Hong Kong: The Airport Core Program and

the Absence of Corruption

Report by a Mission of Transparency International
comprising Peter Rooke and Michael H. Wiehen
December 1999

1. The opening of the new Hong Kong International Airport in July 1998 marked
the completion of the Airport Core Programme (ACP). The total capital cost
exceeded HK$160 billion (US$ 20.6 billion at the current exchange rate of
US$1 = HK$ 7.75), making the ACP one of the largest infrastructure projects
ever. The airport was the central project in the 10-project ACP, commenced in
1991 on the basis of feasibility studies going back to the early 1980's. The
ACP also included extensive road and rail infrastructure and a new town.
2. Seven of the ACP projects - involving the formation of new land and the
construction of highways and bridges and a new town - were funded and
carried out by the Government of Hong Kong as direct capital works.
3. The Airport Authority (AA) was responsible for developing the new airport,
and the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) built the airport railway.
Both are statutory bodies owned by the Government. The private sector
Western Harbour Crossing Company built the new cross-harbor tunnel under a
30 year "Build, Operate and Transfer" franchise.
4. Implementation of the ACP projects was overseen by the Government's New
Airport Projects Co-ordination Office (NAPCO) operating under the auspices
of the Works Bureau. NAPCO provided overall project management services
in coordinating project implementation and interfacing. NAPCO reported
directly to the Airport Development Steering Committee which had overall
responsibility for guiding the implementation of the ACP.
5. The timing of the ACP was particularly sensitive as it was largely
implemented in the run up to Hong Kong 's reversion to China in July 1997.
6. From all appearances, the ACP has been implemented largely within budget
and with a minimum of corruption. Apart from very minor corruption cases,
only one significant case has been reported in the press relating to non-ACP
work - bribery in connection with substandard foundation work in connection
with property development adjacent to the Airport Railway's Hong Kong
Station which was a joint venture between the MTRC and a developer and was
not part of the ACP.
The ACP

7. A Transparency International (TI) team comprising TI Board Members Peter

Rooke, CEO of TI Australia, and Michael H. Wiehen, President of
TI-Deutschland, visited Hong Kong during the week of December 13, 1999,
and discussed the execution of the ACP with representatives of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), various departments of
the Government, the MTRC, the AA and various private sector people in order
to learn how this remarkable outcome was achieved, so as to be able to share
the lessons learned with others around the globe, who are desirous to reduce
corruption in the context of major investment projects.
8. The mission was graciously and effectively coordinated by the Corruption
Prevention Department of the ICAC and received generous support and
information from all offices and persons contacted.
9. The mission concluded that there are four groups of factors, which allowed
and facilitated the corruption-free execution of this massive set of investment
projects:
o the existence of a clear and strict Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and
of a strong, central anti-corruption institution (ICAC), which has
impressive legal powers and adequate (one is tempted to say, generous)
staff resources to carry out its tasks and whose track record has led to
Hong Kong's reputation as a low corruption zone backed by vigorous
enforcement;
o

the existence of clear rules

for the selection/procurement of consultant and construction
services and of equipment supplies;
for the effective supervision
implementation of all contracts,

and

monitoring

of

the

for the enforcement of accountability among the Government's

own staff and the consultants and contractors, and
for Dispute Resolution;
o

the establishment, for ACP purposes, of special institutions such as the

New Airport Projects Coordinating Office (NAPCO - since dissolved)
and the Engineering and Associated Consultant Selection Board
(EACSB) which handles non-ACP projects as well; the NAPCO had a
flying dispute resolution team, which stepped in whenever a problem
occurred; and

a favorable working environment, including appropriate salary levels

among government servants, a high degree of professionalism and
pride among the officials, and a relatively small society in which
businessmen caught bribing or otherwise trying to manipulate the

processes find it difficult to obtain other business, making any effort at

corruption a high-risk activity. Hereafter the major factors are
described in some more detail.
The Law and the Institutions
10. The Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (CAP 201, first enacted in 1970, with
many amendments over the years) contains a broad prohibition against,
without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, soliciting/accepting or
giving/offering "any advantage" as an inducement or reward for performing or
abstaining from performing any act in a public capacity or giving assistance
etc. in regard to public contracts, procuring withdrawal of tenders and related
matters
o

to/by Civil (Crown) Servants with no link to any official act by the
Civil Servant required,

to/by Public Servants (that is civil servants and employees of any

institution declared a "public body" such as railways, hospitals,
universities and a power company) in connection with any official act,
but no illegal act by the public servant is required,

to/by "agents" (any person employed by, or acting for another, i.e.
including private-to-private bribery), or

to/by "any person" (usually a competitor) so as to induce him to refrain

from bidding or to withdraw his bid.

