Stop Chance! Silence Noise!

Author(s): Ren Thom and Robert E. Chumbley

Source: SubStance, Vol. 12, No. 3, Issue 40: Determinism (1983), pp. 11-21
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3684251
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Stop Chance!SilenceNoise!
RENETHOM

Thereforelet us
neverspeak of chance . . .
-Joseph de Maistre

What one mightcall the popular French epistemology- we shall returnlater

to this strange phenomenon - has edified us in recent years with a number of
works, certain ofwhich have attained great recognition.I will mention: Chance
and Necessity
by Jacques Monod, La Mithode(The Method) by Edgar Morin,
Entrele cristalet la fumie(Between Crystal and Smoke) by Henri Atlan, and
La Nouvelle
Alliance(The New Alliance) by Ilya Prigogineand Isabelle Stengers.*
The philosophies underlyingthese diverseworksare themselvesdiverse, sometimes even in opposition. But curiously, theyall have a common trait: all outrageously glorifychance, noise, "fluctuation."All make randomness responsible eitherforthe organizationoftheworld (via "dissipativestructures,"according to Prigogine) or forthe emergence of life and of thoughton Earth (via the
synthesisand accidental mutations of DNA, according to Monod). And our
friend Michel Serres is also of the band when, in his The BirthofPhysics,he
becomes the impassioned thuriferof Lucretius' "clinamen." I would like to say
straightout that this fascinationwith randomness testifiesto an antiscientific
attitudepar excellence. Moreover, in a large measure, it proceeds froma certain
deliberate mental confusion, excusable in writersof literaryformation,but
difficultto pardon in men of science who in principle have been trained in the
rigors of scientificrationality.
In effect,what is randomness? One can give only a purelynegative definition: a random process is one which cannot be simulated by any mechanism,
nor described by any formalism.' To assert that "chance exists" is therefore
to take the ontologicalpositionwhich consistsin affirming
thatthereare natural
phenomena which we shall never be able to describe, thereforenever understand. This revives the famous Ignorabimus
of Du Bois-Reymond; it resuscitates the wave of irrationalismand anti-scientismof the 1880s, the waves of
the apostles of the "crisis of science": the Boutroux, the Le Roys, ...
Is the world subject to a rigorous determinismor is there a "chance" that
is irreducibleto any description?Posed in such a manner, obviously, the probSubStance No 40, 1983

11

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12

Ren6 Thornm

lem is of a metaphysical nature2 and only an equally metaphysical option is

capable of deciding the issue. As a philosopher, the scholar can leave the question open; but as scholar, it is forhim an obligation of principle- under pain
of internalcontradiction- to adopt an optimisticposition and to postulate that
nothing, in nature, is unknowable a priori.
That authors like Atlan or Prigogine, whose philosophy is fundamentally
anti-reductionist- truly,forthe first,mystical-, have adopted thisviewpoint
of the hypostasis of chance is not surprising. One will be more astonished to
find that the materialistJacques-Monod concurs. But Monod, in this matter,
has only followed, if not Darwin himself, at least Darwinian orthodoxy
(reinforcedin neo-Darwinism). In this regard, it is probably legitimateto say
that withDarwinism the illegitimateutilizationof chance introduceditselfinto
science, this chance that one had thought definitivelyburied under the
quodlibets which had greeted the Democritean "clinamen." For, in fact, how
would the appeal to "chance" to explain evolution be more scientificthan the
appeal to the Creator's will? Would chance be anythingother than a secular
substitutefordivine finality,just as teleonomy is an admissible substitutefor
teleology?
What has contributed greatlyto obscuring the debate is that neither the
notion of chance, nor of its opposite, determinism,are simple notions. It was
believed thatScience's use of statisticalmethodsjustifiedthe presenceofchance;
many - followingBrillouin- have sought to give a statisticalfoundationto the
laws of physics themselves. Under these conditions, how can one follow Einstein who refusedto see in God a perpetual dice player? Moreover, the "laws
of chance" are evoked like the law of large numbers. How can one come to
gripswiththisbizarre dialectic between chance and necessity?Chance, in principle negatingall order,is subjectto laws, while determinismveryoftenbecomes
blurred under a statistical structure.
To unscramble this set of problems somewhat, it is good to returnto the
point of departure: for a phenomenon to be an object of science, counted in
the common (and, in principle, eternal) heritage of scientificknowledge, it is
firstnecessary to describe it. This is why any discussion on the theme "chance
vs. determinism"must begin with an examination of the languages and formalisms which permitmaking a phenomenon the object of a realm of knowledge. However, we do not have many of these descriptivetechniques; in all,
thereare hardlymore than two: naturallanguage and mathematicalformalism.3
One may thus decompose Observable Reality into describable islands, whether
linguistically- (NL) islands, or mathematically- (M) islands, these islands
being themselvesseparated by non-describablezones, or at least by zones accessible with difficultyto description.
Having posed that, one may assert that the goal of every science is, once
one has taken stockof the describable (NL) and (M) islands, to tryto organize
them into largerislands explaining- determining- the spatio-temporalconcatenation of these differentislands. In other words, one makes an effortto construct a "syntax" of these islands of description which would report their
necessary or probable modes of association. Concerning (NL) islands of usual
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Stop Chance! Silence Noise!

