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Sheffer
Author(s): Michael Scanlan
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 193-224
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27795017
Accessed: 16-06-2015 13:36 UTC
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Michael
The Known
Scanlan
and Unknown
H.M.
Sheffer1
I. The Problem
In the history of logic in the United States, Henry Sheffer (1883-1964)
is
both well-known and hardly known at all. He iswell-known as the discoverer of
the eponymous "Sheffer stroke", a binary truth-functional operator with which
any truth-functional operator can be defined. This was presented in his 1913
paper, "A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras, with applica
tion to logical constants". As the tide indicates, Sheffer's stroke operator was not
originally developed by him in the context of truth-functional logic, but to use in
postulate sets for Boolean Algebra. This idea could be applied to the proposi
tional logic of Principia Mathematics,
and Sheffer does this by giving definitions
of the "primitive ideas" of negation ( ~ ) and disjunction (v) using his stroke with
the interpretation of "p|q" as "neither p nor q".2
Sheffer is quite different from other figures in twentieth century logic who
have eponymous items in the literature, such as Turing or Church. Most
logi
cians know nothing more about Sheffer than the Sheffer stroke. There seems to
be very littie to know. Someone knowledgeable about the history of logic in the
United States would know that Sheffer spent almost all of his career at Harvard
(1917-1952) where he was the principal teacher of logic at a time when Harvard
was viewed as the leading center for the new logic in the United States. They
would also know that he had a very limited publication record. Aside from his
1913
paper,
this was
mainly
some
reviews
and
abstracts.
People
who
are
very
Alonzo
Church,
C.I.
Lewis,
H.S.
Leonard,
W.V.
Quine,
Norbert
Transactions
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Wie
194
ner,
Michael
F.S.C.
Scanlan
Northrop,
CJ.
Ducasse,
George
Sarton,
Suzanne
K.
Langer,
Marvin
Farber, R.B. Perry, Charles Hartshorne, and Donald C. Williams. Yet, even with
this sort of evidence, one can wonder what itwas evidence of. Do we have simply
a teacher of stirring personal qualities who evokes admiration in his better stu
dents for "abstract thought"? One can still seriously ask, does he have an impor
tance which merits some pages devoted to him in the ideal history of mathemati
cal/symbolic logic in the United States? I'd like to suggest in this article that,
while it has its difficulties,more should be said about Sheffer and some help in
doing this can come from his papers archived atHarvard.
II ShefferJs
Life
Since the details of Sheffer's life are not readily available3, I give them here.
Sheffer was born in the Ukraine in 1883. His parents were Max and Ida (n?e
Hirshberg) Sheffer.4 His familymoved to Boston about ten years after his birth.
After graduating from Boston Latin School, he went on to receive his A.B. from
Harvard in 1905, followed by a Ph.D. in 1908. His school career seems to have
been facilitated by a great gift for languages. According to Langer (1964, 305)
he could read some Hebrew along with the Greek and Latin he learned at the
Latin School. In addition he knew French, German, and Italian, beyond the Eng
lish that he presumably learned after he arrived in this country as an immigrant
child.
The most important aspect of Sheffer's Harvard education is that he was
taken up as a student by Josiah Royce at a timewhen Royce was one of themost
prominent figures inAmerican philosophy. Sheffer served as an assistant to Royce
for four academic years (1906 - 1910). He received a Sheldon Traveling Fellow
ship for 1910-11 and went to England to studywith Russell and to Italy to study
with Peano. In a letter of recommendation to Russell, Royce said "we have, in
America, no more promising research student of the new logic than Sheffer
is" (letter of June 29, 1910 inRoyce 1970, 540-41).
Sheffer on his return to theUnited States found a series of one year appoint
ments at universities from Seattle to New York and points in between. He was
called back from such a one year appointment at the University of Michigan,
which he had started in the Fall of 1916, to fill in as a temporary instructor at
Harvard in theWinter of 1917 after the death of Royce in September 1916. With
this precarious start he was destined never to leave Harvard until his retirement in
1952, but formany years his position was tenuous. He remained an instructor for
the next ten years until his position was somewhat regularized by appointment as
Assistant Professor in 1927. Langer attributes this promotion to a crisis "when a
severe nervous breakdown, brought on by professional hopelessness and extreme
personal troubles, called general attention to his plight but also to his invaluable
teaching" (1964, 307).
An important factor in Sheffer's promotion, with hardly any publication
cord,
was
apparentiy
an
account
of Sheffer's
research
from A.N.
Whitehead
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re
in a
The Known
Sheffer
195
memorandum
esoteric
treatments
of
logic
was
a consistent
theme
in evaluations
of
Sheffer.
In
his preface to the Sheffer festschrift, Frankfurter quotes the assessment of the
chair at the time of Sheffer's promotion, James H.
Philosophy Department
Woods. He said "We all value Sheffer's influence on the advanced students. He
raises the standard and is a living example of mental integrity and high
mindedness, whether he publishes a book or not" {ibid. x).
