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The Known and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer
Author(s): Michael Scanlan
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 193-224
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27795017
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Michael

The Known

Scanlan

and Unknown
H.M.

Sheffer1

I. The Problem
In the history of logic in the United States, Henry Sheffer (1883-1964)
is
both well-known and hardly known at all. He iswell-known as the discoverer of
the eponymous "Sheffer stroke", a binary truth-functional operator with which
any truth-functional operator can be defined. This was presented in his 1913
paper, "A Set of Five Independent Postulates for Boolean Algebras, with applica
tion to logical constants". As the tide indicates, Sheffer's stroke operator was not
originally developed by him in the context of truth-functional logic, but to use in
postulate sets for Boolean Algebra. This idea could be applied to the proposi
tional logic of Principia Mathematics,
and Sheffer does this by giving definitions
of the "primitive ideas" of negation ( ~ ) and disjunction (v) using his stroke with
the interpretation of "p|q" as "neither p nor q".2
Sheffer is quite different from other figures in twentieth century logic who
have eponymous items in the literature, such as Turing or Church. Most
logi
cians know nothing more about Sheffer than the Sheffer stroke. There seems to
be very littie to know. Someone knowledgeable about the history of logic in the
United States would know that Sheffer spent almost all of his career at Harvard
(1917-1952) where he was the principal teacher of logic at a time when Harvard
was viewed as the leading center for the new logic in the United States. They
would also know that he had a very limited publication record. Aside from his
1913

paper,

this was

mainly

some

reviews

and

abstracts.

People

who

are

very

knowledgeable about Sheffer would know that he was believed to be working


during his lifeon a new "system" of logic, but was secretive about it.
This seems to be the sum of the scholarly history of Henry Sheffer. A more
serious perusal of the record might create doubts about how much he should be
logic in the
relegated to a footnote, at least for the history of mathematical
United States. The main evidence that gives pause here is a quite impressive
festschriftpublished in his honor in 1951 (Henle, 1951). The contributors in
cluded many of the leading figures in theUnited States philosophy community of
the day:

Alonzo

Church,

C.I.

Lewis,

H.S.

Leonard,

W.V.

Quine,

Norbert

of theCharles S. Peirce Society


Spring, 2000, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2

Transactions

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Wie

194

ner,

Michael

F.S.C.

Scanlan

Northrop,

CJ.

Ducasse,

George

Sarton,

Suzanne

K.

Langer,

Marvin

Farber, R.B. Perry, Charles Hartshorne, and Donald C. Williams. Yet, even with
this sort of evidence, one can wonder what itwas evidence of. Do we have simply
a teacher of stirring personal qualities who evokes admiration in his better stu
dents for "abstract thought"? One can still seriously ask, does he have an impor
tance which merits some pages devoted to him in the ideal history of mathemati
cal/symbolic logic in the United States? I'd like to suggest in this article that,
while it has its difficulties,more should be said about Sheffer and some help in
doing this can come from his papers archived atHarvard.
II ShefferJs
Life
Since the details of Sheffer's life are not readily available3, I give them here.
Sheffer was born in the Ukraine in 1883. His parents were Max and Ida (n?e
Hirshberg) Sheffer.4 His familymoved to Boston about ten years after his birth.
After graduating from Boston Latin School, he went on to receive his A.B. from
Harvard in 1905, followed by a Ph.D. in 1908. His school career seems to have
been facilitated by a great gift for languages. According to Langer (1964, 305)
he could read some Hebrew along with the Greek and Latin he learned at the
Latin School. In addition he knew French, German, and Italian, beyond the Eng
lish that he presumably learned after he arrived in this country as an immigrant
child.
The most important aspect of Sheffer's Harvard education is that he was
taken up as a student by Josiah Royce at a timewhen Royce was one of themost
prominent figures inAmerican philosophy. Sheffer served as an assistant to Royce
for four academic years (1906 - 1910). He received a Sheldon Traveling Fellow
ship for 1910-11 and went to England to studywith Russell and to Italy to study
with Peano. In a letter of recommendation to Russell, Royce said "we have, in
America, no more promising research student of the new logic than Sheffer
is" (letter of June 29, 1910 inRoyce 1970, 540-41).
Sheffer on his return to theUnited States found a series of one year appoint
ments at universities from Seattle to New York and points in between. He was
called back from such a one year appointment at the University of Michigan,
which he had started in the Fall of 1916, to fill in as a temporary instructor at
Harvard in theWinter of 1917 after the death of Royce in September 1916. With
this precarious start he was destined never to leave Harvard until his retirement in
1952, but formany years his position was tenuous. He remained an instructor for
the next ten years until his position was somewhat regularized by appointment as
Assistant Professor in 1927. Langer attributes this promotion to a crisis "when a
severe nervous breakdown, brought on by professional hopelessness and extreme
personal troubles, called general attention to his plight but also to his invaluable
teaching" (1964, 307).
An important factor in Sheffer's promotion, with hardly any publication
cord,

was

apparentiy

an

account

of Sheffer's

research

from A.N.

Whitehead

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re
in a

The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

195

dated January 23, 1927.5 He says there, "Symbolic Logic, as the


general theory of structure, has been generalized to its utmost extent by Dr.
Sheffer. He has not only enunciated the general principles, but achieved the far
more difficult task of making substantial progress in constructing the ground
work of the science" (Henle 1951, ix-x).Whitehead
concludes his account of
Sheffer's work by saying "In the department of philosophy atHarvard, Mr. Shef
fer has been notably successful in exciting interest among those students with ap
titude for this study" {ibid. x). This ability to develop student interest in rather

memorandum

esoteric

treatments

of

logic

was

a consistent

theme

in evaluations

of

Sheffer.

In

his preface to the Sheffer festschrift, Frankfurter quotes the assessment of the
chair at the time of Sheffer's promotion, James H.
Philosophy Department
Woods. He said "We all value Sheffer's influence on the advanced students. He
raises the standard and is a living example of mental integrity and high
mindedness, whether he publishes a book or not" {ibid. x).
The Harvard Philosophy Department seems to have been willing to make
significant efforts to keep Sheffer, in the face of an indifferentor hostile university
administration. As related inKuklick 1977 (457-458), after 1919 Woods
steadily
fundraised among Jewish donors to support Sheffer's position,6 Shefferwas pro
moted to Associate Professor in 1929, still using departmental and not university
funds. In 1938, he was finally promoted to full Professor.
It is fairly clear that therewere threemain sources of difficulty for Sheffer's
career, but their relative importance is difficult to assess. One was his lack of
publication. Another was his recurrent psychiatric breakdowns. The final negative
factor, for some, was his Jewishness. Of these, the lack of publication is themost
straightforward. I have included in the references what I believe is the entire list
of Sheffer's publications. They come to twenty-five items. Almost all of these are
reviews or short abstracts of papers presented at mathematical meetings. Besides
the paper on Boolean Algebra, which introduced the Sheffer stroke, the most
substantive "publication"
is "Notational Relativity" which was distributed in
form
Harvard Philosophy Department. This consists of
the
by
mimeographed
thirty-three

pages

of

typescript

text

and

twenty-seven

pages

of

rather

mysterious

logic diagrams. The reasons for this restricted listof published research was often
attributed by his supporters to Sheffer's fastidiousness about writing up and for
mulating his work. Others seem to detect a preference in him for presenting his
ideas in teaching and not in publication. One must also wonder whether his re
current emotional problems interferedwith his ability towork.
A telling picture of Sheffer's emotional/psychiatric difficulties is presented by
Morton White in his recent memoir (1999). He recounts how Sheffer had a col
lapse inWhite's firstyear at Harvard as an assistant professor (1948-49). Accord
ing toWhite,
Henry Aiken was also very fond of Sheffer and would go to
his room in the old Ambassador Hotel just to sit therewith the

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196

Michael

Scanlan

poor man while he sat with his face to a wall and groaned
loudly. I vividly remember this groaning on a day when I went
to lunch with Sheffer and Lewis while Sheffer was ill. Lewis,
who was familiar with the ways of his almost lifelong friend,
paid no attention to ShefFer's peculiar noises throughout the
meal and kept up a conversation with me alone. Itwas clear to
Lewis that Shefferwanted merely to bewith people and not talk
to them during these episodes. (101)
I have found no account of ShefFer's emotional difficultieswhich would in
dicate their nature in terms of present day psychiatric description. Some evidence
for the occurrences of these episodes can be found in records of (inconclusive)
divorce proceedings between Henry and his wife Adele (n?e Blonden).7 They
were married in June of the year (1917) that Sheffer returned toHarvard to take
up Royce 's classes. This was presumably an optimistic time for Sheffer. But the
marriage

does

seem

not

to have

gone

well.

There

were

no

Kuklick

children.

re

ports thatAdele was considered "disagreeable" (1977, 458). Records from the
divorce actions brought in the 1940's, firstby Adele against Henry and then by
Henry against Adele, indicate that they separated in 1928 and never lived to
gether after that.Records from the action he brought against Adele in 1945 indi
cate that he suffered "nervous collapses", sometimes requiring hospitalization, in
each year from 1927 to 1930.8 Sheffer similarly suffered a "serious nervous col
10, 1945.
lapse" while being cross examined by Adele's attorney on December
As White's account of the behavior of C.I. Lewis toward Sheffer indicates, these
seem

"collapses"

to have

become

almost

routine

to Sheffer's

colleagues.

