces may wait until friendly
forces arrive in their area.
One of the more common means of exltration is by special operations helicopters. There are a number of techniques that do not require the helicopter to land, in which
the SR team clips harnesses to ropes or rope ladders, and
the helicopter ies away to an area where it is safe for
them to come aboard. Small helicopters, such as the MH6, have benches outside the cabin, onto which trained soldiers can quickly jump and strap in.

28.5 SR
CommunicationsElectronics
Without modern military electronics, and occasionally
civilian ones, modern SR is fundamentally dierent from
special soldiers that took on such risky missions, but with
unreliable communications and a constant danger of being located through them. Human-to-human electronics
are not the only critical advance. Navigational systems
such as GPS, with backups to them, have immense value.
GPS tells the patrol its location, but laser rangenders
and other equipment can tell them the exact location of a
target, which they can then send to a re support unit.
Strong encryption, electronic counter-countermeasures,
and mechanisms, such as burst transmission to reduce the
chance of being located all play a role.
Current trends in secure communications, light and exible enough for SR patrols to carry, are based on the evolving concept of software dened radio. The immensely
exible Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is deployed
with NATO special operations units, and can provide
low-probability-of-intercept encrypted communications
between ground units, from ground to aircraft, or from
ground to satellite. It lets a SR team use the same radio
to operate on several networks, also allowing a reduced
number of spare radios. Some of the raiders on the Son
Tay raid carried as many as ve radios.
JTRS closely integrates with target designators that plug
into it, so that a separate radio is not required to communicate with precision-guided munition launchers. While
unmanned aerial vehicles obviously involve more technologies than electronics, the availability of man-portable
UAVs for launch by the patrol, as well as communications
between the patrol and a high-performance UAV, may result in fundamentally new tactical doctrines.

US Marines from 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion practicing Special Purpose Insert and Extraction (SPIE), 2006.

Software dened radio, along with standard information

exchange protocols such as JTIDS Link 16, are enabling
appropriate communications and situation awareness, reducing the chance of fratricide, across multiple military
services. The same basic electronic device[28] can be an

28.7. EXAMPLES
Air Force Situation Awareness Data Link (SADL) device that communicates between aircraft doing close air
support, but also can exchange mission data with Army
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS)
equipment. Again, the same basic equipment interconnects EPLRS ground units.

147
Canada:
Canadian Special Operations Regiment
Joint Task Force 2
Denmark:
Jgerkorpset

28.6 Reporting during and after

the mission
The debrieng may be done by HUMINT ocers of
their own organization, who are most familiar with their
information-gathering techniques. Information from SR
patrols is likely to contribute to HUMINT collection, but,
depending on the mission, may also contribute to IMINT,
TECHINT, SIGINT, and MASINT Some of those techniques may be extremely sensitive and held on a needto-know basis within the special reconnaissance organization and the all-source intelligence cell.
SR personnel generally report basic information, which
may be expressed with the SALUTE mnemonic
Size
Activity
Location
Unit
Time
Equipment. They will provide map overlays, photography, and, when they have UAV/IMINT, SIGINT or MASINT augmentation, sensor data.
SR troops, however, also are trained in much more advanced reporting, such as preparing multiple map overlays of targets, lines of communications, civilian and
friendly concentrations, etc. They can do target analysis,
and also graph various activities on a polar chart centered
either on an arbitrary reference or on the principal target.

Frmandskorpset
Sirius Patrol (two-man arctic patrols)
Special Support and Reconnaissance Company.
France:
13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment
2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment
Commando Parachute Group
India:
Para Commandos
MARCOS
Special Frontier Force
Garud Commando Force
Ghatak Force
Ireland:
Army Ranger Wing (ARW)
Directorate of Intelligence (G2)
Israeli:
Sayeret Matkal
Shaldag Unit
Shayetet 13
Maglan.
New Zealand:
Special Air Service Group.
Poland:
GROM

28.7 Examples

1 Puk Specjalny Komandosw.

Portugal:

Many countries have units with an ocial special reconnaissance role, including:
Australia:
Special Air Service Regiment.
Italy:
185th Parachute Regiment special reconnaissance and target acquisition.

Tropas de Operaes Especiais (Special Operations Troops)

Precursores Aeroterrestres (Air-Land Pathnders)
Destacamento de Aes Especiais (Naval Special Actions Detachment)
Russia:
45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment

148

CHAPTER 28. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Razvedchiki personnel/units within larger formations.

Sri Lanka:
Sri Lanka Army Commando Regiment
Sri Lanka Army Special Forces Regiment
Special Boat Squadron (Sri Lanka)
Sri Lanka Air Force Regiment Special Force
Sweden:
Srskilda Operationsgruppen (Special Operations Task Group)
United Kingdom:
Special Air Service
Special Boat Service
Special Reconnaissance Regiment.
The Pathnder Platoon
United States:
CIA Paramilitary Operations Teams
US Army Special Forces
75th Ranger Regiment
US Army Long Range Surveillance Companies (LRS)
US Army Battleeld Surveillance Brigade
(BfSB)
US Army Reconnaissance & Surveillance
Squadron (R&S Squadrons)
US Army Regimental Reconnaissance Company (RRC, formerly RRD)
US Marine Corps Force Recon
US Marine Corps Special Operations Command
US Navy SEALs
US Army Special Missions Combat Applications Group (CAG), a/k/a Delta Force
United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group, a/k/a DEVGRU and SEAL
Team 6

28.8 See also

HUMINT
Intelligence collection management
List of intelligence gathering disciplines
MASINT
Special Activities Division
SEAL Team Six

28.9 References
[1] William J. Perry. 1996 Annual Defense Report, Chapter
22, Special Operations Forces. Retrieved 2007-11-11.
[2] Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 29.. International Red Cross. 18 October 1907. Retrieved 200711-11.
[3] Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August
1949, Article 29.. International Red Cross. Retrieved
2007-11-11.
[4] Ankony, Robert C., Lurps: A Rangers Diary of Tet, Khe
Sanh, A Shau, and Quang Tri, revised ed., Rowman &
Littleeld Publishing Group, Lanham, MD (2009)
[5] Department of the Army. Field Manual 7-93 - LongRange Surveillance Unit Operations Reconnaissance and
Surveillance Units.
[6] Suvorov, Viktor (1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of
The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-67168917-7.
[7] Field Manual 31-20-5 - Special Reconnaissance Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces. 7 March
1990. FM 31-20-5. Retrieved 2007-11-11.
[8] U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command(MARSOC)" (PDF). Archived from the original
(PDF) on 2007-12-16. Retrieved 2007-11-17.
[9] FM 3-05.102 Army Special Forces Intelligence (PDF).
July 2001.
[10] L3/Linkabit Communications. The AN/PRD-13 (V1)
Man Portable Signal Intelligence System.
[11] 18 (UKSF) Signals Regiment. Retrieved 2007-11-16.
[12] TASK FORCE BLACK. Retrieved 2007-11-16.
[13] Department of the Army (30 September 1991). 4: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Special Forces
Group (Airborne)". FM 34-36: Special Operations Forces
Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
[14] Rosenau, William (2000). Special Operations Forces
and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War. U.S. Air Ground Operations Against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1966-1972 (PDF).
RAND Corporation. Retrieved 2007-11-11.
[15] Haas, Michael E. (1997). Apollos Warriors: US Air
Force Special Operations during the Cold War (PDF).
Air University Press. Retrieved 2007-11-16.
[16] John T. Correll (November 2004). Igloo White
(– SCHOLAR SEARCH ). Air Force Magazine 87
(11).
[17] CACI (9 April 2002). AN/GSQ-187 Improved Remote
Battleeld Sensor System (I-REMBASS)". Retrieved
2007-10-15.

28.10. EXTERNAL LINKS

[18] Paul, James. Operation Biting, Bruneval, 27th/28th Feb.

1942. Paul. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
[19] Joint Chiefs of Sta (1993). Joint Publication 3-05.5:
Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-13.
[20] Gordon, Michael R.; Trainor, Bernard E. (1995). The
Generals War: The Inside Story of the Conict in the Gulf.
Little, Brown and Company.
[21] Ripley, Tim. Scud Hunting: Counter-force Operations
against Theatre Ballistic Missiles (PDF). Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster University. Retrieved 2007-11-11.
[22] Douglas C. Waller (1994). The Commandos: The Inside
Story of Americas Secret Soldiers. Dell Publishing.
[23] Army Command and General Sta College (9/00). SOF
Reference Manual. Retrieved 2007-11-12. Check date
values in: |date= (help)
[24] Erwin, Sandra I. (April 2002). Air Warfare Tactics Rened in Afghanistan: Planners, air crews ne-tuning targeting techniques and rules of engagement (–
SCHOLAR SEARCH
). National Defense Magazine. Retrieved
2007-11-11.
[25] Theisen, Eric E. (2003). Ground-Aided Precision Strike
Heavy Bomber Activity in Operation Enduring Freedom.
Air University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on
2012-02-02. Retrieved 2007-11-12.
[26] Clancy, Tom; Horner, Chuck (2000). Every Man a Tiger.
Berkley Trade. ISBN 0-425-17292-9.
[27] JTIDS - Link 16. The Warghters Encyclopedia. Naval
Air Warfare Center. Retrieved 2007-11-11.
[28] Joint Combat ID through Situation Awareness. Retrieved 2010-08-05.

28.10 External links

Long Range Surveillance: True test for quiet professional
Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units
US Army Field Manual 7-93 Long Range Surveillance Unit Operations. (FM 7-93)
PDF downloadable version of the US Armys Long
Range Surveillance Unit Operations Field Manual.
(FM 7-93) This manual provides doctrine, tactics,
techniques, and procedures on how Long Range
Surveillance Units perform combat operations as
a part of the Armys new Battleeld Surveillance
Brigades.
LRSU: EYES OF THE COMMANDER by Sta
Sergeants Brent W. Dick and Kevin M. Lydon

149
Riding With the Posse Part I by Mike Giord
International Special Training Center and NATO
celebrate 30 years of teaching special forces (July
2, 2009) by Maj. Jennifer Johnson, 7th Army Joint
Multinational Training Command Public Aairs

Chapter 29

Steganography
29.1 History

Not to be confused with Stenography.

i
Steganography
(US
/st.n.r.fi/,
UK
/st.n.r.fi/) is the practice of concealing a
le, message, image, or video within another le, message, image, or video. The word steganography combines
the Ancient Greek words steganos (), meaning covered, concealed, or protected, and graphein
() meaning writing.

The rst recorded use of the term was in 1499 by

Johannes Trithemius in his Steganographia, a treatise on
cryptography and steganography, disguised as a book on
magic. Generally, the hidden messages appear to be (or
be part of) something else: images, articles, shopping
lists, or some other cover text. For example, the hidden message may be in invisible ink between the visible lines of a private letter. Some implementations
of steganography that lack a shared secret are forms
of security through obscurity, whereas key-dependent
steganographic schemes adhere to Kerckhoss principle.[1]

The rst recorded uses of steganography can be traced

back to 440 BC when Herodotus mentions two examples in his Histories.[3] Demaratus sent a warning about
a forthcoming attack to Greece by writing it directly on
the wooden backing of a wax tablet before applying its
beeswax surface. Wax tablets were in common use then
as reusable writing surfaces, sometimes used for shorthand.
In his work Polygraphiae Johannes Trithemius developed
his so-called "Ave-Maria-Cipher" that can hide information in a Latin praise of God. "Auctor Sapientissimus
Conseruans Angelica Deferat Nobis Charitas Potentissimi
Creatoris" for example contains the concealed word VICIPEDIA.[4]

29.2 Techniques
29.2.1 Physical

The advantage of steganography over cryptography alone

is that the intended secret message does not attract atten- Steganography has been widely used, including in recent
tion to itself as an object of scrutiny. Plainly visible en- historical times and the present day. Known examples
crypted messagesno matter how unbreakablearouse include:
interest, and may in themselves be incriminating in countries where encryption is illegal.[2] Thus, whereas cryp Hidden messages within wax tabletin ancient
tography is the practice of protecting the contents of a
Greece, people wrote messages on wood and covmessage alone, steganography is concerned with concealered it with wax that bore an innocent covering mesing the fact that a secret message is being sent, as well as
sage.
concealing the contents of the message.
Steganography includes the concealment of information
within computer les. In digital steganography, electronic communications may include steganographic coding inside of a transport layer, such as a document le,
image le, program or protocol. Media les are ideal for
steganographic transmission because of their large size.
For example, a sender might start with an innocuous image le and adjust the color of every 100th pixel to correspond to a letter in the alphabet, a change so subtle that
someone not specically looking for it is unlikely to notice it.

Hidden messages on messengers bodyalso used

in ancient Greece. Herodotus tells the story of a
message tattooed on the shaved head of a slave of
Histiaeus, hidden by the hair that afterwards grew
over it, and exposed by shaving the head. The message allegedly carried a warning to Greece about
Persian invasion plans. This method has obvious
drawbacks, such as delayed transmission while waiting for the slaves hair to grow, and restrictions on
the number and size of messages that can be encoded on one persons scalp.
During World War II, the French Resistance sent

150

29.2. TECHNIQUES

151

some messages written on the backs of couriers in 29.2.2

invisible ink.

Digital messages

Hidden messages on paper written in secret inks, under other messages or on the blank parts of other
messages
Messages written in Morse code on yarn and then
knitted into a piece of clothing worn by a courier.
Messages written on envelopes in the area covered
by postage stamps.
In the early days of the printing press, it was common to mix dierent typefaces on a printed page
due to the printer not having enough copies of some
letters in one typeface. Because of this, a message
could be hidden using two (or more) dierent typefaces, such as normal or italic.
During and after World War II, espionage agents
used photographically produced microdots to send
information back and forth. Microdots were typically minute (less than the size of the period produced by a typewriter). World War II microdots
were embedded in the paper and covered with an
adhesive, such as collodion. This was reective, and
thus detectable by viewing against glancing light.
Alternative techniques included inserting microdots
into slits cut into the edge of post cards.

Image of a tree with a steganographically hidden image. The hidden image is revealed by removing all but the two least signicant
bits of each color component and a subsequent normalization.
The hidden image is shown below.

During WWII, Velvalee Dickinson, a spy for Japan

in New York City, sent information to accommodation addresses in neutral South America. She was a
dealer in dolls, and her letters discussed the quantity
and type of doll to ship. The stegotext was the doll
orders, while the concealed plaintext was itself encoded and gave information about ship movements,
etc. Her case became somewhat famous and she became known as the Doll Woman.
Jeremiah Denton repeatedly blinked his eyes in
Morse Code during the 1966 televised press conference that he was forced into as an American POW
by his North Vietnamese captors, spelling out TO-R-T-U-R-E. This conrmed for the rst time to
the U.S. Military (naval intelligence) and Americans
Image of a cat extracted from the tree image above.
that the North Vietnamese were torturing American
POWs.
Modern steganography entered the world in 1985 with the
Cold War counter-propaganda. In 1968, crew mem- advent of personal computers being applied to classical
[5]
bers of the USS Pueblo intelligence ship held as pris- steganography problems. Development following that
oners by North Korea, communicated in sign lan- was very slow, but has since taken o, going by the large
guage during staged photo opportunities, informing number of steganography software available:
the United States they were not defectors, but captives of the North Koreans. In other photos presented to the US, crew members gave "the nger"
to the unsuspecting North Koreans, in an attempt to
discredit photos that showed them smiling and comfortable.

Concealing messages within the lowest bits of noisy

images or sound les.
Concealing data within encrypted data or within random data. The message to conceal is encrypted, then

152

CHAPTER 29. STEGANOGRAPHY

used to overwrite part of a much larger block of encrypted data or a block of random data (an unbreakable cipher like the one-time pad generates ciphertexts that look perfectly random without the private
key).

Chang and winnowing.

Mimic functions convert one le to have the statistical prole of another. This can thwart statistical
methods that help brute-force attacks identify the
right solution in a ciphertext-only attack.
Concealed messages in tampered executable les,
exploiting redundancy in the targeted instruction set.
Pictures embedded in video material (optionally
played at slower or faster speed).

Using hidden (control) characters, and redundant

use of markup (e.g., empty bold, underline or italics) to embed information within HTML, which is
visible by examining the document source. HTML
pages can contain code for extra blank spaces and
tabs at the end of lines, and colours, fonts and sizes,
which are not visible when displayed.
Using non-printing Unicode characters ZeroWidth Joiner (ZWJ) and Zero-Width Non-Joiner
(ZWNJ).[8] These characters are used for joining
and disjoining letters in Arabic and Persian, but
can be used in Roman alphabets for hiding information because they have no meaning in Roman
alphabets: because they are zero-width they are
not displayed. ZWJ and ZWNJ can represent 1
and 0.

Injecting imperceptible delays to packets sent over

the network from the keyboard. Delays in key- Social steganography
presses in some applications (telnet or remote desktop software) can mean a delay in packets, and the In communities with social or government taboos or censorship, people use cultural steganographyhiding mesdelays in the packets can be used to encode data.
sages in idiom, pop culture references, and other messages they share publicly and assume are monitored. This
Changing the order of elements in a set.
relies on social context to make the underlying messages
Content-Aware Steganography hides information in visible only to certain readers.[9][10] Examples include:
the semantics a human user assigns to a datagram.
These systems oer security against a nonhuman ad Hiding a message in the title and context of a shared
versary/warden.
video or image
Blog-Steganography. Messages are fractionalized
Misspelling names or words that are popular in the
and the (encrypted) pieces are added as comments
media in a given week, to suggest an alternate meanof orphaned web-logs (or pin boards on social neting
work platforms). In this case the selection of blogs is
the symmetric key that sender and recipient are using; the carrier of the hidden message is the whole 29.2.3 Network
blogosphere.
All information hiding techniques that may be used to ex Modifying the echo of a sound le (Echo change steganograms in telecommunication networks can
Steganography).[6]
be classied under the general term of network steganography. This nomenclature was originally introduced by
Steganography for audio signals.[7]
Krzysztof Szczypiorski in 2003.[11] Contrary to typical
Image bit-plane complexity segmentation steganog- steganographic methods that use digital media (images,
audio and video les) to hide data, network steganograraphy
phy uses communication protocols control elements and
Including data in ignored sections of a le, such as their intrinsic functionality. As a result, such methods are
after the logical end of the carrier le.
harder to detect and eliminate.[12]
Typical network steganography methods involve modication of the properties of a single network protocol.
Such modication can be applied to the PDU (Protocol
[13][14][15]
to the time relations between the ex Making text the same color as the background Data Unit),
[16]
[17]
in word processor documents, e-mails, and forum changed PDUs, or both (hybrid methods).
posts.
Moreover, it is feasible to utilize the relation between two

Digital text

Using Unicode characters that look like the standard

ASCII character set. On most systems, there is no
visual dierence from ordinary text. Some systems
may display the fonts dierently, and the extra information would then be easily spotted, of course.

or more dierent network protocols to enable secret communication. These applications fall under the term interprotocol steganography.[18]
Network steganography covers a broad spectrum of techniques, which include, among others:

29.4. COUNTERMEASURES AND DETECTION

Steganophony the concealment of messages in
Voice-over-IP conversations, e.g. the employment
of delayed or corrupted packets that would normally
be ignored by the receiver (this method is called
LACK Lost Audio Packets Steganography), or,
alternatively, hiding information in unused header
elds.[19]

153
up in software specically, and are easily confused. These
are most relevant to digital steganographic systems.

The payload is the data covertly communicated. The

carrier is the signal, stream, or data le that hides the
payloadwhich diers from the channel (which typically means the type of input, such as a JPEG image). The
resulting signal, stream, or data le with the encoded payload is sometimes called the package, stego le, or covert
WLAN Steganography transmission of
message. The percentage of bytes, samples, or other sigsteganograms in Wireless Local Area Networks. A
nal elements modied to encode the payload is called the
practical example of WLAN Steganography is the
encoding density, and is typically expressed as a number
HICCUPS system (Hidden Communication System
between 0 and 1.
for Corrupted Networks)[20]
In a set of les, those les considered likely to contain a
payload are suspects. A suspect identied through some
type of statistical analysis might be referred to as a can29.2.4 Printed
didate.
Digital steganography output may be in the form of
printed documents. A message, the plaintext, may be rst
encrypted by traditional means, producing a ciphertext.
Then, an innocuous covertext is modied in some way so 29.4 Countermeasures and detecas to contain the ciphertext, resulting in the stegotext. For
tion
example, the letter size, spacing, typeface, or other characteristics of a covertext can be manipulated to carry the
hidden message. Only a recipient who knows the tech- Detecting physical steganography requires careful physinique used can recover the message and then decrypt it. cal examinationincluding the use of magnication, deFrancis Bacon developed Bacons cipher as such a tech- veloper chemicals and ultraviolet light. It is a timeconsuming process with obvious resource implications,
nique.
even in countries that employ large numbers of people
The ciphertext produced by most digital steganography to spy on their fellow nationals. However, it is feasible
methods, however, is not printable. Traditional digital to screen mail of certain suspected individuals or institumethods rely on perturbing noise in the channel le to tions, such as prisons or prisoner-of-war (POW) camps.
hide the message, as such, the channel le must be transmitted to the recipient with no additional noise from the During World War II, prisoner of war camps gave pristransmission. Printing introduces much noise in the ci- oners specially treated paper that would reveal invisible
phertext, generally rendering the message unrecoverable. ink. An article in the 24 June 1948 issue of Paper Trade
There are techniques that address this limitation, one no- Journal by the Technical Director of the United States
Government Printing Oce, Morris S. Kantrowitz, detable example is ASCII Art Steganography.[21]
scribes, in general terms, the development of this paper. They used three prototype papers named Sensicoat, Anilith, and Coatalith. These were for the man29.2.5 Using puzzles
ufacture of post cards and stationery provided to GerThe art of concealing data in a puzzle can take advantage man prisoners of war in the US and Canada. If POWs
of the degrees of freedom in stating the puzzle, using the tried to write a hidden message, the special paper renstarting information to encode a key within the puzzle / dered it visible. The U.S. granted at least two patents related to this technologyone to Kantrowitz, U.S. Patent
puzzle image.
2,515,232, Water-Detecting paper and Water-Detecting
For instance, steganography using sudoku puzzles has as Coating Composition Therefor, patented 18 July 1950,
many keys as there are possible solutions of a sudoku and an earlier one, Moisture-Sensitive Paper and the
puzzle, which is 6.711021 . This is equivalent to around Manufacture Thereof, U.S. Patent 2,445,586, patented
70 bits, making it much stronger than the DES method, 20 July 1948. A similar strategy is to issue prisoners with
which uses a 56 bit key.[22]
writing paper ruled with a water-soluble ink that runs in
contact with water-based invisible ink.
In computing, steganographically encoded package detection is called steganalysis. The simplest method to
detect modied les, however, is to compare them to
Discussions of steganography generally use terminology known originals. For example, to detect information beanalogous to (and consistent with) conventional radio and ing moved through the graphics on a website, an analyst
communications technology. However, some terms show can maintain known-clean copies of these materials and

29.3 Additional terminology

154

CHAPTER 29. STEGANOGRAPHY

compare them against the current contents of the site.

