Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86603
February 5, 1990
Diaz,
Hayudini
&
Bodegon
for
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals in LRC Case No. P-39-84 of
Branch XIV. 1
The facts narrated in the decision of the Court of Appeals
are accurate.
Respondent Judge Legaspi is the presiding judge of Branch
XX where Civil Case No. 6518-M is pending. LRC Case No. P39-84 is pending in Branch XIV presided over by Judge
Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr.
The LRC Case No. P-39-84 was initiated by the private
respondent State Investment House, Inc., when it filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over Active
Wood's two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 262966 and
262967 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-64250. September 30, 1983.]
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and ERLITO LORCA,
Petitioners, v. HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, Judge Presiding over
Branch XVI of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, TIMOTEA T.
MORALDE, CAYETANO T. MORALDE, JR., ALEXANDER T.
MORALDE, EMMANUEL T. MORALDE, and JOCELYN MORALDE
ABELLANA, Respondents.
Benito P. Fabio for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Michael Moralde for Private Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND
ADMINISTRATION AS WELL AS CONVENIENCE OF THE
PARTIES; CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
IN THE CASE AT BAR. There is, however, a more
pragmatic solution to the cotroversy at bar; and that is to
consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case.
Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as
well as the convenience of the parties for which the rules on
procedure and venue were formulated, dictate that it is the
Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court, which serves
as the more suitable forum for the determination of the
rights and obligations of the parties concerned. As observed
by both the trial and appellate courts, to require private
respondents who are all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to
litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would
unnecessarily expose them to considerable expenses. On
the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the
defendants transportation companies if they were required
to plead their causes in Cavite, for such change of venue
would not expose them to expenses which are not already
liable to incur in connection with the Gumaca case.
2.
ID.; PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF PROCEDURE. The
whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the
powers of the court fully and completely available for
justice. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is
that which gives opportunity for the most complete and
perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the
limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in
other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the count to transmute themselves into concrete
acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of
such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility
in righteous action. The purpose of procedure is not to
thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute
the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the
means by which the powers of the court are made effective
in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the administration of justice
becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open
to grave criticism." (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,
20 Phil. 523)
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
A petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-00708
entitled "Superlines Transportation Co., Inc., Et. Al. versus
Hon. Luis L. Victor, Et Al.," which affirmed the orders dated
March 28 and April 27, 1983 of herein respondent Judge
Luis L. Victor in Civil Case No. N-4338 of the Regional Trial
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
Promulgated:
November 17, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
- versus -
DECISION
INVESTITIONS-UND
7.
All existing suppliers credits (subject to final
validation) shall have 2 options:
a.
To be paid quarterly over a period of 5 years without
interest, or
b.
To continuously supply the company on the pay-reavail (Deliver same amount paid) basis.
8.
All loans, suppliers credit and other SCP liabilities are
subject to final verification once the recommended
rehabilitation plan is approved.
The rehabilitation plan recommended by Atty. Gabionza has
three (3) phases in the implementation of the proposed
P3.5 Billion fresh equity infusion, thus:
Phase 1
SCPs articles of incorporation and by laws shall be amended
to accommodate the additional equity of P3.5 Billion. The
present stockholders of SCP shall be given sixty (60) days
from approval of the plan to keep their stockholdings SCP
by raising/sourcing the P3.5 Billion fresh equity required.
Phase 2
In the event the present stockholders fail to raise the P3.5
Billion fresh equity needed to keep their stockholdings and
save their company, Atty. Gabionza shall offer to acceptable
investors, through negotiated sale or bidding, 67% of SCP
for the P3.5 Billion fresh equity required.
Phase 3
Should Phase 1 and 2 fail, there shall be a debt to equity
conversion in the required amount of P3.5 Billion.[5]
SO ORDERED.[7]
SO ORDERED.[9]
SCP then filed a Supplemental Petition for Review dated July
21, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101732, praying, among others,
for the approval of its Revised Updated Counter
Rehabilitation Plan.