"Advantage" is very broadly defined and includes gifts, loans, loan release or
discharge, employment, contract or any favor or service. Curiously,
"entertainment" is allowed provided it is not excessive.
11. For a Civil (Crown) Servant, the "possession of unexplained property"
demonstrated by maintaining a standard of living above that which is
commensurate with his past or present official emoluments or by being in
control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his official
income is a crime "unless he gives a satisfactory explanation as to the source
of his wealth". This reversal of the normal burden of proof has been quite
effective but remains somewhat controversial among lawyers and civil
liberties activists.
12. The giver and taker of bribes are considered equally guilty. In case of a
"conspiracy in committing any such acts", all participants are treated like the
principal perpetrator.
13. The penalty for such offenses is prison for up to ten years plus a fine plus
confiscation of the "unexplained" assets and (optionally) the prohibition of

future employment by a public body.

14. Among the defenses against bribery accusations, the claim of a "custom" is
not admissible, and in the case of a "defense of lawful authority", the burden
of proof rests on the accused.
15. Whistleblowers are protected, but "frivolous or malicious accusations" are
dealt with firmly.
16. There exists also a broad two-tier policy on conflict of interest and the
declaration of any such interest for members of boards and committees: upon
appointment to any sensitive positions, for all others when a potential conflicts
actually arises.
17. The institutional backing for the enforcement of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance is provided by the Ordinance setting up the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (CAP 204, originally of 1974, with several
amendments). The Commissioner is given wide-ranging powers and duties.
Among the powers is the power to investigate, search, arrest and seize. Among
the duties are the following:
o

to receive and consider complaints,

to investigate any alleged or suspected offense,

to investigate any conduct of a Civil (Crown) Servant,

to investigate the practices and procedures on corruption prevention

matters of government departments,

to instruct, advise and assist any person,

to advise heads of departments,

to educate the public, and

to enlist and foster public support.

The ICAC issues a comprehensive Annual Report on its activities.

18. The work of the ICAC is carried out in a three-pronged manner
o

the Operations Department carries out the investigation and

prosecution of offenses,

the Corruption Prevention Department (CPD) examines the practices

and procedures of government departments and public bodies and
makes recommendations on how opportunities for corruption can be
eliminated or reduced:

it gets involved early at the legislative stage,

it is involved at the procedure or policy formulation stage,
it provides ongoing consultation and quick advice,
it carries out in-depth research on selected procedures,
it offers Corruption Prevention Talks on such topics as legal,
management and supervisory accountability,
it is involved in industry practice and system development and
provides advice to various government boards and committees,
it liaises with industry, offers advice on industry codes of
conduct and keeps close contact with industry and trade
associations (of the 2800 corporations registered on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange, about 70% have adopted a proper Code
of Conduct),
it provides quick response action after any cases indicating
system fault,
it is involved in the establishment of the government's basic
framework of rules, regulations and guidelines, and
it prepares and promulgates industry good practice such as
corporate governance, segregation of duties, independence of
testing, checks and balances etc;
any private organization or person may also seek advice from
the CPD; and
o

the Community Relations Department (CRD) is responsible for

educating the public against the evils of corruption and harnessing
support for the ICAC. The CRD is currently very active in spreading
anti-corruption messages and positive values among youth from
kindergarten up to tertiary institutions and in their workplace. Youth
education is done through face-to-face contacts such as training talks
and by producing teaching packages for use by teachers to help
spreading the messages. Apart from paying attention to ethical and
integrity issues relating to public officials, the CRD also provides
preventive education for the business sector. The bulk of the work is
conducted under the Hong Kong Ethics Development Centre, whose
activities are guided by six major chambers of commerce in Hong
Kong . It liaises with business organizations to offer advice on drawing
up codes of conduct and training services. For example, under the

Business Ethics Programme conducted in 1994 - 1997, the CRD had

approached 2,600+ publicly listed companies, large corporations and
trade/professional associations to offer consultancy on ethics programs.
70% of these organizations had already formulated/reviewed their
codes of conduct under the assistance of the ICAC.
19. The ICAC has about 1350 professional staff and is thus staffed at a level that
can only cause envy in any other anti-corruption organization. One should
remember that it was created, in 1974, because the traditional anti-corruption
institution, the police, was hopelessly corrupt itself and was beyond repair
from within. Even though one would normally tend to strengthen existing
institutions rather than creating new ones, it seems to the mission that the very
broad powers enjoyed by the ICAC could not possibly be employed
effectively by a traditional police department, and that not only the broad
powers and duties, but especially the independence conveyed to the ICAC, is a
critical factor in its effectiveness and success.
20. In 1993, ICAC issued an Anti-Corruption Guidebook for Contractors
following a sharp rise in the number of complaints in the sector, which still
appears to present a problem, at least in private-to- private activities.
Good Operating Rules
21. Coming to the second category of factors which facilitated the corruption-free
implementation of the massive investment program, a clear set of detailed
rules for the selection and supervision of suitable consultants, contractors
and suppliers should have played a major role. These rules - very much the
product of the Corruption Prevention Department of the ICAC - assure the
selection of a competent and experienced firm, at a reasonable price. The
integrity of the selection process is assured by the involvement of boards and
committees (where in many other countries often individuals make the
equivalent decisions) with elaborate checks and balances, which on occasion
will cost some time but in the final analysis almost certainly save time and
avoid wastage.
22. In all contracts (for consultancy services, for construction or supplies) there is
a clause reminding the private party that it is not permitted to give or offer
"any advantage, gratuity, bonus, discount, bribe or loan of any sort to any
agent or employee" of the principal, and that any violation of this clause
entitles the principal to "terminate the employment under the ...contract" and
to hold the contractor "liable for any loss or damage". In some of these clauses,
the threat of delisting or exclusion from future contract opportunities is also
specifically mentioned.
23. In a proposed set of new rules for the Housing Department (which has a major
capital budget in Hong Kong ) it is also stated that "Contractors ...shall be

responsible for the good behavior of their subcontractors, employees and

agents. The Contractor shall advise its subcontractors, employees and agents
that they are not allowed to offer or give any advantage or excessive
entertainment...or to solicit or accept any advantage or excessive entertainment
from other subcontractors, employees and agents in relation to the services...".
The Consultant Engineer
24. The Government recognizes that consultant engineers, especially those active
in the upstream phases of the project cycle such as prefeasibility and
feasibility studies, project preparation, design studies and preparation of tender
documents, can have a major adverse impact on project economy and integrity,
and has developed a detailed, systematic process for selecting a suitable
consultant. The process provides for
o

a consultant search among well known as well as new consultant firms,

competition among several consultants,

full information to all consultants being considered for a job,

evaluation of all consultancy proposals by more than one official

(normally a panel of experts, occasionally coopting an independent
person from outside the respective government department),

receipt of the proposals in a double lock box and other security

measures to prevent tampering with the proposals, and

the provision for indemnity insurance.

25. The Highways Department, when selecting consultants (e.g. for design work),
starts with a long list of firms with the appropriate expertise and invites
expression of interest from those firms with a project brief. The Department
allows foreign firms to enter into joint ventures with local firms. The
Highways Department will then form an Assessment Panel, with members
from different departments, and ask the members to mark the submissions
(without disclosing them to the other members) and send their result to the
Chairman. At the Panel meeting three to four firms are selected for the short
list; detailed minutes are kept of the Panel proceedings. All departments
prepare semi-annual reports on the performance of all consultant firms; these
reports are kept centrally and are accessible to all departments.
26. Consultancy proposals are then invited from the short list on the basis of two
envelopes - technical and price. Normally the technical proposal will have a
weight of 60%, the financial 40%. For technically complicated proposals, the
weighting may be 80/20. (The mission heard the view that a weighting of

60/40, except for simple or repeater projects, is likely to cause problems.