The dierences, assuming the carrier is the same, comprise the payload. In general, using extremely high compression rate makes steganography dicult, but not impossible. Compression errors provide a hiding place for
databut high compression reduces the amount of data
available to hold the payload, raising the encoding density, which facilitates easier detection (in extreme cases,
even by casual observation).

29.5 Applications
29.5.1

electronics that digitize an analog signal suer from several noise sources such as thermal noise, icker noise, and
shot noise. This noise provides enough variation in the
captured digital information that it can be exploited as a
noise cover for hidden data. In addition, lossy compression schemes (such as JPEG) always introduce some error
into the decompressed data; it is possible to exploit this
for steganographic use as well.
Steganography can be used for digital watermarking,
where a message (being simply an identier) is hidden in
an image so that its source can be tracked or veried (for
example, Coded Anti-Piracy), or even just to identify an
image (as in the EURion constellation).

Use in modern printers

Main article: Printer steganography

29.5.3 Alleged use by intelligence services

Some modern computer printers use steganography, including HP and Xerox brand color laser printers. These
printers add tiny yellow dots to each page. The barelyvisible dots contain encoded printer serial numbers and
date and time stamps.[23]

In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation alleged that

the Russian foreign intelligence service uses customized
steganography software for embedding encrypted text
messages inside image les for certain communications
with illegal agents (agents under non-diplomatic cover)
stationed abroad.[24]

29.5.2

29.5.4 Distributed steganography

Example from modern practice

The larger the cover message (in binary data, the number of bits) relative to the hidden message, the easier it is
to hide the latter. For this reason, digital pictures (which
contain large amounts of data) are used to hide messages
on the Internet and on other communication media. It is
not clear how commonly this actually is. For example:
a 24-bit bitmap uses 8 bits to represent each of the three
color values (red, green, and blue) at each pixel. The blue
alone has 28 dierent levels of blue intensity. The dierence between 11111111 and 11111110 in the value for
blue intensity is likely to be undetectable by the human
eye. Therefore, the least signicant bit can be used more
or less undetectably for something else other than color
information. If this is repeated for the green and the red
elements of each pixel as well, it is possible to encode one
letter of ASCII text for every three pixels.
Stated somewhat more formally, the objective for making steganographic encoding dicult to detect is to ensure that the changes to the carrier (the original signal)
due to the injection of the payload (the signal to covertly
embed) are visually (and ideally, statistically) negligible;
that is to say, the changes are indistinguishable from the
noise oor of the carrier. Any medium can be a carrier,
but media with a large amount of redundant or compressible information are better suited.
From an information theoretical point of view, this means
that the channel must have more capacity than the surface signal requires; that is, there must be redundancy.
For a digital image, this may be noise from the imaging
element; for digital audio, it may be noise from recording techniques or amplication equipment. In general,

There are distributed steganography methods,[25] including methodologies that distribute the payload through
multiple carrier les in diverse locations to make detection more dicult. For example, U.S. Patent 8,527,779
by cryptographer William Easttom (Chuck Easttom).

29.5.5 Online challenge

The online mechanism Cicada 3301 incorporates
steganography with cryptography and other solving
techniques since 2012.[26]

29.6 See also

29.7 Citations
[1] Fridrich, Jessica; M. Goljan and D. Soukal (2004).
Searching for the Stego Key (PDF). Proc. SPIE, Electronic Imaging, Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia Contents VI 5306: 7082. Retrieved 23
January 2014.
[2] Pahati, OJ (2001-11-29). Confounding Carnivore: How
to Protect Your Online Privacy. AlterNet. Archived
from the original on 2007-07-16. Retrieved 2008-09-02.
[3] Petitcolas, FAP; Anderson RJ; Kuhn MG (1999).
Information Hiding: A survey (PDF). Proceedings of the IEEE (special issue) 87 (7): 106278.
doi:10.1109/5.771065. Retrieved 2008-09-02.

29.8. REFERENCES

[4] Trimenius Polygraphiae (cf. p. 71f)". Digitale Sammlungen. Retrieved 2012-02-21.

[5] The origin of Modern Steganography
[6] Echo Data Hiding
[7] Secure Steganography for Audio Signals
[8] Akbas E. Ali (2010). A New Text Steganography
Method By Using Non-Printing Unicode Characters
(PDF). Eng. & Tech. Journal 28 (1).
[9] Social Steganogrphy: how teens smuggle meaning past
the authority gures in their lives, Boing Boing, May 22,
2013. Retrieved June 7, 2014.
[10] Social Steganography, Scenario Magazine, 2013.
[11] Krzysztof
Szczypiorski
(4
November
2003).
Steganography in TCP/IP Networks. State of the
Art and a Proposal of a New System - HICCUPS
(PDF). Institute of Telecommunications Seminar.
Retrieved 17 June 2010.
[12] Patrick Philippe Meier (5 June 2009). Steganography
2.0: Digital Resistance against Repressive Regimes. irevolution.wordpress.com. Retrieved 17 June 2010.
[13] Craig Rowland (May 1997). Covert Channels in the
TCP/IP Suite. First Monday Journal. Retrieved 16 June
2010.
[14] Steven J. Murdoch and Stephen Lewis (2005).
Embedding Covert Channels into TCP/IP (PDF).
Information Hiding Workshop. Retrieved 16 June 2010.
[15] Kamran Ahsan and Deepa Kundur (December 2002).
Practical Data Hiding in TCP/IP (PDF). ACM Wksp.
Multimedia Security. Retrieved 16 June 2010.
[16] Kundur D. and Ahsan K. (April 2003). Practical Internet
Steganography: Data Hiding in IP (PDF). Texas Wksp.
Security of Information Systems. Retrieved 16 June 2010.
[17] Wojciech Mazurczyk and Krzysztof Szczypiorski
(November 2008). Steganography of VoIP Streams
(PDF). Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) 5332,
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, Proc. of The 3rd
International Symposium on Information Security (IS'08),
Monterrey, Mexico. Retrieved 16 June 2010.
[18] Bartosz Jankowski, Wojciech Mazurczyk, and Krzysztof
Szczypiorski (11 May 2010). Information Hiding Using
Improper Frame Padding. arXiv:1005.1925 [cs.CR].
[19] Jzef Lubacz, Wojciech Mazurczyk, Krzysztof Szczypiorski (February 2010). Vice Over IP: The VoIP
Steganography Threat. IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved 11
February 2010.
[20] Krzysztof Szczypiorski (October 2003). HICCUPS:
Hidden Communication System for Corrupted Networks
(PDF). In Proc. of: The Tenth International MultiConference on Advanced Computer Systems ACS'2003, pp.
31-40. Retrieved 11 February 2010.
[21] Vincent Chu. ASCII Art Steganography.

155

[22] B.r., Roshan Shetty; J., Rohith; V., Mukund;

Honwade, Rohan; Rangaswamy, Shanta (2009).
Steganography Using Sudoku Puzzle. pp. 623626.
doi:10.1109/ARTCom.2009.116.
[23] Secret Code in Color Printers Lets Government Track
You; Tiny Dots Show Where and When You Made Your
Print. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 16 October 2005.
[24] Criminal complaint by Special Agent Ricci against alleged Russian agents (PDF). United States Department
of Justice.
[25] Distributed Steganography. IEEE. October 2011.
[26] Jane Wakeeld (9 January 2014). Cicada 3301: The
dark net treasure trail reopens. BBC News. Retrieved
11 January 2014.

29.8 References
Wayner, Peter (2002). Disappearing cryptography:
information hiding: steganography & watermarking. Amsterdam: MK/Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. ISBN 1-558-60769-2.
Wayner, Peter (2009). Disappearing cryptography
3rd Edition: information hiding: steganography &
watermarking. Amsterdam: MK/Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. ISBN 978-0-123-74479-1.
Petitcolas, Fabien A.P.; Katzenbeisser, Stefan
(2000).
Information Hiding Techniques for
Steganography and Digital Watermarking. Artech
House Publishers. ISBN 1-580-53035-4.
Johnson, Neil; Duric, Zoran; Jajodia, Sushil (2001).
Information hiding: steganography and watermarking: attacks and countermeasures. Springer. ISBN
978-0-792-37204-2.

29.9 External links

Steganography at DMOZ
Examples showing images hidden in other images
Information Hiding: Steganography & Digital Watermarking. Papers and information about steganography and steganalysis research from 1995 to the
present. Includes Steganography Software Wiki list.
Dr. Neil F. Johnson.
Detecting Steganographic Content on the Internet.
2002 paper by Niels Provos and Peter Honeyman
published in Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (San Diego, CA,
February 68, 2002). NDSS 2002. Internet Society, Washington, D.C.

156
Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Suite1996 paper
by Craig Rowland detailing the hiding of data in
TCP/IP packets.
Network Steganography Centre Tutorials. Howto articles on the subject of network steganography (Wireless LANs, VoIP - Steganophony, TCP/IP
protocols and mechanisms, Steganographic Router,
Inter-protocol steganography). By Krzysztof Szczypiorski and Wojciech Mazurczyk from Network Security Group.
Invitation to BPCS-Steganography.
Steganography by Michael T. Raggo, DefCon 12 (1
August 2004)
File Format Extension Through Steganography by
Blake W. Ford and Khosrow Kaikhah
Computer steganography. Theory and practice with
Mathcad (Rus) 2006 paper by Konakhovich G. F.,
Puzyrenko A. Yu. published in MK-Press Kyiv,
Ukraine

CHAPTER 29. STEGANOGRAPHY

Chapter 30

Surveillance
This article is about observing peoples actions and communications. For the article about monitoring the spread
of diseases, see disease surveillance. For other uses, see
Surveillance (disambiguation).
Electronic surveillance redirects here. For surveillance
of electronic computer systems, see Computer surveillance.
Surveillance (/srve.ns/ or /srvelns/)[1] is the

Surveillance is often a violation of privacy, and is opposed by various civil liberties groups and activists.[7][8]
Liberal democracies have laws which restrict domestic
government and private use of surveillance, usually limiting it to circumstances where public safety is at risk.
Authoritarian government seldom have any domestic restrictions; and international espionage is common among
all types of countries.

30.1 Types
30.1.1 Computer

A 'nest' of surveillance cameras

monitoring of the behavior, activities, or other changing

information, usually of people for the purpose of inuencing, managing, directing, or protecting them.[2] This
can include observation from a distance by means of electronic equipment (such as CCTV cameras),[3] or interception of electronically transmitted information (such as
Internet trac or phone calls); and it can include simple,
relatively no- or low-technology methods such as human
intelligence agents and postal interception. The word
surveillance comes from a French phrase for watching Ocial seal of the Information Awareness Oce -- a U.S. agency
over (sur means from above and veiller means to which developed technologies for mass surveillance
watch), and is in contrast to more recent developments
such as sousveillance.[4][5][6]
Main article: Computer surveillance
Surveillance is used by governments for intelligence gathering, the prevention of crime, the protection of a process, person, group or object, or for the investigation of
crime. It is also used by criminal organizations to plan
and commit crimes such as robbery and kidnapping, by
businesses to gather intelligence, and by private investigators.

The vast majority of computer surveillance involves the

monitoring of data and trac on the Internet.[9] In the
United States for example, under the Communications
Assistance For Law Enforcement Act, all phone calls and
broadband Internet trac (emails, web trac, instant
messaging, etc.) are required to be available for unim-

157

158

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

peded real-time monitoring by Federal law enforcement companies such as Verint, and Narus, which search for
agencies.[10][11][12]
certain words or phrases, to decide whether to dedicate a
[22]
There is far too much data on the Internet for human in- human agent to the call.
vestigators to manually search through all of it. So automated Internet surveillance computers sift through the
vast amount of intercepted Internet trac and identify
and report to human investigators trac considered interesting by using certain trigger words or phrases, visiting certain types of web sites, or communicating via
email or chat with suspicious individuals or groups.[13]
Billions of dollars per year are spent, by agencies such as
the Information Awareness Oce, NSA, and the FBI, to
develop, purchase, implement, and operate systems such
as Carnivore, NarusInsight, and ECHELON to intercept
and analyze all of this data, and extract only the information which is useful to law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.[14]
Computers can be a surveillance target because of the
personal data stored on them. If someone is able to install
software, such as the FBIs Magic Lantern and CIPAV,
on a computer system, they can easily gain unauthorized
access to this data. Such software could be installed
physically or remotely.[15] Another form of computer
surveillance, known as van Eck phreaking, involves reading electromagnetic emanations from computing devices
in order to extract data from them at distances of hundreds of meters.[16][17] The NSA runs a database known
as Pinwale, which stores and indexes large numbers of
emails of both American citizens and foreigners.[18][19]

30.1.2

Telephones

Main articles: Phone surveillance and Lawful interception

The ocial and unocial tapping of telephone lines
is widespread. In the United States for instance, the
Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement Act
(CALEA) requires that all telephone and VoIP communications be available for real-time wiretapping by Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.[10][11][12]
Two major telecommunications companies in the U.S.
AT&T Inc. and Verizonhave contracts with the FBI,
requiring them to keep their phone call records easily
searchable and accessible for Federal agencies, in return
for $1.8 million per year.[20] Between 2003 and 2005,
the FBI sent out more than 140,000 "National Security
Letters" ordering phone companies to hand over information about their customers calling and Internet histories.
About half of these letters requested information on U.S.
citizens.[21]
Human agents are not required to monitor most calls.
Speech-to-text software creates machine-readable text
from intercepted audio, which is then processed by automated call-analysis programs, such as those developed
by agencies such as the Information Awareness Oce, or

Law enforcement and intelligence services in the United

Kingdom and the United States possess technology to activate the microphones in cell phones remotely, by accessing phones diagnostic or maintenance features in order to
listen to conversations that take place near the person who
holds the phone.[23][24][25][26][27][28]
Mobile phones are also commonly used to collect location data. The geographical location of a mobile phone
(and thus the person carrying it) can be determined easily
even when the phone is not being used, using a technique
known as multilateration to calculate the dierences in
time for a signal to travel from the cell phone to each of
several cell towers near the owner of the phone.[29][30]
The legality of such techniques has been questioned in
the United States, in particular whether a court warrant
is required.[31] Records for one carrier alone (Sprint),
showed that in a given year federal law enforcement agencies requested customer location data 8 million times.[32]
In response to customers privacy concerns in the post
Edward Snowden era, Apples iPhone 6 has been designed to disrupt investigative wiretapping eorts. The
phone encrypts e-mails, contacts, and photos with a code
generated by a complex mathematical algorithm that is
unique to an individual phone, and is inaccessible to
Apple.[33] The encryption feature on the iPhone 6 has
drawn criticism from FBI director James B. Comey and
other law enforcement ocials since even lawful requests
to access user content on the iPhone 6 will result in Apple
supplying gibberish data that requires law enforcement
personnel to either break the code themselves or to get
the code from the phones owner.[33] Because the Snowden leaks demonstrated that American agencies can access phones anywhere in the world, privacy concerns in
countries with growing markets for smart phones have intensied, providing a strong incentive for companies like
Apple to address those concerns in order to secure their
position in the global market.[33]
Although the CALEA requires telecommunication companies to build into their systems the ability to carry out
a lawful wiretap, the law has not been updated to address the issue of smart phones and requests for access
to e-mails and metadata.[34] The Snowden leaks show
that the NSA has been taking advantage of this ambiguity in the law by collecting metadata on at least hundreds of millions of incidental targets from around the
world.[34] The NSA uses an analytic tool known as COTRAVELLER in order to track people whose movements
intersect and to nd any hidden connections with persons
of interest.[34]
The Snowden leaks have also revealed that the British
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
can access information collected by the NSA on American citizens. Once the data has been collected, the GCHQ

30.1. TYPES

159

can hold on to it for up to two years. The deadline can be In the United States, the Department of Homeland Seextended with the permission of a senior UK ocial.[35] curity awards billions of dollars per year in Homeland
Security grants for local, state, and federal agencies to
install modern video surveillance equipment. For exam30.1.3 Cameras
ple, the city of Chicago, Illinois, recently used a $5.1
million Homeland Security grant to install an additional
Main article: Closed-circuit television
250 surveillance cameras, and connect them to a cenSurveillance cameras are video cameras used for the pur- tralized monitoring center, along with its preexisting network of over 2000 cameras, in a program known as
Operation Virtual Shield. Speaking in 2009, Chicago
Mayor Richard Daley announced that Chicago would
have a surveillance camera on every street corner by the
year 2016.[36][37]

A surveillance camera in Cairns, Queensland

Surveillance cameras such as these are installed by the millions

in many countries, and are nowadays monitored by automated
computer programs instead of humans.

pose of observing an area. They are often connected to

a recording device or IP network, and may be watched
by a security guard or law enforcement ocer. Cameras and recording equipment used to be relatively expensive and required human personnel to monitor camera
footage, but analysis of footage has been made easier by
automated software that organizes digital video footage
into a searchable database, and by video analysis software
(such as VIRAT and HumanID). The amount of footage
is also drastically reduced by motion sensors which only
record when motion is detected. With cheaper production techniques, surveillance cameras are simple and inexpensive enough to be used in home security systems,
and for everyday surveillance.

