EN BANC

A.M. No. P-06-2161

September 25, 2012
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 05-2115-P)
ATTY. DENNIS A. VELASCO, Petitioner,
vs.
MYRA L. BATERBONIA, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. P-07-2295
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-1-16-RTC)
IN RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE RTC BRANCH 38, ALABEL, AND MCTC OF MALUNGON, BOTH IN SARANGANI
PROVINCE.
DECISION
PER CURIAM: J.:
A cash clerk of a trial court who defrauds the Judiciary is guilty of the most serious administrative offense that warrants her dismissal from the service.
She should also be criminally prosecuted for estafa through falsification.
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint dated January 19, 2005 filed by Atty. Dennis A. Velasco (Velasco), 1 then the Clerk of Court VI of
Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Alabel, Sarangani Province, against RTC Cash Clerk Myra L. Baterbonia (Baterbonia).
In his complaint,2 Velasco averred that Baterbonia had short-changed the Government on several occasions by not remitting the full amounts of the
judicial fees paid by the litigants; that her modus operandi had involved a clandestine effort to record in the duplicate and triplicate copies of the official
receipts (ORs) amounts smaller than what had actually appeared on the ORs issued to the litigants; that he had discovered her scheme while he was
checking the filing fees for a petition for notarial commission to serve as basis for the filing fees to be assessed in the filing of a new petition; that he had
then found that what had appeared as paid on the duplicate and triplicate copies of OR No. 21459326 had been the amount of only P 6.40 for a certified
photocopy, instead of the proper amount of P 1,532.00, and that she had made only the amount of P 3.60 appear on the duplicate and triplicate copies
of OR No. 21459376 covering the payment of a certified photocopy instead of the correct amount of P 468.00;3 that his discovery of the fraud had made
probe further, resulting in his unearthing other falsified transactions relating to 18 civil actions (namely, Civil Case No. 9997, Civil Case No. 2000, Civil
Case No. 2001, Civil Case No. 2002, Civil Case No. 2003, Civil Case No. 2004, Civil Case No. 2005, Civil Case No. 2006, Civil Case No. 2007, Civil
Case No. 2008, Civil Case No. 2009, Civil Case No. 2011, Civil Case No. 2012, Civil Case No. 2013, Civil Case No. 2014, Civil Case No. 2015, Civil
Case No. 2018, Civil Case No. 2019);4 that she had thereby misappropriated the total sum of P 43,964.80;5 and that she had voluntarily admitted and
confessed to her misdeeds upon confrontation.6
Atty. Velasco requested the conduct of an audit of all the financial records of Branch 38 of the RTC by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA); and
prayed that Baterbonia be punished for her acts of malversation, falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct.
Acting upon the recommendation of then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr., the Court ordered: (a) that a financial audit and investigation of
the accounts handled by Baterbonia be conducted and a report be submitted within 60 days from completion of the investigation; and (b) that Baterbonia
be preventively suspended pending the conduct of the investigation.7
Findings of the Audit Team
The OCA audit team found Baterbonia primarily responsible for discrepancies between the legal fees received from party litigants and the amounts she
had written in the duplicate and triplicate copies of the ORs, 8 as follows:

Per Legal Fees

Form

Recorded Amount
per duplicate and
triplicate copies

Difference of
unrecorded/unreceipted
amount

For JDF:
Civil Cases
Miscellaneous
Cases
Special Proceedings

P 213,996.24

P 115,451.84

P 98,544.40

25,300.00

9,508.00

15,792.00

5,232.00

2,801.80

2,430.20

Special Civil
Actions

21,064.15

11,722.00

9,342.15

Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure

157,842.31

98,531.20

59,311.11

423,434.70

238,014.84

185,419.86

31,152.06

20,835.06

10,317.00

5,250.00

0.00

5,250.00

360.00

328.00

32.00

Special Civil
Actions

2,620.00

1,770.00

850.00

Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure

6,873.39

3,639.86

3,233.53

35,877.06

10,585.60

25,291.46

Miscellaneous
Cases

8,254.00

1,899.00

6,355.00

Special Proceedings

3,508.00

1,853.20

1,654.80

Special Civil
Actions

6,588.53

3,478.00

3,110.53

Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure

15,727.98

7,790.07

7,937.91

69,955.57

25,605.87

44,349.70

14,820.00

11,400.00

3,420.00

1,460.00

0.00

1,460.00

Special Proceedings

420.00

420.00

0.00

Special Civil
Actions

600.00

300.00

300.00

17,300

12,120.00

5,180.00

P 556,945.72

P 302,313.63

P 254,632.09

TOTAL

For the General

Fund
Civil Cases
Miscellaneous
Cases
Special Proceedings

For SAJF
Civil Cases

TOTAL

For Sheriffs
General Fund
Civil Cases
Miscellaneous
Cases

TOTAL

GRAND TOTAL

The audit team also found that Baterbonia had not deposited either in the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) or in the Sheriffs General Fund (GF) the
amount of P 36,000.00 representing the withdrawn confiscated bonds.
At this juncture, minor mathematical errors have been detected in summing up the discrepancies uncovered by the audit team. The amount defrauded
was only P 231,699.03.

Atty. Anthony A. Barluado, then the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 38 of the RTC, was similarly subjected to the audit, and was found to have
sufficiently explained all the accountability issues relevant to certain withdrawals. Hence, the matter concerning his withdrawals was deemed closed and
terminated.
Findings and Recommendations of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated August 23, 2011, the OCA adopted the findings of the audit team and recommended the following disciplinary actions to be
taken, to wit:
1. The letter-compliance dated 14 July 2011 of Atty. Anthony A. Barluado, Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province,
in compliance to the Resolution dated 23 June 2008, submitting certified photo machine copies of the following: a) the two (2) withdrawal slips in the
amount of P 10,000.00 each duly validated by the Land Bank of the Philippines, both dated 21 March 2000, for Election Case No. 98-10 entitled "Flora
L. Benzonan vs. Enrique Yap" and Election Case No. 98-11 entitled "Roselito Wong, et al. vs. Venancio Wata, et al."; b) two (2) Orders to withdraw said
amounts both dated 21 March 2000; c) Acknowledgement Receipts dated 21 March 2000; and d) a photocopy of the LBP Passbook (Fiduciary Fund)
with account no. 2071-0148-97 evidencing that only two withdrawals in the amount of P 10,000.00 each were made on that date, be NOTED.
xxxx
4. Respondent Myra L. Baterbonia, Clerk III, RTC Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani province, be found GUILTY of dishonesty and gross misconduct, and the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service and forfeiture of retirement and all other benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment
in any government agency, including government-owned and controlled corporations, be imposed upon her.
xxxx
7. Atty. Anthony A. Barluado, Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Alabel, Sarangani Province, be ADMONISHED for his failure to
supervise Acting Cash Clerk Myra L. Baterbonia, which resulted to the mishandling of the courts judiciary funds and be STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same infraction shall be dealth with more severely;
xxxx
Ruling
We find the foregoing recommendations of the OCA to be warranted by the evidence on record.
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines declares that a public office is a public trust, and mandates public officers and employees
at all times to be accountable to the people, to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to act with patriotism and
justice, and to lead modest lives.
In enforcing the constitutional declaration, the Court has been constant and unceasing in reminding all its judicial officers and other workers in the
Judiciary to faithfully perform the mandated duties and responsibilities of their respective offices. The Court is ever aware that any act of impropriety on
their part, be they the highest judicial officers or the lowest members of the workforce, can greatly erode the peoples confidence in the Judiciary. This,
because their conduct, good or bad, necessarily reflects on the image of the Judiciary as the temple of justice and right. It is, therefore, the sacred duty
of every worker in the Judiciary to maintain before the people the good name and standing of the courts. 9
Based on the findings of the OCA, Baterbonia failed to measure up to the standards of conduct prescribed for her office. As an accountable employee
charged with the safekeeping of fees collected from litigants and the rest of the public dealing with the court she was serving, she was expected to
exercise honesty and fidelity in the discharge of that duty of safekeeping because she would thereby ensure the flow of judicial funds so essential to the
orderly administration of justice.10 Yet, she frequently violated the trust and confidence reposed in her position by committing serial acts of
misappropriation of the funds she had received as fees that amounted to gross dishonesty. She thereby manifested a malevolent tendency to cheat the
Judiciary of its funds.
Baterbonias misconduct was certainly grave. The Court has explained the concept of grave misconduct in Imperial v. Santiago, Jr., 11 viz:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of the office. There
must also be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law.1wphi1
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule must be manifest.12 Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or employee who unlawfully or
wrongfully uses her station or character to procure some benefit for herself or for another, contrary to the rights of others. 13 Certainly, Baterbonias acts
constituted very serious administrative offenses of grave misconduct that called for her dismissal from the service many times over. In that regard, her
boldness in repeatedly committing the acts erased all possibility of leniency towards her.
Baterbonias grave misconduct, being a grave offense, deserved the ultimate penalty of dismissal for the first offense pursuant to Section 52, A, of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.14