There appears to be some evidence that the higher the technical weight, the
fewer the number of change or variation orders.) The technical proposal is
submitted to the Department and the fee proposal is submitted to EACSB.
27. Once the proposals have been submitted, the Technical Panel will review and
rank the proposals (with minutes kept of the discussions), and then submit its
report to the Board for exchange of the fee proposal. It will then combine the
technical scores and the fees according to set rules and make the
recommendation on the consultant to be selected.
28. The selection of consultants is administered by the Engineering and
Associated Consultant Selection Board (EACSB). All consultant applicants
need ISO 9000 certification. Both the shortlist and the recommended
consultant have to be approved by the Board.
29. In some cases, consultants employed to prepare feasibility or design work
were required explicitly to provide "generic, non- discriminatory" proposals.
The Contractor
30. For the selection of contractors and suppliers, the government normally
works with a list of "approved contractors". Firms, upon application, will be
entered into the list on a "probationary" or "confirmed" basis. In the
application for being added to the list, the firm has to provide information
adequate to demonstrate its financial soundness and its technical and
management capability, and its capacity being "in all other ways considered
suitable". Very often a Hong Kong base is required, and Hong Kong
experience is given substantial weight. The list is published annually and
consulted and taken into account by private employers as well. Firms can be
removed from this list on grounds of unsatisfactory performance or serious (or
suspected) misconduct. The application form contains a "Certified Statement"
containing a reference to bribery being a serious crime.
31. For major projects (such as the ACP) the Government allows contractors not
on the "approved list" to enter an ad hoc prequalification process, but they are
required to apply to join the list at the same time. Some public bodies
deliberately seek to achieve a broad geographic representation among their
contractors, in order to "spread the risk", as they explained. Whether
accidental or the result of deliberate "geo-selection", the very broad
representation of firms among the ACP projects suggests that the process
employed by the government at least does not end up in heavy discrimination
in favor of local firms.
32. Recently the Government decided to join and apply the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA), which has non-discrimination among bidders

as a central objective.
33. The Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC), a public body with very
significant investment activity, asks of its contractors interested in joining its
"approved list" some detailed information on previous projects carried out by
the applicant, namely on
o

the value of "variations" (or change orders) on previous projects,

the amount of claims agreed and/or outstanding,

previous prosecutions for a breach of health and safety legislation, and

information on major subcontractors.

On the other hand, the MTRC contractor selection process does not have a
formal reference to bribery or integrity, but MTRC inquires about probity
issues during the interview and feels that integrity issues would come out
during the discussion. MTRC conducts regular integrity and bribery awareness
sessions with its own staff as well as with contractors. There is a reference to
anti-corruption in the MTRC code of conduct.
34. MTRC also employs a Post Tender Price Adjustment Procedure (a form of
limited negotiation), in order "to get the best value for money". These
negotiations are conducted with the shortlisted tenderers only in the presence
of a team of Senior Officials, and full records are kept.
35. The MTRC invites a limited number of bidders for individual contracts. The
MTRC will limit the number of contracts won by a single contractor. It will
also try to achieve a national spread among its contractors, so as to contain the
risk.
36. The Highways Department uses the Government's Central Tender Board for
any contract above a value of HK$ 10 million (US$ 1.3 million equivalent),
comprising officials from the Works and Finance Bureaus as well as other
officials. This Department also limits the number of firms which it invites to
submit tenders. It considers tendering too costly both for the project owner and
the tenderer to ask other than the most likely winners to go through the process
of preparing the tender documents.
37. The Airport Authority (AA) works under the watchful eyes of the Airport
Consultative Committee made up of competent people including appointed
legislators. It has a watching function over technical, financial and legal
matters. The AA is headed by a Board the members of which are appointed by
the Chief Executive of the Government of Hong Kong.

38. The AA employs a selection process which allows full competition. Its
standard contract form was developed in conjunction with ICAC and the Hong
Kong Contractors Association. The selection of contractors follows a five step
procedure:
o

it starts with Group C - the Evaluation Task Force, staffed from the
controls, construction, engineering, planning & scheduling, quality
control, finance and legal departments; Group C reports to

Group B - the Review Group, comprising department heads of the

above groups, which reviews and reports to

Group A - the Peer Review Group, which comprises the CEO, the
Project and Finance Directors, and coopted Directors, as needed, which
endorses the Group B report and submits it to the

Project Committee (Works Committee - a Subcommittee of the Board),

which reviews the recommendations of Group A and endorses them for
approval by

the Board, which notes the recommendation of the Project Committee

and endorses or rejects it.

