Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Vincent Juan) 1
4TH EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
PATERNITY and FILIATION
BADUA v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND
FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
30862 dated May 29, 1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna.
Isabel died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the
grave on November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria BenitezLirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and
nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90)
before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br.
30. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration
of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent Aguilar.
They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or relatives be
they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or legally adopted; despite claims or
representation to the contrary, petitioners can well and truly
establish, given the chance to do so, that said decedent and
his spouse Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and
whose estate had earlier been settled extra-judicial, were
without issue and/or without descendants whatsoever, and
that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared
by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal
heir; . . .
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside
at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where
it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should
reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the
birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown
to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from
the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
fact of registration of said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of
the child within the period prescribed in the preceding Article
only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the
period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without
having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do
not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child
of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of
his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should
file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the
case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited
in the impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of
Appeals in this wise:
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No. CV56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of limitation
(prescription); [and]
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was always
known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista Guinto; that
plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of
the matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal and
[defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her
Certificate of Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena
Babiera, x x x Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report
Card x x x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and affirmative
defenses, defendant/respondent contended that the petition
states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy
of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article
171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the
Family Code." [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during
trial proved that petitioner was not the biological child of
Hermogena Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was
presented to show that Hermogena became pregnant in
1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old
at the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way
back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed birth took
place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of
Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the
local civil registrar, and the signature therein, which was
purported to be that of Hermogena, was different from her
other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn
the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a
situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the
child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action involved
the cancellation of the childs Birth Certificate for being
void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to
either the father or the mother.
Issues
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
in
Favor
of
the
Birth
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal
basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child
[Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the
existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would
prevent any possible rapproachment between the married
couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common
admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo
was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year
after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various
evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the
same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of
the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a
minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the
bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the
supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children
for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be
compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor
can change his status for the information contained therein
are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a
parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a
reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A
child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child [21] and to protect his
status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained the rationale of
this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles
was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake.
This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time
already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is
involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these
proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time
he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now
comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has
unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the
presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right
to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma.
Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code
on surnames.[50] A persons surname or family name
identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on
from parent to child.[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his
surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and
effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register
regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in
a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation
rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children.
Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both
parent and child to each others company. There being no
such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has
no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child.
Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions
regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is
similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection
to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide
protection to those of tender years. [52] Through its laws, the
ONG v. DIAZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171713
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005
and (2) the Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT
FOR
COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG
WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER
JAPANESE
HUSBAND,
CONSIDERING
THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO
FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G.
ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment
remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing
analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the
legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this
Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third
one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding
the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing.
Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will
decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor
Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues
raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the
result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of
filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of
the said minor.
PUNO, J.:
The legal dispute between the parties began when the
petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against
the private respondent before the RTC of Quezon City. The
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted
that he has to be shown a picture of the private respondent
by Violeta Esguerra to recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately, when you were first shown
this picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q When was the first time you know you are going to testify
here?
A It is difficult. . .
A Let us see, you came there two times and first one was
you want to get a baptismal certificate and then the second
time was I asked you for what is this? And you said it is for
the court.
Q On the second time that Ms. Violeta Esguerra went to your
place, you were already informed that you will testify here
before this Honorable Court?
A Yes.
A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized the father and the mother
who were present at that time?
A Yes.
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to the court?
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A There (witness pointing to the defendant, Carlito
Fernandez).
Q For instance, just give us more specifically what question
do you remember having asked him?
A Yes, like for example, do you renounce Satan and his
works?
Q What was the answer of Fernandez?
A Yes, I do.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will you please look at the
defendant again. I want to be sure if he is the person who
appeared before you on that occasion?
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close
friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which
should render unquestionable his identification of the private
respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence
of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father
Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies
day in and day out can remember the parents of the children
he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court
on the credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
IV
[20]
LABAGALA v. SANTIAGO
IDA
C.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the
decision dated March 4, 1997,[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the
judgment dated October 17, 1990,[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 87-41515,
finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro
indiviso share in a parcel of land.
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the
records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta.
Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered
it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now
respondents herein), sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property.[3] On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case
decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of
ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No.
64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to
include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate
of title to said property.[4]
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5,
1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C.
Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to
recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to
Jose but which came into petitioners sole possession upon
Joses death.
