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ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, .JR.

, ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES,


JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO R. CO, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 156759 | 2013-06-05

Subject:
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a requirement of due process; Only after the second attempt at
personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted
service; Voluntary appearance in court waives improper service of summons; Corporation by estoppel can be
impleaded as a defendant in a civil case
Facts:
Francisco Co., Jr, sued Abante Tonite and its Editorial Management, claiming damages because of an allegedly
libelous article published in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The RTC issued summons to be served on
each defendant in the libel case, including Abante Tonite.
RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants
were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at
serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons and explained why in his sheriffs return.
The Editorial Management moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons
because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had made
no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them. They further moved to drop Abante Tonite as a
defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil
action.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The CA upheld the trial
courts finding that there was a substantial compliance with the rules that allowed the substituted service.
Held:
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a requirement of due process
1. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam is the power of the court to render a personal
judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action is
an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi
in rem.
2. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the
action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly
to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
3. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by
the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.

5. The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in personam fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b)
to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him.
Only after the second attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable
time may the officer resort to substituted service
6. Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself
whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. If, for justifiable reasons, the
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected
either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. Such service of summons is called substituted service.
7. The requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service
other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service
should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed,
which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriffs return.
8. In this case, Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their
office address. Each attempt failed because the petitioners were either always out and not available" or were
"always roving outside and gathering news." Sheriff Medina was not expected or required as the serving officer to
effect personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard,
what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining.
Voluntary appearance in court waives improper service of summons
9. In this case, petitioners actually evinced their voluntary appearance in the action. They had actually received the
summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including
an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed
themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court.
Corporation by estoppel can be impleaded as a defendant in a civil case
10. Abante Tonite is a corporation by estoppel as the result of its having represented itself to the reading public as
a corporation despite its not being incorporated. Its non-incorporation with the SEC was of no consequence, for,
otherwise, whoever of the public who would suffer any damage from the publication of articles in the pages of its
tabloids would be left without recourse.

G.R. No. 175799


NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED, Petitioner, v. LEPANTO
CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY,Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed with the RTC of Makati City
a Complaint against petitioner NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for
a judgment declaring the loan and hedging contracts between the parties void for

being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages.
Upon respondents motion, the trial court authorized respondents counsel to
personally bring the summons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in
Sydney, Australia for the latter office to effect service of summons on petitioner.
The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds:
(a) the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the
defective and improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a
cause of action and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action
is barred by estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court,
there was a proper service of summons through the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) on account of the fact that the defendant has neither applied for a license to
do business in the Philippines, nor filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a Written Power of Attorney designating some person on whom
summons and other legal processes maybe served. The trial court also held that the
Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. The other allegations in the Motion
to Dismiss were brushed aside as matters of defense which can best be ventilated
during the trial.
Issue: W/N RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Ruling:
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on
account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner
through the DFA, with respondents counsel personally bringing the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia. Moreover, by
seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of
the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
Acosta vs. Salazar (2009)
G.R. No. 161034 | 2009-06-30

Subject: Land registration under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem; Petition for cancellation of entries in
the title is an action quasi in rem; Judgment cannot attain finality against indispensible party not impleaded; Void
order has no legal effect and cannot be the source of rights; Laches

Facts:

Respondents Trinidad and Aniceta Salazar (Salazars), filed a petition for the cancellation of the entries annotated at
the back of an OCT registered in the names of spouses Juan Soriano and Vicenta Macaraeg, who died without
issue. The RTC Branch 63 granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the second entry. No respondent was
impleaded
in
the
said
petition.
Subsequently, the Salazars filed an urgent motion praying for the issuance of an order to direct the RD of Tarlac to
recall all subsequent titles issued under the entries and to cancel all the tax declarations issued based thereon. The
motion
was
granted.
The RD of Tarlac initially objected to the order and explained that to comply with the said court order would
indubitably result in the deprivation of the right to due process of the subsequent registered owners thereof.
Nevertheless, upon order of the RTC and threatened with contempt, the RD of Tarlac issued TCT No. 219121 in the
names
of
the
Salazars,
without
the
cancelled
entries.
It was at this stage of the proceedings that herein petitioners together with other subsequent purchasers for value
of the disputed property 27 titleholders in all filed their formal written comment. In their comment, the
oppositors contended that they had acquired their titles in good faith and for value, and that the lower court, acting
as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over issues of ownership. Hence, the RTC issued an Order stating
that all the incidents of the case are withdrawn without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action in a proper
forum.
This prompted the Salazars to file a complaint for quieting of title impleading herein petitioners as well as other
individuals who claim to have purchased the said property from the heirs of Juan Soriano. The complaint was
docketed
before
RTC
Branch
64.
The complaint for quieting of title alleged that although the new TCT No. 219121 was issued to the Salazars
without the two cancelled entries at the back of said title, the previous TCTs issued by the RD of Tarlac as well as
the existing tax declarations existing have not been cancelled and revoked by the said government agencies to the
detriment
and
prejudice
of
the
Salazars.