39. Normally the selection of contractors by the AA goes through two rounds: in
the first (technical only) round, 8 -10 bidders are invited to participate; the 3 or
4 best in this group are then asked to submit a full technical and financial bid.
40. All agencies appear to allow "non-conforming alternative bids" (provided they
accompany a "conforming bid"), even though they deal differently with them.
The AA will consider such alternatives and, if it sees merit in any of them, will
give all bidders a chance to bid on the alternative design as well. The
Highways Department, if it sees merit, will not give other bidders the
opportunity to bid on it.
41. The criteria for the evaluation of consultant, contractor and supplier proposals
are made public and thus are fully transparent. Equally, tenders to be issued
over the forthcoming 9 months or so are published on the Web and in the
Official Gazette.
42. Since Hong Kong applies the WTO-GPA, any company worldwide can ask for
tender invitations, whether it is on the "approved list" or not, but it will then
have to go through the inquiry/prequalification process to demonstrate its
technical and financial

competence.
Contract Implementation
43. To deal with integrity and bribery issues during contract implementation, the
Government provides for
o

regular exposure, for its own and contractor staff, to anti-corruption

training programs, the cultivation of a corruption-free work
environment,

the establishment of adequate internal reporting mechanisms,

firm action in case of breach of rules, and

exclusion (blacklisting), in several degrees of severity, after allowing

due process of inquiry.

44. The Highways Department regularly employs a Consultant Engineer for

quality control and monitoring of implementation, who in turn is monitored by
the Department. The Department issues performance reports on the Contractor
every three months; in case of persistent poor performance, the Contractor
may be suspended from tendering for other highway projects. The reports are
circulated to all departments. The Department also issues half-yearly
performance reports on the Consulting Engineer. EACSB will consolidate all
reports and circulate them to relevant departments.
45. For supply contracts, the MTRC sends its own engineers to supervise the
quality of the goods, both to the PRC and to other countries, and provides
supervision of contract implementation in- house. The Government employs
"agents" for the same purpose. The inspectors are rotated regularly; the
Projects Director visits and supervises the inspectors.
Change Orders / Variations
46. Perhaps the most common instrument for corruption and manipulation during
contract implementation is the use of change orders or variations. Here
again the Government has established clear rules for administering claims both
as to the principle and the quantum of a change order.
47. The MTRC requires the site team to quantify, explain and justify any change.
The proposal goes to the Project Control Team for approval. Field-decisions
are possible for changes up to HK$ 5 million (US$ 650.000 equivalent), but
such a field decision requires subsequent formal approval.

48. The AA also has a complex process for change orders. A Divisional Review
Committee of senior line managers will have to give Contract Change
Authorization (CCA), Budget Change (BCA) or Expenditure Change
Authorization (ECA). A CCA will involve design, construction and contract
engineers, the Project Manager, the Project Control Manager and the Project
Director. All in all, up to 17 signatures are required before a change order can
be approved. If the change exceeds a value of HK$ 5 million (US$ 650.000
equivalent), even the CEO has to sign off.
49. In general government matters, change orders within the terms of the contract
up to HK$ 300 000 (US$ 40.000 equivalent) can be approved by the
consultant engineer, everything above requires approval by the Department:
o

if <5% of contract value or <HK$ 3m (US$ 390.000 equivalent),

whichever is greater - at Directorate level,

if <10% or <HK$ 4.5 million (US$ 580.000 equivalent), at Assistant

Director level,

if <20% or <HK$ 6 million (US$ 775.000 equivalent), at Deputy

Director level, and

for all higher value changes, at Director level.

If outside the terms of the contract, then changes at < HK$ 3 million (US$
390.000 equivalent) can be approved with legal advice, anything beyond
requires the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
Other Implementation Issues
50. One instrument employed by government to assure quality implementation is
Quality Control Testing, normally by an independent organization. In this
regard, the contract may contain a probity clause which specifically prohibits
inappropriate handling of samples and disclosure of information. Good test
management would also focus on the avoidance of corruption through staff
rotation, regular audits and suitable conflict of interest provisions.
51. On a selective basis (technically complex projects or BOT projects, or in the
presence of safety concerns), the Government employs "independent
checking engineers" to obtain an independent quality check of project
implementation. In the case of BOTs, the "independent checker" is paid by the
franchise holder, but he is responsible to the Government as well as to the
franchise holder. While this was not the case with the West Harbour Crossing,
an independent design and works checker was employed. The task here can
include a technical audit of project supervision ( test records, site observation,
approval of and compliance with control procedures) and an audit of the

