Rev Page 26

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171713
December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing (1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2)
the Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and
thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the
premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at
Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February
1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to
give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive
pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in
default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and
Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a
decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and
further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and
the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to
find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial
court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the
same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated
April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record,
subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to
file a reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the
Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of
P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears
and the amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support pendente lite
during the pendency of this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff
Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of
the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the
spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still
presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article
167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for
in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must
be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was
living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once
a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and
no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the
birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man
before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with
other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second
child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must
have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills
representing the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when
he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996.
Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth
of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to
Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky
and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the
illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this
Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the
support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of
the trial court dated 19 January 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the
case was submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as
early as 12 July 2002.13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a
manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of
Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the
Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and
experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early
stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good
faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific
procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological
father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiffs
mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be
the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute.
Considering, however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency
of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field
of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA
samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor
whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE

THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND
HER JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED
THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the
case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and
Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its
attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case to
the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA
testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to
resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of
the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father
is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.21 As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.
The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was
not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties
to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of
new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the
biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a
persons DNA profile can determine his identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except
for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It
is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a
single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of
every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or
her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other
body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double
stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or CG. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci,"
which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other
words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to
conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism);
"reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted
as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of
1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of
replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other
hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a
reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate,
when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the
evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each
of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from
each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of
the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological
father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological
sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for
the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained
from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct
identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of
parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may
provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our
articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In
Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we
cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had)
not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to
be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and
written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage,
as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA
17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No.
144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples
from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that
"the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between
the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we
acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed)
in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other
scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of
then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May
2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC
for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case
to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the
alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more
ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a
persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility
of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30
citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004,
424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in
this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of
AAAs child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are
authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However,
while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and
act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in
the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that
the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with
due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose
to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have
long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 171713
December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing (1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2)
the Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City.
In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and
thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the
premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at
Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February
1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to
give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive
pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in
default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and
Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a
decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and
further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and
the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to
find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial
court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the
same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated
April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record,
subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to
file a reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the
Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of
P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears
and the amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support pendente lite
during the pendency of this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff
Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of
the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the
spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still
presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article
167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for
in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must
be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was
living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once
a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and
no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the
birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man
before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with
other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second
child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must
have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills
representing the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when
he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996.
Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth
of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to
Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky
and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the

illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this
Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the
support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of
the trial court dated 19 January 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the
case was submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as
early as 12 July 2002.13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a
manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of
Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the
Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and
experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early
stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good
faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific
procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological
father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiffs
mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be
the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute.
Considering, however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency
of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field
of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with whatever remaining DNA
samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor
whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE
THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND
HER JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED
THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the
case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and
Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its
attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case to
the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA
testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to
resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of
the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father
is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.21 As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.
The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of
the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of
the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was
not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties
to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of
new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the
biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a
persons DNA profile can determine his identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except
for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It
is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a
single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of
every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or
her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other
body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double
stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or CG. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci,"
which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other
words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to
conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism);
"reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted
as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR
(variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-
([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of
1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of
replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other
hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a
reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate,
when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the
evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each
of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from
each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of
the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the biological
father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA
types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match,
then he is not excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological
sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for
the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained
from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct
identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of
parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may
provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our
articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In
Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we
cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had)
not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to
be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and
written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage,
as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA
17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case
comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No.
144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples
from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that
"the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between
the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we
acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed)
in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other
scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of
then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May
2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with
homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC
for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case
to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the
alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more
ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following:
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a
persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility
of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30
citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004,
424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in
this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of
AAAs child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are
authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However,
while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and
act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in
the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that
the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with
due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose
to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally
provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have
long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez,, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 190710
June 6, 2011
JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,

vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this petition
for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with
a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation
(with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie
Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen (Belen)" who
worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work.
On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace,
and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant and, on
March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioners father was
not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his
father is respondent. On August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft
Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a
period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to
accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner
was growing up, Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all
attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the
petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and
obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on
September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
the Order3 setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to
file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and that the
Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may
appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed
a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the
summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court agree that summons was
required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and (4) notice
by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the
subject matter.4
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for recognition
is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.5
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could
not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father.
Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an Order6
dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v. Alba,7 there are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have to face: a
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. The court opined that petitioner must first establish
these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of paternity and filiation, which
may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test results.
The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present.
Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally
declare that she had sexual relations with respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his
mother told him about his father was clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not
signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no
allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court
opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present
any affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of parties to
DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008, which
the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order9 setting aside the
courts previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby reconsidered
and set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for hearing on
January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court
stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a
certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in the petition were
not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court also dismissed
respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test, and that jurisprudence is
still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that the new Rule on DNA
Evidence11 allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts instance or upon
application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition,12 reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as no
defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b) there was no
prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the hearing.13
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders dated
October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07 is
DISMISSED.14
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondents special appearance could not be considered as
voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of
the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise questioned the courts jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition, the same is not equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically
seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show
that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met. The CA
further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish
a prima facie case, thus:
While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could not
really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could have not
meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could have not been
intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be the situation in this
particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test. If the DNA test in
compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the petitioner/complainant without
requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a dire and absurd rule would result.
Such will encourage and promote harassment and extortion.
xxxx
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of allowing
an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed to
establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and without pre-conditions, the
court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory recognition cases, then the
prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy prey for opportunists and
extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual indiscretions in their younger
years could be used as a means to harass them. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of
their children may just be taking the chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long
past one-time encounter. Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for
compulsory recognition case opens wide the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who
have no stomach for scandal.15
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack
of merit.16
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED
THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED

TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED
VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.
I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER
THAN ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY THE
PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA
TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY
RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE
PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED
RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.17
Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the courts
lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same,
because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking
for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3,
2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November
6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has
waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the petition does
not state respondents name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his name and his known
address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the
dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA
entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the
motion.18 Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require that
there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that the CA
erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as enunciated in
Herrera v. Alba.19 Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not applicable at this point of
the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should be taken up during the trial.20
In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the petition for
certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue before
the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance. Respondent
denies that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the alleged waiver and
voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that summons is indeed
required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction
over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying
respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a motion
to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As
such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal unless
and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion to dismiss but only when it has
been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.21 In the
present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the
motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction over
his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance of the
petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA, whether
the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether respondent waived his
right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was
necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the case. In other words, was the service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this
question depends on the nature of petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam,
in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is
directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which
concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction
of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.22
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective. 23
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of
the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An
in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established.24 Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.25 This
is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he
so chooses.26 Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try
and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined
that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find
that the due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that
he has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his
opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we
further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to
implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A
proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.27 In this petitionclassified as an action
in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the
publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the
trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of
the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.28 A complaint states
a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right.29
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his filiation
to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition were hearsay as
they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that
cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the
court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a
cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.30
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.31 The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.32
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and require
the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the
parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.33
The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case
the first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is
built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis
the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More
essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is
warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter
has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without
corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this observation,
we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid the courts in
resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We,
thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue
a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and
use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the
requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of
DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to
ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively
and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to
ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public."35
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are
aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either
motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following:

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these
states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions
(as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the
kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that
a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may
issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a
reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.371avvphi1
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute
necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity
and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a
DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183965
September 18, 2009
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated
25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the
demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition1 for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to
petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother.
Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden surname
of Irenes mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had
consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided
her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to work
at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work at the
Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondents efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to
each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondents illegitimate children.
During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondents relatives even
attended the baptism of petitioners daughter.2
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an
illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.4 Hearings then ensued during
which petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all
her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family
occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence5 on the ground that
the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had
already been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch
24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003,
petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to
RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated
21 February 2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000,
praying that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which
follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no
blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and
[herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or
acknowledgement is concurred with petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party
to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration
herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan)
civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE
NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her
brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have
received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more
claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors
and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including
Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development Corporation
where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or
participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand
with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent
dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment
permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim."
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same.
Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The
parties are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.7
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to respondents Demurrer to Evidence in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondents
Demurrer.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and
Opposition, respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this Court;
the Opposition thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
xxxx
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there was a judgment
entered based on the Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court,
branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or
alteration by another Regional Trial Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter
how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioners pleadings to the effect that there is no
blood relationship between petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration against
interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioners father is Alfredo Surposa is
a public document which is the evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by
judicial order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise agreement,
she is estopped from refuting on the effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein
respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to
Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to
compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the
same relief against the same defendant.9
Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are tied.
Unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to vacate, much more annul,
that Judgment issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and in fact
executed.
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in patent
abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction
cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving same
parties to re-litigate on the same issues already closed.10
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due
course, as the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.11
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration12 in a Resolution13 dated 29 July
2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case.14
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondents Demurrer to
Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that
petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.a1f
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of
the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the
other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the
law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.15
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between
petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February
2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.1avvphi1
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence
and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1)
public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end
to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he
should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.16
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.17
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is
apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However,
the question arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic,19 the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must
comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of
the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and
public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void,
and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.20
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code,
which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000
and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother
Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay
petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence
of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and
future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement
dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under
Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela
Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No.
3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both
parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same
court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court
declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent
filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case
No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status, which cannot be
the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.22 Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations.
It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the
parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.24
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said
contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9
to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a
Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was
executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent,
under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can
allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the
Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta25 is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a
matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a
competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself
is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where
there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and
consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the
sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to
pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on
it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight,
or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.26
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata,
since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondents Compromise Agreement, which
was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTC-
Branch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on
the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission
petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.27
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24
for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for
respondents presentation of evidence.
Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more
appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is
reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence
shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for
the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or
tribunal may either grant or deny.28
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be
granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer
to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim.
It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.29
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been
able to show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make
such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did
not take into consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24
dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res judicata, given the
Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
approving the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution
dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having dismissed Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an adjudication on the
merits of respondents demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to present
evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that
grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will
not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were
conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice
have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on
the balance, technicalities take backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around.30
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and set aside.
This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165016
June 17, 2008
DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, petitioners,

vs.
RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the September 29, 2003 Decision1 and the July 19, 2004
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944, which had reversed the May 28,
2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Naga City in Civil Case No.
RTC '99-4460.
The facts culled from the records are as follows.
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint4 for acknowledgment and support
against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son
Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support
to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as father.5
According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since
Laurence was born in 1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance
despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married,
and that Vasquez has his own family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines
Sur. Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother returned
the documents to the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons.6
Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack of
proper service of summons.7
In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int. President Garcia St., Zone 6,
Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila" upon petitioners' motion. Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff
served it by substituted service on Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return
incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname.8
Another alias summons9 was issued, also received by Bejer. The second sheriff's return states:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on the 19th day of July 2000 the undersigned sheriff caused
the service of summons issued by the court in the above-entitled case together with the
copy of the complaint and annexes attached thereon upon defendant RONNIE S.
VASQUEZ, by substituted service, thru his caretaker, RAQUEL BEJER, a person of
sufficient discretion, who acknowledged the receipt thereof at No. 10 Int. President
Garcia St. Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila, as evidenced by her signature
appearing at the lower portion of the original copy of summons.
WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to the court of origin DULY SERVED
for its records and information.
Taguig for Naga City, July 19, 2000
(SGD.)
ERNESTO G. RAYMUNDO, JR.,
Deputy Sheriff
MTC BR 74
Taguig, Metro Manila10
On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer
despite the substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices
of the proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as he had allegedly moved
to another place and left no new address.11
In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers, explaining that they had no ill-motive and that
Dolores gave a truthful testimony. The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the
allegations by his silence. It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a
public document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate filiation. The trial court
decreed:
WHEREFORE, by preponderant evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs Dolores Montefalcon and her minor child Laurence Montefalcon and against
defendant Ronnie S. Vasquez who is hereby ordered to:
1. Acknowledge plaintiff Laurence Montefalcon as his illegitimate child with Dolores
Montefalcon;
2. Give support to the said minor in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS monthly commencing on June 1, 1993, the past support for eight (8) years in the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (P480,000.00) PESOS less the
amount of NINETEEN THOUSAND (P19,000.00) PESOS previously given, shall be
paid promptly and the monthly support of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS shall
be paid not later than the end of each month beginning on July 31, 2001 and every end of
the month thereafter as prayed for in the complaint; and
3. Pay the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and THREE THOUSAND
(P3,000.00) PESOS as attorney's and appearance fees, respectively, and litigation
expenses of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.12
In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed.
Appeal was granted by the court.13 Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred
in trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in
awarding P5,000-per-month support, which was allegedly "excessive and exorbitant." The
appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was "defective" as there was no
explanation of impossibility of personal service and an attempt to effect personal service, and
decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
appealed May 28, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City in Civil Case
No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let this case be
REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioners argued in their motion for reconsideration15 that any attempt at personal service of
summons was needless as Vasquez already left for abroad. The appellate court, however, denied
the motion. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assign two appellate court errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IN
THIS CASE WAS NOT VALIDLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. RTC '99-4460; AND THAT
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ANNUL[L]ING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION (ANNEX "B") FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.16
Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had left as overseas seafarer
when the sheriff served the summons on July 19, 2000 in Taguig. Noting that Vasquez's seaman's
book indicated that he left the country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000,
they criticize the appellate court for anchoring its rulings on mere technicality.
Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons should have been personal or
by publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the country. Vasquez also
added that the sheriff's return did not state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the
summons.17
In their reply, petitioners insist that a substituted service is the normal method if one is
temporarily away from the country as personal service abroad or by publication are not ordinary
means of service.18
Simply put, the issues now for resolution are: (1) whether there is a valid substituted service of
summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with jurisdiction over his person; and (2) whether
he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.
To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal,19 or
if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service.20 It is of judicial notice
that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once
their contracts expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning
agency and principal if they wish. It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman often
has a temporary residence in the urban areas like Metro Manila, where majority of the manning
agencies hold offices, aside from his home address in the province where he originates. In this
case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City when the
complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either place.
Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer,
Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of summons on
him is governed by Rule 14, Section 16 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When any action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily
out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under
the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied.)
The preceding section referred to states:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or
the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or
claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the
court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
answer.
Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other
methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving
officer on a defendant-seaman.
Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons. But was personal service of summons
practicable? Conversely, was substituted service of summons justified?
Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since the defendant was temporarily
out of the country. To proceed with personal service of summons on a defendant-seaman who
went on overseas contract work would not only be impractical and futile it would also be
absurd.
The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the Naga City-based
sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve the summons personally on Vasquez.
When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the whereabouts of Vasquez. Upon
being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga court commissioned a Taguig City-based
sheriff to serve the summons. Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez's
whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort to substituted service. There was no
undue haste in effecting substituted service. The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable
time to locate Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there was indeed no precipitate haste in
serving the summons.
In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and justified because
previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the summons, but to no avail. Diligent
efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the concerned sheriffs in the performance of their
official duty. Also, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable age and
discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling. There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's
residence, as evidenced by his employment contract, executed under the supervision and
authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Vasquez cannot deny
that in his contract of employment and seafarer's information sheet, both bearing POEA's
letterhead, his address in Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the alias summons
that Bejer received. She must have informed Vasquez one way or another of the suit upon his
return in October 2000 after finishing his nine-month contract with Fathom Ship Management.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have the default order set aside. The
default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. He also had enough time to file a motion for
reconsideration. But he did nothing. The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at
personal service by the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in Camarines Sur to the final
substituted service in Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight months, a
reasonable time long enough to conclude that personal service had failed and was futile.
Montalban v. Maximo21 offers a rational and logical solution of the issue. We held in said case
that the normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted
service because personal service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of
summoning defendants. Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent resident
may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are always amenable to suits in
personam therein.22
"Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. A plaintiff is
merely required to know the defendant's residence, office or regular business place. He need not
know where a resident defendant actually is at the very moment of filing suit. He is not even
duty-bound to ensure that the person upon whom service was actually made delivers the
summons to the defendant or informs him about it. The law presumes that for him. It is
immaterial that defendant does not receive actual notice.
As well said in Montalban:
. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a
dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be
directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he
leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place
and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him
from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his
affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates
information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him
crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against
him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of
our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot
be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit
against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance
telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with
him.23
Aside from, at present, various forms of texting and short message services by the ubiquitous
cellular phones.
More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit. The absence in the final sheriff's
return of a statement about the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively prove that
the service is invalid. Such failure should not unduly prejudice petitioners if what was
undisclosed was in fact done. Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been
submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident assailing the validity of the
substituted service24 had Vasquez surfaced when the case was heard. In fact, he was declared in
default. It was only when a judgment against him was rendered by the trial court that he
questioned the validity of service of summons before the appellate court. Such failure to appear,
and then later to question the court's jurisdiction over his person, should not be taken against
herein petitioners.
Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to know of the case when his mother
told him about the trial court's decision and the sheriff's return on the substituted service which
carries a presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of more faith and credit.
The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts set out in it.
Only clear and convincing evidence may overcome its presumption of regularity. Given the
circumstances in the present case, we agree that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty on the part of the sheriff stands.25
On the second issue, the trial court's order must also be sustained. Co-petitioner Laurence is
legally entitled to support from the respondent, and the amount of P5,000 monthly set by the trial
court is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
Article 17526 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article
172,27 the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) through
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final order; or (2) by admission of filiation in a
public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or in
default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Laurence's record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece of evidence to prove
paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed
as father in Laurence's certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in
it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the
child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no
further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a
consummated act.28
As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners were able to
prove that Laurence needs Vasquez's support and that Vasquez is capable of giving such support.
Dolores testified that she spent around P200,000 for Laurence; she spends P8,000 a month for
his schooling and their subsistence. She told the lower court Vasquez was earning US$535
monthly based on his January 10, 2000 contract of employment29 with Fathom Ship Management
and his seafarer information sheet.30 That income, if converted at the prevailing rate, would be
more than sufficient to cover the monthly support for Laurence.
Under Article 195 (4)31 of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate child.
The amount is variable. There is no final judgment thereof as it shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.32 It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.33 Support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.34 Under the premises, the
award of P5,000 monthly support to Laurence is reasonable, and not excessive nor exorbitant.
In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the substituted service of
summons and remanding the case. As there was valid substituted service of summons under the
circumstances of this case, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over his person and correctly
ordered him to pay past and present monthly support to his illegitimate child as well as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses to petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 29, 2003 and
Resolution dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against respondent.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181132
June 5, 2009
HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA

PANGILINAN MARAMAG, Petitioners,
vs.
EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL
BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, seeking to reverse and set
aside the Resolution2 dated January 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
85948, dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The case stems from a petition3 filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
29, for revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto
Maramag (Loreto), while respondents were Loretos illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman
Maramag (Eva) was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is
disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. (Insular)4 and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);5 (3) the
illegitimate children of LoretoOdessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angeliewere entitled only to
one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the proceeds released to Odessa and
those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced;
and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among
others, that part of the insurance proceeds had already been released in favor of Odessa, while
the rest of the proceeds are to be released in favor of Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie, both minors,
upon the appointment of their legal guardian. Petitioners also prayed for the total amount of
P320,000.00 as actual litigation expenses and attorneys fees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa,
Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the
insurance proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal
wife of Loreto, it disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released
Odessas share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and
Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint
or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation
of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070
and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as
inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no settlement
of Loretos estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the heirs been determined.
Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children
of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated
as an insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation in
his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years
old when he signed it in September 2001; that the case was premature, there being no claim filed
by the legitimate family of Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where the
designation of insurance beneficiaries is clear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to
petitioners, summons by publication was resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family of Loreto failed
to file their answer. Hence, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, declared them in default in
its Order dated May 7, 2004.
During the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife moved that the issues raised in
their respective answers be resolved first. The trial court ordered petitioners to comment within
15 days.
In their comment, petitioners alleged that the issue raised by Insular and Grepalife was purely
legal whether the complaint itself was proper or not and that the designation of a beneficiary
is an act of liberality or a donation and, therefore, subject to the provisions of Articles 7528 and
7729 of the Civil Code.
In reply, both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong exclusively to
the designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate or to the heirs of the insured.
Grepalife also reiterated that it had disqualified Eva as a beneficiary when it ascertained that
Loreto was legally married to Vicenta Pangilinan Maramag.
On September 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of defendants Insular Life and
Grepalife is granted with respect to defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Maramag. The
action shall proceed with respect to the other defendants Eva Verna de Guzman, Insular Life and
Grepalife.
SO ORDERED.10
In so ruling, the trial court ratiocinated thus
Art. 2011 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of insurance is governed by the (sic)
special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be regulated by this
Code. The principal law on insurance is the Insurance Code, as amended. Only in case of
deficiency in the Insurance Code that the Civil Code may be resorted to. (Enriquez v. Sun Life
Assurance Co., 41 Phil. 269.)
The Insurance Code, as amended, contains a provision regarding to whom the insurance
proceeds shall be paid. It is very clear under Sec. 53 thereof that the insurance proceeds shall be
applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is
made, unless otherwise specified in the policy. Since the defendants are the ones named as the
primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the deceased Loreto C. Maramag and
there is no showing that herein plaintiffs were also included as beneficiary (sic) therein the
insurance proceeds shall exclusively be paid to them. This is because the beneficiary has a vested
right to the indemnity, unless the insured reserves the right to change the beneficiary. (Grecio v.
Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada, 48 Phil. [sic] 63).
Neither could the plaintiffs invoked (sic) the law on donations or the rules on testamentary
succession in order to defeat the right of herein defendants to collect the insurance indemnity.
The beneficiary in a contract of insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The
rules on testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does not partake
of a donation. As such, the insurance indemnity cannot be considered as an advance of the
inheritance which can be subject to collation (Del Val v. Del Val, 29 Phil. 534). In the case of
Southern Luzon Employees Association v. Juanita Golpeo, et al., the Honorable Supreme Court
made the following pronouncements[:]
"With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy belongs
exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate property, we agree that the proceeds
of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person
whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the
beneficiary and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America.
We believe that the same doctrine obtains in these Islands by virtue of Section 428 of the Code of
Commerce x x x."
In [the] light of the above pronouncements, it is very clear that the plaintiffs has (sic) no
sufficient cause of action against defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie Maramag for
the reduction and/or declaration of inofficiousness of donation as primary beneficiary (sic) in the
insurances (sic) of the late Loreto C. Maramag.
However, herein plaintiffs are not totally bereft of any cause of action. One of the named
beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the late Loreto C. Maramag is his concubine
Eva Verna De Guzman. Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article
739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy of the person who cannot make any
donation to him, according to said article (Art. 2012, Civil Code). If a concubine is made the
beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract will still remain valid, but the indemnity
must go to the legal heirs and not to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art.
2012 is the naming of the improper beneficiary. In such case, the action for the declaration of
nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee, and the guilt of the donor and donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action (Comment of Edgardo L. Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines, page 897). Since the designation of defendant Eva Verna de
Guzman as one of the primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the late Loreto C.
Maramag is void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code, the insurance indemnity that should be paid to
her must go to the legal heirs of the deceased which this court may properly take cognizance as
the action for the declaration for the nullity of a void donation falls within the general
jurisdiction of this Court.11
Insular12 and Grepalife13 filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main,
that the petition failed to state a cause of action. Insular further averred that the proceeds were
divided among the three children as the remaining named beneficiaries. Grepalife, for its part,
also alleged that the premiums paid had already been refunded.
Petitioners, in their comment, reiterated their earlier arguments and posited that whether the
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action must be determined solely on
the basis of the allegations in the complaint, such that the defenses of Insular and Grepalife
would be better threshed out during trial.1avvphi1
On June 16, 2005, the trial court issued a Resolution, disposing, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
defendants Grepalife and Insular Life are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the portion of the
Resolution of this Court dated 21 September 2004 which ordered the prosecution of the case
against defendant Eva Verna De Guzman, Grepalife and Insular Life is hereby SET ASIDE, and
the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
In granting the motions for reconsideration of Insular and Grepalife, the trial court considered the
allegations of Insular that Loreto revoked the designation of Eva in one policy and that Insular
disqualified her as a beneficiary in the other policy such that the entire proceeds would be paid to
the illegitimate children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code. It
ruled that it is only in cases where there are no beneficiaries designated, or when the only
designated beneficiary is disqualified, that the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the
insured. As to the claim that the proceeds to be paid to Loretos illegitimate children should be
reduced based on the rules on legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance
proceeds is governed primarily by the Insurance Code, and the provisions of the Civil Code are
irrelevant and inapplicable. With respect to the Grepalife policy, the trial court noted that Eva
was never designated as a beneficiary, but only Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie; thus, it
upheld the dismissal of the case as to the illegitimate children. It further held that the matter of
Loretos misrepresentation was premature; the appropriate action may be filed only upon denial
of the claim of the named beneficiaries for the insurance proceeds by Grepalife.
Petitioners appealed the June 16, 2005 Resolution to the CA, but it dismissed the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action involved a pure question of law. The appellate court also noted that
petitioners did not file within the reglementary period a motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts Resolution, dated September 21, 2004, dismissing the complaint as against Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie; thus, the said Resolution had already attained finality.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
a. In determining the merits of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action,
may the Court consider matters which were not alleged in the Complaint, particularly the
defenses put up by the defendants in their Answer?
b. In granting a motion for reconsideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action, did not the Regional Trial Court engage in the examination and
determination of what were the facts and their probative value, or the truth thereof, when
it premised the dismissal on allegations of the defendants in their answer which had not
been proven?
c. x x x (A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the
insurance for the concubine?15
In essence, petitioners posit that their petition before the trial court should not have been
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because the finding that Eva was either
disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance companies or that her designation was revoked by
Loreto, hypothetically admitted as true, was raised only in the answers and motions for
reconsideration of both Insular and Grepalife. They argue that for a motion to dismiss to prosper
on that ground, only the allegations in the complaint should be considered. They further contend
that, even assuming Insular disqualified Eva as a beneficiary, her share should not have been
distributed to her children with Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs
of the insured deceased, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
The petition should be denied.
The grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial courts finding that the petition failed to
state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section 1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act
or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action.17
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on
the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on
whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is
the general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical
admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2. such allegations are legally impossible;
3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or
in the course of the hearings related to the case.18
In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are
the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies
issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of
Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the
insurance policies, and that Evas children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to
a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the
Insurance Code,19 Evas share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former
having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of
the shares of Loretos illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs
of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable
judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance
Code states
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the
person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are
either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the
maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract
was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable
stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the
insurer.21
Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are
not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a
beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment
considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance
policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the
children of illicit relationships by the insured,22 the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the
Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be
awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of
petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,23 or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the insurance policy
proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the
same light, the Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue of failure to state a
cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there being no findings of fact in the first
place.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177728
July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO,"
represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and
then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents
Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005,
Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner
minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs
Certificate of Live Birth,2 Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father
Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had
never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY"
which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of
which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20
THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE
BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS
AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN
WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND
AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR
HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S.
Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their
Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as
the Family Code of the Philippines"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed
by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall
use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father
and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock
and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539,
which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of
registration of the childs name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased
father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10
which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of
paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted
provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was
declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her commonlaw relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his
lifetime, he had acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief.12 Dominiques lone brother,
Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of
action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing
the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through
which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and
duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.1avvphi1
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely
legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE
DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT"
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS
AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS
SURNAME.15 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require
that the private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity
must be signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the
Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void
as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the childs paternity.17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents position, as
affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenies
pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use
the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a
public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence, no separate action
for judicial approval is necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the
Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his
signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of
A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the
import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in
the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled
from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his
brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the
questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the
child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE"
as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR
THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing
filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its
members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of
paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made
by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father. A
notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent
to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be
taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are
sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques
Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts
extant herein that Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as commonlaw spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan,
Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two
months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the child of
Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules
respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is
made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to
prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must
be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and
competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been
made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving
questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child
of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration.23 (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as
parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to
petitioner minor childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased
Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is
DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas
Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183965
September 18, 2009
JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated
25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the
demurrer to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the RTC a Petition1 for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene when the latter was giving birth to
petitioner on 27 April 1959, and instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with the
following names: "ALFREDO F. SURPOSA" as father and "IRENE DUCAY" as mother.
Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden surname
of Irenes mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan. Respondent had
consistently and regularly given petitioner allowances before she got married. He also provided
her with employment. When petitioner was still in high school, respondent required her to work
at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work at the
Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondents efforts. Petitioner and Allan were introduced to
each other and became known in the Chinese community as respondents illegitimate children.
During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his
representative, and it was the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondents relatives even
attended the baptism of petitioners daughter.2
In his Answer3 to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003, respondent denied that he had an
illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner was his daughter.4 Hearings then ensued during
which petitioner testified that respondent was the only father she knew; that he took care of all
her needs until she finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on special family
occasions. She also presented documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence5 on the ground that
the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had
already been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch
24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003,
petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to
RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise Agreement in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision6 dated
21 February 2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:
Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the parties on February 18, 2000,
praying that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which
follows:
"1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no
blood relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and
[herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This declaration, admission or
acknowledgement is concurred with petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party
to the case, hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by the declaration
herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and her brothers (Allan)
civil, monetary and similar claims but without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE
NGO CHUA hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her
brother, ALLAN SURPOSA. Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have
received in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they have absolutely no more
claims, causes of action or demands against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs, successors
and assigns and/or against all corporations, companies or business enterprises including
Cebu Liberty Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development Corporation
where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO NGO CHUA may have interest or
participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim or counter-demand
with respect to the subject matter of the present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a judgment for the permanent
dismissal with prejudice of the captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment
permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim."
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court hereby approves the same.
Judgment is rendered in accordance with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The
parties are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings embodied in the agreement.7
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February 2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding 8830-CEB was declared final and executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to respondents Demurrer to Evidence in

Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondents
Demurrer.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and petitioner in the Demurrer and
Opposition, respectively, as follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the Evidence submitted to this Court;
the Opposition thereto; the Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
xxxx
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata because there was a judgment
entered based on the Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court,
branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or
alteration by another Regional Trial Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter
how erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioners pleadings to the effect that there is no
blood relationship between petitioner and respondent, which is a declaration against
interest, are conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioners father is Alfredo Surposa is
a public document which is the evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by
judicial order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their compromise agreement,
she is estopped from refuting on the effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein
respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is established by the open, and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative grounds for a Motion to
Dismiss.
3. The question on the civil status, future support and future legitime can not be subject to
compromise.
4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another action asking for the
same relief against the same defendant.9
Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court believes that its hands are tied.
Unless the Court of Appeals strikes down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not attempt to vacate, much more annul,
that Judgment issued by a co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and in fact
executed.
This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do otherwise would result in patent
abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of jurisdiction
cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.
This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of allowing herein case involving same
parties to re-litigate on the same issues already closed.10
In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the Evidence is hereby given due
course, as the herein case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.11
RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration12 in a Resolution13 dated 29 July
2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following issues for resolution of this Court:
I
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to judgments predicated upon a
compromise agreement on cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case.14
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondents Demurrer to
Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that
petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.a1f
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or resolution of
the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact exists, on the
other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the
law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.15
The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into between
petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February
2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.1avvphi1
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence
and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1)
public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there should be an end
to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual that he
should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.16
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.17
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before RTC-Branch 9, and
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner against respondent. Hence, there is
apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases. However,
the question arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced.18 In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic,19 the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A
judgment based on a compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a compromise agreement must
comply with the requisites in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of
the obligation that is established. And, like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a
compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and
public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is null and void,
and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for any party. It produces no legal effect at all.20
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code,
which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent, executed on 18 February 2000
and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e.,
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and her brother
Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent, respondent would pay
petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary consequence
of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her rights to future support and
future legitime as an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement
dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered by the prohibition under
Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula21 has a factual background closely similar to the one at bar. Manuela
Advincula (Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No.
3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both
parties, said case was dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same
court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court
declared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent
filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case
No. 3553 was an action for acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status, which cannot be
the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.22 Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties.23
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000
between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations.
It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the
parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.24
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said
contract valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9
to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch 9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a
Compromise Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was
executed and submitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent,
under any circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise Agreement. No court can
allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the
Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta25 is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a
matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a
competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable before it, but whether the court itself
is competent under any circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where
there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and
consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives from the
sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision of law, as its agent to
pronounce its decrees in controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on
it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight,
or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.26
In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 is not barred by res judicata,
since RTC-Branch 9 had no jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondents Compromise Agreement, which
was contrary to law and public policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for having been rendered by RTCBranch 9 without jurisdiction, could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment on
the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission
petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of filiation.27
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding this case to the RTC-Branch 24
for the continuation of hearing on Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for
respondents presentation of evidence.
Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more
appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is
reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant
having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence
shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for
the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or
tribunal may either grant or deny.28
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be
granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer
to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim.
It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.29
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been
able to show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make
such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did
not take into consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24
dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res judicata, given the
Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,
approving the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution
dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having dismissed Special
Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an adjudication on the
merits of respondents demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to present
evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail. When there is a strong showing that
grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will
not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. The Rules of Court were
conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice
have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on
the balance, technicalities take backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around.30
WhereforE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 24, in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and set aside.
This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with the ruling of the Court herein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193161
August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the reversal of the April 30, 2009
Decision1 and July 21, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
74531-MIN, entitled Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Avila Parreo v. Hon. Erasto D.
Salcedo, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC (Branch 2), Tagum City, and Diosdado Salinas
(Manungas). The CA Decision set aside as null and void the Order dated November 4, 20023 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao del Norte, in Special
Proceedings No. 708 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Engracia N.
Vda de Manungas, Diosdado Manungas, petitioner, wherein the RTC reversed its appointment of
respondent Florencia Avila Parreo (Parreo) as the special administrator of the estate of
Engracia Manungas and appointed petitioner Diosdado Salinas Manungas (Diosdado) in her
stead.
The Facts
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they
adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on
May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother.4 Avila was survived by his wife
Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. There,
she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for
herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino
Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avilas widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October
29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia
Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and
Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs.6
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreo, the niece of
Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent
aunt.7
Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the spouses
Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed that
Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed beyond
the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a summary
judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and to
restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to
the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC.8 On appeal to
this Court, defendants petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution
which became final on April 20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before
the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas.10 The petition was opposed by Margarita
Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreo alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of
the Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia
Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a
debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of
a Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an
Order appointing Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Florencia A. Parreo is hereby appointed as Special
Administrator of the property of the late Engracia N. Vda. de Manungas. The Special
Administrator is hereby directed to post a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to Sec. 4
of Rule 81.
SO ORDERED.11
Diosdado filed a Motion for Reconsideration with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction.12 In his motion, Diosdado argued that Parreos appointment as special
administrator of the Estate of Manungas was by virtue of her being the judicial guardian of the
latter but which relation ceased upon Engracia Manungas death, concluding that her
appointment as special administrator was without basis. He added that Parreo was not fit to
become a special administrator having already been fined by the court for failing to render a
timely accounting of Engracia Manungas property as her judicial guardian. Diosdado also
reasoned that Parreo is a mere niece, a collateral relative, of Engracia Manungas, while he is the
illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On November 4, 2002, the RTC issued an Order reversing itself and ordering the revocation of
its earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas while
appointing Diosdado as the Special Administrator.13
Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. The CA issued its assailed April
30, 2009 Decision finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking its
earlier appointment of Parreo as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas and appointing
Diosdado instead. The CA further reinstated Parreo as the special administrator of the estate.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated November 4,
2002 setting aside the appointment of Florencia Parreo as special administrator of the estate of
the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas, and denying the property bond posted by Florencia Parreo
[is] hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE as having been issued by Public
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, Davao del Norte with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.14
Diosdado assailed the CA Decision in a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 15, 200915 which
the CA denied in the July 21, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, We have this petition.
The Issues
Diosdado raises the following issues:
The Court a Quo utterly disregarded the jurisprudence that certiorari cannot be a substitute for an
appeal where the latter remedy is available.16
The Court a Quo in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration grossly violated the rule
that once a decision or order is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.17
The Court a Quo committed a grave error when it ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner,
Diosdado Manungas as judicial administrator and reinstating the appointment of Florencia
Parreo as special administrator.18
The Court a Quo gravely erred in [giving] due course to oppositors petition that is flawed.19
The Courts Ruling
The petition must be denied.
The RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order
The first two issues raised by Diosdado revolve around the issue of whether the RTC Order dated
November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.
Diosdado alleges that, following the ruling of this Court that Certiorari cannot be the substitute
for a lost appeal, Parreo should have appealed the RTC Order dated November 4, 2002 to the
CA through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Diosdado
contends that the Order dated November 4, 2002 became final and executory, Parreo having
failed to file the petition within the reglementary period; thus, the Order cannot be the subject of
review even by this Court. However, Diosdados position assumes that the RTC Order dated
November 4, 2002 is a final order instead of an interlocutory order.
In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua,20 the Court stated what an interlocutory order is:
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task
of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory",
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules x x x. Unlike a final
judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case.
The Court has considered an appointment of a special administrator as an interlocutory or
preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or
intestate proceeding. In Ocampo v. Ocampo,21 the Court succinctly held, "The appointment or
removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court."
With such categorical ruling of the Court, the Order dated November 4, 2002 is clearly an
interlocutory order. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court as argued by petitioner. The proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Thus, Section 1(c) of Rule 41 states:
Section 1. Subject of appeal.
An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Verily, respondents made use of the proper mode of review by filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CA. Respondents filed the petition well within the prescribed period
under this rule.
There was no necessity to file a motion for reconsideration
As properly noted by petitioner, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is required
before a decision may be appealed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under the rule,
there must be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as
a motion for reconsideration, to justify the filing of a petition for certiorari. Thus, petitioner
argues that respondents failure to move for the reconsideration of the Order dated November 4,
2002 is fatal to an appeal from it. Such general rule, however, admits of exceptions as explained
in Delos Reyes v. Flores:22
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are
available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, such as a motion for reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another
adequate remedy is available for the correction of the error. x x x However, there are several
exceptions where a petition for certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for
reconsideration, to wit:
xxxx
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule. An examination of the issues raised
by respondents in appealing the Order dated November 4, 2002, reveals that the issues are only
questions of law. Ergo, there is no need for a motion for reconsideration.
In addition, the Court has even allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari despite the existence
of an appeal or other appropriate remedy in several instances, including when the court a quo
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed order.23
Thus, while respondent failed to move for the reconsideration of the November 4, 2002 Order of
the RTC, a petition for certiorari may still prosper, as in this case.
The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion

The lower court stated in its November 4, 2002 Order that:
After carefully scrutinizing the arguments and grounds raised by both petitioner and oppositors,
this Court finds merit in the contention of petitioner. In the case of Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals, 298 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court ruled:
The presence of illegitimate children precludes succession by collateral relatives to his estate;
Diosdado Manungas, being the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas inherits the latters
property by operation of law;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the order appointing Florencia Parreo as special
administrator of the estate of the late Engracia Vda. de Manungas is ordered set aside.
Such reasoning is a non sequitur.
The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is
entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion
of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel,24 it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons
to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions
as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now
Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the
law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or
equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:
While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in
their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate
court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those
enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the
issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of
Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the
discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal
principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and
legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special
administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec.
2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of
the deceased unless so ordered by the court.1avvphi1
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart
from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the
estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as
Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdados contention that he is the
illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado
is not related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latters estate. On
the other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive
and who is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her
late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the
decedents estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia
Avila Parreo as special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower
court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must
be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution.27 With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas,
is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its
value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.
Consequently, with the setting aside of the November 4, 2002 Order of the trial court, reversing
its May 15, 2002 Order and appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas estate, the May 15, 2002 Order is necessarily reinstated and Parreos appointment as
special administrator is revived.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The CAs April 30, 2009 Decision and July 21,
2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 74531-MIN declaring as null and void the November 4,
2002 Order of the RTC in Special Proceedings No. 708 are AFFIRMED. Consequently, the
Order dated May 15, 2002 of the RTC is hereby REINSTATED and Florencia Avila Parreo is
REINSTATED as the special administrator of the estate of Engracia Manungas.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165166
August 15, 2012
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to
challenge the March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide
legal support to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the parties failure to
amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.6 Trial on the merits
ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a
casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started
courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the
last week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special
occasions, such as on Valentines Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care
of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent
in the formers rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle,
on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from
March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became
more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she
was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry
the respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage license.14 The petitioner even inquired about
the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner
backed out of the wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the petitioner did not
show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24,
1995 demanding recognition of and support for their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer
the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity,22
claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and
she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion,24 granted a P2,000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of
when she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct
testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for
engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It
ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to
pay P 10,000.00 as attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents
testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the
questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner,
from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside
the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated
the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs
appreciation of the respondents testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to
prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the
respondents testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the
record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several
intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes
birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the
RTCs findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son
Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity
but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this
case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that
the putative father is the biological father of the child."31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained
that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that
she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner
and the respondent had intimate relationship.39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent,
only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was
physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in
September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations,
therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial
cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondents direct
testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her crosstestimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as
follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted
from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding
was later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory
statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was
incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel)
but the latter took no action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony
is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the
respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The
respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner
sometime in September 1993.44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged
to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support
is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase
of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the
filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears,
considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision
and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 206248
February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24,
2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time
lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8,
1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by
respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties
relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval
of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized
Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio,
ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be
promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent
Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonios] prayer for
recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith
issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the
name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective
Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the
surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over
the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties minor
children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios]
residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes] custody
from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre
Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the
Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of
the country, without the written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis
Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70%
for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the
trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC
for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to
the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified
in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in
part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City
are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of
Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis
to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is
hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the
children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his
children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable
to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
"ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only
did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his
acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason
to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally
inherent and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the
minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via
the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their
mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art.
176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has
the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation
of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors
from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under
Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But
he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over
the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis
for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken
to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16
Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no
legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one
must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate
children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be
measured is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and
again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor
child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue
using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best
interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of
the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the childs
father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second only to the rule
requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an
illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his identity,
his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child.
For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be
affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper
remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with
all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he
was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A
change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to
his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
(Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname
upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed
by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the
surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of
the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of
the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname
of the father upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument
supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the
age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of
Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF
shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant
to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of
Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or
AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in
the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from
(original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act.
In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the
power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative

agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or
the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional
prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25
Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255
insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname upon
the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate
fathers surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the
surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and
fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial
court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the children's choice of
surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which
shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in
part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis
to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is
hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the
children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for
the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45349 August 15, 1988
NEWTON JISON and SALVACION I. JOSUE petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERT 0. PHILLIPS & SONS, INC., respondents.
Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioners.
Domicador L. Reyes and Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The instant petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals poses the issue of the validity of the rescission of a contract to sell a
subdivision lot due to the failure of the lot buyer to pay monthly installments on their due dates and the forfeiture of the amounts already paid.
The case is not one of first impression, and neither is it exceptional. On the contrary, it unambiguous. the common plight of countless
subdivision lot buyers.
Petitioners, the spouses Newton and Salvacion Jison, entered into a Contract to Sell with private respondent, Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc.,
whereby the latter agreed to sell to the former a lot at the Victoria Valley Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal for the agreed price of P55,000.00,
with interest at 8,1965 per annum, payable on an installment basis.
Pursuant to the contract, petitioners paid private respondents a down payment of P11,000.00 on October 20, 1961 and from October 27,
1961; to May 8, 1965 a monthly installment of P533.85.
Thereafter, due to the failure of petitioners to build a house as provided in the contract, the stipulated penalty of P5.00 per square meter was
imposed to the effect that the monthly amortization was increased to P707.24.
On January 1, 1966, February 1, 1966 and March 1, 1966, petitioners failed to pay the monthly installments due on said dates although
petitioners subsequently paid the amounts due and these were accepted by private respondent.
Again on October 1, 1966, November 1, 1966, December 1, 1966 and January 1, 1967, petitioners failed to pay. On January 11, 1967,
private respondent sent a letter (Exh. "3") to petitioners calling their attention to the fact that their account was four months overdue. This
letter was followed up by another letter dated February 27, 1967 (Exh. "3") where private respondent reminded petitioner of the automatic
rescission clause of the contract. Petitioners eventually paid on March 1, 1967.
Petitioners again failed to pay the monthly installments due on February 1, 1967, March 1, 1967 and April 1, 1967. Thus, in a letter dated
April 6, 1967 (Exh. "D"), private respondent returned petitioners' check and informed them that the contract was cancelled when on April 1,
1987 petitioners failed to pay the monthly installment due, thereby making their account delinquent for three months.
On April 19, 1967, petitioners tendered payment for all the installments already due but the tender was refused. Thus, petitioners countered
by filing a complaint for specific performance with the Court of First Instance of Rizal on May 4, 1967 and consigning the monthly installments
due with the court.
Following the hearing of the case, wherein the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court on January 9, 1969 rendered judgment
in favor of private respondent, dismissing the complaint and declaring the contract cancelled and all payments already made by petitioner
franchise. ordering petitioners to pay P1,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and declaring the consignation and tender of payment made by
petitioners as not amounting to payment of the corresponding monthly installments.
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Agreeing with the findings and conclusions of
the trial court, the Court of Appeals on November 4, 1976 affirmed the former's decision.
Thus, the instant petition for review.
In assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners attributed the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY, COMPLIED WITH
THE TERMS OF THEIR AGREEMENT WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONTRACT TO SELL MAY BE AUTOMATICALLY RESCINDED
AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY UNILATERALLY RESCINDED SAID CONTRACT AND REJECT THE CONSIGNATION OF PAYMENTS
MADE BY PETITIONERS, WHICH ACTIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARE HIGHLY INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ACT OF FORFEITING ALL
PREVIOUS PAYMENTS MADE BY PETITIONERS IS CONTRARY TO LAW, HIGHLY INIQUITOUS AND UNCONSCIONABLE. [Petitioners'
Brief, pp. 13-27.]
As stated at the outset, the principal issue in this case is the legality of the rescission of the contract and the forfeiture of the payments
already made by petitioners.
To support the rescission and forfeiture private respondent falls back on paragraph 3 of the contract which reads:
This contract shall be considered automatically rescinded and cancelled and of no further force and effect, upon the
failure of the Vendee to pay when due Three (3) or more consecutive monthly installments mentioned in Paragraph 2 of
this Contract, or to comply with any of the terms and conditions hereof, in which case the Vendor shall have the right to
resell the said parcel of land to any Vendee and any amount derived from the sale on account hereof shall be forfeited
in favor of the Vendor as liquidated damages for the breach of the Contract by the Vendee, the latter hereby renouncing
and reconveying absolutely and forever in favor of the Vendor all rights and claims to and for all the amount paid by the
Vendee on account of the Contract, as well as to and for all compensation of any kind, hereby also agreeing in this
connection, to forthwith vacate the said property or properties peacefully without further advise of any kind.
Since the contract was executed and cancelled prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 65856, (the Realty Installment Buyers', Protection
Act) and Presidential Decree No. 957 (the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree), it becomes necessary to resort to
jurisprudence and the general provisions of law to resolve the controversy.
The decision in the recent case of Palay, Inc. v. Clave [G.R. No. L-56076, September 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 7,1969, factions the resolution of
the controversy. In deciding whether the rescission of the contract to sell a subdivision lot after the lot buyer has failed to pay several
installments was valid, the Court said:
Well settled is the rule, as held in previous k.- [Torralba v. De los Angeles, 96 SCRA 69, Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v.
Maritime Building Co., 43 SCRA 93 and 86 SCRA 305; Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327; U.P. v. De
los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102; Ponce Enrile v. CA, 29 SCRA 504; Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 12 SCRA 276;
Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao; 43 Phil. 896, that judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. However, even in the cited
cases, there was at least a written notice sent to the degeneration, informing him of the rescission. As stressed in
University of the Philippines v. Walfrido de los Angeles [35 SCRA 102] the act of a party in treating a contract as
cancelled should be made known to the other....
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, resolution of reciprocal contracts may be made extrajudicially unless successfully impugned in Court. If
the debtor impugns the declaration it shall be subject to judicial determination.
In this case, private respondent has denied that rescission is justified and has resorted to judicial action. It is now for
the Court to determine whether resolution of the contract by petitioner was warranted.
We hold that resolution by petitioners of the contract was ineffective and inoperative against private respondent for lack
of notice of resolution, as held in the U.P. v. Angeles case, supra.
xxx xxx xxx
The indispensability of notice of cancellation to the buyer was to be later underscored in Republic Act No. 65856,
entitled "An Act to Provide Protection to Buyers of Real Estate on Installment Payments." which took effect on
September 14-15). when it specifically provided:
Sec. 3 (b) ... the actual cataract, of the contract shall take place thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender
value to the buyer.
There is no denying that in the instant case the resolution or rescission of the Contract to Sell was valid. Neither can it be said that the
cancellation of the contract was ineffective for failure of private respondents to give petitioners notice thereof as petitioners were informed
cancelled private respondent that the contract was cancelled in the letter dated April 6, 1967 (Exh. "D"). As R.A. No. 65856, was not yet
effective, the notice of cancellation need not be by notarial act, private respondent's letter being sufficient compliance with the legal
requirement.
The facts of 'fee instant case should be distinguished from those in the Palay Inc. case, as such distinction will explain why the Court in said
case invalidated the resolution of the contract. In said case, the subdivision developer, without informing the buyer of the cancellation of the
contract, resold the lot to another person. The lot buyer in said case was only informed of the resolution of the contract some six years later
after the developer, rejected his request for authority to assign his rights under the contract. Such a situation does not obtain illness: the
instant case. In fact, petitioners were informed of the cancellation of their contract in April 1967, when private respondent wrote them the
letter dated April 6, 1967 (Exh. "D"), and within a month they were able to file a complaint against Private respondent.
While the resolution of the contract and the forfeiture of the amounts already paid are valid and binding upon petitioners, the Court is
convinced that the forfeiture of the amount of P5.00 although it includes the accumulated fines for petitioners' failure to construct a house as
required by the contract, is clearly iniquitous considering that the contract price is only P6,173.15 The forfeiture of fifty percent (50%) of the
amount already paid, or P3,283.75 appears to be a fair settlement. In arriving at this amount the Court gives weight to the fact that although
petitioners have been delinquent in paying their amortizations several times to the prejudice of private respondent, with the cancellation of
the contract the possession of the lot review.... to private respondent who is free to resell it to another party. Also, had R.A. No. 65856, been
applicable to the instant case, the same percentage of the amount already paid would have been forfeited [Torralba 3(b).]
The Court's decision to reduce the amount forfeited finds support in the Civil Code. As stated in paragraph 3 of the contract, in case the
contract is cancelled, the amounts already paid shall be forfeited in favor of the vendor as liquidated damages. The Code provides that
liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable [Art.
2227.]
Further, in obligations with a penal clause, the judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor [Art. 1229; Hodges v. Javellana, G.R. No. L-17247, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1228]. In this connection,
the Court said:
It follows that, in any case wherein there has been a partial or irregular compliance with the provisions in a contract for
special indemnification in the event of failure to comply with its terms, courts will rigidly apply the doctrine of strict
construction and against the enforcement in its entirety of the industry.' where it is clear from the terms of the contract
that the amount or character of the indemnity is fixed without regard to the probable damages which might be
anticipated as a result of a breach of the terms of the contract; or, in other words, where the indemnity provided for is
essentially a mere penalty having for its principal object the enforcement of compliance with the corporations;
(Laureano v. Kilayco, 32 Phil. 194 (1943).
This principle was reiterated in Makati Development Corp. v. Empire Insurance Co. [G.R. No. L-21780, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 557] where
the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance reducing the subdivision lot buyer's liability from the stipulated P12,000.00 to
Plaintiffs after finding that he had partially performed his obligation to complete at least fifty percent (50%) of his house within two (2) years
from March 31, 1961, fifty percent (50%) of the house having been completed by the end of April 1961.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as to the amount forfeited which is reduced to fifty percent (50%)
of the amount already paid or P23,656.32 and AFFIRMED as to all other respects.
Private respondent is ordered to refund to petitioners the excess of P23,656.32 within thirty (30) days from the date of finality of this
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan , C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141273
May 17, 2005
JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MARY JANE DY CHIAO*-DE GUZMAN, and BENITO DY
CHIAO, JR., represented by his uncle HENRY S. DY CHIAO, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 44261 annulling the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City,
Branch 19, in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
The Antecedents
On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint2 against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De
Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga
City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.,
and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995.
Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo, filed the
complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.'s wife, was not impleaded as she had died on
July 7, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. RTC 96-3612 and raffled to Branch 19 of
the court.3
Benedick, whose counsel was Atty. Amador L. Simando, made the following allegations in his
complaint:
During his lifetime, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. was engaged in business, under the business name
Benito Commercial in Naga City. He courted Shirley Arevalo (Benedick's mother) in 1991,
assuring her of his sincere love, likewise promising that her college education would be financed
and that she would be provided with a better life. Blinded by his promises and assurances of his
love for her, Shirley agreed to an amorous relationship with Benito, Sr. True to his word, Benito,
Sr. then provided her with a residential house and lot located in Canaman, Camarines Sur, where
they cohabited and resided; he also financed her college education in midwifery. On October 5,
1995, "Benedick Arevalo Dy Chiao, Jr.," the plaintiff, was born, the product of the amorous
relationship, whom Benito, Sr. acknowledged as his son. He also continued to give Shirley and
their son financial and moral support.
It was also alleged that the Dy Chiao siblings recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their
father. Moreover, when he died intestate, Benito, Sr. left behind residential lands and commercial
buildings worth P100,000,000.00, more or less; as such, there was a need for the appointment of
an administrator of the estate to preserve his (Benedick's) rights over the same before its
partition. It was prayed that upon the filing of the complaint, Benedick's mother be appointed as
his guardian ad litem, that an administrator of the estate of the deceased be appointed, and that
after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in favor of Benedick, as follows:
a. declaring the Plaintiff as the illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.
b. ordering herein Defendants to recognize and acknowledge the Plaintiff as the
illegitimate son of the late Benito Dy Chiao.
c. ordering the Partition of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao and distributing the same in
favor of the Defendants and herein Plaintiff in a manner provided for by law.
d. granting the Plaintiff such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the law.4
In an answer to the complaint, Mary Jane, through counsel, for herself, and purportedly in behalf
of her brothers, denied the allegations that Shirley and her father had an amorous relationship
and that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father for want of knowledge or information;
the allegation that they had recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father was,
likewise, specifically denied. Finally, she alleged that the plaintiff's action was for a claim against
the estate of their father, which should be filed in an action for the settlement of the estate of their
deceased parents.5
On October 28, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion,6 praying that the court order a mental
examination of the Dy Chiao brothers, who were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental
Hospital, and for the appointment of their sister as their guardian ad litem in the case. It was,
likewise, prayed that the director of the hospital be summoned to appear before the court to
inform it of the mental condition of the Dy Chiao brothers.
On December 6, 1996, Benedick filed a Motion7 set for hearing on December 9, 1996, reiterating
his plea for the appointment of Mary Jane as guardian ad litem of her brothers. That same day,
however, the plaintiff, through counsel, filed a "Compromise Agreement" dated November 24,
1996, with the following signatories to the agreement: Shirley Arevalo, for the plaintiff and
assisted by counsel, Atty. Amador L. Simando; and Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, assisted by
counsel, Atty. Adan Marcelo B. Botor, purportedly for and in behalf of her brothers.
Appended to the agreement was a photocopy of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)8 dated
September 20, 1995, notarized and certified by Atty. Edmundo L. Simando, purportedly signed
by the Dy Chiao brothers, who were then still confined in the hospital. Mary Jane was therein
appointed to be their attorney-in-fact, with the following powers:
1. To represent us in negotiations and be our representative with power to sign
Agreements or Contracts of Lease involving property and/or assets belonging to the
estate of our late father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr. while said estate is not yet settled between
(sic) all heirs; as well as to collect rentals and other money due to the estate by reason of
said agreements or contracts;
2. To file or cause to be filed the necessary proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
our late father, and to ask for letters of administration in her favor as a next of kin or as
someone selected by us, next of kin, to be the administrator.
On December 13, 1996, the trial court approved the agreement and rendered judgment on the
basis thereof, quoted as follows:
Before this Court is a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT entered into by and between the
parties in this case which is herein below quoted, thus:
"COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
Plaintiff and defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman duly assisted by their
respective counsels hereby submit the following Compromise Agreement:
1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the
plaintiff as the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.;
2. That in full satisfaction and settlement of plaintiff's claim from the estate of the
late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao De Guzman for herself
and in behalf of her brothers, who are likewise defendants in this case, hereby
agree and bind herself to pay the plaintiff the amount of P6,000,000.00 which
shall be taken from the estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., which amount shall
be payable under the following terms and conditions:
a. The amount of P1,500,000.00 shall be payable upon signing of this
Compromise Agreement;
b. The balance of P4,500,000.00 shall be payable within the period of one
year from the date of signing of this Compromise Agreement and for
which the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman shall issue twelve
(12) checks corresponding to the said balance in the amount of
P375,000.00 per check;
3. That the parties hereby waive other claims and counterclaims against each
other;
4. That any violation of this Compromise Agreement shall render the same to be
immediately executory.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the
foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved and a decision be rendered in
accordance therewith.
Naga City, Philippines, November 24, 1996.
(SGD.)
MARYJANE DY CHIAO-DE GUZMAN
Defendant
BENEDICK AREVALO
Plaintiff
represented by:
(SGD.)
SHIRLEY AREVALO
Natural Guardian & Guardian
Ad Litem
Assisted by:
(SGD.)
AMADOR L. SIMANDO
Counsel for the Plaintiff
(SGD.)
ADAN MARCELO BOTOR
Counsel for the Defendants"
WHEREFORE, finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be the law between the
parties, not being tainted with infirmities, irregularities, fraud and illegalities, and the
same not being contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals and good customs,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered APPROVING the same.
Parties are hereby enjoined to faithfully abide by the terms and conditions of the
foregoing Compromise Agreement.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.9
It appears that a copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the Dy Chiao brothers to the
"Benito Commercial Building, Naga City."
On December 17, 1996, Mary Jane, through Atty. Simando, (the counsel for Benedick in Civil
Case No. RTC'96-3612), filed a petition with the RTC for the settlement of the estate of her
father and for her appointment as administrator thereto. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. RTC96-684 and raffled to Branch 20 of the court; it was later transferred to
Branch 19.
On April 3, 1997, Benedick filed a Motion for Execution,10 of the Decision dated November 24,
1996, on the allegation that the defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the
compromise agreement. The trial court granted the motion in an Order11 dated April 7, 1997.
Conformably, it issued a Writ of Execution12 for the enforcement of the said decision.
On April 18, 1997, Benedick terminated the services of Atty. Simando since he was Mary Jane's
counsel in Special Proceedings No. 96-684.
On April 28, 1997, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property13 over five
parcels of land titled under Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., including the improvements thereon.
The Dy Chiao brothers, represented by their uncle, Henry S. Dy Chiao, then filed with the CA a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order dated May 27, 1997, assailing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
RTC'96-3612, as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto. The petition alleged that
the Dy Chiao brothers had no legal capacity to be sued because they were of unsound mind,
which impelled their uncle Henry to file a petition for guardianship over their person and
property, now pending in the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
RTC'97-695. They did not authorize their sister Mary Jane to execute any compromise agreement
for and in their behalf; yet, in confabulation with Benedick's counsel, she was able to secure a
judgment based on a void compromise agreement. It was further alleged that the Dy Chiao
brothers were unaware of the complaint against them and that they did not engage the services of
the law firm of Botor, Hidalgo & Fernando Associates to represent them as counsel in said cases.
As such, the said counsel had no authority to file the answer to the complaint for and in their
behalf. It was further pointed out that less than a month before the said compromise agreement
was executed by their sister, she filed purportedly in their behalf, on November 22, 1996, a
petition for the settlement of the estate of their parents in the RTC of Naga City, with the
assistance of Atty. Simando (Benedick's counsel), as well as for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. RTC'96-684.14 There was thus
collusion between Mary Jane and Atty. Simando.
The Dy Chiao brothers, likewise, opposed the appointment of their sister as the administrator of
their parents' estate.15 The verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the petition
was signed by their uncle Henry as their representative.
On May 29, 1997, the CA issued a status quo order. However, before the said order was served
on Benedick, several lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16931 in the name
of Benito, Sr. had already been sold at public auction: Lot No. 3, to Jose Rivero for
P6,400,000.00; Lot No. 4 to Jessie Rivero for P7,600,000.00 and Lot No. 5, for P7,000,000.00,
to Amalia Rivero. Another property covered by TCT No. 5299 had also been sold to Consuelo
Dy for P310,000.00.16 The buyers at public auction had already remitted the amounts of
P15,319,364.00 and P162,836.00 to the executing sheriffs,17 who later remitted P5,711,164.00 to
Benedick through his mother, Shirley, in satisfaction of the decision,18 and the remainder given to
the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
On June 3, 1997, Sheriffs Arthur S. Cledera and Arnel Jose A. Rubio executed a Provisional
Certificate of Sale19 over the property to the buyers at public auction.
The Dy Chiao brothers, through their uncle Henry, then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, informing the CA of the recent developments in the case below. In a
Resolution20 dated July 14, 1997, the appellate court granted their plea for a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the filing of a P500,000.00 bond, directing as follows:
(a) the private respondents and/or the sheriffs of the respondent court to deposit before
the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Naga City, the
proceeds of the public auction sale held on June 3, 1997 and to submit to this Court
within five (5) days from notice, proof of compliance therewith;
(b) Sheriffs Arnel Jose Rubio and Arthur Cledera, through the respondent court, to refrain
from issuing any certificate of sale over the properties sold at the public auction sale
conducted on the aforementioned date;
(c) the respondent court to issue a notice of lis pendens on all the properties affected by
[the] public auction sale conducted on June 3, 1997 and cause its registration with the
Register of Deeds concerned within five (5) days from notice.
The sheriff was, likewise, directed to refrain and/or cease and desist from issuing/effecting any
further certificate of sale over the affected properties.21 On August 15, 1997, the RTC issued an
Order22 directing the Register of Deeds of Naga City to comply with the CA resolution.
Meantime, Benson died intestate on June 25, 1997.23 His brother, Benito, Jr. then filed a Notice
of Death and Substitution, and thereafter, a Motion to Admit an Amended Petition to drop
Benson as petitioner, and the inclusion of his sister Mary Jane, as party respondent, as well as
those who participated in the public auction, namely, Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero, Amalia Rivero
and Consuelo Dy. The CA granted the motion in a Resolution24 dated January 14, 1998.
Thereafter, Atty. Botor, Mary Jane's new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss,25 alleging, inter alia, that an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of the spouses
Dy Chiao had already been executed. Benito, Jr., represented by his uncle Henry, opposed the
motion,26 alleging that a dismissal grounded on the extrajudicial settlement alone was improper,
since what was being assailed was a decision of a court based on a compromise agreement
involving one who is not a party thereto, with third-party bidders acting in bad faith. In a
Resolution27 dated February 27, 1998, the CA directed Mary Jane to submit her reply to the
opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by Henry on behalf of Benito, Jr.
In her compliance and comment/manifestation,28 Mary Jane declared that there appeared to be a
sound basis for the nullification of the assailed decision since the illegitimate filiation of
Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the
parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the compromise agreement, as in fact she and
the petitioners were exploring the possibility of modifying their extrajudicial settlement.29
Benedick, represented by his mother Shirley, presented before the appellate court an SPA dated
October 31, 1996 executed by Benito, Jr., prepared by Atty. Simando, authorizing Atty. Botor to
enter into a compromise agreement in the RTC.30
On March 31, 1999, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Benito, Jr., granting the petition and
nullifying the assailed decision and writ of execution issued by the RTC, including the sale at
public auction of the property of the deceased. The appellate court ruled that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over Benedick's action for recognition as the illegitimate son of Benito, Sr. and for
the partition of his estate. It further held that the filiation of a person could not be the subject of a
compromise agreement; hence, the RTC acted without jurisdiction in rendering judgment based
thereon. It concluded that the said compromise agreement was procured through extrinsic fraud.
The CA ordered the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Naga City to deliver to the trial court within
ten days from finality of said judgment, the amount of P15,482,200.00, together with all interests
earned therefrom, and to thereafter distribute the aggregate amount to the buyers of the said
properties, in proportion to the amounts they had paid. It also ordered Benedick, through his
mother Shirley, to turn over to the trial court, within ten days from finality of judgment, the
amount of P5,711,164.00 received from Sheriffs Rubio and Cledera, together with all other
amounts that she might have been paid pursuant to the compromise agreement. This was,
however, without prejudice to the buyers' right of recourse against Mary Jane, who was declared
subsidiarily liable therefor. The RTC was, likewise, directed to return to the buyers the aggregate
amount in the same proportion as above stated; thereafter, the properties would be delivered to
the intestate estate of Benito, Sr. for proper disposition by the intestate court.31
Jose Rivero, Jessie Rivero and Amalia Rivero filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
decision, on the following grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS INVALID DUE TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE
ASSAILED JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE;
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PUBLIC AUCTION SALE CONDUCTED ON JUNE 2, 1997 WAS VOID; AND
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS JOSE, JESSIE AND AMALIA, ALL SURNAMED RIVERO COULD
NOT HAVE LEGALLY BECOME THE OWNERS OF THE PROPERTIES SOLD AT
THE PUBLIC AUCTION SALE.32
Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration thereof, they filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
The Present Petition
The petitioners raise the following issues: (1) whether or not Henry Dy Chiao had the authority
to file the amended petition for Benito Dy Chiao, Jr.; (2) whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction
over the action of Benedick Arevalo for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased
Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., as well as the action for partition and distribution of the latter's estate; and
(3) whether the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement is null and void for
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.33
On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping contained in the petition with the CA was executed by Henry; hence, it was he and not
Benson or Benito, Jr. who filed the petition. Moreover, Henry had no proof of his authority to file
the petition for and in behalf of the brothers. The petitioners assert that there was no need for
Henry to file the petition with the CA, since the Dy Chiao brothers had the legal capacity to do
so, as admitted by their counsel, and Henry himself. Moreover, there was no law mandating
Henry to represent his nephews in all actions which may redound to their benefit.
The petitioners point out that although Henry sought to remedy the situation by filing an
amended petition praying that he be appointed as guardian ad litem for the Dy Chiao brothers,
the CA did not take cognizance of the allegations in the petition. The CA was correct in so doing,
since the matter of whether one is incompetent should be threshed out in the guardianship
proceedings, Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695, and not in the CA via a petition to annul the
judgment of the RTC, where Benito, Jr. is also a party respondent.
On the other issues, the petitioners maintain that the CA erred in annulling the decision of the
RTC based on the compromise agreement on the ground of extrinsic fraud; the alleged fraud was
committed by Mary Jane as an incident to the trial. What the CA should have done was to
dismiss the petition, without prejudice to the rights of the Dy Chiao brothers to file an action
against their sister. The latter was herself a party to the compromise agreement and also a
principal party to the case; hence, was bound by it. As a matter of fact, the petitioners aver, Mary
Jane was appointed by her brothers as their attorney-in-fact to negotiate for and execute the
compromise agreement in their behalf.
The petitioners further assert that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition filed by Benedick in
the RTC, and that the latter's recourse was based on paragraph 1, Article 172 of the Family Code,
although his putative father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., was already dead when the complaint was
filed.
The petitioners thus insist that the public auction sale conducted by the sheriff on the subject
properties was valid.
In her comment on the petition, Mary Jane avers that the decision of the CA holding that the
compromise agreement was vitiated by extrinsic fraud is correct. She claims that she was made
to sign the agreement, but was not informed of its intricacies. She insists that she does not have
any liability to Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, despite her being a signatory to the
said agreement.
For his part, respondent Benito, Jr., through his uncle Henry, avers that the latter's authority to
file the amended petition before the CA in their behalf was never questioned by the petitioners.
He asserts that the CA admitted the amended petition containing the prayer that his uncle Henry
be appointed as his guardian ad litem. Besides, the CA found that he and his brothers were not of
sound and disposing minds; hence, the need for a guardian ad litem in the person of his uncle.
He further alleges that the compromise agreement was the product of connivance between his
sister and Benedick, and their respective counsels. He further points out that Atty. Simando,
Benedick's counsel in the RTC, was likewise the counsel for Mary Jane when she filed her
petition for letters of administration in the RTC of Naga City on December 17, 1996. He further
insists that the ruling of the CA on the issues of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC is in accord with law, and that the decision based on the compromise agreement was null
and void for lack of jurisdiction.34
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
On the first issue, we reject the petitioners' contention that Henry was the petitioner who filed the
amended petition before the CA. As gleaned from said petition, the petitioners were "Benito Dy
Chiao, Jr. and Benson Dy Chiao, represented by their uncle Henry S. Dy Chiao." Moreover,
Henry had the authority to file the amended petition and sign the requisite certification on nonforum shopping when the CA admitted the amended petition and appointed him as guardian ad
litem of his nephews. This was in the January 14, 1998 Resolution of the CA, where the
following findings were made:
x x x We find the opposition to be devoid of merit, firstly because there is an obvious
necessity to amend the petition; and secondly, because the representation of an
incompetent need not be by a duly appointed judicial guardian. A guardian ad litem may
be appointed by the court. In the instant case, the members of this Court who conducted
the several hearings herein, are convinced from an observation of the petitioners that they
are not of a sound or disposing mind. x x x35
In resolving whether to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent, the appellate court
needed only to determine whether the individual for whom a guardian was proposed was so
incapable of handling personal and financial affairs as to warrant the need for the appointment of
a temporary guardian. It only needed to make a finding that, based on clear and convincing
evidence, the respondent is incompetent and that it is more likely than not that his welfare
requires the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian.36 A finding that the person for
whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is incapable of managing his own personal and financial
affairs by reason of his mental illness is enough.37
Guardians ad litem are considered officers of the court in a limited sense, and the office of such
guardian is to represent the interest of the incompetent or the minor.38 Whether or not to appoint a
guardian ad litem for the petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of the court where the
petition was filed, taking into account the best interest of the incompetent or the minor.39 The
court has discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem that will best promote the interest of
justice.40 The appointment of a guardian ad litem is designed to assist the court in its
determination of the incompetent's best interest.41
The records will show that no less than Benedick Arevalo sought the appointment of Mary Jane
Dy Chiao-De Guzman as guardian ad litem for respondent Benito Dy Chiao, Jr. and his brother,
Benson Dy Chiao, before the RTC in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
It must be stressed that the appellate court was not proscribed from appointing Henry as
guardian ad litem for the respondents, merely because of the pendency of his petition for
appointment as guardian over their person and property before Branch 61 of the RTC. Time was
of the essence; the RTC had issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of its decision based
on the compromise agreement; the plaintiff therein, Benedick Arevalo, was bent on enforcing the
same, and had in fact caused the sale of five parcels of land belonging to the estate of Benito, Sr.
worth millions of pesos. Indeed, the sheriff was able to sell at public auction prime real property
of the estate of the deceased for P20,000,000.00 before the status quo order of the CA reached
him.
It goes without saying that the finding of the CA on the mental capacity of the respondents is
without prejudice to the outcome of the petition in Special Proceedings No. RTC'97-695.
The petitioners' claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate court's finding that the
respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted a
hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More
importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On the issue of jurisdiction, case law has it that the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the nature
and subject matter of an action is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint, the law in
effect when the complaint was filed and the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. The
caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. If a court is authorized
by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only and undertakes to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case to which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is
void. The lack of statutory authority to make a particular judgment is akin to lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.42
The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of Benedick
could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to execute the
compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
The petitioners, for their part, maintain that Mary Jane's recognition of Benedick as the
illegitimate son of her father was not a compromise, but an affirmation of the allegations in the
complaint that the Dy Chiao siblings had, in effect, recognized him as the illegitimate son of
their deceased father. The petitioners posit that the admissions in the compromise agreement are
likewise binding on the Dy Chiao siblings.
The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and so holds that the decision
of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by Mary Jane is null and void.
Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of
persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship
that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to determine its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.43
A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put
an end to one already commenced.44 Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite
provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties;
(b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation
which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise
agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.45
Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests
no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.46 Considering all
these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a
compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is
null and void.
Article 1878 of the New Civil Code provides that an SPA is required for a compromise.
Furthermore, the power of attorney should expressly mention the action for which it is drawn; as
such, a compromise agreement executed by one in behalf of another, who is not duly authorized
to do so by the principal, is void and has no legal effect, and the judgment based on such
compromise agreement is null and void.47 The judgment may thus be impugned and its execution
may be enjoined in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced.48 A
compromise must be strictly construed and can include only those expressly or impliedly
included therein.49
As previously stated, the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by Mary
Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter's filiation. Mary Jane recognized
Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which was the
amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from the estate
of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against
Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings' unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two
months earlier, that Benedick was merely an impostor:
11. That paragraph 11 is DENIED for the truth of the matter is that they have not
recognized any person or impostor who pretends having a filial relation with their
deceased father by reason of herein Defendant's father's incapacity to bear children or to
engage in any carnal act considering the age and physical state of their father at that time
alluded to by the Plaintiff .50
To stress, the compromise agreement executed by Benedick and Mary Jane is null and void; as
such, the decision of the RTC based thereon is also without force and effect.
It is, likewise, plain as day that only Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of
her deceased father
1. That the defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao-De Guzman hereby recognizes the plaintiff as
the illegitimate son of her deceased father Benito Dy Chiao, Sr.51
Such recognition, however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the recognition must be made
personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.52
It is conceded that Mary Jane, in her behalf, and purportedly in behalf of her brothers, agreed and
bound herself to pay Benedick the amount of P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate of their
deceased father. However, a cursory reading of the SPA on record will show that the Dy Chiao
brothers did not authorize their sister to recognize Benedick as the illegitimate son of their father.
They could not have agreed to pay P6,000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, because they had
denied that Benedick was the illegitimate son of their father in their answer to the complaint.
On the assumption that the Dy Chiao brothers had signed the SPA on September 20, 1995, a
cursory reading of the compromise agreement will show that they did not specifically empower
their sister to enter into a compromise agreement with Benedick in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612.
It bears stressing that the SPA was executed as early as September 20, 1995, while the complaint
was filed with the RTC almost a year thereafter, or on August 27, 1996.
The trial court acted with precipitate and inordinate speed in approving the compromise
agreement. The records show that at about the time when it was executed by Mary Jane, her
brothers were patients at the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital, and Benedick had
accused her of being a spendthrift by reason of her alleged addiction to drugs.53
On his belief that the Dy Chiao brothers were incompetent, Benedick even filed a motion for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for them, and for the examination of Mary Jane for drug
addiction, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after hearing,
an order be issued, as follows:
1. Appointing a Special Administrator and/or Receiver over the Estate of Benito Dy
Chiao [Sr.];
2. Appointing Guardian Ad Litem over the person of Defendants Benito, Jr. and Benson
Dy-Chiao;
3. Ordering defendant Maryjane Dy Chiao to submit a medical examination by a medical
expert on drugs to be commissioned by the Honorable Court to determine whether or not
said defendant is a drug dependent.54
Indeed, Benedick filed a Motion on November 14, 1996, for the Dy Chiao siblings to appear
before the RTC at 8:30 a.m. of November 18, 1996. He, likewise, prayed that the Director of the
Don Susano J. Rodriguez Mental Hospital be directed to bring the clinical records of the
brothers, which the trial court granted per its Order dated November 12, 1996.55
Upon Mary Jane's failure to appear for the hearing, Benedick even sought to have her cited in
contempt of court. Despite his charge that Mary Jane was a drug addict and a spendthrift, he,
nevertheless, prayed in his Motion dated December 5, 1996, that she be appointed the special
administratrix of the estate of Benito, Sr. and the guardian ad litem of her brothers, thus:
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, it is most respectfully prayed
of this Honorable Court that Maryjane Dy Chiao- De Guzman be appointed as Special
Administrator over the Estate of the late Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and as Guardian Ad Litem
of defendants Benito, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao.56
Barely two weeks earlier, or on November 24, 1996, Mary Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman (whom
Benedick branded as a spendthrift and a drug addict), executed the compromise agreement, not
only in her behalf, but also in behalf of her brothers, who were confined in the hospital and
whom Benedick considered as mentally incompetent, and needed a guardian ad litem. The trial
court ignored all the foregoing proceedings and approved the compromise agreement without
bothering to resolve the issue of whether the Dy Chiao brothers were indeed incompetent, and
whether there was a need to appoint a guardian ad litem for them.
What is so worrisome is that the counsel of the Dy Chiao siblings, Atty. Botor, did not even
bother to file any pleading in his clients' behalf, relative to the motions filed by Benedick.
Despite the allegations that the Dy Chiao brothers were in the mental hospital and needed a
guardian ad litem, and that Mary Jane was a spendthrift and a drug addict, Atty. Botor still
proceeded to sign the compromise agreement as their counsel. More ominously, the said counsel
knew that it was he who had been empowered by the Dy Chiao brothers to compromise Civil
Case No. RTC'96-3612 (based on the SPA dated October 31, 1996); yet, he still allowed Mary
Jane to execute the same based on an SPA dated September 20, 1995 notarized by no less than
Benedick's counsel, Atty. Amador Simando.
The Court is convinced that the compromise agreement was the handiwork of Atty. Simando,
because it was he who notarized the SPA dated September 20, 1995 purportedly executed by the
Dy Chiao brothers. He later became the counsel of Benedick against the Dy Chiao siblings in
Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612. He signed the compromise agreement as Benedick's counsel,
despite his incessant claim that the brothers were incompetent and needed a guardian ad litem.
Barely 11 days after the execution of the compromise agreement, Atty. Simando filed a Petition
for the Settlement of the Estate of Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., this time as counsel of Mary Jane. It
bears stressing that Mary Jane was the defendant in Civil Case No. RTC'96-3612, and that as
counsel of Benedick, the plaintiff in the said civil case, Atty. Simando had accused her of being a
drug addict and a spendthrift. By then of course, his client (Benedick) had already received
P6,000,000.00 from the estate of his alleged putative father.
Since the decision of the RTC is null and void, the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto and
the subsequent sale at public auction of the properties belonging to the estate of Benito Dy
Chiao, Sr. are null and void.
Considering our foregoing disquisitions, the Court no longer finds the need to still resolve the
other issues that were raised.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733
January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA
DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO
CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA
CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA;
and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and
respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto
adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with
Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation
of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the
surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his
Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point
out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,
never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in
1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by
legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
(3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as
husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado
vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of
Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance
with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving
heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to
the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after
hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed
the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters
of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the
APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive
portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision;
3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his
or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of
the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent
of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of
the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41
the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and
his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would
be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten
with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater
rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the
half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate
and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for
its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten
with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of
the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive
at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia.
As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child
of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new
Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in
any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through
the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her
birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing
of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of
Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma
did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972,
that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have
been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado
vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the
next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby
ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or halfsiblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150206
March 13, 2009
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,

PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS
JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil
Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat
commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan,
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5
and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in
the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the
sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena
Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the
only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and
Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death
Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death,
respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender
the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents
demands for them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan
Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and
that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessorin-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from
Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including
respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the
subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against
Teofilos wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but
the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the
complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed
and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually
named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila
Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed
land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan
represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to
RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana,
free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October
20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA
declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when
the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as
an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was
signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they
acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule
1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could
not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to
heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the disputed property
could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never
held the property in the concept of an owner.lawphil.net
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending
that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and
without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent)
as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena
Clareto "GABATAN";
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
"GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of
evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs
of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.7
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of
appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.8 It is not our function to examine and evaluate the
probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its
impugned decision or resolution is based.91avvphi1
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by
the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.10
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the
lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical
errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration
of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve
the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent. 11
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the
case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by
the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties, both
insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil
action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here
are seeking the establishment of a status or right.13
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must
be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was
reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they
claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman,
hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants
were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of
his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled
that such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in
Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue
until the presentation of the project of partition.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its ruling
that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,17 this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the Court
relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the
status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal
is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status
as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals,
174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render
a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole
heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the
basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her
claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession
of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent,
during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her
typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden name was "Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents
handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the
differences was respondents mothers full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena
Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate
(sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the
plaintiff and Exhibit "1" for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified.
These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that
Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the "as is and
where is" rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used
in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan.
While Exhibit "1", the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of
dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mothers maiden
name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother
filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the
Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic
certificate of live birth.20
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the
above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an
original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s
vintage21 but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 122 was of a
later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity
of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1
states "Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945)" which makes it an older form than
Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was
manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A
except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that
Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth
(Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the
notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten beside their names. The words "A certified true copy:
July 6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by
the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the
information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P.
Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature
of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony
cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten,
Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten
birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two
competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the
Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho),
Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified
that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective
offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful
reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal,
during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial
court and respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually
marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise
categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their records
except the handwritten birth certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of
respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which
Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil
Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their
respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued
by the trial court and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving
their testimonies. Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the
latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent
(Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondents
filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and
authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a certain "Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted
by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.28
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation
of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to
Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of
these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the
respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the
RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically
evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondents
mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and
that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had
personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena
to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married
Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at
Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on
what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a
word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses testimonies. The
records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco
Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was
admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His testimony regarding the relationships within
the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of according probative
weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her
(respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other words, although these
witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondents husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on
a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which
appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this
document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir
of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the
statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in
interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same
statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures
therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel
for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.35 After a close scrutiny of the
said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the
same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best evidence
rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence
would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for
the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of
Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A
party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for nonproduction of the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who
identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony
regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any
public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this,
respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true
xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer,
who seems to be an officer in the local assessors office. Regarding the authentication of public
documents, the Rules of Court38 provide that the record of public documents, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.39 The attestation of the certifying
officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be.40
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H
was registered or exists in the records of the local assessors office. Furthermore, the stamped
certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs
certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez
was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed,
it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessors office is
not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal
custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale
in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the
proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a
certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima
Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and
as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the
alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a
copy of Exhibit H from the assessors office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner
of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof
that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan
Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same
admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena
Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to
either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that
respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan" (respondents Exhibit
A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondents own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action
of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet title
to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were
truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that
respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No.
5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.43 However, that case was dismissed
without prejudice for failure to prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her
cause of action, i.e. the present case.45 She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita
Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old.46
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were
advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to
preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity."47
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing,
credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her
evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she
presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b)
she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now
affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Rev Page 26

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rev Page 26

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Republic of the Philippines

December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE

December 17, 2007

ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the

JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

September 18, 2009

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

June 17, 2008

DOLORES MONTEFALCON & LAURENCE MONTEFALCON, petitioners,

HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA

G.R. No. 177728

July 31, 2009

6. Income Tax Return (ITR)

September 18, 2009

JOANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,

Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition8 to respondents Demurrer to Evidence in

The court rules in the negative.

Republic of the Philippines

August 22, 2011

DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,

The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion

August 15, 2012

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

Republic of the Philippines

February 18, 2014

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,

because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance an administrative

Republic of the Philippines

May 17, 2005

JOSE RIVERO, JESSIE RIVERO and AMALIA RIVERO, petitioners,

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner

xxx xxx xxx

March 13, 2009

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,

You might also like