Petitioners, together with the Macaraegs and Jonatas, et al., filed before the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment rendered by RTC 63 of Tarlac (petition for cancellation of entries in the title). The case was, however,
dismissed
on
the
ground
of
litis
pendencia.
RTC 64 dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. It also declared the TCT issued in the name of the Salazars as
null and void, and affirmed the first TCT as well as all certificates of title derived therefrom.
The Salazars appealed to the CA, which ruled in their favor. According to the CA, it was erroneous for the RTC
Branch 64 to reverse and declare as null and void the decision of Branch 63, which is a court of equal rank. Such
issue should have been properly ventilated in an action for annulment of final judgment. Consequently, the orders
issued
by
RTC
63,
had
become
final
and
executory,
hence,
covered
by
res
judicata.
The CA also struck down the arguments raised by the petitioners that the orders of RTC 63 are null and void for
lack of proper notice. It ratiocinated that the proceeding is a land registration proceeding, which is an action in
rem. This being so, personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered is not necessary
in
order
to
vest
the
court
with
jurisdiction
over
the
res
and
over
the
parties.
Held:
Land

registration

proceeding

is

an

action

in

rem

1. It is true that the registration of land under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem and not in personam.
Such a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal
service upon the claimants within the state or notice by mail to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is acquired by virtue
of the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly

do to make a distinction between constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known
to
the
plaintiff,
when
the
proceeding
is
to
bar
all.
Petition

for

cancellation

of

entries

in

the

title

is

an

action

quasi

in

rem

2. The proceedings instituted by the Salazars both for the cancellation of entries in the OCT and later for quieting
of
title
can
hardly
be
classified
as
actions
in
rem.
3. The petition for cancellation of entries ought to have been directed against specific persons: namely, the heirs of
Juan Soriano and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have acquired different portions of the
property over the years because it is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Accordingly, the Salazars should
have impleaded as party defendants the heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming
ownership over the property under their names because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this
case.
4. Both parties in this case are dealing with property registered under the Torrens system. To allow any individual,
such as the Salazars in this case, to impugn the validity of a Torrens certificate of title by the simple expediency of
filing an ex parte petition for cancellation of entries would inevitably erode the very reason why the Torrens system
was adopted in this country, which is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question on the legality
of the title, except claims that were noted, at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. Once a title is registered under the Torrens system, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the courts or sitting in the "mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility of losing
his land. Rarely will the court allow another person to attack the validity and indefeasibility of a Torrens certificate,
unless there is compelling reason to do so and only upon a direct action filed in court proceeded in accordance with
law.
Judgment

cannot

attain

finality

against

indispensible

party

not

impleaded

5. Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for cancellation of entry herein
petitioners are not bound by the dispositions of the said court. Consequently, the judgment or order of the said
court
never
even
acquired
finality.
6. The failure of the Salazars to implead indispensable party defendants in the petition for cancellation of entries
should have been a ground for the RTC to dismiss, or at least suspend, the proceedings of the case. Yet, although
the action proceeded, any judgment or order issued by the court thereon is still null and void for want of authority
on the part of the court to act with respect to the parties never impleaded in the action. Thus, the orders issued by
said court never acquired finality. Quod ab initio non valet, in tractu temporis non convalescit.
Void

order

has

no

legal

effect

and

cannot

be

the

source

of

rights

7. A void order is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid order. It may be entirely disregarded or declared
inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for
any purpose or at any place and thus cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is,
ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce the same. Accordingly,all proceedings founded on the void
court order are themselves regarded as invalid, and the situation is the same as it would be if there was no order
issued by the court.It leaves the party litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. A void order, like
any void judgment, may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight. (See
Metropolitan
Waterworks
&
Sewerage
System
vs.
Sison)
Laches
8. More than 30 years from the time the second entry was annotated at the back of the OCT until the time of the
filing of the ex parte petition for cancellation of entries on the said certificate of title the Salazars remained
deafeningly quiet and never made any move to question the issue of ownership over the said land before the
proper forum. They also failed to ventilate their claim during the intestate proceeding filed by the heirs of Juan
Soriano. Likewise, they miserably failed to stop the transfer of portions of the property to petitioners who, for

themselves, were able to secure TCTs in their own names. All of these would lead to the inevitable conclusion that
if there is any validity to the claim of the Salazars over the said property although such issue is not the subject of
the present case the same had already prescribed or, at the very least, had become stale due to laches.