13

macroscopic reality, we have at our disposal mental processes which permit

us to foreseethe effectsof certain initiallydescribed situations; this is a question of what we might call "natural logic" (or "common sense"). As for (M)
islands, mathematicsand physicsfurnishmethods which oftenpermitextrapolation of the data, hence extending the domain of validity of a description.
("Analytic continuation" is one of the most typical of these tools.) But even
beforethe problem of the extension of islands, thereis the problem of articulation between the two formalisms (NL) and (M). The Galileo-Newtonian
"epistemological rupture"can be described in the followingmanner: certain
(NL) islands can be described- at least in what concerns certain subsequent
effects- by (M) islands. These latter islands permit one, by extrapolation of
a mathematical character, to anticipate the presence of other (NL) islands.
"Natural logic" did not permitthis. For example, in mechanics, one can calculate the trajectoryof a projectile; ifone knows withenough precision the position and the velocityof William Tell's arrow when it leaves the crossbow, one
will be able to foresee that it will go through the apple on his son's head.
Thus was founded the belief that mathematical language - because it is
intrinsicallymore precise- was more powerfulthan natural language, and that
in the long run, all sciences had to adopt it; it is this belief which is magnificentlyexpressed in the famous formulationof Laplacian determinism. However, a superficialexamination of the conditions of use of natural languages
shows that this is not at all the case. In macroscopic realityat our scale there
exist enormous blocks of phenomena [(NL) islands] whose verbal description
is qualitatively very satisfactory,but where a rigorous mathematical description of the Laplacian type would not only be very difficult,but, moreover,
not pertinent:in fact,the equivalence class definedbetweenobjects ofthe world
by referenceto a single concept (defined by a grammatical noun, like "cat,"
"tree,""table," etc.) cannot be formulatedmathematicallyin termsof the positions and velocities of molecules which constitutethe objects. Such is the case,
in particular, of the description of living beings.
We mustenvisagethepresentstateof the universeas theeffectofits previous
whichfora given
state,and as the cause of the stateto come. An intelligence
instantwouldknowall theforcesbywhichnatureis animatedand therespective
locationsofthebeingswhichcomposeit,ifmoreoveritwerevastenoughto submitthesedata to analysis,it would embracein the same formulathe motions
ofthelargestbodiesoftheuniverseand thoseofthelightest
atom:nothingwould
be uncertainforthisintelligence,
and thefuturelikethepast wouldbe present
to its eyes. The human spiritoffers,in the perfection
it has been able to give
to Astronomy,
a slightsketchof thisintelligence.Its discoveriesin Mechanics
and in Geometry,
joined to thatofuniversalgravity,have enabledit to include
in thesameanalyticexpressions
thepastand future
oftheworldsystem.Byapplying the same methodto some otherobjectsof its knowledge,it has succeeded
in reducingtheobservedphenomenato generallaws, and in anticipating
those
whichthegivencircumstances
mustbringintotheopen. All theseefforts
in the
searchfortruthtendceaselessly
tobringthespiritclosertothatintelligence
which
we havejust conceived,but fromwhichit willremainalwaysinfinitely
distant.
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14

Rene Thom
This tendencyproperto humankindis whatrendersit superiorto animals,and
its progressin thisgenredistinguishes
nationsand centuriesand definestheir
trueglory.
PierreSimon Laplace, Essai Philosophique
surlesprobabilitis,
1814 edition:"Maitresde la pensee scientifique,"
Paris,
Gauthier-Villars,
1921, pp. 3-4.

