Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Hitoshi YAMAMOTO
Faculty of Business Administration
Rissho University
Tokyo, Japan
Email: hitoshi.yamamoto@mbm.nifty.com
social media. Information in social media has the characteristic of a public good because it is available to anyone
with the proper permission. One of the schemes proposed
to enhance users contributions of such public goods centers
on the norms and metanorms games created by Axelrod[2].
In these games, non-cooperators receive punishment from
the other players. However, it is nearly impossible to punish
non-participants in social media. Another scheme is to give
rewards to contributors; however, whether this is effective
is debatable. For example, some studies ([4], [9]) reported
that a punishment system is more effective than a reward
system.
In this study, we clarify the necessary conditions to
motivate users to voluntarily provide information in social
media, and toward this end we use the framework of a
public goods game to describe user behaviors such as posting
articles and comments.
II. L ITERATURE
There have been many studies on social media. Ahn[1]
analyzed Cyworld in Korea, which is a large-scale network
whose nodes exceed 10 million. Toriumi[11] classified more
than 5,000 small-sized SNSs from the viewpoints of network structures and communication patterns, and Kwak[7]
analyzed twitter data. Akshay[6] discussed the relationship
between users interactions and their behaviors.
Some studies on social media have focused on their
institutional design. Toriumi[10] used an agent-based approach to examine the methodology of promoting the type
of system utilization that is effective in activating social
network services. The objective of each of these studies
was institutional design for a specific social medium. On
the other hand, there have been few studies on analyzing
the mechanism of voluntary participation in general social
media.
Studies on users motivations to provide information in
social media usually adopt a social psychological approach
using questionnaire surveys. Miura[8] conducted an investigation of questionnaire surveys given to personal blog
Keywords-Social media, Metanorms game, Reward, Punishment, Agent-based simulation, Population dynamics analysis,
Evolutionarily stable strategy
I. I NTRODUCTION
Many types of social media such as Facebook and Twitter
have been developed over recent years, and these have
attracted many users. In social media, many users voluntary and continuing provision of information creates many
kinds of values. Users incur costs for creating and posting
information in the course of their participation, and thus
non-contributors have incentives to engage in free-ride
behavior. To avoid this problem, many social media provide
feedback systems to enhance users voluntary participation,
such as comments and the Like! buttons on Facebook.
What type of mechanism can social media use to encourage the continuous participation of users, even though
these users pay certain costs for generating content? Much
information is submitted and many participants share it in
Isamu OKADA
Faculty of Business Administration
Soka University
Tokyo, Japan
Email: okada@soka.ac.jp
43
44
Figure 1.
Table I
PAYOFF MATRIX IN POSTING AN ARTICLE
Cooperate
Defect
Cooperate
F + (Nc 1)M \ F + (Nc 1)M
Nc M \ F
Defect
F \Nc M
0\0
45
(v vmin )2
! i
,
2
j (vj vmin )
Table II
PARAMETER SETTING OF META REWARD GAME
Parameter
Cost for posting article, F
Benefit for reading article, M
Cost for posting comment on article, C
Benefit for reading previous comment, R
Cost for posting comment on comment, C
Benefit for reading previous comment, R
Value
-3.0
1.0
-2.0
9.0
-2.0
9.0
Table III
PARAMETER SETTING OF META PUNISHMENT GAME
(1)
Parameter
Benefit of defecting, T
Harm by defecting, H
Cost for punishment, E
Harm by punishment, P
Cost for meta punishment, E
Harm by meta punishment, P
Value
3.0
-1.0
-2.0
-9.0
-2.0
-9.0
46
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
agents
comment is still low, and thus few articles get posted over
time. However, by implementing a meta reward game, that
is, a system in which participants make comments on the
others comments on an original article, users have greater
motivation to post comments, and thus they can gain high
payoffs for posting. As a result, such a system promotes
users voluntary participation.
B. Influence of payoff
Next, we tested the influence of parameters in the payoff
matrix on the evolution of cooperation. The parameters correspond to costs and benefits of an agents actions in social
media. These costs and benefits depend on the function of
social media. For example, the Like! button1 on Facebook
gives a cooperative action (posting an article) something
like a reward; however, a user who clicks this button has
little cost. On the other hand, we can assume that on the
1 A function of pushing a button to express approval of another users
posted article. All of the participants can view the number of times the
button was pushed, and so the poster can observe how well his or her
article was received by others.
47
Average B
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
5
r
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Influence of reward
00
3
c
Um
Ui
bm = bm
#
"
Ui
m
OR bm = 1 AND U
b
b
m
m
#
"
Ui
m
OR bm = 1 AND U
bm bm ,
V. DYNAMICS A NALYSIS
(3)
It must be difficult to mathematically analyze a heterogeneous population and their interactions, such as communications in social media. However, by employing the strong
assumption of a homogeneous population we may be able
to find a type of saturated solution. Such an approach might
help us to understand the performance of heterogeneous populations. Here, we clarify mathematically why cooperation
48
Ui
= T bi + H
n
$
bj + E
vi
2
j=1
vi
4
k=1
b2j + P
j=i
b3k (1 vj ) + P
1 vi
4
(1 bj) + C
li
2
j=1
n
n
$
$
k=1
li
4
k=1
j=1
$$
vi
4
j=1
k=i j=i,k
n
n
$$
k=1
(1 bj )2 + R
n
n
$
$
k=1
b3k vj + R
j=1
k=i j=i,k
n
(1 bi )2
2
vi
4
n
$
lj
j=1
j=i
li
(1 bk )3 lj + R
4
k=i j=i,k
n
n
b3k vj
j=1
j=i
n
n
$
$
k=1
n
$
vj
j=i
j=1
F (1 bi ) + M
li
C
4
n
$
j=1
k=i j=i,k
b2i
j=1
j=i
n
n
$
$
n
$
j=i
(1 bk )3 lj
j=1
k=i j=i,k
n
b3k lj
$$
n
k=1
j=1
k=i j=i,k
(1 bk )3 (1 lj ) + P
(1 li )
4
j=1
n
n
$
$
k=1
k=i j=i,k
(1 bk )3 vj ,
(2)
j=1
k=i j=i,k
(4)
Figure 8.
49
[6] A. Java, T. Finin, X. Song, and B. Tseng. Why we twitter : Understanding microblogging usage and communities.
Proceeding of the Joint 9th WEBKDD and 1st SNA-KDD
Workshop, 2007, 2007.
VI. C ONCLUSION
[8] A. Miura and K. Yamashita. Psychological and Social Influences on Blog Writing: An Online Survey of Blog Authors
in Japan. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication,
12(4):14521471, 2007.
[9] M. Sutter, S. Haigner, and M. G. Kocher. Choosing the
Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in
Social Dilemma Situations. Review of Economic Studies,
77(4):15401566, 2010.
[10] F. Toriumi and K. Ishii. Simulation of encouragement methods for sns based on user behavior model. In Proceedings of
3rd World Congress on Social Simulation, 2010.
[11] F. Toriumi, I. Okada, H. Yamamoto, H. Suwa, K. Izumi, and
Y. Hashimoto. Classification of social network sites based on
network indexes and communication patterns. In Proceedings
of International Workshop on Social Web Mining Co-located
with IJCAI2011, 2011.
[12] H. Yamamoto and I. Okada. Vulnerability and evolution of
cooperation in the metanorms game. In Proceedings of 3rd
World Congress on Social Simulation, 2010.
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