From the July 3, 2008 CA Decision, DEG, SCP, Landmark
Glory Limited, and Liquigaz Philippines Corporation
interposed separate motions for reconsideration. However,
on December 3, 2009, the CA denied all motions for
reconsiderations.
The Issues
I.
The [CA] erred when it did, it denied the petitioner its rights
to both procedural and substantive due process when
II.
(a) It did not follow its own internal rules of procedure and
thereafter justified its error on the bases of misleading and
false statements;
(b) It granted a relief which none of the parties sought for,
nor were heard, nor given the opportunity to be heard,
thereon, and
(c) It substituted its judgment for that of the rehabilitation
court, usurping in the process the exclusive authority
reposed in the said court.
II.
Consolidation of Cases Is Proper
The [CA] erred and when it did, it acted in a manner at war
with orderly procedure when it declared the termination of
(c)
Notice of the consolidation and replacement shall be
given to the Raffle Staff and the Judicial Records Division.
1.
Under its Phase 1, the articles of incorporation and by
laws of SCP be accordingly amended to accommodate the
additional equity of Php3.0 Billion.
2.
Under Phase 2, the present stockholders and/or the
Rehabilitation Receiver shall offer for sale to acceptable
Promulgated:
DEUTSCHE BANK AG,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 12, 2010[1] and
July 19, 2010[2] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 111556 entitled Deutsche Bank AG v. Hon.
Judge Albert A. Kalalo and Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (Deutsche Bank AG Petition) for having been
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, insofar as they
ordered the consolidation of the Deutsche Bank AG Petition
with another case earlier filed and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 107535 entitled Vitarich Corporation v. Judge Danilo
Manalastas (Vitarich Petition) on the ground that the two
cases involve a common question of law.
MENDOZA, and
THE FACTS
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Private respondent Steel Corporation of the Philippines
(SteelCorp) is a domestic corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal
place of business in Munting Tubig, Balayan, Batangas. It is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution
of cold-rolled, galvanized and pre-painted steel sheets and
coils.
In its Decision[5] dated December 3, 2007, the RTCBatangas approved the proposed Rehabilitation Plan and
ordered the parties to comply strictly with the provisions of
the approved Rehabilitation Plan.
In February 2008 and during the pendency of the
proceedings before the RTC-Batangas, RCBC and petitioner
Deutsche Bank AG entered into a deed of assignment,[6]
wherein the former assigned to the latter all of its rights,
obligations, title to, and interest in, the loans which it had
extended to SteelCorp in the aggregate outstanding
principal amount of 94,412,862.58.
SteelCorp was duly informed of the said assignment
through the Notice of Transfer[7] sent to it by RCBC.
Through its Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Substitution of Parties[8] dated May 2, 2008, Deutsche
Bank AG informed the RTC-Batangas of the said transfer and
assignment of the loan obligations.
The RTC-Batangas, upon the motion of SteelCorp, issued its
Order dated October 28, 2009, directing the assignees,
including Deutsche Bank AG, to disclose the actual price or
1.
CA-G.R. SP No. 111560 entitled Investments 2234
Philippines Fund, Inc. v. Hon. Albert A. Kalalo, in His
Capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Batangas City, Branch 4 and Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (Investments 2234 Petition); and
2.
CA-G.R. SP No. 112175 entitled Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. (now BDO Unibank, Inc.) v. Hon. Albert A. Kalalo in His
Capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 4 and Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (EPCIB Petition).
In the meantime, SteelCorp filed its Motion for
Consolidation[11] dated February 18, 2010, praying for the
consolidation of the Deutsche Bank AG Petition, together
with the Investments 2234 Petition and EPCIB Petition, with
the Vitarich Petition on the ground that the cases involved
the same question of law whether creditors could be
compelled to disclose the actual assignment price for
credits in litigation which were assigned in the context of a
corporate rehabilitation proceeding pursuant to Articles
1634 and 1236 of the Civil Code.
