1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and MAXINE

BRADFORD, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUIS R. REYES, as Presiding Judge of
Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of Cavite, and
NELIA T. MONTOYA, respondents.

Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases

Agreement of 1947, as amended. Checking of
purchases at the NEX is a routine procedure
observed at base retail outlets to protect and
safeguard merchandise, cash and equipment
pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4(b) of
NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. 7Thus,
Bradford's order to have purchases of all
employees checked on 22 January 1987 was
made in the exercise of her duties as Manager
of the NEX-JUSMAG.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of

the Rules of Court. Petitioners would have Us annul
and set aside, for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
the Resolution of 17 July 1987 of Branch 22 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)
FACTS:
Nelia Montoya, respondent, is an American citizen
who, at the time material to this case, was
employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the
U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United
States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City.
Petitioner Maxine Bradford, hereinafter referred to
as Bradford, is likewise an American citizen who
was the activity exchange manager at the said
JUSMAG Headquarters.
Respondents body and belongings were searched
by Yong Kennedy, also an ID checker, upon the
instruction of the store manager, Ms. Maxine
Bradford while she was already at the parking
area in the presence of the defendant and
numerous curious onlookers;
she was informed by the defendant that the
search is to be made on all Jusmag employees
that day; but checking the records, its only she.
-

Montoya formally protested the illegal search on

February 14, 1987 in a letter addressed to Mr. R.L.
Roynon; but no action was undertaken by the said
officer;
-

PROCESS:
Montoya filed complaint with RTC-Cavite for
damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory
acts committed by the latter in excess of her
authority as store manager
Bradford filed two (2) motions for extension of
time to file her Answer which were both granted
by the trial court, but instead of answering, she,
together with USA, filed Motion to Dismiss on ff.
grounds:
o

Montoya filed her opposition alleging:

o Bradford, in ordering the search upon her
person
and
belongings outside the
NEX
JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers,
had committed an improper, unlawful and
highly discriminatory act against a Filipino
employee and had exceeded the scope of her
authority
o having exceeded her authority, Bradford
cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the
public petitioner because her liability is
personal
o Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction
over the case because Bradford is a civilian
employee who had committed the challenged
act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act is
not one of those exempted from the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts
Philippine courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances of the case to determine
whether or not Bradford had acted within or
outside the scope of her authority.

They exchanged replies until Bradford was

declared in default for failure to answer, so
Montoya presented her evidence ex-parte. This
default also showed admission of truth of
allegation.

ISSUES: Whether or not the trial court committed

grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
dismiss based on the following grounds:
-

(This) action is in effect a suit against the

United States of America, a foreign sovereign
immune from suit without its consent for the
cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and

Bradford, as manager of the US Navy

Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is
immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the
performance of her official functions under the
Philippines-United States Military Assistance

The complaint in Civil Case No. 224-87 is in effect

a suit against the public petitioner, a foreign
sovereign immune from suit which has not given
consent to such suit and
Bradford is immune from suit for acts done by her
in the performance of her official functions as
manager of the U.S. Navy Exchange of JUSMAG
pursuant to the Philippines-United States Military
Assistance Agreement of 1947 and the Military
Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.

HELD: Petition denied for lack of merit.

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-

Montoya has a sufficient and viable cause of

action that Bradford acted not only outside the
scope of her authority or more specifically, in
her private capacity but also outside the
territory where she exercises such authority, that
is, outside the NEX-JUSMAG particularly, at the
parking area which has not been shown to form
part of the facility of which she was the manager..
the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply
and may not be invoked where the public official is
being sued in his private and personal capacity as
an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are
sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts
without authority or in excess of the powers
vested in him. agents and officials of the United
States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base
are no exception to this rule.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different

venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals
Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay
$39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount
as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary
damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the
increase of the damages to be collected from
defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued
using the defense that they are immune from suit for
acts done/statements made by them in performance
of their official governmental functions pursuant to
RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim
that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the
case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of
a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus
case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision.
According to the CA, defendants are immune from
suit.

LOIDA Q. SHAUF & JACOB SHAUF, petitioners

vs.
HON. CA, DON E. DETWILER & ANTHONY PERSI,
respondents

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in

their private capacity thus this is not a suit against
the US government which would require consent.

Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado

Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit.

They further claim that the rule allowing suits against
public officers & employees for criminal &
unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines
& is not part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

FACTS:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an
American who is a member of the US Air Force, was
rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the
Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she
is eminently qualified.

ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from

suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
HELD:
No they are not immune.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and
severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00
as moral damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees, and the costs of suit.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint

for damages and an equal employment opportunity
complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler
(civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi
(Education Director), for alleged discrimination by
reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a
temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day
period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she
will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if
no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released
but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes
available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time,
Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her
position. But Mrs. Abalateos appointment was
extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said
position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was
extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as
retaliation for the complaint that she filed against
Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a
joint decision of the management & it was in
accordance of with the applicable regulation.