Respondents alleged that Joses share in the property
belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the
only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the
property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March
1979[5] was
executed
through
petitioners
machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to
secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
172334[6]) in petitioners name alone.[7]
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a
forgery. The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark
thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to
graduate from college, Jose never put his thumbmark on
documents he executed but always signed his name in
full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property
Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she
explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees
would only paste a document like this Certificate of Live
Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to
replace the record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the
record when the leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume
to be taken out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are
detached so we have to paste them."[14] (Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates,
this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the
volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from
explaining the anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit
"D", she actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances
surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a
finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's
Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence
by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local
Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable certificates and
documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar
General, thus:
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars
shall (a) file registrable certificates and documents
presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same monthly
and prepare and send any information required of them by
the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies of
any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d)
order the binding, properly classified, of all certificates or
documents registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil
Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each
month, a copy of the entries made during the preceding
month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search and
identification in case any information is required; and (g)
administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register
purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document
sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar
General should be identical in form and in substance with the
copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8",
issues
are
evidence,
the
substantive
from
VERCELES v. POSADA
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159785
My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should
have no regret, because I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall take
care of it and let him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and
addressed her as "Chris," probably because of their twentyfive (25)-year age gap. In court, she identified petitioners
penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an
employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters 5 sent to
her by petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as
mayor of Pandan. She also presented the pictures6 petitioner
gave her of his youth and as a public servant, all bearing his
handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of
her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket
money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would
enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In June 1987,
petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her
another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of
her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and
brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987, 7 she
gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story.
She said they learned of their daughters pregnancy through
her husbands cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by
petitioner and shamed by her daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes
against petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their
favor, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the
[petitioner] and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he was
I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE
THAT APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE
CHILD?
II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD
THE
RTC
COURT
HAVE
ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THIS ISSUE OF APPELLANTS
DE LA CRUZ v. GRACIA
SECOND DIVISION
versus
QUISUMBING
CARPIO MOR
CHICO-NAZA
LEONARDO-D
PERALTA,* JJ
a. AUSF[8]
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE
STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF
AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING
OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA
STREET
BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM
THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE
ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY
FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH
AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS
RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE
NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET
EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN,
TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME
GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN
Employment records
SSS/GSIS records
Insurance
Certification of membership in any organization
Statement of Assets and Liability
Income Tax Return (ITR)
NEPOMUCENO v. LOPEZ
FIRST DIVISION
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO,
Petitioner,
Present:
x------------------------------------------------ x
SEC. 40.
Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in
a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member
of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on
rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
children
is
GOTARDO v. BULING
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165166
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172471
recounted having met him for the first time in 1994 in the
house of his Aunt Lelita, Antonios sister, where he was
vacationing.25 During their encounter, Randy called Antonio
"Papa" and kissed his hand while the latter hugged
him.26 When Randy asked him for support, Antonio promised
that he would support him.27 Randy further testified that
during his one-week stay in his Aunt Lelitas place, the latter
treated him as member of the family.28
For her part, Aurora Ducay testified that she knew both
Mirasol and Antonio as they were neighbors in Upper
Bicutan, Taguig. Presently, Antonio is still her neighbor in the
said place.29 According to her, she knew of Mirasols and
Antonios relationship because aside from seeing Antonio
frequenting the house of Mirasol, she asked Antonio about
it.30 She further narrated that the two have a son named
Randy31 and that Antonios mother even tried to get the child
from Mirasol.32
Testifying as an adverse witness for the respondents,
Antonio admitted having sexual intercourse with Mirasol in
February and August33 of 1981.34 When shown with Randys
Certificate of Live Birth and asked whether he had a hand in
the preparation of the same, Antonio answered in the
negative.35
Testifying for himself, Antonio denied having courted Mirasol
on January 5, 1981 because during that time, he was
studying in Iloilo City. He graduated from the Iloilo Maritime
Academy in March of 198136 as shown by his diploma.37 It
was only in May 1981 or after his graduation that he came to
Manila. Further, he denied having any relationship with
Mirasol.38 He claimed that he had sexual intercourse with
Mirasol only once which happened in the month of
September or October of 1981.39
Antonio came to know that he was being imputed as the
father of Randy only when Mirasol charged him with
abandonment of minor in 1994, which was also the first time
he saw Randy.40 Prior to that, neither Mirasol nor her sister,
Norma, whom he met a few times told him about the child.41
Anent Randys Certificate of Live Birth, Antonio testified as to
several inaccuracies in the entries thereon. According to him,
his middle initial is "E" and not "A" as appearing in the said
certificate of live birth.42 Also, he is not a protestant and a
laborer as indicated in said certificate.43 Antonio likewise
alleged that Mirasol only made up the entries with respect to
their marriage on October 28, 1981.44
Daisy Balmori Rodriguez (Daisy), for her part, testified that
she came to know Mirasol through her mother Erlinda who
was the "hilot" when Mirasol gave birth to Randy.45 She
narrated that her mother asked Mirasol the details to be
entered in the childs Certificate of Live Birth such as the
names of the parents, date and place of marriage, and the
intended name of the child.46 Her mother also told her that
Mirasols son has no acknowledged father.47 Daisy likewise
claimed that Mirasol later left to her care the then infant
The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the
relief sought since Antonio himself admitted that he had sex
with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy
testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. The
RTC opined that Mirasol would not have gone through the
trouble of exposing herself to humiliation, shame and ridicule
of public trial if her allegations were untrue. Antonios
counterclaim was denied due to the absence of bad faith or
ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and Randy.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Randy Perla and against the defendant Antonio
Perla, ordering the latter to give a reasonable monthly
support of P5,000.00 to Randy Perla for his sustenance and
support to be given to him from the time of the filing of this
Complaint.
Defendants counterclaim is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.50
Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal51 which was given due
course by the RTC.52
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision53 of March 31, 2005, the CA upheld Randys
illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his
birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying
Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court, while
these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they
are proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified
father of Randy. The CA also affirmed the trial courts
findings on the credibility of the witnesses and its
appreciation of facts, as there was nothing to suggest that
the RTC erred in such respects. It highlighted Antonios
vacillation in his testimony regarding the number of times he
had sex with Mirasol and concluded that the same is a clear
badge of his lack of candor - a good reason to disregard his
denials. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.54
55
SALAS v. MATUSALEM
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
factual
antecedents:
2.
3.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court
decided the case without affording him the right to introduce
the
following
grant
the
petition.
instituted
at
the
time
the
action
is
commenced.14
of
the
guardian ad
litem for
the
minor
ADOPTION
LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
heirs.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164948
A No, sir.38
xxxx
A None, sir.
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been
under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother.
However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their
deceased father now serves as their guardian. The
petitioner, together with her children and other relatives
abroad have been supporting the minor children financially,
even during the time that they were still living with their
natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support
but very minimal.39
xxxx
A None, sir.
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her
younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and
has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their
problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and
petitioner-aunt.40
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein
minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and
comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws
which include the petitioner had continued providing support
for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the
support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work
abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they
are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents
mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy
and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her
3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who
returned home for good, however she died on November
2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man
from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and
have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of
them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage
and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate
family regular support.
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best
of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal
infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA.
In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new
petition for adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM and
MICHAEL JUDE LIM
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina
P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated
15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and
Michael Jude P. Lim.
the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old
and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of
age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they
have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the
sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried,
can singly adopt.
the
legitimate
Effects of Adoption
TAMARGO v. CA
THIRD DIVISION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent
spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal
information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without
discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
SUPPORT
DE ASIS v. CA
THIRD DIVISION
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under
the premises.[3]
CHILDREN
AT
I.
RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON
RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND
RINAS PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE
OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE
GRANDFATHER.
II.
IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED
TO GIVE SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS
UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT
DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT
OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.27
At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged
that Rica had already entered Rutgers University in New
Jersey with a budget of US$12,500.00 for academic year
1994-1995. She was able to obtain a tuition fee grant of
US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from the US
government in the amount of US$2,615.00.28 In order to
defray the remaining balance of Ricas education for said
school year, petitioner claims that she had to secure a loan
under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program.
Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University,
where she was expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the
school year 1994-1995. She was given a financial grant of
US$6,000.00, federal work study assistance of US$2,000.00,
and a Federal Stafford loan of US$2,625.00.29 Again,
petitioner obtained a loan to cover the remainder of Rinas
school budget for the year.
Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to
furnish support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed
upon their parents. She contends, however, that the records
of this case demonstrate her as well as respondent
Federicos inability to give the support needed for Rica and
Rinas college education. Consequently, the obligation to
provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco being
the grandfather of Rica and Rina.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has
the financial resources to help defray the cost of Rica and
Rinas schooling, the Court of Appeals then erred in
sustaining the trial courts Order directing respondent
Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of
award P5,000.00 each as monthly support pendente lite.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the
trial court correctly declared that petitioner and respondent
Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed
61
CARPIO, J.:
DECISION
The Case
The Facts
The Issue
WHEREFORE,
we DENY the
petition.
We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28
April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with
theMODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena
Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim.
We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this
ruling.
SO ORDERED.
June 5, 2013
ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2)
children every month?
A Presently, Sir?
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those
two (2) drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need
two (2) drivers. And I need another househelp.
Yes.
xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
A My clothing.
COURT:
ATTY. ZOSA:
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x.
What else, what specific need that you would like to add so I
can tell my client, the defendant.
xxxx
WITNESS:
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children,
you mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?
Php1,350,000.00
613,472.86
Php 42,450.71
11,500.00
14,611.15
260,900.00
121,000.00
TOTAL -
Php 946,465.64
GRAND TOTAL -
Php 3,428,813.80
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the
foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent
should, in equity, be considered advances which may be
properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the
petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the
absence of petitioners contribution to the joint obligation of
support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of
legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions
of the Rule on Provisional Orders24
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been
admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of
their two (2) childrens schooling, he gave his two (2) children
two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for
various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of
their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of
more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each
of them and considering that as testified by the private
respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00
for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that
petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and
to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable
to him through the credit cards he provided them in the
amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the
monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private
respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount
of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take
care of the household and other needs. This monthly support
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount
of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred
ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical
attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the
conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support
of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or
decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private
respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending
on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings
for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being
a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may
be allowed as deductions from the accrued support
pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1wphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua
Php 42,450.71
11,500.00
365,282.20
(Groceries
and
Dry
Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL
Php 648,102.29