E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co., Ltd. vs.

Benito,
G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City and with branch offices at
Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of
Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at
Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for theconstruction of low cost housing units.
They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the
proper courts of Makati. private respondent, asplaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and
Damagesagainst petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with its
contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial
developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its
Branch Manager at the stated address at Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return ofService stated that the
summons was duly served "upon defendantE.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. at
their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the
original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper
service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its
branch office atCagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon
whom service of summons may be made. plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss.plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying
defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. defendant, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary,
restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific
and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate secretary",
and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner upon service of
summons on its Branch Manager
HELD: No. the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive"
following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of
Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by
clear and concise language. under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no
longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for
a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors"
is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
BF Corporation v. CA,
G.R. No. 120105 March 27, 1998
FACTS:Petitioner and respondent Shangri-la Properties, Inc. entered into an agreement whereby the latter engaged the former to construct
the main structure of the "EDSA Plaza Project," a shopping mall complex in Mandaluyong. Petitioner incurred delay in the construction work that
SPI considered as "serious and substantial."On the other hand, according to petitioner, the construction works "progressed in faithful compliance
with the First Agreement until a fire broke out damaging Phase I" of the Project.Hence, SPI proposed the re-negotiation of the
agreement between them. Petitioner and SPI entered into a written agreement denominated as "Agreement for the Execution of Builder's
Work for the EDSA Plaza Project." Said agreement would cover the construction work on said project as of May 1, 1991 until its eventual
completion. According toSPI, petitioner "failed to complete the construction works and abandoned the project." This resulted in disagreements
between the parties as regards their respective liabilities under thecontract. Petitioner filed with the RTC of Pasig a complaint for collection of
the balance due under the construction agreement. SPI and its co-defendants filed a motion to suspend proceedings instead of filing an
answer. The motion was anchored on defendants' allegation that the formal trade contract for the construction of the project
provided for a clause requiring prior resort to arbitration before judicial intervention could be invoked in any dispute arising from the
contract. Petitioner opposed said motion claiming that there was no formal contract between the parties although they entered into an
agreement defining their rights and obligations in undertaking theproject.Thereafter, upon a finding that an arbitration clause indeed exists,
the lower courtdenied the motion to suspend proceedings as the Conditions of Contract was not duly executed or signed by the parties, and
the failure of the defendants to submit any signed copy of the said document,. The lower court then ruled that, assuming that the arbitration
clause was valid and binding, still, it was "too late in the day for defendants to invoke arbitration. Considering the fact that under the supposed
Arbitration Clause invoked by defendants, it is required that "Notice of the demand for arbitration of a dispute shall be filed in writing with the
other party . . . . in no case . . . . later than the time of final payment . . . "which apparently, had elapsed because defendants have failed to file
any written notice of any demand for arbitration during the said long period of one year and eight months. The CA annulled the orders of the
RTC.
ISSUE:WON a petition for certiorari is proper
HELD:Yes. The rule that the special civil action of certiorari may not be invoked as a substitute for the remedy of appeal. The Court has
likewise ruled that "certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. As long as a court
acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari . The question of jurisdiction,
which is a question of law depends on the determination of the existence of the arbitration clause, which is a question of fact. In the instant
case, the lower court found that there exists an arbitration clause. However, it ruled that in contemplation of law, said arbitration clause does
not exist. It is that mode of appeal taken by private respondents before the CA that is being questioned by the petitioners before this Court. But
at the heart of said issue is the question of whether there exists an Arbitration Clause because if an Arbitration Clause does not exist, then