But there is more: it can happen that a natural system admits a precise
mathematicaldescription,say an (M) island; thenthe sub-objectsofthe system,
which in this formalismcan be described linguistically,are objects of a simple
form.They are geometricobjects forthisformalism.If one followsthe temporal
evolution described by the mathematical formalism,two cases are possible.
In the firstcase, this evolution preserves the linguisticallydescribable "geometric"objects. This will be the case especially if the evolution is of the "geometric"typeof a translation,which preservesdistances and, therefore,the form
of the objects. Such is the case of systemsdescribing the movement of projectiles in our atmosphere- at our scale. One can speak then of systemshaving
controllableevolution [written(Mc) systems].On the otherhand, ifit is a question of a recurrenttypesystem(which returnsarbitrarilyclose to its initialposition, e.g., the movement of the planets), or still more precisely an "ergodic
mixing" system (like the "baker's transformation"described in the book by
Prigogine and Stengers4),at the end of a littletime, the geometricformstwist
in space to the point of losing theirrecognizable character. Then the linguistic
formalismloses all efficacyfordescribing these forms;the only entitieswhich
remain accessible to descriptionin the asymptoticstateofthe systemare defined
by mean values of invariant measures extended over the whole space. There
exists a quantity,"Kolmogoroff-Sinaientropy,"which describes veryprecisely
this progressiveloss of efficacyoflinguisticformalismin localizing futurestates
of the system. Thus in order to preserve a certain control of the system,one
must pass froma detailed- microscopic- descriptionof the systemto a sketchy,
global descriptionof a statisticalcharacter.This statisticaldegradationof determinism appears as a verygeneral phenomenon- and veryrobustvis-a-visperturbation.It is therethatthe ultimatemotivationofthe so-called laws of chance
is found; what one calls "laws of chance" are in factonly propertiesof the most
general deterministicsystem. We shall speak then of an (Ms) system.5
Phaedra: Speak now about trulygeometricfigures.
Socrates:I'm gettingto that,but I don'tthinkthatI can say betterwhatthey
are thanI did by the exclusionof otherfigures.
Phaedra: You mustsay it all the same.
whicharetracesofthosemoveSocrates:Wellthen,I callthesefigures
"geometric"
mentsthatwe can expressin a fewwords.
Paul Val6ry,Eupalinosou l'Architecte,
Paris, Gallimard,1923, p. 140.
For these (Ms) systems,linguistic describabilityrapidly loses all efficacy,
and only the statisticalmathematical description of the system remains; the
describable, such as a spiral of smoke, which doesn't hesitate to dissipate
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Stop Chance! Silence Noise!

15

into the atmosphere, becomes absolutely indescribable, and this has been
spoken of as a "chaotic evolution." This description of increasing disorder in
the course of time is the one that is usually attributedto systemsof increasing
entropy governed by the second principle of thermodynamics. It is not then
surprising. . . . More astonishingis the emergence of the describable fromthe
indescribable. For it is a fact of everyday experience that our universe is not
a chaos, that one can discern objects therein, things which sometimes prove
to be of a great stability, and which sometimes seem to be born from an
apparently undifferentiatedmedium. How can the describable emerge from
the indescribable?This is fundamentallythe centralproblemwithwhich science
findsitselfconfronted.Sometimes the newlydescribable issues froman equally
describable situation, but the syntactictie which links the new to the old is
unhabitual and surprising. Jacques Monod mentions on this subject the
Spinozist definitionof chance as accidental intersectionof two independent
causal chains: thusthepasserbywhilewalkingwillbe struckby a fallingchimney
pushed by the wind. In this case, it is permissibleto make the process preceding the "catastrophic"factfitinto a deterministicschema ofthe Laplacian type.
The independent causal chains can then be considered like separate motions
of a global dynamic system. The condition of collision between two moving
objects bringsabout a conditionhaving to do withthe initial states.6In mathematical terms, the initial conditions which give birthto collision forma submanifold S of codimension one in the space of the initial data (or in a thin
tubular neighborhood of this manifold S). This is to say the phenomenon is
rare,and thisjustifiesthe surpriseof the observer. One will be able to interpret
the appearance of the catastrophe as the resultof a phenomenon of "focusing,"
topologically analogous to the phenomenon which creates a shock wave in a
fluidmedium in frontof a piston driven by an accelerated motion (RiemannHugoniot phenomeon) or the shock wave created by a supersonic airplane.
The only differenceis that the firstphenomenon requires a strictcontrol of
the initial data, while the second is "structurallystable" and resistsa small perturbationof these data. The conspicuous weakness of Monod's position is that:
the state of the Earth at the moment of the appearance of life is said to have
been in a very special condition, extremelyunstable, and the slightest"noise"
in the preparation of this state would have prevented the appearance of life
and human intelligence.Not only creation,but also continuingcreation,would
have been necessary. Everythingthen pushes us to admit that one encountered rathera situationof the second type- structurallystable: once the Earth
was constitutedin the climatic and chemical conditions of the epoch, life and
thoughtnecessarily had to be born, even in the presence of "small perturbations" of this environment.
To produce the describable fromthe indescribable is preciselythe program
definedby the slogan: "orderthroughnoise." The movementwhich claims this
program, created some thirtyyears ago by von Foerster, has known under
diverse guises a remarkable and persistentsuccess among scholars and epistemologistsof WesternEurope. It is a question, in most cases, of making a theory
of these phenomena of dynamic divergence where a weak perturbationof the
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16

Rene Thom

initialconditionssufficesto createverylarge variationsin the effects.A remarkable textby Maxwell had already, however, offereda startlingpicture of these
situations which are, needless to say, perfectlycompatible with the strictest
deterministicschema.7 In all these cases, one confrontsa singular point of the
dynamics leading to what is called a "bifurcation"(and, if the bifurcationis
slow to manifestitself,it leads to a "catastrophe). The whole mental game of
theoreticiansof"orderthroughfluctuations"(Prigogine-Stengers)has consisted
in mentallyerasingthe global dynamiclandscape - fromnow on deducible from
a complete enough examination of the substratum-to the advantage of the
small triggeringperturbationwhich will collapse the metastabilityof the system
toward an equilibriumoflowerenergy.The artificeconsistsin makingus believe
thatthe subsequent evolution,having spectaculareffects,was effectively
created
the
It
is
as
in
the
from
Maxwell's
"fluctuation."
taken
if,
by
triggering
example
text, one were saying that the spark which set the forestablaze had to create
it. Well this situation is general: a complete enough examination of the substratumpermitsanticipatinga priorithe possibleresultsofthebifurcation,which
existsbeforethe triggeringfluctuation.The role ofthisfluctuation,on one hand,
is to get the process underwayand - eventually- to determineby an apparently
arbitrarychoice the subsequent evolution among all the possible outcomes.
But it does not create this evolution.
Prigogine recognizes the fact implicitlywhen he remarksthat, farfromthe
bifurcation,the statisticsof the fluctuationsare approximatelyGaussian ("bellshaped") around the equilibrium, but that theycease to be so when the value
of instabilityis approached.
This is to claim that it is the underlying deterministicdynamics which
models the statisticsof fluctuationand not the reverse. The very nature of a
fluctuationis to be indescribable (one can give only the statisticsof a set of
fluctuations);as soon as an individualfluctuationgrowsto the pointof takingon
polarized directed characteristics(as soon as it presents correlations of great
range), it can be described, and consequently ceases being a fluctuationto
become a perturbation . . . Then, why this discourse on the initial fluctuation? What does one gain by clothingthe bones of determinismwith a layer
of statisticalflesh?8One will be able, at most, to specifya local modification
of the conditions for the bifurcated solutions to appear, but that will not at
all affectthe phase diagram - the global landscape of possible outcomes-, the
landscape existing beforethe noise affectingthe system. Then why this fascination with the "clinamen," with the small triggeringfluctuation?Let us not
deceive ourselves; the sophism of order throughnoise is also that of the neoDarwinian Monod. Certainly, one must not deny the existence of these fluctuations in a system;but when this systemis structurallystable, the existence
of these fluctuationshas no effectqualitativelyand can be considered as insignificant. That is what the geneticistKimura saw when he affirmedthat the
genetic overflowof populations is "neutral,"that is to say withouteffecton the
phenotype of the species. It is only by loss of structuralstabilitythat fluctuation becomes significant,but onlyin the frameworkof a pre-existingbifurcation.