RATIO:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in
their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction

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Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs.
Aligaen Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose
rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the
State within the rule of immunity of the State from
suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or
invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is
not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf

failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United
States federal legislation on equality of opportunity
for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of
any other remedy under American law, let alone
remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign
law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these
remedies, but is entitled as a matter of plain and
simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise
proscribed, which will best advance and protect her
interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from
seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not
be ousted of jurisdiction on the dubious and
inconclusive representations of private respondents
on that score.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION
vs.
HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, ET. AL.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which

suggests any arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or
motive on the part of the trial judge in ruling that
private respondents committed acts of discrimination
for which they should be held personally liable.

FACTS:
At about 7am of December 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by
Bernardo Balagot (owned by the Estate of Macario
Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose
Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino Velasquez), and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano
Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of
physical injuries.

There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs'

complaint that plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused
appointment as Guidance Counselor by the
defendants on account of her sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the
University of Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has
completed 34 semester hours in psychology/guidance
and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science.
She has also completed all course work in human
behavior and counselling psychology for a doctoral
degree.
She is a civil service eligible.
More
important, she had functioned as a Guidance
Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9 level
for approximately four years at the time she applied
for the same position in 1976.

The private respondents instituted a complaint for

damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of
the passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid
defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the
petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner raised as one of its defenses the nonsuability of the State.

In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor,

defendant Persi did not even consider the application
of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to
CORRO which appointed Edward B. Isakson who was
not eligible to the position.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernando is

immune from suit.
HELD: YES.
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is
liable for the torts committed by its employee, the
test of liability of the municipality depends on whether
or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality,
is performing governmental or proprietary functions.

Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution

provides that the State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over
from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution
ensuring equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race, or creed..

In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the

municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." We
already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs.
Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
construction or maintenance of roads in which the

There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and

Detwiler, in committing the acts complained of have,
in effect, violated the basic constitutional right of
petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is very
much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this,
they should be held accountable

4
truck and the driver worked at the time of the
accident are admittedly governmental activities."

on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to

P.D. 1620."

We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality

cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the
death of the passenger tragic and deplorable
though it may be imposed on the municipality no
duty to pay monetary compensation.
ERNESTO
CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL
RICE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in

this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?
Held: No.
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute
shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that
immunity has been expressly waived by the DirectorGeneral of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a
driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the
IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the

aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the
Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has
been held to be a political question conclusive upon
the Courts in order not to embarass a political
department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and
under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government or other officer
acting under his direction.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a

preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department Manager.
In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty
under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report
to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start
because of a problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the
charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the

assurance of unimpeded performance of their
functions by the agencies concerned.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the

Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue
of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that
it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as
an international organization in the instant case filed
by petitioner, not having waived the same.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal

and an express waiver by its Director-General is the
only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this
immunity.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity,

the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order
issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases
of
termination,
respondent
IRRI
waives
its
immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense
of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the
case.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute

may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.
HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO
G.R. No. 101949
238 SCRA 524
December 1, 1994

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal

and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set
aside and the complaint dismissed.

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity

of the IRRI as an international organization granted by
Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be
invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived
the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a

parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name
Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the

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name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land
was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the
Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who
exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome,
Italy, for his residence.

made for profit but claimed that it acquired said

property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Nunciature in the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of
selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature.
The lot was acquired through a donation from the
Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct the official
place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The
transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal
are likewise clothed with a governmental (nonproprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for
profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict
the squatters living in said property.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup

who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc.
When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a
dispute arose between the two parties because both
were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the
squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales
Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the
property while Holy See says that respondent
corporation should do it or the earnest money will be
returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,
subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is

hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed
accordingly.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties

and Development Corporation.

GRN L-35645 May 22, 1985.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES B.
GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and
ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for

annulment of the sale, specific performance and
damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground
that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign
immunity by entering into a business contract. The
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was
forwarded to the Supreme Court.

FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base
in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair
projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to
the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals
and for the name of its bonding company. The
company construed this as an acceptance of its offer
so they complied with the requests. The company
received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins
of Department of the Navy of the United States, also
one of the petitioners herein informing that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating in repairs, and that the projects
were awarded to third parties. The company filed a
complaint against the defendants herein demanding
specific performance that the company be allowed to
perform the work on the projects and, in the event
that specific performance was no longer possible, to
order the defendants to pay damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign

immunity.
HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly
invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As
expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution,
generally accepted principles of International Law are
adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the
laws of the land as a condition and consequence of
our admission in the society of nations.
It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic
envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over
any real action relating to private immovable property.
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that
the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited
diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local
jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

ISSUE: WON the US is immune from suit having dealt

with a private corporation.
HELD: YES.
A State may be said to have descended the the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at

bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the
ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the
said transaction can be categorized as an act jure
gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the
acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were

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defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated
to commercial or business purposes.