private respondents took the wrong mode of appeal before the CA.For this Court to be able to resolve the question of whether private
respondents took the proper mode of appeal, which, incidentally, is a question of law, then it has to answer the core issue of whether there
exists an Arbitration Clause which, admittedly, is a question of fact. Moreover, where a rigid application of the rule thatcertiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court
which are technical rules may be relaxed. As we shall show hereunder, had the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari the issue of
whether or not an arbitration clause exists in the contract would not have been resolved in accordance with evidence extant in the record of the
case. Consequently, this would have resulted in a judicial rejection of a contractual provision agreed by the parties to the contract. In the same
vein, this Court holds that the question of the existence of the arbitration clause in the contract between petitioner and private respondents is a
legal issue that must be determined in this petition for review oncertiorari
DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SUNSHINE SAUCE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
G.R. No. L-78325 January 25, 1990
FACTS:Del Monte Corporation is an American corporation which is not engaged in business in the Philippines.
Though not engaging business here, it has given authority to Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) the right
to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the
Del Monte trademark and logo. In 1965, Del Monte also authorized PPC to register with the Patent Office the Del
Monte catsup bottle configuration. Philpack was issued a certificate of trademark registration under the
Supplemental Register.Later, Del Monte and Philpack learned that Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing was using Del
Monte bottles in selling its products and that Sunshine Sauces logo is similar to that of Del Monte. The RTC of
Makati as well as the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no infringement because the trademarks used
between the two are different in designs and that the use of Del Monte bottles by Sunshine Sauce does not
constitute unfair competition because as ruled in Shell Company vs Insular Petroleum: selling oil in containers
of another with markings erased, without intent to deceive, was not unfair competition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is unfair competition and infringement in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court recognizes that there really are distinctions between the designs of the logos or
trademarks of Del Monte and Sunshine Sauce. However, it has been that side by side comparison is not the final
test of similarity. Sunshine Sauces logo is a colorable imitation of Del Montes trademark. The word catsup in
both bottles is printed in white and the style of the print/letter is the same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not
a tomato, the figure nevertheless approximates that of a tomato. The person who infringes a trade mark does
not normally copy out but only makes colorable changes, employing enough points of similarity to confuse the
public with enough points of differences to confuse the courts. What is undeniable is the fact that when a
manufacturer prepares to package his product, he has before him a boundless choice of words, phrases, colors
and symbols sufficient to distinguish his product from the others. When as in this case, Sunshine chose, without
a reasonable explanation, to use the same colors and letters as those used by Del Monte though the field of its
selection was so broad, the inevitable conclusion is that it was done deliberately to deceive.The Supreme Court
also ruled that Del Monte does not have the exclusive right to use Del Monte bottles in the Philippines because
Philpacks patent was only registered under the Supplemental Register and not with the Principal Register. Under
the law, registration under the Supplemental Register is not a basis for a case of infringement because unlike
registration under the Principal Register, it does not grant exclusive use of the patent. However, the bottles of
Del Monte do say in embossed letters: Del Monte Corporation, Not to be Refilled. And yet Sunshine Sauce
refilled these bottles with its catsup products. This clearly shows the Sunshine Sauces bad faith and its intention
to capitalize on the Del Montes reputation and goodwill and pass off its own product as that of Del Monte.
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS INC. vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES
G.R. No. 137378 October 12, 2000
FACTS: On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship
arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated ("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli
Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and
distributorship in the United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB
value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with
the contract.On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and
recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to
discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWI's persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the
Central District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI. On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice
of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a
complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment", before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the
case, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The
lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed
foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI
to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation, amounted to an unjust enrichment on
the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements which the California court had based its judgment
were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's
authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUE: Should the Philippine Court enforce the foreign judgment?

HELD: YES. In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that
there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon
regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing
to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is
clear that an attorney cannot, without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation
even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest. However, PAWI failed
to substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced.Even if
PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the
enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the
agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this
Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e.,
fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would
go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to
defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes
to the very existence of the cause of action - such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract - is deemed
already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign
judgment.