financial operations. The experience with BOT projects indicates that

problems are fewer if the franchise holder has a financial stake in the project.
Overall, the employment of an independent checker appears to increase the
likelihood of a clean implementation.
52. Finally, the government has introduced clear Dispute Settlement Procedures.
The process starts by necessity with mediation efforts, then allows
"adjudication by management" and finally foresees arbitration. It is interesting
to note that under the ACP, nearly 90% of all cases brought were resolved
before reaching arbitration, whereas in non-ACP projects, about half of all the
disputes reach arbitration, suggesting that dispute settlement under ACP works
quite successfully.
53. The AA also requires several internal steps before a case can be taken to
arbitration (and also, no arbitration until after the Completion Certificate has
been issued). Prior to arbitration there is a dispute resolution procedure
governed by a Convenor who selects a panel of one or three independent
experts to hear the dispute. There are strict time limits within which the parties
have to act (e.g. 90 days to hear and resolve a dispute; the Chairman can allow
another 30 days, any other extension only with mutual consent of the parties).
The panel decision is final and binding on the parties, until the issue of the
Completion Certificate, following which either party may refer the panel
decision to arbitration.
54. Throughout the government and public bodies, important decisions are not
made by an individual, but through concerted action of several officials, often
at different levels.
55. The CPD of the ICAC holds regular advisory meetings with the AA, the
MTRC and other organizations implementing the ACP program to discuss the
procurement arrangements and reduce the corruption opportunities. The CPD
is also present at selected selection board meetings and tender openings. The
CPD also cooperates closely with the internal audit department of the AA.

Conclusion and the Future

56. The outcome of the very large ACP (on schedule, close to budget and without
any significant corruption) attests to the high quality work of the Hong Kong
authorities as well as to the quality and appropriateness of the legal and
administrative systems and rules within which the ACP was carried out. The
projects were handled transparently, with advance publication of predicted
construction programs, careful selection of consultants, contractors and
suppliers on a basis that assured a good degree of competition, and tight
control of the implementation through stringent quality monitoring by

government staff and third-party certification. Some of the procedural

requirements may appear elaborate (e.g. the up to 17 signatures required for a
change order under the Airport Authority), but this complexity did not slow
down the project execution, and thus apparently served a useful purpose.
57. It was somewhat surprising to us that the issue of "probity" or "integrity" of
the private-sector partners of the government in this very large and complex
venture did not receive a more formal treatment in the selection procedures,
e.g. by asking bidders specific questions as to their past probity or integrity
record. In the event, this does not seem to have led to any problems, but TI
would recommend to others studying the Hong Kong experience to consider
adding such probing questions in the procurement process.
58. There are indications that in some more recent major investment projects in
Hong Kong (such as the Cyberport and Disneyland), none of which were
associated with the ACP, the contractors may have been selected without full
competition. If that should be correct, one would perhaps worry about the
integrity of the procurement processes in general. It is also unfortunate that the
Government is reported to have rejected the idea of using a NAPCO type
central organization to coordinate future mega projects inspite of the fact that
NAPCO appears to have been an important element in achieving effective
project coordination for the ACP. But the fact remains that Hong Kong has
managed to carry out the massive Airport Core Programme, at the phenomenal
sum of about HK$ 160 billion (US$ 20.6 billion equivalent), with a minimum
of corruption. That is a truly remarkable achievement for which Hong Kong
rightly deserves - and has received - major credit. And an achievement, from
which many countries around the globe - industrial or developing - can learn
and have learned a lot. One can only hope that Hong Kong will carry on its
recent tradition of insisting on impeccable procedures characterized by
transparency and integrity. Hong Kong has taught the world that with the right
procedures and the right attitude a government can practically eliminate the
scourge of corruption, over a relatively short period of time. As the rest of the
world observes, and considers to emulate, the experience of Hong Kong ,
Hong Kong itself should carry on with its superb tradition.
Source: http://www.transparency.org/ 12/1999