The Harvard Philosophy Department seems to have been willing to make
significant efforts to keep Sheffer, in the face of an indifferentor hostile university
administration. As related inKuklick 1977 (457-458), after 1919 Woods
steadily
fundraised among Jewish donors to support Sheffer's position,6 Shefferwas pro
moted to Associate Professor in 1929, still using departmental and not university
funds. In 1938, he was finally promoted to full Professor.
It is fairly clear that therewere threemain sources of difficulty for Sheffer's
career, but their relative importance is difficult to assess. One was his lack of
publication. Another was his recurrent psychiatric breakdowns. The final negative
factor, for some, was his Jewishness. Of these, the lack of publication is themost
straightforward. I have included in the references what I believe is the entire list
of Sheffer's publications. They come to twenty-five items. Almost all of these are
reviews or short abstracts of papers presented at mathematical meetings. Besides
the paper on Boolean Algebra, which introduced the Sheffer stroke, the most
substantive "publication"
is "Notational Relativity" which was distributed in
form
Harvard Philosophy Department. This consists of
the
by
mimeographed
thirty-three
pages
of
typescript
text
and
twenty-seven
pages
of
rather
mysterious
logic diagrams. The reasons for this restricted listof published research was often
attributed by his supporters to Sheffer's fastidiousness about writing up and for
mulating his work. Others seem to detect a preference in him for presenting his
ideas in teaching and not in publication. One must also wonder whether his re
current emotional problems interferedwith his ability towork.
A telling picture of Sheffer's emotional/psychiatric difficulties is presented by
Morton White in his recent memoir (1999). He recounts how Sheffer had a col
lapse inWhite's firstyear at Harvard as an assistant professor (1948-49). Accord
ing toWhite,
Henry Aiken was also very fond of Sheffer and would go to
his room in the old Ambassador Hotel just to sit therewith the
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196
Michael
Scanlan
poor man while he sat with his face to a wall and groaned
loudly. I vividly remember this groaning on a day when I went
to lunch with Sheffer and Lewis while Sheffer was ill. Lewis,
who was familiar with the ways of his almost lifelong friend,
paid no attention to ShefFer's peculiar noises throughout the
meal and kept up a conversation with me alone. Itwas clear to
Lewis that Shefferwanted merely to bewith people and not talk
to them during these episodes. (101)
I have found no account of ShefFer's emotional difficultieswhich would in
dicate their nature in terms of present day psychiatric description. Some evidence
for the occurrences of these episodes can be found in records of (inconclusive)
divorce proceedings between Henry and his wife Adele (n?e Blonden).7 They
were married in June of the year (1917) that Sheffer returned toHarvard to take
up Royce 's classes. This was presumably an optimistic time for Sheffer. But the
marriage
does
seem
not
to have
gone
well.
There
were
no
Kuklick
children.
re
ports thatAdele was considered "disagreeable" (1977, 458). Records from the
divorce actions brought in the 1940's, firstby Adele against Henry and then by
Henry against Adele, indicate that they separated in 1928 and never lived to
gether after that.Records from the action he brought against Adele in 1945 indi
cate that he suffered "nervous collapses", sometimes requiring hospitalization, in
each year from 1927 to 1930.8 Sheffer similarly suffered a "serious nervous col
10, 1945.
lapse" while being cross examined by Adele's attorney on December
As White's account of the behavior of C.I. Lewis toward Sheffer indicates, these
seem
"collapses"
to have
become
almost
routine
to Sheffer's
colleagues.
In the eyes of some, ShefFer's Jewish ethnic background must have been an
other "negative", in addition to his emotional fragility.There seems no reason to
think that Sheffer had any Jewish religious beliefs, but his colleagues and others
were quite aware that he was Jewish and thiswas one factor in their evaluation of
him. It is probably impossible to assess the effect of this on his career with any
precision. It is the case that critical portions of his career at Harvard coincided
with a period of anti-Jewish sentiment. This was especially evident during the
1920's when therewas much campus support for instituting admissions quotas to
reduce
the
percentage
of
Jewish
students
to
around
10
percent.9
Although
no
official quota was ever introduced, changes were eventually made to the admis
sions process which had the effect of significantly reducing the proportion of
Jewish students (Lipset 1975, 145-50). The issue of specific quotas was a matter
of student admissions, but it clearly reflected an atmosphere which could be simi
larlyhostile to Jewish faculty appointments.
On the other hand, many colleagues seem to have been warm friends and
supporters, despite his "negatives". Rather typical isMorton White's recollection
of Sheffer.
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The Known
He
was
an
extremely
sweet
man,
and
very
generous
Sheffer
197
to me
Roxbury,
MA.11
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Michael
198
Scanlan
thought he was important.12 2) Sheffer, in the period of the 1920s and 1930s,
seems to have been the only capable person in the United States who might be
said to have a general theory of logic that he was working on and which was the
basis for his research. 3) A slightly different issue, which connects to the first
two, is that understanding Sheffermay give some insight into a hitherto unno
ticed problem in the history of logic inAmerica. This is the rapid absorption of
the "new" logic of G?del and Tarski in the 1930's by theU.S. logic community.
Some of this can be attributed to the fortuitous presence of individual genius,
such as Church and Quine, but not all. What was it about the state of logic in
Information
the United States in the 1920's, say, which made this possible?
about Sheffer, because of the characteristics mentioned in 1 and 2 above, can
throw light on this.
That students were influenced by his ideas and not just his personality can be
documented in a number of ways. Two important indicators are letterswritten to
Sheffer byMarvin F?rber and C.H. Langford. Farber's letter (May 14, 1927) is
from Freiburg, Germany where he had gone to studywith Zermelo after a year's
(F?rber had earlier studied with Husserl in
teaching at Ohio State University.
on
an
to
and
would
be
go
Freiburg
importantAmerican interpreterof phenome
"I
F?rber
says
nology.)
regard myself to be more than ever indebted to your
on
to
He
goes
report that he has "been at work on a book on logic"
teaching."
with
Zermelo.
This
apparently
never
came
to fruition.
F?rber
asks
about
the
return
to the U.S.
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The Known
K-elements
two
Sheffer
199
variables.
such
structures
are
isomorphic.
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200
Michael
Scanlan
various
printed
references
to him.
He
was
a short man
seems
who
to have
created a big impression on those who came in contact with him. He was a man
who at one time expected to extend and develop the logical framework of Prin
ciple*. In particular, he would do this by explicit consideration of interpretational
structures
for
theories,
a version
of what
we
today
call
"models"
or
"structures".
In the 1920's, thiswas new territory;by the end of his career, his never fully for
mulated considerations had been eclipsed by the methods of G?del, Tarski and
others.
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The Known
Sheffer
201
a philosophic
theory cannot be taken to be "given" as having a particular
"substance", that is they are not mental or material or mathematical or of some
other type.As he puts it, they are "neutral" entities. This clearly echoes a central
aspect of James's Radical Empiricism which was subsequendy labeled "neutral
monism" by Russell.16 The Jamesian idea was that the same element of experi
ence could function as either mental or material depending on the relations it
had with other experiences. The fundamental ontological view is rather lighdy
developed by James.
One place where this theme ismore fully developed is in E.B. Holt's The
Concept ofConsciousness. There he speaks of experience as a mosaic of "neutral"
entities. Holt notes that the manuscript of this book was finished in 1908 al
though the book was not published until 1914. Sheffer seems to have read early
versions of the manuscript at the time he was working on his dissertation. Holt
credits Sheffer with his use of the term "neutral" and Sheffer's dissertation in
cludes an extensive discussion of the book, apparently under the assumption that
itwould soon be published. According toHolt, the task of philosophy is to show
how these neutral entities, by class combinations and relations, go to build up the
known world. This produces a hierarchy of sciences, each responsible for describ
ing the relations in one layerof increasingly complex conglomerations of neutral
entities. These sciences have an ideally deductive form inwhich the "deductions"
mirror the causal relations between the entities in that science (cf. Holt 1914,
164).
The main thematic similarities between Sheffer and Holt are the idea of a
reformed ontology which overcomes the longstanding metaphysical dualisms and
the idea of the ideal structure of scientific knowledge as somehow forming a
"logical" system. But a specific comparison of Sheffer's treatment with Holt's
indicates a significant difference in detail. Much
of this difference probably
more
a
from
Sheffer's
notion
of
springs
developed
logically structured deductive
theory.
"class"
Sheffer's
of objects
human
vision
there must
be
experience
contains
attached
defining
concept
Value,
or
formula.
and oth
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In
202
Scanlan
Michael
or
necessary
priori
structure
of knowledge
or
here.
experience
For
Sheffer
science and philosophy are ultimately charged with simple description of experi
ence. Philosophy simply functions at a more general level. It offers no a priori
necessities or ultimate explanations. According to Sheffer "the function of the
philosopher is neither to introduce into our world anything which is not really a
fact of experience, nor to eliminate from it any actual fact" (1908, p. 84).
Sheffer concludes themain portion of his dissertation by discussing the appli
cation of his ideas about philosophy as describing the postulates which define cer
tain sub-manifolds of the neutral realm. For this he limits himself to the sub
manifolds
of
and
"Logic-mathematics"
In
"Mind".
the
area
of
"Logic
these
tions"
and
also
(Dedekind)
conclusions
about
the
idea
that
mathematical
or "conventional"
the "Problem
postulate
(Whitehead),
of the Consistency
sets
are
"free
crea
of Propositions".
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The Known
Sheffer
203
suggestion here does not point to any systematic "method" for proving con
sistency. It seems mainly to be a suggestion that any proof of consistency must
ultimately be extensional, that is, in some sense empirical.We must actually find
objects in the neutral realmwhich serve for true interpretation of the postulates.
Sheffer only briefly touches on what this thesis about consistency proofs
means for postulate sets, such as those of set theory,which require an infinitedo
main of objects for a true interpretation. Sticking to his own doctrine of consis
tency proofs resting on our own experience of a domain of objects that the pos
tulates truly apply to, he says,
The
results
of "science"
about
the nature
of mind.
According
to Sheffer,
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204
Michael
Scanlan
for our knowledge is nicely brought out by his full acceptance of the conse
quence that such experience may be an individual matter. He iswilling to ascribe
to some
individuals
better
"vision"
than
others.
of
the
"neo-realist"
Holt.
The one area inwhich Sheffer has clearlymastered the dialectical approach of
Royce is in his arguments for the pragmatic necessity of "logic" as themethod of
philosophy. He accepts "modern mathematical logic", particularly in the postu
late theory form of Huntington, as the model of logically correct theories. Ulti
mately, of course, this acceptance of the newest results of logical studies is con
gruent with the overall empirical and pragmatic tenor of Sheffer's approach. The
nature of logic, just as the nature of reality, is something to be discovered and
not arrived at by a priori deduction.
2. The Logocentric Predicament
What we can discern of Sheffer's later philosophy goes quite beyond the
themes of his dissertation. With a little rational reconstruction one can detect in
two themes of his later published writings some connections with his dissertation
work. These are the concept of our inevitable "logocentric predicament" and the
concept
of "notational
relativity".
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The Known
205
Sheffer
based
on
the use
of
terms
"significant"
and
"valid"
that
the goal
of
in
quiry at this level is to delineate why these concepts are the correct concepts for
logical analysis.
Sheffer's discussion of foundational research in logic seems to reveal a realism
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206
Michael
Scanlan
about logic.18 What this realism means is that foundational research has a single
real object, that is logic, and it is possible for researchers to be right or wrong in
their description of it. Sheffer's interest inwhether such basic logical concepts as
"class" or "propositional function" are "valid" is indicative of this.
3. Notational Relativity
Sheffer's realism about logic underlies his project for developing a theory of
"notational relativity". This project relates to the issues Sheffer puts in the second
phase of foundational studies, issues connected to the relations of notational
forms with interpretational "loci". The basic problem which this theory was
meant to address was the proliferation of formalized theories thatwere apparently
notational
variants
of one
another.
Thus
for
the
classic
case
of euclidean
geome
try, the literature Sheffer was familiar with contained, among others, Hilbert's
1899 axioms in terms of points, lines, planes, relations between these objects, a
"between" relation of points, a "congruence" relation of line segments; Veblen's
1904 axioms in terms of points and "between"19; and Huntington's postulates of
1913 in terms of solid spheres and an "inclusion" relation between them. One
could ask what makes all of these specifically postulate sets for euclidean geome
try.The situation was similar in other areas. In Huntington's paper of 1904 on
Boolean Algebra he gives three different postulate sets, each using a different un
defined relation in its postulates. One could ask what makes these three, along
with themany other postulate sets for Boolean Algebra in the literature, all theo
ries of the same thing.
The procedure commonly used in the literature of postulate/axiom setswas
to show, in either a detailed or sketchyway, how the terminology of other theo
ries could be defined in the terminology of the given theory, and how the postu
lates/axioms of the other theories could be derived as theorems in the given the
ory plus the definitions of the added terminology. This was the standard proce
dure of the mathematical literature, but Sheffer seems to have been inclined to
ask, how do we know that itworks? That is, his distinction between manipulation
of notational forms and their interpretation in domains of real objects made him
aware
that
there was
no
automatic
guarantee
of agreement
between
the
two
types
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The Known
Sheffer
207
Thus
any
two
relational
"reference-systems"
story.
A number of years ago I took a look at the Sheffer papers. They are well
kept in 50 archival boxes in theHarvard Archives. At that time I looked at Boxes
1-5. Box 1 contains, in different folders, a fairly neat assortment of letters to
Sheffer
and
some
reply
drafts
and
carbons.
But,
looking
at Boxes
2-5,
it was
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208
Michael
Scanlan
was
done originally on the small slip, and not cut from a larger manuscript.
Many of these "decks" and cut-up slips of paper have been bundled together in
archival sleeves in groups which seem to go together, or for themost part go to
gether. However, there is other such material in the folders which is less coher
ently organized, along with stray newspaper clippings, household notes, etc.
Some of the boxes, folders and sleeves have descriptive labels such as
on
"probability",
"Notes
"consistency",
"locability",
Pre-assertial
logic",
"Names",
"Notational
Relativity".
Along with the bundling of some slips together, this seems to indicate some past
efforts to organize thematerial.
Especially on the small slips in "decks" the writing contains an odd assort
ment of squiggles. A little study, however, reveals that this is not really a code.
It is instead Sheffer's own shorthand notation for such frequently used terms as
etc.
This
is consistent
with
the common
use
of
short
hand by writers in Sheffer's period, most famously G?del. The shorthand nota
tion does, however, add an extra layer of difficulty to an already jumbled archival
record.
"Professor
Whitehead",
etc.
in the
text.
The
presence
of
these
student papers in the Sheffermaterial creates another layerof confusion, since the
authorship
of each
recovered
text must
be
established.
A rather fascinating sort of text that can be recovered is also connected with
Sheffer's teaching and has a sort of mixed authorship. These are class notes
which Sheffer apparently had a student recorder transcribe in a number of his
classes. What are preserved are typescripts prepared from his notes by the re
corder and then duplicated for the class members. The quality of these seems to
vary from recorder to recorder, but some give the impression of almost steno
graphic detail.
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The Known
Sheffer
209
structed
notes
and
other
material.
1. Codes,
Much
Postulates, Systems
of Sheffer's work was based on his own formulation of the nature of
postulational theories. His models for such theories were the geometries of Hil
bert and Veblen, and the numerous postulational theories of his Harvard mathe
matics colleague Huntington.
The terminology that Sheffer used seems to have
varied somewhat over the years, but the basic approach seems to have been sta
ble. This approach was to distinguish between propositions and sets of proposi
tions involving a meaningful nonlogical vocabulary, and cases where this vocabu
lary is replaced with variables. Sometimes, such introduction of variables is said
to produce "propositional functions" and sometimes "propositional forms". Al
though problems with dating make it difficult to prove, it is tempting to hy
pothesize that the "function" terminology was earlier, under the influence of
Principia Mathematica, while the "form" terminology was later, as a result of
awareness of the confusions invited by the "function"
terminology.20 In Sheffer,
1921, the "function" terminology is used, on analogy with one of Russell's
senses of "propositional function". Here Sheffer uses the theory of Euclidean
1913 as an example to illustrate his own ap
geometry presented inHuntington
proach to the logical structure of postulational theories. That paper constructs all
of Euclidean geometry on the basis of two undefined "notions". These are the
class of solid spheres and the relation of inclusion of one sphere in another. Us
ing this theory as an example of his general approach, Sheffer says,
We
sphere-inclusion],
unproved propositions
the system of Euclidean
nian
language,
we
language,
and
the
set of
theHuntingtonian
assumptions. By
geometry in terms of the Hungtingto
shall mean
the
set of
Huntingtonian
assump
tions together with the set of all those and only those proposi
tions "logically" deducible from these assumptions.
(Sheffer
1921, p. 3)
Thus,
present
logical
conception
of a "theory".
That
is, both
are
the
closure
to the
under
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210
Michael
Scanlan
In a similar
the fixed
manner,
Shefferian
"system"
now
becomes
function".21
In (presumably) later treatments, Sheffer changes his terminology but not his
basic conception. One example of this is provided by an eight page handwritten
paper with the title "Variables"
(Sheffer Papers, Box 10). It is not clear whether
it is by Sheffer or is a student paper. Even as a student paper, however, it pre
sumably reflects Sheffer's own terminology. Indeed, this terminology can be
confirmed from some of the class notes of Sheffer's lecture presentations.
In this paper, the innovation, compared to Sheffer 1921, is that the combi
nation of both the base undefined notions and the set of assumptions is called a
"code". The entire "system" is the "code" plus theorems that are logically de
ducible on this basis. This relation is described as follows,
Thus the entire system is in terms of the fundamental no
tions accepted at the start; the code, which iswithin the system,
consists of the fundamentals, whatever theymay be?
notions,
assumptions,
etc. while
and deductions,
the
system
contains
both
fundamentals
(p. 7)
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The Known
211
Sheffer
"code" for ge
Thus, the author speaks here of both Veblen's and Huntington's
as
case
in
each
notions
class
of spheres, or
such
ometry, meaning
point,
specific
der relation combined with each author's set of (what they call) postulates or axi
oms. Now, however, it is the introduction of "variables" into a code that pro
duces
a "code
form"
and
"system
form".
variables.
The
In
this paper
term
the
"variable"
per
haps is overused. It is not reserved for variables replacing basic vocabulary, but is
extended so that propositional forms containing such variables are also called
variables, as is a code form as a whole.
Presumably, the author is envisioning
the
of
the
substitution
variables
for
base non-logical vocabulary of the sys
simply
tem and describing theway inwhich the (Shefferian) postulates and system form
become
functions
of
those
two
aspects
are not,
well
however,
dis
tinguished. Allowing for this ambiguity, however, the basic Shefferian picture of
the logical structure of a deductive theory is described as follows,
The System form is a function of whatever values, or loci,
may be substituted for the code form, and of whatever values
may be substituted for the postulate set, and so on, to the pos
sible values of the term variables, operational variables, rela
tional variables, and so forth. It is a function of every variable
involved within itself,and is itself a variable. In likemanner, a
postulate set is a variable, varyingwith and depending upon the
fundamental notions, and a code form is a variable, varying with
and depending upon the postulate set and the fundamental no
tions. When all the variables in a code form are substituted by
constants the result is a code. (p. 8)
The last sentence here illustrates the sort of problems caused by the impreci
sion in the use of "variable". We can't substitute constants for everything de
scribed as a variable in the prior text and reliably get a code structurally related to
the code form. The author is presumably relying on the fact that substitution for
the non-logical
vocabulary
set and therefore
postulate
variables
the
in the code
system
form
induced
fixed
for the
values
form.
to these notes
"[Sheffer's]
tivity".
According
special
more
has been
and postulational
codes
technique."
as focusing on
postulate
sets).
These
notes
summarize
interest
He
presents
independence,
Sheffer's
attitude
for
twenty
these
years or
concerns
and equivalence
towards
the
three
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(of
con
212
cerns
Michael
Scanlan
as follows,
consistency,
independence,
and
completeness,
by
non-interpretational
method"
assumes
the
consistency
of
the
real
number
system
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The Known
Sheffer
213
locability.
This report might reflect an earlier period of Sheffer's thinking. It is fairly clear
that he startedwith the standard postulational terminology inwhich the question
of "consistency" asked whether contradictory theorems were "logically deduci
ble" from a given postulate set. The consistency of such sets was standardly
proven by authors such asHuntington and Veblen, by "giving" interpretations of
the postulate
sets
for which
each
postulate
in the
set was
true.
Starting
from
this
practice it is clear that Shefferwas concerned with the question of how to give an
account of the adequacy or lack of adequacy of the practice.
Sheffer's use of the word "locable" was part of his effort to isolate the com
ponents of this practice for analysis. We can assume that he worked these issues
out for himself over time because in Box 3, folder e one set of slips gives a rather
precise set of definitions of concepts for analyzing the postulational practice of
consistency proofs. These use an idiosyncratic symbolism and terminology,
which seem tomark them as Sheffer's own work and not that of a student. Their
detailed nature suggests that they are from a later stage of Sheffer's thinking on
this
issue.
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214
Michael
Scanlan
guage of the code). Here "imply" is taken in an unanalyzed sense. It does not
require an effective deductive method. A code is "locable" if its base can be
given values forwhich the postulates of the code are true. What I have just indi
cated is roughly Sheffer's thinking, but I will give some examples of his specific
definitions.
The most interesting aspect of these is that he does not have a very clear way
of expressing the notion of an arbitrary sentence of a formally fixed language for
a theory. He begins a set of definitions by saying,
Given
logical
ox
function
... of
the
terms
in the
analytic
lan
"derivation"
or
implication.
X ) Df.
He
similarly
defines
the "interaccordance"
of an
arbitrary
(finite)
number
propositions.
of
But he needs to extend this notion to a code. For this he gives the definition
in terms of a code with only a two element base
vocabulary. Here "K" is a class
variable and "R" is a relation variable. ShefTer says,
Consider C(K,R) as a general symbol for a code form on K and
R. Let C(K*R*)
be any code derived from (i.e. any locus of) C
are structurally identical,
and C(K*,R*)
(K,R). Since C(K,R)
we
retain
the
letter C
in both
cases.
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The Known
Sheffer
215
Here the asterisks indicate the replacement of the variable terms in the code
form with meaningful non-logical vocabulary (of appropriate grammatical type).
Each of these replacements produces a specific codewhich is a locus for the code
form.
Given this notation, Sheffer defines accordance for a specific code as follows
is ace, = .( X ).~[C(K*R*).
X ] Df.
\ .X
C(K*,R*)
As in earlier examples, thismay be read as saying, "The specific code C(K*R*)
is
accordant if and only if (by definition) for any formula X of the language, C
~ X". Sheffer also
says that we can give a
(K*R*) does not imply both X and
similar definition of accordance for a code form.
Having treated the notion of accordance, Sheffer goes on to define the dis
tinct notions of locatedness and locability that his analysis finds in the postula
tional treatment of "consistency". Here in each case the definition is going to be
for a codeform, which is the only sort of thing that can be given a locus (i.e., in
terpretation) according to Sheffer. For the notion of a code form being
"located", that is having a locus actually given, Sheffer has the following defini
tion,
is located .= .K*
C(K,R)
R* g
legitimate R-value
C(K*R*)
Df.
In this definition "K*/K means the proposition 'K* has been substituted for K
throughout', and R*/R has the corresponding meaning. This introduces the no
tion that a locus (i.e., substitution of meaningful vocabulary) has actually oc
curred. The last clause of this definition, C(K*R*) means that the resulting code
is true. Sheffer takes truth to apply to the entire code because "C(K*R*)
is
merely a complex proposition."
Sheffer also defines the notion of "locability", which does not require that a
specific locus has already been given. Itwill perhaps be clear to the reader at this
point how to interpret the following Shefferian definition.
is locable. =. ( 3K*R*): K* e legitimate K-value
C(K,R)
value .C(K*R*)
Df.
.R* e
legitimate R
Sheffer distinguishes loci according to the types of objects that are referred
to in the loci. One slip in the group I am considering here contains a classifica
tion of loci along these lines,
A
and,
or,
stroke,
class
of
n-adic
etc.
roughly,
all
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216
Michael
Scanlan
wants
the
system
reader
cannot
to note
be
that
taken
as
the
given.
accordance
As
of
a result
albeit
complex,
even
here
that
says
such
he
stems
proven
from
using
a conviction
non-logical
that
as a
accordance
assumptions.
In
property
logical
I have
the material
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The Known
Sheffer
217
been discussing he nowhere puts the matter quite so, but the view seems
(conversationally) implied in remarks he does make.
In a distinct set of slips in folder e, grouped in a separate sleeve, there isma
terial which apparently comes from a handwritten manuscript. This discusses
locability as a proof of accordance. Here Sheffer lists a number of specific objec
tions to this. Three of these that he lists first seem to be his principal problems
with themethod.
(1.) To attempt to prove a logical fact by an appeal to some
thing outside of logic is unesthetic, inelegant. It is like saying
that a differential equation of the second order must admit a
solution because there seem to be types of motion which would
demand such an equation to have a solution. (Box 3, folder e)
This first objection seems to be based on the principle I expressed above, that a
logical property should have a purely logical proof. Here Sheffer puts it as a mat
ter of "esthetics" and "elegance".
But the force of his example is stronger than
the
since
it
invokes
19th
that,
century project to provide a rigorous treatment of
not
which
did
involve
the sort of appeals to spatial "intuition" used in
analysis,
the 18th century. For Sheffer and his contemporaries, the difference here was
not just a matter of "elegance", but instead the difference between real and falla
cious
proof.
would
have
to be
able
to
answer
both
these
questions
af
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218
Michael
Scanlan
is inadequate to prove every case of an accordant code. Sheffer simply raises the
possibility that a code which did not imply a contradiction might yet have no lo
cus.
He
says,
postulates
true
propositions.
An
accordant
system-form
This
might have been Sheffer's main research goal. This seems to have been to find a
method for proving accordance which would meet his requirements for being
purely logical. In thematerial that I have been able to consult, one finds various
hints and suggestions about Sheffer's conception of this project, but never
enough to confidently reconstruct his thinking on the matter. Some might sur
mise that there is no such material in the jumble of the Sheffer papers, but it
would be nice to know for sure.
VI A Few Conclusions
While in the history of logic in the U.S. one cannot say that Sheffer is an
unmentioned elephant sitting in the living room, he nevertheless is a significant
enough figure that lack of consideration of him is peculiar. One can point, of
course, to practical considerations which probably led to this situation. The
scanty set of publications, mostly abstracts about a cryptic "system", combined
with the off putting nature of his papers makes him an uninviting target for
scholarship. Nevertheless, it seems from the very limited work that I have been
able to do in his papers that it is possible to recreate substantial fragments of
Sheffer's own words from his active period. These are in reconstructed typescripts
or manuscripts of his own,
significantly detailed class note reports, and perhaps
in some cases student work for him. Such reconstruction is a
scholarly project in
itself. The point of the project would be that such reconstructed material holds
some promise for giving the context which could
provide an understanding of his
system
as
reported
in "Notational
Relativity"
and
the various
mathematical
ab
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The Known
219
Sheffer
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Lewis, American
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- 1922
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1924a
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-1924b
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by F. Enriques,
pp. 469
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
222
Michael
Scanlan
Press, Cambridge,
Eng.
NOTES
a number
of peo
comments
I appreciate
and corrections
1.
by
provided
Ivor
Randall Dipert,
an earlier version of this paper. These
include
for
John
Corcoran,
ple
the legal research done
I especially
Robin.
and Richard
by
Grattan-Guinness,
appreciate
Sloman & MacDonald.
of Meyer,
Scanlon
and Michelle
My
John M.Connolly
Connolly,
I
Libraries.
aided by a grant from the OSU
Finally,
papers was
he
has
for the valuable
encouragement
provided.
that
that there are two different operators
Sheffer in 1913
recognizes
in the Sheffer
research
are operators
serve as the single operator
of a Boolean
Algebra
(p. 488, note). These
Sheffer
to neither p nor q (~p & ~q) or to either not-p or not- ^ (~p v ~q).
that correspond
in the literature today to refer to
It is common
used
the first of these in his 1913 paper.
can
from
11. The divergence
1959,
e.g. Quine
function",
in which he pre
to have its origin in Jean Nicod's
1916 paper
also uses a single opera
sents an axiomatic
calculus with a single axiom. He
propositional
are
two
the either not-p
and
notes
that
there
Sheffer.
Nicod
tor, following
adopts
options
follows
or not-q meaning
of p3q.
Russell
it gives a simpler definition
of stroke because
the
latter as "the
own
Sheffer's
in his
Nicod
Sheffer
treatment
Mathematica
Principia
stroke
seems
article
of the stroke
(xv-xvii).
nor Russell
to the second
in the introduction
function
From
there
it seems
to have
entered
of
literature,
of the stroke
attribute
edition
the
to
In a manuscript
showed
that an operator
from 1880 Peirce
corresponding
serve as a single operator
for Boolean
neither p nor q could
1933, 4.12
(Peirce
Algebra
that the sin
In a manuscript
from 1902, Peirce
Peirce
recognizes
4.20;
1986, 218-221).
This ma
to either not-p or not-q
could also correspond
(Peirce 1933, 4.265).
gle operator
terial only came to light well after Sheffer 1913.
3.
not
Sheffer
does
in older
reference
a biography
have
National
Biography (1999) nor in the Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (1998). I have not
found
biography
4.
sources,
aside from
Who.
in the Massachusetts
Registry
of Vital
Records
and
Statistics.
It was
supplied
by My
er
Sheffer.
5.
et al.
1951.
in his foreword
by Frankfurter
this was Whitehead's
Given
That
settled
opinion
to the Sheffer
is indicated
festschrift, Henle,
by the fact that he
grouped Shefferwith Ramsey and Nicod as "those towhom he had especially looked for
the next generation".
further progress
reports this,
[in logic] among
Roy Harrod
in 1930.
he had with Whitehead
1970, from a conversation
(p. v) of Nicod
in the
Preface
He
6.
He
also
approached
followed
the
donors
Catholic
same
Wulf and Etienne Gilson, which nevermaterialized. (Kuklick 1977, 455, 457)
7.
Petition
for Divorce
(Jan. 24,
1942),
idem.,
was
F).
{"Sheffer
a divorce decree
of Divorce
nisi, Decree
(March
granted
to Vacate
then sought to have it vacated. Motion
(Sept. 18, 1942),
to Vacate
Motion
Order
denied
Court,
Denying
by the Probate
later Adele
but on
June 27,
1944
the Massachusetts
Supreme
Judicial
Court
Three months
30, 1942),
idem. Her
request
17,
(Dec.
reversed
1942),
the di
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
idem.,
The Known
vorce
decree.
Shefferv.
Sheffer,
(No.
4344)
(Mass.
1944).
Henry,
223
Sheffer
in turn, sought
divorce
from Adele the following year. Petition forDivorce (Feb. 19,1945), Shefferv. Sheffer,
Massachusetts Probate Court forSuffolkCounty (No. 32, 404), {"Sheffer77"). This is the
in which
proceeding
his testimony. This
he broke
down
to the case
led
The
under
being
were McLean
hospitals
in Belmont
Hospital
MA
to continue
Order
and
with
of Dis
the Boston
her
Through
tions. Motions
to examine
the medical
records
sought
for Order
for Examination
of Hospital
lawyers, Adele
of Respondent
1945), ShefferII.
hospitaliza
Records
(April
12,
21
The
of Jewish Harvard
students was
around
percentage
perhaps
cf. Synott 1979, 94 ff..
The gist of this story is also given atWhite
1999, 221.
her age at death as
Adele
Sheffer's death certificate apparendy misstates
9.
in 1921,
10.
percent
of these
11.
will
and an
inventory
12.
This
are found.
83. For
tion,
of his estate
13.
It was
1927-29.
These
studied
papers were
carefully
in the course of this seminar that Tarski
For
15.
which
Russell
in the article
"On
of
the present
more
included
16.
James
field of model
theory developed.
to his dissertation
Sheffer disproves
appendix
to symmetrical
in his "L-system".
of asymmetrical
relations
"reduction"
Theorists,
seminar
for a mathe
In a substantial
14.
supposed
Warsaw
the need
recognized
to
central
definition, which were
rec
iswidely
of such concepts
theory of semantic
the methods
of Langford's
matical
ognized
in Tarski's
on Huntington
and the tradition
both him and Sheffer, see Scanlan
1991.
introduces
the term "neutral monism"
the Nature
of Acquaintance"
Russell was a lecturer
of American
Royce's
Postulate
to describe
the view
of
See especially
1914.
pp.
(Russell
at Harvard
in Spring
in Philosophy
17.
writings
"logic"
of logic as a choice between
is not surprising,
since
This
in this period.
issue of foundations
18.
searcher
in logic
19.
is always
different
this was
singular.
He
logics.
the attitude
does
not
of almost
pose
the
every
re
to a system
at the prompting
of R.L. Moore,
later corrected,
of
and
of
"between"
(Vehlen,
pairs
point
"congruence"
points
1983.
and Scanlan,
See
also Tarski,
1999, p.202,
1911).
as confusing
and adopting
in rejecting "propositional
function"
20.
Langer
in her disser
form terminology
form" says that she used the propositional
"propositional
using
and
This
was
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224
ration.
some
319).
there
been
Russell
'logical
Michael
"Since
Scanlan
then Professor
of his disciples
have
recollection
Langer's
ismuch
discussion
to
able
has
is an expansion
of the notion which
'system-function'
I prefer the simpler expression
function.'
Personally,
'propositional
to refer to system 'functions'"
I shall often have occasion
(p.
although
find
is "[Sheffer's]
christened
pattern,'
28).
21.
1922,
He
compares
function"
of C.J. Keyser,
cf. Keyser
Lect.III.
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