Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DNSSEC
Security Extensions for DNS
Champika
Wijayatunga
<champika.wijayatunga@icann.org>
+1-202-709-5262
VoIP
Text
US-NSTIC effort
lamb@xtcn.com
OECS ID effort
mydomainname.com
Text
The
Text Bad:
DNSChanger
-
Biggest
Cybercriminal
Takedown
in
History
4M
machines,
100
countries,
$14M
Text
DNS
Resolver
www.majorbank.id=?
1.2.3.4
Get page
Login page
www.majorbank.id = 1.2.3.4
DNS
Server
webserver
www @
1.2.3.4
Username / Password
Account Data
ISP
DNS Hierarchy
id
root
com
majorbank.id
www.majorbank.id
Majorbank
(Registrant)
Text
www.majorbank.id=?
1.2.3.4
Get page
Login page
Username / Password
Account Data
DNS
Resolver
www.majorbank.id = 1.2.3.4
DNS
Server
webserver
www @
1.2.3.4
The Problem:
DNS Cache Poisoning Attack
Text
www.majorbank.id=?
5.6.7.8
Get page
Login page
Username / Password
Error
DNS
Resolver
www.majorbank.id = 1.2.3.4
DNS
Server
Attacker
www.majorbank.id = 5.6.7.8
Attacker
webserver
www @
5.6.7.8
Password database
Text
www.majorbank.id=?
5.6.7.8
Get page
Login page
Username / Password
Error
DNS
Resolver
www.majorbank.id = 1.2.3.4
DNS
Server
Attacker
webserver
www @
5.6.7.8
Password database
Text
www.majorbank.id=?
1.2.3.4
Get page
Login page
Username / Password
Account Data
DNS
Resolver
with
DNSSEC
DNS
Server with
DNSSEC
Attacker
www.majorbank.id= 5.6.7.8
webserver
www @
1.2.3.4
Text
www.majorbank.id=?
1.2.3.4
Get page
Login page
Username / Password
Account Data
DNS
Resolver
with
DNSSEC
www.majorbank.id = 1.2.3.4
DNS
Server with
DNSSEC
webserver
www @
1.2.3.4
Text
Text
* COMCAST /w 20M and others; most ISPs in SE ,CZ. AND ~12% of resolvers validate using
DNSSEC
**Intl bottom-up trust model /w 21 TCRs from: TT, BF, RU, CN, US, SE, NL, UG, BR, Benin, PT, NP,
Mauritius, CZ, CA, JP, UK, NZ
*** Partial list of registrars: https://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/dnssec/deployment
But
Text
level domains.
Many have plans. Few have taken the step (e.g.,
yandex.com, paypal.com*, comcast.com).
nd
* http://fedv6-deployment.antd.nist.gov/cgi-bin/generate-com http://www.thesecuritypractice.com/the_security_practice/
2011/12/all-paypal-domains-are-now-using-dnssec.html
http://www.nacion.com/2012-03-15/Tecnologia/Sitios-web-de-bancos-ticos-podran-ser-mas-seguros.aspx
Text
Text
For Companies:
For Users:
For All:
Text
DNSSEC Implementation
16
DNS
Data flow
Text
DATA
MASTER
STUB
Resolver
caching
resolver
(recursive)
zone
file
(text, DB)
dynamic
updates
ATTACK
VECTORS
SLAVES
SLAVES
17
man in the
middle
cache
poisoning
modified
data
spoofing
master
(routing/DoS)
spoofed
updates
corrupted
data
Brief
reminder on cryptography
Text
18
One-way
hash functions
Text
Message
one-way
hash
function
Digest
19
fixed length
One-way
hash functions
Text
Most common
o
MD5
SHA-1
SHA-2
GOST
HAVAL
DES
checksum
CRC{16,32,64}
20
Symmetric
key crypto
Text
Alice
21
Bob
Asymmetric
or Public Key crypto
Text
Alice
22
Bob
Public
Key crypto functions
Text
23
How
DNSSEC Works
Text
Client
www.myzone.net. ?
IP address
myzone.net
nameserver
24
Resolve
r
(ISP)
www.myzone.net. ?
x.gtld-server.net.
Root
Server
.net
nameserver
How
DNSSEC Works
Text
25
Text
New concepts
26
New
Concepts
Text
New RRs
o
Signature expiration
Key Rollovers
27
Chain
of trust and Secure Entry Point
Text
Using the existing delegation based model of distribution/
Dont sign the entire zone, sign a RRset
Parent DOES NOT sign the child zone. The parent signs a
pointer (hash) to the key used to sign the data of the child
zone (DS record)
.!
net!
myzone!
28
www!
Text
29
New
RRs
Text
2.
3.
NSEC &
4.
5.
30
New
RR: DNSKEY
Text
OWNER
TYPE
PROTOCOL
FLAGS
ALGORITHM
31
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/
dns-sec-alg-numbers.xml
DNSKEY:
Two Keys, not one
Text
There are in practice at least two DNSKEY
pairs for every zone
o
32
KSK
and ZSK
Text
Key Signing Key (KSK)
o
Flags: 257
Flags: 256
33
New
RR: RRSIG (Resource Record
Text
Signature)
Myzone.net. ! 600 !A
!192.168.10.10!
Myzone.net. ! 600 !A
!192.168.23.45!
!
TYPE COVERED
#LABELS
!
OWNER
myzone.net. ! 600
TYPE
RRSIG
ALG
TTL
600 (!
!
SIG. EXPIRATION
SIG. INCEPTION
KEY ID
SIGNER NAME
!
20150115154303
20141017154303 23807 myzone.net.
!
!
SIGNATURE
CoYkYPqE8Jv6UaVJgRrh7u16m/cEFGtFM8TArbJdaiPu!
W77wZhrvonoBEyqYbhQ1yDaS74u9whECEe08gfoe1FGg!
. . .!
)!
34
RRSIG
Text
SERVFAIL
Domain effectively disappears from the Internet for
validating resolvers
35
New
RR: NSEC
Text
omega.myzone
?
RESOLVE
R
myzone.
!
alpha.myzone.
beta.myzone.
charlie.myzone.
delta.myzone.
NSEC
] delta.myzone. ,
zulu.myzone.[
36
!NS
!!
!A
!!
!CNAME!!
!A
!!
!MX
!!
zulu.myzone.
!A
!!
New
RR: NSEC3
Text
1-Way Hash
AUTH for myzone digests.
H(zulu.myzone.)
H(myzone.)!
H(delta.myzone.)
H(charlie.myzone.)
H(beta.myzone.)!
H(alpha.myzone.)!
New
RR: DS (Delegation Signer)
Text
Hash of the KSK of the child zone
Stored in the parent zone, together with the NS
RRs indicating a delegation of the child zone.
myzone.
!DS
!61138 ! 5
!1
F6CD025B3F5D0304089505354A0115584B56D683!
!
myzone.
!DS
!61138 ! 5
!2
CCBC0B557510E4256E88C01B0B1336AC4ED6FE08C8268CC1AA
5FBF00 5DCE3210!
38
Text
Text
Once
you
sign
the
zone
a
le
with
a
.signed
extension
will
be
created
db.myzone.net.signed
Text
Text
Questions?
42