In the eyes of some, ShefFer's Jewish ethnic background must have been an
other "negative", in addition to his emotional fragility.There seems no reason to
think that Sheffer had any Jewish religious beliefs, but his colleagues and others
were quite aware that he was Jewish and thiswas one factor in their evaluation of
him. It is probably impossible to assess the effect of this on his career with any
precision. It is the case that critical portions of his career at Harvard coincided
with a period of anti-Jewish sentiment. This was especially evident during the
1920's when therewas much campus support for instituting admissions quotas to
reduce

the

percentage

of

Jewish

students

to

around

10

percent.9

Although

no

official quota was ever introduced, changes were eventually made to the admis
sions process which had the effect of significantly reducing the proportion of
Jewish students (Lipset 1975, 145-50). The issue of specific quotas was a matter
of student admissions, but it clearly reflected an atmosphere which could be simi
larlyhostile to Jewish faculty appointments.
On the other hand, many colleagues seem to have been warm friends and
supporters, despite his "negatives". Rather typical isMorton White's recollection
of Sheffer.

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The Known

He

was

an

extremely

sweet

man,

and Unknown H.M.

and

very

generous

Sheffer

197

to me

when I came there. He would often inviteme out to lunch ...


and reminisce charmingly about Royce, James, Santayana, and
his friendMorris Cohen.
(White 1999, 101)
Beyond simply "charm" Sheffer seems to have also been able to inspire a strong
regard for his acuity. This is perhaps epitomized by Isaiah Berlin's account of
Sheffer as the inspiration for his decision to give up work in philosophy proper
and concentrate instead on what Berlin called "history of ideas". Meeting Shef
fer at the end ofWorld War II, Berlin apparendy came to agree with Sheffer's
view that philosophy proper was not a discipline which involved a progressive
Berlin quotes Sheffer as saying, "To speak of a man
growth in knowledge.
learned in epistemology or a scholar in ethics does not make sense; it is not that
kind of study." He reports Sheffer as rejecting the notion of "Carnap and Co."
that a properly reformulated philosophy could be turned into such a progressive
scientific discipline (Berlin 1979, vii-viii).10Whatever the absolute value of Shef
fer's opinions in this regard, what is most interesting is the seriousness with
which Berlin considered Sheffer's views.
In a similar vein, Sheffer's formerHarvard colleague Justice Felix Frankfurter
While the praise is
heaps praise on Sheffer in a foreword to the Sheffer festschrift.
fitted to the occasion, one assumes that there is some basis in fact to Frankfurter's
testimony that "he has sharpened and disciplined far beyond his awareness my
insight into the problems of my own profession" (Henle 1951, ix).
Sheffer seems to have also been able to inspiremuch respect and loyalty in
his students. I've noted above White's account of how Paul Henle was "loyally"
willing to take over Sheffer's classes when he had a breakdown in 1944-45. Su
sanne K. Langer clearly held him in high regard as is indicated in the preface to
Langer 1937 and her warm obituary notice of him (Langer 1964).
Similarly,
Professor Henry Hiz
,who was a student towards the end of Sheffer's career
writes "The recollection of Professor Sheffer brings the warmest sentiments. He
was the kindest man around" (Letter of Sept. 18, 1998).
After Sheffer retired from Harvard in 1952, he continued to live in Cam
17, 1964, he left the bulk of his estate (of
bridge. When he died, on March
to his sisterMary Sheffer.Adele Sheffer had died before him on
about $10,000)
August 13, 1961. Besides Mary Sheffer, he was survived by another sister, Sadie
Gladstone of Berkeley CA and two brothers,Myer Sheffer of Newton MA,
and
Isidore M. Sheffer, a mathematician at Pennsylvania State University. Another
sister ,Rose Leavitt, died before him. Sheffer is buried at Chai Odom cemetery in
West

Roxbury,

MA.11

III. Why Sheffer?


reason why it is important to understand more about Sheffer than one
might glean from the brief printed record is threefold. 1) Many people who
were important for the development of mathematical logic in the United States
The

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Michael

198

Scanlan

thought he was important.12 2) Sheffer, in the period of the 1920s and 1930s,
seems to have been the only capable person in the United States who might be
said to have a general theory of logic that he was working on and which was the
basis for his research. 3) A slightly different issue, which connects to the first
two, is that understanding Sheffermay give some insight into a hitherto unno
ticed problem in the history of logic inAmerica. This is the rapid absorption of
the "new" logic of G?del and Tarski in the 1930's by theU.S. logic community.
Some of this can be attributed to the fortuitous presence of individual genius,
such as Church and Quine, but not all. What was it about the state of logic in
Information
the United States in the 1920's, say, which made this possible?
about Sheffer, because of the characteristics mentioned in 1 and 2 above, can
throw light on this.
That students were influenced by his ideas and not just his personality can be
documented in a number of ways. Two important indicators are letterswritten to
Sheffer byMarvin F?rber and C.H. Langford. Farber's letter (May 14, 1927) is
from Freiburg, Germany where he had gone to studywith Zermelo after a year's
(F?rber had earlier studied with Husserl in
teaching at Ohio State University.
on
an
to
and
would
be
go
Freiburg
importantAmerican interpreterof phenome
"I
F?rber
says
nology.)
regard myself to be more than ever indebted to your
on
to
He
goes
report that he has "been at work on a book on logic"
teaching."
with

Zermelo.

This

apparently

never

came

to fruition.

F?rber

asks

about

the

progress of ShefFer's own "Principia Analytica" (also destined never to appear).


Of his own projected book, F?rber says "I shall hold up a part of it until your
work appears, for I would wish to quote you when that has occurred; it is clear
thatwe must make use of and take account of your ideas." Farber in this letter
clearly looks to Sheffer as an important figure in logic.
Langford's letter (March 17, 1925) was written while he was spending a year
inCambridge, England as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow after receiving his Harvard
Ph.D. in 1924. The 3-page letter is something of a report to Sheffer on his time
at Cambridge along with some expressions of concern about finding a job on his
upcoming

return

to the U.S.

The letter contains some important material on the influence of ShefFer's


ideas. This isLangford's account of the origin of his important proof of semantic
completeness and decidability for a number of theories of linear ("serial") and
In the let
cyclic order. These ideas were published in Langford 1926, 1927.13
ter,Langford describes the origins of his thinking in thisway,
Perhaps you recall my discussing the possibility of proving
that certain sets of "general laws" such as those for serial order
could be shown to be complete as to general law. I have been
able to show that this is true for general laws involving any fi
nite number of elements for Serial Order, Betweeness, and Cy
clic Order, by using the notion ofform. Thus "any two distinct

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The Known

K-elements
two

have the formAB*BA"

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

199

is complete for functions of

variables.

Langford's comments here are obviously a shorthand description based on the


joint conceptual background provided by Sheffer's teaching. In Langford 1926
(116
117) he explicidy attributes the notion of a "form" which elements of an
interpretation can have, to Sheffer. Langford also attributes to Sheffer a notion
of "'postulational undistinguishability' of different permutations of the same sets
of elements." This notion would play an important role in Langford's papers on
In the hands of Tarski, reflecting on Langford's papers, itwould
completeness.
evolve into the notion of elementary equivalence of models for sets of sentences.
A somewhat different suggestion about the influence of Sheffer can be found
in themake-up of one of Sheffer's last graduate seminars atHarvard. This was in
the Spring of 1947 and consisted of four students, Hao Wang, Henry Hiz, Wil
liam Craig, and JohnMyhill. All of these would go on to important careers in
mathematical logic or, in the case of Hiz, inmathematical linguistics. Wang and
Myhill are now dead, but Professors Craig and Hiz have been kind enough to
send me some recollections of Sheffer and the seminar. Even at this late date,
these recollections delineate the puzzle of Henry Sheffer. Professor Craig
(August 10, 1998) gives us a formulation of Sheffer's approach in themathemati
cal format thatwas becoming standard by 1947, even though, as Professor Craig
points out, Shefferwas no longer part of the new developments.
?
I formed the impression?
that Shef
rightiyor wrongly
fer dealt with descriptions of structures <U, Ro , ..., Rk > where
U is finite, each R is of finite degree and k is a natural number,
and the fact that such a description is a complete theory and
that different

such

structures

are

isomorphic.

This is consistent with the sort of background thatwould be helpful to Langford


in developing his completeness proofs for theories of order (aside from the fact
that those universes were not necessarily finite). Professor Craig goes on to say,
Rightiy or wrongly, I felt that Sheffer was not well ac
quainted with work in that area after about 1925.
Nevertheless, perhaps because Sheffer's seminar was only
the second course in logic that I took, while I took the seminar,
Iwas quite fascinated by it.
Professor Hiz (September 18, 1998) remembers the seminar from the point
of view of the historical framework inwhich Sheffer's thinking had developed.
Shefferwas

speaking about mathematical

systems and their

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200

Michael

Scanlan

nature, compared PM and Ramsey with what he imagined it


should be. He never made it explicit. But gave us a sense of
what it should be. All four of us regretted the lack of specifics
and all of us sensed the greatness of his vision.
The picture one gets from these two former students of Sheffer is verymuch
the picture of Sheffer that exists inAmerican philosophy, through oral tradition
and

various

printed

references

to him.

He

was

a short man

seems

who

to have

created a big impression on those who came in contact with him. He was a man
who at one time expected to extend and develop the logical framework of Prin
ciple*. In particular, he would do this by explicit consideration of interpretational
structures

for

theories,

a version

of what

we

today

call

"models"

or

"structures".

In the 1920's, thiswas new territory;by the end of his career, his never fully for
mulated considerations had been eclipsed by the methods of G?del, Tarski and
others.

Even ifShefferwas influential and active in an important period in the devel


opment of mathematical logic, one can sensibly ask ifwe can discover anything
about his thought. Although we probably cannot find as full an account as we
would like, I believe more can be done with thematerial that exists. One place to
start iswith his dissertation and with thematerial he did publish.
TV. Sheffer^sThought
1. ShefFer's Dissertation: Primacy of Logic
The main portion of ShefFer's dissertation may be said to offer two variations
on the theme of the centrality of logic to
philosophy.14 The firstof these argues
that philosophies which posit as fundamental "ineffable" experiences which can
not be expressed inwords are not philosophy at all or are self-contradictory or
both. Sheffer finds such philosophies all around him. Thus, he classifies the
"Neo-Fichteanism"
of his Harvard professor Hugo M?nsterberg as ineffable be
cause of its ultimate foundation in acts of will. He takes
Bergson's philosophy as
ineffable because itposits an ultimate experience which is immediate and uncate
gorized. Finally, he labels the various versions of Absolute Idealism as ineffable
philosophies because they find the answers to philosophic problems in an Abso
lute inwhich all distinctions dissolve and with them all propositional knowledge.
Sheffer argues that all of these are self-contradictory as philosophies. That is, for
each of these "it cannot, consistently with its own initial principles, utter a true
proposition" (p. 9). Such systems are barred from being philosophy at all, since
themethod of philosophy must be taken to be that of "logic".
By the "method of logic" Sheffer seems to mean the development of postu
lational theories, but in a sense much enlarged from the sort of mathematical
postulates developed by his Harvard teacher E.V. Huntington.15
Philosophic
theory, it seems, will be the most general postulate theory of all. Such a theory
begins with a collection of entities. Sheffer argues that the fundamental entities of

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

201

a philosophic
theory cannot be taken to be "given" as having a particular
"substance", that is they are not mental or material or mathematical or of some
other type.As he puts it, they are "neutral" entities. This clearly echoes a central
aspect of James's Radical Empiricism which was subsequendy labeled "neutral
monism" by Russell.16 The Jamesian idea was that the same element of experi
ence could function as either mental or material depending on the relations it
had with other experiences. The fundamental ontological view is rather lighdy
developed by James.
One place where this theme ismore fully developed is in E.B. Holt's The
Concept ofConsciousness. There he speaks of experience as a mosaic of "neutral"
entities. Holt notes that the manuscript of this book was finished in 1908 al
though the book was not published until 1914. Sheffer seems to have read early
versions of the manuscript at the time he was working on his dissertation. Holt
credits Sheffer with his use of the term "neutral" and Sheffer's dissertation in
cludes an extensive discussion of the book, apparently under the assumption that
itwould soon be published. According toHolt, the task of philosophy is to show
how these neutral entities, by class combinations and relations, go to build up the
known world. This produces a hierarchy of sciences, each responsible for describ
ing the relations in one layerof increasingly complex conglomerations of neutral
entities. These sciences have an ideally deductive form inwhich the "deductions"
mirror the causal relations between the entities in that science (cf. Holt 1914,
164).
The main thematic similarities between Sheffer and Holt are the idea of a
reformed ontology which overcomes the longstanding metaphysical dualisms and
the idea of the ideal structure of scientific knowledge as somehow forming a
"logical" system. But a specific comparison of Sheffer's treatment with Holt's
indicates a significant difference in detail. Much
of this difference probably
more
a
from
Sheffer's
notion
of
springs
developed
logically structured deductive
theory.

Sheffer argues in his dissertation thatwhat we are "given" in experience are


entities which are unified simply as "being" and in no other way. They are not all
mind, or matter, or even experience. Our experience of thismanifold is broken
up into types of experiences. Out of the "manifold" of neutral entities are se
lected "sub-manifolds". Each of these is a class of neutral entities unified by a de
fining formula. Sheffer represents these sub-manifolds in the style of Hunting
to
ton's postulate theory papers (such as Huntington
1904) using K(a,b,c,...)
represent some class of entities. In his discussion he seems to take this notation to
represent not just a bare class, but a class and a defining formula or collection of
formulas. This is consistent with the view, common at this time, that to speak of
any

"class"

Sheffer's

of objects
human

vision

there must

be

experience

contains

attached

defining

such manifolds as Nature, Mind, Mathematics,

concept

Value,

or

formula.

and oth

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In

202

Scanlan

Michael

ers, each of which differs from the total manifold of entities in


being a precisely defined, at least a precisely definable, selection
from this totality. It is the function of the sciences, and in a lar
ger way of philosophy, to solve the problem of the constitution
of these various selection-groups. (1908, p. 77)
The assumption is that for each sub-manifold there is such a correct defining for
mula and the task of the sciences and philosophy is to discover and put in proper
logical form the defining formulas of the various sub-manifolds of experience.
Sheffer goes on to indicate that in principle there are "practically limitless" sub
manifolds of neutral entities that can be selected out of our experience. Thus,
"We might ask for the generating formula of all entities thatwould fall under the

(1908, pp. 78-79).


designation of'chalk'"
In practice, Sheffer sees the actual development of defining formulas of sub
manifolds to be limited to a few types, "types which the evolution of mankind
has genetically shown to be deserving of systematic study and investiga
tion" (1908, pp. 80-81). These turn out to be the standard divisions of knowl
edge which one would expect from a philosopher: logic, mathematics, natural
science, psychology, "and the so-called normative sciences" (1908, p. 81). Shef
fer's listing follows a standard hierarchy of fields, but he is at pains to say that this
represents no hierarchy of being or "substance', since all are submanifolds of the
same domain of neutral entities. Indeed, the selection of these sciences is "due,
logically speaking, to accidental factors of evolution" (1908, p.81). Thus, there is
no

or

necessary

priori

structure

of knowledge

or

here.

experience

For

Sheffer

science and philosophy are ultimately charged with simple description of experi
ence. Philosophy simply functions at a more general level. It offers no a priori
necessities or ultimate explanations. According to Sheffer "the function of the
philosopher is neither to introduce into our world anything which is not really a
fact of experience, nor to eliminate from it any actual fact" (1908, p. 84).
Sheffer concludes themain portion of his dissertation by discussing the appli
cation of his ideas about philosophy as describing the postulates which define cer
tain sub-manifolds of the neutral realm. For this he limits himself to the sub
manifolds

of

and

"Logic-mathematics"

In

"Mind".

the

area

of

"Logic

mathematics" he justifies his unified treatment by reference to Russell's


logicism
as expressed in Principles ofMathematics. He takes the studies of what he calls
"definition by postulates" to be the recent developments of modern logic which
are relevant for clarifying selection of "sub-manifolds" in this area. Detailed dis
cussion is limited to the single question of determination of the consistency of
postulate sets. He considers the approaches taken by a number of authors to
proving consistency, including Russell, Huntington, and Royce. After consider
ing

these

tions"

and

also

(Dedekind)

conclusions

about

the

idea

that

mathematical

or "conventional"
the "Problem

postulate

(Whitehead),

of the Consistency

sets

are

"free

crea

Sheffer advances his own

of Propositions".

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

203

What we are really seeking is not consistence but existence.


What we want to know about our "postulates" iswhether they
are neutral entities actually found in the neutral realm, just as
we find gold in a piece of ore, or whether on the other hand
they are only "free creations," that is, a string of words, a "vox
praetera nihil, [nothing but sound]."
ing in original)

(1908, p. 108, underlin

suggestion here does not point to any systematic "method" for proving con
sistency. It seems mainly to be a suggestion that any proof of consistency must
ultimately be extensional, that is, in some sense empirical.We must actually find
objects in the neutral realmwhich serve for true interpretation of the postulates.
Sheffer only briefly touches on what this thesis about consistency proofs
means for postulate sets, such as those of set theory,which require an infinitedo
main of objects for a true interpretation. Sticking to his own doctrine of consis
tency proofs resting on our own experience of a domain of objects that the pos
tulates truly apply to, he says,
The

The epistemological difficulty about "Mengenlehre"


is that
here, ifanywhere inmathematics, we are dealing with what may
turn our to be nothing but counters. The simple infinite is bad
enough; for the transfinitewe have not even a shadow of possi
?
that is, the
bility of ever being able to prove the consistency
?
its
of
(1908, p. 110, un
existentiality
defining postulates.
derlining in original)
is his other example for an illustration of his thesis of philosophy as
of
discovery
postulates for selected sub-manifolds of experience, Sheffer's com
mitment to an ultimately empirical basis is stated even more clearly. He takes phi
losophy to have at most an organizing and synthesizing task in relation to the
Mind

results

of "science"

about

the nature

of mind.

According

to Sheffer,

The one problem for us is to find the exact relationship or


K-property expressed by the word mind or consciousness. We
must be willing towait patiendy for all the facts to come in,we
must wait for scientific resultswhich show wherein a stone and
the perception of a stone do actually differ. (1908, p. 112, un
derlining in original)
Sheffer goes on to present philosophy as unable to "reject" anything "which sci
ence has actually discovered". The task of philosophy is "only with regard to its
proper place in the total sphere of facts or truths" (ibid.).
Sheffer's ultimate commitment to experience of "neutral entities" as the basis

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204

Michael

Scanlan

for our knowledge is nicely brought out by his full acceptance of the conse
quence that such experience may be an individual matter. He iswilling to ascribe
to some

individuals

better

"vision"

than

others.

Remembering the important r?le which such individual differ


ences play in all departments of psychology we shall not be sur
prised to find that in the case of deductive vision similar condi
tions obtain as in the case of optical vision. The mathematician,
for instance, ismuch more acutely "attuned" to the seeing of
mathematical neutral entities than the layman is. (1908, p. 66)
What we finally come to in Sheffer's presentation of the task of philosophy
and the nature of logical methodology as applied to that task seems a far cryfrom
the outlook of his mentor Royce. His program has hardly any hint of the a priori
or of Kantian necessary categories. It has something of the eclectic and world-as
I-find-it spirit of James. His ultimate ontology, however, is clearlymuch more in
the vein

of

the

"neo-realist"

Holt.

The one area inwhich Sheffer has clearlymastered the dialectical approach of
Royce is in his arguments for the pragmatic necessity of "logic" as themethod of
philosophy. He accepts "modern mathematical logic", particularly in the postu
late theory form of Huntington, as the model of logically correct theories. Ulti
mately, of course, this acceptance of the newest results of logical studies is con
gruent with the overall empirical and pragmatic tenor of Sheffer's approach. The
nature of logic, just as the nature of reality, is something to be discovered and
not arrived at by a priori deduction.
2. The Logocentric Predicament
What we can discern of Sheffer's later philosophy goes quite beyond the
themes of his dissertation. With a little rational reconstruction one can detect in
two themes of his later published writings some connections with his dissertation
work. These are the concept of our inevitable "logocentric predicament" and the
concept

of "notational

relativity".

Sheffer's first published article, "Ineffable Philosophies"


(1909) was a pres
entation of the arguments contained in his dissertation that any philosophy, as
such, must be propositional in form and use "logical" methods. On this basis he
findsmay of the philosophies of his day, such as Bergsonism and Absolute ideal
ism, as ultimately appealing to an inexpressible something (e.g. preverbal experi
ence or an all comprehending absolute) and thereby disqualifying themselves as
philosophies. In that article, Sheffer assumes that any real philosophy will articu
late some "fundamental propositions" from which "logical deductions" can be
made. This clearly puts an important burden on logic as the basic method and
standard of philosophic theorizing. As in his dissertation, Sheffer seems here to
take the notion of logic to be fairlyunproblematic.

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

205

Sheffer

By the time of his review of the second edition of Principia Mathematica


(Sheffer, 1926), however, it is clear that Sheffer has given more thought to the
question of how logic should be delineated and how it should be justified as the
correct method. Consistently with his dissertation, Sheffer advances the thesis
thatwe are constrained as thinkers to utilize logic.17 It is thiswhich creates the
"logocentric predicament" when we wish to "formulate the foundations of
logic" (1926, p. 228).
According to Sheffer the predicament arises from the fact that "In order to
give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic" (ibid.). Sheffer
takes the view that this logocentric predicament creates a problem for founda
tions of logic, but does not make a theoretic articulation of these foundations
impossible. He outlines three "basic norms" for the study of foundations of
logic. The first of these is that the goal of foundational research cannot be to
"validate logic", it can only be to explicidy articulate what "we have assumed to
be valid". Such articulation presumably requires the development of a specific
notation (such as that of Principia Mathematica).
This in turn iswhat might in
spire Sheffer's next requirement for foundational research in logic. This is a re
?
the question of
quirement that "We must keep the study of formal structures
?
or
notations
distinct
from
the
the
'loci'
of
entirely
interpretations
investigation
of a structure complex" (1926, p. 228).
In historical retrospect, the distinction
Sheffer points to here seems to bear important similarities to the distinction in
present-day logic between syntax and semantics. But it is also clear that there are
important differences. For instance, I know of no suggestion in Sheffer's writings
for an explication of the notion of notational "forms" by a mathematical defini
tion of the formulas of a language as is done in present-day syntax.
Sheffer's final consideration for foundational studies in logic, as oudined in
his 1926 review, is one that is even more difficult to relate to current conceptions
of logic. For this phase "we must discriminate sharply between the problems of
?
?
and the study of the
of notation and interpretation
'Symbolic Analysis'
conditions that make the notational and the interpretational phases significant
in the original). What
and valid"
Sheffer means
(ibid., underlining
by
"significant" or "valid" goes beyond what is involved in interpretation of nota
tion. Sheffer had described such interpretations, in the previous phase of founda
tional studies, as involving "Reality". Presumably, in this last phase we are talking
about something different from simply having a true interpretation for a formal
theory. Sheffer says that this last phase of foundational studies is to "inquire into
the meaning of those very notions ?
like class, relation, proposition, proposi
tional function?
which are presupposed by the symbolic level." There is not
much evidence here forwhat the exact nature of this inquiry is to be. One can
speculate

based

on

the use

of

terms

"significant"

and

"valid"

that

the goal

of

in

quiry at this level is to delineate why these concepts are the correct concepts for
logical analysis.
Sheffer's discussion of foundational research in logic seems to reveal a realism

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206

Michael

Scanlan

about logic.18 What this realism means is that foundational research has a single
real object, that is logic, and it is possible for researchers to be right or wrong in
their description of it. Sheffer's interest inwhether such basic logical concepts as
"class" or "propositional function" are "valid" is indicative of this.
3. Notational Relativity
Sheffer's realism about logic underlies his project for developing a theory of
"notational relativity". This project relates to the issues Sheffer puts in the second
phase of foundational studies, issues connected to the relations of notational
forms with interpretational "loci". The basic problem which this theory was
meant to address was the proliferation of formalized theories thatwere apparently
notational

variants

of one

another.

Thus

for

the

classic

case

of euclidean

geome

try, the literature Sheffer was familiar with contained, among others, Hilbert's
1899 axioms in terms of points, lines, planes, relations between these objects, a
"between" relation of points, a "congruence" relation of line segments; Veblen's
1904 axioms in terms of points and "between"19; and Huntington's postulates of
1913 in terms of solid spheres and an "inclusion" relation between them. One
could ask what makes all of these specifically postulate sets for euclidean geome
try.The situation was similar in other areas. In Huntington's paper of 1904 on
Boolean Algebra he gives three different postulate sets, each using a different un

defined relation in its postulates. One could ask what makes these three, along
with themany other postulate sets for Boolean Algebra in the literature, all theo
ries of the same thing.
The procedure commonly used in the literature of postulate/axiom setswas
to show, in either a detailed or sketchyway, how the terminology of other theo
ries could be defined in the terminology of the given theory, and how the postu
lates/axioms of the other theories could be derived as theorems in the given the
ory plus the definitions of the added terminology. This was the standard proce
dure of the mathematical literature, but Sheffer seems to have been inclined to
ask, how do we know that itworks? That is, his distinction between manipulation
of notational forms and their interpretation in domains of real objects made him
aware

that

there was

no

automatic

guarantee

of agreement

between

the

two

types

of procedure. In the most simplified form Sheffermight say to a proponent of


the literature, "You have shown me how to 'translate' Veblen talk into Hilbert
talk, intoHuntington talk, and vice versa, but how do I know that the translation
is correct? That is, how do I know that they are all talking about the same thing
in different vocabularies?"
I do not know that Sheffer ever described his notational relativityproject in a
form as terribly simplified as that just given, but I believe that a consideration of
some of the things he does say indicates his
problem is something like that de
scribed above. One clue to this is his use of the term "notational relativity". Shef
fer tells us that this is specifically named by analogy with Einstein's theory of rela
tivity.

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

207

In a paper for the 1926 International Congress for Philosophy at Harvard,


Sheffer described how his theory sought "invariants" that underlie the different
perspectives provided by different notational systems in a manner similar to the
way inwhich Einstein's theory of relativity identified "invariants", i.e. physical
laws, that are constant across the different perspectives provided by different ref
erence frames inmotion relative to one another. Sheffer describes one of his par
ticular approaches, the theory of tropicity, as
a special theory of Notational Relativity. Just as, in the special
theory of physical relativity, any two space-time reference
systems which satisfy a certain space-time invariant are relativ
ized, so, in the theory of tropicity, the propositions of any de
ductive science are invariant in form for any relational
"coordinates".

Thus

any

two

relational

"reference-systems"

which are Syntropie are relativized. (1927, 351)

Sheffer clearly was inspired by Einstein to think of an "invariance" between dif


ferent "deductive sciences" under a certain set of transformations as showing that
there is a common reality linking the "reference-systems" determined by the dif
ferent vocabularies of relation terms used in the different deductive sciences.
V. The ShefferPapers
An additional source for supplementing Sheffer's published work is his pa
pers. One hears that in his later career, out of paranoia about people "stealing"
his ideas, Sheffer cut up his papers into litde pieces and wrote in code. As is typi
cal with legendary history, these reports have a basis in fact, but are not quite the
exact

story.

A number of years ago I took a look at the Sheffer papers. They are well
kept in 50 archival boxes in theHarvard Archives. At that time I looked at Boxes
1-5. Box 1 contains, in different folders, a fairly neat assortment of letters to
Sheffer

and

some

reply

drafts

and

carbons.

But,

looking

at Boxes

2-5,

it was

Each folder contains a jumbled


clear one was entering an archival wilderness.
mix of slips of paper. Some of these slips are cut up parts of standard size writing
paper. Some of thismaterial is handwritten and some is typescript. What I did
notice about thismaterial was that itwas not cut up randomly. In some cases the
slipswere cut so as to extract a coherent piece of text from a longer manuscript.
This follows the pattern authors formerly used to rearrange and edit draft mate
rial by cutting and pasting, in the days before these became functions in com
puter word processing programs. Some other material seems to have simply di
vided a standard size piece of writing paper into thirds. Perhaps Sheffer preferred
to handle written material in small pieces.
Some other material iswhat I have come to call "decks" of notes on approxi
mately 2" x 4" slips of paper. The placement seems to indicate that the writing

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208

Michael

Scanlan

was

done originally on the small slip, and not cut from a larger manuscript.
Many of these "decks" and cut-up slips of paper have been bundled together in
archival sleeves in groups which seem to go together, or for themost part go to
gether. However, there is other such material in the folders which is less coher
ently organized, along with stray newspaper clippings, household notes, etc.
Some of the boxes, folders and sleeves have descriptive labels such as
on

"probability",

"Notes

"consistency",

"locability",

Pre-assertial

logic",

"Names",

"Notational

Relativity".

Along with the bundling of some slips together, this seems to indicate some past
efforts to organize thematerial.
Especially on the small slips in "decks" the writing contains an odd assort
ment of squiggles. A little study, however, reveals that this is not really a code.
It is instead Sheffer's own shorthand notation for such frequently used terms as
etc.

This

is consistent

with

the common

use

of

short

hand by writers in Sheffer's period, most famously G?del. The shorthand nota
tion does, however, add an extra layer of difficulty to an already jumbled archival
record.

On my firstperusal of some of the Sheffermaterial, I saw therewere a num


ber of collections of slipswhich physically matched and when pieced together at
their breaks yielded coherent sequences of material. This inspiredme to return
to the collection for two weeks during the summer of 1997. I was then able to
carry out a quick survey through boxes 1-30 of thematerial. This confirmed in
many ways thatmy initial impression of thematerial carried through all the boxes
surveyed. Further examination of thematerial revealed thatmuch of it,probably
more than half, is connected with Sheffer's teaching activity. Some of this seems
to have been lecture notes of various sorts. One hypothesis for the "decks" of
2" x 4" slips is that theywere sets of class lecture notes that Sheffer used in the
way that some college lecturers use index cards for their notes.
A more confusing element is that apparendy some of the connected material
cut into slips of paper is not by Sheffer, but consists of student papers. This is
sometimes indicated by a student name and letter grade written on the back.
Sometimes, this is indicated by references to "Professor Sheffer", "Professor
Huntington",

"Professor

Whitehead",

etc.

in the

text.

The

presence

of

these

student papers in the Sheffermaterial creates another layerof confusion, since the

authorship

of each

recovered

text must

be

established.

A rather fascinating sort of text that can be recovered is also connected with
Sheffer's teaching and has a sort of mixed authorship. These are class notes
which Sheffer apparently had a student recorder transcribe in a number of his
classes. What are preserved are typescripts prepared from his notes by the re
corder and then duplicated for the class members. The quality of these seems to
vary from recorder to recorder, but some give the impression of almost steno
graphic detail.

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

209

VI. Some Light from the ShefferPapers


As already noted, the physical nature of the material in the Sheffer papers
makes the study of them more akin to archaeology than to normal archival re
search. To indicate the potential value of such archaeological
activity for the his
tory of logic, I would like to present two themes that emerge from some recon
sets of class

structed

notes

and

other

material.

1. Codes,
Much

Postulates, Systems
of Sheffer's work was based on his own formulation of the nature of
postulational theories. His models for such theories were the geometries of Hil
bert and Veblen, and the numerous postulational theories of his Harvard mathe
matics colleague Huntington.
The terminology that Sheffer used seems to have
varied somewhat over the years, but the basic approach seems to have been sta
ble. This approach was to distinguish between propositions and sets of proposi
tions involving a meaningful nonlogical vocabulary, and cases where this vocabu
lary is replaced with variables. Sometimes, such introduction of variables is said
to produce "propositional functions" and sometimes "propositional forms". Al
though problems with dating make it difficult to prove, it is tempting to hy
pothesize that the "function" terminology was earlier, under the influence of
Principia Mathematica, while the "form" terminology was later, as a result of
awareness of the confusions invited by the "function"
terminology.20 In Sheffer,
1921, the "function" terminology is used, on analogy with one of Russell's
senses of "propositional function". Here Sheffer uses the theory of Euclidean
1913 as an example to illustrate his own ap
geometry presented inHuntington
proach to the logical structure of postulational theories. That paper constructs all
of Euclidean geometry on the basis of two undefined "notions". These are the
class of solid spheres and the relation of inclusion of one sphere in another. Us
ing this theory as an example of his general approach, Sheffer says,
We

shall call the two undefined notions


the Huntingtonian

sphere-inclusion],

unproved propositions
the system of Euclidean
nian

language,

we

[class of solid spheres,

language,

and

the

set of

theHuntingtonian
assumptions. By
geometry in terms of the Hungtingto

shall mean

the

set of
Huntingtonian

assump

tions together with the set of all those and only those proposi
tions "logically" deducible from these assumptions.
(Sheffer
1921, p. 3)
Thus,
present

roughly speaking, Sheffer's conception of a "system" corresponds


day

logical

conception

of a "theory".

That

is, both

are

the

closure

to the
under

logical implication of a set of sentences in a fixed language. Sheffer describes the


two basic vocabulary elements as Huntington's
"language". This leaves implicit
the notion of a defined language structure involving only logical elements to

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210

Michael

Scanlan

which these non-logical vocabulary elements are added. In a similarway, the no


from a set of propositional
tion of propositions
"logically deducible"
not
Sheffer.
is
by
"assumptions"
explicated
Sheffer takes these "systems" to consist of fullymeaningful propositions and
vocabulary. It is only by introduction of variables for the non-logical vocabulary
that one abstracts from these "systems" with fixed meaning a "system function"
It is these ab
involving "postulates" in place of the meaningful "assumptions".
stracted theories which are subject to diverse interpretations as particular systems.
My introduction of the "variable" gets a little ahead of what Sheffer specifically
says in 1921. There he describes Huntington's class of solid spheres as being re
placed by the "class function", K. Similarly, he says that the relation of sphere
This then yields the
inclusion is replaced by the "relation function", R.
as func
"language function", [K,R]. Presumably, Sheffer is treating all of these
can
function"
take various values. Sheffer calls the "language
tions, because they
the "base". With this (variable) base of [K,R], Sheffer says,
as
propositions that we have called the Huntingtonian
we
now
that
functions
become
the
sumptions
propositional
may call the Huntingtonian assumptional functions. However,
the name "assumptional function" is conveniently replaced by
the name postulates. (Sheffer 1921, p. 3)
The

Thus, for Sheffer, a specifically postulational theory is going to be one which al


lows multiple interpretations because it involves non-logical elements with vari
able meaning.
"system

In a similar

the fixed

manner,

Shefferian

"system"

now

becomes

function".21

In (presumably) later treatments, Sheffer changes his terminology but not his
basic conception. One example of this is provided by an eight page handwritten
paper with the title "Variables"
(Sheffer Papers, Box 10). It is not clear whether
it is by Sheffer or is a student paper. Even as a student paper, however, it pre
sumably reflects Sheffer's own terminology. Indeed, this terminology can be
confirmed from some of the class notes of Sheffer's lecture presentations.
In this paper, the innovation, compared to Sheffer 1921, is that the combi
nation of both the base undefined notions and the set of assumptions is called a
"code". The entire "system" is the "code" plus theorems that are logically de
ducible on this basis. This relation is described as follows,
Thus the entire system is in terms of the fundamental no
tions accepted at the start; the code, which iswithin the system,
consists of the fundamentals, whatever theymay be?
notions,
assumptions,

etc. while

and deductions,

the

system

contains

both

fundamentals

(p. 7)

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and Unknown H.M.

The Known

211

Sheffer

"code" for ge
Thus, the author speaks here of both Veblen's and Huntington's
as
case
in
each
notions
class
of spheres, or
such
ometry, meaning
point,
specific
der relation combined with each author's set of (what they call) postulates or axi
oms. Now, however, it is the introduction of "variables" into a code that pro
duces

a "code

form"

and

"system

form".

variables.

The

In

this paper

term

the

"variable"

per

haps is overused. It is not reserved for variables replacing basic vocabulary, but is
extended so that propositional forms containing such variables are also called
variables, as is a code form as a whole.
Presumably, the author is envisioning
the
of
the
substitution
variables
for
base non-logical vocabulary of the sys
simply
tem and describing theway inwhich the (Shefferian) postulates and system form
become

functions

of

those

two

aspects

are not,

well

however,

dis

tinguished. Allowing for this ambiguity, however, the basic Shefferian picture of
the logical structure of a deductive theory is described as follows,
The System form is a function of whatever values, or loci,
may be substituted for the code form, and of whatever values
may be substituted for the postulate set, and so on, to the pos
sible values of the term variables, operational variables, rela
tional variables, and so forth. It is a function of every variable
involved within itself,and is itself a variable. In likemanner, a
postulate set is a variable, varyingwith and depending upon the
fundamental notions, and a code form is a variable, varying with
and depending upon the postulate set and the fundamental no
tions. When all the variables in a code form are substituted by
constants the result is a code. (p. 8)
The last sentence here illustrates the sort of problems caused by the impreci
sion in the use of "variable". We can't substitute constants for everything de
scribed as a variable in the prior text and reliably get a code structurally related to
the code form. The author is presumably relying on the fact that substitution for
the non-logical
vocabulary
set and therefore

postulate

variables
the

in the code

system

form

induced

fixed

for the

values

form.

2. Locability and Accordance


Perhaps the major focus of Sheffer's effortswas the consistency of systems.
In the lecture notes for Sheffer's Phil. 165 class of October
10, 1941 (Sheffer
the
either
Box
class
has
taken
down
secretary
Papers,
27)
snippets or paraphrases
of "The logical biography of H.M.S".
Presumably, this was so presented by
Sheffer himself as background for this graduate course entitled "Notational Rela

to these notes
"[Sheffer's]
tivity".
According
special
more
has been
and postulational
codes
technique."

as focusing on

postulate

sets).

three notions, consistency,

These

notes

summarize

interest
He

presents

independence,

Sheffer's

attitude

for

twenty
these

years or
concerns

and equivalence

towards

the

three

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(of
con

212

cerns

Michael

Scanlan

as follows,

The problem of consistency is paramount; the problem of inde


pendence is a matter only of economy. Huntington spent too
much time on this problem (H.M.S.)
In the early days, the lecturerwas much interested in the
as itwas twenty-five
It is still true?
problem of equivalence.
?
we
a
while
have
number
of examples of ad
years ago
that,
hoc equivalences, there is as yet no method for proving equiva
lences, (p. 101)
The references to Sheffer's work "in the early days" on equivalence of postu
late systems probably refers to thework that resulted in ShefTer 1921. That work
was described as applicable to solving all three problems of consistency, inde
pendence, and equivalence of systems, along with completeness (cf. 1921, pp.
33-34). By 1941, however, ShefTerwas apparentiy dissatisfied with the approach
of 1921, since he no longer finds there is any "method" for proving equivalence
of systems. ShefTer does not, however, take this earlier work to be completely
without value. According to the notes,
The lecturer began his logical career by worrying about
problems of postulational technique. The result of preoccupa
tion with such problems led to the atomic theory of notational
?
a theoretical answer to the problem of equivalence.
relativity
The theory has something to say about consistency.
It is a
foundation for logic, (p. 103)
It is unclear what the theory of notational relativity says about consistency. Nev
ertheless, we can detect here one constant feature in Sheffer's logical outlook.
This was a commitment to the unacceptability of interpretation of theories as a
method in logic. In ShefTer 1921, he claims, "By the use of atomic postulates we
are enabled to solve the three important problems of postulational technique,
viz.,

consistency,

independence,

and

completeness,

by

non-interpretational

The significance that ShefTer ascribed in 1921 to non


(p. 33).
ismore bluntly put in the 1941 notes by the statement
methods
interpretational
that "No logician today who knows his business tries to prove consistency by an
example"
(p. 99). ShefTer does distinguish between interpretation as a method
formathematicians and for logicians. According to the 1941 notes,

method"

If a mathematician has his eyes open ?


i.e., is clear about
what he is doing ?
it is all right for him to reduce the consis
tency of a code to that of the real number system; the mathe
matician

assumes

the

consistency

of

the

real

number

system

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

213

it is not his job to prove it. (p. 100)


is that
Presumably, the difference between the logician and the mathematician
the logician will provide a non-interpretational foundation for theworking inter
Sheffer reports to his students that
pretational method of the mathematician.
"Some progress has been made in getting a truly formal proof, by Hilbert ?
the
same man who thinks he is a marks-ist!" (p. 100)
As noted earlier, Sheffer takes the interpretation of a code form to consist in
giving a "locus", i.e., values for the non-logical variables in the code form. A
code form is "locable" if a locus can be given for a code form; it is "located" if a
specific locus has been given for the code form. There is some material in class
notes and in slips of typescriptwhere Sheffer is using "locable" for either of these
notions, but is also wondering whether a more precise distinction needs to be
For instance, two typed slips which seem to be extracted from a set of
made.
notes
class
made by a class secretary read,
Sheffer noted on reading the papers on consistency that there
might have been an unfortunate connotation in the use of the
words "locable" and "locability". He doesn't mean to discuss
the question whether an accordant code is capable of having a
locus. The only question is in regard to a locus which is actu
Instead of "locable" perhaps one ought to say
ally given.
to replace
is no good word
"located."
There
is too awkward. (Box 3, folder f)
"Locatedness"

locability.

This report might reflect an earlier period of Sheffer's thinking. It is fairly clear
that he startedwith the standard postulational terminology inwhich the question
of "consistency" asked whether contradictory theorems were "logically deduci
ble" from a given postulate set. The consistency of such sets was standardly
proven by authors such asHuntington and Veblen, by "giving" interpretations of
the postulate

sets

for which

each

postulate

in the

set was

true.

Starting

from

this

practice it is clear that Shefferwas concerned with the question of how to give an
account of the adequacy or lack of adequacy of the practice.
Sheffer's use of the word "locable" was part of his effort to isolate the com
ponents of this practice for analysis. We can assume that he worked these issues
out for himself over time because in Box 3, folder e one set of slips gives a rather
precise set of definitions of concepts for analyzing the postulational practice of
consistency proofs. These use an idiosyncratic symbolism and terminology,
which seem tomark them as Sheffer's own work and not that of a student. Their
detailed nature suggests that they are from a later stage of Sheffer's thinking on
this

issue.

The main distinction he makes is between "accordance" and "locability". A


code is "accordant" if it does not imply contradictory propositions (in the lan

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214

Michael

Scanlan

guage of the code). Here "imply" is taken in an unanalyzed sense. It does not
require an effective deductive method. A code is "locable" if its base can be
given values forwhich the postulates of the code are true. What I have just indi
cated is roughly Sheffer's thinking, but I will give some examples of his specific
definitions.
The most interesting aspect of these is that he does not have a very clear way
of expressing the notion of an arbitrary sentence of a formally fixed language for
a theory. He begins a set of definitions by saying,
Given
logical

a code or code form, any derivative theorem will be a


construct

ox

function

... of

the

terms

in the

analytic

lan

guage (or base) together with the notions of logic. Similarly,


every postulate (or assumption) in the code form (or code) will
also be a logical construct of the code form (or code), since it is
implied thereby analytically.
One way inwhich one might read this is as stating that any theorem "derived"
from a code will be formulated from the non-logical vocabulary of the code
("base") and "the notions of logic". But Sheffer's formulation does seem to un
necessarily mix together notions of formula construction on a base vocabulary
and

"derivation"

or

implication.

Despite this unclarity, ifwe take Sheffer's notion of a "logical construct" to


mean a (grammatical) formula formed from a non-logical base vocabulary (or
variable terms of appropriate grammatical type for vocabulary elements) and a
suitable logical vocabulary, thenwe find his definitions easy to construe. In these
he uses X as a variable for a logical construct of a given code. He also uses "f" as
an abbreviation for "whatever the word
'implies' properly means." Given these
symbols, he defines "self-accordance" of a single proposition as,
= X ~
.
(p): p is self-acc.
(
).
(p. j X

X ) Df.

This may be read as saying "Any proposition p is self-accordant ifand only if


~
(by definition) for any formula X of the language p does not imply both X and

He

similarly

defines

the "interaccordance"

of an

arbitrary

(finite)

number

propositions.

of

But he needs to extend this notion to a code. For this he gives the definition
in terms of a code with only a two element base
vocabulary. Here "K" is a class
variable and "R" is a relation variable. ShefTer says,
Consider C(K,R) as a general symbol for a code form on K and
R. Let C(K*R*)
be any code derived from (i.e. any locus of) C
are structurally identical,
and C(K*,R*)
(K,R). Since C(K,R)

we

retain

the

letter C

in both

cases.

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

215

Here the asterisks indicate the replacement of the variable terms in the code
form with meaningful non-logical vocabulary (of appropriate grammatical type).
Each of these replacements produces a specific codewhich is a locus for the code
form.

Given this notation, Sheffer defines accordance for a specific code as follows
is ace, = .( X ).~[C(K*R*).
X ] Df.
\ .X
C(K*,R*)
As in earlier examples, thismay be read as saying, "The specific code C(K*R*)
is
accordant if and only if (by definition) for any formula X of the language, C
~ X". Sheffer also
says that we can give a
(K*R*) does not imply both X and
similar definition of accordance for a code form.
Having treated the notion of accordance, Sheffer goes on to define the dis
tinct notions of locatedness and locability that his analysis finds in the postula
tional treatment of "consistency". Here in each case the definition is going to be
for a codeform, which is the only sort of thing that can be given a locus (i.e., in
terpretation) according to Sheffer. For the notion of a code form being
"located", that is having a locus actually given, Sheffer has the following defini
tion,

is located .= .K*

C(K,R)
R* g

legitimate R-value

.R*. K* e legitimate K-value.

C(K*R*)

Df.

In this definition "K*/K means the proposition 'K* has been substituted for K
throughout', and R*/R has the corresponding meaning. This introduces the no
tion that a locus (i.e., substitution of meaningful vocabulary) has actually oc
curred. The last clause of this definition, C(K*R*) means that the resulting code
is true. Sheffer takes truth to apply to the entire code because "C(K*R*)
is
merely a complex proposition."
Sheffer also defines the notion of "locability", which does not require that a
specific locus has already been given. Itwill perhaps be clear to the reader at this
point how to interpret the following Shefferian definition.
is locable. =. ( 3K*R*): K* e legitimate K-value
C(K,R)
value .C(K*R*)
Df.

.R* e
legitimate R

Sheffer distinguishes loci according to the types of objects that are referred
to in the loci. One slip in the group I am considering here contains a classifica
tion of loci along these lines,
A

structural locus is one made

and,

or,

stroke,

class

of

n-adic

up only of such notions as if,


relations,

etc.

roughly,

all

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216

Michael

Scanlan

ideas such as might occur in Principia. An extra-structural locus


is any other kind; made up of empirical material, perhaps, for
the most part. We might supplement empirical loci with, say,
?
if such there
Platonic loci, these being "essences" ?
Ideas
be, and yet extra-structural. We might add nominalistic loci for
such men as regard the number three, say, as themere mark 3.
(Are these not empirical?) Also, to satisfyMeinong, we might
round
admit Meinong
loci, involving griffins, Centaurs,
etc.
folder
squares,
(Box 3,
e)
Sheffer allows here for a great number of typesof loci, but his choices, at least for
the extra-structural ones, seem designed to emphasize themetaphysical and epis
temic assumptions involved in an appeal to loci. To add to this list,Sheffer else
where allows for "mathematical" loci. These might involve such things as geo
metric objects or the sequence of natural numbers.
One might expect that the "structural" loci mentioned here by Sheffer,
which seemingly involve only logical notions, would escape from this danger of
introducing extra-logical assumptions. For Sheffer, however, even the structural
loci are inadequate for a truly logical proof of accordance.
On three, apparently consecutive, slips in this group Sheffer raises this issue
and finds structural loci to also involve unacceptable assumptions. He asks,
Suppose we interpretour postulates in terms of logical material;
for instance in terms of such notions as classes, propositions,
relations, and the like. We may argue that since we are taking
our interpretation from the world of logical reality, everything
must be accordant. Is this assumption justifiedwithout the aid
of an extra assumption derived frommetaphysics?
Sheffer answers his own question by citing the experience of Frege and Prin
cipiaMathematica.
Presumably, in the case of Frege, he is thinking of Russell's
discovery of a contradiction inwhat Frege took to be an accordant "logical" sys
tem. With Principia he refers to the complexity of the Theory of Types and pre
sumably
"logical",

wants

the

system

reader
cannot

to note

be

that

taken

as

the
given.

accordance
As

of

a result

albeit
complex,
even
here
that
says

such
he

"the belief that locability implies accordance" must involve "metaphysical as


sumptions". He lists two different such assumptions, "first, that logical reality is
accordant; and second, that such-and-such propositions from the world of logic
which seem to be locable are really so" (Box 3, folder e).
As I have noted earlier, it seems to me that Sheffer's concern regarding the
introduction of such non-logical, "metaphysical" assumptions in using locability
to prove
accordance
cannot
be properly

stems
proven

from
using

a conviction
non-logical

that

as a

accordance

assumptions.

In

property
logical
I have
the material

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The Known

and Unknown H.M.

Sheffer

217

been discussing he nowhere puts the matter quite so, but the view seems
(conversationally) implied in remarks he does make.
In a distinct set of slips in folder e, grouped in a separate sleeve, there isma
terial which apparently comes from a handwritten manuscript. This discusses
locability as a proof of accordance. Here Sheffer lists a number of specific objec
tions to this. Three of these that he lists first seem to be his principal problems
with themethod.
(1.) To attempt to prove a logical fact by an appeal to some
thing outside of logic is unesthetic, inelegant. It is like saying
that a differential equation of the second order must admit a
solution because there seem to be types of motion which would
demand such an equation to have a solution. (Box 3, folder e)
This first objection seems to be based on the principle I expressed above, that a
logical property should have a purely logical proof. Here Sheffer puts it as a mat
ter of "esthetics" and "elegance".
But the force of his example is stronger than
the
since
it
invokes
19th
that,
century project to provide a rigorous treatment of
not
which
did
involve
the sort of appeals to spatial "intuition" used in
analysis,
the 18th century. For Sheffer and his contemporaries, the difference here was
not just a matter of "elegance", but instead the difference between real and falla
cious

proof.

The second main objection raised by Sheffer is that themethod of "giving" a


locus is epistemically uncertain. We cannot ever be confident thatwe understand
the locus well enough to really take it as a guarantor of accordance.
(2.) Two very great difficulties arise whenever one tries to apply
the test. Are the postulates really satisfied by this interpretation,
or do they only seem to be satisfied? Furthermore, is this uni
verse wherein K and R are given values an accordant universe?
We

would

have

to be

able

to

answer

both

these

questions

af

firmatively before we could legitimately assert accordance.


Thus, the distinction between appearance and reality, the na
ture of reality and the nature of truth,which are questions for
epistemology are drawn into logic where they do not belong.
(Box 3, folder e)
Here Sheffer's ultimate objection seems also to be to the extralogical character of
the assumptions being made, i.e., they are epistemic. One might suspect that
Sheffer ,when pressed, would cite the uncertainty introduced by such epistemic
assumptions as the reason for excluding them from logical considerations.
Sheffer's final objection is of a different character from the other two. Here
he raises the possibility that themethod of proving accordance by presenting loci

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218

Michael

Scanlan

is inadequate to prove every case of an accordant code. Sheffer simply raises the
possibility that a code which did not imply a contradiction might yet have no lo
cus.

He

says,

(3.) It is conceivable that there exist accordant systems forms


forwhose K and R there exists no interpretationwhich makes
the

postulates

true

propositions.

An

accordant

system-form

having nothing in reality corresponding to itmight have great


theoretic interest, even if its "utility" is not apparent, and obvi
ously, from its very nature the locability test for accordance falls
down here. (Box 3, folder e)
last objection seems less fundamental than the other two, since it does not
question the very suitability of loci (or interpretations) as proofs of accordance.
But I am tempted to speculate that the recognition that the use of locimight fall
short of a general method for proving accordance was one impetus for what

This

might have been Sheffer's main research goal. This seems to have been to find a
method for proving accordance which would meet his requirements for being
purely logical. In thematerial that I have been able to consult, one finds various
hints and suggestions about Sheffer's conception of this project, but never
enough to confidently reconstruct his thinking on the matter. Some might sur
mise that there is no such material in the jumble of the Sheffer papers, but it
would be nice to know for sure.
VI A Few Conclusions
While in the history of logic in the U.S. one cannot say that Sheffer is an
unmentioned elephant sitting in the living room, he nevertheless is a significant
enough figure that lack of consideration of him is peculiar. One can point, of
course, to practical considerations which probably led to this situation. The
scanty set of publications, mostly abstracts about a cryptic "system", combined
with the off putting nature of his papers makes him an uninviting target for
scholarship. Nevertheless, it seems from the very limited work that I have been
able to do in his papers that it is possible to recreate substantial fragments of
Sheffer's own words from his active period. These are in reconstructed typescripts
or manuscripts of his own,
significantly detailed class note reports, and perhaps
in some cases student work for him. Such reconstruction is a
scholarly project in
itself. The point of the project would be that such reconstructed material holds
some promise for giving the context which could
provide an understanding of his
system

as

reported

in "Notational

Relativity"

and

the various

mathematical

ab

stracts. The thought of Henry Sheffer remains


largely unknown, but ? no longer
believe it is unknowable.
Oregon

State University, Corvallis

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and Unknown H.M.

The Known

219

Sheffer

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of the American
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of Geometry",
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Longman,
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Relevant

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Cambridge

Press,

Univer

University

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222

Michael

Scanlan

Press, Cambridge,

Eng.

NOTES
a number
of peo
comments
I appreciate
and corrections
1.
by
provided
Ivor
Randall Dipert,
an earlier version of this paper. These
include
for
John
Corcoran,
ple
the legal research done
I especially
Robin.
and Richard
by
Grattan-Guinness,
appreciate
Sloman & MacDonald.
of Meyer,
Scanlon
and Michelle
My
John M.Connolly
Connolly,

I
Libraries.
aided by a grant from the OSU
Finally,
papers was
he
has
for the valuable
encouragement
provided.
that
that there are two different operators
Sheffer in 1913
recognizes

in the Sheffer

research

thank Peter Hare


2.

are operators
serve as the single operator
of a Boolean
Algebra
(p. 488, note). These
Sheffer
to neither p nor q (~p & ~q) or to either not-p or not- ^ (~p v ~q).
that correspond
in the literature today to refer to
It is common
used
the first of these in his 1913 paper.
can

from
11. The divergence
1959,
e.g. Quine
function",
in which he pre
to have its origin in Jean Nicod's
1916 paper
also uses a single opera
sents an axiomatic
calculus with a single axiom. He
propositional
are
two
the either not-p
and
notes
that
there
Sheffer.
Nicod
tor, following
adopts
options
follows
or not-q meaning
of p3q.
Russell
it gives a simpler definition
of stroke because
the

latter as "the
own

Sheffer's

in his

Nicod

Sheffer

treatment

Mathematica

Principia

stroke

seems

article

of the stroke
(xv-xvii).
nor Russell

though neither Nicod


to Sheffer.

to the second

in the introduction

function

From

there

it seems

to have

entered

of

literature,
of the stroke

the either not-p or not-q meaning

attribute

edition

the

to
In a manuscript
showed
that an operator
from 1880 Peirce
corresponding
serve as a single operator
for Boolean
neither p nor q could
1933, 4.12
(Peirce
Algebra
that the sin
In a manuscript
from 1902, Peirce
Peirce
recognizes
4.20;
1986, 218-221).
This ma
to either not-p or not-q
could also correspond
(Peirce 1933, 4.265).
gle operator
terial only came to light well after Sheffer 1913.
3.

not

Sheffer

does

in older

reference

a biography

have

in the recent American

National

Biography (1999) nor in the Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (1998). I have not
found

biography

4.

sources,

aside from

a brief entry in Who Was

Who.

This informationis from Sheffer'sdeath certificate(March 17, 1964)

in the Massachusetts

Registry

of Vital

Records

and

Statistics.

It was

supplied

by My

er

Sheffer.
5.
et al.

1951.

in his foreword

by Frankfurter
this was Whitehead's

Given
That

settled

opinion

to the Sheffer
is indicated

festschrift, Henle,
by the fact that he

grouped Shefferwith Ramsey and Nicod as "those towhom he had especially looked for
the next generation".
further progress
reports this,
[in logic] among
Roy Harrod
in 1930.
he had with Whitehead
1970, from a conversation
(p. v) of Nicod

in the

Preface

He

6.
He

also

approached

followed

the
donors

Catholic

for H.A. Wolfson.


strategy to fund a position
De
to fund positions
Maurice
for the medievalists

same

Wulf and Etienne Gilson, which nevermaterialized. (Kuklick 1977, 455, 457)
7.

Petition

for Divorce

(Jan. 24,

1942),

Sheffer v. Sheffer, Massachusetts

Probate Court for SuffolkCounty (Divorce No. 26,107),


but
was

idem.,

was

F).
{"Sheffer

a divorce decree
of Divorce
nisi, Decree
(March
granted
to Vacate
then sought to have it vacated. Motion
(Sept. 18, 1942),
to Vacate
Motion
Order
denied
Court,
Denying
by the Probate

later Adele

but on

June 27,

1944

the Massachusetts

Supreme

Judicial

Court

Three months

30, 1942),
idem. Her

request

17,
(Dec.
reversed

1942),
the di

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

idem.,

and Unknown H.M.

The Known

vorce

decree.

Shefferv.

Sheffer,

(No.

4344)

(Mass.

1944).

Henry,

223

Sheffer

in turn, sought

divorce

from Adele the following year. Petition forDivorce (Feb. 19,1945), Shefferv. Sheffer,
Massachusetts Probate Court forSuffolkCounty (No. 32, 404), {"Sheffer77"). This is the
in which
proceeding
his testimony. This

he broke

down

to the case

led

missal (May 27, 1946), idem.


8.

The

under

being

and was unable


questioning
dismissed
"without
prejudice".

were McLean

hospitals

in Belmont

Hospital

MA

to continue
Order
and

with

of Dis

the Boston

PsychopathicHospital in 1927, and the Phipps Clinic of JohnsHopkins Hospital in 1928.

her
Through
tions. Motions

to examine
the medical
records
sought
for Order
for Examination
of Hospital

lawyers, Adele
of Respondent

1945), ShefferII.

hospitaliza

Records

(April

12,

21
The
of Jewish Harvard
students was
around
percentage
perhaps
cf. Synott 1979, 94 ff..
The gist of this story is also given atWhite
1999, 221.
her age at death as
Adele
Sheffer's death certificate apparendy misstates

9.

in 1921,
10.

percent

of these

11.

are listed as born in England.


n?e M?nzen,
and Rebecca,
Jacob Blonden
parents
Certificate
of Death
and
Massachusetts
of Vital Records
13, 1961),
(August
Registry
estate was probated
in Cambridge,
Statistics.
Sheffer's
In Re Sheffer, Mas
Massachusetts,
55. Her

sachusettsProbate Court forMiddlesex County (ProbateNo. 390220)

will

and an

inventory
12.
This

are found.

(1964), where his

cf. his remarks at Quine


group does not include Quine,
1985, 82
of his Harvard
educa
insightful treatment of the influence on the young Quine
the influence of Sheffer, see Dreben
1990.
including
an

83. For
tion,

of his estate

13.
It was

1927-29.

These
studied
papers were
carefully
in the course of this seminar that Tarski

as the seed from which

For

15.
which

Russell

in the article

"On

of

the present

more

included

16.
James

field of model
theory developed.
to his dissertation
Sheffer disproves
appendix
to symmetrical
in his "L-system".
of asymmetrical
relations

"reduction"

Theorists,

seminar
for a mathe

In a substantial

14.
supposed

Warsaw
the need

recognized
to
central
definition, which were
rec
iswidely
of such concepts

such as truth and


concepts,
paper. Tarski's mathematization

theory of semantic
the methods
of Langford's

matical

ognized

in Tarski's

on Huntington
and the tradition
both him and Sheffer, see Scanlan
1991.
introduces
the term "neutral monism"

the Nature

of Acquaintance"
Russell was a lecturer

of American

Royce's
Postulate

to describe

the view

of

See especially
1914.
pp.
(Russell
at Harvard
in Spring
in Philosophy

129, 139) This was written while


at that time. James did not use
1914.
in Minnesota
the term
Sheffer was
teaching
in his published
views.
Hare
Chakrabarti
See
and
"neutral"
of
his
exposition
ontological
to other thinkers of the period,
for the similarity of
1980
James's ontic views
esp. pp.
236-237.
In Sheffer's

17.

writings
"logic"
of logic as a choice between
is not surprising,
since
This
in this period.

issue of foundations
18.
searcher

in logic
19.

is always
different
this was

singular.

He

logics.
the attitude

does

not

of almost

pose

the

every

re

to a system
at the prompting
of R.L. Moore,
later corrected,
of
and
of
"between"
(Vehlen,
pairs
point
"congruence"
points
1983.
and Scanlan,
See
also Tarski,
1999, p.202,
1911).
as confusing
and adopting
in rejecting "propositional
function"
20.
Langer
in her disser
form terminology
form" says that she used the propositional
"propositional

using

and

This

was

the two relations

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224

ration.
some
319).
there
been
Russell
'logical

Michael

"Since

Scanlan

arrived at the same practice


Sheffer has independently
, and
it in print"
p. 91 n., cf. also p.
1953,
recendy used
(Langer
of her dissertation
1926) may be mistaken.
Although
(Langer
I have
in the dissertation,
of "form"
the closest relevant comment

then Professor

of his disciples
have
recollection
Langer's
ismuch

discussion

to

able
has

is an expansion
of the notion which
'system-function'
I prefer the simpler expression
function.'
Personally,
'propositional
to refer to system 'functions'"
I shall often have occasion
(p.
although

find

is "[Sheffer's]

christened

pattern,'

28).
21.
1922,

He

compares

this to the "doctrinal

function"

of C.J. Keyser,

cf. Keyser

Lect.III.

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