Moreover, in her defrauding the Judiciary, Baterbonia schemed to have her acts go undiscovered by surreptitiously tampering the ORs to make them
appear to contain the much diminished amounts. She thereby clearly abused the trust and confidence reposed in her as the cash clerk of her court. She
might have probably incurred criminal liability for the complex felony of estafa through falsification for each such occasion of misappropriation. Hence,
the Court deems it proper to instruct the OCA to initiate the necessary criminal charges against her in the Department of Justice to make her answer for
any crimes she might have been guilty of committing.
Before closing, the Court notes that despite the lack of a showing of a conspiracy in the defraudation of the Judiciary between Baterbonia and Atty.
Barluado, her immediate superior officer, the latter concededly failed to exercise utmost diligence in his oversight of her discharge of her duties as the
cash clerk. Her misappropriations of substantial sums belonging to the coffers of the Judiciary surely did not happen except over some period of time,
and might have been sooner discovered, if not altogether prevented, had he been diligent and vigilant in supervising her. An admonition for him to be
diligent and vigilant in his supervision of his subordinates is, therefore, timely and appropriate, lest such subordinates will take advantage of his laxity
and softness in order to defraud the Judiciary some more or to violate the public trust with some degree of impunity. He ought to be reminded that his
being the clerk of court requires him to perform delicate functions regarding the custody of judicial funds, revenues, records, properties and premises,
and that he should then unceasingly be alert to any misfeasance and malfeasance on the part of his subordinates. He should always bear in mind that
he may be held as responsible to an extent for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of the funds or property entrusted to the court he serves as
any of his guilty subordinates.15
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. FINDS MYRA L. BATERBONIA GUILTY of dishonesty and gross misconduct; and DISMISSES her from the service effective immediately,
with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency, including government-owned and controlled corporations and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits;
2. ORDERS MYRA L. BATERBONIA to restitute within 30 days from her receipt of this decision the amount of P 231,699.03, which is the total
of her shortages consisting of the P 185,419.86 for the Judiciary Development Fund; the 1144,349.70 for the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund; and the 115,180.00 for the Sheriffs Special Fund;
3. DIRECTS the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, to determine the balance of MYRA L. BATERBONIA's earned
leave credits, if any, and to forward the balance to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office for the computation of its monetary value,
and for the application of the monetary value and any other monetary benefits due to her to the restitution of the aforestated shortages;
4. REQUIRES the Office of the Court Administrator to bring to the Department of Justice the necessary criminal complaints for the prompt
criminal prosecution of MYRA L. BATERBONIA, if warranted; and
5. ADMONISHES ATTY. ANTHONY A. BARLUADO to exercise diligent and vigilant supervision of his subordinates, with a warning that a
repetition of his lack of diligence and vigilance shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(ON LEAVE)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

(ON LEAVE)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

(ON LEAVE)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Now Presiding Judge of MTCC of Koronodal City.

Rollo (P-06-2161), pp. 1-8.

Id. at 1-2.

Id. at 2-5.

Id. at 5.

Id.

Id. at 70.

Id. at 160-161.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Recio, A.M. No. P-04-1813, May 31, 2011, 649 SCRA 552, 566.

10

Re: Financial Audit on the Books of Account of Ms. Laura D. Delantar, Clerk of Court, MTC, Leyte, Leyte, A.M. No. 06-2-43-MTC, March 30,
2006, 485 SCRA 562, 570.
11

A.M. No. P-01-1449, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 75, 85.

12

Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 449, 461; Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164,
October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 578, 599.
13

Salazar v. Barriga, id., pp. 453-454.

14

Section 52. Classification of Offenses. xxx.

A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
xxxx
3. Grave Misconduct
1st
offense Dismissal
xxxx

15

Id.

CHRISTOPHER D. MANAOG,
Complainant,

A.M. No. P-08-2521

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2329-P)
Present:

- versus -

ARNEL JOSE A. RUBIO and EDGAR C. SURTIDA II, both Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Naga City,
Respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:

February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:

The instant controversy arose from a Complaint dated November 14, 2005 and docketed as OCA I.P.I No. 05-2329-P for misconduct, unethical behavior,
verbal abuse, manhandling, grave threat, grave/serious oral defamation, harassment, abuse and usurpation of judicial power by Christopher D. Manaog
against Arnel Jose A. Rubio and Edgar C. Surtida, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Naga City.
In a Resolution[1] dated February 27, 2008, the Third Division of the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the RTC at Naga City[2] for
investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), also for evaluation, report
and recommendation.[3]
As summarized by the Investigating Judge, the facts are as follows:
The complainant, on October 21, 2005, went to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC, Naga City to secure information on ownership of
certain parcels of land, which had been transferred to others allegedly through fraud. He was inquiring at the information counter in the lobby of the Hall
of Justice, when respondent Rubio approached him and said, Digdi (Its here) after the former saw the documents he had brought with him. The
complainant claims the respondent told him that the person whose signature appeared on the said documents was already dead, and whatever records
the complainant was looking for were already gone. A discussion followed, culminating in a verbal tussle between them.
The complainant avers that the respondent summoned the guard-on-duty at the Hall of Justice and instructed the latter: Guard, pahaleon mo ang
hayop na taong ini (Guard, send away this beast!). The respondent proceeded to hurl invectives at the complainant, statements like Dae ka tatao
makipag-olay, hayup ka (You do not know how to ask for a favor, you beast!). Respondent Surtida, who was unknown to the complainant at the time,
also joined the fray, telling the complainant, Magdigdi ka ta titirahon ta kang di, puta kang hayop ka (Come here and I will hit you, you vile beast!).
The complainant avers that on October 26, 2005, together with his brother, he returned to the Hall of Justice to verify the identity of the other
employee (respondent Surtida) who had joined respondent Rubio in verbally abusing him. While on their way to the office of RTC Branch 25,
respondent Rubio shouted at him and said, Hoy, hoy, ano nakua mo na ang daga mo (Hey, hey, have you found your land?)? The complainant avers
that he merely ignored the taunts from respondent Rubio. The latter, however, refused to keep silent and, in the presence of the court employees, told
the complainant, Maski ka pa mo, raot garo an payo mo (Whatever, you appear to be a nutcase). The complainants brother responded, UP graduate
man lang kami (We are just UP graduates), which statement apparently drew the ire of respondent Rubio, making him retort with the following remark:
Ano man daa yang UP? Siguro raot an payo kan mga nagkaklase dyan. Maski pa kamo magsurog na duwa, papatulan ko kamo (What is that UP? I
think the students there are also nutcases. Even if both of you would help each other, I will fight you).
In his June 30, 2008 Report, Executive Judge Jaime E. Contreras, RTC, Naga City, found respondents Sheriffs Jose Arnel Rubio and Edgar C.
Surtida II liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Judge Contreras recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) month for
Sheriff Rubio and reprimand for Sheriff Surtida, a recommendation joined by the OCA.
The Court agrees with the report of the Executive Judge and OCA.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to perform. They
are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This is so
because the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Thus, court
employees have been requested to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in order to preserve the judiciarys good name and
standing as a true temple of justice.[4]
This Court, speaking in Pizarro v. Villegas,[5] held that:
We stress that the conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the
judiciarys good name and standing as a true temple of justice x x x.
Respondents Rubio and Surtida failed to meet these exacting standards. They have shown lack of decorum, propriety, and respect in their
dealing with other people. Their actuations also debased the publics regard for the very institution they represent, thereby warranting administrative
sanction. Any conduct that would be a bane to the public trust and confidence reposed in the Judiciary cannot be countenanced. [6]
The Investigating Judge correctly observed that the respondents failed to exercise the necessary prudence in dealing with the complainant. A
court employee, even in the face of boorish behavior from those he deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman and an officer
of the court. Suffice it to say, respondents did not accord the complainant the respect due him. Respondents Rubio and Surtida could have easily
avoided the heated discussion with the complainant had they simply referred him to the OCC.
Respondents Rubio and Surtida should be held liable for conduct unbecoming court employees. Their acts of provoking the complainant
constitute behavior wholly unexpected from those in the judicial service. They should be reminded that government service is people-oriented. Patience
is an essential part of dispensing justice, civility is never a sign of weakness, and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. Impatience and
rudeness have no place in government service in which personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times. [7]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Sheriff Jose Arnel Rubio GUILTY of simple misconduct for which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the service for one (1) month
and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The

Court also finds Sheriff Edgar C. Surtida II GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a court employee for which he is REPRIMANDED with the STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

[1]
[2]
[3]

[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]

Rollo, p. 33.
Judge Jaime E. Contreras, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Naga City.
Resolution dated August 13, 2008, rollo, p. 123.
Reyes v. Vidor, A.M. No. P-02-1552, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 257, 260.
A.M. No. P-97-1243, November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 42.
In Re: Complaint for Failure to Pay Just Debts against Esther T. Andres, A.M. No. 4004-40-SC, March 1, 2005, 452 SCRA 654, 664.
Jacinto v. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541, March 10, 2005, 453 SCRA 83, 94.

EN BANC
A.M. Nos. P-13-3116 & P-13-3112

November 12, 2013

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
MS. ROSA A. ACAMPADO, CLERK OF COURT II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, TAFT, EASTERN SAMAR,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
"Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility."1 Court personnel are expected to act in a manner free from reproach. Medical treatment of a sick husband does not excuse the actions of
the respondent who repeatedly deceived this Court by misusing court funds, falsifying public documents, and failing to comply with orders.
For resolution are two consolidated administrative cases where the respondent is charged with failing to submit the documents required by the Fiscal
Monitoring Division of this Court; failing to remit her collections on time; and submitting falsified bank deposit slips. A.M. No. P-13-3116 (Formerly A.M.
No. 07-11-299-MTC) pertains to the Report on the Non-compliance of respondent Rosa A. Acampado, Clerk II, Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern
Samar, to submit additional documents for financial audit. A.M. No. P-13-3112 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3164-P) pertains to the Report on the
Financial Audit conducted on the books of account of Rosa A. Acampado and Jean Gladys N. Lobina of the Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar.
Then Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao in her Memorandum2 informed this Court that Rosa A. Acampado, Clerk II, failed to submit
to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, the additional documents required to finalize the audit
examination of her books of accounts.3Respondent Acampado failed to comply despite several warnings and follow-up communications sent by the
Office of the Court Administrator.4 Senior Deputy Court Administrator Elepao then requested that the salaries, allowances, and other monetary benefits
of respondent Acampado be withheld until compliance is made.5
Consequently, in a Resolution dated December 12, 2007, this Court withheld respondent Acampados salaries, allowances, and other monetary benefits
until compliance was duly effected as an exception to Administrative Circular No. 2-2000 6 to avoid misuse of government funds and to protect this
Courts interest. This Court also noted the Memorandum dated October 31, 2007 of the Office of the Court Administrator.7
In a Memorandum dated February 19, 2009, the Financial Audit Team headed by Ms. Cielo D. Calonia submitted a report to then Court Administrator
and now Associate Justice of this Court, Jose P. Perez.8 The audit team found that Clerk of Court II, Ms. Rosa Acampado, who was then in charge of the
collections of the court, incurred cash shortages in her books of accounts and falsified or tampered bank deposit slips. The team found shortages
amounting to One Hundred Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-eight Pesos and Thirty-Three Centavos (P100,478.33).9 According to the audit team:
It is clear that she committed gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty and even malversation of public funds when she failed to turn over on time her
collections (JDF, SAJF, MF, Fiduciary fund) and altered/tampered deposit slips and official receipts to cover-up collections. x x x.

