Rem1 Case Digests || CrimPro Jurisdiction || Castro, Boco

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, vs.The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU
FACTS:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted
a preliminary investigation. Afterwards, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to
the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,
Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was
immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty.
Salvador Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio
Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and
killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that
court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection
with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of
the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the
trial court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of
the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet
Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan
Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on
the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the
respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Whether Sanchez was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation
Only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation
Whether Sanchezs warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him
Whether the information charging Sanchez with seven homicides arising from the
death of only two persons is incorrect
Whether as a public officer, Sanchez can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD:
The Preliminary Investigation

that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was
filed.
The petitioner was present at the hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel.
During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his
behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now
question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion
of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the
criminal case in abeyance. In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason
or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to
her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings
conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over
the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to
conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the municipal
mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to
investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we
held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an
exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the
offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe
that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the
Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or omissions
on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however,
be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or
omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of
sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does
not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file
and prosecute the information or amended information.
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person
into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to
be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. 12

The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention
that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.

The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letterinvitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp for
investigation.

During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit.
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion

In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a
request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he

Rem1 Case Digests || CrimPro Jurisdiction || Castro, Boco

expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and
in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial
investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for
questioning.
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly
participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither
did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because
the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. As the rape and
killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the
date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when
the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of
the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the accused
objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the
information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in
the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his
person to the jurisdiction of that court.
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge
Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of
the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial
justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of
that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. *
Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
In one case, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of arrest
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the
particular description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant was
unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be
a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid
warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just have left. This Court will not participate
in such a meaningless charade.
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on
the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with
homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to
the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its
character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an
constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty
which is in the highest degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension
of the application of the death penalty by the Constitution).

It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him
in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having
himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In
other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with
each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The
separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive
rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of
Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by
the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials
or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them
should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This
contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance
of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861 states the the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act and other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations x x x
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not
fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by
paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office"
as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has
to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words,
the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for
instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised
Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator. Being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of
the crime. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with
homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an
essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.
Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged
was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the
facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. In
consequence, the respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against
the petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the
criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge in

Rem1 Case Digests || CrimPro Jurisdiction || Castro, Boco

accordance with the evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for
judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant public
speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 154473

April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION,

Petitioners, vs.ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573

April 24, 2009

PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,

Respondent.
This is a decision for two consolidated cases filed before the Court, on pure questions of law,
on the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC,
delivered a speech in a forum held at the UP-Diliman Campus, Quezon City. The speech was
subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he
stated in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a
registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution
that isnt even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed.
Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly
disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be
worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint 8 for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC). Despite this, an Informatinon on the
case was filed. He later on moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could
not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he
can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate
him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
The trial court issued the challenged Order dismissing the case and considering as moot and
academic petitioners motion to inhibit the judge from presiding. While the RTC found that
respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not
confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his officehe
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda
Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised
nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television shows episode that day was entitled
"COMELEC Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a "PR" campaign
against you? Is that what you are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly,
according to [c]harg d[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001,
it is whats been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of
2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] thats about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what
for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think its
pretty obvious.
Petitioner considered respondents statement as defamatory and filed a Complaint-Affidavit

Rem1 Case Digests || CrimPro Jurisdiction || Castro, Boco

for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. However, an
Information was still filed.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that
the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even
if criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.
The trial court likewise dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.
HELD
Yes.
The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is
whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be
more specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit
on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now,
the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense xxx.
In Jalandoni v. Endaya, acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be
followed.35
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public
respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel
cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one
day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is
lodged within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said
law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts It has been laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the
exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A.
7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases.
Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts
by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it
is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a
special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691
does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on
the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification,
it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in
relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent
committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and
deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.

The two cases are REMANDED and REINSTATED to the RTC of QC for further proceedings.

Rem1 Case Digests || CrimPro Jurisdiction || Castro, Boco

G.R. No. 169004

September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and

ROLANDO PLAZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu,
at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to
liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995, in relation to his office, from
the City Government of Toledo in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) .
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss dated April 7, 2005 with the
Sandiganbayan. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution on July 20, 2005
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper
court.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving
public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended
by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified
under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A.
1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner
questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan, claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606,
as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.

general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time
of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. Section 4 of
P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in
the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December 19,
1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004.
It is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under
Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In
order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that
are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the
same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher;
Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP
chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and
their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses
or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of
the law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Inapplicability of Inding Case

HELD:
Yes.
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code
of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al. as a
background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of
the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The
exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249, where it expressly
provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case
as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense: x x x.14
The present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the
said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the

The Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to
cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This Court concentrated its disquisition on the
provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses
involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or felonies
involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public
officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be
charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are
broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in
the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been
perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the
crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid
office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committed in
relation" to his office.18
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions
qualification as to the public officials involved. It
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except

of Section 4 (b) does not mention any

simply stated, public officials and
section. Therefore, it refers to those
those specifically enumerated.

Petition is granted. The case is remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

Rem1 Case Digests || CrimPro Jurisdiction || Castro, Boco

G.R. No. 186529

August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.

FACTS:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police
authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at
11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white
striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he
transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him
and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when
opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. 23 The team then brought
appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in
the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for
possessing, dangerous drugs.
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11,
Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence this petition. In his brief, appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after
seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest
and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
ISSUE:
Whether there was sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest and search
and seizure.
HELD:
None.
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed
below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet
of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against
him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse,
coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing
whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in
itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner

in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was
caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the
presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a
sachet of shabu. Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was
deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must
precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu
of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest
appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies
a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.
Here, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip
given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. The longstanding rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta, People v. Tudtud and People v. Nuevas, wherein
we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate
probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an
offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was
waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender
a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing
or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant,
appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information"
sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. But as aptly observed by
the Court, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless
searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do
away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by PO1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the
arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise
learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was
an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had
ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his
right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in
the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does
not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.