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Stop Chance! Silence Noise!

17

I can hardly explain this fascination with the "clinamen," with the small
fluctuation initiating large events, except by a certain literary affectation.
Plunging the evolution of phenomena into a sort of "artisticblur," imagining
oneself at the crossroads, and by an involuntaryflickof the fingerhurlingthe
world into an abyss of successive catastrophes . . . Becoming Cleopatra's nose,
or Hercules between vice and virtue: Michel Serres has many times drawn
us into these critical crossroads of evolution. But, on the rational plane, what
remains for us of these imaginary voyages but the pleasure that we took in
followingthem?
The formula"order throughnoise" can, however, admit of a less disagreeable interpretation:the Curie principle which asserts that "every symmetryof
causes is found again in the effects"is well known. Well, this principle runs
into trouble in a great number of phenomena, notably in hydrodynamics.But
there also the observed breakings of symmetryare not arbitrary,and a sufficientlydetailed theorycannot miss definingall the subgroups in which a given
froma cylindrical
symmetrycan break. The situationthereagain is not different
in the direction
will
fall
The
on
its
pencil
point.
pencil standing vertically
data. It should
of
the
initial
with
the
a
minimal
symmetry
departure
imposed by
be remarked, moreover, that in this case, one goes froma larger to a smaller
symmetry:one can thereforelegitimatelyspeak of the creationof disorderrather
than of the creation of order.
And this recalls the wariness with which it is proper to treat all these disof systems.
coursesbuilt on order,disorder,complexity(even hypercomplexity!)
that
What a heavy dossier could be constructedfromthe bold assertions
people
have claimed to have justifiedby thermodynamicsand the second principle ...
There are firstthose who, by an abusive extrapolation- but it is a venial sin have applied the second principle to the entire universe and have risked predictingthe unavoidable thermaldeath of our world. Graver is the case of those
who have played inconsideratelywiththe notionsof order and complexity.One
must see, in effect,that the notion of order is a fundamentallymorphological
notion, and that it reposes in finalanalysis on a geometric,spatial description
of a datum. There is always underlyingsuch a datum, a substratumformed
of interchangeable elements, whether it is a question of geometric points or
elementaryequiprobable events. Now, in this genre of discourse, such a reference is in general never made, because in general it is impossible to make.
Even more so, in systemswhich presentdifferenthierarchicallevels of organization, the notion of order is "relative"to a certain level of organization, and
could not be considered as absolute. Thus, in a molecular system,perfectdisorder, absolute at the scale of the molecule, can at the macroscopic scale be
considered as a perfectorder, since all the points of the medium have the same
observable properties. Atlan plays on this ambivalence of the notion of order
to justifyhis principleof"orderthroughnoise." It is a question here of a correct
idea, but of one whose fecundityto explain a specificmorphogenesis appears
very limited.
All the considerations of the ineluctable growth of disorder are already

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18

Rene Thom

stronglysuspect in the case of closed systems. In effect,thermodynamicsis

in realityonly a thermostatics:it only affirmsthe existenceof an ultimateequilibrium state of the system,but is mute concerningthe time necessaryto attain
it, and cannot describe the mode of approaching the equilibrium. In particular,
such a systemcan include fora very long time spatial organizations and even
present variations in these morphologies . . . Concerning open systems,if it
is a question of almost closed systems,one may extend to these systemsthe
existence of the equilibrium known for closed systems. It is a question here
of a simple mathematical theorem (the implicitfunctiontheorem) which thus
permits construction of what Prigogine calls the "thermodynamicbranch."
Beyond that,thermodynamicshas nothingmore to say concerningthe stationary
states which can presentthemselves("dissipative structures").All that one can
assert about these regimes depends on a specific modeling, on a particular
knowledge which permitsa descriptionof it by a differentialsystem.Once this
systemis obtained, one can then studyit eitherquantitativelyor qualitatively.
One will always look for the "attractors"of the system and will determine if
on these attractorsthe dynamics presents this sensitivityto the initial conditions which destroythe linguisticdescribabilityand makes (Ms) systemsof the
attractors.The correspondence between the internalstructureof the attractor
and the spatial structureof the correspondingregime is not simple. In hydrodynamics, notably in the studyof turbulence, this relation is the object of controversy.9In a certain sense, and to the extentthat every physical systemcan
be modeled by a "structurallystable"(in a broad sense) attractorof a dynamical
system,every systemis ordered "fromthe outside" and chaotic "fromwithin."
In effect,by definition,every observable systemis distinguishedfromthe rest
of the universe. It is thereforeseparated from it by an interface,a more or
less concrete barrier, which renders it ordered. The only actual problem is to
understand the relation between the external barrier and the internal chaos.
Only a careful study of the bifurcationof these "strange attractors"- according to modern terminology' - will permit us to see this more clearly. All the
rest is literature and - I fear- bad literature.
If several new ideas have appeared recentlyin the domain of stabilityof
who continueto play withtheir
regimes,theyare not due to thermodynamicists
traditionalalgorithms(fromCarnot-Clausius to Boltzmann-Gibbs), but rather
to mathematicians. Mathematicians have brought to this domain two essential ideas. On the one hand, they perceived that a classical dynamical system
(Hamiltonian system) is not necessarily ergodic. It is compatible in a stable
manner with a certain persistence of geometric forms(describable linguistically).II Furthermore,the recent progress in qualitative dynamics (the school
of S. Smale group in theUnited States, thatof Sinai in the U.S.S.R.) has greatly
clarifiedthe relationsbetween deterministicschemata and probabilisticdescriptions. Around each "attractor"thereis - in general- the possibilityof defining
"local thermodynamics"describing the stable and intrinsicpropertiesof these
regimes.These accomplishmentsofmathematiciansshould be able to contribute
elementsof an answerto the problemposed by the gaping contradictionbetween
the permanence of the linguisticdescriptionof our world and the degradation

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Stop Chance! Silence Noise!

19

into statisticalfuzziness predicted by the second principle. From this point of

view, the notion of "phase" of matterremains stillextremelymysterious.After
all, ifa solid object is permanent,and can become the object of an (NL) description, it is because itsmolecularorganizationshows a marked stability.This leads
to the permanence of its boundary, of its barrier with the exteriorworld . . .
And ifyou want to embarrass a molecular biologist,ask him what is the "phase"
(solid, liquid, colloid, gel, etc.) of the cytoplasm of a living cell . . . There is
no doubt - to my mind in any event--that the theoryof phase transitionsis
still far from the definitive state which certain theoreticians of statistical
mechanics believe it to have attained.12
But let us return to our subject, the opposition: Chance-Determinism.
Chance, as we have seen, is an entirelyempty, negative concept, therefore
without scientificinterest.Determinism, on the contrary,is a source of fascinating richness- for the one who knows how to scrutinize it. One was a bit
hasty in the New Alliance (La NouvelleAlliance)to dance the scalp dance around
the corpse of Laplacian determinism.There are two ingredientsin our mathematical representationof determinismwhich should be separated: the vector
field(X) whose integrationwill give the possible trajectoriesof the motion and
the "phase" space M on which the field(X) is defined.Prigogine-Stengersattack
the notion of trajectorywhich they find outdated . . . Already, in classical
mechanics, one cannot be content with the usual three dimensional space to
definemovement. A space of double dimensions (6, with the associated kinetic
moments) has been needed since Galileo and Newton. It is in this space that
the theoryof dynamics will definetrajectories.To begin classical determinism
it was necessary to augment the dimensions of space by the introductionof
new initiallyhidden variables (momenta or velocities). This is a completely
general mechanism: when a phenomenon is apparentlyundetermined,one can
tryto reinstatedeterminismby multiplyingthe given space U by an (internal)
space S of hidden variables. The initial phenomenon in U will be considered
as a projection of a deterministicsystemin the product U x S. Statisticsfrom
this point of view is nothing but a deterministic
hermeneutics,
aiming at reinstatA
determinism
it
is
where
apparently lacking. larger space M1 is substiing
tuted forthe initial space M, but in this new space, the deterministicschema
(M,X) is kept becauseone cannotdo otherwise.
13
In thisspace, one will have once again an action oftime givingrise to trajectories . . . Moreover, it is not my understandingthat the practitionersof the
Brussels' School have abstained fromwritingordinary differentialequations,
or partial differentialequations under the pretextthat the notion of trajectory
is outdated . . . On the contrary,evidently,the introductionof these spaces
of hidden parameters raises difficultproblems, because it is obviously necessaryto tryto show the minimal model reinstatingdeterminism.From thispoint
of view, the distinctionmade above between "controllable"systems(Mc) and
statisticalsystems(Ms) is a gross oversimplification.(Mc) and (Ms) systems
are two poles of a quasi-continuous spectrumof intermediatesituations.Determinism has in general a stratifiedstructure(according to time scales): a fast
dynamics projects itselfin a product U x S- approximately-onto a slow
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20