the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we

would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of the states, such principles are deemed
incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into
a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the
level of the other contracting party and divested of its
sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the
aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the
Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim
that they are also insulated from suit in this country
merely because they have acted as agents of the
United States in the discharge of their official
functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any
other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived
its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure
gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental
acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the
barbershops subject to the concessions granted by
the US government to be commercial enterprises
operated by private persons. The Court would have
directly resolved the claims against the defendants as
in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the
record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in
the grant of the barbershop concessions were not
available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the
court below for further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the
nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US
government in its proprietary capacity, as they were
operated for profit, as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. Not even the US government
can claim such immunity because by entering into the
employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of
its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still
dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the
ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the
proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the
petitioners acted quite properly in terminating
Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating
act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the
petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust

USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest

These are cases that have been consolidated because
they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the
case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground
that they are in effect suits against it to which it has
not consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of
the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with
the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base, which was won by
Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his
bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and
also, to conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his
dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation
Center at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been
ascertained after investigation that Genove had
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the
vegetables served to the club customers. The club
manager suspended him and thereafter referred the
case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was
arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners, who were USAF officers and special
agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed
against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified
against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. He then filed for
damages against petitioners claiming that it was
because of the latters acts that he lost his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private
respondents against petitioners (US military officers)
for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this
and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but
resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune
from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done
by them in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without
its consent is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that were have adopted as part of

operation and thereafter testified against the

complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of
the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts imputable to their principal, which has not
given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual
allegations in this case need a closer study of what
actually happened. The record was too meager to
indicate if the defendants were really discharging
their official duties or had actually exceeded their
authority when the incident occurred.The needed
inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it
may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties.

NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO
THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE
DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE
SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS
CONTRACTS.

2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business

relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the
exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent.
(US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL

(TWO PETITIONS CONSOLIDATED.)

En Banc
Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993

Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22,
1987 Mendiola massacre (background: Wiki),
together with those injured (Caylao group),
instituted the petition, seeking the reversal
and setting aside of the orders of respondent
Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in
"Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case
against the Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded
military officers are being charged in
their personal and official capacity,
holding them liable, if at all, would not
result in financial responsibility of the
government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed
by both parties for reconsideration
In
January
1987,
farmers
and
their
sympathizers presented their demands for
what they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems
and demands such as:
giving lands for free to farmers
zero retention of lands by landlords

Dialogue between the farmers and then

Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on
January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR
Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best
to bring the matter to the attention of then
President Cory Aquino during the January 21
Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day
The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment,
barricaded the MAR premises and prevented
the employees from going inside their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated
discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's
group decided to march to Malacanang to air
their demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were
joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of
Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng
Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also
received that the KMP was heavily infliltrated
by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection
was impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at
Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to
15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the
police lines. No dialogue took place;
"pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially
confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12
sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the
group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot
wounds and 20 suffered minor physical injuries
The
"Citizens'
Mendiola
Commission"
submitted its report on the incident on
February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed
with handguns prohibited by law
The security men assigned to protect
the government units were in civilian
attire (prohibited by law)
There was unnecessary firing by the
police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers
are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing

The water cannons and tear gas were

not put into effective use to disperse
the crowd; the water cannons and fire
trucks were not put into operation
because:
there was no order to use them

stop amortizations of land payments

they
were
prepositioned

incorrectly

Issues:
1. Whether or not the State has waived its
immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this is
a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners
argue
that
by
the
recommendation
made
by
the
Commission for the government to
indemnify the heirs and victims, and by
public addresses made by President
Aquino, the State has consented to be
sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit
against the State
Holding:
1. No.
This is not a suit against the State with
its consent.
2. No.
Ratio:
1.
Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State
may not be sued without its consent

The
recommendations
by
the
Commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State

The Commission was simply a factfinding body; its findings shall serve only as
cause of action for litigation; it does not bind
the State immediately

President
Aquino's
speeches
are
likewise not binding on the State; they are not
tantamount to a waiver by the State
2.
Some instances when a suit against the State
is proper:

When the Republic is sued by name;

When
the
suit
is
against
an
unincorporated government agency

When the suit is on its face against a

government officer but the case is such that
the ultimate liability will belong not to the
officer but to the government

Although the military officers and

personnel were discharging their official
functions during the incident, their
functions ceased to be official the
moment they exceeded their authority

There was lack of justification by the

government forces in the use of firearms.

Their main purpose in the rally was to

ensure peace and order, but they fired at the
crowd instead
No reversible error by the respondent Judge found.
Petitions dismissed.

they were out of range of the

marchers
The Commission recommended the criminal
prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed
individuals shown either on tape or in pictures,
firing at the direction of the marchers
The Commission also recommended that all
the commissioned officers of both the Western
Police District (WPD) and Integrated National
Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for
violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly
Act of 1985
Prosecution of the marchers was also
recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be
prosecuted both for holding the rally without
permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended
for the following officers for their failure to
make effective use of their skill and
experience
in
directing
the
dispersal
operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao

Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim

Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres

Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz

Col. Cezar Nazareno

Maj. Filemon Gasmin

Last
and
most
important
recommendation: for the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the
government
It was this portion that petitioners
(Caylao group) invoke in their claim for
damages from the government

No concrete form of compensation

was received by the victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted
an action for damages against the
Republic of the Philippines, together with
the military officers, and personnel involved in
the Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the State cannot be
sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has
waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the
ground that there was no such waiver
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied