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STEPHEN SAUER

DeepDive

E
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B
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WIN HONE
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e
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M se

iOS

vs.
Android
vs.
BlackBerry
vs.
Windows
Phone

Googles Android for

Work and Samsungs
Knox promise serious
security, but how do they
stack up against Apples
iOS and the rest?
BY GALEN GRUMAN

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Apples iPhone and iPad long ago pushed
out the BlackBerry as the corporate standard for
mobile devices, in all but the highest-security
environments. Google whose Android platform reigns outside the corporate world is
now trying to push out Apple, with a new effort
called Android for Work. And Samsung is upping
the game with a new version of its own Android
security suite, Knox.

addresses is the malware problem among

Android apps, both due to the high incidence
of malware residing in the Google Play Store
and to the common file system in Android
that lets malware infect apps via data files. For
example, the feds have said that industrial-class
spyware used in advanced persistent threats has
entered the Google Play market. With Android
for Work, IT admins can prevent users from
installing unapproved apps from the Play Store
in the business workspace to better protect the
What Android for Work does
corporate environment.
and doesnt do
By contrast, iOS uses rigid sandboxing to
That technology came to market last week,
keep apps from accessing other apps, and it
adding new security and management capabiliseverely restricts document sharing to block
ties, plus the ability to do corporate deployments
malware. BlackBerry and Windows Phone have
of Android apps from the Play Store.
small app libraries and a semiporous approach to
Android for Work containers which
sandboxing, so malware has not been an issue
run business apps in a separately managed
for them to date though there have been
workspace on your device are part of the
outbreaks of BlackBerry malware in the past.
Android 5 Lollipop OS and support any Google
Android for Work also does not make
Play store apps. But Android 3.0 Ice Cream
encryption the default on existing Android
Sandwich through 4.4 KitKat requires users to
devices (many models, especially the cheap ones,
install the Android for Work app, which can run
lack the horsepower to handle encryption).
only apps that have the Android for Work APIs
Google promised last October that new
implemented.
Android 5.0 Lollipop would enable encryption by
Either way, you need a compatible mobile
default on all new devices. (Upgraded devices
management server to handle the policies
encryption state is unchanged.) But theres no
applied to apps running in the container, such
requirement that the devices use a crypto chip,
as enforced VPN use or copy-and-paste restricso users could see major performance hits.
tions. Mobile management vendors supporting
InfoWorlds sister publication Greenbot found
Android for Work include BlackBerry, Citrix
that Googles own Nexus 6 slows to a crawl with
Systems, Google, IBM, MobileIron, SAP, Soti,
encryption on, for example.
and VMware AirWatch.
Of particular concern to IT, Google has quietly
What Android for Work only partially
backtracked on its promise that new
Lollipop devices would be encrypted
by default. In fact, several new
Lollipop devices are not.
By contrast, iOS devices have
been encrypted by default (with
s Samsung Knox 2.4 vs. Google Android for Work
no disable option) since 2010,
s How to rethink security for the new world of IT
and BlackBerry devices have
s Real data security for all is now getting its start on mobile
been encrypted for at least a
s Mobile and PC management: The tough but unstoppable union
decade both have the needed
s Mobile management: Making sense of your options
crypto chip to avoid performance
s Unchain your mobile users and just protect the data
hits. But Windows Phone 8.1
s Liquid computing: The next wave of the mobile experience
devices come with encryption
sConsumerization of IT: How IT should manage personal technology at work
disabled by default, and an admin
must enable it. (Windows 8.1 is the

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first version of Microsofts mobile platform to
support device encryption.)

Knox aims for corporate-issued

Android users

Apples
approach
is to handle
apps and
their contents
directly, which
means app
developers
must implement
the APIs for a
management
server to be able
to work with
them.

Announced two years ago, Samsungs Knox

has had a difficult rollout and now has Googles
Android for Work competing with it. But the
company has stuck to the product, quietly
unveiling the new Knox 2.4 version this month.
Knox works only with selected smartphones
and tablets from Samsung, because it integrates
directly with the hardware in a way similar to
how BlackBerry does for its own smartphones
and BES management server. Thus, Knox is a
realistic option only for companies that issue
compatible Samsung devices to employees.
For such companies, Knox 2.4 (which runs
only on Android Lollipop devices) provides Active
Directory password integration for its secure
workspace, bulk enrollment of devices over the
air, and the ability to track users business and
personal data usage.

Mobile device management has

essentially stabilized
Googles Android for Work move comes on the
heels of the efforts of Microsoft to improve the
security of Windows Phone, which historically
has had weak security and management capabilities. Windows Phone 8.1, released last fall,
finally gave the Microsoft smartphone platform a
reasonable level of basic capabilities, though well
behind what other mobile platforms provide.
BlackBerry devices have long offered mobile
device management (MDM) controls in the operating system and key bundled apps to manage
user permissions. iOS added such capabilities in
2010. Android followed a few years later, and
in fall 2014 Windows 8.1 was the last major
mobile OS to provide a strong set of devicemanagement APIs. (BlackBerry devices also
provide a secure network and chip-level antidevice spoofing, which competitors dont have and
are key reasons that high-security environments
rely on BlackBerry still.)
With the market for BlackBerry devices
fading fast, BlackBerry has focused on reshaping
its formerly BlackBerry-only BES tool into a

unified mobile management tool, BlackBerry

Enterprise Service (BES) 12, for managing iOS,
Android, and Windows Phone 8 devices
all widely supported by other MDM tools in
addition to its current BlackBerry 10 and legacy
BlackBerry 5 and 7 devices.
Also, iOS, Android, Windows Phone 8, and
BlackBerry 10 all support Microsoft Exchange
ActiveSync (EAS) policies, which provides basic
but common cross-platform management for
less-rigorous security environments that IT can
administer from an Exchange server, Office
365, Google at Work, Lotus Notes, or Microsoft
System Center, as well as from any MDM server.
Table 1 shows which policies are supported by
each major mobile platform.

Content and app management is

where mobile security is now focused
These days, the mobile management vendors
focus is on content and application security since
device management is all but settled. Apples
iOS 7 APIs were the first to address the issue at a
platform level, providing standard APIs for apps
to use to manage their content and usage.
Apple last made a big leap in mobile security
and management in 2013, when iOS 7 pushed
Apples management and security into new
areas, including application management and
licensing management. The recent iOS 8 has only
a few additions.
Apples approach is to handle apps and their
contents directly, which means app developers
must implement the APIs for a management
server to be able to work with them. Furthermore,
iOS allows only one instance of an app on a
device, so users cant install a personal copy free
of restrictions and a business copy managed by IT.
Apple didnt invent the API-managed apps
notion; in 2011 several startups offered mobile
application management technology that required
app developers to implement proprietary APIs
and proprietary management tools. They went
nowhere. Apples approach in iOS 7 makes the
technology available to all apps and all management servers, eliminating the lock-in barrier.
Since then, most vendors have taken the
containerization approach, which essentially
partitions IT-managed apps and the data they

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EXCHANGE ACTIVESYNC (EAS)

POLICY SUPPORT COMPARED
( M D M M E A N S A S E PA R AT E M O B I L E D E V I C E M A N A G E M E N T S E R V E R I S R E Q U I R E D )

Apple

Google

Samsung

BlackBerry Microsoft

Policy

IOS 7, 8

ANDROID 4, 5

ANDROID 5
+ KNOX

BLACKBERRY 10

WINDOWS
PHONE 8, 8.1

Allow device encryption

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Require device encryption

YES

YES [1]

MDM

YES

YES

Encrypt storage card

NA

YES

YES

YES

YES

Minimum password length

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Minimum number of complex

characters (password)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Password history

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Device wipe threshold

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Disable removable storage

MDM

NO

MDM

MDM

NO

Disable camera

YES

YES

YES

MDM

NO

Disable SMS text messaging

NO

NO

MDM

MDM

NO

Disable Wi-Fi

MDM

NO

MDM

MDM

YES [2]

Disable Bluetooth

MDM

NO

MDM

MDM

NO

Disable IrDA

NA

NO

NO

NO

NO

Require manual sync while

roaming

YES

NO

YES

MDM

NO

Allow Internet sharing from

device

MDM

NO

MDM

MDM

MDM

Allow desktop sharing from

device

MDM

NO

MDM

NO

NO

Disable email
attachment access

YES

MDM

YES

NO

YES

Disable POP3/IMAP4 email

MDM

NO

MDM

YES

NO

Allow consumer email

NO

NO

MDM

YES

NO

Allow browser

YES

MDM

MDM

NO

MDM

Configure message formats

NO

NO

MDM

NO

NO

Include past email items

(days)

YES

NO

MDM

YES

YES

Email body truncation size

(KB)

NO

NO

MDM

NO

YES [2]

HTML email body

truncation size (KB)

NO

NO

MDM

NO

YES [2]

Include past calendar items

(days)

YES

NO

MDM

YES

NO

Require signed S/MIME

messages

YES

NO

MDM

MDM

YES [2]

Require encrypted
S/MIME messages

YES

NO

MDM

MDM

YES [2]

Require signed S/MIME

algorithm

YES

NO

MDM

MDM

YES [2]

Require encrypted
S/MIME algorithm

YES

NO

MDM

MDM

YES [2]

Allow S/MIME encrypted

algorithm negotiation

YES

NO

MDM

MDM

YES [2]

Allow S/MIME soft certs

NO

NO

YES

MDM

YES [2]

(HTML or plain text)

[1] Storage areas only. [2] Windows Phone 8.1 only.

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APIs vary
widely across
the major
mobile OSes,
and each
requires a
management
tool.
Most MDM
tools support
multiple
mobile OSes,
providing a
single console
for IT admins.

work on, into a separate workspace not accessible by the users personal apps. Users have to
switch between the two workspaces, as if they
were using two devices.
For years, several providers such as Divide have
offered such containers for iOS and Android, but
they required that the apps running in them be
tied to their proprietary APIs, which in turn were
tied to a specific vendors mobile management
server. Thus, theyve gained little adoption.
In 2013, Samsung announced a container
technology called Knox that was available
for a handful of its Galaxy smartphones and
supported by few mobile management servers,
so it too has gained very little adoption. But the
company is renewing its Knox effort with the 2.4
version released on April 10, 2015.
Also in 2013, BlackBerry introduced BlackBerry Balance, the first platform-level containerization approach, for BlackBerry 10 devices. It
also has a Balance container app, called Secure
Work Space, for iOS and Android.
Last spring, Google purchased containerization vendor Divide and later said it would make
containerization part of Android now the
Android for Work technology that became available last week.
Container policies differ widely from
container to container, which can make management difficult. However, now that popular
mobile management servers support both iOSs
APIs and Androids containers, IT admins should
be able to create consistent policies that are
largely compatible across the two platforms
much as they can when using the extended
device management APIs in iOS and Android.
Note that BlackBerrys BES12 supports some
of the iOS 7 app-management APIs, few than
those from, for example, Citrix, MobileIron, and
VMware AirWatch. Among the iOS 7 app policies supported by BES12 are per-app VPN, singleapp mode, single sign-on, and Apple Volume
Purchase Plan (its corporate app store).
BES12 supports some app-management APIs
for BlackBerry devices, but the policies available
vary widely based on the type of app managed:
Java, recompiled or Fire OS-compatible Android,
BlackBerry 5- or 7-native, or BlackBerry
10-native. Frankly, its a mess.

Native security and management

API capabilities compared
As noted previously, the platform APIs vary
widely across the major mobile OSes, and each
requires a management tool. Most MDM tools
support multiple mobile OSes, providing a single
console for IT admins.
Some also offer client apps basically, a
proprietary container with proprietary business
and communications apps that add capabilities
not found in the native APIs. Table 2 shows some
of the more commonly requested management
features typically implemented through APIs.
iOS API tour. Apple, for example, has
several dozen APIs for device management that
use remotely installed configuration profiles not
only to configure various iOS settings (such as
preconfiguring VPN or allowed access points)
but also to manage app behavior (such as disallowing the forwarding of corporate messages via
personal accounts in Mail). App-related policies
include the ability to prevent app removal, lock
a user to a specific app (such as for kiosk or
retail usage), and prevent paid apps from being
purchased. All are part of what iOS calls a supervised environment, in which the iPhone or iPad is
treated as an appliance.
iOSs APIs for application management
include managed Open In, per-app VPNs,
managed copy and paste across apps, and single
sign-on, as well as true license management and
profile-based app installation. iOS 8 also has APIs
to disable the new Handoff capability, iCloud sync
for managed apps, backup of enterprise books,
and annotation to enterprise books. Supervised
devices also get the ability to disable erasure of
all content and settings, restriction configuration,
and presentation of Web results in a Spotlight
search. iOS 8 supports per-message S/MIME and
both IKEv2 and always-on VPNs, as well.
Android API tour. Although Google
hasnt published details of its Android at Work
APIs on its Android developer or IT admin sites,
Alexander Romero, an Android engineer at
MobileIron, walked me through them.
To address the Android malware problem,
Android at Work can let IT restrict the provisioning of apps in the business workspace to
only those approved by IT. That means users

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cant install apps themselves in the secured
workspace if IT enables this policy. IT can also
install, update, and remove apps in the business
workspace without user involvement.
There are policies to disable copy and paste
from the business workspace into the personal
one (but not vice versa) and to prevent screenshots being taken in the business workspace. IT
can also determine which IT-managed apps use a
VPN for access, as well as retract personal apps
communication from the corporate VPN.

Google also says the Google Play app store

can now provision apps to Android devices
through volume business licenses, similar to
Apples volume licensing approach introduced in
iOS 7. Called Google Play for Work, the revised
app store supports free apps already and will
soon support paid apps.
Samsung had its own set of device APIs
for Android 4 called SAFE APIs, which allow IT
admins to disable cameras, Bluetooth, tethering,
voice recording, SD cards, and Wi-Fi. You have to

OTHER NATIVE MANAGEMENT

CAPABILITIES COMPARED

( T Y P I C A L LY R E Q U I R E S A M O B I L E D E V I C E M A N A G E M E N T S E R V E R T O U S E )

Apple

Google

Samsung

BlackBerry Microsoft

Capability

IOS 7, 8

ANDROID 4, 5

ANDROID 5
+ KNOX 2.4

BLACKBERRY 10
BES12

WINDOWS
PHONE 8, 8.1

Encryption

AES 256, user has no

disable option

AES 128, user has

disable option,
only some models
support encryption

AES 256, user has

disable option,
only Knox devices
support encryption

AES 256, user has

disable option in
personal workspace

AES 256, user has no

disable option

FIPS 140-2 certification

YES
(LEVEL 1)

NO

SOME MODELS
(LEVEL 1)

YES
(LEVEL 2)

YES
(LEVEL 1)

Over-the-air data encryption

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

S/MIME

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES [2]

VPN

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES [2]

Configure VPN

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES [2]

Per-app VPN

YES

YES [3]

YES

YES

YES [2]

Restrict/block app stores

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

Business licensing and provisioning

YES

YES [3]

YES [3]

YES

NO

Restrict/block wireless LANs

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES [2]

Configure allowable access

points

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES [2]

Signed apps required

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES

Selective wipe of business

apps and data only

YES

YES [3]

YES

YES

YES [2]

Remotely update business

apps

YES

YES [3]

YES

YES

YES

Secure boot

YES

YES [1]

YES

YES

YES

Active Directory container

signin

NA

NO

YES [3]

NO

NO

App sandboxing

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Disable copy and paste

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES [2]

Disable iCloud/Microsoft
Account/Google Account
sync and storage

YES

NO

YES

YES

YES [2]

[1] Added by some smartphone makers. [2] In Windows Phone 8.1 only (and VPN support is partial). [3] In secured container only.

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Its a no-brainer
that iOS and
BlackBerry OS
have what it
takes for almost
any businesss
security needs.

use a SAFE-compatible device and management

server to use those extra policies. The SAFE APIs
have been replaced with the similar Knox APIs in
Android 5.
Windows Phone API tour. In Windows
Phone 8, Microsoft supports the ability to revoke
applications, restrict email forwarding, remotely
enroll or unenroll devices, and remotely update
business-provisioned apps.
One capability in Windows Phone 8 not
available to other mobile OSes is its integration
with Active Directory. This means that compatible MDM tools can access the Active Directory
groups, then assign policies to those groups
rather than maintain a separate set of groups in
the MDM tool from the set in Active Directory.
The feature reduces the risk of employees not
being in the correct groups for the policies that
should apply or falling through the cracks when
terminated in, say, Active Directory but not in the
MDM tools user database.
Microsoft uses a central manager in
Windows Phone 8 called DM Client that contains
all the relevant user and corporate profiles (like
the Windows Registry, in effect), rather than
rely on a set of separate installed configuration
profiles (like the OS X System Folder, in effect).

How to think about mobile device

management
No matter what platforms you support, there are
three bands of management requirements for IT
to think about, advises Ojas Rege, vice president
of strategy at MobileIron.
The first set of requirements is around
configuration and protection of lost or compromised devices. That typically requires password
enforcement, encryption enforcement, remote
lock and wipe, remote email configuration,
certificates for identity, remote connectivity
configuration (such as for Wi-Fi and VPNs,
though Rege says this configuration capability is
not essential if usage is only for email and over
cellular networks), and detection of compromised OSes (whether jailbroken, rooted, or
malware-infected).
The second set of requirements is around
data loss prevention (DLP), which covers privacy

controls (such as for user location), cloud-usage

controls (such as for iCloud, OneDrive, and
Google Docs), and email DLP controls (such as
the ability to restrict email forwarding and to
protect attachments). More regulated environments may require No. 2, and these policies
are still TBD for Windows Phone, Rege notes.
By contrast, iOS, BlackBerry, and Android have
supported most of these needs since (respectively) iOS 4, BES 5, and Android 3, though a few
for example, managing email forwards are
handled outside the OS by MDM client apps
such as MobileIrons.
The third set of requirements is around apps,
such as their provisioning and data security. Both
Apple and Microsoft have mechanisms to do at
least basic app management iOS can essentially hide an app so that its no longer available
to a user, and Windows Phone 8 can update
corporate apps remotely and both Google
and Samsung now offer this capability within
their secured containers.
But mobile application management (MAM)
capabilities are mostly still up to the mobile
management vendors to deploy and can vary
widely across MDM tools, Rege says.
All four platforms provide mechanisms for
businesses to deploy their own apps directly to
users, so they can deploy and manage corporate apps separately from those that users get
from the app store. (Apple, Google, and now
Samsung have volume licensing and distribution
mechanisms in place.) Mobile management tools
can connect these mechanisms to group policies
and content-management controls.
Its a no-brainer that iOS and BlackBerry OS
have what it takes for almost any businesss
security needs. Android, especially with Android
for Work or Knox 2.4 in use, is a plausible platform and they reduce the malware potential
at least in the secured container part of the
device. And Windows Phone, which has long
held down the rear, is becoming more appropriate for midlevel security requirements.
Galen Gruman is an executive editor at
InfoWorld and its columnist on mobile and
consumerization of IT.

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One day, youll manage all

client devices from a central
policy console, but it wont
be a fast or easy journey

STEPHEN SAUER

BY GALEN GRUMAN

Mobile and
PC management:
The tough but
unstoppable union

You know that a trend has peaked when the

establishment jumps on board. Thats happening in
the world of mobile management, pioneered years
ago by niche companies such as Good Technology
and Zenprise and startups like MobileIron and
AirWatch. Now, establishment companies such as
CA Technologies, Citrix Systems (which bought
Zenprise), Dell, EMC VMware (which bought
AirWatch), IBM, and Microsoft are aggressively
pushing their mobile management tools.
Just as the establishment is getting into mobile
management (aka MDM), the field itself is poised
for a shift away from mobile only. Tablets, both
the category-defining iPad and the deconstructed
laptops promoted by Microsoft and other
Windows device makers, are both like smartphones
and like laptops. For some people, they replace
laptops; for others, they supplement them. In any
event, the lines between computers and mobile
devices are blurring.
Even where there are clear divisions, users are
working with multiple devices. Suddenly, any separation on the management side gets hard to keep
separate in reality password, access, and other
policies overlap hugely, no matter if the tools dont.

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10

Deep Dive

Thats why
MDM is
shifting away
from mobile
to encompass
anything and
everything
a user might
access: smartphones, tablets,
computers,
even cloud
desktop
services.

Thats why MDM is shifting away from

mobile to encompass anything and everything
a user might access: smartphones, tablets,
computers, computers, even cloud desktop
services. Some are personally owned, some
are work-owned, most are mixed-use in practice. They cover a range of operating systems:
multiple versions of Windows, OS X, iOS, and
Android for sure, perhaps Linux, Windows
Phone, Chrome OS, and BlackBerry OS as well.
But getting to that state of universal
client management is not easy. Fundamental
technology differences exist on these clients,
affecting what can be secured and managed
and how it can be secured and managed. Still,
vendors are moving in that direction because,
they say, large businesses have decided that in
the not-too-distant future they would like to end
the separate PC and mobile silos and manage
devices collectively.

When it comes to management,

Windows is not like the others
What would it take for a tool to truly be unified?
The reality is that Windows is managed using
very different technologies and assumptions than
the other popular operating systems are. The
reasons are historical and deep: In the carrier
context for mobile, you couldnt worry about
the OS the carriers did it. But in Windows,
you always had the control over it, recalls Neal
Foster, executive director of product marketing
for mobile management at Dell.
Outside of Windows and BlackBerrys traditional BES, the typical approach is to deliver a
payload to a device containing policies. From
there, the device implements those policies
through its standard APIs. Its an approach that
CAs Varadarajan calls simplex: You push out
the policy package and it gets implemented
whenever the device receives and digests the
payload. When the device later tries to access
your servers, a policy check is done to see if the
correct policies are in place.
This payload approach is great for mobile
devices because you can issue them whether
or not you have a connection in fact, you
can issue them when you dont have a connection, so you dont have to provide a safe space

first to even deliver the policies. But you have

no constant monitoring such as for compliance
auditing; you only know when a device tries to
connect what policies it reports are installed.
Apple and others have made such payloads
undeletable by users, but it lacks the constant
assurance that some industries seek.
Windows assumes a very different world, one
where computers are inside a trusted firewall,
dont leave the trusted network, and in fact are
treated as an attached node, not an occasional
guest. Thats the fundamental notion behind the
domain join managed through Active Directory and System Center. Of course, over time
as laptops became popular, Windows management had to adapt to handle access over outside
networks, typically using VPNs to extend the
trusted network through the Internet.
The domain-join approach allows for more
active engagement between the client and the
server, as well as for more constant auditing. But
it does poorly in the in-and-out world of mobile
devices, which explains why even Microsoft hasnt
used the domain-join approach in Windows
Phone and Windows RT. The domain join for
PCs implied a context for environment, says
Dells Foster, but more and more, PCs are not
connected via a domain, so that context is gone.
Its telling that Microsoft doesnt use domain
joining in its mobile-oriented mobile management tool, Intune. Instead, it uses a client app
on the PC that basically consumes the payloads,
then configures Windows accordingly and acts
as a safe space, similar to the sandboxes used
natively in iOS and OS X and via third-party software in Android.
Over time, the payload approach may
become the standard approach, even in
Windows. Microsofts Windows OS team
declined to speak to InfoWorld about its views
on management, and the server group didnt
want to speak for the OS group. But with
Windows 8.1, its possible to manage a PC like a
mobile device, such as by laying down an agent
to do System Center stuff or use a management
API. Windows RT does that, too, says Andrew
Conway, director of product marketing at Microsoft for Windows Server and System Center. Yet
Windows Phone 8.1 does support domain joins,

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so Microsoft may also be trying to keep both
approaches available as the market continues to
experiment.

The path to unified management

Certainly, the MDM pioneers see the shift to
unified management coming, and several have
expanded their mobile offerings to include Macs,
since Apple has unified many of the APIs across
iOS and OS X to simplify the process. Many
partner with other providers to offer not a truly
integrated suite to cover PCs and mobile, but a
twinned product set that allows some sharing or
coordination of policies.

Most companies dont manage desktop

and mobile from the same team.
RAM VARADARAJAN, GENERAL MANAGER AT CA

But its the establishment providers who are

most active in trying to reconcile the desktop
and mobile worlds into a common management
environment, covering everything from asset
tracking to security policy enforcement, for a
simple reason. These establishment providers
typically have Windows-oriented tools, covering
the vast majority of client devices in the workplace and providing a starting point most
familiar to IT: Windows PCs. (Microsoft says that
70 percent of enterprises today use its System
Center for that purpose.)
Their offerings run the gamut from pairing
two separate tools with some commonalities,
such as policy sharing or common admin console,
to a single tool that handles client differences
behind the scenes. Most organizations still
have separate teams managing PCs and mobile
devices, and the single-tool approach works only
when an enterprise ends that separation.
Most companies dont manage desktop and
mobile from the same team. Desktop management has been around a long time, and PC
management is considered a normal activity,
whereas mobile is considered something new
and done by a separate team, notes Ram
Varadarajan, general manager at CA. Were not

seeing a propensity to go to one management

system in one shot, but as a phased evolution,
says Dells Foster.
That poses a chicken-and-egg dilemma for
providers. Right now, mobile devices are managed
by a different team than PCs are. Mobile devices
quickly fell into the domain of Exchange admins
as the early mobile use cases were around email,
and Apple adopted Microsofts Exchange ActiveSync protocol as its default management technology, which Google then did for Android.
Thus, IT organizations typically seek two
tools even as they talk about eventual unification. Were seeing a trend toward more unified
management, notes Microsofts Conway. Most
corporations dont want this island of mobile any
more; they want to treat it all as one, says CAs
Varadarajan.
But until they unify the IT teams, a unified
tool doesnt make a lot of sense. The answer, of
course, is for IT to centralize the management
team first, bringing whatever tools are in place
to that unified team. From there, IT can consider
replacing those tools with a unified management
tool as vendors begin to provide them.
CA, Dell, and Microsoft are good examples of
how management providers are trying to move
to a unified management approach. Chances are
that the providers youre talking to or working
with fall within the continuum they represent.
CA is looking to provide a single console
for all management, notes Varadarajan. The
platform differences get hidden behind the
scenes, and the easiest places to unify are where
platforms share policies even if their execution differs. We do see already a common
management tool for OS X and Windows. iOS
and Android are not that different, he says,
suggesting that the unification challenge is easier
than you may assume because theres already
some convergence across platforms on key attributes. Sure, the measures and implementations
we use might be different. For example, we have
different agents on Windows, OS X, and mobile,
but they do largely the same things.
In other words, providers will need to fork
their tools internally. Forking is a skill that is
underrated, but it has to be embraced for higher
goal of uniformity, Varadarajan says. As an

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Hoping to
impose a
common set of
devices, applications, and
services is a
pipe dream.
But that doesnt
mean IT
shouldnt seek
unity.

example, OS X and iOS use many of same APIs

but different semantics. I expect the same thing
in Android PCs over time, and I can see the
possibility in Windows given Windows Phones
big differences with PC Windows.
Of course, some policies simply dont apply
to some devices, but a unified tool would know
that and would ignore irrelevant policies while
flagging policies that are relevant but cant be
deployed to a specific device. A crude example
of that is Apples OS X Server, whose management console arranges its policies in three
groups: iOS, OS X, and iOS and OS X. Enterpriseclass tools will treat these differences more
elegantly, but they will exist.
Varadarajan also notes that the client isnt
the only part of the equation. You have servers
and network appliances, and they can do a lot of
the work when devices connect, such as monitoring traffic, validating access, and enforcing
policies on the server side directly. Back-end
management is key to unified device management, because all the devices work through that
back end, which is the gateway to the company
information and services.
Microsoft is taking two paths: extending
its traditional System Center to the new, more
intermittent world and delivering a payloadoriented tool via Intune. But its not an either/or
proposition. Intune can be used to manage PCs,
not just mobile devices, via a client app, though
its primary use case is for mobile devices, notes
Microsofts Conway. The PC-focused System
Center can be used in concert with Intune
on mobile devices, so System Center handles
the asset management and configuration and
Intune handles the deployment of security and
device policies.
Windows 8.1 starts Microsofts PC OS down
the path that Apple began with OS X Lion: using
APIs for mobile-style payload-based management.
Dells approach is the most traditional: It has
a basket of specific tools for various management needs, some for mobile, some for PCs,
some for both. Customers pick the tools they
need, whether or not their teams are unified,
and Dell offers consulting services to integrate
the tools for the customers specific needs.
Were finding that customers are all very

different, so theres a lot of custom work, la

professional services, says Dells Foster.

Unified management does not mean

managing a unified technology stack
The computing world is one of heterogeneity, a
mix of device types, operating systems, applications, and services. The notion that everyone
uses a standard PC with a standard OS image
and application set is quaint and on its way
out. You have to embrace heterogeneity. If you
are angry with heterogeneity, you are doomed,
says CAs Varadarajan.
Cloud storage is a great example of that
notion, says Dells Foster, citing Office 365,
Google Drive, and Apple iWork. But no one
does it all well, so users tend to mix and match.
That same mixing and matching applies to
applications, devices, and other services because
no single platform does everything well. Thats
going to be a true for a long time, especially
because technology has gotten so personal that
there is rarely one best set of tools even for
people doing similar jobs.
Hoping to impose a common set of devices,
applications, and services is a pipe dream. But
that doesnt mean IT shouldnt seek unity. IT
just needs to look elsewhere. Common policies are one place to look. But there are others.
The greatest thing that has been adopted are
single-sign-on models like OAuth and SAML. So
the way you get control is not by proxying but
managing the access in the first place, Foster
says. You pair that higher-level standardization
with what Foster calls endpoint posture
ensuring that permitted devices meet your standards on issues such as passwords, encryption,
data isolation, and identity validation then
you put both in a common policy framework on
permitted access based on role and other factors.
Ironically, the path to unified management
goes through an embrace of diversity and
heterogeneity. There are enough commonalities
to create a management fabric. But both the
vendors and IT need to approach it that way.
Galen Gruman is an executive editor at
InfoWorld and its columnist on mobile and
consumerization of IT.

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r
u
o
y
n
i
a
s
h
r
c
e
Un bile us tect
o
r
o
p
m just
and data
the
IT and the
security industry
are both focused
on dubious
protection plans.
This proposed
standard shows a
better way
BY GALEN GRUMAN

PC sales continue to decline, mobile

sales continue to climb, people work at
home, and the notion of strict work/life
separation for equipment is on its way
out for many information workers.
Yet most IT organizations and
security vendors insist on applying
legacy thinking for information security
that simply cannot work in the modern world of
heterogeneous, anywhere, and mixed personal/
business computing. They keep trying to build
mobile prisons, extending perimeter defenses
across the digital world or creating satellite
fortresses on every device. No one willingly
enters a prison, and the gulag and straitjacket
approaches favored by IT and security vendors
simply will be bypassed by business users,
whove been doing so for years on the desktop.
Its time to stop the madness and protect
what really matters: the information that moves
among all the devices. To do so, the industry
needs to stop trying to turn smartphones into
fortresses that people cant use and forcing the
use of proprietary app containers that cant scale

a heterogeneous, interconnected digital

environment or that provide read-only
access (whats the point, then, of having the
file?). Instead, its time we focus on protection
at the information level, essentially using the
notion of digital rights management (DRM) that
travels with the data itself. The only way to make
that work is through an industry standard.
There are two great models for how this can
work. One is Microsofts Exchange ActiveSync
(EAS) protocol, which provides a de facto standard for basic device security that ensures good
security hygiene such as forced device encryption
and enforced password use. This single protocol,
if broadly adopted, gets rid of most of ITs oftenstated what if the user loses the device? fear.
The other is the Wi-Fi Alliance, the group
ensuring interoperability of the 802.11 devices
that in the beginning could not talk to each
other though they were based on the same IEEE
standard. The alliance is now trying to create
the same assurance of interoperability for video
streaming via its Miracast standard. By having an
interoperable information-level security standard,

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Authoring and
editing tools
should be able
to assign both
usage rights
and two of the
access rights:
the password
requirement and the
encryption
requirement.

IT would be assured that critical information

remains protected no matter what apps are
accessing it and no matter on what devices.
Today, we have a muddle of competing
proprietary standards from more than a dozen
companies. Their containers typically work only
with IT-developed apps that use their specific
API and management tool, and sometimes
with commercial apps that adopt that proprietary technology. That proprietary nature puts
everyone at risk: IT and developers are wed
to a single company in a frothy market where
vendors come and go. Users are severely limited
in the apps and devices they can use most
of these systems, for example, dont work on
Windows or OS X, even though PCs remain
the biggest source by far of data loss, whereas
mobile is a minor factor.
Some in the security industry understand
that todays mobile device management (MDM)
and mobile application management (MAM)
tools cant both protect information and support
realistic work scenarios. MobileIron, for example,
has floated the idea of an industry standards
group to define an information-level security
standard. Its a good suggestion, but it should
not be limited to mobile and it needs to work
like the Wi-Fi Alliance in that it doesnt become
a lip-service standards group vendors use to
delay interoperability in hopes their proprietary
platform might win in the meantime.
Any such standard also needs to avoid scope
creep. Theres a place for MDM (the equivalent
of having locks on your doors and an alarm
system, a first level of defense), but it should
not get commingled with an information-level
security standard. Theres also a place for MAM,
for organizations that need to essentially convert
commercially available computing platforms
into appliances, such as retailers or public safety
organizations. But it too should not get commingled with an information-level security standard.
We dont need a theory of everything; in fact, it
would assure that nothing ever happens.

What the InfoTrust standard should do

Instead, the information-level security standard lets call it InfoTrust needs to do the
following:

Provide basic usage rights. Usage rights

need to be embedded in documents, so they
move with the document. Adobe Acrobat is an
example of a file format that support this notion,
and all popular file formats and productivity
apps Microsoft Office, LibreOffice, OpenOffice, Apple iWork, Google Docs/Drive/Apps, and
so on need to offer similar usage rights that
transport from one app to another. The rights
should include:
sRestrictions on previewing content
(such as in OS Xs, iOSs, and Windows
document-preview capabilities)
sRestrictions on changing content
sRestrictions on copying content
sRestrictions on changing and/or
assigning usage rights and access rights
Enforce basic access rights. It shouldnt
be an endpoint devices or apps responsibility to
control access to content, the approach used by
many MDM and MAM products today. Instead,
the documents should carry the access requirements with them, so the apps can validate
access. The requirements should include:
sPassword access (as Acrobat and Office
today support)
sPolicy access (such as requiring it be in
an encrypted environment or be open
able only by people in a specific Active
Directory group)
Allow local policy management.
Authoring and editing tools should be able to
assign both usage rights and two of the access
rights: the password requirement and the
encryption requirement. That way, small businesses such as law offices can protect their documents directly, and trusted employees can share
documents with others outside the corporate
environment (freelancers, contractors, business
partners, governments, and so on).
Apply to all platforms, not just mobile.
Another key principle is that InfoTrust is not a
mobile information security standard. Its for all
devices: smartphones, tablets, computers, cloud
services, and platform technologies yet to be
invented. Again, its not about the device, but
the information, which flows across all sorts of
devices and apps. The device, app, and service are
irrelevant, unless they dont support the standard.

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Identity
management needs
to be done at
the source.
That means
InfoTrust needs
APIs to communicate with
existing enterprise identity
management
tools.

Operating systems, applications, and cloud

services will need to support InfoTrust to act
on the embedded policies in the documents,
just as they need to support EAS today to apply
password and encryption policies. But as a
lingua franca that enables full participation in
the emerging world of anywhere computing, the
key vendors have every reason to participate and
not end up being excluded. The tech industry
has plenty of examples of what happens when
companies delay joining such essential bandwagons just ask what used to be Novell or
IBMs former Lotus group.
Not manage more than is necessary.
Note whats not included: controls over sharing,
an encryption option, controls over allowed
applications, access management, and identity
management. Sharing controls are not needed
because the documents carry their own permissions; if they are shared (lost, stolen, emailed,
copied to a thumb drive, whatever), the
receiving party has to satisfy the access requirements to gain access. Its the same notion as
trusting that encrypted documents are safe in
todays privacy-breach regulations. Speaking of
encryption, that means the documents are automatically encrypted, unless they have no access
rights applied.
Theres also no need to worry about what
app or service that users have on whatever
device or computer theyre working with. If
the app doesnt support the access and policy
requirements, the document cant be opened
in that app end of problem. The goal, as my
colleague Terry Retter likes to characterize it, is
the ability to be secure even when operating in
the middle of Times Square.
If a business has other reasons to enforce
the use of specific apps (such as for compliance
logging or to monitor and control distribution of
supersensitive documents), it should use a MAMstyle tool to restrict users to that tool for those
specific documents that need the extra compliance. But there is no reason to burden everyone
for such a subset of use cases.
Todays MAM and MDM tools are essentially
network-based, requiring a device or app to
check in with a central server to validate and
even enforce its permissions and policies. Thats

not scalable for information management you

cant require a server call every time a document
is opened or is acted upon when in use. Yes,
sessions can preserve the policies when offline,
but thats cumbersome and is of no help when
youre offline before you open the document.
Network-based validation needs to be required
for only the most critical documents.
Instead, access management has to be
done at the source, so enterprises need to use
tools like SharePoint or any of the many other
information repository systems to control who
gets access in the first place. That doesnt mean
repository systems need to be the distribution
points, of course the repository simply needs
to add the permissions to the documents based
on whatever policies IT wants to set using the
policy management tools of their choice. That
way, if a document is emailed, its policy goes
with it. Thats much more secure than todays
situation, where if anyone gets a document out
of the managed repository, its now free and
clear of all policy attributes.
Dozens of vendors who do such policy-based
management tools could adopt InfoTrust. They
could also extend its capabilities in the same way
that Apples iOS and OS X use Microsoft EAS
as the basic lingua franca for policy control but
added APIs for more controls that third-party
management tools could choose to enforce. That
gives everyone a sufficient set of information
management capabilities for the vast majority
of their needs and lets vendors layer additional
controls for the truly special ones. That model
works well for EAS across iOS, OS X, Android,
BlackBerry 10, and Windows Phone.
Likewise, identity management needs to be
done at the source. That means InfoTrust needs
APIs to communicate with existing enterprise
identity management tools, such as Active
Directory, to validate user permissions (and even
existence) on documents for which password
security alone is insufficient. Likely, the operating system will need to provide the local
service that the app communicates with, and
the OS will handle the server communications
similar to how EAS is implemented today.
The use of documents with server-based identity
protection will require an Internet connection to

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validate against the identity management server,
but theres no way around that reality.

A plea to the tech industry: Make

InfoTrust a reality

SHUTTERSTOCK / STEPHEN SAUER

I strongly encourage Microsoft, Apple, and

Google the three platform and app vendors
through which so much business data is acted
on to get together to develop the InfoTrust
standard. Leading, progressive mobile and
desktop security vendors such as MobileIron,
Good Technology, AirWatch, Centrify, AppCentral, and Apperian should be key players.
Perhaps one or two should even chair the effort
due to their more neutral relationships with the

platform vendors.
Traditional, backward-thinking vendors (such
as those in the antivirus industry) should be
kept at arms length, at least in the initial stages.
Theyve shown repeatedly that they cant get out
of the broken defensive-perimeter trap.
IT keeps saying its security concerns are
about protecting information. So, tech vendors,
stop focusing on straitjacketing devices and
apps and instead protect that valuable information wherever it is.
Galen Gruman is an executive editor at
InfoWorld and its columnist on mobile and
consumerization of IT.

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