On March 12, 2010, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 111556 issued
the assailed Resolution ordering the consolidation of
Deutsche Bank AG Petition with the Vitarich Petition, to wit:
The Court will now resolve the merits of the sole issue
raised in this petition, whether the CA gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it ordered the consolidation of the Deutsche Bank AG
petition and the Vitarich petition.
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152071
May 8, 2009
(US$4,585.97
21.212)
P573,225.6014
The total approved bid price, which included the attorneys
fees and sheriff fees, was pegged at P752,074.63. At the
public auction held on 05 January 1988, the Sheriff of
Antipolo, Rizal issued a Certificate of Sale in favor of
petitioner as the highest bidder.15 The certificate of sale
was registered on 24 March 1988.16
On 12 June 1989, petitioner executed an affidavit of
consolidation over the foreclosed properties after
respondent failed to redeem the same. As a result, the
Register of Deeds of Marikina issued new certificates of title
in the name of petitioner.17
On 17 November 1989, respondent instituted an action for
the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure with prayer
for preliminary injunction and damages against petitioner
and the Register of Deeds of Marikina. Docketed as Civil
Case No. 1587-A, the complaint was raffled to Branch 73 of
the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint prayed, among
others, that the defendants be enjoined from causing the
transfer of ownership over the foreclosed properties from
respondent to petitioner.18
On 05 April 1990, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of possession, docketed as LR Case No. 90-787,
before the same branch of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. The
RTC ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No, 1587-A and
LR Case No. 90-787.19
SO ORDERED.20
The RTC held that petitioner, whose obligation consisted
only of receiving, and not of collecting, the export proceeds
for the purpose of converting into Philippine currency and
remitting the same to respondent, cannot be considered as
respondents agent. The RTC also held that petitioner
cannot be presumed to have received the export proceeds,
considering that respondent executed undertakings
warranting that the drafts and accompanying documents
were genuine and accurately represented the facts stated
therein and would be accepted and paid in accordance with
their tenor.21
Furthermore, the RTC concluded that petitioner had no
obligation to return the export documents and respondent
could not expect their return prior to the payment of the
export advances because the drafts and export documents
were the evidence that respondent received export
advances from petitioner.22
xxx
Petitioner, therefore, was not precluded from seeking the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage based on the unpaid
drafts drawn by respondent. In any case, respondent had
admitted that aside from the unpaid drafts, respondent also
had due and demandable loans secured from another
account as evidenced by Promissory Notes (PN Nos.) BDS001-87, BDS-030/86 A, BDS-PC-002-/87 and BDS-005/87.
However, the Court of Appeals invalidated the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground that petitioner
had failed to furnish respondent personal notice of the sale
contrary to the stipulation in the real estate mortgage.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that under paragraph
1239 of the real estate mortgage, personal notice of the
foreclosure sale is not a requirement to the validity of the
foreclosure sale.
A perusal of the records of the case shows that a notice of
sheriffs sale40 was sent by registered mail to respondent
and received in due course.41 Yet, respondent claims that it
did not receive the notice but only learned about it from
petitioner. In any event, paragraph 12 of the real estate
mortgage requires petitioner merely to furnish respondent
with the notice and does not oblige petitioner to ensure that
respondent actually receives the notice. On this score, the
Court holds that petitioner has performed its obligation
under paragraph 12 of the real estate mortgage.
review
on
certiorari
ESPINOZA VS OAB
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the November
9, 2006 decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 62250.
On March 24, 1996, Firematic Philippines was granted a
credit line by respondent United Overseas Bank (then
known as Westmont Bank). As security, petitioners Gregorio
Espinoza and the late Joji Gador Espinoza (spouses
Espinoza) executed a third-party mortgage in favor of
respondent over four parcels of land, one of which was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 197553 of
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Through its credit
line, Firematic obtained several loans from respondent, as
evidenced by promissory notes and trust receipts.
Due to Firematics failure to pay its loans, respondent filed a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure in July 1996 with notary
public Eduardo S. Rodriguez in Caloocan City. After
complying with the legal requirements, the property
covered by TCT No. 197553 was sold at public auction.
Respondent was awarded the property, being the only
bidder in the amount of P200,000.[3]
The certificate of sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City on September 25, 1996. In July
1998, an affidavit of consolidation of ownership over the
property was also registered with the same office. On July
24, 1998, ownership was consolidated in the name of
respondent as evidenced by the issuance of TCT No. C328807.
On March 10, 2000, respondent filed an ex parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession which was docketed as
LRC Case No. C-4233 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 124. This action was opposed by
petitioners who moved for the consolidation of the
proceedings with Civil Case No. C-17913 pending before
RTC Branch 120 of the same city. Civil Case No. C-17913
was an action for the nullification of the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings and certificate of sale of the
property subject of this case.
In an order dated April 18, 2000, RTC Branch 124 granted
petitioners motion for consolidation and ordered that LRC
Case No. C-4233 be consolidated with Civil Case No. C17913, provided that the presiding judge of RTC Branch 120
did not object. Respondents motion for reconsideration was
denied in an order dated September 7, 2000.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus[4] in the CA, which was granted. The orders of
RTC Branch 124 dated April 18, 2000 and September 7,
2000, respectively, were reversed and set aside. The CA
adhered to the long-established doctrine that purchasers in
a foreclosure sale are entitled, as a matter of right, to a writ
of possession and that any question regarding the
regularity and validity of the sale is to be determined in a
separate proceeding. The CA also held that such questions
are not to be raised as a justification for opposing the
issuance of the writ of possession, since such proceedings
are ex parte. Hence, the CA directed the issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of respondent.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed this petition.
The core issue for resolution is whether a case for the
issuance of a writ of possession may be consolidated with
the proceedings for the nullification of extra-judicial
foreclosure.
Petitioners contend that peculiar circumstances in the
instant case make it an exception from the general rule on
the ministerial duty of courts to issue writs of possession.
Given that the issuance of a writ of possession in this case
must be litigated, consolidation with the pending case on
the nullification of extra-judicial foreclosure is mandatory
because both proceedings involve the same parties and
subject matter.
Respondent, on the other hand, insists that the
consolidation of the ex parte petition for the issuance of a
SYLLABUS
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE; CONSTRUED. Section 1 of Rule 35 of the Rules
of Court authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his
part as he would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by
plaintiffs evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief
sought. The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for
the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion
to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or
deny.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL; MERELY, INTERLOCUTORY IN
CHARACTER. The requirement of Section 1 of Rule 36
would only apply if the demurrer is granted, for in this
event, there would in fact be an adjudication on the merits
of the case, leaving nothing more to be done, except
perhaps to interpose an appeal. However, a denial of the
demurrer is not a final judgment, but merely interlocutory in
character as it does not finally dispose of the case, the
defendant having yet the right to present his evidence, as
provided for under Section 1 of Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court.
3.
ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; FAILURE TO
STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH AN ORDER
DENYING A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS BASED; NOT A
1.
ELECTIONS; TURNCOATISM; ALL PRE-ELECTION CASES
SEEKING TO DISQUALIFY WINNER ON GROUND THEREOF
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AFTER JANUARY 30, 1980
ELECTIONS; REMEDIES. Suffice it to reproduce, however,
what I had stressed in my above cited separate opinion of
May l5, 1980, viz:" (I) reiterate my stand that all such preelection cases seeking to disqualify the winner simply on
the ground of alleged turncoatism should be ordered
dismissed after the last January 30th elections, subject to
the filing of an appropriate quo warranto action or election
protest against the winner in the appropriate forum."
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
This is the third time that petitioners have come to this
Court to challenge the actuations of the respondent
Commission on Elections in PDC Case No. 65, entitled
"Oscar Laserna, Petitioner, versus Cesar Nepomuceno, Et
Al., Respondents."cralaw virtua1aw library
1.
THAT THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO AN ACT IN EXCESS OF OR
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE
PETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE BY WAY OF A
JUDGMENT WHEREIN IT SHOULD STATE THE FACTS AND THE
LAW ON WHICH ITS RESOLUTION IS BASED.
2.
THAT THE RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS.
3.
THAT THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, IN PROMULGATING THE RESOLUTION OF
APRIL 16, 1982 THROUGH THE ACT OF ONLY ONE MEMBER
OF A DIVISION.
Petitioners are obviously misled by the title of Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court, "Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence." Said
Rule, consisting of only one section, allows the defendant to
move for dismissal of the case after the plaintiff has
presented his evidence on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence, and provides for the effects of the dismissal or
non-dismissal, as the case may be, on the right of the
defendant to present his cause. Otherwise stated, it
authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he
would ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by plaintiffs
evidence that the latter is not entitled to the relief sought.
The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to
dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or
deny.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It is thus apparent that the requirement of Section 1 of Rule
36 1 would only apply if the demurrer is granted, for in this
event, there would in fact be an adjudication on the merits
of the case, leaving nothing more to be done, except
perhaps to interpose an appeal. However, a denial of the
demurrer is not a final judgment, but merely interlocutory in
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
December 9, 1997 Decision[1] and the May 3, 1999
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
47737. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed order
(dated November 4, 1994) of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch XIV) in the City of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-66507
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this
case be remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners Partial
Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 2, 1991,
Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario (herein
respondents), jointly and severally executed, signed and
delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company (herein
petitioner), a Promissory Note[5] for P138,948. Pertinent
provisions of the Promissory Note read:
SECOND DIVISION
- versus -
PHILBANKING
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
The Facts
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
2.
On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a
Dacion en Pago[7] (Dacion) which ceded and conveyed
petitioners property in Iloilo City to respondent, with the
intention of totally extinguishing petitioners outstanding
accounts with respondent. Petitioner presented a
Confirmation Statement[8] dated April 3, 1989 issued by
respondent stating that petitioner had no loans with the
bank as of December 31, 1988.
3.
Petitioner complied with the condition in the
Dacion regarding the repurchase of the property since the
obligation was fully paid. Respondent sent confirmation
statements in the latter months of 1989, which showed that
petitioner had no more outstanding loan; and
4.
Assuming that petitioner still owed respondent,
the latter was already estopped since in October 1988, it
reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a
deficit of PhP 41,265,325.12.[9]
Thus, petitioner, by way of compulsory counterclaim,
alleged that it made an overpayment of approximately PhP
4 million inclusive of interest based on Central Bank
Reference Lending Rates on dates of overpayment.
Petitioner further claimed moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fee, amounting to PhP 4.5 million plus the
costs of suit as a consequence of respondents insistence on
collecting.[10]
The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during
the pre-trial conference. Thereafter, respondent presented
its evidence and formally offered its exhibits. Petitioner then
filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,
[11] pointing out that the plaintiffs failure to file a Reply to
the Answer which raised the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement constituted an admission of the genuineness and
execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion
date, June 25, 1985 as stipulated in Promissory Note No. 8405; and
3.
pay [respondent] Philbanking Corporation, the amount
representing 25% of total amount due as attorneys fee as
stipulated in the promissory notes.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] which was
denied by the CA in its November 7, 2001 Resolution.[19]
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
EXCLUDING THE PETITIONERS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN
ITS ANSWER IN RESOLVING A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
AND
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO PAY THE
RESPONDENT
In other words, the questions posed by this case are:
1.
Does respondents failure to file a Reply and deny the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a
judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of
these documents?
2.
Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a
demurrer to evidence? If yes, are the judicial admissions in
this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the
complaint?
Petitioner asserts that its obligation to pay under the
promissory notes was already extinguished as evidenced by
the Dacion and Confirmation Statement. Petitioner submits
that when it presented these documents in its Answer,
respondent should have denied the same under oath. Since