WILLIAM F. GEMPERLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

HELEN SCHENKER
and PAUL SCHENKER, as her husband, Defendants-Appellees.
Gamboa & Gamboa, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
A. R. Narvasa for Defendants-Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT;
SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON AN ATTORNEY-IN-FACT; EFFECT.
Where a non-resident alien had constituted his wife as his attorney-infact had authorized her to sue, and the latter in fact had sued on his
behalf, and as a result thereof a suit was brought against him and a
service of summons addressed to him on the latter case was served
personally on his wife, his attorney-in-fact; the court had acquired
jurisdiction over his person, he having empowered her to sue, so that
she was also in effect empowered to represent him in suits filed
against him.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, taken by plaintiff, William F. Gemperle, from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing this case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of defendant Paul Schenker and for want
of cause of action against his wife and co-defendant, Helen Schenker,
said Paul Schenker "being in no position to be joined with her as party
defendant, because he is beyond the reach of the magistracy of the
Philippine courts." chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The record shows that sometime in 1952, Paul Schenker hereinafter
referred to as Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact,
Helen Schenker hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Schenker filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a complaint which was

docketed as Civil Case No. Q-2796 thereof against herein plaintiff

William F. Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenkers allegedly initial
subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippine-Swiss Trading Co.,
Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then
unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase
thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. Alleging that, in
connection with said complaint, Mrs. Schenker had caused to be
published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were
impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case No. Q-2796, aside
from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and
credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his "honesty,
integrity and reputation" and of bringing him "into public hatred,
discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman",
Gemperle commenced the present action against the Schenkers for the
recovery of P300,000 as damages, P30,000 as attorneys fees, and
costs, in addition to praying for a judgment ordering Mrs. Schenker "to
retract in writing the said defamatory expressions." In due course,
thereafter, the lower court rendered the decision above referred to. A
reconsideration thereof having been denied, Gemperle interposed the
present appeal.
The first question for determination therein is whether or not the lower
court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker.
Admittedly, he, a Swiss citizen, residing in Zurich, Switzerland, has not
been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the
summons addressed to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served
personally upon her in the Philippines. It is urged by plaintiff that
jurisdiction over the person of Schenker has been secured through
voluntary appearance on his part, he not having made a special
appearance to assail the jurisdiction over his person, and an answer
having been filed in this case, stating that "the defendants, by counsel,
answering the plaintiffs complaint, respectfully aver", which is
allegedly a general appearance amounting to a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, confirmed, according to plaintiff, by a
P225,000 counterclaim for damages set up in said answer; but, this
counterclaim was set up by Mrs. Schenker alone, not including her
husband. Moreover, said answer contained several affirmative
defenses, one of which was lack of jurisdiction over the person of
Schenker, thus negating the alleged waiver of this defense.
Nevertheless, We hold that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction
over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to

him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the
representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband in the
aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at
her behest, in her aforementioned representative capacity. In other
words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on
behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent
him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar,
which is a consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf.
Inasmuch as the alleged absence of a cause of action against Mrs.
Schenker is premised upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Schenker, which cannot be sustained, it follows that the
conclusion drawn therefrom is, likewise, untenable.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Wherefore, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
reversed, and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, with the costs of this instance against defendantsappellees. It is so ordered.

IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.

GRN 47517, June 27, 1941
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila
against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum
consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable on shares of
stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the

company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said
shares to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that
the withholding of plaintiffs right to the disposal and control of the shares was
due to certain demands made with respect to said shares by the petitioner Idonah
Perkins, and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants
petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner
Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of
stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons by
publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and
Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a
crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her against
respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York, wherein it is
declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and
control of the shares of stock in question with all the cash dividends declared
thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the action, because the alleged judgment of the SC
of the State of New York is res judicata. Petitioners demurrer was overruled, thus
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC
of New York and which is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised
by the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action.

RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action
and of the relief sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organizes the court, and is to be sought for in general nature of its powers, or in
authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended complaint filed by
the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to
certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the
granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the
CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to adjudicate the several
demands contained in petitioners crosscomplaint.
Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and
the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC
of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing
that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action
recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule
39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFIManila, to adjudicate, settle and determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment
annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this
petitioners favor by the courts of the State of New York, which decision is res
judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case and
argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course
of the proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the New York judgment set up
by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes to the merits of
the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and
not to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or

not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion
in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment can
be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner
here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful
exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petition denied.

45 F.2d 426 (1930)

HEINE
v.
NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
No. 10465.
District Court, D. Oregon.
December 1, 1930.
C. T. Haas and E. B. Seabrook, both of Portland, Or., for plaintiff.
Huntington, Wilson & Huntington and Clark & Clark, all of Portland, Or., for
defendant.
BEAN, District Judge.
This is one of a series of cases pending in this court against the New York Life
Insurance Company and the Guardian Insurance Company, each of which is a
New York corporation, to recover on some two hundred and forty life insurance
policies made and issued by the defendants in Germany, in favor of German
citizens and subjects, and payable in German marks. The policies of the New
York Life Insurance Company were issued prior to August 1, 1914, and those of

the Guardian prior to May 1, 1918. As a condition to their right to do business in

Germany, the insurance companies were required to and did submit to the
supervision and control of the German insurance officials, to invest the reserves
arising from German policies in German securities, and to establish, and they do
now maintain, an office in that country with a resident representative or agent
upon whom service of process can be made.
The actions now pending are brought and prosecuted in the name of, or as
assignee of the insured by, certain parties in the United States and Germany,
under an irrevocable power of attorney, by which they are authorized and
empowered to sue for, collect, receive, and receipt for all sums due or owing
under the policies, or compromise the same in consideration of an assignment
and transfer to them of the undivided 25 per cent. interest in the policies and all
rights accruing thereunder.
None of the parties to the litigation are residents or inhabitants of this district. The
plaintiffs reside in, and are citizens of, the republic of Germany. The defendants
are corporations organized and existing under the laws of New York, with their
principal offices in that state, with statutory agents in Oregon, upon whom service
can be made. None of the causes of action arose here, nor do any of the material
witnesses reside in the district, nor are any of the records of the defendant
companies pertaining to the policies in suit in the district, but such records are
either at the home office in New York or at their offices in Germany. The courts of
Germany and New York are open and functioning and competent to take
jurisdiction of the controversies, and service can be made upon the defendants in
either of such jurisdictions. To require the defendants to defend the actions in this
district would impose upon them great and unnecessary inconvenience and
expense, and probably compel them to produce here (three thousand miles from
their home office) numerous records, books, and papers, all of which are in daily
use by it in taking care of current business.
In addition, it would no doubt consume months of the time of this court to try and
dispose of these cases, thus necessarily disarranging the calendar, resulting in
delay, inconvenience, and expense to other litigants who are entitled to invoke its
jurisdiction.

Under these circumstances, the defendants, while conceding that the court has
jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, urges that it should refuse, in its
discretion, to exercise such jurisdiction.
I unhesitatingly concur in this view, for, as said by Mr. Justice Holmes in Cuba
Railroad Co. v. Crosby, 222 U. S. 473, 32 S. Ct. 132, 133, 56 L. Ed. 274, 38 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 40: "It should be remembered that parties do not enter into civil
relations in foreign jurisdictions in reliance upon our courts. They could not
complain if our courts refused to meddle with their affairs, and remitted them to
the place that established and would enforce their rights. * * * The only just
ground for complaint would be if their rights and liabilities, when enforced by our
courts, should be measured by a different rule from that under which the parties
dealt."
*427 It is apparent that the plaintiffs are seeking by these actions to impose on
the defendants a liability under a different rule than "that under which the parties
dealt."
The courts of Germany have ruled that any person seeking to recover on a civil
contract made in Germany prior to August, 1924, and payable in marks, can only
recover on the basis provided in the monetary law of 1924. Manifestly the
plaintiffs are not proceeding on any such theory.
It is argued by the plaintiffs that, because the court has jurisdiction of the subjectmatter and the parties, it has no discretion, but should proceed with the case,
regardless of where the cause of action arose, or the law by which it is controlled,
or the residence or convenience of the parties and witnesses, or the difficulty the
court would encounter in attempting to interpret and enforce a foreign contract, or
the interference with the other business of the court. But that is a matter resting in
its discretion. It may retain jurisdiction, or it may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, decline to do so, as the circumstances suggest. The courts have
repeatedly refused, in their discretion, to entertain jurisdiction of causes of action
arising in a foreign jurisdiction, where both parties are nonresidents of the forum.
Gregonis v. Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223, 32
A. L. R. 1, and note; Pietraroia v. New Jersey & Hudson River Ry. & Ferry Co.,
197 N. Y. 434, 91 N. E. 120; Gregonis v. P. & R. Coal & Iron Co., 235 N. Y. 152,