Rene Thom

dynamics in U. One will then be able to consider the slow dynamics of U as

fundamental (the "signal") perturbedby "noise" due to the projection of U x
S - U. The signal-noisedistinctionis then fundamentallysubjective. One will
call "noise" that component which is too small to affectappreciably the qualitativeevolution of the phenomenon and whose effectiveelucidation would lead
to studies too detailed for the eventual benefitswhich could be drawn from
them. One may even make hypotheses of genericityconcerning this noise generalizingthe Gaussian hypothesisthatone ordinarilyuses ... Determinism
in Science is not something given, it is a conquest. In that vein, the zealots
of chance are the apostles of desertion.
Afterthis critique of so many works of popular epistemology, a question
arises on the sociological plane: what is the source of the floweringof this relatively new genre which cultivates in a rather ostensible manner approximation and "artisticfuzziness"?Why, in France, does the race of the true epistemologists- of Poincar6, Duhem, Meyerson, Cavailles, Koyr6- appear extinct?
Why hasn't French scientificphilosophyproduced- followingthe Anglo-Saxon
example - a Popper, or more recentlya Kuhn? Could it be the fundamentally
subjectivistand a-scientificcharacterof a universitytraditionbased in Husserl
and Heidegger? Or the politico-moralizingambiance which too oftenreigns
there?14Here obviously we are looking for a culprit. Might it be Bachelard,
withhis nice smile,who is at the originofthisliterarydeviationofepistemology?
I admit to having fewerreservationsconcerningthisgenre of productionwhich
prides itselfless in saying what science ought to be than in drawing literary
resonance fromscientificmetaphorsforthe pleasure of all. At least theseauthors
do not speak "ex cathedra" fromthe height of their scientificreputation. The
last of the line, Michel Serres, in The Parasite**transformshis cosmic vision
of parasitismintoa vast moral fresco.I could have completedmy titleas follows:
"Stop chance! Silence the noise! Death to the parasite." But I did not want to
write an article about utopia.
Translated by Robert E. Chumbley
NOTES
Note: Of thegrouponlyMonod'sworkis now availablein Englishtranslation.
*Translator's
1. The identification
betweenformalizable
systemsand mechanizablesystemshas been made
precisein logicunderthenameofChurch'sthesis.Like all foundational
questions,thisidentificationhas a problematical
character,but thisis not the place to discussit.
at theCollegede France2. Certainauthors(amongthemP. Suppesin lecturesheldrecently
November1979 and publishedby FlammarionunderthetitleLogiqueduprobable)
use quantum
to justifyscientifically
the existenceof chance. The efforts
to removequantum
indeterminacy
indeterminacy
by the use of "hiddenvariables"have shown that this question of quantum
was inextricably
linkedto twoquestionsof a stillmoreprofoundnature:locality
indeterminacy
c forcausalinfluences),
and eventhepossibility
ofan instantaneous
ofa limiting
velocity
(theexistence
chance"is thenonlya
descriptionof theworld,completeand valid forall observers."To affirm
- havea disagreeableaspect.
in a finitesetofoptionswhichall- itmustbe recognized
possibility

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Stop Chance! Silence Noise!