xxxx
There is no question that Ms. Rosa A. Acampado committed the act of dishonesty in unreported collections of cash bond under Official Receipt Numbers
5581801 to 5581823 totalling to Sixty-Five Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P65,560.00) and altering deposit slips and official receipts during her
accountability period.10
In a Resolution dated April 15, 2009, this Court treated the Memorandum dated February 19, 2009 of the Office of the Court Administrator as an
administrative charge for gross neglect of duty and dishonesty.11 This Court also consolidated A.M. No. 09-3-41-MTC (Report on the Financial Audit
Conducted on the Books of Account of Ms. Rosa A. Acampado and Ms. Jean Gladys N. Lobina of the Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar) with
A.M. No. 07-11-299-MTC ( Report on the Non-Compliance of Ms. Rosa A. Acampado, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court [MTC], Taft, Eastern Samar
to Submit Additional Documents for Financial Audit).12 In the same Resolution, Hon. Chita A. Umil, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Taft,
Eastern Samar, was directed to: (1) investigate the extent of respondent Acampados responsibilities in relation to the tampered deposit slips and
falsification of official receipts for Fiduciary Fund and submit her report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice; and (2) monitor
and advise the Officer-in-Charge to strictly follow the Supreme Court Circulars on the proper handling of Judiciary funds. 13
Respondent Acampados salaries and allowances were withheld from February 2008 to April 15, 2009 but were subsequently released by this Court for
humanitarian considerations.14 The release was subject to the condition that Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) would be "retained/set aside" to answer
for whatever penalty this Court may impose upon her.15
In a Letter dated June 10, 2009, Judge Umil asked that she be relieved from the task of investigating respondent Acampado to maintain the harmonious
atmosphere in her office and to maintain neutrality.16 After granting Judge Umils request to inhibit herself, this Court referred the matter to Judge Renato
Noel C. Echague, Metropolitan Trial Court, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, for investigation, report, and recommendation. Judge Echague then submitted his
Findings and Recommendations dated July 15, 2010 to the Office of the Court Administrator.17
The Office of the Court Administrator submitted its evaluation, report, and recommendation on Judge Echagues findings on February 9, 2011.
In an Indorsement dated September 3, 2012, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas resolved to refer for appropriate action the case against
respondent Acampado for Malversation of Public Funds18 and deemed the case closed and terminated in so far as the Office of the Ombudsman was
concerned.
The issues for resolution in this case are:
I. Whether respondent Acampado is guilty of gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty;
II. Whether respondent Acampado should be dismissed from service; and
III. Whether mitigating circumstances should be considered in this case.
Findings and Recommendations of the Investigating Judge
Judge Echague found that respondent Acampado incurred the following cash shortages in her collections: (1)P23,712.53 for the Judiciary Development
Fund; (2) P58,285.80 for the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund; and (3) P5,000.00 for the Mediation Fund, amounting to a total of Eighty-six
Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight Pesos and Thirty-three Centavos (P86,998.33).19
After hearing respondent Acampados admission that she under-remitted Judiciary funds and falsified bank deposit slips, Judge Echague found her
guilty of gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty punishable by dismissal from service for failing to turn over cash on time. She is also guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of public documents for falsifying bank deposit slips. For failing to submit the additional documents, she is guilty of simple
neglect of duty.
However, in view of mitigating circumstances, such as respondent Acampados admission, remorse, length of service, and the fact that this is her first
administrative case, Judge Echague recommended that she be given the following penalties:
1. In A.M. No. 07-11-299-MTC (Failure of Ms. Acampado to submit additional documents needed for financial audit), she is guilty of simple
neglect of duty. Accordingly, it is recommended that she be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
2. In A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3164-P (Report on the Financial Audit on the books of account of MTC, Taft, Eastern Samar), Ms. Acampado
is guilty of gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty for her failure to remit on time her collections. Ms. Acampado is likewise guilty of
dishonesty and falsification of public documents for falsifying bank deposit slips. Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that for these two
infractions, she be fined an amount equivalent to six (6) months of her salary to be deducted from her retirement benefits. 20
Respondents Arguments
In the hearing which she requested21 and in lieu of her Comment, respondent Acampado asked this Court for forgiveness. She explained that the
shortages were due to under-remittance. She was tempted to use the money for the medical check-ups and medication of her husband who was insulindependent due to diabetes and who had been undergoing dialysis treatment. 22
She also admitted that she falsified 19 Land Bank of the Philippines deposit slips as well as additional 20 bank deposit slips. 23 She prepared the bank
deposit slips but failed to go to the bank. She was rattled by the presence of the audit team, and she just surrendered the falsified slips to the team.

Respondent Acampado also stated that she already fully restituted the cash shortages in the amount of Eighty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight
Pesos and Thirty-three Centavos (P86,998.33). On her non-compliance to submit additional records needed to finalize the audit, she explained that
these records were damaged by water used to put out a fire that had gutted a portion of the municipal hall. 24
This Court referred the Findings and Recommendations dated July 15, 2010 of Judge Echague to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.
Office of the Court Administrators Report and Recommendations
The Office of the Court Administrator adopted the findings of the investigating judge with modification. According to the Office of the Court Administrator,
a clerk of courts failure to make a timely turnover of cash deposited with him or her constitutes not only gross negligence in the performance of duty but
also gross dishonesty, if not malversation.25 The Office of the Court Administrator said that misappropriation of Judiciary funds amounts to a serious
misconduct. It is "a grave offense punishable by dismissal."26 Restitution of the total cash shortages will not erase his or her liability.27
The Office of the Court Administrator also said that "falsification of bank deposit slips is patent dishonesty."28Dishonesty, as a grave offense, "carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in government service."29 However, the Office of the Court Administrator considered certain mitigating circumstances in this case. The
Office of the Court Administrator noted how respondent Acampado readily acknowledged the offenses and offered her sincerest apologies. This is also
the first time that she was charged with an administrative case. Lastly, the length of service of respondent Acampado, which was more than thirty years
(30), was also considered.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that:
xxxx
2. respondent Rosa A. Acampado be found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty in A.M. No. 07-11-299-MTC (failure of Ms. Acampado to submit
additional documents needed for financial audit) and be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos ( 5,000.00); and likewise be found
GUILTY of: (a) gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty for her failure to remit on time her collections; and (b) dishonesty and falsification
of public documents for falsifying bank deposit slips in A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3164-P (Report on the Financial Audit on the books of account of
MTC, Taft, Eastern Samar); that she be FINED in the amount equivalent to one (1) year of her salary to be deducted from her retirement
benefits; and
3. the Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar, be DIRECTED to MONITOR all financial transactions of the court in strict
adherence to the issuances of the Court on the proper finding of all judiciary funds, otherwise, he/she shall be equally liable for the infractions
committed by the employees under his/her command and supervision.30
We agree with the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator regarding respondent Acampados liabilities. However, we disagree with the
recommended penalty to be imposed on her.
This is not the first time that this Court has disciplined an erring and dishonest court employee for misappropriating Judiciary funds and falsifying public
documents under his or her control. In Rojas, Jr. v. Mina,31we found the respondent guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty for stealing and encashing
Special Allowance for Judges and Justices checks payable to several trial court judges without their consent. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Elumbaring,32 we held that the respondent was guilty of dishonesty for failing to remit the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund collections in full and on time. Similarly, in Court Administrator v. Abdullahi, 33 we said that falsification of Daily Time Records amounts to
dishonesty, and dismissal from service is proper even if the offense was committed for the first time.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel34 prescribes the norms of conduct which are specific to personnel employed in the Judiciary.35 The specificity
of these norms is due to "the special nature of court personnels duties and responsibilities." 36
Respondent Acampado violated the following provisions of the Code:
CANON I
FIDELITY OF DUTY
xxxx
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with
the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
CANON IV
PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the
business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.
xxxx
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not alter, falsify, destroy or mutilate any record within their control.

This provision does not prohibit amendment, correction or expungement of records or documents pursuant to a court order.
xxxx
In A.M. No. P-13-3116,37 respondent Acampado continued to disregard the Orders of this Court to submit additional documents required to complete the
financial audit of her books of accounts. Her non-compliance even resulted in the withholding of her salaries, allowances, and other monetary benefits. 38
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the "failure to give proper attention to a required task. It signifies disregard of duty due to carelessness
or indifference."39 Respondent Acampado disregarded the directives sent to her on several occasions by this Court through the Court
Management Office of the Office of the Court of the Administrator. She merely alleged that she could not produce on time the booklet of
official receipts required from her since the booklet was among the documents damaged by water when a portion of the court had been
gutted by fire.40 We said before that the failure of a respondent to comply with the Office of the Court Administrators directives manifests his
or her "indifference to the lawful directives"41 of this Court.
For respondent Acampados failure to submit the additional documents required for completion of the financial audit, the Office of the Court Administrator
correctly recommended that she be found guilty of simple neglect of duty and should, therefore, be fined the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). Under Rule 10, Section 46 (D) (1) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave
offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second
offense. Section 49 (b) of the same Rule provides that the minimum of the penalty shall be imposed when no mitigating and aggravating circumstances
are present. Submission of the required documents belatedly neither exculpates nor mitigates respondent Acampados liability.42
However, the payment of a fine in lieu of suspension is available in grave, less grave, and light offenses when the penalty imposed is suspension for six
(6) months or less.43 This Court has deemed it proper to impose the fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) on erring court employees who committed
simple neglect of duty.44 We impose the same penalty on respondent Acampado for disregarding her duty to turn over the required documents due to
indifference in the face of several court directives.
In A.M. No. P-13-3112,45 respondent Acampado already admitted the acts charged by the Office of the Court Administrator which included the
misappropriation of Judiciary funds and the falsification of bank deposit slips. 46For these, the Office of the Court Administrator found respondent
Acampado guilty of gross dishonesty and serious misconduct punishable by dismissal:
x x x Misappropriation of judiciary funds is a serious misconduct, a grave offense punishable by dismissal. Although, respondent Rosa A. Acampado
was able to fully restitute the shortages, such act will not in any way erase her culpability.
xxxx
Falsification of bank deposit slips is patent dishonesty. x x x Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service. Indeed,
dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.47
Despite the pronouncements made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding respondent Acampados actions and her failure to meet the high
ethical standards expected of court employees, the Office of the Court Administrator still considered certain allegedly mitigating circumstances.
According to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Acampados ready acknowledgment of her actions, her sincerest apologies, her length of
service in the Judiciary, and the fact that this is the first time she committed the offenses may be considered as extenuating
circumstances.48 Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator reduced its recommended penalty from dismissal to a fine in the amount equivalent
to one (1) year of her salary to be deducted from her retirement benefits.
We disagree with the Office of the Court Administrators recommendation to mitigate the respondents liability and lower the penalty to be imposed.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the acts of under-remitting funds of the Judiciary, remitting cash beyond the
reglementary period, and falsifying bank deposits are grave offenses that merit the most severe penalty of dismissal from service. 49
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct
Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts "funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises." 50 They are "liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment"51 of those entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance "constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively liable." 52
Respondent Acampado committed gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct when she failed to turn over the funds of the Judiciary that
were placed in her custody within the period required by law. We said in Office of the Court Administrator v. Fueconcillo that undue delay by itself in
remitting collections, keeping the amounts, and spending it for the respondents "family consumption, and fraudulently withdrawing amounts from the
judiciary funds, collectively constitute gross misconduct and gross neglect of duty."53 Such behavior should not be tolerated as it denigrates this Courts
image and integrity.
Serious Dishonesty
Dishonesty is defined as the: disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.54

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, serious dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service even if
the offense was committed for the first time.55
Respondent Acampados actions of misappropriating Judiciary funds and incurring cash shortages in the amounts of 1) Twenty-three Thousand Seven
Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fiftythree Centavos (P23,712.53) for the Judiciary Development Fund; 2) Fifty-eight Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-five
Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P58,285.80) for the Special Allowance for the Judiciary; and 3) Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the Mediation Fund
(MF), totaling to Eighty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight Pesos and Thirty-three Centavos (P86,998.33) are serious acts of dishonesty that
betrayed the institution tasked to uphold justice and integrity for all. Moreover, respondent Acampados act of repeatedly falsifying bank deposit slips is
patent dishonesty that should not be tolerated by this Court. Restitution of the missing amounts will not relieve respondent Acampado of her liability.56
Those in the Judiciary "serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary
and the peoples confidence in it."57 The institution demands "the best possible individuals in the service."58 "This Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of
undesirables who undermine its efforts toward an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public." 59
We said in Office of the Court Administrator v. Bernardino60 that:
We have not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty. This Court had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the
norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. 61
Again, this Court does not agree with the Office of the Court Administrators recommendations of imposing the penalty of a fine equivalent to one (1)
years salary to be deducted from her retirement benefits, instead of dismissal from service as the law requires. Dismissal from service is the proper
penalty to be imposed on respondent Acampado. Under Rule 10, Section 52 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, "the
penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and
bar from taking civil service examinations." In addition, Section 49 of Rule 10 in the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides
that:
if the respondent is guilty of two 2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and
the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
In this case, respondent Acampado is found guilty of more than two charges, which are gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct, and
serious dishonesty. All offenses are grave offenses that merit dismissal from service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Rosa A. Acampado is found GUILTY of the following:
i. SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY in A.M. No. P-13-3116 for failing to submit the additional documents required for financial audit and is FINED
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00);
ii. GRAVE MISCONDUCT and GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY in A.M. No. P-13-3112 for failing to remit on time her collections and SERIOUS
DISHONESTY for misappropriating funds of the Judiciary and falsifying bank deposit slips. She is DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court, Taft, Eastern Samar, is DIRECTED to MONITOR all financial transactions of the court in strict adherence
to the issuances of this Court on the proper handling of all Judiciary funds. He or she shall be equally liable for the infractions committed by the
employees under his or her command and supervision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Office of the Court Administrator v. Fontanilla A.M. No. P-12-3086, September 18,2012, 681 SCRA 17 25.

This Memorandum dated October 31, 2007 was docketed as A.M. No. P-13-3116.

A.M. No. P-13-3116, rollo, p. 1.

Id. at 2, 9, 15, and 17.

Id.

This Administrative Circular No. 2-2000 was dated April 12, 2000 and entitled "GUIDELINES ON WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES AND
OTHER MONETARY BENEFITS OR SET-OFF AGAINST SALARIES OF ALLEGEDLY ERRONEOUSLY RELEASED MONETARY
BENEFITS." The Administrative Circular provides that the Office of the Court Administrator may not unilaterally withhold the salaries and other
monetary benefits of judges, court officials, and employees for non-compliance with administrative orders, circulars or for any infractions of
misfeasance the Office of the Court Administrator may deem as a sufficient cause to withhold such salaries or benefits. The Circular also
provides that "neither may the Office of the Court Administrator unilaterally withhold salary checks of judges and court officials and employees
as a means to set off or enforce refund for monetary benefits claimed to have been erroneously or even illegally released to them."
7

A.M. No. P-13-3116, rollo, p. 25.

A.M. No. P-13-3112, rollo, pp. 3-13.

Id. at 10.

10

Id. at 10-11.

11

Id. at 75.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 76.

15

Id.

16

Id. at 78.

17

Id. at 86.

18

OMB-V-C-10-0194-D.

19

A.M. No. P-13-3112, rollo, p. 168.

20

Id. at 172.

21

Letter dated July 7, 2010, A.M. No. P-13-3112, rollo, p. 182.

22

Id. at 185.

23

Id. at 187.

24

Id. at 191.

25

Id. at 225-230. Memorandum dated February 9, 2011, pp. 4-6 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Bernardino, A.M. No. P-97-1258,
January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 88.
26

Id. at 229.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 230.

31

A.M. No. P-10-2867, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 592.

32

A.M. No. P-10-2765, September 13, 2011, 657 SCRA 453.

33

A.M. No. P-02-1560, March 20, 2002, 379 SCRA 521.

34

A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, Effective June 1, 2004.

35

Id., 5th Whereas Clause.

36

Id.

37

Report on the non-compliance of Rosa A. Acampado, MTC-Taft, Eastern Samar, to submit additional documents for financial audit.

38

A.M. No. P-13-3116, rollo, p. 24.

39

Tolentino-Fuentes v. Galindez, A.M. No. P-07-2410, June 18, 2010, 621 SCRA 189, 194-195 citing Atty. Dajao v. Lluch, 429 Phil. 620, 626
(2002).
40

A.M. No. P-13-3112, rollo, p. 191.

41

Sesbreo v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2144, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 398, 407.

42

See Failure of Atty. Jacinto B. Peaflor, Jr., Clerk of Court VI, Regional Trial Court, San Jose, Camarines Sur, to Submit the Required
Monthly Report of Collections, Deposits, and Withdrawals, A.M. No. P-07-2339, August 20, 2008, 562 SCRA 373.
43

Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2011), Rule 10, Sec. 47 (2).

44

See Office of the Court Administrator v. Paredes, A.M. No. P-062103, April 17, 2007, 521 SCRA 365; Vda. de Feliciano v. Rivera, A.M. No.
P-11-2920, September 19, 2012, 681 SCRA 323. See also Office of the Administrator v. Go, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA
1.
45

Report on the Financial Audit on the Books of Account of the MTC-Taft, Eastern Samar.

46

A.M. No. P-13-3112, rollo, p. 168.

47

Id. at 229.

48

Id.

49

Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2011), Rule 10, Sec. 46. Classification of Offenses Administrative Offenses
with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the
government service.
A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
a. Serious Dishonesty;

b. Gross Neglect of Duty;

c. Grave Misconduct;
d. Being Notoriously Undesirable;
e. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
f. Falsification of official document;
g. Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits;
50

See Section B, Chapter 1 of the 1991 Manual for Clerks of Court as amended by the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, p. 4. See
also Office of the Court Administrator v. Canque, A.M. No. P-04-1830, June 4, 2009, 588 SCRA 226.
51

Office of the Court Administrator v. Bawalan, A.M. No. P-93-945, March 24, 1994, 231 SCRA 408, 411. See also Office of the Court
Administrator v. Fontanilla, A.M. No. P-12-3086, September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 17 citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Lising, A.M. No.
P-03-1736, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 16, 22.
52

Office of the Court Administrator v. Fontanilla, A.M. No. P-12-3086, September 18, 2012, 681 SCRA 17, 24.

53

A.M. No. P-06-2208, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 226, 236.

54

(Re: Alleged Anomaly that transpired in LRC Case No. 181 tried before RTC, Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino) Executive Judge Menrado V.
Corpuz, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Maddela, Quirino v. Max Ramiterre, Civil Docket Clerk, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1779, November 25,
2005, 476 SCRA 108, 121 citing Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I and Angelita C. Esmerio,
Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, A.M. No. 2001-7-SC & No. 2001-8-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 1; Office of the
Court Administrator v. Yan, A.M. No. P-98-1281, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 389; Alabastro v. Moncada, Sr., A.M. No. P-04-1887 (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 03-1645-P), December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 42.
55

Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2011), Rule 10, Sec. 46.

56

See Re: Withholding of Other Emoluments of the following Clerks of Court: ELSIE C. REMOROZA of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Mauban, Quezon; ELENA P. REFORMADO of the MTC of Guinayangan, Quezon; EUGENIO STO. TOMAS of the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna;
MAURA D. CAMPAO of the MTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; ELEANOR D. FLORES of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Taytay, Palawan; and JESUSA P. BENIPAYO of the MCTC of Ligao, Albay, A.M. No. 01-4-133-MTC, August 26, 2003, 409 SCRA 574.
57

Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. See Anonymous Complaint Against Sheriff Sales T. Bisnar, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong,
Rizal, A.M. No. 05-7-458-RTC, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 17.
58

Cabanatan v. Molina, A.M. No. P-01-1520, November 21, 2001, 370 SCRA 16, 26.

59

Id.

60

A.M. No. P-97-1258, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 88.

61

Id. at 119-120.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 9608

November 27, 2012

MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Court has often reminded members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. 1

Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."
In her complaint, complainant alleged that
2. The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002 and a Supplemental-Complaint
dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that the crime of RAPE was committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March
2002 when she was merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38) years old,
married to Teresita B. Samson, Filipino and resident of Barangay 5, San Francisco, Agusan Del Sur, Philippines.
3. In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the
herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself.
4. After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur, Philippines issued a RESOLUTION
dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
and issued the corresponding INFORMATION for QUALIFIED SEDUCTION on 04 July 2002.
5. Thereafter, the herein Complainant filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated 26 August 2002 which was denied in the
RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur.
6. The aforesaid RESOLUTION dated 02 October 2002 was elevated to the Department of Justice, by way of a PETITION FOR REVIEW, and
is pending resolution by the Department of Justice.
xxxx
8. The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as
hereinbefore stated clearly constitute "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines which
provides for a penalty of "DISBARMENT or SUSPENSION of an Attorney by the SUPREME COURT."
Complainant narrated in her Sworn Statement3 that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the maids room at
respondents house when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondents
poultry farm in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where he
sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and
her mother.
In her Supplemental-Complaint,4 complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his house after her mother agreed to let her stay there
while she studied at the Agusan National High School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when
respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in
the house. Complainant also claimed that on March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When they
arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.
Respondent alleged in his Answer5 that
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for
Rape at the Provincial Prosecutors Office with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has no
knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years.
xxxx
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect that the acts of respondent in having
sex with complainant constitute grossly immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was done
with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submits that his act of having sex with
complainant once does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant accepts compensation
therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct.
xxxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura
entertained hatred and had a grudge against the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon
Ventura as vengeance against respondent as a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This claim is
supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law Office of respondent.

8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from respondent to settle with her and demanded the
payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00; otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent did not
come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not
prosper because the Prosecutor dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word to respondent that she is amenable for the amount of
P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her
from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as
Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent herein because
Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that
Corazon Ventura is not the biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case No. 5414.
xxxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits that his having sex with complainant with just
compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually
stayed late at night with her male friends when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had sexual affairs
with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant with some of her classmates near their rented house.
Complainant told him that they wanted to go out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave her
money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed.
He just thought that for complainant, sex is a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She casually
walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his
poultry farm, respondent met his farm worker and asked him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker agreed and they went straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not notice any involuntariness on her part as she
undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and
walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay
motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things but her
mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he
was able to confirm that complainant is no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction. 7 The charge
of rape, however, was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Sur, Branch 6,
but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied,
complainant filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of
Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was dismissed.9
In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of one year from the practice of law for immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a
minor, respondent and his wife was victims guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.11
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and
depravity of the offense. She contends that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a young
and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over complainant considering that she was then staying at
respondents residence. Moreover, there was a betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists that
this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant
prays that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.12
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts that complainant has not presented any proof of her
minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter, complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainants mother even testified that her
daughter stayed at respondents house only until February 2002. He further stresses that because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the
first time he has been found administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or private
activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community.16 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.17
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself, we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a
young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had
sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed
and he even gave her money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the
sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed
his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-year-old minor,19who for a time was under respondents
care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of
the legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the
Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required
of lawyers.20
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in
Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot
have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings
as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.1wphi1 A disbarment case
is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23
Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite suspension, depending on the circumstances. 24 In this case,
respondents gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of
a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.25
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.26 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

(On official leave)

BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE***
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On leave.

**

On official leave.

See Tapucar v. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331, 338.

Rollo, pp. 2-5.

Id. at 6-7. Dated April 19, 2002.

Id. at 8-9.

Id. at 57-62. Dated September 2, 2004.

Id. at 63-69.

Id. at 119-122. Resolution dated June 10, 2002.

Id. at 158-159.

Id. at 164.

10

Id. at 172-184.

11

Id. at 170.

12

Id. at 185-188.

13

Id. at 194-201.

14

A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003, 398 SCRA 658, 664.

15

See Advincula v. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600, 609.

16

See Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 314.

17

Garrido v. Garrido, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 508, 518, citing St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS)
Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624.
18

Adm. Case No. 3249, November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 680, 683.

19

Rollo, p. 84. Certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar certifying that complainant was born on September 25, 1988.

20

Garrido v. Garrido, supra note 17 at 526.

21

Adm. Case No. 4539, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 408, 414.

22

A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 513, 521.

23

Tiong v. Florendo, A.C. No. 4428, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 1, 6-7.

24

Samaniego v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 7022, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 1, 5, citing Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, A.C. No. 4526, February 13,
2004, 422 SCRA 527, 533, Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 529 SCRA 1, 21, Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, August 3,
2005, 465 SCRA 520, 525, and Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A.C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 1, 15.
25

See Tapucar v. Tapucar, supra note 1 at 341.

26

Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582, 590, citing Tapucar v. Tapucar, supra note 1 at 339-340 and
Resurreccion v. Sayson, Adm. Case No. 1037, December 14, 1998, 300 SCRA 129, 136-137.
27

Dantes v. Dantes, id.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5581

January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio
Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R.
Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo
Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. 3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage
with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return
Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against him. 6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as
a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or
cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however,
countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents they filed against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order only when
he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also
received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she
failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending
himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that
he and his wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila and
Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the administrative complaint and to
submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his
given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167. 9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint, the Court resolved to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure. 10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not
complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy
of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of
the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple
matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the
Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's
residential address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail. 14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower
St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St.,
Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
respondent entered his appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City." 16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8,
Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this
administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00
payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required thereon. 18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7,
2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3)
DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated

June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI,
showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During
surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building.
Considering that the given address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of arrest
cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per their records, the address of
respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD,
declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as
evidenced by a registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2)
years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in
this case, the failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence
has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The
first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of
Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latters first
marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is
indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the best evidence of their contents,
as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted
the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been
sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive
disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years,
the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and
the rest he will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him, yet, to this day, he
has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against
him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies
of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which
he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case; accommodating respondent's endless requests,
manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have
relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office
and residential addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a
mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking,
respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of
his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in
itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a
Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents
obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.
The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED
from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of
the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
On Leave
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO**
Associate Justice
Acting Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Footnotes
* On leave.
** Acting Chief Justice.
1

Rollo, pp. 1-2.

Id. at 4.

Id. at 5.

Id. at 6.

Id. at 14.

Id. at 8.

Id. at 10-13.

Id. at 17.

Id. at 18.

10

Id. at 23.

11

Id. at 24-25.

12

Id. at 27.

13

Id. at 28-31.

14

Id. at 39.

15

Id. at 42.

16

Id. at 43-44.

17

Id. at 46.

18

Id. at 48.

19

Id. at 50-51.

20

Id. at 49-53.

21

Id.

22

In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.

23

Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, 538 Phil. 501, 511 (2006).

24

See Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012, 676 SCRA 37.

25

Id. at 53.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

26

See Sebastian v. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211, 224 (2007).

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 8383

December 11, 2012

AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAESES, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Raeses filed on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los
Reyes, conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved
it in a resolution dated December 11, 2008.
In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a
Notice of Resolution4 and the records of the case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Raeses to
represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno
paid Atty. Raeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him
P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer
fee paid.
Atty. Raeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several occasions, Atty. Raeses would either be absent or
late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Raeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea,
the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Raeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She
immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Raeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Raeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988, because the amount she had previously given was
inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty. Raeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Raeses to comment on the adverse partys offer of evidence and to submit their
memorandum on the case, but Atty. Raeses failed to comply with the courts directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Raeses concealed this development
from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Raeses office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Raeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno
later discovered from court records that Atty. Raeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty.
Raeses about her discovery and showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Raeses simply denied any knowledge of the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Raeses asked his client for money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty.
Raeses allegedly asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to
prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on appeal with the Court
of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Raeses went to Bellos residence two weeks later. In her (Buenos) presence, Bello paid Atty. Raeses P5,000.00. Bello
demanded a receipt but Atty. Raeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received from
them.
Atty. Raeses never filed an answer against Buenos complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on
March 20, 2000,[7] on May 11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on October 2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an
Order10 declaring Atty. Raeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.

On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" 11 (dated September 30,
2000) filed by Atty. Raeses. Atty. Raeses asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had
prior commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting papers, claiming that he had not been
furnished with these. In the interest of substantial justice, Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 2000 12
Atty. Raeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing, Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card
refuted Atty. Raeses claim that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January
17, 2001. He stated that if Atty. Raeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant submits her
memorandum.13
Atty. Raeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day, Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for
resolution after the complainants submission of her memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled another hearing on March 14, 2003. 15 During the hearing, only
Bueno and her counsel were present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty. Raeses asking for the hearings
resetting because he had prior commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty. Raeses never filed an answer and the case had already been
submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of evidence and her
documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Buenos Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any formal offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary
evidence indicated as attachments to her complaint.
The Investigating Commissioners Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Raeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but
found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint.
These would have proven that Atty. Raeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without these documents, which are not difficult to
procure from the courts, Commissioner Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Buenos bare allegations which could not support a finding
of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Buenos allegation that Atty. Raeses solicited money to bribe judges to be credible. According to
Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed
her statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Raeses did nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Raeses even made a false claim before the investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time
Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry
receipt card evidencing his receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Raeses be disbarred for failure to maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain
public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.19
The Courts Ruling
The Court approves the IBPs findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Raeses from the practice of law in accordance with Commissioner Limpingcos
recommendation and based on our own observations and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule
18.02 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them."20 A client is entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies
or defenses.21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsels failure to file an appellants brief amounts to inexcusable negligence. 22 In Garcia v.
Bala,23 the Court even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his clients.
In this case, Atty. Raeses alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse partys offer of evidence and to submit the required memorandum would
have amounted to negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with court documents that she

could have easily procured. This omission leaves only Buenos bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty. Raeses negligence. We support the
Board of Governors ruling on this point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable decision for his client. He visited the judges office
several times and persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his clients case. The Court found that the respondent lawyer therein
violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from
any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In this case, Atty. Raeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned
both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically
disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.
While the only evidence to support Buenos allegations is her own word, the Investigating Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court
supports the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Raeses and
complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in
hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Raeses, for his part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the
complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this investigation.25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Raeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of
lawyer that Buenos affidavits depict him to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Raeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Raeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty
of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a
lawyers relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1wphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took place as
Atty. Raeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned
the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means a decidedly black mark
against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Raeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a
member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all to all lawyers, their
clients and the general public that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our
judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Raeses is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(ON LEAVE)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

(ON LEAVE)
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice

MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Footnotes
*

On official leave.

Rollo, pp. 3-5.

Id. at 76-81.

Id. at 74.

Id. at 75.

Supra note 1.

Rollo, pp. 25-26.

Order dated March 20, 2000; id. at 10.

Order dated May 11, 2000; id. at 12.

Order dated October 2, 2000; id. at 31.

10

Ibid.

11

Id. at 32.

12

Order dated October 12, 2000; id. at 34.

13

Order dated November 16, 2000; id. at 36-37.

14

Order dated January 17, 2001; id. at 38.

15

Order dated March 14, 2003; id. at 42-43.

16

Ibid.

17

Memorandum for Complainant; id. at 44-45.

18

Id. at 76-81.

19

Notice of Resolution; id. at 75.

20

Garcia v. Bala, A.C. No. 5039, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 85, 92, citing Anderson, Jr. v. Cardeo, A.C. No. 3523, January 17, 2005, 448
SCRA 261, 270; Parias v. Paguinto, A.C. No. 6297, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 179, 184; Ong v. Grijaldo, A.C. No. 4724, April 30, 2003, 402
SCRA 1, 8; Ramos v. Atty. Jacoba, 418 Phil. 346, 351 (2001); and Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, 349 Phil. 520, 528 (1998).
21

Garcia v. Bala, supra, at 92, citing Sarenas-Ochagabia v. Ocampos, A.C. No. 4401, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 286, 290.

22

Sarenas-Ochagabia v. Ocampos, supra; In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos, Adm. Case No. 922, December 29, 1987, 156 SCRA 844;
and People v. Villar, Jr., No. L-34092, July 29, 1972, 46 SCRA 107.
23

Supra note 20.

24

G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 378.

25

Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner; rollo, p. 80.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A. FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A.
FERNANDEZ, Complainants, v.ATTY. JUAN B. BAEZ, JR.,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:

Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.1 On 4 September 2002, they entered into an agreement with Gerry
R. Fevidal (Fevidal), a subdivision developer. In that agreement, they stood to be paid P35,000,000 for all the lots that would be sold in the
subdivision.2 For that purpose, they executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of land
and to sign those agreements on their behalf.3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to account for the titles to the subdivided land. 4 Complainants
also found that he had sold a number of parcels to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither were complainants invited to
the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.5 Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously executed
in his favor.6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of P10,000,000, but the latter again failed to pay them. 7 Complainants engaged
the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting them in the preparation of a settlement agreement.8 Instead of drafting a written
settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions against Fevidal in order to recover their properties.
Complainants then signed a contract of legal services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to respondent,
but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be
recovered of the properties.
In preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim
of complainants to at least 195 titles in the possession of Fevidal.10 A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of
Adverse Claim to the Register of Deeds of Bataan.11 The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to him, the
adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced complainants to agree to another settlement. 12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10 July 2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment,
cancellation and revalidation of titles, and damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006. 13
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the services of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their
complaint against Fevidal on 9 June 2007, and finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007. 14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging that the termination of his services and withdrawal of the
complaint had been done with the intent of defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorneys Charging Lien in the
Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.16 When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration.18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the formers allegation of collusion, 19 complainants sought the
suspension/disbarment of respondent through a Complaint20 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November 2007. Complainants
alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was now
clothed with legal problems brought about by respondent.21 In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons
1.01,221.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27 and 20.0428 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation 29 of the investigating commissioner.
It suspended respondent from the practice of law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous agreement. 30 On 26 June 2011, it denied his
motion for reconsideration.
On 26 November 2012, this Court noted the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as respondents second motion for
reconsideration.
We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants only filed the
instant complaint against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to recover their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement
of P10,000,000 a measly amount compared to that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of
P35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any prospective client and pursue the ends of justice. 31 Any lawyer
worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative
complaint against a lawyer only because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath.
The claim of complainants that they were not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of respondent.
He was never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim. Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement
between complainants and Fevidal. We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received various amounts as loans from respondent from

August 2006 to June 2007,32 they could not spare even a few minutes to ask about the status of the case. We shall discuss this more below.
As regards the claim that respondent refused to patch up with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latters Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement. 33
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his attorneys charging lien as the legal problem preventing them
from enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation.
According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his
services have been retained by the client.
We recently upheld the right of counsel to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI,34 we granted counsels
motion to intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated his services without justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and
respondent had colluded in order to deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the stipulated contingent
fees.
Thus, the determination of whether respondent is entitled to the charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which the lien is presented.
The compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not only to guarantee that the fees they charge
remain reasonable and commensurate with the services they have actually rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession as
well.35 In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services. 36 That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate
venue does not make him liable for disciplinary action.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we find that the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is
in the nature of a champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the clients
rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute.37 Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or
inexistent.39 They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client,
except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client.
A reading of the contract for legal services40 shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket fees. He also paid for the
whole amount needed for the recording of complainants adverse claim.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling in order to safeguard their clients rights, it is imperative that the
advances be subject to reimbursement.41 The purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause.
Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation advanced by respondent shall be subject to
reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and transportation allowance to them for the duration of their attorneyclient relationship. In fact, he admits that the cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants. 42
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients interests with the ethical standards of his profession. Considering
the surrounding circumstances in this case, an admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must always
avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Baez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation expenses in a legal matter he handled for a client
without providing for terms of reimbursement and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Attorney Baez, Jr.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1

Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 3-4.

Id. at 5-6.

Id. at 6-7.

Rollo, (Vol. II), p. 127.

Id.

Id. at 126.

Id. at 263.

Rollo (Vol. I), p. 7.

Id. at 25.

10

Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 102-105.

11

Id. at 7-8.

12

Id. at 264.

13

Id. at 8-9.

14

Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 11-13.

15

Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 187-191.

16

Id. at 197-203.

17

Id. at 209.

18

Id. at 212-222.

19

Id. at 237-238.

20

Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 1-18.

21

Id. at 2.

22

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

23

A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.

24

A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.

25

A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

26

A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the clients case, neither overstating nor
understating the prospects of the case.
27

A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.

28

A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud.
29

Rollo (Vol. IV), pp. 2-12.

30

Id. at 1.

31

Manzano v. Soriano, A.C. No. 8051, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 1.

32

Rollo (Vol. II), pp. 90-101.

33

Id. at 264.

34

G.R. No. 183952, 9 September 2013.

35

Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, 9 July 2010, 624 SCRA 623.

36

RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 24.

37

Bautista v. Gonzales, 261 Phil. 266, 281 (1990).

38

Id.

39

CIVIL CODE, Art. 1409(1).

40

KAMI, na nakalagda sa ilalim nito ay hinihirang and tanggapan ng BAEZ, BAEZ & ASSOCIATES upang siyang humawak sa lahat ng kaso na aming
isasampa laban kay Gerry R. Fevidal at iba pang kasama nito, hinggil sa mga parsela ng lupa na matatagpuan sa Bo. Pinulot, Hermosa, Bataan, na
paw[a]ng pag-aari ni Dominador Alejo, ayon sa mga sumusunod na alituntunin:
Na kami ay hindi magbabayad ng acceptance fee;
Na kami ay hindi magbabayad ng appearance fee tuwing may hearing;
Na paghahatian namin ng aming abogado ang magagastos bilang docket fee o bayad sa husgado sa pagsasampa ng kaso;
Na aming babayaran ang aming nasabing abogado ng katumbas ng 50% ng anumang marerecover o mababawi namin sa mga ari-ariang nakasaad sa
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate na isinagawa noong Abril 12, 1986, gaya Ng mga sumusunod: [1] TCT No. T-18653 [79,885 sq.m.]; [2] TCT No. T21447 [80,555 sq.m.] at [3] 38847 [35,380 sq.m.], at ito ay matapos bawasin ang 10% ng anumang marerecover bilang parte ni Luzviminda Andrade;
Ang anumang bayarin sa buwis para sa nasabing mga parsela ng lupa ay aming sasagutin.
41
Supra note 38.

42

Rollo (Vol. IV), p. 33.