In the United Kingdom, the vast majority of video

surveillance cameras are not operated by government
bodies, but by private individuals or companies, especially to monitor the interiors of shops and businesses.
According to 2011 Freedom of Information Act requests, the total number of local government operated
CCTV cameras was around 52,000 over the entirety of
the UK.[38] The prevalence of video surveillance in the
UK is often overstated due to unreliable estimates being requoted;[39] for example one report in 2002 extrapolated from a very small sample to estimate the number
of cameras in the UK at 4.2 million (of which 500,000
in London).[40] More reliable estimates put the number
of private and local government operated cameras in the
United Kingdom at around 1.85 million in 2011.[41][42]
As part of Chinas Golden Shield Project, several U.S.
corporations, including IBM, General Electric, and
Honeywell, have been working closely with the Chinese
government to install millions of surveillance cameras
throughout China, along with advanced video analytics
and facial recognition software, which will identify and
track individuals everywhere they go. They will be connected to a centralized database and monitoring station,
which will, upon completion of the project, contain a picture of the face of every person in China: over 1.3 billion
people.[43] Lin Jiang Huai, the head of Chinas Information Security Technology oce (which is in charge of
the project), credits the surveillance systems in the United
States and the U.K. as the inspiration for what he is doing
with the Golden Shield project.[43]
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) is funding a research project called Combat
Zones That See that will link up cameras across a city
to a centralized monitoring station, identify and track individuals and vehicles as they move through the city, and
report suspicious activity (such as waving arms, looking
side-to-side, standing in a group, etc.).[44]
At Super Bowl XXXV in January 2001, police in Tampa,
Florida, used Identixs facial recognition software, FaceIt,
to scan the crowd for potential criminals and terrorists
in attendance at the event [45] (it found 19 people with
pending arrest warrants).[46]
Governments often[47] initially claim that cameras are

160

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

A payload surveillance camera manufactured by Controp and

distributed to the U.S. government by ADI Technologies

meant to be used for trac control, but many of them

end up using them for general surveillance. For example,
Washington, D.C. had 5,000 trac cameras installed
under this premise, and then after they were all in place,
networked them all together and then granted access to
the Metropolitan Police Department, so they could perform day-to-day monitoring.[48]
The development of centralized networks of CCTV cameras watching public areas linked to computer databases
of peoples pictures and identity (biometric data), able to
track peoples movements throughout the city, and identify whom they have been with has been argued by some
to present a risk to civil liberties.[49] Trapwire is an example of such a network.[50]

30.1.4

Social network analysis

One common form of surveillance is to create maps of

social networks based on data from social networking
sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter as well as
from trac analysis information from phone call records
such as those in the NSA call database,[51] and others. These social network maps are then data mined
to extract useful information such as personal interests,
friendships & aliations, wants, beliefs, thoughts, and
activities.[52][53][54][55]
Many U.S. government agencies such as the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the
National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) are investing heavily in research involving social network analysis.[56][57] The intelligence community believes that the biggest threat to
U.S. power comes from decentralized, leaderless, geographically dispersed groups of terrorists, subversives,
extremists, and dissidents. These types of threats are
most easily countered by nding important nodes in the
network, and removing them. To do this requires a detailed map of the network.[55][58][59][60]

A graph of the relationships between users on the social networking site Facebook. Social network analysis enables governments
to gather detailed information about peoples friends, family, and
other contacts. Since much of this information is voluntarily
made public by the users themselves, it is often consider to be
a form of open-source intelligence

Jason Ethier of Northeastern University, in his study of

modern social network analysis, said the following of the
Scalable Social Network Analysis Program developed by
the Information Awareness Oce:
The purpose of the SSNA algorithms
program is to extend techniques of social
network analysis to assist with distinguishing
potential terrorist cells from legitimate groups
of people.... In order to be successful SSNA
will require information on the social interactions of the majority of people around the
globe. Since the Defense Department cannot
easily distinguish between peaceful citizens
and terrorists, it will be necessary for them to
gather data on innocent civilians as well as on
potential terrorists.
Jason Ethier[58]

AT&T developed a programming language called Hancock, which is able to sift through enormous databases
of phone call and Internet trac records, such as the NSA
call database, and extract communities of interest
groups of people who call each other regularly, or
groups that regularly visit certain sites on the Internet.
AT&T originally built the system to develop marketing
leads,[61] but the FBI has regularly requested such information from phone companies such as AT&T without a
warrant,[61] and after using the data stores all information
received in its own databases, regardless of whether or not
the information was ever useful in an investigation.[62]

30.1. TYPES
Some people believe that the use of social networking
sites is a form of participatory surveillance, where users
of these sites are essentially performing surveillance on
themselves, putting detailed personal information on public websites where it can be viewed by corporations and
governments.[52] In 2008, about 20% of employers reported using social networking sites to collect personal
data on prospective or current employees.[63]

30.1.5

Biometric

161
facial recognition data, iris/retina (eye) data, ngerprints,
palm prints, and other biometric data of people living in
the United States. The computers running the database
are contained in an underground facility about the size of
two American football elds.[67][68][69]
The Los Angeles Police Department is installing automated facial recognition and license plate recognition devices in its squad cars, and providing handheld face scanners, which ocers will use to identify people while on
patrol.[70][71][72]
Facial thermographs are in development, which allow
machines to identify certain emotions in people such as
fear or stress, by measuring the temperature generated
by blood ow to dierent parts of their face.[73] Law enforcement ocers believe that this has potential for them
to identify when a suspect is nervous, which might indicate that they are hiding something, lying, or worried
about something.[73]

30.1.6 Aerial
Further information: Surveillance aircraft
Aerial surveillance is the gathering of surveillance, usuFingerprints being scanned as part of the US-VISIT program

Main article: Biometrics

Biometric surveillance is any technology that measures
and analyzes human physical and/or behavioral characteristics for authentication, identication, or screening
purposes.[64] Examples of physical characteristics include
ngerprints, DNA, and facial patterns. Examples of
mostly behavioral characteristics include gait (a persons
manner of walking) or voice.
Facial recognition is the use of the unique conguration of a persons facial features to accurately identify
them, usually from surveillance video. Both the Department of Homeland Security and DARPA are heavily
funding research into facial recognition systems.[65] The
Information Processing Technology Oce, ran a program known as Human Identication at a Distance which
developed technologies that are capable of identifying a
person at up to 500 ft by their facial features.

Micro Air Vehicle with attached surveillance camera

ally visual imagery or video, from an airborne vehicle

such as an unmanned aerial vehicle, helicopter, or spy
plane. Military surveillance aircraft use a range of senAnother form of behavioral biometrics, based on sors (e.g. radar) to monitor the battleeld.
aective computing, involves computers recognizing a Digital imaging technology, miniaturized computers, and
persons emotional state based on an analysis of their fa- numerous other technological advances over the past
cial expressions, how fast they are talking, the tone and decade have contributed to rapid advances in aerial
pitch of their voice, their posture, and other behavioral surveillance hardware such as micro-aerial vehicles,
traits. This might be used for instance to see if a person forward-looking infrared, and high-resolution imagery
is acting suspicious (looking around furtively, tense capable of identifying objects at extremely long disor angry facial expressions, waving arms, etc.).[66]
tances. For instance, the MQ-9 Reaper,[74] a U.S. drone
A more recent development is DNA proling, which
looks at some of the major markers in the bodys DNA
to produce a match. The FBI is spending $1 billion to
build a new biometric database, which will store DNA,

plane used for domestic operations by the Department of

Homeland Security, carries cameras that are capable of
identifying an object the size of a milk carton from altitudes of 60,000 feet, and has forward-looking infrared

162
devices that can detect the heat from a human body at distances of up to 60 kilometers.[75] In an earlier instance of
commercial aerial surveillance, the Killington Mountain
ski resort hired 'eye in the sky' aerial photography of its
competitors parking lots to judge the success of its marketing initiatives as it developed starting in the 1950s.[76]

HART program concept drawing from ocial IPTO (DARPA)

ocial website

The United States Department of Homeland Security is

in the process of testing UAVs to patrol the skies over
the United States for the purposes of critical infrastructure protection, border patrol, transit monitoring, and
general surveillance of the U.S. population.[77] MiamiDade police department ran tests with a vertical take-o
and landing UAV from Honeywell, which is planned to
be used in SWAT operations.[78] Houstons police department has been testing xed-wing UAVs for use in trac
control.[78]
The United Kingdom, as well, is working on plans to build
up a eet of surveillance UAVs ranging from micro-aerial
vehicles to full-size drones, to be used by police forces
throughout the U.K.[79]
In addition to their surveillance capabilities, MAVs
are capable of carrying tasers for "crowd control", or
weapons for killing enemy combatants.[80]
Programs such as the Heterogeneous Aerial Reconnaissance Team program developed by DARPA have automated much of the aerial surveillance process. They have
developed systems consisting of large teams drone planes
that pilot themselves, automatically decide who is suspicious and how to go about monitoring them, coordinate
their activities with other drones nearby, and notify human operators if something suspicious is occurring. This
greatly increases the amount of area that can be continuously monitored, while reducing the number of human
operators required. Thus a swarm of automated, selfdirecting drones can automatically patrol a city and track
suspicious individuals, reporting their activities back to a
centralized monitoring station.[81][82][83]

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

30.1.7 Data mining and proling

Data mining is the application of statistical techniques
and programmatic algorithms to discover previously unnoticed relationships within the data. Data proling in
this context is the process of assembling information
about a particular individual or group in order to generate
a prole that is, a picture of their patterns and behavior. Data proling can be an extremely powerful tool for
psychological and social network analysis. A skilled analyst can discover facts about a person that they might not
even be consciously aware of themselves.[84]
Economic (such as credit card purchases) and social (such
as telephone calls and emails) transactions in modern society create large amounts of stored data and records.
In the past, this data was documented in paper records,
leaving a "paper trail", or was simply not documented
at all. Correlation of paper-based records was a laborious processit required human intelligence operators
to manually dig through documents, which was timeconsuming and incomplete, at best.
But today many of these records are electronic, resulting in an electronic trail. Every use of a bank machine, payment by credit card, use of a phone card,
call from home, checked out library book, rented video,
or otherwise complete recorded transaction generates an
electronic record. Public recordssuch as birth, court,
tax and other recordsare increasily being digitized and
made available online. In addition, due to laws like
CALEA, web trac and online purchases are also available for proling. Electronic record-keeping makes data
easily collectable, storable, and accessibleso that highvolume, ecient aggregation and analysis is possible at
signicantly lower costs.
Information relating to many of these individual transactions is often easily available because it is generally
not guarded in isolation, since the information, such as
the title of a movie a person has rented, might not seem
sensitive. However, when many such transactions are
aggregated they can be used to assemble a detailed prole revealing the actions, habits, beliefs, locations frequented, social connections, and preferences of the individual. This prole is then used, by programs such as
ADVISE [85] and TALON, to determine whether the person is a military, criminal, or political threat.
In addition to its own aggregation and proling tools, the
government is able to access information from third parties for example, banks, credit companies or employers, etc. by requesting access informally, by compelling access through the use of subpoenas or other
procedures,[86] or by purchasing data from commercial
data aggregators or data brokers. The United States has
spent $370 million on its 43 planned fusion centers, which
are national network of surveillance centers that are located in over 30 states. The centers will collect and
analyze vast amounts of data on U.S. citizens. It will

30.1. TYPES

163

get this data by consolidating personal information from

sources such as state drivers licensing agencies, hospital
records, criminal records, school records, credit bureaus,
banks, etc. -- and placing this information in a centralized database that can be accessed from all of the centers,
as well as other federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.[87]

companies use software to block non-work related websites such as sexual or pornographic sites, game sites, social networking sites, entertainment sites, shopping sites,
and sport sites. The American Management Association
and the ePolicy Institute also stress that companies tracking content, keystrokes, and time spent at the keyboard
... store and review computer les ... monitor the blogothe company,
Under United States v. Miller (1976), data held by third sphere to see what is being written about
and ... monitor social networking sites.[93] Furthermore,
parties is generally not subject to Fourth Amendment
about 30% of the companies had also red employees for
warrant requirements.
non-work related email and Internet usage such as inappropriate or oensive language and viewing, downloading, or uploading inappropriate/oensive content.[93][94]

30.1.8

Corporate

Corporate surveillance is the monitoring of a person or

groups behavior by a corporation. The data collected is
most often used for marketing purposes or sold to other
corporations, but is also regularly shared with government
agencies. It can be used as a form of business intelligence,
which enables the corporation to better tailor their products and/or services to be desirable by their customers. Or
the data can be sold to other corporations, so that they can
use it for the aforementioned purpose. Or it can be used
for direct marketing purposes, such as the targeted advertisements on Google and Yahoo, where ads are targeted
to the user of the search engine by analyzing their search
history and emails[88] (if they use free webmail services),
which is kept in a database.[89]
For instance, Google, the worlds most popular search engine, stores identifying information for each web search.
An IP address and the search phrase used are stored in
a database for up to 18 months.[90] Google also scans
the content of emails of users of its Gmail webmail service, in order to create targeted advertising based on
what people are talking about in their personal email
correspondences.[91] Google is, by far, the largest Internet advertising agencymillions of sites place Googles
advertising banners and links on their websites, in order
to earn money from visitors who click on the ads. Each
page containing Google advertisements adds, reads, and
modies cookies on each visitors computer.[92] These
cookies track the user across all of these sites, and gather
information about their web surng habits, keeping track
of which sites they visit, and what they do when they are
on these sites. This information, along with the information from their email accounts, and search engine histories, is stored by Google to use for building a prole of
the user to deliver better-targeted advertising.[91]
According to the American Management Association and
the ePolicy Institute that undertake an annual quantitative survey about electronic monitoring and surveillance
with approximately 300 U.S. companies, more than one
fourth of employers have red workers for misusing email and nearly one third have red employees for misusing the Internet.[93] More than 40% of the companies
monitor e-mail trac of their workers, and 66% of corporations monitor Internet connections. In addition, most

The United States government often gains access to these

databases, either by producing a warrant for it, or by simply asking. The Department of Homeland Security has
openly stated that it uses data collected from consumer
credit and direct marketing agenciessuch as Google
for augmenting the proles of individuals whom it is
monitoring.[89] The FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and other intelligence agencies have formed an
information-sharing partnership with over 34,000 corporations as part of their Infragard program.
The U.S. Federal government has gathered information
from grocery store discount card programs, which track
customers shopping patterns and store them in databases,
in order to look for terrorists by analyzing shoppers
buying patterns.[95]

30.1.9 Human operatives

Organizations that have enemies who wish to gather information about the groups members or activities face
the issue of inltration.[96][97]
In addition to operatives inltrating an organization, the
surveilling party may exert pressure on certain members
of the target organization to act as informants (i.e., to disclose the information they hold on the organization and its
members).[98][99]
Fielding operatives is very expensive, and for governments with wide-reaching electronic surveillance tools at
their disposal the information recovered from operatives
can often be obtained from less problematic forms of
surveillance such as those mentioned above. Nevertheless, human inltrators are still common today. For instance, in 2007 documents surfaced showing that the FBI
was planning to eld a total of 15,000 undercover agents
and informants in response to an anti-terrorism directive
sent out by George W. Bush in 2004 that ordered intelligence and law enforcement agencies to increase their
HUMINT capabilities.[100]

164

30.1.10

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Satellite imagery

Main article: Reconnaissance satellite

On May 25, 2007 the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell authorized the National Applications Oce (NAO) of the Department of Homeland Security to allow local, state, and domestic Federal agencies to access imagery from military intelligence Reconnaissance satellites and Reconnaissance aircraft sensors which can now be used to observe the activities of U.S. citizens. The satellites and aircraft sensors will be able to penetrate cloud cover, detect chemical
traces, and identify objects in buildings and underground
bunkers, and will provide real-time video at much higher Hand with planned insertion point for Verichip device
resolutions than the still-images produced by programs
such as Google Earth.[101][102][103][104][105][106]
meters away. They are extremely inexpensive, costing a
few cents per piece, so they can be inserted into many
types of everyday products without signicantly increas30.1.11 Identication and credentials
ing the price, and can be used to track and identify these
objects for a variety of purposes.
Some companies appear to be tagging their workers by
incorporating RFID tags in employee ID badges. Workers in U.K. considered strike action in protest of having
themselves tagged; they felt that it was dehumanizing to
have all of their movements tracked with RFID chips.[107]
Some critics have expressed fears that people will soon
be tracked and scanned everywhere they go.[108] On the
other hand, RFID tags in newborn baby ID bracelets put
on by hospitals have foiled kidnappings.[107]

A card containing an identication number

One of the simplest forms of identication is the carrying of credentials. Some nations have an identity card
system to aid identication, whilst others are considering it but face public opposition. Other documents, such
as passports, drivers licenses, library cards, banking or
credit cards are also used to verify identity.
If the form of the identity card is machine-readable,
usually using an encoded magnetic stripe or identication
number (such as a Social Security number), it corroborates the subjects identifying data. In this case it may
create an electronic trail when it is checked and scanned,
which can be used in proling, as mentioned above.

30.1.12

RFID and geolocation devices

RFID tagging

RFID chip pulled from new credit card

Radio Frequency Identication (RFID) tagging is the use

of very small electronic devices (called RFID tags)
which are applied to or incorporated into a product, animal, or person for the purpose of identication and tracking using radio waves. The tags can be read from several

Verichip is an RFID device produced by a company

called Applied Digital Solutions (ADS). Verichip is
slightly larger than a grain of rice, and is injected under the skin. The injection reportedly feels similar to receiving a shot. The chip is encased in glass, and stores a

30.1. TYPES
VeriChip Subscriber Number which the scanner uses
to access their personal information, via the Internet,
from Verichip Inc.'s database, the Global VeriChip Subscriber Registry. Thousands of people have already had
them inserted.[108] In Mexico, for example, 160 workers
at the Attorney Generals oce were required to have the
chip injected for identity verication and access control
purposes.[109][110]
In a 2003 editorial, CNET News.coms chief political
correspondent, Declan McCullagh, speculated that,
soon, every object that is purchased, and perhaps ID
cards, will have RFID devices in them, which would
respond with information about people as they walk past
scanners (what type of phone they have, what type of
shoes they have on, which books they are carrying, what
credit cards or membership cards they have, etc.). This
information could be used for identication, tracking,
or targeted marketing. As of 2012, this has largely not
come to pass.[111]

165
(whether it is being used or not), using a technique known
multilateration to calculate the dierences in time for a
signal to travel from the cell phone to each of several cell
towers near the owner of the phone.[29][30]
Dr. Victor Kappeler[114] of Eastern Kentucky University
indicates that police surveillance is a strong concern, stating the following statistics from 2013:

Of the 321,545 law enforcement requests

made to Verizon, 54,200 of these requests were
for content or location informationnot
just cell phone numbers or IP addresses. Content information included the actual text of
messages, emails and the wiretapping of voice
or messaging content in real-time.

30.1.13 Human Microchips

Global Positioning System

Main Article
A human microchip implant is an identifying integrated
circuit device or RFID transponder encased in silicate
glass and implanted in the body of a human being. A
subdermal implant typically contains a unique ID number that can be linked to information contained in an external database, such as personal identication, medical
history, medications, allergies, and contact information.
Several types of microchips have been developed in order
to control and monitor certain individuals such as criminals, political gures and spies, a killer tracking chip
patent was led at the German Patent and Trademark Ofce(DPMA) around May 2009.

30.1.14 Devices
Diagram of GPS satellites orbiting Earth

See also: GPS tracking

See also: United States v. Spy Factory, Inc.

Covert listening devices and video devices, or bugs,

In the U.S., police have planted hidden GPS tracking de- are hidden electronic devices which are used to capture,
vices in peoples vehicles to monitor their movements, record, and/or transmit data to a receiving party such as
without a warrant. In early 2009, they were arguing in a law enforcement agency.
court that they have the right to do this.[112]
The U.S. has run numerous domestic intelligence operSeveral cities are running pilot projects to require parolees ations, such as COINTELPRO, which have bugged the
to wear GPS devices to track their movements when they homes, oces, and vehicles of thousands of U.S. citizens,
get out of prison.[113]
usually political activists, subversives, and criminals.[115]
Law enforcement and intelligence services in the U.K.
and the United States possess technology to remotely activate the microphones in cell phones, by accessing the
Mobile phones are also commonly used to collect geolo- phones diagnostic/maintenance features, in order to liscation data. The geographical location of a mobile phone ten to conversations that take place nearby the person who
(and thus the person carrying it) can be determined easily holds the phone.[24][25][26]
Mobile phones

166

30.1.15

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Postal services

As more people use faxes and e-mail the signicance of

surveilling the postal system is decreasing, in favor of
Internet and telephone surveillance. But interception of
post is still an available option for law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, in certain circumstances.

Another common argument is: "If you aren't doing something wrong then you don't have anything to fear. Which
follows that if one is engaging in unlawful activities, in
which case they do not have a legitimate justication for
their privacy. However, if they are following the law the
surveillance would not aect them.[121]

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau

of Investigation have performed twelve separate mail- 30.2.2
opening campaigns targeted towards U.S. citizens. In one
of these programs, more than 215,000 communications
were intercepted, opened, and photographed.[116][117]

Opposition

30.2 Controversy

Grati expressing concern about proliferation of video surveillance

30.2.1

Support

An elaborate grato in Columbus, Ohio, depicting state surveillance of telecommunications

Some supporters of surveillance systems believe that With the advent of programs such as the Total Informathese tools protect society from terrorists and criminals.
tion Awareness program and ADVISE, technologies such
Supporters argue surveillance can reduce crime by three as high speed surveillance computers and biometrics softmeans: by deterrence, by observation, and by reconstruc- ware, and laws such as the Communications Assistance
tion. Surveillance can deter by increasing the chance of for Law Enforcement Act, governments now possess an
being caught, and by revealing the modus operandi. This unprecedented ability to monitor the activities of their
requires a minimal level of invasiveness.[118] Surveillance subjects.[122] Many civil rights and privacy groups, such
can give human operatives a tactical advantage through as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and American Civil
improved situational awareness, or through the use of au- Liberties Union, have expressed concern that by allowing
tomated processes, i.e. video analytics. Surveillance can continual increases in government surveillance of citizens
help reconstruct an incident and prove guilt through the we will end up in a mass surveillance society, with exavailability of footage for forensics experts. Surveillance tremely limited, or non-existent political and/or personal
can also inuence subjective security if surveillance re- freedoms. Fears such as this have led to numerous lawsources are visible or if the consequences of surveillance suits such as Hepting v. AT&T.[122][123]
can be felt.
Some critics state that the claim made by supporters
Other supporters simply believe that there is nothing that
can be done about it, and that people must become accustomed to having no privacy. As Sun Microsystems CEO
Scott McNealy said: You have zero privacy anyway. Get
over it.[119][120]

should be modied to read: As long as we do what we're

told, we have nothing to fear.. For instance, a person
who is part of a political group which opposes the policies
of the national government, might not want the government to know their names and what they have been read-

30.2. CONTROVERSY

167

ing, so that the government cannot easily subvert their organization, arrest, or kill them. Other critics state that
while a person might not have anything to hide right now,
the government might later implement policies that they
do wish to oppose, and that opposition might then be impossible due to mass surveillance enabling the government to identify and remove political threats. Further,
other critics point to the fact that most people do have
things to hide. For example, if a person is looking for a
new job, they might not want their current employer to
know this. Also if an employer wishes total privacy to
watch over their own employee and secure their nancial
information it may become impossible, and they may not
wish to hire those under surveillance. The most concern
of detriment is securing the lives of those who live under
total surveillance willingly, educating the public to those
under peaceful watch while identifying terrorist and those
who use the same surveillance systems and mechanisms
in opposition to peace, against civilians, and to disclose
lives removed from the laws of the land.
In addition, a signicant risk of private data collection
stems from the fact that this risk is too much unknown
to be readily assessed today. Storage is cheap enough to
have data stored forever, and the models using which it
will be analyzed in a decade from now cannot reasonably
be foreseen.[124]

Totalitarianism
Programs such as the Total Information Awareness program, and laws such as the Communications Assistance
For Law Enforcement Act have led many groups to fear
that society is moving towards a state of mass surveillance
with severely limited personal, social, political freedoms,
where dissenting individuals or groups will be strategically removed in COINTELPRO-like purges.[122][123]
Kate Martin, of the Center For National Security Studies said of the use of military spy satellites being used to
monitor the activities of U.S. citizens: They are laying
A trac camera atop a high pole oversees a road in the Canadian
the bricks one at a time for a police state.[105]
Some point to the blurring of lines between public and
private places, and the privatization of places traditionally seen as public (such as shopping malls and industrial
parks) as illustrating the increasing legality of collecting
personal information.[125] Traveling through many public places such as government oces is hardly optional
for most people, yet consumers have little choice but to
submit to companies surveillance practices.[126] Surveillance techniques are not created equal; among the many
biometric identication technologies, for instance, face
recognition requires the least cooperation. Unlike automatic ngerprint reading, which requires an individual to
press a nger against a machine, this technique is subtle
and requires little to no consent.[126]

city of Toronto.

Psychological/social eects
Some critics, such as Michel Foucault, believe that in addition to its obvious function of identifying and capturing
individuals who are committing undesirable acts, surveillance also functions to create in everyone a feeling of always being watched, so that they become self-policing.
This allows the State to control the populace without having to resort to physical force, which is expensive and otherwise problematic.[127]
The concept of panopticism is a means of indirect control

168
over a large populous through the uncertainty of surveillance. Michel Foucault analyzed the architecture of the
prison panopticon, and realized that its success was not
just in its ability to monitor but also its ability to not monitor without anyone knowing.[128] Critics such as Derrick
Jensen and George Draan, argue that panopticism in the
United States began in World War I when the issuing of
passports became important for the tracking of citizens
and possibly enemies of the state. Such surveillance continues today through government agencies in the form of
tracking internet usage and library usage.[129]
Psychologists have shown that merely giving people the
illusion of being observed can produce signicant voluntary changes in a range of pro-social behaviors.[130] For
example, studies have shown that people donate more and
litter less when they think that they are being watched.

Privacy
Numerous civil rights groups and privacy groups oppose surveillance as a violation of peoples right to privacy. Such groups include: Electronic Privacy Information Center, Electronic Frontier Foundation, American
Civil Liberties Union
There have been several lawsuits such as Hepting v.
AT&T and EPIC v. Department of Justice by groups or
individuals, opposing certain surveillance activities.
Legislative proceedings such as those that took place during the Church Committee, which investigated domestic
intelligence programs such as COINTELPRO, have also
weighed the pros and cons of surveillance.

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Sousveillance is inverse surveillance, involving the
recording by private individuals, rather than government
or corporate entities.[132]

30.4 Popular culture

30.4.1 In literature
George Orwells novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, portrays a ctional totalitarian surveillance society with
a very simple (by todays standards) mass surveillance system consisting of human operatives, informants, and two-way telescreens in peoples
homes. Because of the impact of this book, masssurveillance technologies are commonly called Orwellian when they are considered problematic.
The novel - mistrust highlights the negative effects from the overuse of surveillance at Reection
House. The central character Kerryn installs secret cameras to monitor her housemates - see also
Paranoia
The book The Handmaids Tale, as well as a lm
based on it, portray a totalitarian Christian theocracy
where all citizens are kept under constant surveillance.
In the book The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, Lisbeth
Salander uses computers to dig out information on
people, as well as other common surveillance methods, as a freelancer.

30.4.2 In music

30.3 Counter-surveillance, inverse

surveillance, sousveillance

The Dead Kennedys' song, I Am The Owl, is about

government surveillance and social engineering of
political groups.

Countersurveillance is the practice of avoiding surveillance or making surveillance dicult. Developments in 30.4.3 Onscreen
the late twentieth century have caused counter surveillance to dramatically grow in both scope and com- Main article: List of lms featuring surveillance
plexity, such as the Internet, increasing prevalence of
electronic security systems, high-altitude (and possibly
armed) UAVs, and large corporate and government com The movie, Gattaca, portrays a society that uses
puter databases.[131]
biometric surveillance to distinguish between people
who are genetically engineered superior humans
Inverse surveillance is the practice of the reversal of
and genetically natural inferior humans.
surveillance on other individuals or groups (e.g., citizens photographing police). Well-known examples are
George Holliday's recording of the Rodney King beating
and the organization Copwatch, which attempts to monitor police ocers to prevent police brutality. Countersurveillance can be also used in applications to prevent
corporate spying, or to track other criminals by certain
criminal entities. It can also be used to deter stalking
methods used by various entities and organizations.

In the movie Minority Report, the police and government intelligence agencies use micro aerial vehicles
in SWAT operations and for surveillance purposes.
HBO's crime-drama series, The Sopranos, regularly
portrays the FBIs surveillance of the DiMeo Crime
Family. Audio devices they use include "bugs"
placed in strategic locations (e.g., in "I Dream of

30.5. SEE ALSO

Jeannie Cusamano" and "Mr. Ruggerios Neighborhood") and hidden microphones worn by operatives (e.g., in "Rat Pack") and informants (e.g.,
in "Funhouse", "Proshai, Livushka" and "Members
Only"). Visual devices include hidden still cameras
(e.g., in "Pax Soprana") and video cameras (e.g., in
"Long Term Parking").
The movie, THX-1138, portrays a society wherein
people are drugged with sedatives and antidepressants, and have surveillance cameras watching them
everywhere they go.
The movie, The Lives of Others, portrays the monitoring of East Berlin by agents of the Stasi, the
GDR's secret police.
The movie, The Conversation, portrays many methods of audio surveillance.

30.5 See also

Big Brother Watch, a British civil liberties and privacy pressure group
Hepting v. AT&T, a 2006 lawsuit by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) which alleges that
AT&T assisted the National Security Agency (NSA)
in unlawfully monitoring communications
Jewel v. NSA, a lawsuit led by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) against the National Security Agency (NSA) and several high-ranking U.S.
government ocials charging an illegal and unconstitutional program of dragnet communications
surveillance
Informational self-determination, a term for the capacity of the individual to determine in principle the
disclosure and use of his/her personal data
List of government surveillance projects
Mass surveillance
Mass surveillance in Australia
Mass surveillance in China
Mass surveillance in East Germany
Mass surveillance in India
Mass surveillance in North Korea
Mass surveillance in the United Kingdom
Mass surveillance in the United States
Panopticon, a type of institutional building designed
to allow a watchman to observe (-opticon) all (pan-)
inmates of an institution without their being able to
tell whether they are being watched
Privacy law

169
Reconnaissance
Signals intelligence, intelligence-gathering by interception of communications and electronic signals
Sousveillance (inverse surveillance), the recording
of an activity by a participant in the activity
Surveillance art, the use of surveillance technology
to oer commentary on surveillance or surveillance
technology
Surveillance system monitor, a job that consists of
monitoring closed circuit surveillance systems in order to detect crimes or disturbances
Trapwire, a U.S. counter-terrorism technology company that produces software designed to nd patterns indicative of terrorist attacks

30.5.1 United States government

2013 mass surveillance disclosures, reports about
NSA and its international partners mass surveillance of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens
Bullrun (code name), a highly classied U.S.
National Security Agency program to preserve its
ability to eavesdrop on encrypted communications
by inuencing and weakening encryption standards,
by obtaining master encryption keys, and by gaining
access to data before or after it is encrypted either by
agreement, by force of law, or by computer network
exploitation (hacking)
Carnivore, a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
system to monitor email and electronic communications
COINTELPRO, a series of covert, and at times illegal, projects conducted by the FBI aimed at U.S.
domestic political organizations
Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement
Act
Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verier
(CIPAV), a data gathering tool used by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Dropmire, a secret surveillance program by the
NSA aimed at surveillance of foreign embassies and
diplomatic sta, including those of NATO allies
Heterogeneous Aerial Reconnaissance Team
(HART), a DARPA project to develop systems for
aerial surveillance of large urbanized areas using
unmanned aerial vehicles
Magic Lantern, keystroke logging software developed by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

170

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Mail Isolation Control and Tracking and Mail cover,

programs to log metadata about all postal mail sent
and received in the U.S.

[11] CALEA: The Perils of Wiretapping the Internet. Electronic Frontier Foundation (website). Retrieved March 14,
2009.

NSA call database, a database containing metadata

for hundreds of billions of telephone calls made in
the U.S.

[12] CALEA: Frequently Asked Questions. Electronic Frontier Foundation (website). Retrieved March 14, 2009.

NSA warrantless surveillance (200107)

[13] Hill, Michael (October 11, 2004). Government funds

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NSA whistleblowers: William Binney, Thomas

Andrews Drake, Mark Klein, Edward Snowden,
Thomas Tamm, and Russ Tice

[14] McCullagh, Declan (January 30, 2007). FBI turns to

broad new wiretap method. ZDNet News. Retrieved
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Spying on United Nations leaders by United States

diplomats

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Bomb Threats. Wired Magazine. July 18, 2007.

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Terrorist Surveillance Program, an NSA electronic
surveillance program
Total Information Awareness, a project of the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA)

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[82] BAA 04-05-PIP: Heterogeneous Airborne Reconnaissance Team (HART)" (PDF). Information Processing
Technology Oce (DARPA) -- Ocial Website. December 5, 2003. Retrieved March 16, 2009.

[90] Soghoian, Chris (September 11, 2008). Debunking

Googles log anonymization propaganda. CNET News.
Retrieved March 21, 2009.
[91] Joshi, Priyanki (March 21, 2009). Every move you
make, Google will be watching you. Business Standard.
Retrieved March 21, 2009.
[92] Advertising and Privacy. Google (company page). 2009.
Retrieved March 21, 2009.
[93] American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute (2008). Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance 2007
Survey. Retrieved July 27, 2012.
[94] Allmer, Thomas (2012). Towards a Critical Theory of
Surveillance in Informational Capitalism. Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang.
[95] Vlahos, Kelley (August 1, 2002). Store Customer Cards
a Source for FBI?". FOX News. Retrieved March 17,
2009.
[96] anonymous (Jan 26, 2006). Information on the Condential Source in the Auburn Arrests. Portland Indymedia. Retrieved March 13, 2009.
[97] Myers, Lisa (December 14, 2005). Is the Pentagon spying on Americans?". NBC Nightly News (msnbc.com).
Retrieved March 13, 2009.
[98] Senate Hearing: The Use Of Informants In FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations. SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS. U.S. Senate.
April 23, 1976. Retrieved March 13, 2009.
[99] Ranalli, Ralph (November 21, 2003). FBI informant system called a failure. Boston Globe. Retrieved March 13,
2009.

30.7. FURTHER READING

173

[100] Ross, Brian (July 25, 2007). FBI Proposes Building Net- [117] Goldstein, Robert. Political Repression in Modern Amerwork of U.S. Informants. Blotter. ABC News. Retrieved
ica. University of Illinois Press. ISBN 978-0-252-06964March 13, 2009.
2.
[101] U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: Domestic Targets. Na- [118] Deviant Behaviour - Socially accepted observation of behaviour for security, Jeroen van Rest
tional Security Archive. Retrieved March 16, 2009.
[102] Block, Robert (August 15, 2007). U.S. to Expand Do- [119] Sprenger, Polly (January 26, 1999). Sun on Privacy: 'Get
Over It'". Wired Magazine. Retrieved March 20, 2009.
mestic Use Of Spy Satellites. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 14, 2009.
[120] Baig, Edward; Marcia Stepanek; Neil Gross (April 5,
1999). Privacy. Business Week. Retrieved March 20,
[103] Gorman, Siobhan (October 1, 2008).
Satellite2009.
Surveillance Program to Begin Despite Privacy Concerns. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 16,
[121] Solove, Daniel (2007). "'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and
2009.
Other Misunderstandings of Privacy. San Diego Law Review 44: 745.
[104] Fact Sheet: National Applications Oce. Department
of Homeland Security (ocial website). August 15, 2007.
[122] Is the U.S. Turning Into a Surveillance Society?". AmerRetrieved March 16, 2009.
ican Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved March 13, 2009.
[105] Warrick, Joby (August 16, 2007). Domestic Use of Spy
[123] Bigger Monster, Weaker Chains: The Growth of an
Satellites To Widen. Washington Post. pp. A01. ReAmerican Surveillance Society (PDF). American Civil
trieved March 17, 2009.
Liberties Union. January 15, 2003. Retrieved March 13,
2009.
[106] Shrader, Katherine (September 26, 2004). Spy imagery
agency watching inside U.S.. USA Today. Associated
[124] Against the collection of private data: The unknown risk
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factor. March 8, 2012.
[107] Two Stories Highlight the RFID Debate. RFID Journal.
[125] Marx, G. T., & Muschert, G. W. (2007). Personal inforJuly 19, 2005. Retrieved March 23, 2012.
mation, borders, and the new surveillance studies. Annual
Review of Law and Social Science, 3, 375-395.
[108] Lewan, Todd (July 21, 2007). Microchips in humans
spark privacy debate. USA Today. Associated Press.
[126] Agre, P. (2003). Your Face is not a bar code: arguRetrieved March 17, 2009.
ments against automatic face recognition in public places.
Retrieved November 14, 2004, from http://polaris.gseis.
[109] Gardener, W. David (July 15, 2004). RFID Chips Imucla.edu/pagre/bar-code.html
planted In Mexican Law-Enforcement Workers. Information Week. Retrieved March 17, 2009.
[127] Foucault, Michel (1979). Discipline and Punish. New
York: Vintage Books. pp. 201202.
[110] Campbell, Monica (August 4, 2004). Law enforcement
in Mexico goes a bit bionic. Christian Science Monitor.
[128] Foucault, Michel (1995). Discipline and Punish. New
Retrieved March 17, 2009.
York: Random House. pp. 200203.
[111] McCullagh, Declan (January 13, 2003). RFID Tags: Big
[129] Jensen, Derrick (2004). , Welcome to the Machine: SciBrother in small packages. CNET News. Retrieved July
ence, Surveillance and the Culture of Control. Vermont:
24, 2012.
Chelsea Green Publishing. pp. 112124.
[112] Claburn, Thomas (March 4, 2009). Court Asked To
[130] van der Linden, Sander (March 2011). How the Illusion
Disallow Warrantless GPS Tracking. Information Week.
of Being Observed can Make You a Better Person. SciRetrieved March 18, 2009.
entic American. Retrieved September 10, 2014.
[113] Hilden, Julie (April 16, 2002). What legal questions [131] The Secrets of Countersurveillance. Security Weekly.
are the new chip implants for humans likely to raise?".
June 6, 2007.
CNN.com (FindLaw). Retrieved March 17, 2009.
[132] Birch, Dave (July 14, 2005). The age of sousveillance.
[114] Kappeler, Victor. Forget the NSA: Police May be a
The Guardian (London). Retrieved August 6, 2007.
Greater Threat to Privacy.
[115] Wolf, Paul. COINTELPRO. (online collection of historical documents). Retrieved March 14, 2009.
[116] SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: ... DOMESTIC CIA AND
FBI MAIL OPENING PROGRAMS. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE. April 23, 1976. Retrieved
March 13, 2009.

30.7 Further reading

Garnkel, Simson, Database Nation; The Death of
Privacy in the 21st Century. O'Reilly & Associates,
Inc. ISBN 0-596-00105-3
Gilliom, John Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance,
Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy, University Of
Chicago Press, ISBN 978-0-226-29361-5

174
Jenkins, Peter Advanced Surveillance Training Manual, Intel Publishing, UK ISBN 0-9535378-1-1

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

30.8 External links

Jensen, Derrick and Draan, George (2004) Wel- 30.8.1 General information
come to the Machine: Science, Surveillance, and the
Special Issue on Surveillance Capitalism - nine arCulture of Control Chelsea Green Publishing Comticles analyzing nancial, social, political, legal, hispany. ISBN 978-1-931498-52-4
torical, security and other aspects of US and international surveillance and spying programs and their re Lyon, David (2001). Surveillance Society: Monitorlation to capitalism. Monthly Review. 2014. (Voling in Everyday Life. Philadelphia: Open University
ume 66, Number 3, JulyAugust)
Press. ISBN 978-0-335-20546-2
Lyon, David (2007) Surveillance Studies: An
Overview. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 978-07456-3591-0
Fuchs, Christian, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval, eds. (2012). Internet
and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and
Social Media. New York: Routledge. ISBN 9780-415-89160-8
Parenti, Christian The Soft Cage: Surveillance in
America From Slavery to the War on Terror, Basic
Books, ISBN 978-0-465-05485-5
Harris, Shane. (2011). The Watchers: The Rise of
Americas Surveillance State. London, UK: Penguin
Books Ltd. ISBN 0-14-311890-0
Matteralt, Armand. (2010). The Globalization of
Surveillance. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. ISBN
0-7456-4511-9
Feldman, Jay. (2011). Manufacturing Hysteria: A
History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in
Modern America. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
ISBN 0-375-42534-9

ACLU, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex:

How the American Government Is Conscripting
Businesses and Individuals in the Construction of a
Surveillance Society
Balkin, Jack M. (2008). The Constitution in the
National Surveillance State, Yale Law School
Bibo, Didier and Delmas-Marty, The State and
Surveillance: Fear and Control
EFF Privacy Resources
EPIC Privacy Resources
ICO. (September 2006). A Report on the Surveillance Society for the Information Commissioner by
the Surveillance Studies Network.
Privacy Information Center
The NSA Files (Dozens of articles about the U.S.
National Security Agency and its spying and surveillance programs)". The Guardian (London). June 8,
2013.
Blunden, Bill (April 2015). Mass Surveillance is
Driven by the Private Sector, in CounterPunch

Hier, Sean P., & Greenberg, Joshua (Eds.). (2009).

Surveillance: Power, Problems, and Politics. Van- 30.8.2 Historical information
couver, CA: UBC Press. ISBN 0-7748-1611-2
COINTELPROFBI counterintelligence programs designed to neutralize political dissidents
Lyon, David (Ed.). (2006). Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond. Cullompton,
Reversing the Whispering Gallery of Dionysius UK: Willan Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84392-191-2
A Short History of Electronic Surveillance in the
United States
Laidler, Keith. (2008). Surveillance Unlimited:
How We've Become the Most Watched People on
Earth. Cambridge, AU: Icon Books Ltd. ISBN 97830.8.3 Legal resources
1-84046-877-9
Staples, William G. (2000). Everyday Surveillance:
Vigilance and Visibility in Post-Modern Life. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleeld Publishers. ISBN
0-7425-0077-2
Allmer, Thomas (2012). Towards a Critical Theory of Surveillance in Informational Capitalism.
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-63163220-8

EFF Legal Cases

Guide to lawful intercept legislation around the
world

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

175

30.9 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

30.9.1

Text

Agent handling Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agent%20handling?oldid=661941049 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, The Anome,

Michael Hardy, Charles Matthews, Robbot, Vardion, Lowellian, Ashley Y, DocWatson42, Everyking, Gadum, Calm, Sam Hocevar, Joyous!, Truthux, Viriditas, BM, Pearle, Glaucus, GRider, Talkie tim, Feezo, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Cypocryphy, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Mrtoodles, BD2412, Vvuppala, Nobs01, Leutha, Welsh, Qirex, Matthew0028, Cerejota, RG2, SmackBot, RedSpruce, Chris the
speller, Autarch, Frap, NickPenguin, Marco polo, Robosh, Heqs, Estban, ShelfSkewed, J-boogie, Cepopaladin, Thijs!bot, Hcberkowitz,
RevolverOcelotX, Dinkytown, Nobs02, Dlcj1962, StillTrill, Lamro, Alcmaeonid, GorillaWarfare, Gabos, GlamRock, Paul.j.richardson,
Addbot, Lihaas, Terrillja, Lightbot, Donfbreed, AnomieBOT, Thehelpfulbot, FrescoBot, BenzolBot, LittleWink, DexDor, John of Reading,
Ahears, Peterh5322, Paggz, Jacobjohnward, EnricX and Anonymous: 39
Asset (intelligence) Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asset%20(intelligence)?oldid=539467806 Contributors: SimonP, Reinyday,
GrundyCamellia, SmackBot, Lochness Monstah, Keycard, MER-C, Traveliter, Dawynn, Zellfaze, Erik9bot and Anonymous: 3
Black bag operation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black%20bag%20operation?oldid=644372468 Contributors: Bryan Derksen,
Michael Hardy, Skysmith, Julesd, GCarty, The Tom, Necrothesp, Neutrality, Wareldian, Kaisershatner, Kwamikagami, Darwinek, Eleland, SidP, RJFJR, PullUpYourSocks, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Woohookitty, AndrewWatt, Mangojuice, Waldir, Stefanomione,
Petri Krohn, SmackBot, Betacommand, Fuzzform, Frap, Radagast83, Cybercobra, Nabokov, Dontopenyoureyes, Mentisto, Alphachimpbot, MelanieN, SSZ, DerHexer, Bibliophylax, .V., Trusilver, Uesugi kenshin, Delbert Grady, Luciano Magaldi, Taldozer, Thefreemarket,
KWincen, Sfan00 IMG, ClueBot, BWH76, DumZiBoT, Lightbot, Yangvzhen, ClueBot NG, ChrisGualtieri, Tony Mach and Anonymous:
24
Black operation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black%20operation?oldid=661905546 Contributors: Edward, Ixfd64, Skysmith,
Ed g2s, David.Monniaux, Lowellian, DocWatson42, Halda, MSGJ, Trevor MacInnis, Mike Rosoft, Discospinster, Xezbeth, Bender235,
Kross, Iralith, Martey, Tronno, Zupi, Hesperian, Alansohn, Echuck215, Velella, RPH, RJFJR, Kenyon, LOL, MrWhipple, Stefanomione,
Patrick2480, Sj, Steven Hildreth, Jr., SGCommand, SchuminWeb, RobertG, Djrobgordon, Captain Whosit, Lightsup55, DVdm, Mhking, Koveras, Phantomsteve, Petiatil, Kirill Lokshin, C777, Anomalocaris, NawlinWiki, Xyzyxx, Aeusoes1, Moe Epsilon, Marshall, Scope
creep, 2over0, Mikael GRizzly, Katieh5584, Nick-D, Tom Morris, DT29, Luk, SmackBot, Ominae, C.Fred, Davewild, Clpo13, Mauls,
Kevinalewis, CmdrClow, Westsider, Bluebot, Jprg1966, Audigex, Chr.K., A. B., Emurphy42, Drsmoo, Skidude9950, Rrburke, Sapwood2,
Elendils Heir, Rcredit, Cybercobra, DMacks, ALR, Ohconfucius, Byelf2007, CIS, Rukario639, Robosh, Minna Sora no Shita, NYCJosh,
Mr. Vernon, Slakr, Veritas Panther, PaulGS, Woodroar, TwistOfCain, JoeBot, Valoem, CalebNoble, SkyWalker, FleetCommand, CmdrObot, Yoni bhonker, Mika1h, Harej bot, KnightLago, Supermike42, Besieged, SithiR, Rieman 82, Gogo Dodo, Otto4711, ST47, Chasingsol, Christian75, DumbBOT, PamD, Thijs!bot, Jedibob5, Marek69, Kathovo, Heroeswithmetaphors, Noclevername, Ra85, Chegis,
Seaphoto, Dbrodbeck, Willscrlt, Kent Witham, Ingolfson, CosineKitty, Epeeeche, Blindsnyper, MelanieN, Xeno, Freedom Fighter 1988,
That Jason, Magioladitis, Bongwarrior, JamesBWatson, Whamilton, Jvhertum, WLU, Pax:Vobiscum, Xmacro, DGG, J.delanoy, Trusilver,
Grendels mom, Svetovid, TrueCRaysball, Skier Dude, Imacphee, SJP, Heyitspeter, Wavemaster447, Bonadea, Andy Marchbanks, Signalhead, Nikthestunned, Deor, Saddy Dumpington, Wolfnix, Philip Trueman, The Original Wildbear, NPrice, Dictouray, Shredder 187,
Retpyrc, Wikiisawesome, The Devils Advocate, Monty845, Logan, Mr Pie 2006, BonesBrigade, Dawn Bard, Caltas, Xymmax, Bentogoa,
Flyer22, Romsey5, KathrynLybarger, Thorncrag, Kanonkas, Fezmar9, Elassint, ClueBot, General Mannino, Gaia Octavia Agrippa, Drmies,
XClaudiox, Uncle Milty, Boing! said Zebedee, Bualosoldier92, Cirt, Brewcrewer, Lartoven, Grey Matter, NuclearWarfare, SoxBot III,
DarkInVaderVe, James23a, Eik Corell, XLinkBot, Fastily, Stickee, Airplaneman, CalumH93, Addbot, Some jerk on the Internet, Leszek
Jaczuk, Fluernutter, Cblakesley, Glass Sword, Chzz, Favonian, West.andrew.g, Jaydec, 5 albert square, Tide rolls, PlankBot, Luckasbot, TheSuave, Yobot, Fraggle81, Munchenoriginal, AnomieBOT, TurboGUY, DemocraticLuntz, Jackie Stuntmaster, Jim1138, Keithbob, RandomAct, Materialscientist, E2eamon, Monkey225, ArthurBot, Headlikeawhole, Bellerophon, MiddleSt0rm, N419BH, Prezbo,
RightCowLeftCoast, IO Device, Kippenvlees1, Pepper, XnubbXcakeX, Wooly15, RCPayne, Pinethicket, Pink Bull, Phneutral, Hoo man,
Blueteamguy, Brandonf22, Shanmugamp7, Wikielwikingo, Vrenator, Reaper Eternal, Diannaa, Suusion of Yellow, Tbhotch, Reach Out
to the Truth, TheMesquito, Minimac, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Josh9989, DexDor, ChadTycoon1, Slon02, EmausBot, Gfoley4, Katherine, IncognitoErgoSum, Evaneak, RA0808, RenamedUser01302013, Slightsmile, Hounder4, Tommy2010, Wikipelli, Bssasidhar, Shootgunners, 15turnsm, John Cline, LostAlone, Kiwi128, Aeonx, SporkBot, Ojb0110, Wayne Slam, TyA, Reddestroy7, IGeMiNix, Coasterlover1994, L Kensington, Aresofwar, Orange Suede Sofa, ChuispastonBot, Donalm123, Socialservice, Sonicyouth86, Petrb, Xanchester,
ClueBot NG, SpikeTorontoRCP, Smtchahal, Defta, Jack Greenmaven, TheManOfMuchAwesome, Bonqueisha, NOTosama, Dopeguy33,
Scarunner, Katiker, Brett solylo, Ambushers55555, Kylelesta, Lvl 17 Newb, Juno123456789, Lahedoniste, Sadsack75, Chuck norris15796,
Tcroweisbeast, Narutorox72, MadForPlaid, O.Koslowski, Laker repeat, Kittychange, Bill2007805, Borderlandsguy22, Justin w12, Te1005,
Leftgreenday13, XdomX, XKronikz, Chico98, Ill NO SCOPE U, Awesometurds1234, Jk2q3jrklse, Crimebreaker1, Bloodiedyou, Skilledsnow, Shoemakerdalton, Primus202, Oliver521, Simonjames90, Bankboy1257, Cheese190, Shootmehballso, 09gibbn, MusikAnimal,
Iipeanut, Kdoggy80, Dawnofwar345, Aranea Mortem, BlackOpsComedy12, Bighotbannanas, Wwi79581, Destroyer344, Fuzz IFuzion,
Im black ops, MistVillageNinja, Fluxboy6789, Insidiae, Glacialfox, Harry2512, Turnr44, Themacinator, SloppyPoopBag, MofoMofo500,
Harlem SWAGG, Teammm, Riza32, Mdann52, Aarongaunt, EuroCarGT, Webclient101, Fasian89, StealthHawk69, Therdrbog, David
Penn101, TwoTwoHello, Peronter77, Steve4444 1, Peronter777, Learner4444, Epic proman, Kilek15, Derpy hooves22, Coolhaviet, LaceUpLove, Joeather91, Jonmun, YiFeiBot, Ginsuloft, Cms2013, Gloriousglib, YOLOSWAGG123, WeedMan69, Danielramsay, Plodom,
Yoopoo~enwiki, Monkbot, Blackops1251, Its Not Brandon Its Brunden, Jaoiscute, Ruighsuihgiuofad, Sbucksx, Anonymouslolzzz and
Anonymous: 465
Clandestine cell system Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20cell%20system?oldid=662042608 Contributors: Edward,
Tom harrison, Sherurcij, Hu, Tournesol, GraemeLeggett, Rjwilmsi, VolatileChemical, Kajerm, Allens, SmackBot, Premjs, Chris the speller,
Sadads, Colonies Chris, Rogermw, Bigmantonyd, Makyen, CmdrObot, Cydebot, Dougweller, Hcberkowitz, Nick Number, John3103, Erxnmedia, VoABot II, Kyle the bot, RaseaC, Justmeherenow, Laval, StAnselm, Colfer2, ClueBot, Cmmmm, NuclearWarfare, Wprlh, L33tkrew, ApocalypseNow115, Boleyn, Dthomsen8, JimmyPowell323, Addbot, Rejectwater, Protoftruth85, OlEnglish, Zorrobot, Yobot,
Ptbotgourou, AnomieBOT, Galoubet, Xqbot, Noamz, Gighli, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, Jonathandeamer, RedBot, Captain Screebo, Rocketrod1960, ClueBot NG, Helpful Pixie Bot, Andrew Gwilliam, PhnomPencil, LNCP, LouKay1000, Mogism, KindaSortaInTheArmyOnce,
Comp.arch, Monkbot, Jetpax and Anonymous: 34
Clandestine HUMINT Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20HUMINT?oldid=649116508 Contributors: Edward,
Chrism, UtherSRG, ALE!, Kingal86, Ari Rahikkala, Danhash, RJFJR, Woohookitty, Rjwilmsi, Jivecat, Jrtayloriv, RussBot, Filippof,

176

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Arado, Stephenb, PanchoS, Abrio, SmackBot, Addshore, Futurepotentate, ShelfSkewed, J-boogie, Hcberkowitz, Postlewaight, Erxnmedia,
Magioladitis, R'n'B, AzureCitizen, Billinghurst, SwordSmurf, Xavexgoem, SchreiberBike, Jonverve, Plausible to deny, WikiDao, Addbot,
PMLawrence, Citation bot, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, Skakkle, RjwilmsiBot, H3llBot, Helpful Pixie Bot, ElliotX, Mogism, Monkbot,
Thebionicman and Anonymous: 22
Clandestine HUMINT and covert action Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20HUMINT%20and%20covert%20action?
oldid=620769789 Contributors: HaeB, Neutrality, Rama, Crosbiesmith, Canderson7, Rjwilmsi, Cassowary, Rxnd, SmackBot, Mauls,
Sadads, Colonies Chris, ALR, JohnI, Robosh, Vints, AndrewHowse, Cydebot, Hcberkowitz, Erxnmedia, JaGa, Jevansen, Quisquillian,
PeterWD, RTG, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Citation bot, Military photographer, RjwilmsiBot, Al83tito, Helpful Pixie Bot, Fwebel, Monkbot
and Anonymous: 8
Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20HUMINT%20operational%
20techniques?oldid=654387220 Contributors: Lowellian, Klemen Kocjancic, Kingal86, Rama, YUL89YYZ, Cagliost, Mashford,
Amorymeltzer, Woohookitty, Apokrif, Rajanala83, Neoeinstein, Rjwilmsi, SchuminWeb, Brash, RussBot, Kirill Lokshin, Aeusoes1, Victor falk, SmackBot, Kintetsubualo, Autarch, Gamgee, Gobonobo, Robosh, Cydebot, Hcberkowitz, Mk*, Erxnmedia, Destynova, JaGa,
Amarand, JamesR, JL-Bot, ImageRemovalBot, Ecjmartin, Pinkpedaller, Richard-of-Earth, Plausible to deny, Lucian Sunday, Graphiurus
Ocularis, Yobot, Donfbreed, AnomieBOT, Citation bot, Gilo1969, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, John of Reading, H3llBot, Snotbot, Helpful
Pixie Bot, Tom Pippens, Mdy66, BattyBot, Tentinator and Anonymous: 22
Concealment device Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concealment%20device?oldid=656792571 Contributors: Patrick, AndreaPersephone, Dysprosia, Fvw, Securiger, Zigger, Ich, Austin Hair, ArnoldReinhold, Violetriga, Mangojuice, Eyreland, Stefanomione,
Siddhant, GraemeL, SmackBot, Mmernex, Hmains, Chris the speller, Bluebot, Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Frap, Beetstra, Wbadair, Gogo Dodo, Nabokov, Jm3, Ingolfson, EyeSerene, WarthogDemon, Dg2006, Cs302b, Coee, Polartch, Mild Bill Hiccup,
XLinkBot, Exegete48, Lakerfan48, Advancesafes55, Bodysecurity, Regina Jacques, PepperEyes, Mean as custard, Wingman4l7, Arg342,
Morris Goldstein and Anonymous: 29
Cryptography Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptography?oldid=662662018 Contributors: AxelBoldt, WojPob, LC~enwiki,
Brion VIBBER, Mav, Uriyan, Zundark, The Anome, Taw, Ap, Tao~enwiki, Ted Longstae, Dachshund, Arvindn, Gianfranco, PierreAbbat, Ortolan88, Roadrunner, Boleslav Bobcik, Maury Markowitz, Imran, Graft, Heron, Sfdan, Stevertigo, Nevilley, Patrick, Chas
zzz brown, Michael Hardy, GABaker, Dante Alighieri, Liftarn, Ixfd64, Cyde, TakuyaMurata, Karada, Dori, (, Goatasaur, Card~enwiki,
Ahoerstemeier, DavidWBrooks, ZoeB, Theresa knott, Cferrero, Jdforrester, Julesd, Glenn, Kylet, Nikai, Andres, Cimon Avaro, Evercat, Delisek, Dgreen34, Schneelocke, Norwikian, Revolver, Novum, Htaccess, Timwi, Wikiborg, Dmsar, Ww, Dysprosia, Jitse Niesen,
Phr, The Anomebot, Greenrd, Dtgm, Tpbradbury, GimmeFuel, K1Bond007, Tempshill, Ed g2s, Raul654, Rbellin, Pakaran, Jeq, Ckape, Robbot, Fredrik, Chris 73, RedWolf, Donreed, Altenmann, Kuszi, Securiger, Georg Muntingh, MathMartin, Jsdeancoearthlink.net,
Academic Challenger, Meelar, Timrollpickering, Rasmus Faber, Cyrius, Mattaschen, Ludraman, Tobias Bergemann, Dave6, Snobot,
Giftlite, Dbenbenn, Jacoplane, HippoMan, Wolfkeeper, Netoholic, Farnik, Peruvianllama, Michael Devore, Yekrats, Per Honor et Gloria, Sietse, Mboverload, Ferdinand Pienaar, Matt Crypto, Mobius, Neilc, Gubbubu, Geni, CryptoDerk, Antandrus, Beland, Vanished user
1234567890, Pale blue dot, Rdsmith4, APH, Mzajac, Euphoria, SimonLyall, Oiarbovnb, TiMike, Ta bu shi da yu, Freakofnurture, Monkeyman, Blokhead, Heryu~enwiki, Mark Zinthefer, Moverton, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, MaxMad, ArnoldReinhold,
YUL89YYZ, Ivan Bajlo, Paul August, DcoetzeeBot~enwiki, Bender235, TerraFrost, Surachit, JRM, Prsephone1674, Bobo192, Stesmo,
Harley peters, AnyFile, John Vandenberg, Myria, Jericho4.0, Davidgothberg, Slipperyweasel, Wrs1864, ClementSeveillac, M5, Stephen
G. Brown, LoganK, Msh210, Wereldburger758, Alansohn, JYolkowski, Dhar, Mo0, Fg, Seamusandrosy, Complex01, ABCD, Logologist,
InShaneee, Avenue, Snowolf, Super-Magician, Saga City, Zyarb, Daedelus, Egg, H2g2bob, Vadim Makarov, Richwales, Oleg Alexandrov,
Zntrip, Woohookitty, Mindmatrix, Justinlebar, Deeahbz, Jacobolus, Madchester, E=MC^2, Brentdax, Duncan.france, Nfearnley, Shmitra, Jok2000, Wikiklrsc, Mangojuice, SDC, Plrk, DarkBard, Cedrus-Libani, Stefanomione, Turnstep, Jimgawn, Tslocum, Graham87,
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1dragon, Impaciente, Uncle Lemon, Jacek Kendysz, Jagged 85, Jrockley, David G Brault, BiT, JohnMac777, Mauls, Peter Isotalo, Gilliam,
Ohnoitsjamie, Hmains, Skizzik, Chaojoker, Lakshmin, Chris the speller, Ciacchi, Agateller, Hibbleton, Thumperward, Delfeye, Snori,
Alan smithee, PrimeHunter, Iago4096, NYKevin, DevSolar, Vkareh, ZachPruckowski, DrDnar, Wes!, Rashad9607, Alieseraj, Kazov,
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Fatespeaks, Ksn, Sidmow, JoshuaZ, Minna Sora no Shita, ManiF, Michael miceli, Jacopo, Ryanwammons, Slayemin, Chrisd87, Eltzermay,
Meco, TastyPoutine, Dhp1080, Serlin, DeathLoofah, Drink666, Hectorian, DouglasCalvert, RudyB, Judgesurreal777, Pegasus1138, Detach, Shenron, Nightswatch, Gilabrand, Tawkerbot2, Chetvorno, Jafet, Powerslide, Sansbras, CRGreathouse, Hermitage17, Crownjewel82,
BeenAroundAWhile, Thehockeydude44, CWY2190, Saoirse11, Raghunath88, Blackvault, Grandexandi, Cydebot, Ntsimp, Mblumber,
John Yesberg, Gogo Dodo, Corpx, Tawkerbot4, XP105, Kozuch, Brad101, Omicronpersei8, Robertsteadman, Antura, Pallas44, Saber
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ton po, MoleRat, CrazyComputers, Heinze~enwiki, MooCowz69, Connormah, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Nyq, Michi.bo, Nyttend, Homunq, KConWiki, David Eppstein, NoychoH, Havanafreestone, JaGa, Mmustafa~enwiki, BetBot~enwiki, Rettetast, Speck-Made, David
Nicoson, Glrx, CommonsDelinker, Artaxiad, J.delanoy, Hans Dunkelberg, Maurice Carbonaro, Syphertext, Cadence-, Darth Mike, Salih,
MezzoMezzo, Touisiau, AntiSpamBot, SJP, Wilson.canadian, Chandu iiet, R Math, Treisijs, Ross Fraser, Adam7117, Remi0o, Reddy212,
Cralar, Tw mama, Mrstoltz, VolkovBot, Thomas.W, Macedonian, DSRH, JohnBlackburne, Jimmaths, Greatdebtor, Mercurish, TXiKiBoT, Oshwah, GimmeBot, MPA Neto, Xnquist, Qxz, DavidSa, Ocolon, TedColes, Praveen pillay, Abdullais4u, Msanford, LeaveSleaves,
Geometry guy, Bkassay, Rich5411, Symane, Legoktm, NHRHS2010, Radagast3, Botev, SieBot, TJRC, Nihil novi, Moonriddengirl, James
Banogon, Caltas, Yintan, Browner87, Mayevski, Yob kejor, Branger~enwiki, Enti342, WannabeAmatureHistorian, Lightmouse, Skippydo, StaticGull, Hamiltondaniel, Secrefy, PerryTachett, Tom Reedy, Joel Rennie, Dlrohrer2003, Leranedo, WikipedianMarlith, ClueBot,
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Bill431412, Kbdankbot, IsmaelLuceno, B Fizz, Addbot, Ghettoblaster, Some jerk on the Internet, DOI bot, Mabdul, CL, Madmax8712,

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

177

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1955alan, Deeptext, George Makepeace and Anonymous: 9
Dead drop Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead%20drop?oldid=656893493 Contributors: The Anome, Patrick, Karada, Delirium, Zigger, Karn, Sonjaaa, Quarl, Frankieroberto, Zondor, Closeapple, Anthony Appleyard, PeteVerdon, Hypo, RainbowOfLight,
Pauli133, Drbreznjev, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Jemiller226, Nightscream, Vegaswikian, Ewlyahoocom, VolatileChemical, Anders.Warga, Mikeblas, GeoCapp, Arthur Rubin, Yvwv, SmackBot, McGeddon, Bonjedward, Marktreut,
Bluebot, CrookedAsterisk, Thumperward, Victorgrigas, Bazonka, Yahya PL, Onorem, Gamgee, Ceoil, Al1encas1no, Kencf0618, Wbadair,
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ZroBot, Mikhail Ryazanov, ClueBot NG, Pzenner, Helpful Pixie Bot, IvanGroznij, IronOak, FiveColourMap, BattyBot, Diab0lix42 and
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Bearcat, Malcolma, Victor falk, Penbat, Chiswick Chap, Twinsday, Blaylockjam10, AnomieBOT, Elizabeth Blandra, Hcdc12, EyeTruth,
Jrb434, Andrea edits and Anonymous: 4
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Julesd, Cjrother, Klemen Kocjancic, Brianhe, Woohookitty, Je3000, Rjwilmsi, RussBot, Filippof, Petiatil, Rwalker, SmackBot, Incnis
Mrsi, Hippo43, Gamgee, ALR, Lambiam, JohnI, Iridescent, Hcberkowitz, Heroeswithmetaphors, Erxnmedia, Outdawg, ImageRemovalBot, LordJesseD, Addbot, Download, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Drilnoth, Omnipaedista, DrilBot, RedBot, Adi4094, Bunnyman78, John of
Reading, ZroBot, Saebvn, Helpful Pixie Bot, Charliemurphy80, Mark Arsten, PlasmaTime, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, Bluewhizard1001,
Monkbot and Anonymous: 21
Eavesdropping Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eavesdropping?oldid=642650964 Contributors: Magnus Manske, Waveguy, Kku,
Menchi, TakuyaMurata, Skysmith, Docu, Kingturtle, Kaihsu, John K, Lee M, DJ Clayworth, Kierant, Joy, Khym Chanur, Securiger, Postdlf,
Wereon, Zigger, Abu el mot~enwiki, Jh51681, Talkstosocks, Longhair, Jag123, Pearle, Alansohn, Gargaj, AndreasPraefcke, Mangojuice,
Stefanomione, BD2412, FlaBot, Ground Zero, YurikBot, Mikeblas, Occono, EEMIV, Elkman, Zzuuzz, Nikkimaria, Ekeb, Rearden9, Junglecat, SmackBot, Betacommand, Rmosler2100, Chris the speller, Bluebot, Shalom Yechiel, Ortzinator, Cybercobra, Givenez, Joystick74,
Tazmaniacs, Loodog, Ckatz, 16@r, Colonel Warden, Lord E, McQuack, JForget, CBM, Cydebot, Playtime, Clayoquot, SimonDeDanser,
MaaCapo, M. B., Jr., Luigifan, NigelR, Fayenatic london, Jaysweet, Escorial82, MartinBot, Morki, Keith D, LedgendGamer, Pharaoh of
the Wizards, Jeepday, Flatscan, KimiSan, Salamc, Melsaran, SieBot, Dreamafter, Flyer22, Kjtobo, Pinkadelica, Denisarona, Sandy of
the CSARs, Martarius, ClueBot, Stevehs, DionysosProteus, Mike Klaassen, Shaliya waya, BOTarate, Vigilius, Mitch Ames, Kbdankbot,
Cewvero, Addbot, RFBugExpert, Ielvis, OmgDALE, SamatBot, Herr Gruber, Luckas Blade, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Citation bot, Xqbot,
Mononomic, Charles D. Ward, GrouchoBot, SassoBot, Thehelpfulbot, AlexanderKaras, Citation bot 1, Bsandoval, Lotje, MrJackCole,
Werieth, Youngeuropean, Cobaltcigs, ClueBot NG, Helpful Pixie Bot, Mark Arsten, Stevenbeaupre, Essam4002, Anonz 8431, Flat Out,
Dodi 8238, Abracombie, ChrisHF, Suctioninfo2, Amortias and Anonymous: 128
Espionage Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Espionage?oldid=661334640 Contributors: AxelBoldt, The Cunctator, WojPob, The
Anome, Berek, Fubar Obfusco, Roadrunner, SimonP, Mintguy, AntonioMartin, Lisiate, Stevertigo, Edward, Patrick, Kchishol1970, Infrogmation, Michael Hardy, Erik Zachte, Isomorphic, Tannin, Taras, Zeno Gantner, Karada, Skysmith, (, Chadloder, Stw, Ahoerstemeier,
TUF-KAT, SeanO, Aarchiba, Michael, Julesd, Michael Shields, Jiang, Shino Baku, GCarty, Emperorbma, Ww, Jay, Andrewman327, The
Anomebot, Birkett, Tpbradbury, Kaare, Mrand, Dogface, Populus, Omegatron, Jusjih, Lumos3, PuzzletChung, Robbot, Frank A, Vardion, RedWolf, Donreed, Modulatum, Securiger, GreatWhiteNortherner, Tobias Bergemann, Dave6, Gobeirne, DocWatson42, Gtrmp,
Treanna~enwiki, Taion, Eran, Fastssion, Zigger, Marcika, Ich, Bkonrad, Perl, DO'Neil, Mesk, Gracefool, Matt Crypto, Rjyanco, Bobblewik, Richard Myers, Btphelps, Andycjp, Fys, H1523702, Sonjaaa, Beland, Onco p53, Loremaster, Robert Brockway, Khaosworks,
Billposer, Nzpcmad, Mzajac, Gscshoyru, Neutrality, Urhixidur, Trilobite, M1ss1ontomars2k4, Canterbury Tail, Mennonot, Lacrimosus,
Wassim~enwiki, Kingal86, R, N328KF, Lubaf, AlexPU, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, Marxmax~enwiki, Misha Stepanov,
ArnoldReinhold, Prateep, Darren Olivier, Dbachmann, Paul August, ESkog, Jaberwocky6669, Mr. Billion, Vinsci, Chairboy, Shanes,
Palm dogg, Elpuellodiablo, Jpgordon, Bobo192, Ogg, Circeus, Sortior, Robotje, Keron Cyst, R. S. Shaw, Elipongo, Diceman, SpeedyGonsales, Kbir1, Alansohn, ChrisGlew, Polarscribe, Calton, Mrholybrain, Feb30th1712, Hypo, Wtmitchell, Ronark, Cromwellt, M3tainfo,
Evil Monkey, RJFJR, IMeowbot, Geraldshields11, Rajprem, HenryLi, BadSeed, Tintin1107, Evolve75, OwenX, Woohookitty, JPiper,
RHaworth, Georgia guy, Scriberius, JeremyA, Je3000, JRHorse, GregorB, Eras-mus, Eilthireach, KKramer~enwiki, GraemeLeggett,
Doge120, Mario Profaca, KrisW6, Graham87, Descendall, Cuchullain, Jetekus, MC MasterChef, JIP, Rjwilmsi, Rogerd, Commander,
Eyu100, Pako, Harro5, Ligulem, SeanMack, CAPS LOCK, Mirror Vax, SchuminWeb, CooldogCongo, Ground Zero, Chinfo, Pathoschild,

178

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Ewlyahoocom, Gurch, AndriuZ, Chorny, Alphachimp, LeCire~enwiki, Milomedes, Gareth E Kegg, Phoenix2~enwiki, King of Hearts,
VolatileChemical, Wikizen, RussBot, John Quincy Adding Machine, Pburka, Taejo, Briaboru, King Zeal, Nobs01, Crumbsucker, SpuriousQ, Akamad, Stephenb, The Hokkaido Crow, Anomalocaris, Magnoliasouth, Wiki alf, Sjms, Mike18xx, Joshdboz, Aboverepine, Dforest, Rjensen, NYScholar, BirgitteSB, Gorie, Ruzmanci, JulesH, Alex43223, Aleichem, Cerejota, M3taphysical, Zarboki, WAS 4.250,
FF2010, Ninly, Sanmarcos, Breakfastchief, Canley, BorgQueen, David Biddulph, Bdve, Moomoomoo, Tyrhinis, DVD R W, That Guy,
From That Show!, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Terrancommander, Reedy, KnowledgeOfSelf, Pgk, Lawrie, Yuyudevil, Jagged 85, Midway,
Verne Equinox, Antrophica, Mdd4696, William Case Morris, Flamarande, HalfShadow, Mauls, Alsandro, Markeer, Gilliam, Hmains,
Durova, KD5TVI, Wuyz, Swanner, Fplay, Solidusspriggan, Monkeycheetah, Darth Panda, Gracenotes, Blueshirts, Emurphy42, Malosse, Abaddon314159, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Cobain, KaiserbBot, Squalla, Bisected8, OneEuropeanHeart, Addshore, Hateless,
Nakon, KeithB, Clicketyclack, Gryon, Dbtfz, Kuru, John, AmiDaniel, Theotherness, Gobonobo, Nkcs, Joelo, NYCJosh, Suprstr27,
Shattered, Ckatz, Stratadrake, Werdan7, Notwist, LuYiSi, Mr Stephen, Dicklyon, Waggers, E-Kartoel, Ahering@cogeco.ca, Andrwsc,
Zapvet, Darry2385, Hu12, Iridescent, Impy4ever, Dakart, IvanLanin, Esurnir, DEddy, Angeldeb82, Chetvorno, ChrisCork, Heqs, Eastlaw,
Coolioom, JForget, Stadler981, CmdrObot, Patchouli, Ninetyone, Charvex, Chmee2, Cwawak, Yopienso, Omnicog, Kirkesque, Jimiruin,
Gogo Dodo, Ctatkinson, Otto4711, Akcarver, Optimist on the run, Ppsantos, NorthernThunder, Verstan, Thijs!bot, Epbr123, Bot-maru,
StarGeek, Hcberkowitz, BSipsRus, Sdream93, Mojo Hand, Luigifan, Zman555, CharlotteWebb, Amitauti, Adw2000, OuroborosCobra,
Dawnseeker2000, Rompe, Hires an editor, AntiVandalBot, Luna Santin, Puppy Mill, Dylan Lake, Robsmyth40, LibLord, Villy van der Veelen, Leevclarke, Uusitunnus, Flubrain, JAnDbot, MER-C, The Transhumanist, PhilKnight, Space Ghost 900, LittleOldMe, RobJWarwick,
Anne80, Zapp645, VoABot II, Je Dahl, Carom, JanHart, Kierenj, Bzero, KConWiki, SSZ, Bytecount, Ekotkie, Ali masharli, Atulsnischal,
MartinBot, Jim.henderson, Maths Spy, R'n'B, AlexiusHoratius, EdBever, Koplimek, Toiyeumattroi, J.delanoy, Pharaoh of the Wizards,
Sp3000, Lorductape, Uncle Dick, Maurice Carbonaro, WarthogDemon, DigitalCatalyst, Gurchzilla, Mrg3105, AntiSpamBot, Quarma,
NewEnglandYankee, Olegwiki, Kidlittle, Cometstyles, Jamesontai, I like anal with monkeys, Henhellen, Steinberger, Chimaera1001,
Sbeletre, Milnivlek, Ericdn, 212HPR, Philip Trueman, TXiKiBoT, Faktados, DBZROCKS, Slysplace, ,
Supertask, AllGloryToTheHypnotoad, LeaveSleaves, Snowbot, StillTrill, Prof77, CO, Madhero88, Doug, Falcon8765, Karl benjamin,
Logan, NHRHS2010, S8333631, Glenjenvey, SieBot, Caltas, Exemplar sententia, Bentogoa, Breawycker, Moonraker12, Camille Grey,
Dipakgoyal, Oxymoron83, Mexihcatlacatl, Faradayplank, Lightmouse, Reginmund, 48states, Fishnet37222, Timeandscpace, WikipedianMarlith, Larrybao2299, Martarius, Beeblebrox, ClueBot, LAX, Childear, Timeineurope, Trfasulo, Itskamilo, The Thing That Should
Not Be, All Hallows Wraith, Dean Wormer, Boing! said Zebedee, CounterVandalismBot, FIT1005, Niceguyedc, Cirt, Excirial, Waiwai933, Torquilmac, Human.v2.0, Dalac, Tyler, NuclearWarfare, Arjayay, Land111, Familyaccount04, JasonAQuest, Lord Cornwallis,
Caketastic1, Berean Hunter, Local hero, Souvannaphoum, Averizi, Fantr, Jack Dumpsey, Wikiuser100, Skarebo, WikHead, Navy Blue,
Sweeper tamonten, Proofreader77, Gchiste21, Zmpayne2222, Metagraph, Cst17, CarsracBot, Glane23, Favonian, Lucian Sunday, Ivor
Storey, Tassedethe, Tide rolls, OlEnglish, OC Ripper, DeadDeers, Legobot, Yobot, 2D, TaBOT-zerem, Reenem, Geezer1942, Ningauble,
Eric-Wester, Kookyunii, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, DemocraticLuntz, Psantosj, Rubinbot, Jim1138, Lightknights,
Materialscientist, Rtyq2, I Feel Tired, Estlandia~enwiki, Literati666, Grim23, DoveNJ, Champlax, Polartec239, Jack Masamune, Malkman, HoundsOfSpring, IShadowed, Fine491, N419BH, Shadowjams, Joxemai, Astatine-210, Prari, FrescoBot, Etrangere, Komitsuki, Tobby72, Ironboy11, The craziest one, Swordsmankirby, Bobmack89x, Scootercatter, Pinethicket, Abductive, Flick88, LittleWink, Locke jr,
Calmer Waters, Tinton5, Moonraker, Rochdalehornet, Vinie007, Monkeymanman, Jauhienij, MAJArkay, Lotje, Diannaa, DARTH SIDIOUS 2, Ricanmami10000, Mean as custard, RjwilmsiBot, TjBot, DexDor, Misconceptions2, Pangeanempire, Jack Schlederer, EmausBot,
John of Reading, Dexter.Brolls, Nuujinn, Hackydude94, KARL RAN, Mysterygutarman, Tommy2010, Wikipelli, AsceticRose, Sabres87,
AvicBot, John Cline, F, Ahears, Wackywace, Blatantspace, Kilpazz, The Nut, Ossquiz, BredoteauU2, Aeonx, EneMsty12, MJkingofpop0000, SporkBot, Makecat, Mokaroux, Whatsthatcomingoverthehill, Peterh5322, , L Kensington, Tijfo098, Peter
Karlsen, Youarepoopy, Zabanio, Brandonxbrutality, TheVoidmm, Paddingtonbaer, ClueBot NG, Michaelmas1957, AerobicFox, Chester
Markel, Dand37, Cntras, O.Koslowski, Suresh 5, Widr, MerlIwBot, Fazilfazil, Helpful Pixie Bot, HMSSolent, Mikeshelton1, BG19bot,
Northamerica1000, Arcanicus, PLOCHAD, Mark Arsten, Travelour, Lspiste, RJR3333, Johnny Squeaky, LoneWolf1992, TBrandley,
220 of Borg, Busy Moose, Wannabemodel, Lieutenant of Melkor, BattyBot, W.D., McKeaverSpy, JohnA747, The Illusive Man, Comatmebro, CarrieVS, 2Flows, MadGuy7023, Thisenplot, Dexbot, Cwobeel, Gksamsa15, Webclient101, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, Lugia2453, BDE1982, GabeIglesia, Blaue Max, Stephendcalhoun, PinkAmpersand, Tjwilson442, Vanamonde93, BerFinelli, AmaryllisGardener, Fartfartfartfart, Melonkelon, Irishdude06, Popsiclestick123, ProtossPylon, Singer825, DrManhattan11, Vernmildew, Samlumonag,
CaptJack15, Dannyruthe, Blondeguynative, Dinosaursoldier, Dodi 8238, 32RB17, Defalbe, Imdonne, Rezyboy2, BoboMeowCat, Sciophobiaranger, ETBlogs, Gogogone1212121212121212121211, Crystallizedcarbon, Student1234321, TJWilson443, Ecalbier, Drmrc, Cybertex sucks and Anonymous: 647
False ag Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False%20flag?oldid=660474509 Contributors: Olivier, Jdlh, Michael Hardy, Ixfd64,
IZAK, Skysmith, Kingturtle, Ugen64, GCarty, Wikiborg, Furrykef, Tempshill, AnonMoos, Vardion, PBS, Donreed, ZimZalaBim, Bkell,
Carnildo, Tom harrison, Capitalistroadster, Iceberg3k, Tagishsimon, GeneMosher, Tothebarricades.tk, Kevin B12, Asbestos, Neutrality,
Klemen Kocjancic, Cab88, D6, Jayjg, Discospinster, Wikiacc, Narsil, Kostja, Antaeus Feldspar, Bender235, El C, Ascorbic, Cacophony,
Martey, Mike Schwartz, John Vandenberg, Wiki-Ed, Toh, Hardy, La goutte de pluie, BM, Idleguy, Mrzaius, Alansohn, Uncle.bungle,
Hackwrench, Geo Swan, PatrickFisher, Ynhockey, Malo, Bart133, Max rspct, M3tainfo, Lapinmies, Kober, Vuo, Alai, LukeSurl, Zntrip,
Hq3473, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), OwenX, Woohookitty, Mindmatrix, Timharwoodx, Je3000, MONGO, Mangojuice, SDC, Plrk,
Stefanomione, Betsythedevine, Mandarax, RedBLACKandBURN, Graham87, A Train, Kbdank71, Dpr, Rjwilmsi, Bill Cannon, Carbonite,
Jtpaladin, The wub, Tarc, KiernMoran, Fred Bradstadt, Cassowary, Ground Zero, FrancisDrake, MacRusgail, GagHalfrunt, Tequendamia,
Diza, Coolhawks88, Bgwhite, WriterHound, Cornellrockey, Jayme, Subwayguy, YurikBot, Kollision, Jimp, John Quincy Adding Machine,
Briaboru, Zaroblue05, DanMS, Kirill Lokshin, Shaddack, Big Brother 1984, Aryaniae, LaszloWalrus, Grafen, Nutiketaiel, Aaron Brenneman, Lomn, Ospalh, Syrthiss, IceWeasel, BusterD, Miraculouschaos, Closedmouth, E Wing, Petri Krohn, Garybel, Shyam, Ephilei,
Kurai, Je Silvers, Paul Pieniezny, Victor falk, JohnLeonard, SmackBot, Nicolas Barbier, Stie, Kintetsubualo, Nil Einne, Portillo,
GoldDragon, Ksenon, Kaliz, Jprg1966, Hugzz, Sloane, Paulfp, Sb617, AKMask, Tewk, Xeryus, Ian Burnet~enwiki, Chendy, Ncameron,
JRPG, Tim Pierce, Georey Gibson, Bolivian Unicyclist, Robma, Cybercobra, Akral, Xyzzy n, Chrylis, Weregerbil, Doodle77, Xiutwel,
Kukini, Tesseran, Crouchbk, Byelf2007, Ser Amantio di Nicolao, Tazmaniacs, Robosh, JoshuaZ, Mgiganteus1, Minglex, Cmh, Karlwiegand, Meco, Dr.K., SmokeyJoe, OnBeyondZebrax, Skandaprasadn, Clarityend, Poechalkdust, Hwonder, Joseph Solis in Australia,
AlexLibman, Phoenixrod, Lent, Generalcp702, Ehistory, CmdrObot, Megaboz, Olaf Davis, Erik Kennedy, Dgw, Outriggr, Cydebot, Treybien, Goldfritha, Gogo Dodo, Manik52, DumbBOT, Patrick O'Leary, Mathew5000, Septagram, Satori Son, Mamalujo, Malleus Fatuorum,
Thijs!bot, Interested2, Ucanlookitup, Hcberkowitz, Bobblehead, Davidhorman, Kingnixon, Oreo Priest, AntiVandalBot, Opelio, JHFTC,
Joe Schmedley, Legitimus, Arkan5, Erxnmedia, JAnDbot, MarritzN, Minitrue, Attarparn, Lsi, Acroterion, Bencherlite, Canjth, Parsecboy,
NeoJudus, LCJ, SSZ, Bryanpeterson, JaGa, Pax:Vobiscum, Gwern, Dan Dean, Phantomsnake, General Jazza, Ekotekk, KTo288, Nono64,
Pharaoh of the Wizards, PCock, Rodrigo braz, PalestineRemembered, JPLeonard, Maurice Carbonaro, Hodja Nasreddin, Cop 663, Gross-

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

179

cha, RenniePet, Chiswick Chap, Spartelite, C1010, DadaNeem, Xyl 54, Vanished user 39948282, Julyda4th, WLRoss, Ashcroftgm,
Morenooso, Indubitably, Nug, TXiKiBoT, Xenophrenic, Zurishaddai, Room429, EnglishDez, Jaqen, Andrewaskew, Enigmaman, Spadgos, THEODICEAN, AlleborgoBot, GavinTing, Guerillamarketing, StAnselm, DarknessEnthroned, Rabbeinu, Pretest, Jc-S0CO, Fredburks, Cicorp, Tensaije, Anakin101, Capitalismojo, ZaneSteez, LarRan, Sab128, Startswithj, Hoplon, MenoBot, ClueBot, MBD123,
The thing is, Binksternet, Mild Bill Hiccup, Foofbun, LonelyBeacon, Trivialist, Grandpallama, Geo247, CuandoCubango, P.jasons, Xme,
Mlas, Tony May, Thingg, Belchre, 3d-geo, DumZiBoT, Kurdo777, Sannleikur, Ost316, Dominatrixdave, Bazj, Addbot, Mhines54,
Heavenlyblue, MrZoolook, Daverogue, Disbelieve, Download, Fogeltk421, Lihaas, SpBot, Numbo3-bot, Peridon, Alanscottwalker, Lightbot, Nhalks, Aadieu, Henri rouge, PMLawrence, Reenem, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, Tryptosh, Jim1138, McSaddle, Short Brigade Harvester Boris, Glenfarclas, Ulric1313, Materialscientist, Fuelsaver, Tbvdm, Cliftonian, LilHelpa, Xqbot, MaxPuckett,
Thouliha, Catastrophe420, Rbrt21, Srich32977, RibotBOT, A Quest For Knowledge, Shadowjams, LucienBOT, Lothar von Richthofen,
Mark Renier, MureMan, TurningWork, Haeinous, HJ Mitchell, Liverworth, Citation bot 1, Pinethicket, Bmclaughlin9, RedBot, MastiBot, Nikolas93ts, ARMitre, Ionisiso, Princesssissi, Lotje, Defender of torch, Aoidh, Tbhotch, RjwilmsiBot, Grondemar, EmausBot, John of
Reading, WikitanvirBot, GoingBatty, Slightsmile, Acidrain4696, Doelleri, ZroBot, Ahears, Dpenn89, MRBigdeli, Lhixson, Wingman4l7,
Columbia666, Carmichael, Why is pizza so good?, Farizana94, Mcc1789, 8h3d0kg, Whoop whoop pull up, ClueBot NG, Wertydm, Bazuz,
CopperSquare, Helpful Pixie Bot, Legoless, Zlisha Khan, Regulov, BG19bot, Londonboy2011, Shurusheero, Shorisharo, Terry Hildebrand,
Darkness Shines, Mark Arsten, Great50, Jacob van Maerlant, Harizotoh9, Turnr44, BattyBot, Gauzeandchess, Pratyya Ghosh, Ddcm8991,
JYBot, Mogism, Ranze, XXzoonamiXX, Lugia2453, Keptautokeptauto, 93, Pc1985, Halsingpurg, Kabulbuddha, Jgmoneill, Chris troutman, MopSeeker, Lixinheth, GeeBee60, Ter M. Ahn, Damon161, Darkone123, Monkbot, Magma1983, Gdeblois19, Phantomop, Mister
Sneeze A Lot and Anonymous: 380
Field agent Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field%20agent?oldid=653854580 Contributors: Paul A, Interiot, Deathphoenix, Stefanomione, Malcolma, SmackBot, Frap, Mets501, Hebrides, CSeals, MCTales, BarretB, ChenzwBot, Erik9bot, DexDor, Malcolm18,
EdoBot and Anonymous: 12
Industrial espionage Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial%20espionage?oldid=659023925 Contributors: Robert Merkel,
Rmhermen, Nixdorf, Jeejee, Tristanb, Mydogategodshat, Dcoetzee, Ww, WhisperToMe, Tempshill, Joy, ZimZalaBim, Securiger, Lowellian, Michael Snow, Tom harrison, Lode Runner, Niteowlneils, Per Honor et Gloria, Craverguy, Beland, Neutrality, LeoDV, Bender235,
Ylee, Maurreen, Diceman, V2Blast, Bobrayner, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Bushytails, Woohookitty, RHaworth, Miss Madeline,
Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Xydexx, Rjwilmsi, Nightscream, Stardust8212, Ucucha, FlaBot, Joewithajay, Clintond47, YurikBot, SamuelRiv, BorgQueen, Allens, Sycthos, SmackBot, Ratarsed, McGeddon, Bd84, Eskimbot, Hmains, BesselDekker, Cybercobra, Will Beback,
JzG, Rune93, Jimmy Pitt, MTSbot~enwiki, Dl2000, Stevenpam, Eastlaw, Fvasconcellos, Wolfdog, CmdrObot, The Cake is a Lie, Cydebot,
Alaibot, Thijs!bot, Adw2000, Rompe, JAnDbot, Albany NY, Geniac, SteveSims, Nytewing07, Edward321, Atulsnischal, CliC, Maurice
Carbonaro, Jevansen, Sbeletre, RJASE1, Venomlord99, Philip Trueman, Chrishepner, Katoa, Shawn Fynn, Enigmaman, Silent52, SieBot,
Derekcslater, Netspionage, Knifeplay2, Paintman, Android Mouse Bot 3, ClueBot, Nnemo, Trivialist, Jusdafax, Curious Blue, Ottawa4ever,
XLinkBot, PseudoOne, Addbot, Jacopo Werther, Yoenit, SEI Publications, Jukkapaulin, AnnaFrance, Danprzewoz, Zorrobot, Legobot,
Luckas-bot, Yobot, DerechoReguerraz, AnomieBOT, Jim1138, 206209nyc, LilHelpa, News4a2, Mr68000, Cnwilliams, Lotje, Minimac,
RjwilmsiBot, 7mike5000, John of Reading, Dinhtuydzao, Sabres87, ZroBot, Michael Essmeyer, H3llBot, EneMsty12, Wingman4l7, Silvermoonspider, Alice Margatroid, Reallawradio, Ipsign, Zabanio, Paddingtonbaer, Will Beback Auto, ClueBot NG, MelbourneStar, Camipedia, Jrdan, Mensch005, Snotbot, Pluign, Widr, Theopolisme, Helpful Pixie Bot, Joolsa123, M0rphzone, Elizabeth Blandra, FxHVC,
Jd.leiser, 23W, BattyBot, Mobileteeth, Jacksin23, Mathutton, Mogism, Ecstaticreligion, XXzoonamiXX, DrManhattan11, Dannyruthe,
Fixuture, ICPSGWU and Anonymous: 111
Intelligence assessment Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence%20assessment?oldid=646839174 Contributors: The Epopt,
Malcolm Farmer, Stevertigo, Jeejee, Andres, Olathe, DocWatson42, Edcolins, Loremaster, Piotrus, Mzajac, Neutrality, Rich Farmbrough,
ArnoldReinhold, YUL89YYZ, *drew, Remuel, Euniana, John Vandenberg, Kjkolb, Ranveig, Duman~enwiki, Sherurcij, ClockworkSoul,
Danthemankhan, Woohookitty, Kelisi, Wikiklrsc, Eras-mus, SDC, Zzyzx11, GraemeLeggett, Jemiller226, Josh Parris, Ryk, Jared Preston,
YurikBot, Siddiqui, Rjensen, Suva, Moe Epsilon, Cerejota, M3taphysical, Andrew Lancaster, Gego, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Bluebot,
Tonyalbers, CSWarren, Dearlove Menzies, OneEuropeanHeart, Cybercobra, ALR, Hmc3590, FlyHigh, Eliyak, Robosh, Green Giant, Isria, Beetstra, Ahering@cogeco.ca, DabMachine, Simon12, Iridescent, AndrewHowse, Phippi46, Alanbly, Maziotis, PamD, LuckyOne23,
Hcberkowitz, Bobblehead, WinBot, Random Acts of Language, JAnDbot, Quijote3000, MER-C, Ph.eyes, Joshua, Zorro CX, Snd3054,
Grandia01, CommonsDelinker, Ombudswiki, Maurice Carbonaro, Wxhat1, Lilpinoy 82, Mrg3105, Olegwiki, Dorftrottel, LogicDictates,
Pnoble805, Squids and Chips, Deor, DPr77, Enviroboy, SieBot, Gredil, Sanya3, Axiomatica, Carrt81, Zulanka, SchreiberBike, Bunker
Boots, Miami33139, XLinkBot, Jack Dumpsey, Th3 P0p3, Wikiuser100, Mm40, Sweeper tamonten, Felix Folio Secundus, Addbot,
Lucian Sunday, , Htews, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Amirobot, Donovan01, Twohoos, Kookyunii, AnomieBOT, Rubinbot, Mlduda, Obersachsebot, TheAMmollusc, Peterdx, CyrParis, Traord09, Ex13, Hatherington, Nazeem.Mustapha, Xxglennxx, Yappari, Lotje, Ogaryjr,
DKDexter999, Sabres87, AvicBot, Kharados, MerlIwBot, Dodi 8238, Mruanspain, Hannahlore and Anonymous: 76
Intelligence cycle management Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence%20cycle%20management?oldid=647389671 Contributors: Edward, Paul A, Louis-H. Campagna, HaeB, DocWatson42, GraemeLeggett, Rjwilmsi, Lockley, Ground Zero, RussBot, Madcoverboy, Welsh, SmackBot, Dave314159, Robosh, AdultSwim, Patrickwooldridge, Goatchurch, Alaibot, Hcberkowitz, Aniyochanan,
Erxnmedia, Srmoon, Magioladitis, R'n'B, Nono64, Maurice Carbonaro, Chiswick Chap, Jevansen, AzureCitizen, DMCer, Roistacher, Andrewaskew, Farcaster, ForeignerFromTheEast, Mild Bill Hiccup, Dthomsen8, WikiDao, Belatrimmel, Yobot, AnomieBOT, FrescoBot,
Skylark2008, Citation bot 1, Citation bot 4, LittleWink, Jonesey95, Jandalhandler, Trappist the monk, RjwilmsiBot, John of Reading,
H3llBot, Snotbot, Helpful Pixie Bot, Nickken, BattyBot, ChrisGualtieri, AK456, Mr. Guye, Epicgenius, Aaallen001, Fwebel, Robert4565,
JudyCS and Anonymous: 16
Interrogation Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interrogation?oldid=655621152 Contributors: The Anome, Roadrunner, Patrick,
DIG~enwiki, Ciphergoth, Lommer, Dysprosia, Tpbradbury, Altenmann, Hadal, JesseW, DocWatson42, Marcika, Ich, DO'Neil, Toytoy,
Calm, Beland, Bodnotbod, Necrothesp, Sam Hocevar, Neutrality, Discospinster, Guanabot, FT2, Vapour, LeeHunter, ESkog, Viriditas, Hooperbloob, Etrigan, DrDeke, Alansohn, Anthony Appleyard, Craigy144, ZeiP, Dr Gangrene, Scriberius, Derktar, Localh77, Carcharoth, Tabletop, Triddle, Mangojuice, Mdog~enwiki, Randy2063, Kanenas, Stefanomione, GraemeLeggett, Graham87, Dwarf Kirlston,
Rjwilmsi, SMC, Vegaswikian, Olessi, Crazycomputers, PhilipR, RussBot, Gaius Cornelius, Rsrikanth05, NawlinWiki, Wiki alf, Nescio,
WAS 4.250, Sandstein, Modify, SmackBot, Mauls, Xaosux, Chris the speller, Tito4000, Leoni2, The owner of all, Zvar, COMPFUNK2,
Ozdaren, ALR, Acidburn24m, Gobonobo, Peterlewis, Muadd, Meco, Iridescent, Joseph Solis in Australia, Linuxerist, Rimmer, Neelix,
Penbat, CPT Spaz, HalJor, Nick Wilson, Anthonyhcole, Lugnuts, Omicronpersei8, Thijs!bot, Edupedro, Mungomba, Marek69, Nick Number, Escarbot, Revolutionary92, Smartse, Alphachimpbot, Magioladitis, DMY, Froid, KConWiki, CliC, Leyo, Jmm6f488, Teknomunk,
RandMC, LordAnubisBOT, McSly, Brian Pearson, Robertgreer, SoundGuy28, Dhaluza, KylieTastic, Idioma-bot, VolkovBot, Crohnie,

180

CHAPTER 30. SURVEILLANCE

Ask123, Charlesdrakew, Wiikipedian, Wthered, Aaron mcd, SieBot, Ouizardus, Flyer22, Nskillen, AMbot, Martarius, ClueBot, Ktr101,
DILNN1, DangerousPotential, ZooFari, Pulyemyet, Addbot, Kevzspeare, Raoring, Kwarpws, , Zorrobot, Aviados, Yobot, THEN
WHO WAS PHONE?, KamikazeBot, AnomieBOT, Momoricks, Rjanag, Materialscientist, LilHelpa, GrouchoBot, Locobot, Tobby72,
ElijahBosley, Bobmack89x, Yutsi, Jauhienij, Droidekafan, Veron, Lotje, Angers roams, EmausBot, Scottrothstein, Blinx64, GoingBatty,
Primitive Revolutionaries of China, Chickobla, C.rivera11, Emma Frances, H3llBot, Wingman4l7, Benzoyl, Donner60, Chris Gair, Lom
Konkreta, ClueBot NG, James.vadackumchery, , Northamerica1000, Rambus1, Hjdaily, LM103, Mogism, XXzoonamiXX, V. Stinson,
Schwartzjo, Ipanderi, CW3 Chas and Anonymous: 113
Non-ocial cover Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-official%20cover?oldid=630395777 Contributors: Grouse, Mr100percent,
Vardion, Donreed, Rfc1394, PBP, Bkonrad, Siroxo, Khaosworks, Ukexpat, Georgemg, LeeHunter, Toh, Mitchowen, Dhartung, Danhash, Deathphoenix, Dismas, Tbsmith, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Woohookitty, Apokrif, Mangojuice, Eyreland, Stefanomione,
Doge120, Brownsteve, Calicocat, Nightscream, SchuminWeb, Kanchirk, Shaddack, Bullzeye, Robertvan1, -asx-, NYScholar, Derex, BOTSuperzerocool, Mr j galt, Whobot, SmackBot, Alex earlier account, Portillo, Emufarmers, Hgrosser, Will Beback, Ocatecir, Sifaka, Scribner, Valoem, CmdrObot, Lighthead, Im.a.lumberjack, Oden, Cydebot, Reywas92, Bellerophon5685, Kirk Hilliard, 3R1C, Tstrobaugh,
Vudicarus, Misarxist, Nips, M C Y 1008, Andy5421, Baileypalblue, Zach99998, Ask123, Akpoland~enwiki, Cindamuse, Camille Grey,
Zeerak88, Dthomsen8, Addbot, PJonDevelopment, Ivor Storey, Lightbot, Evans1982, AnomieBOT, Xufanc, Spamdrop, FrescoBot, Fulldate unlinking bot, Lotje, GregKaye, Wikielwikingo, Skakkle, DexDor, Beyond My Ken, EmausBot, Chuckthompson32, ,
Beck530, Mercuri88, ClueBot NG, Tsj52, Helpful Pixie Bot, Espiobot, RichardMills65, ChrisGualtieri, Dexbot, Ozz242, Tjwilson442,
Jan Hense and Anonymous: 69
Numbers station Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers%20station?oldid=661746809 Contributors: Koyaanis Qatsi, Camembert,
Leandrod, Patrick, GABaker, Bewildebeast, Shellreef, Taras, Cyde, Tzaquiel, Karada, Skysmith, Paul A, Tregoweth, CatherineMunro,
Vzbs34, Skyfaller, Timwi, Dysprosia, IceKarma, Tempshill, Fibonacci, Elwoz, Scott Sanchez, Hajor, Denelson83, Bearcat, Astronautics~enwiki, Chrism, Tim Ivorson, Spamhog, Cholling, Catbar, Wereon, Scooter~enwiki, Xanzzibar, Cyrius, Dbenbenn, Graeme Bartlett,
Haeleth, BenFrantzDale, LLarson, Jfdwol, Matt Crypto, Bobblewik, Wiki Wikardo, Tom k&e, James Crippen, JeyJeyMan2004,
AHM, HorsePunchKid, Martin Wisse, Heirpixel, Jmwalsh, Ularsen, Jkl, Rich Farmbrough, NickBell, Pmsyyz, Qutezuce, Pie4all88,
ArnoldReinhold, Antaeus Feldspar, Jnestorius, Chewie, Mbroooks, Ferret face, Surachit, Madler, Jpgordon, Apyule, Dbchip, Twobells,
Gothick, Davidmwilliams, AmbassadorShras, Labyrinth13, Caesura, ByrnedHead, ProhibitOnions, Randy Johnston, Drdefcom~enwiki,
Axeman89, Sk4p, Mwalco, Woohookitty, Candymoan, Daniel Case, Thorpe, Onlyemarie, Jpers36, Lucienve, Tierlieb, GregorB, Eyreland, Tetraminoe, Pictureuploader, Xiong Chiamiov, MarcoTolo, Teemu Leisti, Graham87, Magister Mathematicae, Cuchullain, Koavf,
Jowe (usurped), Jivecat, Johnsolo, BartonM, Ian Dunster, Ucucha, Titoxd, SchuminWeb, AlastairR, Fragglet, RexNL, Pete.Hurd, D.brodale,
Milomedes, James2001, Mordicai, Bgwhite, Evilswan, Albrozdude, Kjlewis, YurikBot, Kencaesi, RussBot, Icarus3, Ericorbit, Rintrah,
RichardJohn, Blutnk, Arichnad, Nick Roberts, Seegoon, Smartyhall, Mysid, Takeel, MacMog, Abrio, Nikkimaria, Spawn Man, JQF,
JeramieHicks, Sprocketeer, AMbroodEY, Poulpy, Monk of the highest order, Thomas Blomberg, Rehevkor, Klassobanieras, DT29, User24,
SmackBot, John Lunney, Kherron, Rosicrucian, F, McGeddon, The reverend, C.Fred, Anastrophe, Brossow, ComaDivine, Imzadi1979,
Nil Einne, Mauls, Antifumo, CrypticBacon, Master Deusoma, Hmains, Teemu08, Gonzalo84, Jprg1966, Robertissimo, Thumperward, Oli
Filth, OrangeDog, Neo-Jay, Colonies Chris, Emurphy42, Brendanmccue, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Factorylad, Tamfang, Frap, Kevinpurcell, Hateless, BaseTurnComplete, Monotonehell, Treki, Sarahtdl, Charivari, TenPoundHammer, Angela26, JzG, Kevin908, Bucksburg,
IronGargoyle, Fedallah, Sfgreenwood, Redeagle688, Dr.K., EEPROM Eagle, SubSeven, Culture jam, Janus303, Tawkerbot2, LSX, Eastlaw, Bitchen, Johnny Zoo, CmdrObot, Sewebster, Filthy Ice Cube Tray, Vectro, Badseed, Crossmr, Papias256, Tanru, Bellerophon5685,
Csumnerwiki, Rearviewmirror, Tkynerd, Fifo, Max sang, Nabokov, Jedibob5, Christopherj4321, LachlanA, 21122012, MoogleDan, Alphachimpbot, Milonica, Dr Mango, Hell P, Ecphora, Msalt, Cryptical, Gert7, ZPM, KYJustin, S4t00th, SHCarter, WikkanWitch, Not
An IP, PEAR, Duggy 1138, CodeCat, Swldxer, Adobetemplar, InvertRect, Pax:Vobiscum, Harriscat, IvoShandor, STBot, Pennywisepeter,
Custos0, Filll, Maurice Carbonaro, Yonidebot, R. sparts, DasMustafah, Jtorey, Naniwako, SparsityProblem, Largoplazo, STBotD, RVJ,
Guru Larry, Curtis bartok 21, Hystericalwomb, Kayo97, Morefun, Imasleepviking, PDFbot, Wolfrock, Flakblaster, Biggs33, Hakanai,
SieBot, Mguerard27, Bedelato, The Parsnip!, Cwkmail, Semitones, Kylswych76, Svick, Rjfost, Owlmonkey, Reneld286, ObfuscatePenguin, Dpdiddy, Sfan00 IMG, ClueBot, Robbiemun, Stoney3K~enwiki, Nonobst4nt~enwiki, Drmies, Snoopy21, Trivialist, Sv1xv, Tnxman307, Cexycy, Marko Parabucki, Stepheng3, MelonBot, 89*Book, DumZiBoT, AlanM1, XLinkBot, 68Kustom, Addbot, ERK, KaletheQuick, Doniago, WCPWM, Lightbot, Neurovelho, Team4Technologies, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Themfromspace, Elsayed Taha, AnomieBOT,
Cptnono, Piano non troppo, Flopsy Mopsy and Cottonmouth, Eumolpo, Cameron Scott, Xqbot, Wing Dairu, BritishWatcher, GrouchoBot,
Dogpup4, FrescoBot, Surv1v4l1st, Schuhpuppe, Staccatoque, Jonesey95, Geogene, Full-date unlinking bot, Xeworlebi, Trappist the monk,
TotoCZ, Darrylb500, Dxer1963, Weedwhacker128, Tbhotch, MidgleyC, Boundarylayer, Drthatguy, TheXenomorph1, ZroBot, Mkratz,
Jatkinson100, Rails, Wingman4l7, DJSeaking, Brycehughes, Cgt, ClueBot NG, Themarkdolan, Stiofan88, Lyla1205, Orlando Avare,
LastNinja01, BG19bot, Original Token, Kerkeslager, Bruceyang1998, Demag1200, Stapletongrey, MyNameWasTaken, Tosk Albanian,
Ssscienccce, Hmainsbot1, Mogism, Vistawhite, GreenHorne101, Rylee55, Wendell890, TrollerMan1337, Chris troutman, Stratojet94,
Haminoon, CaptainPedge, DevonX21, Tullamore92, 32RB17, Vainilha, Unilith0, Monkbot, Editorial.ESP, HOT WUK, Doeribs, RB550,
Colonel Hatch, VizL00, Shazepe, FF700 and Anonymous: 418
Ocial cover Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Official%20cover?oldid=620493371 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Deathphoenix,
Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Graham87, Megapixie, VederJuda, Frap, Bolivian Unicyclist, Magioladitis, DexDor, Prisoner of Zenda and
Anonymous: 4
One-way voice link Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-way%20voice%20link?oldid=658690479 Contributors: Michael Hardy,
JonMoore, Scott Sanchez, Eyreland, Stefanomione, RxS, Tole, Cobblet, Mmernex, Bluebot, Amalas, Estban, Alaibot, Rruelas,
Jim.henderson, MystBot, Addbot, AnomieBOT, N419BH, Erik9bot, Skyerise, Brambleclawx, Mark Arsten, Springing Up and Anonymous: 3
Resident spy Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resident%20spy?oldid=660707061 Contributors: Altenmann, Orangemike, OwenBlacker, Espoo, Jonathan de Boyne Pollard, Stefanomione, SmackBot, Verne Equinox, Marktreut, Bluebot, Arcarius, Trekphiler, Frap,
Aboudaqn, Cesium 133, MARK S., Exhummerdude, J-boogie, Siberian Husky, Cole Dalton, CEngelbrecht, Olegwiki, Wikimandia, Hersfold, Steven J. Anderson, Akerbeltz, StillTrill, ClueBot, Addbot, Lucian Sunday, The Bushranger, Yobot, U b 6 i b 9, Rubinbot, Obersachsebot, Xqbot, Cantons-de-l'Est, Carrite, Jesse V., Peacemaker67, Benjitheijneb, Mogism and Anonymous: 16
Special reconnaissance Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special%20reconnaissance?oldid=662598929 Contributors: Edward, Rl,
Cjrother, DocWatson42, Grant65, Klemen Kocjancic, RossPatterson, Bender235, Rackham, Giraedata, Mpeisenbr, Kenyon, Tabletop, JamesBurns, Rjwilmsi, RussBot, Filippof, TDogg310, Nick-D, Colonies Chris, RomanSpa, Ckatz, Beetstra, RelentlessRecusant,
Hcberkowitz, Archangel1, Dawnseeker2000, Erxnmedia, EmericaRon, Hiplibrarianship, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Mrg3105, KylieTastic,

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

181

AzureCitizen, Eyesbehindthelines, BonesBrigade, WRK, Foofbun, Niceguyedc, FreedomFighterXL, Arjayay, Smidsy999, Pgallert, Addbot, Kman543210, Yobot, Orangepippen, Galoubet, Materialscientist, Citation bot, SFBubba, Xqbot, Tragino, Wholemanne, Armyjoe,
FrescoBot, Der rikkk, Citation bot 1, Hellknowz, Alexnip, RjwilmsiBot, IshmaelMarcos, Dewritech, GoingBatty, Danyy0202, H3llBot,
Helpful Pixie Bot, Dainomite, BattyBot, Briancarlton, Jordankiljoy6, Rybec, Irish321, Icemanwcs, Lakun.patra, Monkbot, IrishSpook and
Anonymous: 46
Steganography Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography?oldid=659576804 Contributors: Tbc~enwiki, WojPob, Bryan Derksen, Koyaanis Qatsi, Eclecticology, Arvindn, PierreAbbat, Valhalla, Heron, Bdesham, Michael Hardy, EvanProdromou, Breakpoint, Wwwwolf, Lquilter, Sannse, TakuyaMurata, Rodzilla, Ahoerstemeier, Cyp, WeiNix, Theresa knott, Smack, Novum, Adam Bishop, Ww, Dysprosia, The Anomebot, Greenrd, Peregrine981, Furrykef, Saltine, Omegatron, Ed g2s, Jose Ramos, Calieber, Robbot, Owain, Donreed,
Securiger, Chris Roy, Stewartadcock, Sverdrup, Hadal, Saforrest, Refdoc, Fargoth~enwiki, Giftlite, DocWatson42, Lunkwill, Sj, Inter,
Wwoods, Chinasaur, Matt Crypto, SWAdair, Pne, Dugosz, Pgan002, Antandrus, Vina, Lynda Finn, Maximaximax, Talrias, Cynix,
Kelson, Lazarus666, Intrigue, Thorwald, Takaitra, Mike Rosoft, RossPatterson, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, ArnoldReinhold, Minorbob, Pmetzger, El C, Aydee, Meggar, Robotje, Billymac00, Nk, Photonique, Davidgothberg, Themindset, Seared eyes, Alansohn,
PaulHanson, Arthena, Thebarrin, Andrewpmk, Blues-harp, Benefros, Theodore Kloba, Kevinp~enwiki, Wtmitchell, Evil Monkey, RainbowOfLight, Egg, Drdefcom~enwiki, Oleg Alexandrov, Lkinkade, Feezo, Camw, Guy M, WPPWAH, Ruud Koot, MrDarcy, Tabletop,
Shonzilla, Wikiklrsc, Inventm, Eyreland, Pissas@acm.org, Stefanomione, Gerbrant, Marudubshinki, Mandarax, Deltabeignet, Grammarbot, EbenVisher, Mlewan, MarkHudson, Rjwilmsi, Strait, Edggar, LjL, AndyKali, Yar Kramer, FlaBot, Authalic, Kammerbulle, Mathbot,
Dirkbike, Gurch, Mitsukai, RobyWayne, Intgr, GreyCat, OpenToppedBus, Imnotminkus, Peterl, YurikBot, Hairy Dude, Beltz, Mclayto,
Hydrargyrum, Grubber, Pseudomonas, Janke, Codyrank, Cheeselog3000, Tkinkhorst, Mysid, Bota47, Edub, Cstaa, Ninly, Haddock420,
Cojoco, JoanneB, Alasdair, Repayne, Ilmari Karonen, Singingwolfboy, JDspeeder1, Innity0, AceVentura, True Pagan Warrior, SmackBot,
Mmernex, Elonka, Prodego, McGeddon, MeiStone, Alan McBeth, Aphid360, Tommstein, Brianski, Anwar saadat, Saros136, Bluebot, Oli
Filth, RayAYang, LukeFerry, Octahedron80, A. B., Shouta, Gilbertera, Petlif, Midnightcomm, Yermiyahu, Maxt, Cybercobra, Akulkis, B
jonas, DMacks, Katt, Madeleine Price Ball, Microchip08, JoshuaZ, Robferrer, Peterhoneyman, JoGusto, Aarktica, Lemojk7, Mercan, DabMachine, EmreDuran, Iridescent, JMK, NEMT, Joseph Solis in Australia, Ljlego, Oseransky, Tawkerbot2, Dycedarg, Van helsing, Smoore
500, Shandris, INVERTED, Caliberoviv, Gogo Dodo, Nick2253, Etienne.navarro, Nuwewsco, Fatrabbit, Thijs!bot, Edman274, MrFire,
Headbomb, Rfrohardt, AntiVandalBot, Gioto, Dougher, Deective, Barek, Hut 8.5, Andylindsay, VoABot II, Antipodean Contributor,
Sarahj2107, Jancikotuc, Tookiewana, Rohasnagpal, Upholder, Davidmatt, LorenzoB, Cpl Syx, Thibbs, Gappiah, WLU, Jim.henderson,
CommonsDelinker, Daeroni, Felipe1982, Slash, Hans Dunkelberg, Moshe szweizer, Crakkpot, Touisiau, KylieTastic, Cometstyles, SmackTacular, Tkgd2007, HeadOce, Cralar, Deor, TreasuryTag, JoeDeRose, LokiClock, Spihuntr, TXiKiBoT, Raftermast, Newtown11, Boonhead, Dlae, Raymondwinn, Surroundsound5000, Fergie4000, AlleborgoBot, Mpx, Lonwolve, Agvulpine, Dogah, SieBot, AlasdairBailey,
Parhamr, Dawn Bard, Vidiii, Vanished user 82345ijgeke4tg, Radon210, Henke37, VanWoods, 05, Wikiguy28272, Joekasper,
H8gaR, PerryTachett, Tnolley, Denisarona, XDanielx, ClueBot, Nfj9800, HiddenMind, BenWillard, MartinTheK, Boing! said Zebedee,
Wikistegano, DragonBot, Eaglemb, Alexbot, Alexanderwdark, Psinu, Goldshinapicklejar, Syvaidya, DumZiBoT, XLinkBot, Rror, Steinsomers, Futurevision, Addbot, Mr0t1633, Ghettoblaster, Dunhere, DougsTech, MrOllie, MrVanBot, Rschauer, Iobehmom, OlEnglish,
Bartledan, Legobot, Yobot, MarioS, Kusano k, MrBlueSky, Jez1, Gjohnson9894, AnomieBOT, KDS4444, Jim1138, Kingpin13, Flewis,
Materialscientist, 90 Auto, Citation bot, Xqbot, Ann arbor street, Lele giannoni, GrouchoBot, Teumteum, Jllopezpino, Silvergriphon,
Omnipaedista, Brandon5485, Shadowjams, Aaron Kauppi, Chaheel Riens, FrescoBot, Surv1v4l1st, Mohdavary, Welshcorgi, Beanmaster758, Rhalah, AstaBOTh15, Ivangrimm, Thinking of England, Ctrlaltdecimate, Tim1357, Fama Clamosa, Vrenator, Ammodramus,
Eeshsidhartha, Suusion of Yellow, TheMesquito, Stj6, RjwilmsiBot, TankMiche, VernoWhitney, Djfgregory, Aircorn, JackNapierX,
EmausBot, Katherine, Spy message, NateEag, Sinfocol, WikiGonz, Anirudh Emani, Cogiati, F, Spacexplosion, , A930913,
H3llBot, Wingman4l7, Erianna, Donner60, Roshanbrshetty, Blackvisionit, ChuispastonBot, 28bot, ClueBot NG, Muasad, ByScientist,
JohnsonL623, Cntras, Lismet, Helpful Pixie Bot, Xdpdc888, Gut informiert, Chafe66, Fonduelover, ZipoBibrok5x10^8, Cndv, Hawaiirules, Nerdsauce, Cheddad, Rbcafe, KATANAGOD, Pillsmith, Librarywild, Chirayu.Chiripal, Dexbot, Ot7, Mogism, Gertie the hertie,
WastedMeerkat, Kalex68, Ashikali1607, Mraggo, XndrK, MV360, Raseman~enwiki, Vim nation, Theheisenberg, Ginsuloft, Jianhui67,
, Ekkt0r, ChrisyHuber, Monkbot, KonigProbst, FursuitYi, Mattyboy1066, Gauntman1 and Anonymous: 472
Surveillance Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surveillance?oldid=662118754 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Derek Ross, WojPob, The
Anome, Ortolan88, DavidLevinson, Edward, Patrick, Michael Hardy, Kku, Liftarn, Suisui, Kingturtle, Michael Shields, Tristanb, Mxn,
Novum, Dysprosia, WhisperToMe, Wik, Hyacinth, Nv8200pa, David.Monniaux, MrJones, ZimZalaBim, Securiger, Lowellian, Chris Roy,
Vfrickey, Michael Snow, Mushroom, Zigger, Solipsist, Tagishsimon, Andycjp, Popefauvexxiii, Beland, Glogger, Toshimarise, Izzycohen, N328KF, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Bender235, ZeroOne, JoeSmack, Pedant, JustPhil, El C, Kwamikagami, Leif, Adambro,
Harley peters, ZayZayEM, Arcadian, Csabo, Babajobu, Paleorthid, Ejstarchuk, Efortune, Hu, Hohum, Evil Monkey, ~shuri, Bookandcoee, Walshga, Hq3473, Richard Arthur Norton (1958- ), Alvis, Woohookitty, Pol098, Mangojuice, Stefanomione, Clapaucius, Canderson7, Rjwilmsi, PHenry, Wingover, G Clark, Ground Zero, Old Moonraker, Jrtayloriv, Quuxplusone, Coolhawks88, YurikBot, Wavelength, RussBot, Arado, Hede2000, Raquel Baranow, Hydrargyrum, Stephenb, Gaius Cornelius, Shaddack, Rsrikanth05, Nirvana2013,
Aeusoes1, Joel7687, JulesH, SeaFox, Zzuuzz, Jacklee, Petri Krohn, GraemeL, Ajuk, Izayohi, Veinor, MacsBug, SmackBot, Mmernex,
Moez, Impaciente, McGeddon, J-beda, Londonlinks, Alex earlier account, Jdfoote, Ohnoitsjamie, Snappa, Chris the speller, Spilla, Oli
Filth, Victorgrigas, Scwlong, Chendy, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Frap, MJBurrage, OOODDD, Gala.martin, COMPFUNK2, YankeeDoodle14, Badgerpatrol, Weregerbil, Ohconfucius, Byelf2007, Quevaal~enwiki, J 1982, Gobonobo, Ckatz, A. Parrot, Beetstra, EKartoel, Nabeth, Hu12, OnBeyondZebrax, Kencf0618, Agent X2, K0Yaku, Joseph Solis in Australia, Dp462090, Linkspamremover,
Tawkerbot2, Chetvorno, Jafet, ChrisCork, Peter1c, CmdrObot, ShelfSkewed, Sdorrance, Bakanov, Myasuda, Drozdp, Cydebot, Mike
Christie, Gogo Dodo, Optimist on the run, Maziotis, Thijs!bot, Epbr123, Maximilian Schnherr, PaperTruths, Tobias Baccas, Classic
rocker, Dawnseeker2000, AntiVandalBot, Gioto, Mashiah Davidson, Alphachimpbot, Guul~enwiki, CGroup, Yancyfry jr, Res2216restar,
JAnDbot, Deective, MER-C, SiobhanHansa, Elizabennet, Magioladitis, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, Atalanta86, Soulbot, Nyttend, Froid,
Eysen, MCG, DerHexer, WLU, Foregone conclusion, Waytohappiness, Atulsnischal, Jim.henderson, GeorgHH, vangline, TheEgyptian,
CommonsDelinker, Balaraat, J.delanoy, Jcsurveillance, Siobhan Hansa, Maurice Carbonaro, Jesant13, Brian Pearson, Olegwiki, Xavier
Gir, Scranium, TRimester6, Diamondrake, Concaire, Fooghter20x, Ogranut, Sandman619, Scdweb, IHTFP, Crevox, GcSwRhIc, Humair85, Aymatth2, Qxz, PeetMoss, Free0willy, Doc James, Nicksoda21, Interstates, Swliv, Spease, Csblack, Doritosyeah, Moonraker12,
Brankow, Mazugrin, RW Marloe, Slmvbs, Svick, Joel Rennie, ClueBot, Mingacorn91, Bigdoole, Tanglewood4, Mild Bill Hiccup, Laudak, SuperHamster, CoolIdeas, Abrech, Rhododendrites, Erunestian, Night-vision-guru, Ellswore, DumZiBoT, Maraparacc, AlanM1,
XLinkBot, Abdul2m, Zodon, Activenanda, Addbot, Ashton1983, Download, Sillyfolkboy, Ccacsmss, Tassedethe, MagneH, Wireless
friend, Jarble, Tartarus, Artichoke-Boy, Yobot, Granpu, Alexanderhayes, Fraggle81, TaBOT-zerem, Edoe, Kikbguy, AnomieBOT, VanishedUser sdu9aya9fasdsopa, A Taste of Terre Haute, Rjanag, Piano non troppo, Quantumseven, Mahmudmasri, Materialscientist, Jcs45,
Mechamind90, LilHelpa, Mlduda, Xqbot, PhDOnPoint, Capricorn42, Tnyl, ToLLIa, Gabriel1907, Tulaneadam21, Shadowjams, Fres-

182

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coBot, Citation bot 1, Pinethicket, Rochdalehornet, Merlion444, Videoinspector, Cnwilliams, Zevschonberg, Sociologo11, Clirmion,
RjwilmsiBot, Davegagner, DexDor, CCTVPro, Wunderpants, EmausBot, John of Reading, Super48paul, Contributor75, Smurfjones,
Jenks24, Nyenten, H3llBot, Exhibitions.intern, W163, Jrest, Madisonpadre, ClueBot NG, Mesoderm, Tjepsen, Helpful Pixie Bot, Mdeets,
BG19bot, Slater555, Northamerica1000, Wiki13, Paganinip, Elzaibak, MrSidneyReilly, Meclee, Glacialfox, Tristan Lall, Michaelpetercarter, Chrisswanger, BattyBot, Jimw338, Cyberbot II, Khazar2, E.N.Stanway, Artem12345, IjonTichyIjonTichy, The kaper, Stacy Jacobson, Shivajivarma, Mathfreak231, Yulipipin, Donnchacol, Bravoa60, Ugog Nizdast, Watchpocket, Whizz40, Dodi 8238, Petelogger, Danniel Curze, Ibrahim Farid, Monkbot, TechnoTalk, Parktoy, Crazy Aberdeen Guy, Chrisnlorenzo, Wasanajones, AuthenticSam.,
CaseyMillerWiki, ResearchMinder and Anonymous: 274

30.9.2

Images

File:16th_century_French_cypher_machine_in_the_shape_of_a_book_with_arms_of_Henri_II.jpg Source:
http://upload.
wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a2/16th_century_French_cypher_machine_in_the_shape_of_a_book_with_arms_of_Henri_II.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, photographed at Musee d'Ecouen Original artist: Uploadalt
File:193109_mukden_incident_railway_sabotage.jpg Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/193109_
mukden_incident_railway_sabotage.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: published in japanese newspaper Rekishi Syashin Original
artist: Unknown
File:2008-09_Kaiserschloss_Kryptologen.JPG
Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/2008-09_
Kaiserschloss_Kryptologen.JPG License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ziko
File:2010-05-14-USCYBERCOM_Logo.jpg
Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/
2010-05-14-USCYBERCOM_Logo.jpg License:
Public domain Contributors:
Department of Defense Original artist:
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410_cybersec/images/cybercom_seal_large1.jpg Department of Defense
File:3-Boyd-and-Command.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c1/3-Boyd-and-Command.png License:
CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz
File:3-Boyd-and-Initial-Intel.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d8/3-Boyd-and-Initial-Intel.png License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz
File:Al-kindi_cryptographic.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/76/Al-kindi_cryptographic.png License:
Public domain Contributors: en:Image:Al-kindi_cryptographic.gif Original artist: Al-Kindi
File:Alessandro_Magnasco_-_Interrogations_in_Jail_-_WGA13849.jpg
Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
Public domain Contributors:
1.
commons/6/6b/Alessandro_Magnasco_-_Interrogations_in_Jail_-_WGA13849.jpg License:
Web Gallery of Art:
<a href='http://www.wga.hu/art/m/magnasco/int_jail.jpg' data-x-rel='nofollow'><img alt='Inkscape.svg'
src='//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Inkscape.svg/20px-Inkscape.svg.png'
width='20'
height='20'
srcset='//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Inkscape.svg/30px-Inkscape.svg.png
1.5x,
//upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Inkscape.svg/40px-Inkscape.svg.png 2x' data-le-width='60' data-le-height='60' /></a>
Image <a href='http://www.wga.hu/html/m/magnasco/int_jail.html' data-x-rel='nofollow'><img alt='Information icon.svg'
src='//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Information_icon.svg/20px-Information_icon.svg.png'
width='20'
height='20' srcset='//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Information_icon.svg/30px-Information_icon.svg.png 1.5x,
//upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Information_icon.svg/40px-Information_icon.svg.png 2x' data-le-width='620'
data-le-height='620' /></a> Info about artwork
Original artist: Alessandro Magnasco
File:Alfred_Naujocks.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/Alfred_Naujocks.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, item number CW-004 Original artist: U.S. Army
File:Ambox_globe_content.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Ambox_globe_content.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: Own work, using File:Information icon3.svg and File:Earth clip art.svg Original artist: penubag
File:Ambox_important.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, based o of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk contribs)
File:Audio_drill.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Audio_drill.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
? Original artist: ?
File:BLW_Teapot_with_Actresses.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b9/BLW_Teapot_with_Actresses.
jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.0 uk Contributors: Originally uploaded at http://www.britainloveswikipedia.org/ Original artist: David Jackson
File:Bansky_one_nation_under_cctv.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8a/Bansky_one_nation_under_
cctv.jpg License: CC BY-SA 2.0 Contributors: One Nation Under CCTV Original artist: oogiboig
File:BodywornSurveillanceEquipment.jpg
BodywornSurveillanceEquipment.jpg License:
Central Intelligence Agency

Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/
Public domain Contributors: Bodyworn Surveillance Equipment Original artist:

File:Boundless_Informant_data_collection.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5b/Boundless_Informant_

data_collection.svg License: CC0 Contributors: Own work This le was derived from: BlankMap-World6.svg
Original artist: Rezonansowy
File:CCIRM-Info-Tasking-Flow.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/CCIRM-Info-Tasking-Flow.gif
License: Public domain Contributors: http://fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/bosch04.htm Original artist: Larry K. Wentz
File:CIA.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/23/CIA.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.
law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/403m.html Original artist: United States federal government
File:Cairns-Lagoon.JPG Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a4/Cairns-Lagoon.JPG License: CC-BY-SA-3.0
Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Bidgee using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Original
uploader was Frances76 at en.wikipedia

30.9. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

183

File:Charlemagne_Pralte.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/Charlemagne_P%C3%A9ralte.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Nombreux sites Internet et ouvrages divers Original artist: Unknown
File:Commons-logo.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original
artist: ?
File:ConstellationGPS.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/ConstellationGPS.gif License: Public domain
Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia Original artist: Original uploader was El pak at en.wikipedia
File:Cooper_bomb_threat.gif Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/Cooper_bomb_threat.gif License: Public
domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Liftarn using CommonsHelper. Original artist:
Original uploader was ChrisO at en.wikipedia
File:Crypto_key.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/65/Crypto_key.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work based on image:Key-crypto-sideways.png by MisterMatt originally from English Wikipedia Original artist: MesserWoland
File:Crystal_Clear_app_kedit.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/Crystal_Clear_app_kedit.svg License:
LGPL Contributors: Sabine MINICONI Original artist: Sabine MINICONI
File:DSTAMP_Controp_Camera.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/DSTAMP_Controp_Camera.jpg
License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: 320i
File:Dead_drop_spike.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/49/Dead_drop_spike.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Diffie_and_Hellman.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/88/Diffie_and_Hellman.jpg License: CCBY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:EarlyOSStransitions1945-52.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/21/EarlyOSStransitions1945-52.
png License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz
File:Edit-clear.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the le, specically: Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).
File:Encoded_letter_of_Gabriel_Luetz_d_Aramon_after_1546_with_partial_deciphering.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/Encoded_letter_of_Gabriel_Luetz_d_Aramon_after_1546_with_partial_deciphering.jpg License: CC BYSA 3.0 Contributors: Own work, photographed at Ecouen Museum Original artist: Uploadalt
File:Enigma.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Enigma.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: User:
Jszigetvari Original artist: ?
File:Fbi_duquesne.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Fbi_duquesne.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Fiber_optic_tap.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Fiber_optic_tap.png License: GFDL Contributors: Own work Original artist: Roens
File:Flag_of_Australia.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/b9/Flag_of_Australia.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Brazil.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/05/Flag_of_Brazil.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original
artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Canada.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/cf/Flag_of_Canada.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Cuba.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bd/Flag_of_Cuba.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Drawn by User:Madden Original artist: see below
File:Flag_of_France.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/c/c3/Flag_of_France.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Germany.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/b/ba/Flag_of_Germany.svg License: PD Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_India.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg License: Public domain Contributors:
? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Israel.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Flag_of_Israel.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern%20History/Israel%20at%2050/The%20Flag%20and%20the%20Emblem Original artist: The Provisional Council of State Proclamation of the Flag of the State of Israel of 25 Tishrei 5709 (28 October 1948) provides
the ocial specication for the design of the Israeli ag.
File:Flag_of_New_Zealand.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3e/Flag_of_New_Zealand.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: http://www.mch.govt.nz/files/NZ%20Flag%20-%20proportions.JPG Original artist: Zscout370, Hugh Jass
and many others
File:Flag_of_North_Korea.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/51/Flag_of_North_Korea.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Template:
Original artist: Zscout370
File:Flag_of_Pakistan.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Flag_of_Pakistan.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: The drawing and the colors were based from agspot.net. Original artist: User:Zscout370
File:Flag_of_Romania.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/73/Flag_of_Romania.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: AdiJapan
File:Flag_of_Russia.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f3/Flag_of_Russia.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

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File:Flag_of_South_Africa.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/Flag_of_South_Africa.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Per specications in the Constitution of South Africa, Schedule 1 - National ag Original artist: Flag design by
Frederick Brownell, image by Wikimedia Commons users
File:Flag_of_South_Korea.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Flag_of_South_Korea.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Ordinance Act of the Law concerning the National Flag of the Republic of Korea, Construction and color guidelines
(Russian/English) This site is not exist now.(2012.06.05) Original artist: Various
File:Flag_of_the_People{}s_Republic_of_China.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Flag_of_the_
People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, http://www.protocol.gov.hk/flags/eng/n_flag/
design.html Original artist: Drawn by User:SKopp, redrawn by User:Denelson83 and User:Zscout370
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