139 N. E. 223, 32 A. L. R. 1; Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 734;

Smith v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 336-343; National
Telephone Mfg. Co. v. Du Bois, 165 Mass. 117, 42 N. E. 510, 30 L. R. A. 628, 52
Am. St. Rep. 503; Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N. Y. S. 619; Great
Western Railway Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Disconto Gesellschat v. Umbreit, 127
Wis. 651, 106 N. W. 821, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045, 115 Am. St. Rep. 1063.
As said by Mr. Justice Bradley in The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5 S. Ct. 860,
864, 29 L. Ed. 152: "Circumstances often exist which render it inexpedient for the
court to take jurisdiction of controversies between foreigners in cases not arising
in the country of the forum; as, where they are governed by the laws of the
country to which the parties belong, and there is no difficulty in a resort to its
courts; or where they have agreed to resort to no other tribunals * * * not on the
ground that it has not jurisdiction, but that, from motives of convenience, or
international comity, it will use its discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction or
not."
See, also, Charter Shipping Co. v. Bowring, 281 U. S. 515, 50 S. Ct. 400, 74 L.
Ed. 1008.
These, in my judgment, are cases of that kind. They are actions brought on
causes of action arising in Germany. The contract of insurance was made and to
be paid there and in German currency. It is to be construed and given effect
according to the laws of the place where it was made. 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of
Law (2d Ed.) 1350. The courts of this country are established and maintained
primarily to determine controversies between its own citizens and those having
business there, and manifestly the court may protect itself against a flood of
litigation over contracts made and to be performed in a foreign country, where the
parties and witnesses are nonresidents of the forum, and no reason exists why
the liability, if any, cannot be enforced in the courts of the country where the
cause of action arose, or in the state where the defendant was organized and has
its principal offices. True, the courts of New York have declined to exercise
jurisdiction over actions brought on insurance policies similar to those in suit.
Higgins v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 220 App. Div. 760, 222 N. Y. S. 819, and Von NessenStone v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.[1] But that affords no reason why this court should do

so. It is to me unthinkable that residents and citizens of Germany may import

bodily into this court numerous actions against a nonresident defendant, on
contracts made and payable in Germany, and insist as a matter of right that,
because it has obtained jurisdiction of the defendant by service of its statutory
agent, the taxpayers, citizens, and residents of the district having business in the
court should stand aside and wait the conclusion of the case, where, as here, the
courts of Germany and of the home state of the defendant are open and
functioning.
Judge Tucker, in the state court of Multnomah county, in an able and wellconsidered opinion in a case brought on one of the German policies (Kahn v.
New York), reached the same conclusion.
Motion allowed

G.R. No. L-32636

March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appealed from
a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by
the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We

think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these
proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of
First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance
of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42
Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia,
on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of
West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library, should govern.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should govern.
RULING: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts.(In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested
by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced
to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will
was executed.
Note: In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on
this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to
indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent
witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the
will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove
execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West
Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony
of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine
Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration
in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant
presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents
attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be
the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West

Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L.
MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown
by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country,
West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the
estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application
for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the
proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are
strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West
Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply
with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been
proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased
left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any
in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded
Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific
pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant.

PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. v. BOHANAN

Topic: Succession and Administration
Date: January 30, 1960
Labrador, J.
DOCTRINE:
The validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator, provided that the law must be proved in courts.
QUICK FACTS:

Decedent Bohanan was a US citizen. Nevada law allows a testator to dispose of all
his property according to his will. His ex-wife and children oppose the project of
partition filed by the executor-petitioner, saying they were deprived of their
legitimes. According to them, Philippine law must prevail, requiring decedent to
reserve the legitime for surviving spouse and children.
CONFLICT LAWS:
Old CC Art. 10(2), now NCC Art. 16(2)
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights to personal property
are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925, Sec. 9905
Every person over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of
all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the
payment of the testators debts.
FACTS:
Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US citizen. He has some
properties in California. Despite his long residence in the Philippines, his stay was
found by the CFI to be merely temporary, and he remained to be a US citizen. The
CFI declared his will as fully in accordance with the laws of Nevada and admitted it
to probate. The Philippine Trust Co. was named executor of the will.
A project of partition was filed by Phil Trust which distributed the residuary estate
into 3: 1) to his grandson, 2) to his brother and sister, to be distributed equally,
3) legacies of P6,000 each to his son and daughter, and 4) legacies to other people.
Respondent Magdalena Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions the validity of the partition,
claiming that she and her children were deprived of their legitimes. (It must be
noted that Magdalena and decedent C.O. Bohanan were married in 1909 but he
divorced her in 1922. She re-married in 1925 and this marriage was subsisting at
the time of the death of decedent.)
ISSUE 1: W/N Magdalena is entitled to legitime as surviving spouse
HELD: NO.
There is no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife in the State
of Nevada. There is also no conjugal property between her and decedent.
Moreover, during the proceedings of the case, Magdalena filed a motion to withdraw
P20,000 from the estate funds, chargeable against her share in the conjugal
property. But the Court found that there is no community property.

ISSUE 2: W/N the children are entitled to their legitime

HELD: NO.
1) The CFI has correctly held that the law to be applied is Nevada law, because the
decedent was a US citizen.
2) The children do not dispute the provision.
3) While Sec. 9905 was not introduced as evidence in the hearing of the project of
partition, it was introduced during the hearing of the motion to withdraw filed by
Magdalena. The Court took judicial notice of the law and deemed it unnecessary to
prove the law at the hearing of the project of partition.
DISPOSITIVE:
As in accordance with Art. 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary
dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has
been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of
the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of
all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court
approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary
provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. L-35694

December 23, 1933

FACTS: Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens of
California and domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was
no antenuptial marriage contract between the parties and during the
existence their marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands,
as conjugal property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died and that in
accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses
who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of
the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without
administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22,
1930, filed an ex parte petition. The court granted said petition and entered

a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute
owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California.
When this decree presented to the Register of Deeds of Manila and
demanded for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title, it declined to
accept as binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the
corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in
the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to
issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous
payment of any inheritance tax.
ISSUE: Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the
owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands.
RULING: The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the
order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.
The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or
testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines and in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the

in other words, the second

of article 10 can be invoked only
deceased was vested with a descendible
property within the jurisdiction of the
Islands.
successional rights;

paragraph
when the
interest in
Philippine

In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke, the court said:

It is principle firmly established that to the law of the state in
which the land is situated we must look for the rules which govern its
descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of
wills and other conveyances.

This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10

of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the
nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which
it is situated.
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which
vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands
here in question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is
admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as
community property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of a title equal to that
of her husband. It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law
of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to
that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates
of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their
acquisition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid
was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission
plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of
the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary
in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of
the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect
at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.

EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS,
thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDOvs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATIONS ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS

CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme
Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in their own behalf and on
behalf of 728 other OCWs instituted a class suit by filing an Amended
Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising from their recruitment by
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment
by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI) which is a foreign
corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in
construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the
employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest
on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits;
reimbursement of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of
withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited
practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of
BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the Motion to Strike Out of
the Records filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the deficiencies
in the complaint pointed out.

AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of Time to file their answer.
The POEA kept on granting such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to
file their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC
and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new complainants joined the case, ang
daming inavail na remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer to the complaint. At the
same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within
which to submit their respective position papers. On February 24, 1988, AIBC
and BRII submitted position paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a
Consolidated Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered his decision which awarded
the amount of $824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants
submitted their Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal from the decision of
the POEA. AIBC also filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the Notice of
Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA. The
resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants. NLRC
denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants and by AlBC and
BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by Bahrain where most of the
complainants were deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1176, otherwise known re the

Labour Law for the Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree No. 23
that are relevant to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to
his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn thereof
for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum off fifty per centurn thereof
for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven
oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official
holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal
wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years continuous service with his
employer shall be entitled to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days
for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous
years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the
proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may
be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party prior notice
before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and
fifteen days notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract
without the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent

to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon termination
of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment calculated
on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of the first three years of service
and of one months wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker shall be
entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to
the period of his service completed within a year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the contract of the parties.(WON the
complainants who have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-mentioned
benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the case. (Assuming it is applicable
WON complainants claim for the benefits provided therein have prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as; a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence
governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a
simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the
Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the

claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of
the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those stipulated
therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which provides
that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted downward so that the
total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation therein agree, another part of the same provision categorically
states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host
country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted
against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is
already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract
and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is that there was
an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the
contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the

provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The
parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a
case, the foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead
of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that
specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law,
the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign
law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms
deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of the
applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the
parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims of the
complainants was 3 years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not actionable after the
lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the Contract.

As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum (local
court), Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that
it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law. In Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company
(220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising
from said Code, the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law
but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not specifically
intended to be substantive, hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of
the forum should apply. The Court observed: . . . we are dealing with a statute of
limitations of a foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that
its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign
country concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We
think that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose, this test
is the most satisfactory one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it appears to us that the
libellant is entitled to succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that
the Panamanian period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against
the particular rights which the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code
is a statute having broad objectives. The American court applied the statute of
limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there
was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be

substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to

give way to the law of the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum (local Court) has a borrowing
statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the state of the
forum (local Court) to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing
statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where
it accrued will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute was not
run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It provides: If by the laws of
the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also
barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be
enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction
of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
to the forums public policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene
the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development (Sec. 10).

The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law.
The next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the
claims is 3 years, as provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided by the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a
judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written
contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art.
1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the claims are for
benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside

Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia under different terms
and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is not present (common or
general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only
logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their claims
in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the
claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question of law
or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the
claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each
claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other
employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the interests of
the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned
their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise settlements of
their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed
to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are DISMISSED.

7 SCRA 95 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Law Nationality

Principle Internal and Conflict Rule
Application of the Renvoi Doctrine
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where
he resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he
became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a
legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo
Aznar was the executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen claims that under Article
16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under
California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile. On the other
hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must
apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in
determining the successional rights of his heirs.
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law
which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the
Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings the determination of the successional
rights under Philippine law only.

Aznar vs. Garcia [7 SCRA 95]

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Edward Christensens (citizen of the State of California) will was executed
in Manila where it provides that Helen ChristensenGarcia receive a payment
of P3,600 and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen Christensen Garcia opposed the project
of partition of Edwards estate claiming that she was deprived of her legitime as
acknowledged natural child under the Philippine law.

Issue: Whether or not the California law or the Philippine law shouldapply in the
case at bar.

Held: Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two
sets of laws for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its
citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Art. 946 of the California Civil Code
states that If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property
is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the
law of his domicile. Edward, a citizen of the State of California, is considered to
have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not
refer the case back to the California, as such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination, because the case would then be tossed back and
forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity of the provisions of
Edwards will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latters legacy, should
be governed by the Philippine law.

The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court
with instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides.

Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided
and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to
the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire
period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen
Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an
acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil
code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that
Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for
daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of
the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under
California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen
Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1.

The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside the California, and

2.

The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there
is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is
ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with
instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in
the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis