Webb vs Hon De Leon, G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995.

In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having
reservations when she first executed the first statement and held back vital
information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel
believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been
sufficiently explained especially specially so where there is no showing that
the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.
Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith
and credit. As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally
incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of
mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the
import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which transpired
(People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been
committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence
submitted by the complainant indicate a prima faciecase that respondents
conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.
People v. Langcua, G.R. No. 190343, 6 February 2013
1.Trayvilla in her testimony recalled that she was the one who asked the
accused to bring out the contents of her underwear. However, in her redirect, she clarified that it was Bagsican who asked the accused.
2. Bagsican in her testimony recalled that after confiscation of the alleged
illegal drugs, she placed the items inside her blazer for safekeeping.
However, SPO3 Appang testified that when the two female friskers came out
from the comfort room, they immediately handed to him the seized illegal
drugs allegedly taken from Cadidia.
Even assuming that the said set of facts provided conflicting statements, We
have consistently held time and again that minor inconsistencies do not
negate the eyewitnesses positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. As long as the testimonies as a whole presented a
coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be upheld.
What is essential is that the witnesses testimonies corroborate one another
on material details surrounding the commission of the crime.
People vs De Guzman, G.R. No. 122740, March 30, 1998.
It is evidentiarily proscribed to discredit a witness on the bases of
purportedly prior inconsistent statements which were not called to the
attention of that witness during the trial, although the same are supposedly
contained in a document which was merely offered and admitted in its
entirety without the requisite specifications.

Through such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can

expediently offer in evidence at the trial the whole document containing
allegedly variant statements and then point out much later on appeal the
supposed contradictory statements which were not specified, intentionally or
otherwise, in the same trial. That sub silentio gambit would necessarily
deprive a witness of the chance to explain the seeming divergencies, which
is the paramount consideration of the rule mandating the laying of the
proper predicate.
Complainant is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by
the rule to explain the supposed differences in her statements. Without such
explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to
evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached. As things stand before us
and the court a quo, therefore, complainants credibility remains
unimpeached.
On the foregoing considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine
articulated by the Court of Appeals in Villaruel vs. Bascon] that, unless the
proper predicate is laid during the trial by calling the attention of a witness to
his alleged inconsistent statements given outside of his testimony in court
and asking him to explain the contradiction, the supposed inconsistencies
cannot be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of destroying the credibility
of the witness. This pronouncement was actually based upon and in line with
the holdings of this Court in Escosura and People vs. Lim Quingsy.
Heirs of Delgado vs Gonzales, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009.
While her first sworn statement undoubtedly counts as a fresh account of
the incident, there are valid reasons to suspect that the second sworn
statement could have been tainted, if not supplied or suggested, considering
the intervening time between the execution of the first and second
statements.
Fourth, there was sufficient lapse of time between the time of the
commission of the crimes when private respondent Pesico allegedly saw the
assailants and the time she made her identification. The intervening period,
i.e., four (4) days to be exact, was more than sufficient to have exposed what
was otherwise accurate and honest perception of the assailants to
extraneous influences, which more or less leads this Court to conclude
that private respondent Pesicos identification of the petitioners could not
have been uncontaminated. This, in light of the fact that prior to the
identification, private respondent Pesico was part of the joint inspection of
the crime scene conducted by the police investigators with the members of

the Delgado family, who, at that time floated the family feud theory of the
case.
Kummer vs People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held
that inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on
one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand,
referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and
the veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the
commission of the crime itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these may be considered as
badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their
testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and
evenimpro babilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or
recall.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate.
Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction
with the declarants testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked
standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit
answers, that later turn out not to be wholly descriptive of the series of
events as the affiant knows them.Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may
sometimes amount to putting words into the affiants mouth, thus allowing
the whole statement to be taken out of context.

The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have

ruled that the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his
affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As between
the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails
because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to
the testimony given in court.

APO CEMENT CORPORATION vs ZALDY BAPTISMA, G. R. No.

176671, June 20, 2012. (In case of inconsistent affidavit, the second
statement may be proven to be the correct one if corroborated by other
witnesses)

To begin with, we find no inconsistencies between the first and the second
affidavits of Lobitaa. If at all, the only difference between the two is that the
second affidavit is more detailed than the first one. This, however, is
understandable considering that the first affidavit was executed by Lobitaa
during petitioners initial investigation, when it was still verifying the information it
received from Moralda, while the second affidavit, which contains Lobitaas
testimony during respondents administrative hearing, was executed long after
the investigation was conducted.
Also, there appears to be no ill-motive on the part of Lobitaa to falsely
accuse respondent of accepting commissions and/or kickbacks. In fact, it was
not Lobitaa but Moralda who reported the irregularities to petitioner. Lobitaa
came forward only during petitioners initial investigation to confirm the testimony
of Moralda that some personnel were indeed receiving commissions and/or
kickbacks.
Moreover, as between the positive testimony of Lobitaa that he gave
respondent commissions and/or kickbacks on two separate occasions, and the
negative testimony of respondents witnesses Cedeo and Banzon that no such
meeting took place, we are more inclined to give credence to the former. It bears
stressing that a positive testimony prevails over a negative one, more especially in
this case where respondents witnesses did not even execute affidavits to attest to
the truthfulness of their statements. Thus, it was error on the part of the Labor
Arbiter and the CA to disregard the testimony of Lobitaa.