Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita

495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the
Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating
Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate
attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent
belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves.
Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from
their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes
on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish
Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour,
whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if
he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No.
108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of
its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued
another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner
of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No.
1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru

a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendumplebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar
as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections
to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that
the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the
power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and
2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute
itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed
as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section
2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but
also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals
to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.
Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission
63 Phil. 139 Political Law Separation of Powers
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the
said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par.
6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation,
Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the
election protest and that the EC can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: (a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and
the judicial.
(b)
The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.
(c)
That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d)
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and
duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e)
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and
perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
(f)
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g)
That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
(h)
That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i)
That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j)
That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k)
That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of

Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members,
the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l)
That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested or not,
is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m)
That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest
against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
Tanada v. Angara
Facts
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act
binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to
seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self
reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy.
Issue
Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and
independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.
The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The
Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless
there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the
absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state
which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
Bondoc v Pineda
FACTS:
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Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
Representative for 4TH district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral
Tribunal (HRET)
After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc because he was consistent with truth, justice
and self-respect and that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.
Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its resolution.
ISSUE:

W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING
THE REPRESENTATION IN THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS NOMINATION IS VALID
HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF
REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:
1.
IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST
BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE
AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
2.
MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT,
IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF
MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
3.
IT VIOLATES CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP
MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION
FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!