Republic vs. Glasgow (2008)


G.R. No. 170281 | 2008-01-18

Subject: Venue in Civil Forfeiture cases; Sufficiency of form and substance;


Criminal Conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of
a civil forfeiture proceeding; Failure to prosecute; Forfeiture Proceedings, being an
action in rem, Service of Summons may be made by Publication
Facts:
The Republic, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed a
complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for
issuance of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction)
against the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc. (Glasgow) in Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. (CSBI). The case was filed pursuant to
RA 9160 (the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). TRO was granted, and then the
injunctive writ.
However, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be
found at its last known address.
The RTC directed the Republic to serve alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within
15 days. However, it did not resolve the Republic's motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication.
The alias summons was likewise returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer
holding office at the given address and left no forwarding address. The Republic
filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication.
The OSG received a copy of Glasgows "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special
Appearance)". It alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as
summons had not yet been served on it; (2) the complaint was premature and
stated no cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or other criminal
violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was failure to prosecute on the part of
the Republic.
The Republic opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was an
action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that prior conviction for
unlawful activity was not a precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and

that its complaint alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It
denied that it failed to prosecute the case.
The trial court issued the assailed order dismissing the case on the following
grounds: (1) improper venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where
CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought to be forfeited, was located; (2)
insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to release to Glasgow or its
authorized representative the funds.
Held:
The Complaint Was Filed In The Proper Venue
1. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by [the] trial court on the
ground of improper venue is plain error. (See Dacoycoy vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court)
2. The trial court was a proper venue. The Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture applies to the Republics complaint. Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially
admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the
instant case."
3. Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture,
therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any RTC of the judicial region where
the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating
to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located.
4. Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited in this case is situated, is
within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil
forfeiture of the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is
one of the RTCs of the NCJR, it was a proper venue of the Republics complaint for
civil forfeiture of Glasgows account.
The Complaint Was Sufficient In Form And Substance
5. In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The determination is
confined to the four corners of the complaint and nowhere else.
6. In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question
submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in
the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of
fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.
7. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or

not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.
8. The form and substance of the Republics complaint substantially conformed with
Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture.
Criminal Conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the
institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding
9. Since the account of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several suspicious
transaction reports and (2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions provided in Section
12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by
the AMLC, properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.
10. Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that the account contains the
proceeds of unlawful activities is an evidentiary matter that may be proven during
trial. The complaint, however, did not even have to show or allege that Glasgow had
been implicated in a conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful activities of
estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
11. A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the
institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated otherwise, a finding of guilt for an
unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.
12. Regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal prosecution for
the unlawful activity or for money laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may be
separately and independently prosecuted and resolved.
There Was No Failure To Prosecute
13. While there was admittedly a delay in the proceeding, it could not be entirely or
primarily ascribed to the Republic. That Glasgows whereabouts could not be
ascertained was not only beyond the Republics control, it was also attributable to
Glasgow which left its principal office address without informing the Securities and
Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new address. Moreover,
quite early on the Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
14. While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test
for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the
part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with
rather than wield their authority to dismiss. (See Marahay vs. Melicor)

15. There is no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to delay the
disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of
the rules. The trial court should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the
Republics complaint.
Forfeiture Proceedings, being an action in rem, Service of Summons may
be made by Publication
16. The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. While
that case involved forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies
in cases for civil forfeiture under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not
terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties
either acquired illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor of the
State. (SeeRepublic vs. Sandiganbayan)
17. As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against
the person. In actions in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served
upon the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process. For this
purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service is
allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.
MAnotok v CLT
Facts:
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover
from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the
possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129.[7]

CLT's claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013 issued
in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds, which title in turn was derived
from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage dated 10 December 1988. Hipolito's title emanated from Jose Dimson's
(Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a title issued pursuant to an order of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33. Dimson's title appears to have been
sourced from OCT No. 994.[8]

For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT,
claiming that Dimson's title, the proximate source of CLT's title, was irregularly
issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise
void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they
derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority.

[9] The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994 which, on 9
September 1918, was transferred to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had
previously acquired the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an "Escritura de
Venta" executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis.[10] On 3 March
1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold the property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title
thereto until 22 August 1938 when the property was transferred to Jose Leon
Gonzalez, Consuelo Susana Gonzalez, Juana Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara
Gonzalez, Francisco Felipe Gonzalez and Concepcion Maria Gonzalez under TCT No.
35486. The lot was then, per annotation dated 21 November 1946, subdivided into
seven (7) parcels each in the name of each of the Gonzalezes.[11]

The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions arrived
at by the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the conflict of titles. It was
established that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by
virtue of which OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal;[12] that
Lot 26 was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from the Dimson
title and that on the basis of the technical descriptions of the property appearing in
the Manotok titles, the latter's property indeed encroached on the property
described in CLT's title.[13]

The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court.[14] Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,[15] they filed a
petition for review with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the appellate court in
upholding the trial court's decision which decided the case on the basis of the
majority commissioners' report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority
commissioner's report.[16]

B. G.R. No. 134385, Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs of Jose B.


Dimson, et. al.

On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan
City a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta). Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of part
of the Maysilo Estate in Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City. Alleging that Araneta had been illegally occupying the land
and that the latter refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands, he
prayed that Araneta be ordered to vacate the same and remove all improvements
thereon and to return full possession thereof to him. Araneta for its part admitted
occupancy of the disputed land by constructing some buildings thereon and
subdividing portions thereof in the exercise of its right as absolute owner. He
alleged that Dimson's title to the subject land was void and hence he had no cause
of action.[17]

The trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28 May 1993 with these
findings: first, there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in the titles that
formed each link in the chain of ownership that culminated in the Manotok title, i.e.,
that the technical descriptions in the titles were written in Spanish whereas those in
the alleged mother title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an abnormal state
that deviated from the usual practice in the issuance of titles; and second, it was
established procedure to indicate in the certificate of title, whether original or
transfer certificate, the date of the original survey of the mother title together with
the succeeding date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence of the
original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on Manotok's chain of titles, the trial court
added, should mean that OCT No. 994 was not the mother title not only because the
original survey dates were different but also because the original survey date must
always be earlier than the issue date of the original title. OCT No. 994 was issued on
May 3, 1917 which was much ahead of the survey date indicated in the succeeding
titles, which is December 22, 1917.[18]

Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, on 30 May


1997, affirmed the lower court's decision.[19] In so holding, the appellate court
declared that the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted that
Dimson's TCT No. R-15169 was derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,
1917" and that the same was obtained by Dimson simultaneously with other titles,
viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and 15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13,
1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings No. C-732. It was
also pointed out that Araneta's TCT No. 13574 and 21343 were both derived from
"OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917" which was previously "declared null and
void by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals."[20]

Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court attributing error to
the Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it had a better right of possession
over the property than did Dimson.[21]

As both petitions involved interrelated challenges against the validity of the parties'
separate titles to portions of the greater Maysilo Estate, they, along with G.R. No.
148767[22], were consolidated per Resolutions dated 21 April 1999 and 6 March
2002. Also in 2002, the Republic of the Philippines sought and was allowed
intervention in these cases.

On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court rendered the 2005 Decision,
[23] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.[24]

The Court acknowledged that the paramount question raised in the petitions is
whether the titles issued in the name of Dimson and of CLT are valid. Noting that
this question is one purely of fact, the Court held that the same was beyond its
power to determine and so, the factual findings of the trial courts in these cases as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals must be accorded the highest degree of respect
and not disturbed at all.

Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit in the petitions.
First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court upheld the validity of
the trial court's adoption of the commissioners' majority report as part of the
decision inasmuch as the same is allowed by Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of
Court and that a case of overlapping titles absolutely necessitates the assistance of
experts in the field of geodetic engineering who, on account of their experience and
expertise, are in a better position to determine which of the contending titles is
valid. For this reason, the Court emphasized, the trial court may well rely on their
findings and conclusions. Second, the Court pointed out that the titles of
respondents in all three cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City registered on 19 April 1917. However, because the validity
of said mother title was upheld by the Court itself in MWSS and reiterated in Heirs of
Gonzaga, the Court chose not to delve anymore into the correctness of the said
decisions which had already attained finality and immutability.

The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
On 5 June 2006, the cases were elevated to the Court en banc, which heard oral
arguments on 1 August 2006.
Issue:

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