21

3. We place aside herethe pure and simplerecordingof roughempiricaldata like the atlas
of photographswhichconstitute
the map of the sky. . .
4. La Nouvelle
Alliance(Paris, 1979), p. 246.
5. (Ms) systemsare differential
whichhave theproperty
of"sensitivity
to initialcondisystems
thedistanceoftwomovingpointsm(t),m'(t) issuing
tions"accordingto D. Ruelle'sterminology:
fromtwoneighboring
pointsm(0), m'(0), increases- at leastin thebeginning-as an exponential
function
ofthetimet. Thesesystems
-to systems
saidtobe of"weakstability"
correspond-probably
in La Nouvelle
Smale'saxiomA)
Alliance,
p. 248. Numeroussystems
(thoseforexamplewhichsatisfy
exhibitthispropertyin a stablemanner.
6. For example,ifone has twostreetsintersecting
each otherat rightangles,whoseaxes are
theCartesianaxes OX, OY oftheplane OXY, twovehicleswhichat theinstantt = 0 are located
at theabscissapointsxo, y = 0 and x = 0, y = yo,and suppliedrespectively
with
respectively
uniformvelocitiesdx/dt= a, dy/dt= b willcollide0 ifthe conditionxo/a = yo/bis satisfied.
This relationdefinesthehypersurface
(S) in thespace oftheinitialconditionswhichis discussed
in the text.
7. The roleof singularities
in dynamicshad alreadybeen pointedout in 1880 by Boussinesq
who believedthathe had inauguratedthe"crisisof science"(sup.).
thesystemhas a quantityofpoten"In all suchcasesthereis one commoncircumstance,
intomotion,but whichcannotbegin
tial energy,whichis capable of beingtransformed
to attainwhich
tillthe systemhas reacheda certainconfiguration,
to be so transformed
ofwork,whichin certaincases maybe infinitesimally
small,and
requiresan expenditure
in generalbears no definiteproportionto the energydevelopedin consequencethereof.
For example,therockloosed by frostand balancedon a singularpointofthemountainthelittleworkwhichsetstheworlda-fightside,thelittlesparkwhichkindlesthegreatforest,
a manfromdoinghiswill,thelittlesporewhichblights
ing,thelittlescruplewhichprevents
or idiots.
all the potatoes,thelittlegemmulawhichmakesus philosophers
Quotation fromJ. C. Maxwell in The Life ofJamesClerkMaxwell.L. Campbell and
W. Garnett.London: MacMillan, 1969, p. 443.
8. Paraphraseoftheformula
describetheBKW method:"putting
bywhichtheEnglishphysicists
some quantumfleshon classicalbones."(Translator'snote: thismethodis used forthe solution
of problemsof wave propagation.)
9. I am alludinghereto theinterpretation
ofhydrodynamic
turbulence
proposedbyD. Ruelle
whenconfronted
withthe empirical
and F. Takens-an interpretation
whichraisesdifficulties
of turbulentislandsin a laminarzone.
morphology
see therecentarticle
10. On strangeattractors
and theproperty
ofsensitivity
to initialconditions,
is
no. 108 (February1980), pp. 132-144. The Englishtranslation
by D. Ruelle in La Recherche,
in TheMathematical
2 (1980), no. 3, pp. 126-137.
Intelligencer
threebodyproblemhas
11. The worksof Kolmogoroff,
Arnol'dand Moser on the restricted
a genericHamiltoniansystem
shownthat,contrary
to beliefsstillverywidespread
amongphysicists,
is not necessarilyergodic;sincetheessentialalgorithmofGibbs is based on thelocal ergodicity
ofthedynamicsofsystems
ofparticles(gas), one seesthesuspicionwithwhichone shouldapplyit.
12. Allusionto thetheoryofcriticalphenomenafoundedon therenormalization
group(K. Wilson's theory).In a moregeneralmanner,all the so-calledexact modelsof statisticalmechanics
(forexample,the model of a gas lattice)sufferfromevidentunreality.
13. Thus in thepresenceofa classicaldeterministic
system(M,X) one willoftenhave to substituteforit a stochasticmodelbearingon a probability
distribution
m(x) whoseevolutionwillbe
governedby the Fokker-Planck
equationassociatedwithit: am/at = X(m) whereX is the Lie
derivative.By doingthis,one has onlychangedspace substituting
forthe originalmanifoldM
the space C(m) of real functionssmoothon (M).
14. Aside fromtheverylivelytraditionin FranceofChristianidealism,it is necessaryalso to
acrosstheRhine(theFrankfurt
in opposition
totheircounterparts
evokethecaseofMarxistthinkers;
School), FrenchMarxistshave too oftenseen theirthoughtsterilizedby politicaldogmatism.
**Translator's note: See The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R. Schler (Baltimore, 1982).

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