WILSON ONG CHING KIAN CHUNG and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY, petitioners, vs.
CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS OIL AND FOODSTUFFS IMPORT AND EXPORT CORP., CEROILFOOD
SHANDONG CEREAL AND OILS and BENJAMIN IRAO, JR.,
G.R. No. 131502 June 8, 2000
FACTS:Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chung is selling vermicelli (sotanghon) using his copyrighted cellophane wrapper
with the two-dragons designed label. In 1993, Wilson Ong sued Lorenzo Tan for infringing upon his copyrighted
cellophanes. Wilson Ong alleged that Tan was importing sotanghon from China National Cereals, Oils and
Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation (CEROILFOOD SHANDONG) and then Tan would use Wilson Ongs
copyrighted cellophanes to sell the sotanghon (vermicelli).While the case was pending before the Quezon City
RTC, China National Cereals filed another complaint to cancel the copyright of Wilson Ong before the Manila RTC.
Judge Palattao of the Manila RTC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Wilson Ong from using his
copyrighted cellophanes.Eventually, Wilson Ong appealed before the Court of Appeals questioning the TRO. The
Court of Appeals in the body of its decision cited that the case before the Manila RTC should have been
dismissed because of litis pendentia and forum shopping, there being an existing case before the QC RTC which
a co-equal court of the Manila RTC. But in the dispositive portion of the CA decision, it said that the Manila RTC
has the discretion to dismiss the case. Manila RTC did not dismiss the case but rather it ordered the cancellation
of Wilson Ongs copyright. The Manila RTC invoked that though the CA cited forum shopping and litis pendentia
as grounds for dismissing the case the CA did not order Manila RTC to actually dismiss the case but rather it
gave the Manila RTC the discretion to continue hearing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila RTC is correct.
HELD: No. The general rule states that the dispositive portion of a Judgment becomes the subject of execution.
However, there are exceptions to this rule and one of the exceptions is that if the dispositive portion differs with
the discussion in the body of the decision such as in the case at bar. This is because the dispositive portion finds
support from the decisions ratio decidendi.The Quezon City court and the Manila court have concurrent
jurisdiction over the case. However, when the Quezon City court acquired jurisdiction over the case, it excluded
all other courts of concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The Manila court is,
therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the complaint filed resulting in the assailed decision which must perforce be
declared null and void. To hold otherwise would be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might
have conflicting orders.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
FACTS:Oil and Natural Gas Commission is a foreign corporation, owned and controlled by the Government of
India. Pacific Cement Co is a Philippine corporation.Pacific was supposed to deliver more than 4,000 metric tons
of oil well cement to Bombay and Calcutta but because of a dispute with the carrier, the shipment never reached
the destination. Despite payment by Oil and Natural, as well as repeated demands, Pacific does not deliver the
oil well cement.During negotiations, the parties agreed that the Pacific will replace the oil well cement with Class
G cement. Pacific did deliver the Class G cement but they were not according to specifications. Oil and
Natural informed Pacific that they will submit the dispute to arbitration as provided for in their contract.The
dispute was therefore submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator was Shri Malhotra, an employee of Oil and Natural
Gas. The decision of the arbitrator was in favour of Oil and Natural Gas. The arbitral decision was confirmed by
an Indian court.Oil and Natural Gas filed a complaint in Pasig RTC for the enforcement of the foreign judgment.
This was opposed by Pacific for being bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of
the petitioner was based. The judgment of the Indian court apparently simply adopted the award of the

arbitrator without stating anything by way of support for its judgment.The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint.
The RTC said that the contract provided for some disputes to be settled by the regular court and some to be
submitted to arbitration. This type, the RTC said, was for the courts. Consequently, the proceedings had before
the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the
source of an enforceable right. The CA affirmed the dismissal by the RTC. Aside from agreeing with the RTC that
the arbitral award was void, the CA also said that the full text of the judgment of the foreign court contains the
dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said
judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it would violate the constitutional provision that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
ISSUE:Whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the private
respondent's allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based.
HELD:Yes, it is enforceable in this jurisdiction. The SC said that even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by
reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions
thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated
is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper
No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced pages.. In effect, the SC was saying that we also do in this
country what the Indian court did and it was okay for as long as the award or decision adopted was complete in
terms of the discussion of the facts and conclusions. The 18 pages of single spaced award by the arbitrator was,
according to the SC, complete enough. The short decision of the Indian court which merely adopted the award
was acceptable in our jurisdiction.Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was
rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has held
that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if
under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting
the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the
foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the
necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest
Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals that:"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein."Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment
in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty." Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment (Pacific Cement) had
the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.The foreign
judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that Oil
and Natural Gas merely prays for, the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has
ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in
the RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC
G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia
while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and
existing under Philippine laws. Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur
entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines.Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up
in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of the loan
it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By Pass; Project.The High
Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private
respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment,
petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of
Malaya.Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the alleged
judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted
with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear
mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied
upon are not the proper grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of
Court.Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claims and therein raised the
grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner contended that the High Court of
Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission the courts
jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all
objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.In due time, the trial court rendered
its decision dismissing petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the
appellate court dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment.

HELD: Yes.Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions
that may vary in different countries.In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it
is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign
forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the
instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.
Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked
with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the
existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioners sole
witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was
connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of
private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent
for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and
Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional
appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but
subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary
judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then
heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by
counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.In addition to the
said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence to support their claim.Having thus
proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign
judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein
private respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden
that fell upon it to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent
enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.